Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

ISSN: 0096-3402 (Print) 1938-3282 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20

IV. Salt, Mirv and First-Strike

Ralph E. Lapp

To cite this article: Ralph E. Lapp (1972) IV. Salt, Mirv and First-Strike, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 28:3, 21-26, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1972.11457907

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1972.11457907

Published online: 15 Sep 2015.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1

View related articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbul20

IV. SALT, MIRV AND FIRST-STRIKE
The technology of the M/RV,
the multiple independently tar-
getable reentry vehicle (or war-
head), tends to perpetuate a
certain degree of ambiguity in
any strategic arms limitation
agreement, unless a system of
verification is adopted to deter-
mine the number of warheads
each ICBM carries. How verifi-
cation of warheads on a missile
can be carried out without on-
site inspection, which the USSR
Enrico Fermi once described a
miracle as "anything with a proba-
bility of less than 10 per cent." This
article will be concerned with nuclear
miracles - with events which by
any rational reckoning fall well with-
in Fermi's definition. I speak of a
first-strike by a nuclear aggressor.
The strategic arms limitation talks
have been haunted by the incubus
of a nuclear miracle, for both
sides must arrange their strategic of-
fensive systems so that they do not
tempt the other into making a first-
strike. If a single missile carried a
single warhead, then a SALT agree-
ment could be reached which could
be orbitally verifiable as to numeri-
cal strength. However the multipli-
cative effect of MIRV technology
which allows for multiple, indepen-
dently targetable, reentry vehicles to
be fitted to the last stage of a single
intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) introduces considerable am-
biguity into the calculus of strategic
strength.
MIRV's ambiguity has the poten-
tial of undermining confidence in
any strategic arms control plan un-
less a system of verification is pro-
vided to inspect for the number of
warheads aboard an ICBM. This
would require U.S. inspectors peer-
ing into Soviet missile silos and vice
versa, and nothing suggests that
SALT will agree upon such extremes
traditionally has rejected, has
eluded negotiators for years.
Even with a strategic arms limi-
tation agreement on missiles,
which can be verified by re-
connaissance from the air or
from orbit, the M/RV ambigui-
ty will continue to feed the fear
of a first-strike. Ralph E. Lapp,
a consulting physicist, has writ-
ten extensively on strategic
weapons technology and de-
velopment.
of verification. In fact, it appears
that the Soviets have been extremely
bashful about discussing anything
having to do with MIRV technology,
and it is likely that SALT will pro-
duce a "white sheep only" agree-
ment: an agreement confined to a
purely quantitative quota system of
missile launchers with no mention
of "black sheep" or the multiplicity
of warheads to be carried by a single
missile. Some of the implications for
deterrence inherent in such an agree-
ment have been discussed by Martin
L. Perl in his analytic article "SALT
and Its Illusions" (Bulletin, Dec.
1971).
Assuming that the 1972 SALT
agreement fixes a numerical ceiling,
say, 2,000 to the number of ballistic
launchers and a sublimit of 300 to
the heavyweight SS-9 Soviet ICBM,
the burden of U.S. debate on the
agreement centers on the growth po-
tential of this strike-force as en-
hanced by MIRV technology of the
future. From the Soviet viewpoint,
their decision-makers must assess the
first-strike potential of an up-rated
Minuteman ICBM.
The background for discussion of
a strategic balance has been confused
by the variety of strength compari-
sons made public by spokesmen in
the military-political hierarchy of the
Nixon administration. For example,
the 1971 "posture statement" of De-
March 1972
RALPH E. LAPP
fense Secretary Melvin R. Laird
stresses the number of missile launch-
ers - 1,500 ICBMs for the Soviet
Union as opposed to 1,054 for the
United States - but makes only
passing reference to "total offensive
force loadings" where the United
States has a 4,600 to 2,000 advantage
as of mid-197I.l Former Defense
Secretary Robert S. McNamara said:
For the most meaningful and
realistic measurement of nuclear
capability is neither gross megaton-
nage, nor the number of available
missile launchers; but rather the
number of separate warheads that
are capable of being delivered with
accuracy on individual high-priority
targets with sufficient power to
destroy them.•
Yet on April 23, 1970 President
Nixon briefed Republican leaders on
the military balance, stressing nu-
merical inferiority in launchers and
stating: "In terms of throw weight
of weaponry, the USSR outnumbers
the United States two and one-half
to one." On March 12, 1971 in a
New York Times interview, the
President was reported as saying:
"The Soviets now have three times
the missile strength (ICBM) of our-
selves." Two days later the White
House clarified the statement by ex-
plaining that it referred to "mega-
tonnage, not numbers, of missiles"
and that the latter included subma-
rine-launched missiles.
