Liu Et Al 2023 The Superstitious Heuristic in Strategic Decision Making

Journal of Management
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DOI: 10.1177/01492063231198191
© The Author(s) 2023
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The Superstitious Heuristic in Strategic Decision

Making
Jing Liu
Northern Kentucky University
Eric W.K. Tsang
University of Texas at Dallas
Weilei (Stone) Shi
Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business
This study focuses on the phenomenon of using superstition as a decision heuristic in strategic
decision-making. We introduce the construct of superstitious heuristic, which is defined as a deci-
sion shortcut based on superstitious beliefs. The superstitious heuristic is commonly used in stra-
tegic decision-making in various cultures and can lead to seemingly puzzling decisions that have
strategic consequences for the firm. It is also distinctly different from other major decision heu-
ristics (i.e., heuristics-and-biases, fast-and-frugal heuristics, expert intuition, and simple rules)
and can be used over the latter, especially under high uncertainty. Nevertheless, this heuristic
type has not yet received much attention in the strategy literature, presumably because its
usage in strategic decision-making is less prevalent in Western contexts where most heuristics
research takes place. In this study, we initiate an inquiry into this phenomenon through two
objectives: (1) introducing the construct of superstitious heuristic with conceptualization and
measurement and (2) probing the executive antecedents to the superstitious heuristic. Our
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Action Editor Wei Shi and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful
input to this article. A substantial portion of the article is based on the first author’s dissertation at the Graduate
Center and Baruch College, City University of New York (CUNY). We gratefully acknowledge Naomi Gardberg and
Loren Naidoo for their invaluable contributions as dissertation committee members. We also thank other scholars at
Baruch College for their helpful comments during the early stage of this research. The work in this article was
supported by the CUNY Graduate Center Dissertation Fellowship and the ASEAN Business Research Initiative
(“ABRI”) grant. Early versions of the article were presented at the 2020 Annual Meeting of the Academy of
Management and the 2020 Annual Conference of the Strategic Management Society. We are thankful for the feedback
received from these conferences and appreciate funding from the Haile College of Business for conference
attendance.
Supplemental material for this article is available at http://jom.sagepub.com/supplemental
Corresponding author: Jing Liu, Department of Management, Haile College of Business, Northern Kentucky
University, Nunn Drive, Highland Heights, KY 41099, USA.
E-mail: liuj3@nku.edu
1
2 Journal of Management
study not only brings the superstitious heuristic to the attention of strategy scholars but also lays
the conceptual and empirical foundation for advancing strategy research on this heuristic. By
delineating the profile of executives who are prone to employing this heuristic in making strategic
choices, our study also contributes to upper echelons research on the use of heuristics in strategic
decision processes.
Keywords: superstition; heuristic; strategic decision making; executive attributes; institutional

misalignment
Stemming from the seminal work of Simon (1947, 1955), heuristics research in strategic
management highlights the role of heuristics in complex and uncertain strategic decision pro-
cesses (Bettis, 2017; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Schwenk, 1984). Over the past few
decades, this research domain has advanced remarkably, studying a variety of heuristics in
the strategic decision context, including “heuristics-and-biases” (Lovallo & Kahneman,
2003), “fast-and-frugal heuristics” (Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014), “expert intuition” (Day
& Lord, 1992; Simon, 1987), and “simple rules” (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011;
Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001).
However, the literature has largely overlooked a heuristic type that is different from all the
aforementioned heuristics: the superstitious heuristic, a decision shortcut based on supersti-
tious beliefs. The use of superstition1 as a heuristic in strategic decision-making is common in
many cultures. Hong Kong tycoons often consult fortune tellers before making big invest-
ment decisions. Japanese managers seek advice from their Shinto gods and Indian business-
men comply with principles of Vaastu Shastra for luck (Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). In Europe and
Latin America, unlucky numbers such as “13” are avoided in important business choices
(Poorsoltan, 2012). In North America, increasingly more company executives consult astrol-
ogers or psychics on critical business decisions (Bertodano, 2008; Pardes, 2015).
Despite being a global phenomenon, the superstitious heuristic has not attracted much
scholarly attention, presumably because existing decision heuristics studied are mostly
approached from a Western perspective, whereas superstitious heuristics are relatively
more prevalent in other parts of the world, notably in the Eastern contexts (Tsang, 2004a,
2004b). This lack of research attention is problematic because the study of the superstitious
heuristic may offer theoretical and managerial insights that are missed by the Western lens.
According to the scant research touching upon this phenomenon, superstitious heuristics
appear to substantially impact firms’ strategic behavior. For instance, Burmese managers
would not choose a firm as a strategic alliance partner if the representative of the firm had
an unlucky birthdate (Andrews, Nimanandh, Htun, & Santidhirakul, 2022). Thus, strategic
choices based on superstitious heuristics may appear puzzling, according to existing
Western-based theories, and fall outside the explanatory domain of these theories.
Furthermore, the superstitious heuristic is not only distinct from the other existing heuristic
types but may also have an edge over the latter, especially in highly uncertain situations
(Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). To function under uncertainty, exiting heuristics in general require
the identification of similar structures or regularities in the decision milieu (Bingham &
Eisenhardt, 2014; Gigerenzer, 2008; Simon, 1987). When such cues do not exist or are
Liu et al. / The Superstitious Heuristic in Strategic Decision Making 3
unrecognizable, existing heuristics would fail and superstition is an often-adopted means to

navigate uncertainty (Kurdoglu, Jekel, & Ateş , 2023; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). As an
example, magical thinking is often used by entrepreneurs for sensemaking and decision-
making in entrepreneurial venturing, a situation characteristic of unpredictability (Ganzin,
Islam, & Suddaby, 2020). As such, superstition as a decision heuristic plays an important
—yet unrecognized—role that warrants research endeavors for a more complete understand-
ing of heuristics in strategic management.
The scarce research that has touched on the role of superstition neither exclusively focuses
on the strategic context nor explicitly studies superstition as a decision heuristic.2 Those
studies also tend to focus on only single aspects of superstition, missing a full picture of
the phenomenon. For example, Fisman and colleagues’ (2022) investigation of the relation-
ship between superstition and corporate investments only focused on the birth years of the
chairpersons of corporations. Another limitation is the very limited quantitative examination
of the phenomenon, especially of its antecedents. Despite the wide adoption of superstitious
heuristics by business executives in various cultures, we know little about what kinds of exec-
utives are likely to engage in this decision practice. Lacking empirical investigation on exec-
utive antecedents impedes the generation of meaningful theorical and practical implications.
Unlike other decision heuristics, the superstitious heuristic is comparatively more common in
Eastern than Western cultures, which makes the study of antecedents more pertinent.
Exploring the executive antecedents will also contribute to upper echelons research which,
despite emphasizing decision makers’ bounded rationality as heuristics scholarship does,
has seldom directly examined how executive attributes might be related to the use of
heuristics.
To address these research gaps, we initiated an inquiry into the use of superstitious heu-
ristics in strategic decision-making with two major objectives: (1) introducing the construct
of superstitious heuristic with conceptualization and scale development and (2) probing the
executive antecedents of the superstitious heuristic. In the first part of the study, we formally
explore the definition and dimensionality of the superstitious heuristic and differentiate it
from existing heuristic types examined in the strategy literature. We also discuss when the
superstitious heuristic may be used in place of other heuristics. Following that, we develop
and validate a Superstitious Heuristic Scale (SHS) to measure the use of superstitious heuris-
tics. In the second part of the study, we draw on superstition research and the upper echelons
literature to explore the attributes of executives who are likely to use superstitious heuristics.
Since the predictive power of executive attributes tends to vary by circumstances (Carpenter,
Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Neely, Lovelace, Cowen, & Hiller, 2020), we also examine
institutional misalignment, which refers to the imbalance among different aspects of the insti-
tutional environment, as a boundary condition. Using data collected from a sample of Chinese
senior executives, we theorize and find that the use of superstitious heuristics can be predicted
by tenure and functional background. Additionally, as we theorize, institutional misalignment
moderates the predictive power of gender, tenure, and functional background.
Our study makes several contributions to the existing literature. We extend heuristics
research in strategic management by introducing the superstitious heuristic. Through a
formal conceptualization, we offer a clear definition of the superstitious heuristic and
exhibit its multidimensional nature. We delineate its distinct attributes and demonstrate its
importance vis-à-vis other heuristic types. In this way, we advance the current understanding
of heuristics in strategy research. The scale instrument we develop enables researchers to

comprehensively and directly measure the use of superstitious heuristics without being
restricted to single aspects of the phenomenon or secondary data proxies. Our findings on
the executive antecedents indicate the profile of executives who are likely to engage in super-
stitious heuristics and shed light on the contingent role of the institutional environment. Our
investigation not only addresses the issue of insufficient quantitative research on the phenom-
enon but also contributes to upper echelons research on the use of heuristics in strategic deci-
sion processes. In sum, this research brings the phenomenon of superstitious heuristics to the
attention of strategy scholars and lays the conceptual and empirical foundation for advancing
strategy research on this heuristic.
The Superstitious Heuristic

