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“Germania,” he says, “a Sarmatis Dacisque mutuo metu aut
montibus separatur”—an ethnic or physical frontier. He reports, too,
a significant remark of Agricola in reference to the possibility of the
conquest of Ireland: “Idque etiam adversus Britanniam profuturum, si
Romana ubique arma et velut e conspectu libertas tolleretur.” The
practical ethnic question was evidently in Tacitus’ time in process of
becoming crystallized into a political theory.
It would require too much space to recount in detail all the
examples of the ethnic problem which have been conspicuous in
mediæval and modern history. It has cropped up again and again
within the memory of the living generation.
Austria had to face it in Italy in 1859–60. She has to face it now in
the Sclav provinces of the North.
Denmark’s attempted solution of the problem in Schleswig-
Holstein cost her those provinces in 1864.
The demand for the cession of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 would
hardly have been made by Germany had not the problem in these
regions presented itself to her in a seemingly favourable form.
The Turkish Empire presents, and has presented, numerous
examples of the problem—Servia in 1876; Bulgaria in 1878; the
Greek populations of the Ægean coast at the present day.
In South Africa Great Britain has been within the last year forced
to solve the problem in the special phase in which it presented itself
to her there.
To sum up, the circumstances which give rise to the ethnic
problem are, stated briefly, of the following nature⁠—
(1) The existence within but on the borders of a state of a race
alien to the ruling race, but akin to the race beyond the frontier.
(2) The real or fancied inferiority in respect to liberty of the aliens
within the state to their kinsmen outside it.
(3) The consequent setting up of two currents of feeling, one from
the outside to the inside, and another from the inside to the outside
of the state. These are usually coexistent, though in exceptional
cases one may exist without the other.
(4) The dangers to the state arising from the existence of
circumstance (3).
The various solutions which have been tried by different states at
different periods of history have taken one of two main forms of
policy⁠—
Either (1) the pushing forward of the borders by conquest to the
ethnic frontier;
Or (2) the denationalization of the alien race within the border.
Of these the second requires time. Any attempts to bring it about
rapidly must end in failure, and may end in disaster; witness the case
of Denmark in 1864.
Rome under the early Principate adopted, by the precept of
Augustus, the policy of denationalization as against that of conquest.
Augustus had tried both policies, but had deliberately laid aside the
latter in a.d. 9.
But there was a vast difference between the Rome of Augustus
and the Persia of Darius. Two centuries of past existence as the
greatest power in the world made the Roman regard the future with a
confidence with which Darius, heir to the maker of a new empire,
and himself its re-maker, can never have regarded it. The Roman
speculated in eternity, the Persian in time; hence the latter was
naturally led to adopt methods which promised to bear fruit in the
immediate future.
The question whether this is the sole motive which can be
suggested for the expedition remains for consideration.
The evidence as to the real drift of the policy of Darius during the
last fifteen years of the sixth century is so obscure and uncertain,
that there has been much debate among historians as to whether
this expedition was the first deliberate step in a large scheme of
conquest in Europe. In order to form a judgment on this question it is
necessary to take into consideration not only the immediate sequel
of the expedition, but also the history, in so far as it is known, of the
years which intervened between it and the outbreak of the Ionian
revolt.

H. iv. 143; H.
Darius took back with him to Asia the greater part
v. 1. of the great army which he had employed in the
Scythian expedition; but he left his general
Megabazos in Europe with a considerable force to complete the
work of conquest which he had begun in Thrace, and, presumably, to
suppress the revolt of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of the
Propontis. This force is reported by Herodotus to have amounted to
80,000 men.

H. iv. 144.
Megabazos proceeded, says the historian, to
reduce “the Hellespontians who had not medized.”
Who are these Hellespontians? They are certainly in Europe. They
are also not the populations of the revolted
CAMPAIGN OF 9
MEGABAZOS. cities, for he expressly states that these were
subsequently reduced by Otanes. They must
be some small places in the neighbourhood of Miltiades’ principality
in the Thracian Chersonese.