It would seem that much of the
national debate about strategic arms
controls will focus on the concept
of sufficiency- a prescription popu-
larized by President Nixon. Here the
quantitative aspects of a military stra-
tegic balance are confused by the
double definition of sufficiency
which was introduced on February
25, 1971 in the President's Foreign
Policy Message for the 1970s:
Specifically, sufficiency has two
meanings. In its narrow military
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21
 sense, it means enough force to in-
flict a level of damage on a poten-
tial aggressor sufficient to deter
him from attacking.
In its broader political sense,
sufficiency means the maintenance
of forces adequate to prevent us
and our allies from being coerced.
Thus the relationship between our
strategic forces and those of the
Soviet Union must be such that
our ability and resolve to protect
our vital security interests will not
be underestimated.
The President added an ominous
point of amplification to the second
definition by observing: "It would
be inconsistent with the political
meaning of sufficiency to base our
force planning solely on some finite
- and theoretical - capacity to in-
flict casualties presumed to be un-
acceptable to the other side." This
is clearly a retreat from the McNa-
mara mathematics of nuclear deter-
rence since it involves third party
perception of strategic forces and,
thus, takes us from hard estimates of
strategic strength into the murky
area of weapon prestige. It was pre-
cisely the Nixon brand of "weap-
ons politics" which was used to trans-
form the Sentinel ABM system into
the Safeguard System. Unfortunately,
the prolonged debate on Safeguard
focused on the military and techni-
cal issues of ABM and avoided the
political underpinning of the Presi-
dent's decision. In any event, the
emphasis on the political sense of
strategic sufficiency could promote
escalation of military force levels far
beyond those dictated by military
considerations. I shall proceed to
confine myself to quantifiable as-
pects of strategic issues, concentrat-
ing on the fear of a first-strike and
the impact of MIRV technology on
the arms race.
First-Strike Fear
Fear of a first-strike is a funda-
mental destabilizing force in the
world of strategic armaments, and
it is shared by both sides. Let us
look at Soviet perception of U.S.
strategic forces as they threaten the
Soviet strategic launch sites, here-
after called "base points." (A "base
point" corresponds to one a1m
point" as viewed by a first-striker.)
Bombers are not included in this
assessment since they lack the si-
multaneity of a missile salvo. Table
22
Table 1
STRATEGIC WEAPONS DEPLOYABLE BY THE
UNITED STATES IN 1975
Launchers
Base Points
ICBMs
1,000 Minuteman 1,000
54 Titan 11 54
SLBMs
496 Poseidon 31
160 Polaris 10
Total
1,710 1,095
• Although the U.S. Congress has authori>ed 550 Minuteman Ill and 450 Minuteman 11,
Soviet analysts might assume the worst, i.e., every silo contains a Minuteman Ill. They
could also project a higher multiplicity of warheads for Minuteman Ill, i.e., a sextet
MIRV rather than the triplet configuration.
1 tabulates the numbers of strategic
weapons deployable by the United
States in the 1975 time frame.
The number of base points are
included here because their relevance
to U.S. fear of a first-strike. Mega-
tonnage is not a dominant considera-
tion in a first-strike scenario, except
as it applies to MIRV yield com-
bined with accuracy. The numbers
of nuclear warheads are impressive
and could well be a prime factor in
the Soviet decision to deploy large
numbers of ICBMs, thus increasing
their total base points and decreas-
ing their vulnerability to a first-
strike. Soviet concern will obvious-
ly focus on ICBMs since at present
the limited range of their submarine-
launched missiles denies them the
capability of targeting many U.S.
missile silos.