Heuristics Research in Strategic Management
Heuristics research in strategic management traces back to Simon’s (1955, 1979) notion
of bounded rationality, which takes a realistic view of human rationality in problem
solving and decision-making. This perspective maintains that, rather than searching for
the optimal solution, people in reality “satisfice,” that is, stop searching at the first satis-
factory and sufficient solution. To satisfice is to use heuristics, which Simon defines as
cognitive shortcuts that emerge when time, information, and processing capacity are
limited (Newell & Simon, 1972).
Building on the concept of bounded rationality, heuristics research in the strategy literature
has evolved along four streams. The first examines heuristics that were traditionally studied in
the “heuristics-and-biases” program (e.g., representativeness, anchoring, and availability;
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) in the context of execu-
tive judgment and decision-making (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003;
Malhotra, Morgan, & Zhu, 2018; Shapira & Shaver, 2014). Heuristics from this program
occur when people accept a plausible judgment that automatically comes to mind, while
the deliberate thought process fails to scrutinize it (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002). In other words, these heuristics arise from cognitive defect and operate
unconsciously. They are, thus, often erroneous and lead to systematic biases (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Since this heuristic type deviates from statistical principles, it is considered
to fall outside the domain of “rationality”—a notion applied to analytical, comprehensive,
decision models that aim to optimize outcomes through intensive information research and
complex computation (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). This heu-
ristic type is universal among individuals, including well-trained statisticians (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). It also has a broad scope of application and is unconsciously applied in
various decision settings (Kahneman, 2011).
The second research stream studies heuristics from the “fast-and-frugal” program
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) in strategic decision contexts (Mousavi & Gigerenzer,
2014; Nikolaeva, 2014). The fast-and-frugal approach proposes an adaptive toolbox of heu-
ristics (e.g., recognition, take-the-best, imitate the majority) that facilitate quick decision-
making with minimum information (Gigerenzer, 2008). Fast-and-frugal heuristics can
operate either unconsciously or consciously. They are an outcome of individual and social
learning of valid cues that facilitate inferences about decision situations (Gigerenzer, 2008;
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). Fast-and-frugal heuristics are regarded as “ecologically rational”
as they demonstrate good validity and sometimes perform better than optimal models when
they match the structure of the environment (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Fast-and-frugal
heuristics are universal decision rules commonly applied by individuals in different decision
settings.
The third research stream investigates the role of “expert intuition” (Chase & Simon, 1973;
Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986) in executive decision making (Day & Lord,
1992; Simon, 1987). This research traces back to Barnard (1938), who observed that firm
executives rely heavily on “non-logical” decision-making, the process for which is automatic,
without conscious effort, and not explainable in words or reasoning. This process is com-
monly described as decision-making based on “gut feelings.” Simon (1987: 63) links this
type of decision-making to expert intuition, which he defines as “analyses frozen into habit
and the capacity for rapid response through recognition.” Expert intuition is an outcome of
professional experience and is fundamentally the recognition of patterns that are stored in
memory through repeated practice and feedback learning. Expert intuition yields a valid judg-
ment when a familiar pattern from the repertoire is recognized (Kahneman & Klein, 2009;
Simon, 1987). Expert intuition tends to be idiosyncratic as it is grounded in the expert’s per-
sonal experience, training, and knowledge base. It is also domain specific. A firm executive’s
“gut feeling” that can accurately judge a business situation may not work in other contexts,
such as a medical diagnosis.
The last research stream investigates firm idiosyncratic “simple rules” in strategic
decision-making (Atanasiu, Ruotsalainen, & Khapova, 2023; Bingham, Eisenhardt, &
Furr, 2007; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). These are unique decision heuristics developed
and refined continually by individual firms through organizational learning from success and
failure (Atanasiu et al., 2023; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). These
simple rules are usually applied consciously and are used by firms to capture opportunities in
turbulent environments (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). The validity and effectiveness of simple
rules lies in their match with “similar situations.” They can improve performance vis-a-vis
opportunity capture by narrowing the problem scope to similar situations while still
leaving room for adaptation (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2014). Thus, simple rules are regarded
as a “rational” decision approach that avoids “overfitting” in highly unpredictable
environments.
While heuristics research in strategic management has advanced substantially along these
four research streams, it has neglected a distinct heuristic type that is based on superstitious
beliefs and used rather extensively in strategic decision processes in various cultures. The
phenomenon of superstitious heuristics has received scant attention in strategy research,
with only a few exceptions touching upon the topic. Tsang’s (2004a, 2004b) studies focusing
on businessmen in Singapore and Hong Kong were among the earliest endeavors to investi-
gate business people’s reliance on superstition in business decision-making. Similar practices
have been documented in more recent studies. Examining how multinational corporations
respond to superstitious practices in Myanmar, Andrews and colleagues (2022) reported
that Burmese managers would reject a potential strategic alliance partner if any of those rep-
resenting the potential partner had an unlucky birthdate. Focusing on the Chinese supersti-
tious belief that one’s zodiac year3 brings bad luck, Fisman and colleagues (2022)
discovered, among publicly traded Chinese firms, a pattern of substantial and abnormal drop
in research and development (R&D) and acquisition activities in their chairman’s zodiac year.
These studies, while few in number, offer examples of firms’ strategic decisions that seem
puzzling if the superstitious elements are neglected. Business owners in Tsang’s (2004a)
study would switch between foreign direct investment (FDI) location alternatives due to
superstitious considerations when all other factors that usually affect the investment location
are similar between these alternatives. These location choices cannot be explained adequately
by existing FDI theories without taking into account the role of superstition in the decision
process. Similarly, nonsensical decreases in R&D and acquisition activities observed in
Fisman and colleagues’ study (2022) cannot be explained by related theories unless decision
makers’ superstitious concerns are brought into the equation. These examples indicate that
decisions driven by superstitious heuristics often fall outside the explanatory domain of exist-
ing theories.
Although the abovementioned studies do touch on the role of superstition, they do not
exclusively focus on the strategic context or explicitly examine superstition as a decision heu-
ristic. Moreover, since most of the studies are qualitative research (e.g., Andrews et al., 2022;
Poorsoltan, 2012; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b), there is inadequate quantitative examination of
superstitious heuristics, especially regarding its antecedents. Another limitation of the prior
studies is that they tend to focus on single aspects of superstition, missing a comprehensive
grasp of the phenomenon. For example, Fisman and colleagues’ (2022) study only examined
the chairmen’s year of birth. Tsang (2004a, 2004b) and Andrews and colleagues (2022) cen-
tered on a few single practices, such as feng shui, astrology, and clairvoyance. To be fair, this
issue is not unique to strategy research but is also common among other business disciplines
which have predominantly focused on numerology (see Bhattacharya, Kuo, Lin, & Zhao,
2018; He, Liu, Sing, Song, & Wong, 2019; Kramer & Block, 2008 for a few examples).
Overall, our review suggests that there is very limited attention to the role of superstitious
heuristic in strategy research and a lack of endeavor to formally conceptualize, comprehen-
sively measure, and quantitatively investigate this phenomenon. Our study is aimed at
filling these gaps.
Definition and Dimensions of the Superstitious Heuristic