H. v. 1, 2. Of the history of this campaign Herodotus gives no

detail, save that he says that Perinthos was taken; and
this incident is obviously mentioned in order to introduce a story
which has but a very remote connection with the circumstances of
the time.
After the capture of this town “Megabazos marched his army
through Thrace, reducing every state and race of those parts to
subjection to the king; for Darius had ordered the reduction of
Thrace.”
This is a very remarkable statement. The coast districts of the
Euxine had submitted to Darius on his advance to the Danube. It
may be doubted whether this submission was very real or
permanent.

H. v. 10.
But now Megabazos appears to be represented as
having reduced the whole of Thrace, of which region
Herodotus takes the opportunity of giving a comprehensive
description. Bearing in mind the language of the sentence which
suggested the description, it is somewhat startling to read in the
closing sentence of it the words, “Megabazos then reduced the coast
regions (of Thrace) to subjection to the Persians.”
These two apparently conflicting statements form one of the many
examples of the highly composite character of the sources from
which Herodotus drew his history of these obscure years. It is
impossible to say that the one is true and the other false. It is
probably the case that here, as in some other similar instances in
Herodotus’ history where two irreconcilable accounts of the same
thing are either deliberately or inadvertently given, that either both
are true in a sense, or that both contain elements of the truth. May it
not be that this is an instance of the first of these two alternatives,
and that the assertion with regard to the whole of Thrace refers to a
position of weak dependence, whereas that with regard to the coast
region refers to actual subjection?
It will be seen later that this matter is not unimportant in its
bearing upon the conclusions which must be drawn as to the history
of the years which follow.
The hypothesis is supported by the fact that though in those thirty
years the coast region does appear to be, save during the interval of
the Ionian revolt, under Persian rule, there is no evidence of the real
subjection of the hinterland.
Herodotus next recounts two incidents, the first of which is
connected indirectly, the second directly with this campaign.
These are (1) the grant of Myrkinos to Histiæus;
(2) The removal of the Pæonians to Asia.
Of the prominent Greeks who had accompanied the king to the
Danube, Koës the Mytilenian, and Histiæus the Milesian were
singled out for special rewards. To Koës was given the tyranny of
H. v. 11.
Mytilene. Histiæus was already tyrant of Miletus, and
he asked not for further tyranny, but requested the
grant of Myrkinos on the Strymon. This Darius gave him.
 There can be no question that he knew for what he was asking.
This place, which stood within a short distance of the site of
Amphipolis of later days, was the key of the North Ægean lands. It
commanded not merely the great coast route from east to west, but
the trade route which ran up the Strymon valley towards mid-Europe.
It may well be that it was the latter circumstance, together with its
nearness to the Thracian gold region, which made its value known to
the tyrant of the great trading city.

H. v. 12, 13.
The sequel to this story is in all probability not
unconnected with the policy which led to the removal
of the Pæonians to Asia. It is evident that
THE LOWER
STRYMON.
Herodotus had no idea of the reasons which
induced Darius to adopt a measure which,
though not uncommon in the previous history of the Eastern
empires, was an unusual one with him. The tale which he tells in
order to account for it was doubtless a commonplace among the
stories of his time, and one which was told in relation to more than
one event in the history of the past. It is unnecessary to reproduce it
here, and still more unnecessary to point out the inadequacy of the
motive which it suggests.
The strategic importance of the country occupied by this people is
amply sufficient to account for the policy which Darius adopted with
regard to them. They commanded the short stretch of the Strymon
10
river between Lake Prasias and the sea, and were thus in a
position whose natural strength was again and again demonstrated
in later history, and whose importance lay in the fact, already pointed
out in the case of Myrkinos, that it commanded not merely the trade-
route north, but also the great route westward from Eastern Thrace
and the Hellespont region.
The substantial details in the account of the incident indicate that
it must have taken place during, not after, that conquest of the coast
districts of Thrace of which Herodotus has already spoken.
The story is told as follows:⁠—

H. v. 14.
 “Then Darius wrote letters to Megabazos, whom he had
left in command in Thrace, ordering him to remove the
Pæonians from their homes, and to bring them, their
children and wives, to him. A horseman immediately
hurried off to the Hellespont bearing the message, and,
having crossed over, handed the despatch to Megabazos.