Soviet fear of a U.S. first-strike
inevitably centers on the MIRV capa-
bility of the Minuteman force and
this brings us to specifics of the
Minuteman Ill capability. Soviet
analysts read U.S. Congressional
hearings and follow the various pub-
lic statements of U.S. military lead-
ers, but their interpretation of the
various pronouncements is debatable.
Nonetheless, they must be puzzled
by the contradictory character of
some of these statements. For exam-
ple, a House Armed Service authori-
zation report stated: "It should be
remembered that the MIRV missiles
carry relatively smaller individual
warheads and are not of the size
that would be associated with a suc-
cessful first strike against hardened
enemy weapons." 3 On the other
hand, Gen. John D. Ryan, U.S. Air
Megatonnage Warheads
500-2,000 2,100-3,000"
100-600 54-540
200 4,960
100 480
900-2,900 7,594-8,980
Force Chief of Staff said on Septem-
ber 22, 1970:
In the most critical area of stra-
tegic offense, we are scoring a
measure of qualitative improve-
ments in the ICBM force through
the introduction of the Minuteman
Ill. This missile, with a multiple
independently targetable reentry
vehicle, will be our best means of
destroyed time-urgent targets like
the long-range weapons of the ene-
my.•
General Ryan's statement drew a
prompt commentary by Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird:
I believe that General Ryan's com-
ment was made in the context of
limiting damage to the United
States by second-strike employment
against remaining weapons of an
aggressor nation which had struck
first . . . . You should know that,
even if used in the context de-
scribed by General Ryan, the capa-
bility of Minuteman Ill against
hardened silos is relatively low.•
It will be recalled that Senator
Brooke had tried to introduce legis-
lation curbing the U.S. first-strike
capability by amending the military
procurement bill in 1970. A year
later, Senator James L. Buckley in-
troduced three amendments all aimed
at improving warhead accuracy for
Poseidon and Minuteman Ill.
Whatever might be U.S. intentions,
and the record was blurred, the So-
viets would undoubtedly base their
assessments on their projections of
MIRV technology. It is assumed that
the targeter desires a 95 per cent kill
probability against a missile silo
hardened to withstand an overpres-
sure of 300 pounds per square inch.
Will Minuteman Ill be capable of
attaining an accuracy of 180 yards? tial of a U.S. first-strike. Presuma-
Apparently such accuracy is not pos- bly, this threat would not begin to
sible with present guidance systems mature until the Soviets witnessed
which may limit the circular proba- atmospheric tests of such sextet sys-
ble error (CEP) to being larger than tems, but they are well aware of the
200 yards. "The state of the art," Poseidon throw capability which can
testified Gen. Bruce K. Holloway on go up to a multiplicity of 14; there-
March 23, 1971, "offers a technically fore, they might even make the
more advanced system which we be- worst assumption that the transfer
lieve would bring the accuracy of of Poseidon capability to Minute-
Minuteman Ill down to about ........ man might be made without exten-
feet. " 6 (The blank space is the House sive, verifiable, atmospheric tests.
Appropriations Committee 1971 style Such R&D phobia conjures up po-
for indicating deleted testimony of tentially unlimited escalation of a
a classified nature.) General Hollo- first-strike threat and perhaps it is
way stated that it would cost about the very open-endedness of this sit-
$155 million to develop the new in- uation which has instilled in some
ertial system for Minuteman Ill and Soviets the willingness to try to work
that the new inertial measurement out a SALT agreement. It is even
unit could be procured for about possible that the Soviets may take
$300,000 per copy. This is a rela- seriously the admonition of former
tively modest development program, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNa-
cost-wise, and although funds were mara that:
not approved for it, the Soviets could The United States cannot - and
well assume that the projects would will not - ever permit itself to get
be funded on a budgetarially obscure into the position in which another
basis. nation, or combination of nations,
would possess a first-strike capa-
Crunch of Crisis bility, which could be effectively
used against it .... But if the only
The Soviets would also have to way to prevent the Soviet Union
make the worst assumption that from obtaining a first-strike capa-
bility over us is to engage in such
every silo held a Minuteman III a race, the United States possesses
weapon, thus giving a threat poten- in ample abundance the resources,
tial of 3,000 in-silo MIRVs to be the technology, and the will to
targeted on Soviet base points. In- run faster in that race for whatever
distance is required.'