In the long history of research on superstition, superstitious beliefs have been defined in
various ways (see Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012 for a definition review), most of which
focus on their shared characteristic of lacking scientific support or being inconsistent with sci-
entific principles (e.g., Broad, 1953; Keinan, 1994; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). These defini-
tions, while not invalid, are too general to distinguish superstitious beliefs from other
scientifically unfounded beliefs such as “Vitamin C prevents flu” (Lindeman & Svedholm,
2012). In recent years, researchers (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000;
Risen, 2016; Wellman & Gelman, 1998) have proposed definitions that specify the funda-
mental erroneousness of superstitious beliefs, most of which point to the mistake of confusing
ontological categories, that is, assigning distinctive properties/attributes of one ontological
category to another (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Defining superstition in this way
enables us to differentiate between superstitious beliefs and other false beliefs that do not
involve ontological confusions. We thus incorporate the idea of ontological confusion to
propose the following definition: “Superstition refers to beliefs that are not based on scientific
knowledge, but, rather, are connected with ideas about magic or paranormal power that
confuse ontological categories.” Following Lindeman and Svedholm (2012: 249), we refer
to “ontological categories” as “mental phenomena, material objects, living things, animate
beings, and intentional and unintentional events.”
Our definition clarifies the boundary between superstitious beliefs (e.g., ashes from a
temple cure an illness because the ashes have been blessed by the deity of the temple) and
other ungrounded beliefs (e.g., Vitamin C prevents flu because the vitamin improves one’s
immune system); in the former example, an ontological error occurs as a mind (i.e., the
deity of the temple) is assumed to exist without a physical body, and to exert influence
like animate entities (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). In the
same way, our definition differentiates what we identify as superstition from the notion in
the superstitious learning literature, which considers misspecified causality to be “supersti-
tious” (Levitt & March, 1988).
Building on our above definition, we further define a superstitious heuristic as “a decision
shortcut based on one’s superstitious beliefs.” By “decision shortcut,” we mean a tactic that
serves as a substitute for a rational, comprehensive decision approach. By “based on,” we
consider that superstitious beliefs play a determinant role in the decision-making process;
that is, superstitious beliefs trump other information in leading to the decision outcome.
These terms capture the nature of heuristics and reflect how heuristics are conceptualized
and defined in the literature.
Depending on the superstitious beliefs in play, superstitious heuristics can be classified
into different categories. Superstition researchers have studied a long list of superstitious
beliefs in different societies (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012; Tobacyk, 2004; Vyse, 2013).
Among these beliefs, those relevant to decision-making can be categorized into five broad
domains, which we label as (1) Birth Profile, (2) Physical Attribute, (3) Object/Act, (4)
Surrounding Environment, and (5) Paranormal Revelation. We identify these five domains
based on two considerations. First, each domain represents a distinct superstitious source
that can allegedly exert influence on, or provide insight into, people or future events.
Second, the five domains can be observed commonly across different cultures, although
the specific content may vary. For example, most societies believe that certain numbers
bring bad luck. The unlucky number is “13” in the West (Vyse, 2013); its counterpart in
East Asia is “4” (Hirshleifer, Jian, & Zhang, 2018).
The five superstitious domains determine the five ways through which superstitious heu-
ristics can be brought into strategic decision processes. As an illustration, when deciding
whether to build a company’s headquarter in a particular location, the owner could (1)
consult an expert on destiny calculation to determine if the location is in harmony with his
or her birth profile (Birth Profile), (2) consult a feng shui master to examine if the location
attracts or keeps positive energies that foster prosperity (Surrounding Environment), or (3)
ask a psychic whether the location will bring fortune to the company’s development
(Paranormal Revelation). Below we discuss superstitious heuristics related to each of the
five domains.
Superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile are based on the alleged influence of one’s
birth profile on his or her personality, character, fate, or significant life events. Typical prac-
tices include destiny calculation (based on the year, month, day, and hour of one’s birth) as
well as astrology and horoscopes (based on the position of stars at the time of one’s birth). As
a real-world example, managers in Hong Kong seek advice from fortune tellers during the
Lunar New Year to check the degree of congruence between the upcoming year and their
birth profiles. If the new year is at odds with their birth profiles, they would employ a defen-
sive strategy in business throughout that year (Tsang, 2004b).
Superstitious heuristics related to Physical Attribute are based on the alleged influence of a
person’s physical attributes (e.g., facial characteristics, body shape, palm lines, and blood
type) on their personality, character, or fate. Typical practices include physiognomy, anthro-
poscopy, palmistry, and blood typing. Essays on Physiognomy, a guidebook on hiring, net-
working, and partnership building, remained popular in Europe for over 150 years
following its initial publication in the late 18th century (Vyse, 2013). Today, in modern
Japanese society, many companies hire, promote, and assign job tasks based on candidates’
blood types (Evans, 2012).
Superstitious heuristics related to Object/Act are based on the alleged influence of objects
or acts, including dates, numbers, words, names, colors, amulets, charms, rituals, taboos,
human acts, animal behavior, and natural phenomena or events. In Taiwan, many companies,
when opening a new business, consult the lunar calendar to pick an auspicious date and avoid
inauspicious ones (“Play Your Cards Right,” 1993). Similarly, Greeks consider Tuesdays to
be unlucky and avoid opening new businesses on that day (Poorsoltan, 2012).
Superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding Environment are based on the alleged
influence of forces or energies in the surrounding environment. Typical superstitious
beliefs include feng shui in Chinese culture, Vaastu Shastra in India, and pyramid power
in the West. One real-world example is Hong Kong Disneyland, which made changes to
its entrance based on the advice of a feng shui master (Holson, 2005).
Lastly, superstitious heuristics related to Paranormal Revelation are based on alleged rev-
elations from paranormal agents or deities. Typical practices along this dimension include
seeking advice from deities, card reading, dream reading, casting of lots, and consulting
mediums or psychics. In the United States, corporate psychic services have been growing
since the 1980s (Samuel, 2011), and an increasing number of executives are consulting
so-called “intuitive counselors” and “spiritual advisers” on important decisions (Marinova,
2015).
Superstitious Heuristics Versus Other Types of Heuristics

As noted earlier, superstitious heuristics differ in multiple aspects from the other types of
decision heuristics in the strategy literature. To begin with, superstitious heuristics differ from
heuristics-and-biases and expert intuition in that they are often used consciously with a clear
intent. J. P. Morgan once remarked that one needs an astrologer to become a billionaire
(Poorsoltan, 2012), suggesting that his reliance on astrological advice was a conscious
choice, the purpose being to increase wealth.
Superstitious heuristics also differ from fast-and-frugal heuristics, expert intuition, and
simple rules, in that they are not typically developed through a valid learning process and
can be driven solely by superstitious convictions independent of experience or performance
feedback. In fact, superstitious heuristics are more likely to be used when decision makers are
less experienced (Bhattacharya et al., 2018). Moreover, whereas the other three types of
heuristics are developed and validated through empirically verifiable effectiveness, such a
learning process is often hindered in the case of superstitious heuristics due to the absence
of scientifically supported causality between superstition and alleged effects. A meaningful
learning process is impeded further by resistance to corrective feedback and refutation of evi-
dence, which is a tendency particularly common in the case of superstition (Festinger,
Riecken, & Schachter, 1956; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). Unlike simple rules (Bingham &
Eisenhardt, 2011), the inability to adapt to feedback disqualifies superstitious heuristics
from being a source of organizational adaptability and dynamic capabilities.
Due to the absence of a verifiable causal link between superstition and the alleged
outcome, the effectiveness of superstitious heuristics in making accurate judgments is doubt-
ful. In fact, Tsang’s (2004a) study found that about 80% of respondents admitted to having
made, on the basis of superstition, a decision that later turned out to be wrong. Bhattacharya
and colleagues (2018) also reported that superstitious stock traders experienced losses due to
superstitious trading strategies. This erroneous feature is different from fast-and-frugal heu-
ristics, expert intuition, and simple rules, which are effective when the heuristic matches
the environmental structure (Gigerenzer, 2008), when familiar patterns are recognized
(Simon, 1987), and when the problem scope is narrowed to similar situations (Bingham &
Eisenhardt, 2014), respectively.
Furthermore, superstitious heuristics cannot really be viewed as rational decision tactics on
a par with fast-and-frugal heuristics and simple rules. The latter two are, arguably, rational in
the sense that they can be more efficient and effective than optimal models in certain circum-
stances: Fast-and-frugal heuristics can be highly effective when they fit the environment (i.e.,
“ecological rationality”; Gigerenzer, 2008), while simple rules are a rational approach to cap-
turing opportunities when experiences are few and uncertainty is high (Bingham &
Eisenhardt, 2011). Superstitious heuristics, however, replace optimal models with rules
driven by superstitious beliefs that lack scientific support. Regarding expert intuition,
Simon (1987) considers it nonrational because intuitive judgment cannot be expressed as a
systematic step-by-step reasoning process.
Superstitious heuristics also differ from universal heuristics such as heuristics-and-biases
and Fast-and-frugal heuristics. While the use of superstitious heuristics is a common phenom-
enon, the specific superstitious practice is determined idiosyncratically by cultural and indi-
vidual specifics. As such, superstitious heuristics are less consistently observable across
individuals compared with universal heuristics. Lastly, superstitious heuristics are distinct
from expert intuition and simple rules by virtue of the former’s broader scope of application.
Since people can be superstitious in various aspects of life and work, superstitious heuristics
are used in a wide variety of decision-making settings. Table 1 summarizes the differences
elaborated above. The comparison clearly shows that superstitious heuristics are a distinct
type.
Moreover, superstitious heuristics may be used over other types of heuristics under high
uncertainty. While existing heuristics (e.g., fast-and-frugal heuristics, expert intuition,
simple rules) can be handy levers to cope with uncertainty, their effectiveness requires that
heuristic cues be identified in the decision environment. Expert intuition needs familiar pat-
terns to be recognized and simple rules necessitate similar situations to capitalize on past
experience (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2014; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Simon, 1987). When
uncertainty reaches a certain level where such cues do not exist or are unrecognizable,
Table 1
Comparison Between Superstitious Heuristics and Existing Heuristic Types
Fast-and-Frugal Expert Superstitious