After reading it, Megabazos took guides from Thrace and
marched against Pæonia.”
From the last detail it must be presumed that he had not as yet
been campaigning in the Pæonian region.
“The Pæonians, on hearing that the Persians were
coming against them, collected their forces on the side
towards the sea; thinking that the Persians would attempt
the invasion at that point”
The Persians, however, turned the position by taking the inland
road.

H. v. 16.
The Pæonians between Lake Praslas and the sea
immediately surrendered and were removed to Asia.
Herodotus then adds that those about Mount Pangæus were “not
11
substantially” subdued by Megabazos.
If this were indeed the case, it is evident that the assertion which
he has previously made to the effect that Megabazos reduced the
“coast districts” of Thrace must be understood in a restricted sense
in so far as this part of the country is concerned.
The net result of this part of the campaign seems to have been
that Megabazos got possession of the most critical point of the coast
road.

H. v. 17.
In accordance, it may be presumed, with his
instructions, Megabazos next sent seven Persians of
high rank to the neighbouring kingdom of Macedonia to demand the
earth and water of submission from Amyntas, its then ruler. The
12
extraordinary tale of this embassy, —how it came to Amyntas; how
he agreed to give earth and water; how the envoys were murdered
at a banquet at the instigation of his son Alexander; how the murder
was hushed up:⁠—contains what are evidently elements of fact
combined with a large amount of fiction whose intent is to glorify
13
Alexander in the sight of the Greeks. That such a murder could, if
H. v. 21, ad
it ever took place, be hushed up, is incredible. The
fin. parts of the story which appear to be true, are (1) that
Macedonia did in some way tender submission to
Persia; (2) that a Persian, Bubares, probably the son of the general
Megabazos, did marry a Macedonian princess. It is, however, a
doubtful question whether the submission was very real.
After the negotiations with Macedon, Megabazos went to the
Hellespont and thence to Sardes, taking the Pæonians with him.
On arriving there he heard, says Herodotus,
HISTIÆUS AND
MYRKINOS.
of the grant of Myrkinos to Histiæus; and that
the latter was fortifying the place. If this be
H. v. 23. true, it must be presumed that he had not marched
direct from Pæonia to the Hellespont and Sardes,
otherwise he would have known all about the proceedings of
Histiæus at Myrkinos. It is, however, much more probable that Darius
first heard from him the measures which Histiæus was taking to
secure his new possession. Megabazos was evidently alarmed at
the idea of this Greek tyrant holding a position which commanded
the North Ægean route; and, if the matter of his representations to
the king be truly reported, he pointed out to Darius the possibility of
Histiæus establishing Myrkinos as a rallying centre for the Thracians,
which might become the nucleus of a powerful state.
The subsequent history of Histiæus shows conclusively that the
great Persian officials had the deepest distrust of this scheming
Greek.
Megabazos’ representations had their effect. Histiæus was
recalled to Sardes, and when, later, Darius went up to Susa, he took
him with him, an honoured but unwilling guest.

H. v. 25, 26.
Before departing for Susa, Xerxes appointed
Artaphernes satrap of Sardes, and Otanes to succeed
Megabazos in the command in Thrace.

H. v. 26.
Otanes proceeded to take Byzantion and
Kalchedon. He also took Antandros in the Troad, and
Lamponion. Then, by means of ships obtained from Lesbos, he
reduced the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. That, according to
Herodotus, was the sum of his exploits.
There follow words, one at least of which has got corrupted in the
text; but there seems little cause to doubt that Herodotus wrote
either: “After this there was a respite from troubles, though not a long
14
one:” or, “After no long time there was a renewal of troubles.”
He then enters upon the description of that affair at Naxos which
immediately preceded the Ionian revolt.
The story of these operations in Thrace which are subsequent to
and the direct outcome of the so-called Scythian expedition, is one of
the most obscure chapters in Herodotus’ history. He had manifestly
the greatest difficulty in obtaining information with regard to the
events of the time. That which he did get he got from various
sources, whose discrepancies he only partially succeeded in
reconciling.