deed, Soviet analysts might feel that
in view of the lead time required to A point often overlooked in dis-
deploy ballistic missiles, the uncer- cussions of first-strike capability is
tainties about MIRV technology that intelligence evaluation of a tech-
might warrant assuming a Minute- nological threat is subject to consid-
man sextet configuration, thus se- erable revision when a crisis situa-
verely upgrading the threat poten- tion actually impends. Under such
Table 2
CURRENT ESTIMATES OF SOVIET MISSILE
DEPLOYMENTS (1971)
launchers Base Points Megatonnage Warheads
ICBMs
300 SS-9 300 7,:500 300"
tSS-11
1,200 SS-13 1,200 1,200 1,200
SLBMs
400 SS-N-6~> 2:5 200 400
Total
1,900 1,:52:5 8,900 1,900
• Single warheads that are preponderantly the Mod-4 type, but include a small number
of Mod-~ types; the latter being adapted for the fract1onal orbital bombardment system
(FOBS), and carrying less payload than Mod-4 (U.S. Senate, Commi~tee on Armed
Services AuthorizatiOn Hearings for Fiscal Year 1972, Part 1, pp. 1'6 and 242.) Total
megatonnage has been indicated for Mod-~ warhead yields.
h Shorter range SLBMs launched by the ~-tube G(Golf) and H(Hotel) class diesel and
nuclear submarines are not included since they do not constitute a first-strike threat to
U .S. missile silos.
March 1972
taut conditions "worst assumption-
ing" by decision-makers leads to the
most pessimistic estimates of an ene-
my's capability. If a weapons sys-
tem possesses an ambiguous capa-
bility in noncrisis times, the crunch
of crisis can exaggerate an enemy's
first-strike capability and throw a
decision-maker into a mode of des-
peration which contemplates a pre-
emptive strike. Thus it becomes
highly desirable to remove ambigui-
ties from weapons systems, that is,
to plan arms controllable strategic
forces. Certainly, one cannot char-
acterize the present land-based Min-
uteman force as optimal from the
standpoint of striking a stable bal-
anced deterrent force.
To turn over the strategic coin,
the U.S. fear of a first-strike is keyed
to the Soviet SS-9's threat potential,
largely as a result of its buildup by
the Pentagon as a rationale for the
Safeguard System to protect Minute-
man silos. This fear is based on U.S.
observations of the terminal trajec-
tories of MRVs (multiple reentry
vehicles) launched by the SS-9 com-
bined with estimates of the throw
power of the missile. Thus a com-
bination of accuracy and explosive
yield makes the SS-9 appear to U.S.
defense authorities as a first-strike
weapon while larger numbers of
lighter payload SS-lls and SS-13s are
viewed as less threatening to the in-
tegrity of the Minuteman strike
force.
The Safeguard ABM debate served
to break out "top secret" data about
the Soviet missile strength and its
potential aggrandizement in the fu-
ture. Furthermore, even after the
Safeguard decision, defense officials
continue to put into print detailed
estimates of Soviet strategic capabili-
ty. For example, one finds publica-
tion in the "Congressional Record"
of a briefing by a high-ranking Air
Force intelligence officer of current
estimates of Soviet missile deploy-
ments.s As a result we can set down
the strategic data for 1971 as shown
in Table 2.
