Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar

[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 1

SHAIKH MOHD IBRAHIM SHAIKH OMAR

lwn.
TAN SRI DR HAILI DOLHAN & YANG LAIN

Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Kota Bharu

Mohamad Abazafree Mohd Abbas PK
[Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman No: DA-25-4-05/2021]
4 Julai 2022

Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Abd Razak Atan v. Dato' Hj Ahmad Ragib Hj Mohd Salleh And Ors [2010] 4
MELR 1; [2010] 1 MLRA 802; [2010] 3 MLJ 753; [2010] 4 ILR 1; [2010] 6 CLJ
887 (dirujuk)
Amraoti v. Vithal Vinayak [1941] AIR Nagpur 125 (dirujuk)
Azman bdullah v. Ketua Polis Negara [1996] 2 MLRA 49; [1997] 1 MLJ 263;
[1997] 1 CLJ 257; [1997] 1 AMR 180 (dirujuk)
Dato' Saadon Othman v. Lembaga Tatatertib Awam Kumpulan Pengurusan (No
1) & Ors [2019] MLRHU 623 (dirujuk)
Domnic Selvam S Gnanapragasam v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2007] 1 MLRH 1;
[2007] 2 MLJ 761; [2006] 8 CLJ 114 (dirujuk)
Marzuki Abdul Aziz v. Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [2003] 1 MLRA 299; [2003] 3
MLJ 390; [2003] 3 CLJ 315; [2003] 4 AMR 175 (dirujuk)
M Sentivelu R Marimuthu v. Public Service Commission Malaysia & Anor [2005]
1 MLRA 633; [2005] 5 MLJ 393; [2005] 3 CLJ 778 (dirujuk)
Noor Bhayzura Dali v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor
[2021] MLRAU 186; [2021] 6 MLJ 479; [2021] 10 CLJ 860 (dirujuk)
Nordin Hj Zakaria (Timbalan Ketua Polis Kelantan) & Anor v. Mohd Noor
Abdullah [2004] 1 MLRA 387; [2004] 2 CLJ 777; [2008] 3 AMR 689 (dirujuk)
Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow And Another Appeal [2019] 3
MLRA 183; [2019] 3 MLJ 443; [2019] 4 CLJ 561; [2019] 3 AMR 625 (dirujuk)
Ranjit Kaur S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 MELR 129;
[2010] 5 MLRA 696; [2011] 1 ILJ 479; [2010] 6 MLJ 1; [2010] 4 ILR 475; [2010] 8
CLJ 629; [2011] 3 AMR 38 (dirujuk)
Rohana Ariffin & Anor v. Universiti Sains Malaysia [1986] 2 MLRH 43; [1988] 2
MLJ 609; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 390 (dirujuk)
T Ganeswaran v. Suruhanjaya Polis Diraja Malaysia & 1 Lagi [2005] 1 MLRA
493; [2005] 6 MLJ 97; [2005] 3 CLJ 302; [2005] 4 AMR 541 (dirujuk)
Wira Swire Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2019] MLRHU 685
(dirujuk)
Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 6
MLRA 326; [2015] 6 MLJ 810; [2016] 2 CLJ 414 (dirujuk)

Perundangan yang dirujuk:

Public Officers (Conduct And Discipline) Regulations 1993, regs 20, 25(1), 34,
35, 37, 53(1)
Rules of Court 2012, O 53
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 2 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

Lain-lain yang dirujuk:

Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edn, West Group (2004) US
Doctrine of Condonation: Challenges in the Management of Disciplinary Cases in
Public University UUMJLS, pp 139-149 (2016)
Halsbury Law of Malaysia
Webster's New World Law Dictionary, 2nd edn, (2010) Wiley Publishing INS
(New Jersey)

Kaunsel:
Bagi pihak pemohon: Shaharuddin Mohamed; Tetuan Shaharuddin Hidayu &
Marwaliz
Bagi pihak responden-responden: Ahmad Faiz Fitri Mohamad; Pejabat Penasihat
Undang-Undang Negeri

[Permohonan pemohon ditolak dengan kos.]

PENGHAKIMAN

Mohamad Abazafree Mohd Abbas PK:

Pendahuluan

[1] Ini adalah merupakan satu permohonan Semakan Kehakiman yang

difailkan oleh Pemohon di bawah A 53 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah (KKM
2012) bagi memohon satu relif untuk membatalkan hukuman lucuthak
emolumen bagi tidak hadir bertugas dan buang kerja yang dibuat oleh
Responden serta satu Perintah Mandamus untuk Pemohon dikembalikan
semula kepada pekerjaannya.

[2] Kertas-kertas kausa yang berkaitan bagi permohonan ini adalah seperti
berikut:

(a) Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman bertarikh 13 September

2021 adalah di Kandungan 3;

(b) Notis Pendengaran Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman adalah

di Kandungan 6;

(c) Pernyataan Mengikut A 53 k 4(2) KKM 2012 adalah di

Kandungan 7;

(d) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Pemohon iaitu Shaikh

Mohd Ibrahim bin Shaikh Omar bertarikh 12 September 2021 adalah
di Kandungan 8;

(e) Afidavit Tambahan Pemohon yang diikrarkan oleh Wan Nurul

Hafiza binti Wan Hassan bertarikh 12 September 2021 adalah di
Kandungan 9;
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 3

(f) Afidavit Jawapan Responden yang diikrarkan oleh Tan Sri Dr

Khair bin Mohamad bertarikh 18 Oktober 2021 adalah di Kandungan
11;

(g) Afidavit Balasan (1) Pemohon yang diikrarkan oleh Pemohon

bertarikh 23 November 2021 adalah di Kandungan 12; dan

(h) Afidavit Balasan oleh Wan Nurul Hafiza pada 23 November 2021
adalah di Kandungan 13.

Latar Belakang Dan Fakta Kes

[3] Pemohon di dalam kes ini adalah merupakan bekas Pegawai Perkhidmatan
Pendidikan yang bergred DG41 yang ditempatkan di Sekolah Kebangsaan
Pulai Chondong, Kelantan. Pemohon mendakwa telah mengalami penyakit
kemurungan sejak awal tahun 2014 dan ianya berpanjangan sehingga perlu
mendapatkan rawatan di Hospital Tumpat, Kelantan.

[4] Pemohon turut mendakwa bahawa Pemohon telah memaklumkan perkara

ini kepada Guru Besarnya yang merupakan Ketua Jabatan di sekolah tempat
Pemohon mengajar. Pada 10 Julai 2014, Pemohon yang dibantu oleh isterinya
iaitu Wan Nurul Hafiza binti Wan Hassan telah mengisi Borang Permohonan
Cuti Tanpa Gaji selama 180 hari bagi mendapatkan rawatan dan borang
permohonan tersebut telah dihantar kepada Guru Besar pada 16 Julai 2014
berserta surat pengesahan rawatan dari Hospital Tumpat yang menyatakan
Pemohon sedang menjalani rawatan yang memerlukan rawatan ulangan
setiap 2 minggu. Tiada sebarang perakuan yang dikemukakan oleh mana-
mana Pegawai Perubatan yang mengesahkan Pemohon mengalami penyakit
kemurungan.

[5] Setakat keterangan yang dikemukakan, tiada sebarang bukti yang

menunjukkan bahawa permohonan cuti tersebut telah diluluskan oleh Ketua
Jabatan Pemohon. Sebaliknya, Pemohon mempunyai rekod kehadiran
bertugas yang kurang baik sepertimana yang ditunjukkan melalui ekshibit
"TSKM-1" di Kandungan 11.