The modern writer is obliged to face the historical situation with
the courage alike of necessity and despair; of necessity, inasmuch
as the history of these years is of the utmost importance in the story
of the Persian relations with Europe, and, consequently, with
Greece; of despair, in that he must feel that detailed criticism of such
material must border on mere eclecticism. On the main outlines the
question it is, however, possible to arrive at conclusions which have
some sound foundation in evidence.
It seems quite clear that these campaigns of Megabazos and
Otanes aimed at the reduction of the Thracian races in Europe. In
ordering them Darius was probably pursuing the policy which had
underlain the so-called Scythian expedition. His stay at Sardes, for
what cannot have been less than the better part of a year after his
return from that expedition, indicates certainly that he considered
that the affairs of the westernmost extremity of his empire demanded
his personal attention more imperatively than affairs elsewhere, and
may well imply that they were of a nature to cause him some anxiety.
There had certainly been some disaster in the Scythian expedition. It
had been followed by the revolt, not merely of the towns on the
European side of the Propontis, but of places like Antandros in the
Troad, which Otanes had subsequently to reduce.
The strategic policy observed in the campaign of Megabazos is
striking in that the revolted cities are practically ignored. Its results
are in many respects uncertain. Herodotus describes them in a
descending scale;—first, as having consisted of the subjugation of all
the Thracians; secondly, as being confined to the conquest of the
coast regions; thirdly, as leaving even the conquest of these regions
incomplete in the neighbourhood of Mount Pangæus. It has been
pointed out that the first two statements may
DESIGNS OF
DARIUS IN EUROPE.
be reconciled as implying subjugation in two
different degrees; but the third constitutes, in
whatever way it be regarded, a significant exception.
As far as the revolted cities are concerned, it is possible that
Darius thought he could bide his time for dealing with them, and that
the larger Thracian policy first demanded his attention. The cities
were not powerful enough to do any active damage meanwhile.
How far was Megabazos successful in carrying out this larger
policy? If any conclusion is to be drawn from the fact that Darius
before leaving Sardes put Otanes in command in place of him, it is
that the king was not satisfied with what he had achieved.
Nevertheless, the success of his operations seems to have been
sufficient to convince the Macedonian king Amyntas of the
advisability of submitting to Persian suzerainty. What Megabazos
certainly did was to open up the coast road to the West; and this, if
the tale of the Pæonians is to be regarded as significant, he seems
to have done by the express orders of the king. In any case the
advance along this line is certainly a significant fact.
The objects, then, of Megabazos’ campaign appear to have
been⁠—
(1) To complete the reduction of Thrace;
 (2) To open up the route westwards.
Of these the first seems to have been but half accomplished; and
though more success had been attained with the second, the failure
to fully accomplish the first made it impossible for Darius to avail
himself for the time being of the advantages won along that western
route. He had found the Thracians, as others found them in later
days, a much more difficult conquest than he had in all probability
anticipated.
It is now possible to consider whether the attempt to arrive at an
ethnic frontier is the only object which may be suggested as guiding
the policy with regard to Thrace. Despite the obscurity of the
evidence, it seems clear that Darius intended the conquest of Thrace
to be a prelude to further conquest westwards, and that, in
pursuance of this design, European Greece was to be the next
object of attack. Whether the conquest of Greece was to be merely a
second stage in a great scheme of conquest along the northern
shores of the Mediterranean, or whether it was merely designed for
the purpose of securing the western borders of the empire by
subjugating the free kinsmen of the most western subjects of the
empire, cannot now be said, inasmuch as there is no evidence which
throws light upon the question.
It now remains to consider the evidence,⁠—
(1) As to Darius’ design of conquest westward;
(2) As to the reasons why the attempts to carry it out was
postponed for many years.
The operations of Megabazos on the Strymon, followed by the
demand for the submission of Macedonia, are certainly strong
indications, if not conclusive evidence of, the design to get hold of
the coast route to Northern Greece.