The Defense Department consid-
ers the accuracy of the liquid-fueled
SS-11 - of which over 900 have
been deployed as of mid-1971 -
and the solid-fueled SS-13 as too low
to be committed to first-strike mis-
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 23
 sions. These are currently viewed as ture, but this conclusion depends on
"city-busters" designed exclusively

I
slow maturation of the Soviet MlR V

GMn1N
for soft-targeting. At present the technology. It also assumes that the
concern of defense officials focuses Soviets do not deploy a mobile ICBM
on the SS-9s which were first ob- configuration - an act which would
served testing MRVs in August 1968. wreck any SALT agreement - and
HANDBOOK During the course of Adm. Thomas
H. Moorer's testimony before the
that they do not camouflage many
SS-11s as non-ICBMs. The latter
OF House Appropriations hearings for
fiscal year 1972, Chairman George
development, which has been given
little press attention, was disclosed
INORGANIC CHEMISTRY H. Mahon heard that "if the Soviets in Admiral Moorer's statement as a
were to seek a first-strike threat, as VRBM (variable range ballistic mis-
few as 1,300 to 1,500 SS-9 MIRV sile) .12 VRBMs have been deployed
Just Published: warheads in the Soviet inventory in some Soviet silos which normally
LEAD would be sufficient." 9 This would house IRBMs (intermediate range
System No. 41 mean an inventory of some 400 to ballistic missiles) where they might
Part B, Section 1 500 SS-9s. Although the evidence escape orbital inventory.
497 pa1es, 87 fipres, 1971 for a Soviet MIRV capability is still
DM 598 1$185 approx.) 10 MIRV Missile
obscure and it is taking the Soviets
THE ELEMENT Since military technologies tend
L..d Isotopes
quite long to convert their MRV
Abundance, preparation, enrichment, system into a full-fledged MIRV, it to converge and all one side can do
separation seems reasonable to assume that their is to hope to lead the other by a few
Radioactive
missile experts are capable of mak- years, this projection of Soviet mis-
natural decomposition series
ing this transformation. sile strength could be up-rated in the
Stable
enriched formation from U and Th Many spokesmen for defense and late 1970s. While the SS-llj13 up-
Atom and Atomic Ions--Properties the aerospace industries attribute a rating would be comparable to that
Crystallographlc, mechanical, thermal,
first-strike capability to the Soviet for the Minuteman, that for the SS-9
magnetic, electrical, optical would be considerably greater as il-
missile build-up. For example, mem-
Chemical Reactions
bers of the Blue Ribbon Defense lustrated in Table 4. It is not too
Corrosion far-fetched to believe that the Soviet
Protective Layer Formation Panel appointed by the President
acid and salt solutions and the Secretary of Defense sub- missile experts will attain a 0.1 nau-
Ions in Solution
mitted a Supplemental Panel Report tical mile accuracy in the late 1970s;
hydrolysis, complex formation
on July 1, 1970 which warned that thus transforming the SS-9 into an
Redox Reactions
"the United States will become a instrument capable of mounting 10
Detection and Determination
second-rate power incapable of as- MIRVs. This development would
Toxicity
suring the future security and free- turn the 300 SALT -allowed SS-9
Also Available:
dom of its people." It concluded: force into one capable of throwing
Part C, Section 1 METALLURGY 3,000 MIRVs. Meanwhile, it must
Part C, Section 2 "The evidence is now reasonably
COMPOUNDS TO Pb and C
conclusive that the Soviet Union ... be assumed that the same technology
Part C, Section 3 applied to the SS-11/13 would es-
COMPOUNDS from Pb-Si to Pb-Ra is deploying strategic weapons sys-
Part C, Section 4
tems designed for a first-strike capa- calate the throw power of this strike
ALLOYS, COORDINATION COMPOUNDS
bility."10 (Marvin L. Goldberger, act- force to some 5,000 MIRVs, al-
In Preparation:
ing for the Federation of American though this potential pushes the
Part A HISTORY, OCCURRENCE
Part B, Section 2 ELECTROCHEMISTRV Scientists, has made a very effective MIRV system to limits somewhat
counter-critique. 11 ) beyond that assumed for the SS-9
mounting 10 MIRVs. At the same
REPAINT PROGRAM If the "evidence" for a Soviet first-
time the SS-N-6 could be up-rated
Reprints ot pre-1958 issues are strike capability is controversial now,
now available with English Mar- to perhaps a sextuplet configuration,
it is certain to be much in dispute as
ginal Notes and Bilingual Table giving the Soviets a 1980 strategic
of Contents. Recently reprinted time passes and uncertainty grows
volumes: Nitrogen 1-4, Sulfur A capability of over 10,000 MIRVs.