Heuristics-and-Biases Heuristics Intuition Simple Rules Heuristics
Consciousness Unconscious Unconscious or Unconscious Conscious Conscious

conscious
Experiential No Yes Yes Yes No
and Feedback
Learning
Effectiveness No Effective when Effective Effective when No
matching the when narrowing
environmental familiar problem scope
structure patterns are to similar
recognized situations
Rationality No Ecologically No Rational under No
rational high
unpredictability
and with few
experiences
Universality Universal Universal Idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic
Scope of Broad Broad Narrow Narrow Broad
Application (applies (applies to
within opportunity
domain of capture)
expertise)
existing heuristics would fail and people would turn to other means for guidance, among
which superstition is an often sought-out solution to navigate uncertainty (Kurdoglu et al.,
2023; Tsang, 2004b).
One plausible reason is that superstitious heuristics can be used on the sole basis of super-
stitious beliefs and do not necessitate recognition of familiar cues in the environment
(Kurdoglu et al., 2023). Moreover, when valid cues cannot be identified, superstition could
offer an alternative footing for order seeking, sensemaking, and judgment. There is a ten-
dency for people to freeze and do nothing under overwhelming uncertainty (Perlmuter &
Monty, 1977). It could be more helpful to do something, even if guided by superstition,
than being stuck in inactivity; and, it could be easier to base a decision on superstitious
reasons than being indecisive (Tsang, 2004a). Additionally, superstition can bring psycholog-
ical benefits, such as confidence or a sense of control, to people facing uncertainty (Darke &
Freedman, 1997; Tsang, 2004b). Since strategic decision-making is often characterized by
high uncertainty, it is no surprise that superstitious heuristics are rather common in this deci-
sion context, especially in the East.
Beyond uncertainty, superstitious heuristics can also be used over other heuristics when
superstition as a basis for decision-making is acceptable, or even desirable. Such scenarios
can typically be found in cultures where superstitious beliefs prevail and the importance of
meeting superstitious requirements trumps other decision criteria. This is illustrated in the
aforementioned example where Burmese managers passed on a potential strategic alliance
partner simply because the candidate’s representative had an unlucky birthdate (Andrews
et al., 2022). Since superstitious heuristics are a distinct category and often employed over
existing heuristics, research on this heuristic type will contribute to a more complete under-
standing of heuristics in strategic management and generate meaningful managerial
implications.
The Superstitious Heuristic Scale

The first major objective of this study includes developing a scale for the construct of a super-
stitious heuristic. To do so, we first developed and validated a Superstitious Heuristic Scale
(SHS) which can be applied to different decision settings and cultures. We then validated the
SHS in the strategic decision context. Due to space considerations, we briefly describe the pro-
cedures in this section and report detailed information in the online supplemental file.
In the previous section we describe how an individual’s superstitiousness in decision-
making may manifest in different ways corresponding to the five domains of superstitious
beliefs. Hence, the superstitious heuristic can be regarded as an aggregate multidimensional
construct in the sense that “it combines or aggregates specific dimensions into a general
concept” (Edwards, 2001: 145). We generated initial scale items along each of its five dimen-
sions. In order for the SHS to be culturally neutral, we used general expressions such as “a
certain number” instead of culturally specific content such as “the number 13.” The lead ques-
tion of the scale stated, “When making a decision, to what extent do you base your decision
on the following considerations as decision rules?”4 Response anchors were 1 = “Not at all,”
2 = “Slightly,” 3 = “Moderately,” 4 = “Considerably,” and 5 = “A great deal.”
With the goal of developing a scale that would be applicable in different cultures, we
recruited a global sample using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and supplemented East
Asian responses through a leading online survey platform in China. Through both platforms
we constructed a final sample of 1,179 respondents (Mage = 33.91, SDage = 10.33; 50.65%
female) from more than 60 self-identified national cultures and seven geographic cultural
clusters. We randomly assigned two thirds of the sample to exploratory analysis and the
remaining third to confirmatory analysis.
We first conducted an exploratory analysis to develop the SHS. Since the questionnaire
was administered separately in English and in Chinese, we employed Multiple Group
Exploratory Factor Analysis (MGEFA) to explore the factor structure of the scale among
the two groups separately, yet simultaneously, under the constraint of measurement
(scalar) equivalence (Davidov, Meuleman, Cieciuch, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2014; Marsh
et al., 2009). The exploratory analysis eventually yielded a 20-item scale consisting of five
well-defined factors (Table 2 presents the SHS including the lead question, response
anchors, scale items, and factor loadings). The five factors corresponded nicely to the five
dimensions of the superstitious heuristic construct we derived from theory, empirically con-
firming the dimensionality of the construct. The factors were substantially intercorrelated with
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.42 to 0.75, suggesting that a meaningful total score for
the use of superstitious heuristics can be computed for each respondent (Furr & Bacharach,
2013). The five subscales demonstrated high reliability (with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from
0.89 to 0.95) well above the 0.70 minimum requirement for newly developed scales (Hinkin,
1998).
Table 2
Superstitious Heuristic Scalea (SHS) With Factor Loadingsb
Factor
Index Item 1 2 3 4 5
bp8 Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth suggests 0.79
positive things about his/her personality
bp11 Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth indicates he/ 0.88
she is likely to succeed in his/her career
bp13 Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign indicates he/she has 0.88
good fate
bp15 Whether a certain birth chart or astrological sign may increase the luck 0.92
for attaining a particular goal
pha1 Whether a person’s physical appearance may bring good luck 0.52
pha3 Whether some features of a person’s face or head imply positive things 0.93
about his/her personality
pha4 Whether some attributes of a person’s face or head suggest positive 0.85
things about his/her character (moral qualities)
pha6 Whether some characteristics of a person’s face or head suggest he/she 0.59
will have good fate
obj1 Whether a particular day is lucky 0.82
obj4 Whether a certain number is lucky 0.83
obj7 Whether a particular word or name is lucky 0.77
obj10 Whether some objects may bring good fortune 0.60
se1 Whether a place breeds or gathers positive energy 0.92
se2 Whether a location is blessed by positive energy around it 0.90
se4 Whether the energy of a place increases the luck for attaining a 0.72
particular goal
se5 Whether the energy surrounding a place boosts occupants’ well-being 0.80
pr4 Whether the decision is supported by those who can communicate with 0.81
the dead
pr5 Whether the decision is instructed by someone who hears from a 0.90
supernatural being
pr6 Whether the choice follows the advice of those who can see into the 0.87
future
pr8 Whether the choice follows a supernatural revelation 0.75
Note: SHS lead question: “When making a decision, to what extent do you base your decision on the following
a
considerations as decision rules?” Response anchors: 1 = “Not at all,” 2 = “Slightly,” 3 = “Moderately,” 4 =

“Considerably,” 5 = “A great deal.” bBlanks represent absolute loadings under 0.40. N English + Chinese = 780. EFA
with robust maximum likelihood estimator and oblique rotation. Factor 1 – Birth profile; Factor 2 – Physical
Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 4 –Surrounding Environment; Factor 5 – Paranormal Revelation.
After the SHS was developed, we submitted the scale for a confirmatory analysis and ver-
ified its factor structure and scale equivalence across language and culture. We also validated
the scale by establishing its convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity (see the online
supplemental file for detailed information on all procedures).
In summary, we developed and validated a scale instrument that can be used to
measure the use of superstitious heuristics in different cultures and decision settings.
The SHS demonstrated psychometric soundness and measurement equivalence across

language and culture. To facilitate empirical research of superstitious heuristics in stra-
tegic decision-making, we further validated the SHS in the strategic decision context
with a sample of Chinese firm executives, as reported in the next section.
Superstitious Heuristics in the Strategic Decision Context

