Professional Documents
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23-50_n648
23-50_n648
Syllabus
Syllabus
Syllabus
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. GOR-
SUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1
No. 23–50
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It is so ordered.
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1
No. 23–50
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*The Court purports to offer some guidance today by rejecting the
Sixth Circuit’s “categorical rule barring a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution claim if any charge is valid.” Ante, at 6–7. But, it is not clear
that the Sixth Circuit even has such a rule. See Howse v. Hodous, 953
F. 3d 402, 409, n. 3 (2020) (recognizing that the underlying inquiry is
whether an unfounded charge “change[s] the nature of the seizure”); see
2023 WL 152477, *4 (Jan. 11, 2023) (citing Howse). It is thus unclear
what, if any, doctrinal progress today’s decision makes.
Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 5
No. 23–50
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all, when a State provides exactly the tort claim the plain-
tiff seeks, it provides him with all the process he is due. See
id., at 284; Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at 662 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.). And, consistent with the common law, many
States recognize claims for malicious prosecution. Indeed,
the relevant State here (Ohio) permits such a cause of ac-
tion. Notably, too, unlike the tort this Court seeks to cobble
together under the aegis of the Fourth Amendment, Ohio’s
tort does not require a plaintiff to prove that he was seized.
Compare Trussell v. General Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St. 3d
142, 145–146, 559 N. E. 2d 732, 735–736 (1990), with ante,
at 1 (majority opinion). Of course, should a State fail to
provide a malicious-prosecution claim to secure his proce-
dural due process rights, or a fair forum for entertaining
such a claim, a federal court may need to act to vindicate
§1983 and the promise of procedural due process. Cordova,
816 F. 3d, at 665 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). But in many
cases (this one included), a State malicious-prosecution
claim may be both easier for a plaintiff to prove than any-
thing the Court today provides and sufficient to ensure any
process he is due. Albright, 510 U. S., at 285–286 (opinion
of Kennedy, J.); Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at 662 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.