about the state of the Soviet MIRV
1, 2, B 1, Polonium, "Sodium, Po- One must add, however, that the
tassium Supplement, Ammonium technology. For example, if the 1972
1, Actinium, Protactinium, Cobalt SALT agreement limits ballistic MlR V technology will probably not
A 1, Iron F 11 1. represent a static contest of offensive
launchers to 2,000 with a sublimit
versus defensive military systems.
of 300 SS-9s, and if a 41 boat ceiling
AVAILABLE FROM: Verla1 Chemle The U.S. Air Force is already started
lllabH. Welnhelm-Bercstrassa, West
for nuclear strategic submarines is
on an upgraded silo program (UGS)
Germany er throuch leadlnc Allerican imposed, then the mid-1970s could
beok dealers. Far Information write: to add hardness to Minuteman silos,
D. R. Stein, 7 Woadland Anne, display the Soviet strategic strike thus raising the accuracy require-
Larchmont. New Ytrk 10538. A new force potential as shown in Table 3. ments for attacking MIRVs and forc-
lloeklet a1111 11rlce list descrlblac tile Comparison of this tabulation with
Gmelin Handboak Series are awailable ing the Soviets to reduce the num-
on request that in Table 2 shows little relative ber of warheads per SS-9, and pos-
growth over the 1971 strategic pos- sibly to abandon MIRVing of the
24
SS 11 j13s. 13 Additional protection
for the Minuteman force is contem-
plated and would no doubt be im-
plemented should the Soviet SS-9
threat mature.
Silo Targeting
Warhead statistics do not tell the
full story of first-strike since the
execution of an effective first-strike
- targeted on 1,000 Minuteman
sites, 14 with a 95 per cent kill -
would require more than single ini-
tial salvo, unless the targeters as-
signed more than one MIRV per
aim point and these MIRVs were vec-
tored by different SS-9s. For exam-
ple, a launch of 300 SS-9s would
probably involve a 20 per cent fail-
ure in the boost-phase so that even
a sextupled missile would commit
only 1,440 MIRVs, and of these
perhaps 20 per cent might fail to be
directly accurate or fall into a mar-
ginal category, leaving 1,152 war-
heads on good trajectories. But there
would be no way to cover all 1,000
aim points with such a blitz. The
attackers would be compelled to de-
pend on telemetered data about
MlR V performance to program a
follow-up salvo at uncovered aim
points. This could involve assign-
ment of back-up MIRVs to several
hundred silo targets. Ground control
would have to have available the
computer means of absorbing the
target intelligence data and program-
ming a sufficient number of MIRVs
to cover the aim points. All this
would have to be executed with great
synchronization since uncovered silos
would be candidates for prompt re-
taliatory response. In this connec-
tion the U.S. Air Force is introduc-
ing its Command Data Buffer (COB)
system to provide Minuteman Ill
with a remote capability for retarget-
ing an entire squadron (50 missiles)
on the basis of electronic insertion
of new target constants to the mis-
sile's computer in-silo. 15
I have always considered that So-
viet planners would be fearful that
the deployment of an in-depth sys-
tem of early warning devices makes
it probable that U.S. authorities
would order a launch of Minuteman
missiles on warning of evidence of a
massive attack. In his Foreign Poli-
cy Statement for 1971 President
Table 3
PROJECTED ESTIMATES OF SOVIET MISSILE
DEPLOYMENTS (mid-1970s)
Launchers Base Points Megatonnage Warheads
ICBMs
300 SS-9 300 4,500 900
\ SS-11 1,700 1,700 1,700
1,700 SS-13
SLBMs
656 SS-N-6 41 325 656
Total
2,656 2,041 6,525 3,256
Table 4
UPRATED POTENTIAL OF THE SS-9
Missile Multiplicity (n) = Number of MIRVs per missile
n= 1 3 6 10 20
Warhead Yield• 20-25 5 1.5 0.5 0.1 Megatons
Accuracy (CEP) 1,800 400 300 210 160 Yards
• Individual warhead yield is sensitive to the split-up of payload which could include
hardening, penetration aids and propellant expenditure for w1dely-spaced targets.