For the carrying out of operations on the scale requisite for an
expedition aiming at the reduction of Greece as a whole, the
command of a land route was necessary. The carrying capacity of a
ship of those days was so small that it would have been very difficult,
if not impossible, to transport a force of the magnitude required
across the Ægean. The expedition of 490 represents in all probability
the utmost that Persia could accomplish by sea transport, and that
was merely directed against Athens and Eretria, and had as its
declared object the punishment of the only two states of European
Greece which had interfered in the Ionian revolt.
But the results of Megabazos’ campaign, if unsupported by other
facts, would afford very inadequate evidence of a design on Greece.

H. iii. 138.
There is, however, a tale in Herodotus, the very
telling of which by that historian argues strongly for its
general truth. It is the story of Demokedes, the famous physician of
Kroton, who, having been in the service of Polykrates of Samos, was
captured by the Persians at the time of his murder, and after a series
of adventures became court physician at Susa.
PERSIANS
EXPLORE THE
About the time when Darius was starting for
GREEK COAST. the Scythian expedition, this Demokedes had
rendered a great service to Atossa, the wife of
Darius, who, instructed by him, persuaded Darius to send him with
an expedition to explore the coasts of Greece, with a view to the
H. iii. 136.
subsequent invasion of the country. Accompanied by
some prominent Persians, Demokedes went down to
Sidon in Phœnicia, where the expedition embarked on two triremes
and set sail for Greece. They circumnavigated the land, keeping
close to the shore, surveying the coasts, and making notes thereof in
writing. “At length, having examined the greatest part of it, they
proceeded to Tarentum in Italy.” What happened thereafter is not so
important. Suffice it to say that, with the aid of the tyrant of Tarentum,
Demokedes made his escape, and went to Kroton, whither the
Persians followed. The Krotonians refused to surrender him. The
Persians accordingly sailed back to Asia, but, “not having their guide,
they did not attempt to explore Greece any further.” It is not
H. iii. 129–
necessary to recount the rest of their adventures.
138. Herodotus closes the tale by remarking that they were
the first Persians who came from Asia to Greece, and
that they were spies.
This tale, like other tales of the time, did not lose in the telling. It
manifestly contains fanciful elements. But there do not, on the other
hand, exist any grounds whatever for disbelieving its main details,—
namely, that such an expedition was actually sent with a view to
explore the lands of Greece, and in accordance with an intention to
invade the country when the necessary steps for such an invasion
had been taken.
Megabazos’ campaign in Thrace was such a step. But when this
is said, it must not be supposed that the remark is intended to
convey the impression that this was the sole or even the main motive
of that campaign. Sole motives are, as it has been said, rare in the
history of policies. The design on Greece was the corollary to the
problem to be solved in Thrace. It was not necessarily regarded as
either superior or inferior in importance to the Thracian problem.
It is possible that the designs on both Thrace and Greece were
parts of a larger design which aimed at a simultaneous advance of
the Persian frontier along both sides of the Mediterranean. It is, at
any rate, noticeable that at the time of these operations in Europe, if
Herodotus’ rough chronology is to be accepted, Aryandes, the
Persian satrap in Egypt, was engaged in a campaign in Cyrene.
H. iii. 13; iv.
Cyrene had been tributary to Persia for some time
165. past; but troubles had arisen there which called for
Persian interference; and this resulted in the Persian
frontier being advanced as far as Euesperides.
There still remains what is, owing to the lack of evidence, the very
difficult question as to the reasons which prevented or dissuaded
Darius from carrying out his designs on Greece in the years which
intervened between the campaign of Megabazos and the outbreak of
the Ionian revolt. That may be calculated to have actually broken out
in 499. But what is the date of the end of Megabazos’ campaign?

H. v. 23.
It certainly took place some time before Darius left
Sardes. Megabazos finds him there on his return; and
Histiæus is subsequently recalled to Sardes before Darius leaves the
place.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to fix the date of Darius’ departure
from Sardes.