We have so far focused on conceptualizing the construct of superstitious heuristics and
developing a scale instrument to measure it. In this section, we empirically examine the use
of superstitious heuristics in the strategic decision context, with a focus on exploring its
executive antecedents and contingency. As noted earlier, despite the wide usage of super-
stitious heuristics by firm executives in many cultures, it is unclear what kinds of execu-
tives are inclined to engage in this decision practice. We, thus, as an exploratory attempt,
investigate what executive characteristics might predict the use of superstitious heuristics
in strategic decision-making, and how the business environment might moderate this
tendency.
It is well established in upper echelons research that executives’ bounded rationality and
cognitive base affect how they make strategic decisions (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). In particular, executives’ cognitive frames shape the focus of their attention
and their interpretation of the strategic situation, which, in turn, determine how they act.
We believe that this tenet applies to the case of superstitious heuristics. Since substantial evi-
dence shows that the demographic and experience attributes of executives (i.e., age, gender,
education level, tenure, and functional background) are valid proxies of their cognitive frames
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hambrick, 2007), our study focuses on these
executive characteristics as potential antecedents to the use of superstitious heuristics in stra-
tegic decision-making.
Extensive research on superstition has investigated factors that foster superstitious
beliefs and practices. In addition to demographic factors (some of which we review
below), people are likely to engage in superstitions when they sense a low level of per-
ceived control and/or a desire to enhance or regain control (Case, Fitness, Cairns, &
Stevenson, 2004; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).
These control-related mechanisms typically operate in situations where individuals expe-
rience high uncertainty, low confidence, or high stakes (Keinan, 1994; Malinowski,
1954; Tsang, 2004b). To name a few examples, in a chance-determined card guessing
experiment conducted by Case and colleagues (2004), participants’ use of superstitious
strategies (i.e., using card selections made by a psychic instead of a professional or
oneself) as a means to control outcomes surged with increased uncertainty and decreased
confidence in guessing the correct card. Attempts for outcome control through supersti-
tions also occur in high stakes situations, such as taking important exams (Keinan, 2002;
Rudski & Edwards, 2007), making important business decisions (Tsang, 2004a), risking
damaging one’s physical wellbeing (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002), or facing death
(Keinan, 1994; Malinowski, 1954). We incorporate these findings from the superstition
literature to inform our exploration of executive antecedents in the use of superstitious
heuristics.
Age. Prior studies have reported mixed results regarding the relationship between age and
superstition (Vyse, 2013); however, there are relatively more findings that older individuals
are less superstitious (Harris, Milfont, & Hornsey, 2022; Irwin, 1993). We expect this nega-
tive relationship to present among business executives. Age is considered an indicator of
executive experience in upper echelons research (Finkelstein et al., 2009). With more expe-
rience than their younger peers, older executives tend to feel more confident in their ability to
make the right decisions. Executive age is also found negatively associated with risk-taking
(Vroom & Pahl, 1971), suggesting that older executives tend to avoid risky strategic situa-
tions. In both cases there is less need for exerting control through superstition. Thus, we
expect that older executives will rely less on superstitious heuristics than younger executives
in strategic decision-making.
Gender. Superstition research has consistently shown that women in general are more
superstitious than men (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Harris et al., 2022; Irwin, 1993; Vyse,
2013). We speculate that this difference can also be observed among business executives.
Women remain underrepresented in this predominantly male group and continue to struggle
with stereotypes and invisible barriers (Keller, Molina, & Olney, 2023; Lyness & Thompson,
2000). To counter negative biases, female executives have to prove their ability repeatedly
through superior performance (Ragins, Townsend, & Mattis, 1998). Superstition research
suggests that performance-related situations, such as attaining performance goals, are partic-
ularly likely to elicit superstitious behavior as an attempt to control outcomes (Damisch,
Stoberock, & Mussweiler, 2010; Hamerman & Morewedge, 2015). Thus, we predict that
female executives use superstitious heuristics more often than male peers in making strategic
decisions.
Education Level. The nature of the relationship between education and superstition
remains inconclusive (Irwin, 1993; Vyse, 2013), with slightly more evidence that having a
higher level of education is associated with fewer beliefs in superstition (Aarnio &
Lindeman, 2005; Harris et al., 2022). We draw on these findings to predict that executives
with a higher education level are less likely to use superstitious heuristics. Admittedly, edu-
cation does not make a person immune to superstitious beliefs (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002;
Tsang, 2004a), but more highly educated executives are more likely to be exposed to
advanced techniques of information search and analysis as well as problem solving. They
may also be in a better position to build high-quality social networks. In other words,
more highly educated executives may have better access to resources, which reduces the like-
lihood of relying on superstitious heuristics.
Tenure. According to Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) “seasons” model of executive

tenure, the longer executives are in the office, the more task knowledge (e.g., facts, trends,
contacts, and procedures) they accumulate, and the more confident they are in making judg-
ments and decisions. Indeed, research has shown that executives tend to develop a sense of
correctness as their tenure increases, even to a point of “overconfidence” (Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991). Incorporating findings that confidence reduces superstition,
we expect that long tenured executives, with accumulated knowledge and heightened confi-
dence, rely less on superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making.
Functional Background. The superstition literature has called for increases in science
education (including science, technology, engineering, and math) as a means to reduce
superstitious beliefs (Singer & Benassi, 1981; Vyse, 2013). The rationale is that exposure
to scientific principles fosters critical thinking and skepticism toward superstition.
Indeed, research has shown that individuals who are trained in natural and social sciences
are more skeptical than those with a background in humanities and the arts (Gray & Mill,
1990; Otis & Alcock, 1982). Among those who are scientifically trained, natural scien-
tists are found to be less superstitious than social scientists (Pasachoff, Cohen, &
Pasachoff, 1970; Wagner & Monnet, 1979). Applying these findings to executive func-
tional backgrounds, we conjecture that executives from functions that are more natural
science/engineering-based are less likely to use superstitious heuristics compared to
peers from other functions.
In addition to executive characteristics, upper echelons theory has, since the seminal
work of Hambrick and Mason (1984: 197), emphasized the importance of investigating
contingency relationships, as “the combination of certain situational conditions and
upper echelon characteristics will lead to strategic choices that could not have been pre-
dicted as strongly by knowing only one or the other.” In this study, we consider institu-
tional misalignment as a situational contingency to gain more insights into the
association between executive attributes and superstitious heuristics. There has been an
increasing interest in the role of institutional context in recent upper echelons research
(Neely et al., 2020). Prior studies have shown that unfavorable institutional conditions
present challenges for firms operating within them (Luo, Zhang, & Bu, 2019). In particu-
lar, the misaligned development of different forces in the institutional environment can be
a major source of uncertainty that confuses and frustrates strategic decision makers (Child
& Rodrigues, 2011; Shi, Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017). For instance, if the government passes
on more power and accountability to the market, but the development of markets and legal
environment fail to catch up, firms will likely face newfound uncertainties in areas such as
access to resources, contract enforcement, and protection of intellectual and/or private
properties.
As noted earlier, uncertainty is one of the common situational conditions that
amplify individuals’ tendency toward superstitious behavior. Being in control is an
instinctual desire and a fundamental need of humans (DeCharms, 1968; White,
1959). Uncertainty threatens the sense of perceived control, which causes a painful
psychological state and an urge to regain control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).
Superstition is frequently employed under this condition to make sense of the situa-
tion, predict the future, influence chance, and/or share in the power of paranormal
forces to reestablish control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Whitson &
Galinsky, 2008). We expect that institutional misalignment, which causes considerable
uncertainty for decision makers, will moderate the relationships between executive
attributes and superstitious heuristics. Specifically, institutional misalignment will
amplify the impact of executive characteristics that positively predict the use of super-
stitious heuristics (i.e., gender) and weaken the effect of executive characteristics that
negatively predict the use of superstitious heuristics (i.e., age, education level, tenure,
and functional background).
Sample and Data Collection

To test our predictions, we conducted a survey to collect data from top Chinese business
executives. We chose a survey study over other research designs—such as experiments or
secondary data methods—for two reasons. First, we were interested in investigating the phe-
nomenon of interest in real life. While experiments are superior at establishing causality, they
often take place in artificial settings. Second, a survey study would allow us to obtain first-
hand information from executives and directly analyze their actual strategic decision
process (as opposed to using indirect proxies). We focus on the Chinese setting because
superstition is frequently used in business decision-making in this culture (Bhattacharya
et al., 2018; Fisman et al., 2022; Hirshleifer et al., 2018; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b).
Since the population of our study consisted of top Chinese business executives, we
administered the survey to a sample of top Chinese executives enrolled in the EMBA
program of a leading institution in China in 2019. Those executives were CEOs, CFOs,
and vice presidents in diverse functional areas such as R&D, marketing, and product devel-
opment. To minimize respondent fatigue and frustration, we pretested our questionnaire
with a focus group of firm executives to assess the length of the survey and the wording
of questions. A total of 150 questionnaires were distributed during class breaks and col-
lected by the end of the day. For those who were unable to return the survey on the
same day, a reminder was sent out the next day. We eventually received 105 returned ques-
tionnaires, yielding a 70% response rate. After dropping missing values, 80 responses were
included in our final sample to test the predicted relationships.5 We tested whether there
were significant differences between the dropped responses and the responses kept in
our final sample and found no significant differences between the two groups for each
of our executive-level or firm-level variables, suggesting no systematic pattern in
missing values.
Due to our sampling process, we do not consider our final sample to be representative
of the population. However, since our respondents were from a top EMBA program in
China, they were successful top executives who, to a large extent, could represent man-
agerial styles and ideologies there. Moreover, the firms in our sample consist of seven
different ownership types, four organizational types, and 11 of the 18 primary industries
identified by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. In addition, the average age of
the firms in our sample (13.1 years) is close to that of the firms traded on the major and
secondary stock exchanges6 in China (15.5 years). For these reasons, we believe that our
final sample, while small in size, reflects Chinese executives and firms in a meaningful
way.
Measures
Dependent Variable. We measured the use of superstitious heuristics using the newly
developed SHS with minor modifications made to the lead question of the scale.
Specifically, a time frame of “2016–2018” and the word “strategic” were added.
Accordingly, the lead question stated, “When making strategic decisions during 2016–
2018, to what extent did you base your decisions on the following considerations as decision
rules?” The scale items and response anchor stayed unchanged (α = 0.95).
Independent Variables. Executive age was calculated by taking the difference between
the current year and the respondent’s year of birth. Gender was coded 1 if the respondent
was female and 0 if male. Education level was measured as an ordinal variable ranging
from 1 = “Elementary school graduate” to 7 = “Doctorate degree.” Tenure was measured
by the number of years the respondent had been in the position by the current year.
Functional background was coded 1 if the respondent’s primary functional track was in
R&D, production and operations, information and technology, and 0 if otherwise.
Moderating Variable. Institutional misalignment was operationalized using the