Nixon disclaimed U.S. intentions in sume that receipt of such informa-
these words: "Sole reliance on a tion in U.S. strategic headquarters
'launch on warning' strategy, some- would trigger a counter blow de-
times suggested by those who would signed to minimize damage by strik-
give less weight to the protection ing at residual filled silos. It is pre-
of our forces, would force us to live cisely this kind of worst assumption
on the edge of a precipice and deny that any first-striker must take and
us the flexibility we wish to pre- thus the threat of launch on warn-
serve." Note the qualifying word ing must amount to a prime deter-
"sole." To my knowledge few Safe- rent.
guard critics ever suggested such a
singular policy; it is sufficient that Worrisome Counter
the Soviets cannot be sure Minute- Even if the Soviets downgrade the
man missiles would not be launched. possibility of launch on warning and
This existence of a triple set of warn- manage to perfect a quick-response
ing systems - BMEWS (ballistic retargeting system for following up
missile early warning system), OTH their first-strike at ICBM sites, the
(over-the-horizon) radar systems on development of Hardsite Defense
foreign bases, and PAR (perimeter (HSD) for Minuteman silos could
acquisition radars) - makes it high- provide a most worrisome counter
ly improbable that any massive first- to the confidence an attacker might
strike launch vehicles would go un- invest in a first-strike. 18 An attacker
detected. The addition of SEWS 647 could not rely on knocking out huge
(satellite early warning system) al- radars so characteristic of the Safe-
lows for exhaust plume detection by guard ABM and he would be in
infrared sensors aboard satellites op- doubt as to the success of MIRV at-
erating in parked orbits. 16 The layers tacks on silos for some period of time
of this global early warning system following the moment of intercep-
provide multiple assurance that a tion. It would take a highly com-
first-strike would be detected on plex damage evaluation system to in-
launch. As Gen. John C. Meyer, ventory the status of the attacked
Vice Chief of Air Force Staff, stated silos, forcing the attacker to delay
on May 18, 1971: "We feel now follow-up attacks for perhaps an
there is only a very remote chance hour after his initial launch order.
of missing a mass missile launch." 17 Such a time delay would inevitably
Soviet planners would have to as- force the attacker to worry about his
March 1972 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 25
remaining ICBM force; of course, it
would also lay the Soviet cities open
to a massive retaliatory strike.
An operations analyst confining
himself to the mathematically re-
ducible elements of the foregoing
exposition could, I admit, reach the
conclusion that a Soviet first-strike
might become feasible later in this
decade. Indeed, there is a severe
danger that public acceptance of a
SALT agreement might be imperiled
by arms advocates who oppose arms
controls, using technically-based ar-
guments to breed fear of a Soviet
first-strike. But I submit that argu-
ments based on MlR V inventories
and singular focus on a single com-
ponent of the deterrent mix, i.e.,
Minuteman, represent technician's
myopia. Such parochial analysis not
only fails to come to grips with the
realities of deterrent doctrine, as a
first-striker would have to appreciate
them, but also fails to consider the
consequences of the future arms race.
The U.S. deterrent apparatus does
not abruptly disintegrate if the So-
viets escalate their MIRV capabili-
ty. Defense "hedges" such as extra
hardening and hardsite defense are
already underway to neutralize such
a potential MIRV advantage. But to
zero in on the Minuteman system as
though it were the sole deterrent is
to make the same mistake evident in
the national debate over Safeguard.
The argument must embrace the full
spectrum of nuclear deterrence and
"It's one of those anti-missile missiles."