 H. v. 73.
He had certainly gone to Susa before the arrival of
the Athenian embassy which appealed to Persia for
aid against Spartan aggression, because it is to Artaphernes that the
appeal is addressed. But even if the date of Hippias’ expulsion be
taken as fixed, who is to say what time elapsed between that and the
H. v. 66, 70,
sending of this embassy? Much happened at Athens
72, 73. during the interval—the political struggle between
Kleisthenes and Isagoras; the demand of Kleomenes
of Sparta for the expulsion of Kleisthenes; the retirement of
Kleisthenes; the disastrous expedition of Kleomenes, ending in his
own defeat, and in disaster to the party of Isagoras; the return of
Kleisthenes, and the carrying out of the reforms which bear his
name.
All these things must have taken a considerable time; but in so far
as the history of Persian affairs in Asia is concerned, the conclusion
to be drawn from them is but vague. It comes
POSTPONEMENT
to no more than this,—that Artaphernes was
OF DESIGNS ON
GREECE. acting alone in Sardes some years after the
expulsion of Hippias, at a date which can
hardly be later than b.c. 507, and that therefore Darius had gone up
to Susa before that time; but, on the other hand, it is quite impossible
to say how long before that time his departure had taken place.
Darius’ departure seems to indicate clearly that he had for the
time being given up all idea of the immediate prosecution of large
designs in the West.
There are several reasons which may be suggested for the
temporary abandonment of his plans.
There can, in the first place, be little doubt that the campaign in
Thrace had not ended in anything resembling the complete
subjugation of that difficult country. Disaster in the Scythian
expedition had seriously shaken Persian prestige, not merely on the
European, but also on the Asiatic side of the Propontis; and though
Megabazos’ campaign may have staved off actual danger, its
positive results appear to have been but partial, and not such as to
warrant further advance.
 By the time that campaign came to an end Darius must have
been absent from Susa for a space of well-nigh two years; and so
prolonged an absence in one remote corner of the empire, far away
from the real centre of government, must have had its
inconveniences, if not its dangers, in a dominion so wide and so
recently reduced to obedience.
The postponement of success in Thrace was the first cause of the
postponement of the designs on Greece.
During the years between the departure of Darius from Sardes
and the occurrence of those incidents which led to the outbreak of
the Ionian revolt Persian history is almost a blank. Darius, the central
figure of the whole drama, vanishes from the stage for a long interval
of years. Had he, like the Nebuchadnezzar of the Book of Daniel,
been driven forth among the beasts of the field, his effacement from
H. ii. 110.
written record could hardly have been more complete.
There is an incidental tale in Herodotus’ Egyptian
history which refers to a visit of Darius to Egypt, made possibly
during this time. If the tale be true, the incident certainly occurred
after the Scythian expedition; and the campaign in Cyrene, or the
settlement of affairs after it, may have called for his presence in that
part of the empire.
Otherwise, in so far as is known, he spent these years at Susa,
where he appears to have been at the time of the outbreak of the
Ionian revolt.
Otanes, Megabazos’ successor, is engaged in a campaign
against the revolted Greek cities of the Hellespontine region, which
are once more brought into subjection; but there is no means of
judging how long the campaign lasted.
Did he carry on the operations in Thrace? Probable though the
H. v. 116.
conjecture may be, there is no evidence that he did so,
save the very indecisive fact that he is still in Asia
Minor at the time of the revolt.
Artaphernes is satrap at Sardes throughout the interval, and
during his tenure of office there is a distinct and striking development
of the relations between Persia and European Greece. It is
remarkable that it is from the side of Greece,—from Athens, above
all,—that the first advances are made.
That state had been for some years past in the throes of a
revolution, in which the Spartan king, Kleomenes, had played
various parts. After being instrumental in expelling Hippias in 511
b.c., he had discovered that by so doing he had placed the power
in the hands of the democratic party at Athens. He sought to remedy
the mistake by espousing the cause of Isagoras and the oligarchs.
His interference was disastrous to himself and fatal to them. In spite
of his failure, his action caused great alarm at Athens, and an idea
sprang up there that he aimed at making the country subservient to
Sparta. There was no power in Greece itself to which Athens could
H. v. 73.
turn for protection against Sparta, and in her perplexity
she cast her eyes over sea to the great empire on the
eastern side of the Ægean, and sent an embassy to Artaphernes
asking for his assistance.