[6] Ini membawa kepada beberapa Surat Tunjuk Sebab yang dikeluarkan oleh
Guru Besar kepada Pemohon bertarikh 30 April 2015, 13 Mei 2015, 16 Jun
2015, 7 Julai 2015, 22 Julai 2015 dan 20 Ogos 2015 yang kesemuanya di
ekshibitkan sebagai "TSKM-2" di Kandungan 11. Melalui surat bertarikh 7
Mei 2015, Pemohon telah memberi jawapan bahawa ketidakhadirannya
disebabkan oleh masalah kewangan yang dihadapi oleh Pemohon. Ia
sepertimana di ekshibit "TSKM-3" di Kandungan 11. Tiada sebarang
makluman berkenaan keadaan mental Pemohon dinyatakan di dalam surat
tersebut.

[7] Pada 23 Ogos 2015, Guru Besar selaku Ketua Jabatan Pemohon telah
mengemukakan laporan Mengenai Salah Laku Pegawai kepada Pengarah
Pendidikan, Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Kelantan bagi melaporkan
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 4 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

ketidakhadiran Pemohon dan selanjutnya pada 5 Oktober 2015, Jabatan

Pendidikan Kelantan telah mengemukakan laporan kepada Pengerusi
Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Pendidikan Kumpulan Pengurusan (No 2),
Bahagian Sumber Manusia, Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia.

[8] Selanjutnya pada 23 November 2017, Guru Besar mengemukakan Analisa

Kehadiran Pegawai kepada Responden-responden sepertimana di ekshibit
"TSKM-5" di Kandungan 11. Berlanjutan dari itu, pada 16 Januari 2018
Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Pendidikan Kumpulan
Pengurusan (No 2) bersandarkan kepada Peraturan 35 Peraturan-peraturan
Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan & Tatatertib) 1993 ("Peraturan 1993") telah
mendapati bahawa berdasarkan kepada laporan yang diadukan, ia
mewarankan hukuman buang kerja atau penurunan pangkat dan telah
mengemukakan Perakuan Tindakan Tatatertib ke atas Pemohon kepada
Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pelajaran (SPP).

[9] Ini membawa kepada satu surat pertuduhan dikeluarkan kepada Pemohon
pada 24 September 2018 yang telah diserahkan oleh Guru Besar kepada
Pemohon melalui surat yang diekshibitkan sebagai "TSKM-7". Menurut
keterangan oleh Responden, tiada sebarang representasi dikemukakan oleh
Pemohon dan pada 10 Januari 2019, SPP telah bersidang dan memutuskan
hukuman lucut hak emolumen bagi tempoh tidak hadir bekerja dan buang
kerja ke atas Pemohon.

[10] Sehubungan dengan itu, surat pemakluman telah dikeluarkan oleh SPP
pada 22 Januari 2019. Guru Besar yang telah diamanahkan untuk membuat
serahan surat tersebut namun Pemohon telah enggan untuk menerima surat
pemakluman tersebut yang membawa kepada serahan dokumen tersebut
kepada isteri Pemohon.

[11] Pemohon melalui Semakan Kehakiman ini, memohon relif-relif seperti

berikut:

a. Suatu Perintah Certiorari bagi membatalkan hukuman lucut hak

emolumen dan buang kerja yang dibuat yang berkuatkuasa pada 10
Januari 2019 melalui surat bertarikh 22 Januari 2019;

b. Suatu Perintah bahawa hukuman lucut hak emolumen dan buang

kerja yang dibuat yang berkuatkuasa pada 10 Januari 2019 melalui
surat bertarikh 22 Januari 2019 adalah batal, tidak sah dan tiada efek;

c. Suatu Perintah Mandamus bahawa plaintif dikembalikan ke

pekerjaannya dengan pangkat asalnya sebelum pada hukuman buang
kerja dikenakan oleh responden;

d. Suatu Perintah bahawa pemohon layak menerima semula semua

pembayaran gaji, elaun, emolumen, pampasan pencen, pencen
bulanan dan segala bayaran yang beliau layak terima mengikut skim
perkhidmatannya serta peluang kenaikan pangkat dan kekananan; dan
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 5

e. Suatu inkuiri/siasatan dijalankan untuk menentukan gaji-gaji

tertunggak, elaun-elaun, emolumen-emolumen, pampasan pencen,
pencen-pencen bulanan dan faedah-faedah lain yang Pemohon
sepatutnya menerima dari tarikh Pemohon dibuang kerja daripada
perkhidmatan (10 Januari 2019) sehingga penyelesaian penuh.

Prinsip Undang-Undang Berkaitan Semakan Kehakiman

[12] Prinsip undang-undang di dalam A 53 KKM 2012 adalah jelas dan

mantap berkaitan kuasa Mahkamah ini sebagaimana yang dijelaskan oleh
Hakim Nordin Hassan HMT (pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Wira Swire Sdn
Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2019] MLRHU 685 seperti berikut:

"The law on judicial review is well settled that the court may review a
decision in the exercise of public duty or function on the grounds of
illegality, irrationality or procedure impropriety."

[13] Hakim Nordin Hassan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah

Persekutuan iaitu Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow (sebagai
Setiausaha Kebajikan dan Amal Liam Hood Thong Chor Seng Thuan) And
Another Appeal [2019] 3 MLRA 183; [2019] 3 MLJ 443; [2019] 4 CLJ 561;
[2019] 3 AMR 625 yang menyatakan:

"[60] This landmark decision moved the courts from a position of

deciding whether prerogative power existed to deciding if they were
being carried out lawfully. Lord Diplock in his speech at p 401D of the
GCHQ case enunciated three classic grounds for judicial review:

'Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when

one can conveniently classify under heads the grounds upon
which administrative action is subject to control by judicial
review. The first ground I would call 'illegality'. The second
'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'...

By 'illegality' as a ground for Judicial Review, I mean that the

decision-maker must understand correctly the law that
regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.
Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question
to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the
judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable.

By 'irrationality', I mean what can by now be succinctly

referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB
223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be
decided could have arrived at it."
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 6 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

[14] Terdahulu, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes T Ganeswaran v.

Suruhanjaya Polis Diraja Malaysia & 1 Lagi [2005] 1 MLRA 493; [2005] 6 MLJ
97; [2005] 3 CLJ 302; [2005] 4 AMR 541 telah menggariskan bidangkuasa
semakan kehakiman seperti berikut:

"Sebelum Mahkamah ini mempertimbangkan alasan-alasan rayuan

yang dikemukakan peguam perayu kami berpendapat adalah lebih
sesuai jika dinyatakan di sini mengenai prinsip- prinsip yang
digunapakai oleh mahkamah-mahkamah dalam pengendalian kes-kes
'judicial review'.

Mengenai perkara ini ingin kami merujuk kepada keputusan House of

Lords di dalam kes Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans
[1982] 3 All ER 141 yang menyatakan:

Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review

of the manner in which the decision was made, and, therefore
the court is not entitled on an application for judicial review to
consider whether the decision itself was fair and reasonable.

Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with

the decision - making process. Unless the restriction on the
power of the court is observed, the court will in my view
under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself
guilty of usurping power."