26
encompass the PolarisjPoseidon sea
strike force as well as the B-52jFB-
111 strategic air force, which con-
stitute the two other components of
the TRIAD. U.S. defense officials
are reluctant to discuss the forward
base aircraft, stationed in the NATO
theater and on aircraft carriers, which
do concern the Soviets as evidenced
by issues brought up at SALT. In
addition, the Soviets have to con-
sider French and British nuclear
strike forces. Thus as viewed from
the Kremlin, the deterrent machin-
ery arrayed against it must be so over-
whelming as to appear unnecessarily
redundant, if not veritably designed
for a first-strike. An enemy is apt
to judge opposing weapons systems
by their technical character and not
by what we say about them.
Finally, anti-SALT arguments must
face up to the ultimate question -
admitting that a SALT agreement
poses some risks, what risks are in-
herent in an unabated arms race? A
partial answer is provided by Gen.
John D. Ryan in his 1971 testimony
before Congress:
If a SALT agreement does not
occur and the threat increases [de-
leted} upgrade of the remainder of
the Minuteman silos and further
expansion of our ABM capabilities
for the defense of Minuteman may
be called for. Other actions such
as making part of our land-based
ICBM force mobile would also be
contemplated should the threat be-
come extremely severe.'"
Actually, the Pentagon has a long
shopping list of multibillion dollar
purchases it contemplates if SALT
talks fail - and even if a SALT
agreement is reached.
Summing up, although MIRV
math may seem to allow the Soviets
to acquire a first-strike capability in
spite of SALT restrictions, I would
conclude that the nature and dispo-
sition of U.S. deterrent and detec-
tion systems possess the necessary
strength to maintain a posture of
strategic sufficiency throughout the
1970s.
REFERENCES
1. Melvin R. Laird, Statement before
U.S. House Committee on Armed Ser-
vices, March 5, 1971, Table 2, p. 165.
2. Robert S. McNamara, Speech de-
livered at San Francisco, Sept. 18, 1967.
See also Ralph E. Lapp, ""The Weapons
Culture,'" Appendix XII.
3. U.S. House Committee on Armed
Services, Report No. 91-1022, Union
Calendar No. 478, April 24, 1970.
4. Gen. John D. Ryan, Speech presented
on Sept. 22, 1970 (text available from
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of
Public Information).
5. Melvin R. Laird, Letter to Sen. Ed-
ward W. Brooke, Nov. 5, 1970.
6. Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, Testimony
before Department of Defense (DOD)
Appropriations Hearings, U.S. House,
Fiscal Year 1972, Part 2, pp. 260, 269.
7. McNamara, San Francisco speech.
8. Brig. Gen. H. N. Cordes, "Soviet-
ChiCom Strategic Threat,'" Cong. Rec.,
pp. E6337-39 (June 23, 1971).
9. U.S. House, DOD Appropriations
Hearings, FY72, Part 1, p. 784.
10. Blue Ribon Defense Panel, "The
Shifting Balance of Military Power,''
Cong. Rec., pp. H2668ff. (April19, 1971).
11. M. L. Goldberger, Cong. Rec.,
S17613 (Nov. 4, 1971).
12. Adm. T. H. Moorer, Statement be-
fore DOD Appropriations Hearings, U.S.
Senate, FY72, Part 1, pp. 176, 465.
13. U.S. Senate, DOD Appropriations
Hearings, FY72, Part 1, p. 393.
14. Air Force authorities often use the
number 1,014, which includes launchers
at Vanderberg Air Force Base.
15. U.S. Senate, DOD Appropriations
Hearings, FY72, Part 4, pp. 2932, 2940;
and U.S. House, DOD Appropriation
Hearings, FY72, Part 1, p. 862.
16. U.S. Senate, DOD Appropriations
Hearings, FY72, Part 4, p. 647. See also
Cong. Rec., p. S14147 (Sept. 13, 1971).
17. Gen. John C. Meyer, "The Time
Dimension of Military Forces, Cong. Rec.,
pp. S7193-95 (May 18, 1971).
18. U.S. Senate, DOD Appropriations
Hearings, FY72, Part 2, pp. 625, 655-57.
19. U.S. House, DOD Appropriations
Hearings, FY72, Part 1, p. 785.