It is on the face of it a very remarkable fact
AFFAIRS AT
ATHENS.
that Artaphernes abstained from making full
use of the opportunity thus offered him for
interference in the affairs of Greece; but the fact, remarkable as it is,
is in accord with such other indications as exist of the position of
affairs at this time in the West Asian satrapies. It is probable that
Artaphernes had his hands full with the maintenance of the dominion
which Persia had won in that region, and that he had at the time
neither the will nor the power to spare such resources as he had at
his disposal on the direct acquisition of further territory. He made a
pretence,—his ignorance can hardly have been real,—of not
knowing who the Athenians were. On being informed, he offered
them alliance on condition they gave earth and water, an offer which
the Athenian ambassadors took upon themselves to accept. When,
however, they returned to Athens their conduct in so doing was
strongly condemned, and the terms were repudiated.
Shortly after this the storm which the Athenians had foreseen
H. v. 74.
broke upon them. Kleomenes collected a formidable
army from Peloponnesus and invaded Attica, while the Bœotians
and the Chalkidians of Eubœa prepared to attack from the north.
The main danger was averted by the disruption of Kleomenes’ army.
The defection not merely of the Corinthians, but also of Demaratos,
Kleomenes’ partner in the dual kingship of Sparta, brought the
expedition to a premature close after it had actually entered upon
Attic territory. This was disastrous for the northern allies. The
Bœotians and the Chalkidians were both defeated. In the case of the
latter the disaster was irreparable. Their great city, foremost in early
Greek trade and colonization, lost its independence, and its lands
were occupied by Athenian settlers. Athens had acquired one of the
great strategic positions of Greece; and Corinth had made the first of
those fatal mistakes of policy which were to have such momentous
consequences in the next century.
The Bœotians did not accept defeat. Left in the lurch by their
H. v. 89.
Peloponnesian allies, they sought and obtained aid
from Ægina, which great trading state seized the
opportunity of inflicting damage on an old enemy and growing rival in
commerce, and harried the Attic coast with piratical raids.
Meanwhile events were preparing for a second interference of
H. v. 90.
Persia in Athenian affairs. The Lacedæmonians had
discovered the fact that they had been tricked by the
Delphic Oracle, which, bribed by the Alkmæonidæ, had urged them
to aid in the expulsion of Hippias from Athens. Seeking to amend this
mistake, they recalled Hippias from Sigeon in the Troad, to which
principality he had retired after his expulsion, and where he must
have been living for some years as a vassal prince of Persia. Their
intention was to reinstate him in the tyranny at Athens. It was again
the Corinthians who wrecked the plan. At a conference of the
Peloponnesian League called to consider the question, they bitterly
opposed the proposal, and carried the other allies with them.
Hippias, having had his journey for nothing, returned to Asia more
than ever embittered in feeling against Athens and Greece alike; and
he seems to have moved heaven and earth to induce Artaphernes to
reinstate him in his tyranny. In the end he prevailed so far that
Artaphernes called upon the Athenians to receive him back. Whether
he intended to take action in case of their refusal will never be
known, but events were imminent in Asia, even if they had not
already occurred, which rendered all idea of his active interference
out of the question; for, if Herodotus’ chronology be correct, this
demand was made by him either immediately before or after the first
H. v. 96, 97.
actual step had been taken in the great revolt. The
demand, says Herodotus, convinced the Athenians
that thereafter there could only be open enmity with Persia; and
while they were in this mind Aristagoras came to Athens.
 CHAPTER III.
THE IONIAN REVOLT.
The mist which hangs over the history of the last decade of the sixth
century lifts somewhat when the historian enters upon the narrative
of the first ten years of the fifth; but it does not wholly vanish. Striking
incidents occur indeed within the range of vision; but it is evident that
beyond that range many events took place which had much
influence on the history of the time; and the causes of the known lie
largely in the region of the unknown.