[15] Menyentuh soal yang sama di dalam kes Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v.
Universiti Sains Malaysia [1986] 2 MLRH 43; [1988] 2 MLJ 609; [1988] 2 CLJ
(Rep) 390, Hakim Edgar Joseph Jr J (beliau ketika itu) di dalam
penghakimannya menyatakan:

I would at the outset say that in considering these applications I have

kept in the forefront of my mind the basic principles to be distilled
from a number of cases upon which courts will review decisions of
public authorities and inferior tribunals.

The basic principles may be stated thus:

(1) judicial review applies to any body of persons having legal

authority derived from public law to determine questions
affecting the rights of subjects whether that right is derived
from statute or from the common law;

(2) the High Court is not a Court of Appeal from the body
under review;

(3) the High Court limits itself to determining whether the

public authority or inferior tribunal has acted lawfully,
rationally and with due regard to proper procedures;
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 7

(4) the court will not substitute its judgment or discretion for
the judgment or discretion of the body under review;

(5) facts determined by the body under review are rarely open
to review in the High Court;

(6) the High Court will intervene unless there is express

statutory direction to the contrary;

(7) if there is an established appeal procedure from the

decision of the body under review the court usually prefers this
course to be followed;

(8) only activities of a public nature can be the subject of

judicial review.

The cases from which I have distilled the above principles are:
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1
Ridge v. Baldwin, 2 Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food
, 3 Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, 4 Secretary of State
for Education & Science v. Tameside BC, 5 Chief Constable of the North
Wales Police v. Evans , 6 O'Reilly v. Mackman , 7 Law v. National
Greyhound Racing Club Ltd , 8 Square Meals Frozen Foods Ltd v.
Dunstable Corporation, 9 R v. Crown Court at Ipswich, ex p Baldwin, 10
and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service."

[16] Berdasarkan kepada prinsip-prinsip asas ini, Mahkamah menegaskan

bahawa permohonan Semakan Kehakiman bukan bertujuan untuk menyemak
keputusan tetapi untuk menyemak proses keputusan itu dibuat, dan bahawa di
dalam permohonan Semakan Kehakiman, Mahkamah tidak menjalankan
bidang kuasa rayuan tetapi bidangkuasa penyeliaan. Adalah menjadi
kewajipan Mahkamah untuk melihat sama ada keputusan yang dibuat oleh
responden-responden telah mengikut prosedur yang ditetapkan di bawah
undang-undang yang terpakai.

Analisis Dan Dapatan Mahkamah

Isu Pertama: Sama Ada Doktrin Pemaafan ("Doctrine Of Condonation")

Terpakai Memandangkan Terdapatnya Kelewatan Di Dalam Tatacara
Tatatertib Ke Atas Pemohon

[17] Peguam pemohon menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini alasan kepada
hukuman ke atas pemohon adalah disebabkan pemohon tidak hadir bertugas.
Pemohon mendakwa bahawa Pemohon telah memaklumkan kepada Guru
Besar iaitu Ketua Jabatan tempat pemohon bekerja berhubung dengan
penyakit yang dialami oleh pemohon iaitu kemurungan sejak Januari 2014.

[18] Dengan dibantu oleh isterinya iaitu Wan Nurul Hafiza, pada 10 Julai
2014, Pemohon telah mengisi Borang Permohonan Cuti Tanpa Gaji,
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 8 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

memohon cuti selama 180 hari bagi mendapatkan rawatan. Berdasarkan surat
tersebut, terdapat akuan penerimaan oleh Ketua Jabatan. Namun menurut
Pemohon, Guru Besar telah meminta Pemohon berehat dan mendapatkan
rawatan di hospital.

[19] Ini menurut Pemohon dibuktikan dengan perakuan Guru Besar bahawa
prestasi rekod kehadiran Pemohon adalah baik namun prestasi kehadiran
Pemohon mula merosot bermula bulan Mei 2017. Guru Besar kemudiannya
telah mengemukakan ulasan kepada Pengarah Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri
Kelantan agar Pemohon ditukarkan ke sekolah yang lebih dekat dengan
rumah Pemohon dan menghantar Pemohon mengikuti kursus bagi
membolehkan Pemohon menjadi guru yang baik.

[20] Peguambela Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa ini menunjukkan

wujudnya doktrin pemaafan ("doctrine of condonation") dalam
mengendalikan kes Pemohon. Peguambela telah merujuk kepada kes Noor
Bhayzura Dali v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [2021]
MLRAU 186; [2021] 6 MLJ 479; [2021] 10 CLJ 860 di mana Mahkamah
Rayuan telah menyatakan:

"[31] Tuan Ruslan Tuan Mat in his affidavit in opposition, said more
than once that in 2014 the absence of the appellant was reported to the
integrity unit by the head of department but failed to explain why it
was not reported to the Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Pengurusan
(No 1) for action to be taken. The complaint of the appellant is not
that she would have succeeded in her defence of condonation before
Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Pengurusan (No 1) or the Public
Services Commission. She has complained it was not taken into
account at all by the Disciplinary Authority and that this omission
resulted in procedural impropriety. We find merit in this ground for
the following reasons.

[32] The substantive disciplinary offence of the appellant in the instant

case is absence from work. As we noted earlier, absence from work
must be reported to the Disciplinary Authority "as soon as possible"
under reg 25 Although it is correct to say that the 1993 Regulations do
not impose any time limit for commencement of disciplinary
proceedings, the omission to report an officer for being absence from
work "as soon as possible", would certainly call into question whether
there was condonation of the disciplinary infraction by the head of
department. Otherwise, the words, "as soon as possible" would be
rendered otiose and meaningless.

[33] In the instant case, the appellant had deposed unchallenged

evidence of condonation by her head of department and his
recommendation for leniency. As we said earlier, the head of
department only sent a report to the integrity unit and not to the
Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Pengurusan (No 1). The appellant's
explanation was accepted by the head of department and she was
allowed to continue work in 2014. In fact, nothing much happened
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 9

after that until the end of 2016 when she was absent again for 11 days
which resulted in her salary for seven days being deducted. In the
interim, she was given a good performance report (above 90%) for the
years 2014, 2015 and 2016 by her head of department. She was even
deemed suitable for promotion."

[21] Mahkamah dapati tiada tafsiran yang jelas berkaitan doktrin ini. Black's
Law Dictionary (eight edition), West Group (2004) US bagaimanapun
menafsirkan "condonation" sebagai:

"as- a victim's express or implied forgiveness of offence, specially by

treating the offender as if there had been no offence"

[22] Manakala Webster's New World Law Dictionary (second edition) (2010)
Wiley Publishing INS (New Jersey) menafsirkan perkataan yang sama
sebagai:

"the forgiveness, purposeful disregard, or tacit approval by a victim of

another's illegal or objectional act, especially by treating the other
person as if nothing happened."

[23] Halsbury Law of Malaysia pula di atas subjek ini menyatakan:

"Condonation arises when an employer with full knowledge of a

servant's misconduct, elects to continue him in service. Where
misconduct has been condoned, it may not be relied on by the
employer to dismiss a workman unless there are subsequent acts of
misconduct."

[24] Di dalam kes Azman bin Abdullah v. Ketua Polis Negara [1996] 2 MLRA
49; [1997] 1 MLJ 263; [1997] 1 CLJ 257; [1997] 1 AMR 180 Hakim Abdul
Malek Ahmad HMR (pada ketika itu) telah merujuk kepada kes Amraoti v.
Vithal Vinayak [1941] AIR Nagpur 125 yang menyatakan:

"Once a master has condoned any misconduct which would have

justified dismissal or a fine, he cannot after such condonation go back
upon his election to condone and claim a right to dismiss his (the
servant) or impose a fine or any other punishment in respect of the
offense which has been condoned."