Marketization Index (Wang, Fan, & Yu, 2017) developed by China’s National Economic
Research Institute. This index captures the marketization level of each province in China
and has been extensively used in previous studies (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2010; Shi
et al., 2017; Zhou, Gao, & Zhao, 2017). The index consists of five dimensions: government
and market relations, development of private economy, development of product markets,
development of factor markets, and development of market intermediaries and legal environ-
ment. We operationalized institutional misalignment using the coefficient of variance of the
five dimensions, calculated as the standard deviation scaled by the mean. A higher score indi-
cated a larger degree of misalignment of a province’s marketization process along the five
dimensions, and thus higher uncertainty faced by decision makers.
Control Variables. We first controlled for executives’ compensation plan, which can be
related to their use of superstitious heuristics. Companies have long used performance-
contingent compensation plans to align managerial interests with shareholder interest.
Arguably, the more an executive’s pay is contingent on firm performance, the higher their
personal stakes involved in decision outcomes and the stronger their desire may be to
control outcomes. Executives in this situation may have a stronger tendency to use supersti-
tious heuristics to enhance outcome control. We measured compensation plan through a ques-
tion regarding the extent to which the respondent’s overall compensation was contingent on
firm performance. The response anchors ranged from 1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “Completely.”
Since it is common that executives use non-superstitious heuristics (i.e., other types of heu-
ristics) in strategic decision processes, we also controlled for this factor to tease out situations
where other traditional heuristics were used instead of, or in addition to, superstitious heuris-
tics. Executives’ use of non-superstitious heuristics was measured through three items we
developed based on the definition and nature of heuristics. The three items were “I used
simple decision rules (unrelated to folk beliefs) to simplify decision tasks,” “I used decision
shortcuts (unrelated to folk beliefs) to make decisions quickly,” and “I used rules of thumbs
(unrelated to folk beliefs) to find good enough solutions.”7,8 The response anchors ranged
from 1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly Agree” (α = 0.97). It is worth noting that
this variable showed a nonsignificant correlation with superstitious heuristics (r = 0.15, p =
.171), offering an empirical indication of the conceptual distinction between superstitious
heuristics and other heuristic types.
We also controlled for several firm-level factors that might affect executives’ use of super-
stitious heuristics. Firm age was computed as the difference between the current year and the
founding year of the firm. Firm ownership was coded 1 when the company was state or col-
lectively owned and 0 otherwise. Firm type was a categorical variable indicating whether the
Table 3
Regression Analyses Predicting Superstitious Heuristics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age −0.01 (0.01) [0.399] −0.00 (0.01) [0.671]

Gender 0.13 (0.13) [0.339] 0.24 (0.10) [0.056]
Education Level 0.09 (0.07) [0.208] 0.22 (0.10) [0.050]
Tenure −0.06 (0.01) [0.000] −0.03 (0.01) [0.038]
Functional Background −0.37 (0.13) [0.023] −0.28 (0.14) [0.086]
Institutional Misalignment 0.51 (0.57) [0.404] −0.67 (1.09) [0.558]
Age × Institutional Misalignment 0.04 (0.17) [0.819]
Gender × Institutional Misalignment 5.11 (1.89) [0.031]
Education Level × Institutional Misalignment 2.74 (1.38) [0.087]
Tenure × Institutional Misalignment 0.60 (0.18) [0.012]
Functional Background × Institutional 5.73 (1.16) [0.002]
Misalignment
Compensation Plan 0.15 (0.10) [0.176] 0.17 (0.08) [0.073] 0.11 (0.04) [0.045]
Non-Superstitious Heuristics 0.07 (0.04) [0.121] 0.07 (0.03) [0.064] 0.06 (0.03) [0.074]
Firm Age −0.02 (0.01) [0.044] −0.01 (0.01) [0.175] −0.01 (0.01) [0.237]
Firm Ownership 0.07 (0.23) [0.741] −0.01 (0.24) [0.956] 0.03 (0.26) [0.924]
Firm Type: Standalone Mature 0.60 (0.13) [0.003] 0.96 (0.18) [0.001] 0.79 (0.10) [0.000]
Firm Type: Group Subsidiary 0.07 (0.10) [0.500] 0.11 (0.09) [0.276] 0.11 (0.06) [0.089]
Firm Type: Group Parent 0.61 (0.12) [0.002] 0.55 (0.20) [0.029] 0.31 (0.14) [0.061]
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
Constant 1.05 (0.26) [0.005] 0.82 (0.28) [0.022] 1.07 (0.19) [0.001]
R2 0.22 0.30 0.37
Note: N = 80. Reference group for firm type = standalone startup. Industry dummies are omitted from the table for
space considerations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; exact p values are in square brackets. All
tests are two tailed.
company was a stand-alone startup, a stand-alone mature company, a subsidiary of a group

company, or a parent of a group company. Industry was coded following the industrial clas-
sification by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Data Analysis and Results

Prior to examining the relationships of interest, we first validated the SHS in the strategic
decision context. As expected, a well-defined five-factor structure emerged in the analysis
with a satisfactory model fit, establishing the validity of the SHS in this context. Results of
the validation are available in the online supplemental file.
Table 3 displays the estimated regression coefficients of relationships of interest. We
employed Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and clustered robust standard errors by province
to account for interdependence of observations from the same province (Wooldridge,
2010). Model 1 is the baseline model, Model 2 includes the main effects, and Model 3 pre-
sents the full model with the interaction terms added. The average variance inflation factors
Figure 1
Relationship Between Gender and Superstitious Heuristics Moderated by Institutional
Misalignment
(VIFs) for these models are 1.56, 1.74, and 2.26 (see Appendix 1 for the VIF of all variables).
These values are well below the widely adopted threshold of 10, indicating that multicolli-
nearity is not a concern in our analyses (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).
As shown in Table 3, executive age is not a significant predictor of the use of superstitious
heuristics, although the negative coefficient is consistent with our prediction (b = −0.01, p =
.399, Model 2). Additionally, the relationship between age and superstitious heuristics does
not vary by institutional misalignment (b = 0.04, p = .819; Model 3). Thus, we find no support
for our predictions regarding age.
The coefficient of gender is positive as expected but nonsignificant (b = 0.13, p = .339,
Model 2), indicating no statistical support that female executives are more likely to rely on
superstitious heuristics than male executives. The moderating effect of institutional misalign-
ment is positive and significant (b = 5.11, p = .031; Model 3), supporting our prediction that
the gender difference in using superstitious heuristics is amplified in misaligned institutional
environments. We visualize this moderating effect in Figure 1. The relationship between
gender and superstitious heuristics is nonsignificant when institutional misalignment is
low (b = 0.01, p = .857) but is significantly positive when institutional misalignment is
high (b = 0.67, p = .029). In the latter situation, female executives’ use of superstitious heu-
ristics is 36% higher than that of male executives.
The coefficient of education level is positive and nonsignificant (b = 0.09, p = .208;
Model 2), suggesting that the use of superstitious heuristics does not vary by education
level. There is a marginal moderating effect of institutional misalignment on this relationship
Figure 2
Relationship Between Tenure and Superstitious Heuristics Moderated by Institutional
Misalignment
(b = 2.74, p = .087; Model 3). Specifically, while there is no difference in executives’ use of
superstitious heuristics across education levels when institutional misalignment is low (b =
0.10, p = .162), more highly educated executives show marginally more reliance on supersti-
tious heuristics than less educated peers under high institutional misalignment (b = 0.45, p =
.053). These results differ from our predictions, but they are not entirely surprising consider-
ing that prior findings on education level and superstition are mixed.
Tenure is negative and significant (b = −0.06, p = .000; Model 2), supporting our predic-
tion that long-tenured executives rely less on superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. Also, as we predicted, this relationship is weakened by institutional misalignment
(b = 0.60, p = .012; Model 3; see Figure 2). When institutional misalignment is low, there
is a negative association between tenure and superstitious heuristics (b = −0.06, p = .003),
with short-tenured executives’ use of superstitious heuristics 23% higher than that of long-
tenured executives. This relationship becomes nonsignificant when institutional misalign-
ment is high (b = 0.02, p = .439), meaning that long-tenured executives are as likely to rely
on superstitious heuristics as short-tenured peers when facing highly misaligned institutional
forces.
Functional background is also a negative and significant indicator (b = −0.37, p = .023,
Model 2), confirming our speculation that executives in more natural science/engineering-
based functions rely less on superstitious heuristics than peers. This relationship, as expected,
is attenuated by institutional misalignment (b = 5.73, p = .002; Model 3). Figure 3 illustrates
Figure 3
Relationship Between Functional Background and Superstitious Heuristics Moderated
by Institutional Misalignment
Note: Functional background 1 = natural science/engineering-based; functional background 0 = other.
this moderating effect. When institutional misalignment is low, the relationship between func-
tional background and superstitious heuristics is negative and significant (b = −0.53, p =
.009); executives in natural science/engineering-based functions rely less on superstitious
heuristics by 28% than their peers from other functions. However, there is no statistically-
significant difference when institutional misalignment is high (b = 0.20, p = .273), suggesting
that under such conditions executives from natural science/engineering-based functions
engage in superstitious heuristics to a similar extent as their peers from other functions.
In summary, we find support for about half of our predictions. Tenure and functional
background significantly predict executives’ use of superstitious heuristics, and these rela-
tionships are weakened by institutional misalignment. Additionally, institutional misalign-
ment moderates the effect of gender such that female executives are more likely to use
superstitious heuristics than their male peers in a highly misaligned institutional
environment.
Additional Analysis
As an additional analysis, we tested whether the same pattern of results would be observed
for non-superstitious heuristics. The purpose was to further determine, in addition to the non-
significant correlation we note earlier in the control variable section, whether superstitious
heuristics and non-superstitious heuristics can be distinguished empirically, as they can
conceptually. The rationale was that, if superstitious heuristics are in fact conceptually indis-
tinguishable from other types of heuristics, we should observe that the executive characteris-
tics identified above function similarly as antecedents to the latter; otherwise, results should
be different. To perform the test, we estimated non-superstitious heuristics as the dependent
variable and included superstitious heuristics as a control variable in the analysis.
As shown in Appendix 2, the only significant executive characteristic is gender shown in
the main effect model. The negative coefficient suggests that female executives’ use of tradi-
tional heuristics is lower than that of male executives. This is different from the case of super-
stitious heuristics. Neither of the antecedents of superstitious heuristics—tenure or functional
background—are significant in predicting non-superstitious heuristics. Moving on to the
interaction terms, institutional misalignment is a moderator in none of the relationships. It
does not impact how gender, tenure, or functional background is related to non-superstitious
heuristics as it does in the case of superstitious heuristics. In sum, these sharply divergent pat-
terns of results suggest that superstitious heuristics are distinct from other heuristics both con-
ceptually and empirically.
Discussion
This study explores the phenomenon of using superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. We aimed to accomplish two major purposes: (1) introduce the construct of super-
stitious heuristic with conceptualization and measurement and (2) probe its antecedents at the
executive level. Our study lays the conceptual and empirical foundation for further inquiry
into superstitious heuristics in strategy research.
Theoretical and Empirical Implications