It is impossible to accept the accounts which Herodotus gives of
the Ionian revolt or of the Marathonian campaign as a full history of
either of those events. There are wide gaps in both narratives; and
much that is recorded is wholly unaccounted for by anything in the
rest of the story, or is, in some cases, wholly inconsistent with other
facts which are mentioned. In tracing the course of events the
modern inquirer is in the position of an astronomer who, having
observed aberrations in the course of a far-off planet which cannot
be accounted for by any known causes, seeks in the dim distance
beyond for the disturbing influence. There, alas! the parallel between
the two inquirers ceases, inasmuch as mathematical formulæ have
not yet been made applicable to human action.
The imperfect character of the information which Herodotus
furnishes with regard to the story of the great Revolt is so evident
that the historian himself must have been conscious of it. The
peculiarity of his narrative was therefore due in all probability to
some simple reason; either, it may be, to the difficulties which met
him in his search for reliable information, and to his disinclination to
insert in his history anything which he personally regarded as
unreliable; or to a determination to deal with only the most prominent
and striking incidents of a part of history which was, after all, merely
a preface to the great tale which he had set himself to tell—the story
of the war in Europe in the years 480 b.c. and 479 b.c.
It is possible that both causes had their effect on his narrative. But
if any judgment can be formed from data furnished by the general
characteristics of the history as a whole, the first of these two
suggested causes is the more credible. If, as is manifestly the case,
he experienced the greatest difficulty in arriving at the truth
concerning events which were comparatively recent at the time at
which he wrote, and which had been of a nature such as to attract
the attention of the whole world of his day, it is by no means
surprising if he experienced much greater difficulty in getting at the
facts concerning what occurred at an earlier date, and about events
which, though striking, were infinitely less remarkable than those of
the period which immediately followed them.
15
The defects in the story of the Ionian revolt, to whatever cause
they be due, are in the main of three kinds:⁠—
(1) Omissions;
(2) Lack of chronological data;
(3) Anti-Ionian bias.
The main chronological difficulty is to attribute the events
recorded to the years in which they actually took place. The only fact
H. vi. 18.
obtainable from Herodotus is that the outbreak took
place in the sixth year before the capture of Miletus. It
is possible to calculate with satisfactory certainty that the latter event
took place in 494 b.c.; and therefore the revolt must have broken
out in 499.
The actual outbreak of the rising was
THE AFFAIR OF
brought about in a somewhat indirect way by
NAXOS.
an event or series of events which appear in
Herodotus’ narrative as wholly independent of what had happened in
the previous years. It may, however, be seen that these events could
hardly have taken place had they not promised an issue such as
would have been in accord with the tentative policy which
Artaphernes had been following for some time past in his relations
with European Greece.
He had already on two occasions shown a wish to interfere in the
internal affairs of Athens. On both occasions he had made demands
which aimed at the establishment of an area of Persian influence
west of the Ægean; but on both occasions also he had omitted to
back up those demands by even the display of force, unless,—which
is, indeed, possible,—the demand for the reinstatement of Hippias
was made at the time that the Persian expedition was preparing to
16
start for Naxos, if not on its way thither.
The affair at Naxos, which afforded Artaphernes the prospect of
being able to forward his policy towards Greece, arose from
circumstances which were but too common in Greek communities.
The island was at the time the most opulent in the Ægean. When
Samos lost its position as the easternmost land of the free Greeks
on the great trade route which followed the line of islands which all
H. v. 28.
but bridge the middle of that sea, much of its trade
must have passed to the most important of the islands
which now became the outworks of Greek liberty. Prosperity did not
bring peace in its train. Political dissension was rife; and certain of
the wealthier inhabitants were driven out from the island, and sought
refuge at Miletus.
There ruled at this time in Miletus Aristagoras, a cousin and son-
in-law of that Histiæus whom Darius had taken up to Susa. To him
the exiles applied for assistance. He told them that he could not
unaided supply them with a force powerful enough to cope with the
eight thousand hoplites which Naxos could put into the field, but that
H. v. 31.
he would get help from Artaphernes. To Artaphernes
at Sardes he accordingly went. The great satrap
required but little persuasion to induce him to enter upon an
undertaking so promising for the fulfilment of his designs upon
Greece; for Aristagoras held out the prospect of the acquisition not
merely of Naxos, but of the other Cyclades and of the great island of
Eubœa.