[25] Mahkamah ini turut merujuk kepada kes Abd Razak bin Atan v. Dato' Hj
Ahmad Ragib bin Hj Mohd Salleh (sued in his capacity as Assistant Chief
Administrator to IGP) And Ors [2010] 4 MELR 1; [2010] 1 MLRA 802; [2010]
3 MLJ 753; [2010] 4 ILR 1; [2010] 6 CLJ 887, Hakim Abdul Malik Ishak
HMR telah menjelaskan berkaitan konsep doktrin pemaafan ini seperti
berikut:

"[55] In regard to condonation, I have this to say.

 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 10 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

[56] It has its origin in the common law (Phillips v. Foxall [1871-72] 7
LRQB 666, at p 680; and Beattie v. Parmenter [1888-89] 5 TLR 396, at
p 397) and it has been accepted in Australia as seen in the case of
Meyrick v. Stirling Bros Limited [1899-1901] 1-3 WAR 51, in New
Zealand as reflected in the case of Corry v. Clouston & Co (Limited)
[1904] 23 NZLR 595, SC, in South Africa as demonstrated in the case
of The Federal Supply and Cold Storage Company of South Africa
(Limited) v. Angehrn and Piel [1910] LT 626, in India as shown in the
case of LW Middleton v. Harry Playfair AIR [1925] Calcutta 87, at p
92, in Canada as can be seen in the case of Lucas v. Premier Motors Ltd
[1928] 4 DLR 526, in Malaysia as reflected in the case of The
Manager, Scudai Estate, Johore Bahru v. Narayanan [1960] 1 MLRH
90; [1960] 26 MLJ 162, and, finally, in Hong Kong as seen in the case
of Yeung Chee-Kiu v. Lam Chee Trading As Yau Fat Furniture Co
[1966] HKDCLR 65, at p 68.

[57] Very often condonation is referred to as a waiver. According to

Lord Goff in Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v. Shipping
Corporation of India (The "Kanchenjunga") [1990] 1 Lloyd's Law
Reports 391, at p 398, condonation as a waiver is not a variation of the
contract and does not require consideration to support it. It is said that
condonation prevents an employer from punishing an employee not
because for a breach of a contractual duty but rather because the
employer has condoned the misbehaviour of the employee and it is
unconscionable or inequitable for the employer to be permitted to
deny the effect of his words or conduct. Equity gives birth to the idea
of unconscionable or inequitable conduct in the 20th century starting
with the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v. High Trees
House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 and culminating in Bremer
Handelsgesellschaft MBH v. C Mackprang Jr [1979] 1 Lloyd's Law
Reports 221, CA.

[58] In Bremer Handelsgesellschaft MBH v. C Mackprang Jr (supra),

Lord Denning at p 226 said:

I regard the decision of the House in Bremer v. Vanden [1978]

2 Lloyd's Rep 109 as a most important decision on waiver. As
Mr Davenport said, it is the final step in the series of Central
London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House [1947] KB 130;
Rickards v. Oppenheim [1950] 1 KB 616; Panchaud Freres SA
v. Etablissements General Grain Co [1970] 1 Lloyd's Re p 53;
and WJ Alan & Co v. El Nasr Export & Import Co Ltd [1972] 1
Lloyd's Re p 313; [1972] 2 QB 189.

[59] Again, in Bremer Handelsgesellschaft MBH v. C Mackprang Jr

(supra) at p 225, Lord Denning relied on his own judgment in WJ Alan
& Co Ltd v. El Nasr Export And Import Co [1972] 1 Lloyd's Law
Reports 313, at p 323, CA, [1972] 2 QB 189, at p 231, CA when
explaining the principle of waiver. This was what his Lordship said:
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 11

... If one party, by his conduct, leads another to believe that

the strict rights arising under the contract will not be insisted
upon, intending that the other should act on that belief, and he
does act on it, then the first party will not afterwards be
allowed to insist on the strict legal rights when it would be
inequitable for him to do so...

[60] And it is this very passage that serves as the modern basis of
condonation. Here, there was no condonation. The unpaid leave
granted to the plaintiff to further his study and the acting post of
Assistant Superintendent of Police given to the plaintiff were separate
issues. They are distinct from the process of judicial review. Moreover,
at that point of time, the report from the Anti- Corruption Agency was
not available and the first defendant did not know of the plaintiff's
misconduct. Once the first defendant came to know of the plaintiff's
misconduct, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.

[61] According to Lord Chelmsford LC in The Earl of Darnley v. The

Proprietors, & C Of The London, Chatham, and Dover Railway [1867]
LR 2 HL 43, at p 57:

A waiver must be an intentional act with knowledge.

[62] For a waiver to arise, there must, firstly, be "some distinct act
ought to be done, to constitute a waiver" (per Parke B in Doe D Nash
v. Birch ER 150 Exch 1 M & W 402, 406). Secondly, it must be
"intentional" in the sense that it is intended to treat the matter as if the
condition did not exist or as if the forfeiture or breach of condition had
not occurred (per Isaacs J in Craine v. The Colonial Mutual Fire
Insurance Company Limited And Another [1920] 28 CLR 305, at p
326). Lastly, what is being done must be done with "knowledge" (
Matthews v. Smallwood [1910] 1 Ch 777)."

[Penekanan Ditegaskan]

[26] Berpandukan kepada nas-nas yzang dirujuk, Mahkamah merumuskan

makna doktrin ini sepertimana yang disimpulkan oleh penulis di dalam artikel
bertajuk " Doctrine of Condonation: Challenges in the Management of
Disciplinary Cases in Public University" UUMJLS, 139-149 (2016) sebagai:

"...the meaning of doctrine of condonation can be generally describes

as permission granted to an employee retrospectively to cover a breach
of conduct or prior misconduct as well as prospectively. Such
retrospective permission is called condonation. An employer who
excuses or condones the employee's breach of duty with full
knowledge, cannot thereafter punish the employee unless the same
duty is breached again".
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 12 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

[27] Di dalam menimbangkan sama ada doktrin ini terpakai, Mahkamah perlu
meneliti terlebih dahulu sama ada Responden di dalam kes ini mempunyai
pengetahuan ke atas perlakuan Pemohon (rujuk; Ranjit Kaur a/p S Gopal
Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 MELR 129; [2010] 5 MLRA
696; [2011] 1 ILJ 479; [2010] 6 MLJ 1; [2010] 4 ILR 475; [2010] 8 CLJ 629;
[2011] 3 AMR 38).

[28] Di dalam kes ini, Pemohon melalui Afidavit Sokongan di Kandungan 8

dan Kandungan 9 serta Afidavit Jawapan di Kandungan 12 dan Kandungan
13 telah memplidkan fakta berkaitan doktrin ini dan Responden telah
memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan oleh TS Dr Khair bin Mohamad yang telah
mengekshibitkan kesemua surat-surat yang berkaitan. Oleh itu ia jelas
menunjukkan bahawa Responden sedar berkaitan ketidakhadiran Pemohon
yang merupakan asas kepada tindakan yang di ambil ke atasnya.