Superstitious heuristics are widely used in strategic decision-making, and are especially
prevalent among certain cultures. Their use can lead to puzzling strategic decisions that
cannot be explained by existing theories but may bring significant consequences to a firm.
Superstitious heuristics are also distinct from the existing heuristics studied in the literature
and are often used over the latter in decision-making, especially under high uncertainty.
Despite its importance, this heuristic type has not received much attention in the strategy lit-
erature, presumably because superstitious heuristics are comparatively less prevalent in
Western contexts where most heuristics research takes place. This is problematic as the
study of superstitious heuristics can offer meaningful theoretical and managerial implications
that are overlooked by the Western lens. A few studies have touched on the phenomenon;
however, they neither exclusively focus on the strategic context nor explicitly examine the
use of superstition as a decision heuristic. They also tend to investigate only single aspects
of superstition, missing the full picture of the phenomenon. Another issue is that since exist-
ing studies are mostly qualitative research, there are few insights generated from quantitative
analysis, especially regarding antecedents. Despite its wide adoption among business execu-
tives in many cultures, there is limited understanding as to the executive attributes that might
predict the use of this decision heuristic. In sum, there is a lack of formal conceptualization
and comprehensive examination of the phenomenon, as well as a lack of understanding of its
executive antecedents. Our study helps to fill these gaps.
To begin with, we pave the way for research on the superstitious heuristic through formal
conceptualization. By introducing the construct of superstitious heuristic and developing its
definition, we clarify the domain of research concerning the role of superstition as a decision
shortcut. We compare this heuristic type with existing heuristics studied in the strategy liter-
ature and show that the superstitious heuristic is clearly different from heuristics-and-biases,
fast-and-frugal heuristics, expert intuition, and firm idiosyncratic simple rules vis-a-vis a
variety of features. Our findings from the additional analysis also provide empirical evidence
for the distinction between the superstitious heuristic and other heuristic types. Adding this
overlooked heuristic—which does not fall into any of the existing heuristic categories—
helps advance our current understanding of heuristics in various ways. For instance, the
superstitious heuristic can emerge solely from superstitious convictions and is often resistant
to corrective feedback or contradictory evidence. This unique nature is not discussed in the
current decision-making literature and is a clear deviation from the experiential/feedback
learning process through which most other heuristic types typically emerge and evolve.
Furthermore, the superstitious heuristic sheds light on executive behavior in decision sce-
narios where existing heuristics may fail. Strategy and management scholars have recently
exhibited a renewed interest in Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) through concepts
such as organizational intractability (Bettis, 2017) and fundamental uncertainty (Alvarez &
Porac, 2020). This renewed interest is partly due to the fact that much remains unknown
as to how strategic decision makers act under highly unpredictable conditions (Alvarez &
Porac, 2020). We suggest that decision makers are likely to resort to superstitious heuristics
over traditional heuristics as uncertainty increases to a certain degree. While fast-and-frugal
heuristics, expert intuition, and firm idiosyncratic simple rules can be useful tools under
uncertain circumstances, they require that a certain level of similar structures or regularities
be identifiable in the decision milieu. When such cues do not exist or are unrecognizable, tra-
ditional heuristics would fail and decision makers might turn to superstitious beliefs for guid-
ance. Prior research offers support for this conjecture (Case et al., 2004; Kurdoglu et al., 2023;
Tsang, 2004a, 2004b; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Our empirical results also provide some
indirect evidence: While executives of certain attributes are more inclined to rely on super-
stitious heuristics to cope with uncertainty in highly misaligned institutional environments,
executives’ use of other heuristics is less affected under the same condition. In short, by intro-
ducing the superstitious heuristic, our study adds an essential yet missing building block to
the foundation of decision heuristics research.
Our conceptualization of the superstitious heuristic as a multidimensional construct offers
a comprehensive view of this decision practice. Whereas an individual’s superstitiousness can
be manifested along different dimensions, existing superstition research in strategic manage-
ment, and business disciplines in general, has usually focused on single aspects of supersti-
tion, such as birth profile (e.g., Andrews et al., 2022; Fisman et al., 2022) and, most often,
numerology (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2018; He et al., 2019; Hirshleifer et al., 2018),
which is a specific subcategory of the Object/Act dimension in our conceptualization.
Taking a comprehensive approach, our study indicates that different strategic decision
makers tend to engage in different types of superstitious heuristics. Figure 4 presents data
from three executives in our sample. These executives were founders of their respective com-
panies and reported intensive practice of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision making.
As shown in the graph, while Executive 2 exhibits the most usage of Objective/Act-related
Figure 4
Superstitious Heuristic Profiles
superstitious heuristics compared with the other categories, those heuristics were employed
less by Executive 3 and were the least adopted of all the categories by Executive 1.
We believe that the multidimensional conceptualization of the superstitious heuristic
opens up future research opportunities to explore potential interplay between superstitious
heuristics and various aspects of decision-making, such as different types of strategic deci-
sions. In fact, our survey data did exhibit some patterns that support the potential of this
research direction. While superstitious heuristics were overall most frequently used in deci-
sions on internationalization, merger and acquisition (M&A), and diversification among
various types of strategic decisions included in our survey, we noted that different dimensions
were associated with different types of decisions. As an example, superstitious heuristics
related to Birth Profile demonstrated a distinctively high usage in strategic alliances and
joint ventures, suggesting the particular relevance of this dimension in seeking business part-
ners. We encourage more thorough research in this direction. The multidimensional nature of
the construct also enables researchers to investigate whether different types of superstitious
heuristics bring different strategic and economic outcomes for the firm under different
circumstances.
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 4, our comprehensive conceptualization of the supersti-
tious heuristic makes it possible to construct a superstitious heuristic profile for each strategic
decision maker, operating unit, or company based on their standing in relation to the five
dimensions. Figure 4 shows that superstitious heuristic profiles can vary substantially from
case to case, warranting between-case comparison. It would be interesting to examine if
superstitious heuristic profiles vary under different conditions. National differences could
be an example. Japanese companies might display a longer spike along the Physical Attribute
dimension (e.g., face reading) than American companies due to lower popularity of physical
attribute-related superstitions in the United States.
In addition to the conceptualization of the construct, our development of the SHS facili-
tates the empirical investigation of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making.
Due to scant prior research, there was no scale instrument to measure the extent to which
superstitious heuristics are employed. Our SHS fills this void and exhibits several strengths.
First, compared with common operationalization of superstition in business, typically
(un)lucky numbers or days (Bhattacharya et al., 2018; Chung, Darrat, & Li, 2014; He
et al., 2019; Hirshleifer et al., 2018), the SHS has a solid theoretical foundation and offers
a comprehensive measure of the use of superstitious heuristics. Second, the SHS as a
survey instrument enables researchers to peer into the “black box” of strategic decision pro-
cesses by obtaining first-hand information from superstitious decision makers. Third, while
studies on superstition in business are often restricted to a particular culture due to the
culture-specific nature of superstitious beliefs, the SHS is culturally neutral and thus can facil-
itate cross-cultural studies of superstitious heuristics. It is worth noting that, despite our inten-
tion and effort, the global sample we recruited for scale development was not fully
representative of the world’s population. For instance, respondents from sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa were underrepresented due to inadequate
numbers of MTurk workers from these areas. Future research is encouraged to reassess the
psychometric properties of the SHS in these regions before using it.
An important purpose of our study is to explore the executive antecedents of superstitious
heuristics in strategic decision-making. Our findings not only advance empirical research on
superstitious heuristics but also contribute to the upper echelons literature by combining the
study of heuristics with executive characteristics. Although both upper echelons theory and
heuristics research are grounded in the concept of bounded rationality and emphasize cogni-
tive limitations in decision-making (Bettis, 2017; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Newell &
Simon, 1972), heuristics has been an understudied topic in the upper echelons literature.
While a few studies have examined related concepts such as rational decision-making and
decision comprehensiveness (see Shepherd & Rudd, 2014 for a review), little research has
directly studied heuristics as to how executive attributes may affect the use of heuristics in
making strategic choices. Our study fills this void by probing and substantiating the associ-
ations between executive characteristics and both superstitious and non-superstitious
heuristics.
More broadly, linking executive characteristics to heuristics helps to address the “black
box” issue in upper echelons research. Existing research has shown that executive attributes,
such as tenure and age, clearly influence firm outcomes, but much is yet to be learned about
how they influence those outcomes (Bromiley & Rau, 2016). More efforts have been called
for to examine executives’ cognitive styles and processes that precede strategic choices and
performance (Bromiley & Rau, 2016; Neely et al., 2020). Our study serves as a response to
this call by suggesting that decision heuristics as cognitive shortcuts can be a fruitful angle to
unpack this black box in upper echelons research.
Recent reviews of the upper echelons literature also highlight the reinforced need to
examine environmental conditions and the importance of identifying where and how moder-
ators operate in the link between executive characteristics and firm outcomes (Neely et al.,
2020). Our study addresses these calls by investigating the contingent role of institutional
misalignment in the connection between executive attributes and the cognitive mechanism.
While we approach the environment from an institutional perspective, future research
could consider the industrial aspect. For example, the predictive power of executive attributes
might be stronger in industries with high environmental hostility and low munificence. In
such industries, the failure rate of firms is high, and firms can be jeopardized by one bad deci-
sion due to severe competition and limited opportunities for growth and profitability (Baum &
Wally, 2003; Covin, Slevin, & Heeley, 2000). Those harsh environments may amplify exec-
utives’ inclination to exert control and alleviate anxiety through superstitious heuristics
(Keinan, 1994; Tsang, 2004b).
Future research may also investigate boundary conditions at the individual, team, or firm
level. The managerial discretion perspective (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Li & Tang,
2010) could be a useful framework to identify factors at multiple levels that moderate the rela-
tionships between executive attributes and superstitious heuristics. For instance, CEO power
measured by CEO duality or stock ownership may reinforce a CEO’s tendency toward or
against using superstitious heuristics. Also, upper echelons research has demonstrated that
different executive characteristics could interact to shape the impact of executives and calls
for more investigation into such interactions (Carpenter et al., 2004; Neely et al., 2020).
Future research could, for instance, examine whether gender or tenure moderates the relation-
ships between other executive attributes and superstitious heuristics.
Our study focuses on the antecedents of superstitious heuristics, while future research
could investigate potential consequences of this heuristic type. A promising direction
could be to investigate how superstitious heuristics shape choices and performance in
various decision situations (e.g., FDI, M&A, diversification). Researchers could also
explore potential mechanisms through which superstitious heuristics impact firm out-
comes. For instance, since superstitious heuristics can lead to drastic changes in strategic
choices following changes of superstitious elements in the decision situation (Tsang,
2004a), it would be interesting to examine the impact of superstitious heuristics on
erratic decision-making.
Our empirical analyses are not without limitations. Some nonsignificant results might be
partially attributed to insufficient statistical power due to small sample size. There is also a
good chance that our EMBA sample is not representative of the population of interest. We
encourage researchers to revisit our findings using larger and more representative samples.
Since the EMBA sample is likely to be more homogeneous than the population on some
of the executive attributes, the effect sizes of our findings are arguably smaller than reality.
We speculate that the patterns we observe will be stronger in more representative samples
where there are more variations in the variables. Our study may also be subject to omitted
variable bias, an issue common among executive antecedent analyses (Bromiley & Rau,
2016; Neely et al., 2020). Research has shown that the relation between executives’ charac-
teristics and outcomes is complex, with tangled correlations and interactions (Bromiley &
Rau, 2016). There is a possibility that our analysis omitted influential variables that could
bias our findings. Lastly, our study took a survey approach, while future research could incor-
porate randomized experiments to probe causal relationships of interest. Researchers could
also consider longitudinal studies to track executives’ use of superstitious heuristics over
time.
Managerial Implications
Our study offers managerial implications in several ways. First, highlighting the use
of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making suggests options for better inter-
firm competition and cooperation. Being aware of the role of superstitious heuristics pro-
vides an additional way for firm executives to understand and predict the strategic moves
of competitors and/or partner firms from superstitious cultures or run by superstitious
individuals. It is worth paying attention to specific superstitious beliefs endorsed by par-
ticular cultures or key decision-makers. Such additional intelligence could be surpris-
ingly useful to a focal firm seeking to better position itself vis-a-vis competition and
cooperation.
Second, our findings on the antecedents of superstitious heuristics provide practical
insights for boards of directors and executives. When selecting executives, boards should
be aware that candidates of certain attributes might be more (or less) prone to using supersti-
tious heuristics in strategic decision-making. It would be beneficial to incorporate this consid-
eration in hiring or promotion decisions if superstitious heuristics are deemed undesirable.
Since institutional misalignment amplifies the tendency to engage in superstitious heuristics,
boards should be particularly wary of strategic decisions made in such environments. Boards
could also order executive training on techniques of data-driven decision-making to reduce
the involvement of superstitious heuristics. Similarly, if deemed undesirable, executives
may want to monitor and restrict their own tendency, or that of fellow executives, for
relying on superstitious heuristics. It is also critical that rationales behind proposals be
openly and thoroughly discussed in decision processes. With all that being said, it is worth
noting that superstitious heuristics are not without merit. As noted in our study, superstitious
practices can bring psychological benefits. In situations where peace of mind or morale is crit-
ical, executives may use superstitious heuristics to reduce anxiety, enhance confidence, and
raise morale in the organization.
ORCID iDs
Jing Liu https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7373-3382
Eric W.K. Tsang https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0642-0714
Notes
1. In this study, we use the term “superstition” in a broad sense, encompassing paranormal, superstitious, magical,
and supranatural beliefs. Lindeman and Svedholm (2012) conducted a review of the four types of beliefs and concluded
that they refer to the same thing.
2. For instance, Tsang (2004a, 2004b) and Andrews and colleagues (2022) examine the involvement of super-
stition in business decision-making in general. Their studies cover superstitious practices widely used by managers
and employees at different levels to make decisions of various types and importance. Moreover, in their studies super-
stition is not always used as a decision shortcut; often it is used as a habitual ritual or as confirmation to provide a
peaceful mind during or after the decision process.
3. The Chinese zodiac features 12 animal signs in a 12-year cycle. A person’s zodiac year includes the year of
their birth as well as every 12th year following their birth. For example, if a person was born in the year of the rat, their
zodiac year is every year of the rat. Superstitious Chinese believe that a person’s zodiac year brings bad luck to that
person.
4. The items thus do not measure beliefs (e.g., whether one believes a certain number is lucky) but rather the
heuristic decision behavior of using superstitious beliefs as decision rules (e.g., whether one uses the belief that a
certain number is lucky as a heuristic in decision-making).
5. We were able to retain 97 responses for validating SHS in the strategic decision context by removing from
the initial sample only those who did not respond to the SHS items.
6. Including Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and National Equities Exchange and
Quotations.
7. To mitigate social desirability bias, the term “folk beliefs” was used in place of “superstitious beliefs”
throughout the survey to avoid the negative sentiments associated with superstition.
8. Explanations and examples were provided for “simple decision rules” “decision shortcuts” and “rules of
thumbs” to aid respondents’ interpretation of these terms.
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Liu Et Al 2023 The Superstitious Heuristic in Strategic Decision Making

