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put to sea on the following day; and had a strong line of gunboats
drawn up across the mouth of the harbor.
On October 19th the Allied fleets, by signal from the Commander-
in-chief, began getting under way, at seven o’clock in the morning.
There was a fair breeze, but light, and the British reconnoitring
frigates at once saw and reported the movement. Owing to the light
wind, only twelve ships got out, and these lay becalmed until
afternoon, when a breeze sprang up from the west-north-west, and
the twelve stood to the northward, accompanied closely by the two
English frigates on guard. At daylight the next morning the rest of the
combined fleet left Cadiz, making, with the twelve already outside,
thirty-three sail-of-the-line, five frigates, and two brigs. They had a
light southeast wind, while the ships in the offing, as is frequently the
case on this coast, had the wind south-southwest.
The French had four 80-gun ships, and fourteen 74s, with the
frigates and brigs. The Spanish had one 130-gun ship; two of 112
guns; one 100; two 80s; eight 74s, and one 64.
Villeneuve’s flag-ship was the Bucentaure, 80, and Gravina’s the
Principe de Asturias, 112.
Scarcely had the fleet cleared the harbor when a southwest wind
and thick weather began to delay their progress. Meantime the two
English frigates carefully watched their every manœuvre.
The first effect of the thick weather was that the English ship
Agamemnon, with a merchant brig in tow, was unconsciously
running into the midst of the enemy’s ships, but was, after some
difficulty, warned off by the frigates. Then one of the English frigates
was in danger of capture by her stopping too long to examine an
American ship; she was chased and fired upon.
In the afternoon the weather cleared, and the wind shifted to north-
northwest; whereupon Admiral Villeneuve ordered his fleet to form in
five columns, in accordance with a plan previously communicated to
his Admirals and Captains.
The Allied fleet then divided itself into two parts. The first part was
of twenty-one sail, and was denominated the line-of-battle, and this
was again subdivided into three squadrons, of seven ships each; of
which the centre was commanded by Villeneuve himself; the van by
Vice-Admiral Alava; and the rear by Rear-Admiral Dumanoir.
The second part of the Allied fleet, the reserve, was divided into
two squadrons, of six ships each, the first under Admiral Gravina,
and the second under Rear-Admiral Magon.
Villeneuve’s instructions to these officers were as follows: in case
of being to windward, the line to bear down together, and each ship
to engage her opponent in the English line; to engage closely, and to
board, if possible.
If, on the contrary, the English fleet was to windward, the allied
fleet was to await attack in close order of battle.
The French Admiral said, “the enemy will not confine himself to
forming a line-of-battle parallel to ours, and engage us with his
cannon, when success often attends the most skillful, and always the
most fortunate; he will endeavor to turn our rear, to pass through our
line, and will endeavor to surround such of our ships as he succeeds
in cutting off, and reduce them with numbers of his own.”
Villeneuve adds “there is nothing to alarm us in the sight of the
English fleet; their 74-gun ships have not five hundred men on
board; their seamen are harassed by a two years’ cruise; they are
not more brave than we; and have infinitely less motives to fight well,
and have less love of country. They are skillful at manœuvring. In a
month we shall be as much so as they are. In fine, everything unites
to inspire us with hopes of the most glorious success, and of a new
era for the Imperial marine.”
The most remarkable feature of the French Admiral’s plan was,
that it persisted in ordering the movements of his fleet to be
conducted in close line-of-battle, even while he admits that his
enemy will adopt a different mode of attack, that of cutting off the
rear of the line, and making it an easy conquest. Such, however, was
the ancient rule of sea-tactics, and France had not yet had a Rodney
to break through them.
Shortly after the combined Fleet had formed in five columns, one
of their advanced frigates made the signal for eighteen sail of British
ships in sight. On this the fleet, still on the port tack, cleared for
action, and at about five p. m. tacked, and stood for the mouth of the
Straits of Gibraltar. They had continued so long on the other tack that
Lord Nelson thought it was Villeneuve’s intention to proceed to the
westward.
About this time the four British frigates came down to reconnoitre,
and were chased by some of the Allied fleet, which latter, however,
rejoined the main body at nightfall.
Just before dark the French ship Aigle made signal for eighteen
British ships in line-of-battle, to the southward; and shortly after the
combined fleet wore and stood to the northwest.
On the 21st, a little before daylight, the French Admiral,
abandoning his plan of forming line-of-battle of twenty-one ships (as
the enemy were now to windward, and of nearly equal force to
himself), ordered the three columns, composed of the twenty-one
ships, without regard to priority of rank among them, to form in close
line-of-battle, on the starboard tack, upon the leewardmost division
of twelve ships, and then to steer southeast. The manœuvre
executed, daylight found the two fleets fairly in sight of each other,
for the first time. The centre of the Franco-Spanish fleet bearing
about east by south of the centre of the British, and distant about ten
miles.
The wind was then light, from west-northwest, and a heavy swell
setting in from the westward.
Let us now look at the movements of the British fleet during the
period just before the momentous battle now impending.
About half-past nine a. m., on the 19th, while the British fleet was
lying to, fifty miles west-southwest from Cadiz, the line-of-battle ships
which formed the cordon of communication between the fleet and
the reconnoitring frigates, inshore, repeated the signal that the
enemy was coming out of port.
Lord Nelson immediately made sail to the southeast with light
breezes, mostly from south-southwest. At three p. m. the signal was
repeated, that the enemy was at sea.
That afternoon Lord Nelson directed that the fleet should observe
the motions of his flag-ship, the Victory, during the night, and that the
best sailing ships should stand ahead, and steer for the mouth of the
Straits.
On the 20th of October, at daylight, the English found themselves
near the entrance of the Straits, but saw nothing of their enemy.
Thereupon the fleet wore, and made sail to the northwest, with a
fresh breeze at south-southwest.
At seven a. m., one of the frigates signalled the Allied fleet, bearing
north; and by noon the Victory and the English fleet were within
twenty-five miles of Cadiz, standing to the west-northwest, on the
port tack.
Early in the afternoon they were taken aback, by a breeze from the
west-northwest, and at 4 p. m. wore, and again came to, on the port
tack, steering north.
It was now telegraphed that the Allied fleet seemed determined to
go to the westward, and Lord Nelson replied that he relied on the
frigates keeping them in sight during the night. The frigates then
signalled “thirty-one sail of the enemy, bearing north-northeast.”
When night fell the British fleet wore, and stood to the southwest,
and at 4 a. m. of the 21st wore again, and steered north by east,
under easy sail.
To the general reader these details of manœuvres, (which precede
any great battle, whether on sea or land), may appear tedious, but it
is absolutely necessary to a description of this great event, and could
not be omitted by any one who tried to give an account of the battle.
At six in the morning the flag-ship Victory had a view of the
combined fleet, bearing about east by south, distant, as has been
said in the account of the manœuvres of the Franco-Spanish fleet,
about ten or twelve miles.
At this time Nelson was about twenty miles from Cape Trafalgar,
which bore east by south.
Soon after this the English fleet, by signal, formed in two columns,
in the order of sailing, and bore up to the eastward, under all sail.
This was according to Nelson’s previous orders; to avoid delay
and inconvenience of forming line-of-battle in the usual manner.
THE BATTLE.