[29] Pertimbangan selanjutnya yang perlu dinilai adalah berkaitan tempoh

masa tindakan yang diambil ke atas Pemohon iaitu sama ada wujud kelewatan
yang melampau. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M Sentivelu R Marimuthu
v. Public Service Commission Malaysia & Anor [2005] 1 MLRA 633; [2005] 5
MLJ 393; [2005] 3 CLJ 778 telah memutuskan:

"The fact that the General Orders do not prescribe a time limit does
not mean that a disciplinary hearing in respect of charges of
misconduct brought no matter how long after the event may be upheld
as being procedurally fair. It depends on the facts of each case as well
as on a number of factors such as the nature of the charge, the length
of the delay and the reason for the delay, and the opportunity for the
employee to meet the accusation against him. In the absence of any
reasonable explanation, the longer the delay the more difficult it
would be for the disciplining body to justify the proceedings against
the employee. Long delay coupled with other circumstances may
amount to strong evidence of condonation on the part of the employer
of the employee's misconduct"

[Penekanan Ditegaskan]

[30] Mahkamah telah menimbang ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan dan

berpandangan bahawa Guru Besar telah mengemukakan surat-surat
peringatan untuk meminta Pemohon menjelaskan ketidakhadirannya. Ia
sepertimana dinyatakan di perenggan 5.2 Afidavit Jawapan dan Ekshibit
"TSKM-2". Namun Pemohon tidak pernah mengambil tindakan untuk
menjawab surat-surat tersebut dan ini membawa kepada tindakan tatatertib ke
atas pemohon oleh responden.

[31] Bagi Mahkamah, walaupun terdapat kelewatan di dalam tindakan,

namun ia dapat ditunjukkan bahawa terdapat tindakan-tindakan yang diambil
oleh Responden dan ianya tidak mendapat respons daripada Pemohon. Oleh
itu kelewatan tindakan yang diambil tidak boleh dianggap berlakunya
pemaafan.
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 13

[32] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah turut perlu menimbangkan sama ada terdapat

tindakan atau perbuatan di peringkat Responden yang menunjukkan
pengakuan pemaafan ke atas Pemohon. Bagi maksud ini, Mahkamah telah
menimbang fakta kes ini berserta hujahan dan Mahkamah ini berpandangan
bahawa tindakan-tindakan yang telah diambil oleh Guru Besar tidak
menunjukkan bahawa Responden telah mengenepikan haknya untuk
mengambil tindakan ke atas Pemohon bagi membolehkan doktrin pemaafan
ini terpakai. Ini kerana surat-surat yang dikemukakan menunjukkan bahawa
Guru Besar memandang serius isu ini dan telah turut mengemukakan laporan
kepada Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Kelantan. Ini selanjutnya telah membawa
kepada tindakan tatatertib ke atas Pemohon.

[33] Di dalam masa yang sama Mahkamah mendapati tiada tindakan yang
khusus serta berniat yang diambil oleh Guru Besar untuk menunjukkan
bahawa perbuatan pemohon untuk tidak hadir bertugas tersebut adalah
dimaafkan atau menunjukkan Responden tidak berhajat untuk mengenakan
apa-apa tindakan ke atas Pemohon. Bagi Mahkamah, Pemohon tidak boleh
hanya bergantung kepada tempoh masa yang diambil serta tindakan- tindakan
Guru Besar yang cuba membantu Pemohon dengan mengenepikan fakta jelas
bahawa Guru Besar telah mengemukakan surat tunjuk sebab serta selanjutnya
melaporkan perkara ini kepada Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Kelantan.

[34] Mahkamah turut berpandangan bahawa doktrin ini tidak terpakai

memandangkan terdapat surat-surat yang diekshibitkan sebagai "TSKM-2" di
Kandungan 11 yang bertarikh 30 April 2015, 13 Mei 2025, 16 Jun 2015, 7
Julai 2015, 22 Julai 2015 dan 20 Ogos 2015 yang memohon penjelasan
Pemohon di atas ketidakhadiran Pemohon. Pemohon hanya mengemukakan
penjelasan melalui surat bertarikh 7 Mei 2015 yang menyatakan
ketidakhadiran Pemohon adalah disebabkan oleh masalah keluarga dan tidak
pernah menyatakan berkenaan masalah kesihatan mentalnya.

[35] Tindakan Guru Besar ini tidak langsung menampakkan sebarang elemen
kemaafan. Pemohon tidak boleh bersandarkan kepada tempoh masa yang
diambil di dalam pengemukaan surat-surat tersebut serta tindakan tatatertib
yang diambil ke atasnya bagi membuat satu inferens kemaafan. Bagi doktrin
ini terpakai, ia perlu ada satu indikasi yang jelas dan positif niat kemaafan
tersebut.

[36] Kesimpulan yang cuba dibuat oleh peguamcara Pemohon di dalam kes ini
bagi Mahkamah adalah terlalu jauh untuk mewajarkan bahawa pemohon
dimaafkan dan doktrin pemaafan ini terpakai. Oleh itu bagi isu yang pertama,
Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa doktrin pemaafan tidak terpakai dan tiada
sebarang kekhilafan di pihak Responden di dalam keputusan yang telah
mereka ambil.

Isu Kedua: Sama ada berlaku ketakakuran ke atas Peraturan-Peraturan

Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993 ("Peraturan 1993")

[37] Peguamcara Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa telah berlaku ketakakuran

Peraturan 25(1) Peraturan 1993 yang memerlukan Guru Besar yang
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 14 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

merupakan Ketua Jabatan untuk seberapa segera yang mungkin, melaporkan

kepada Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib. Ini kerana tiada Afidavit Jawapan oleh
Guru Besar telah difailkan. Peraturan 25 Peraturan 1993 menyatakan:

25. (1) Jika seseorang pegawai tidak hadir bertugas tanpa cuti atau
tanpa terlebih dahulu mendapat kebenaran atau tanpa sebab yang
munasabah, Ketua Jabatannya hendaklah, seberapa segera yang
mungkin, melaporkan hakikat itu berserta dengan tarikh-tarikh dan
hal keadaan ketidakhadiran itu dan apa-apa maklumat selanjutnya
berkenaan dengan ketidakhadiran itu kepada Pihak Berkuasa tatatertib
yang berkenaan.

[38] Bagi isu ini Mahkamah bersandarkan kepada keputusan kes Domnic
Selvam a/l S Gnanapragasam v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2007] 1 MLRH 1; [2007] 2
MLJ 761; [2006] 8 CLJ 114 di mana Mahkamah menerima Afidavit Jawapan
yang difailkan oleh pihak yang mempunyai pengetahuan di dalam kes
tersebut. Hakim Abdul Malik Ishak HMT (pada ketika itu) menyatakan:

"[16] In encl 23 at para 4, the plaintiff avers that the evidence of

Allaudeen in the affidavit in encl 25 is hearsay because Allaudeen is
not related to the proceedings at all. The defendants, in rebuttal,
submit that Allaudeen has access to all the records of the defendants
and because of that he is qualified to affirm the affidavit in encl 25. All
the records are self- explanatory and clear evidence as to what actually
happened in the process of servicing the documents onto the plaintiff.
The records exhibited in the affidavit in encl 25 comprised the
following items:

(a) a letter dated 21 January 1998 signed by Datuk Mohd

Jamil Johari who was the Pengarah Pengurusan at the Jabatan
Pengurusan at Bukit Aman (exh "AAM1" of encl 25);