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Journal of Management

The Superstitious Heuristic in Strategic Decision

Keywords: superstition; heuristic; strategic decision making; executive attributes; institutional

unrecognizable, existing heuristics would fail and superstition is an often-adopted means to

of heuristics in strategy research. The scale instrument we develop enables researchers to

The Superstitious Heuristic

Deﬁnition and Dimensions of the Superstitious Heuristic

Superstitious Heuristics Versus Other Types of Heuristics

Fast-and-Frugal Expert Superstitious

Consciousness Unconscious Unconscious or Unconscious Conscious Conscious

The Superstitious Heuristic Scale

considerations as decision rules?” Response anchors: 1 = “Not at all,” 2 = “Slightly,” 3 = “Moderately,” 4 =

The SHS demonstrated psychometric soundness and measurement equivalence across

Superstitious Heuristics in the Strategic Decision Context

Tenure. According to Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) “seasons” model of executive

Sample and Data Collection

Moderating Variable. Institutional misalignment was operationalized using the

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Age −0.01 (0.01) [0.399] −0.00 (0.01) [0.671]

company was a stand-alone startup, a stand-alone mature company, a subsidiary of a group

Data Analysis and Results

Note: Functional background 1 = natural science/engineering-based; functional background 0 = other.

Theoretical and Empirical Implications

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