(b) a letter dated 25 March 1998 signed by Dato' Abdul

Ghafar bin Abdul Karim on behalf of the Ketua Polis Perak
(exh "AAM2" of encl 25);

(c) a letter dated 15 April 1998 signed by Sulaiman bin Haji

Mohd Yusof on behalf of the Penolong Pengarah Pengurusan
(Perjawatan) at Bukit Aman (exh "AAM3" of encl 25);

(d) a letter dated 29 September 2000 signed by Datuk Mohd

Bakri bin Hj Osman who was the Pengarah Jabatan
Pengurusan at Bukit Aman (exh "AAM4" of encl 25);

(e) borang utusan Polis dated 22 October 2000 signed by

Mohamad bin Haji Abdullah on behalf of the Pengarah
Jabatan Pengurusan at Bukit Aman (exh "AAM6" of encl 25);

(f) a letter dated 23 January 2001 signed by Mohamad bin

Haji Abdullah on behalf of the Penolong Pengarah
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 15

Pengurusan (Perjawatan) at Bukit Aman (exh "AAM7" of encl

25);

(g) a letter dated 7 January 2002 signed by Tan Sri Norian bin
Mai, the former Inspector General of Police (exh "AAM8" of
encl 25); and

(h) a letter dated 11 June 2002 signed by Kahar bin Kassim on

behalf of the Inspector General of Police (exh "AAM10" of
encl 25).

[17] All the documents exhibited in the affidavit in encl 25 showed a

series of events in the plaintiff's service history. All the documents
were signed and issued by different personnel at different places.
Allaudeen is presently in charge and he has access to all the records of
service of the plaintiff. Indeed Allaudeen is a qualified person to affirm
and depose to all the facts in the affidavit in encl 25. No facts in this
case are within the knowledge of any particular individual or officer.
All the facts pertaining to the plaintiff's matter are documented and
they are available as records kept by the defendants. Allaudeen, in my
judgment, is a qualified person and he is the right person to affirm the
affidavit in encl 25. Allaudeen has signed the affidavit in encl 25 (
Anderson v. Stather [1845] 9 Jur 1085) before the Commissioner for
Oaths (Ex p Heymann [1872] LR 7 Ch 488) and that affidavit is
certainly admissible in evidence.

[18] The plaintiff takes the position that the affidavit in encl 25 ought
to be rejected by this court because the averments contained therein
are hearsay statements. It is argued that Allaudeen is not a party to
this action and that he is relying on matters that are not within his
personal knowledge but rather on documents of other persons. It is
further argued that the makers of the documents annexed to the
affidavit in encl 25 ought to have affirmed affidavits on their own
accord exhibiting those documents. So, the plaintiff submits that the
documents are hearsay and inadmissible. It is misconceived on the
part of the plaintiff to rely on the case of Chan Kwai Chun v. Lembaga
Kelayakan [2002] 1 MLRH 84; [2002] 5 MLJ 273; [2002] 2 CLJ 288;
[2002] 3 AMR 2537 HC because the judgment did not indicate what
actually were exhs "D" and "F" annexed to the affidavit of Dato'
Abdul Wahab were. The judgment merely ruled that exhs "D" and "F"
cannot be tendered through the affidavit of Dato' Abdul Wahab.
Perhaps these two exhibits were not so relevant to the issues in
question because counsel for the defendant relied on other documents
to bolster up the defendant's case. Again, reliance by the plaintiff on
the case of Rossage v. Rossage and Others [1960] 1 All ER 600 does not
affect the outcome of this case in favour of the defendants. In Rossage
v. Rossage (supra), certain affidavits were struck out because they were
irrelevant to the matter. Hodson LJ in his judgment made this
observation:
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 16 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

It is quite clear that we cannot strike out matters in a pleading

or an affidavit simply because they are scandalous, because
scandalous matter may be relevant, and may be the very
matters which have to be investigated by the court. If,
however, the matters are plainly irrelevant, as they are here,
there is no doubt that the court can strike them out,...

Here, in the present case before me, all the documents that
were exhibited and alluded to earlier are relevant to show the
sequence of the plaintiff's service records.

Nationwide Building Society v. Bateman [1978] 1 All ER 999

can readily be distinguished. In that case the deponent of the
affidavit on the building society's behalf stated: 'I am informed
and verily believe that the defendant and his family are the
only persons in occupation of the said premises'. It showed
that the deponent had no knowledge as to who was actually in
possession of the land in question. By comparison, in the
present case before me, Allaudeen is a police officer and he
has access to all the records of service of police personnel
maintained by the defendants. The plaintiff further relies on
the case of MUI Bank Bhd v. Alkner Investments Ptd Ltd
[1990] 5 MLRH 234; [1990] 3 MLJ 385 where the learned
Judicial Commissioner said at pp 387-388: 'Further, even
assuming that r 5(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970
applies to the application there is a defect in the affidavits
affirmed by Lam: he failed to identify the specific officers in
ACB from whom he had obtained the information. So,
strictly, this portion of the evidence should be disregarded'.
Here, in sharp contrast, the affidavit affirmed by Allaudeen is
not defective at all. Finally, the plaintiff relies on the case of
Kassim bin Sulong & Anor v. Guthrie Estates Holdings Ltd &
Ors [1993] 4 MLRH 565; [1993] 3 MLJ 303; [1994] 3 CLJ 186
where the second to the seventh respondents had not disclosed
the source of the information, had presumed certain facts, had
made a presumption on the other party's interest and had used
extrinsic evidence. Here, the source of the information is
clearly stated and exhibited in Allaudeen's affidavit in encl 25.
There is also no presumption of facts or extrinsic evidence
incorporated in Allaudeen's affidavit in encl 25.

[19] The plaintiff in his affidavit in reply in encl 23, particularly in

paras 6, 7 and 8, denies having any knowledge in regard to the records
of the defendants identified as exhs. "AAM2", "AAM3" and "AAM7"
annexed to Allaudeen's affidavit in encl 25. A perusal of these three
exhibits would show that they are within the factual knowledge of the
plaintiff."
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 17

[39] Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa TS Khair Mohammad adalah

merupakan Pengerusi bagi Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pelajaran yang
merupakan Responden Ketiga. Beliau sama sekali mempunyai akses ke atas
segala dokumen yang berkaitan dengan kes ini. Oleh itu adalah memadai bagi
beliau untuk mengikrarkan Afidavit dengan mengemukakan segala keterangan
dokumen berkaitan kes ini untuk dinilai oleh Mahkamah.

[40] Peguamcara Pemohon selanjutnya menghujahkan bahawa telah berlaku

ketakakuran ke atas Peraturan 37 Peraturan 1993 apabila Ketua Jabatan tidak
mengemukakan segala maklumat yang ada termasuk surat permohonan cuti,
surat pengesahan rawatan dan semua dokumen berkaitan Pemohon secara
khususnya exhibit C. Peraturan 37 menyatakan:

37.(1) Jika ditentukan di bawah subperaturan 35(2) bahawa kesalahan

tatatertib yang diadukan terhadap seseorang pegawai adalah daripada
jenis yang patut dikenakan hukumanbuang kerja atau turun pangkat,
Pengerusi Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib yang berkenaan yang kepadanya
kes itu dirujukkan hendaklah menimbangkan segala maklumat yang
ada.

[41] Persoalan yang berbangkit kini adalah, apakah dokumen yang sedia
terwujud semasa prosiding tatatertib ke atas Pemohon dilaksanakan. Di dalam
pertimbangan Mahkamah ke atas keterangan-keterangan melalui Afidavit,
Mahkamah mendapati bahawa semasa prosiding tatatertib hanya surat
bertarikh 2 Julai 2014 oleh Hospital Tumpat yang terwujud bagi menyokong
permohonan cuti tanpa gaji Pemohon. Pemerhatian Mahkamah mendapati
bahawa surat ini hanya sekadar menyatakan bahawa Pemohon perlu
menghadiri rawatan susulan dan tidak di dalam mana-mana keadaan
menyatakan bahawa Pemohon disahkan menghidapi sebarang penyakit
mental.

[42] Ekshibit C yang dikemukakan di dalam Afidavit Sokongan Pemohon

hanya dibuat pada 2019 iaitu selepas keseluruhan prosiding tatatertib selesai.
Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa hujahan peguamcara
Pemohon adalah tidak bermerit. Sebaliknya Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa
Peraturan 25 Peraturan 1993 telah dipatuhi dan SPP telah menimbang
kesemua maklumat sebelum Pemohon dijatuhi hukuman

Isu Ketiga: Sama Ada Percanggahan Tarikh Ketidakhadiran Di Ekshibit

TSKM-6 Dan TSKM-7 Menjejaskan Keputusan Responden

[43] Adalah menjadi satu fakta yang tidak dinafikan bahawa telah wujud
perbezaan tarikh di dalam kedua-dua ekshibit tersebut. Peguamcara Pemohon
telah menghujahkan bahawa memandangkan ia adalah asas kepada
pertuduhan ke atas Pemohon, maka percanggahan ini adalah dihujahkan
sebagai fatal memandangkan ianya melibatkan kehidupan (livelihood)
Pemohon.
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 18 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

[44] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa "TSKM-6" adalah merupakan "Perakuan

Tindakan Tatatertib" yang disediakan berdasarkan kepada Peraturan 35
Peraturan 1993 yang menyatakan:

35.(1) Jika seseorang pegawai dikatakan telah melakukan suatu

kesalahan tatatertib-

(a) Pengerusi Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib yang berkenaan bagi

pegawai itu; atau

(b) Jika terdapat lebih daripada satu peringkat Pihak Berkuasa

Tatatertib berkenaan dengan pegawai itu, Pengerusi Pihak
Berkuasa Tatatertib yang mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk
mengenakan hukuman selain buang kerja atau turun pangkat,
hendaklah, sebelum memulakan apa-apa prosiding tatatertib
berkenaan dengan pegawai itu, menimbangkan dan
menentukan sama ada kesalahan tatatertib yang diadukan itu
adalah daripada jenis yang patut dikenakan hukuman buang
kerja atau turun pangkat atau suatu hukuman yang lebih
ringan daripada buang kerja atau turun pangkat.

[45] Ia bukan merupakan pertuduhan yang dikenakan ke atas Pemohon

namun sebaliknya merupakan satu laporan yang dibuat oleh Lembaga
Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Pendidikan bagi memperakukan satu tindakan
tatatertib ke atas Pemohon kerana melanggar tatakelakuan yang
membolehkan tindakan tatatertib diambil. Ianya tidak diperlukan untuk
diserahkan kepada Pemohon dan di dalam kes inipun ianya tidak diserahkan
kepada Pemohon.

[46] Hanya selepas dapatan tersebut barulah satu pertuduhan rasmi

dikemukakan sepertimana yang disediakan ke atas Pemohon sepertimana di
ekshibit "TSKM-7". Pemohon hanya berdepan dengan pertuduhan rasmi ini.

[47] Mahkamah selanjutnya telah meneliti percanggahan yang dimaksudkan

dan mendapati bahawa percanggahan yang berlaku adalah berkaitan jumlah
hari di mana Pemohon dikatakan tidak hadir. Persoalan yang menjadi
pertimbangan Mahkamah adalah sama ada perbezaan tersebut material
sehingga memprejudiskan Pemohon.

[48] Di dalam pertimbangan Mahkamah, asas kepada tindakan ke atas

Pemohon adalah berpaksikan kepada ketakhadiran Pemohon untuk bertugas.
Ia dinyatakan dengan secara jelas di dalam "TSKM-7" dan inilah yang perlu
diberi penjelasan dan jawapan oleh Pemohon. Namun Pemohon tidak pernah
mengemukakan sebarang jawapan atau penjelasan ke atas "TSKM-7" tersebut.
Oleh itu, bagaimana Pemohon kini boleh menyatakan bahawa Pemohon
dikatakan diprejudiskan oleh percanggahan tersebut.

[49] Apatah lagi di dalam kes ini, "TSKM-6" tidak pernah dikemukakan
kepada Pemohon. Ia hanyalah merupakan dokumen yang diberi pertimbangan
oleh Responden semata-mata di dalam menyediakan perakuan untuk suatu
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 19

pertuduhan rasmi dikenakan ke atas Pemohon. Apabila Pemohon sendiri

memilih untuk tidak mengemukakan representasi ke atas pertuduhan di
"TSKM-7" tersebut, maka Mahkamah ini tidak nampak bagaimana ianya
boleh memberi kesan prejudis kepada Pemohon.

[50] Peguamcara pemohon telah merujuk kepada kes Nordin Hj Zakaria

(Timbalan Ketua Polis Kelantan) & Anor v. Mohd Noor Abdullah [2004] 1
MLRA 387; [2004] 2 CLJ 777; [2008] 3 AMR 689 di mana Mahkamah
Persekutuan menyatakan:

"The concept of procedural fairness concerning the dismissal or

reduction in rank in the public service is very much enshrined in cl 2 of
art 135 of the Federal Constitution which states that no member of the
public services of which the respondent is one "shall be dismissed or
reduced in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity of being
heard". The Privy Council in the case of B Surinder Singh Kanda v. The
Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 MLRA 233; [1962] 1
MLJ 169 has defined that constitutional right to be as follows.

If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it

must carry with it a right in the accused person to know the case
which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been
given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he
must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them.

Perusing the show cause letter requiring the respondent to attend the
Orderly Room Proceeding it is noted that:

(1) he had been informed of the punishable provisions of the

1970 Regulations.

(2) all the important and relevant particulars appear clearly in

the charges as to leave him with no doubt as to the specific
allegations he had to answer and of the possible sentence that
could be meted out under reg 2 if found guilty.

(3) he was informed of his right to be supplied with all relevant

documents pertaining to the charges upon written request.

(4) he could be represented by an officer of his choice provided

such an officer does not hold a rank above that of the 1st
appellant."

[Penekanan Ditegaskan]

[51] Sepertimana yang Mahkamah ini tegaskan, Peraturan 1993 tidak

mengkehendaki "TSKM-6" dikemukakan kepada Pemohon. Di bawah
Peraturan 1993, Pemohon akan hanya diberikan pertuduhan dan ini
dilaksanakan apabila "TSKM-7" dikemukakan serta diserah kepada Pemohon.
Penelitian Mahkamah ke atas "TSKM-7" mendapati bahawa ianya adalah
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 20 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

jelas berkaitan pertuduhan yang dihadapinya. Selain itu, "TSKM-7" turut

mendedahkan bentuk hukuman yang boleh dijatuhkan oleh Lembaga
Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Pendidikan.

[52] Sehubungan dengan Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa walaupun

terdapatnya percanggahan di antara "TSKM-6" dan "TSKM-7", ia tidak
memprejudiskan Pemohon serta tidak menjejaskan keputusan Responden ke
atas Pemohon.

Isu Keempat: Sama Ada Pemohon Tidak Menerima Surat Tindakan

Tatatertib Bertarikh 26 September 2018

[53] Asas kepada isu ini adalah apabila Pemohon dikatakan tidak
mengemukakan representasi dan peguam Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa ini
adalah kerana Pemohon tidak menerima surat bertarikh 26 September 2018
daripada Responden. Peguamcara pemohon menghujahkan bahawa ianya
tidak mematuhi Peraturan 20 dan Peraturan 34 Peraturan 1993 yang
mengkehendaki surat bertulis diserahkan kepada Pemohon.

[54] Peguamcara Pemohon selanjutnya menghujahkan bahawa terdapat

dakwaan khusus di dalam Afidavit Sokongan Pemohon namun tiada Afidavit
oleh Guru Besar. Asas kepada bantahan Pemohon kini adalah berkaitan
tandatangan Pemohon yang kini didakwanya telah dipalsukan oleh Guru
Besar.

[55] Penelitian Mahkamah mendapati surat tunjuk sebab bertarikh 24

September 2018 adalah sepertimana di ekshibitkan sebagai "TSKM-7" dan
terdapat tandatangan Pemohon di ruang "Akuan Penerimaan". Keterangan ini
bagi Mahkamah adalah satu keterangan prima facie membuktikan bahawa
Pemohon telah menerima surat tersebut dan dengan sendirinya Peraturan 25
serta 34 Peraturan 1993 telah sewajarnya dipatuhi.

[56] Sebaik Responden mengekshibitkan surat tersebut, maka beban kini

beralih kepada Pemohon untuk membuktikan ianya palsu. Ini sepertimana
yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v.
Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 MLRA 326; [2015] 6 MLJ 810; [2016] 2
CLJ 414 seperti berikut:

"[17] In law, the party who desires the court to give judgment in its
favour as to any legal right or liability bears the burden of proof (s
101(1) of the Evidence Act 1950). The burden of proof on that party is
twofold: (i) the burden of establishing a case; and (ii) the burden of
introducing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party throughout
the trial. The standard of proof required of the plaintiff is on the
balance of probabilities. The evidential burden of proof is only shifted
to the other party once that party has discharged its burden of proof. If
that party fails to discharge the original burden of proof, then the
adverse party does not need to adduce any evidence..."
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 21

[57] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Peguam Persekutuan, bahawa tiada

keperluan bagi Responden untuk memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan oleh Guru
Besar kerana beban Responden hanyalah untuk membuktikan bahawa surat
tersebut telah diserahkan kepada Pemohon.

Isu Kelima: Sama Ada Surat Keputusan Hukuman Bertarikh 22 Januari 2019
Adalah Tidak Sah Dan Batal

[58] Peguamcara Pemohon selanjutnya menghujahkan bahawa surat berkaitan

hukuman perlu ditandatangani oleh Pengerusi Tatatertib dan bukannya oleh
Timbalan Pengerusi. Ia sepertimana keperluan di bawah Peraturan 53(1)
Peraturan 1993 yang menyatakan:

53.(1) Surat dan persuratan lain antara Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib yang
berkenaan dengan pegawai yang dikenakan tindakan tatatertib
hendaklah ditandatangani oleh Pengerusi Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib
yang berkenaan atau oleh mana-mana anggota Pihak Berkuasa
Tatatertib itu bagi pihak Pengerusi.

[59] Bagi isu ini Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah
Rayuan di dalam kes Marzuki Abdul Aziz v. Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [2003]
1 MLRA 299; [2003] 3 MLJ 390; [2003] 3 CLJ 315; [2003] 4 AMR 175 yang
turut berhadapan dengan isu yang sama dan telah memutuskan:

"As we have pointed out, the Deputy IGP has been delegated with all
the powers to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant
under the Instrument of Delegation, PU(B) 621. Vested with that
power he had decided to issue the show cause letter, and directed it to
be sent to the appellant. This was the first letter. Upon receipt of the
appellant's representations the Deputy IGP had deliberated upon them
and decided that dismissal was the only punishment to meet the many
instances of absence without leave on the part of the appellant. He had
then directed that his decision to dismiss be communicated to the
appellant and this was done through the second letter. Under these
circumstances we say that the decision-making process has been done
by the one and only person who has been delegated to do so namely
the Deputy IGP. The writing of the two letters does not form part of
the decision making process as the two letters merely convey the
directives and decisions of the Deputy IGP and form part of the
administrative functions of the Deputy IGP for which an officer can be
directed to execute.

The two letters were written on the police letter head and based on the
opening words in the two letters as aforesaid, Abdul Aziz must have
been a Senior Officer in the police force and the fact that his official
status had not been identified on the two letters does not render the
decision to dismiss made by the Deputy IGP to be contrary to law.
Abdul Aziz does not feature in the decision-making process. What he
did was merely to convey the decisions of the Deputy IGP,
administrative acts which do not fall within the Category of the
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
pg 22 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain [2022] MLRHU 1235

decision-making process."

[60] Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di atas telah dirujuk oleh Mahkamah

Tinggi Kuala Lumpur di dalam kes Dato' Saadon Othman v. Lembaga
Tatatertib Awam Kumpulan Pengurusan (No 1) & Ors [2019] MLRHU 623
dengan memutuskan:

"[14] The next issue raised by the applicant is that the letters issued by
the 1st respondent (the show cause letter dated 1 July 2016 and the
letter dated 9 November 2016 informing him of the 1st respondent's
decision) must be signed by the Chairman of the 1st respondent.
Instead, the letters were signed by Tan Sri Mohammad Zabidi Zainal,
who signed the letters on behalf of the Chairman. Therefore, it is the
submission of the applicant that this is against reg 36 of the 1993
Regulations, which provides that the "Pengerusi Pihak Berkuasa
Tatatertib... hendaklah memaklumkan pegawai itu melalui Notis di
bawah peraturan 52."

[15] I am of the considered opinion that the fact that the disciplinary
letters were not signed by the Chairman of the 1st respondent does not
nullify the disciplinary actions. In his affidavit affirmed on 26 October
2017, the Chairman of the 1st respondent, Tan Sri Dr Ali bin Hamsa,
states as follows:

"19. Saya menyatakan bahawa saya telah mengarahkan Tan

Sri Mohamad Zabidi Zainal iaitu Ketua Pengarah
Perkhidmatan Awam pada masa material yang juga anggota
Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Kumpulan
Pegurusan (No 1) untuk menandatangai surat tersebut bagi
pihak saya.

20. Setelah dinasihatkan Peguam Kanan Persekutuan, saya

menegaskan bahawa tidak ada kewajipan bagi saya untuk
menandatangani surat berkenaan di bawah Peraturan yang
dirujuk Pemohon dan surat tersebut telah ditandatangani oleh
Tan Sri Mohamad Zabidi Zainal bagi pihak saya selaku
Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam
Kumpulan Pegurusan (No 1)."

[16] Therefore, the letters were merely to inform the applicant of the
decision of the Chairman of the 1st respondent (Show Cause letter)
and the decision of the 1st respondent."

[61] Di atas pertimbangan ini serta keterikatan Mahkamah ini ke atas

keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut, Mahkamah merumuskan bahawa
bagi isu ini ia tidak bermerit dan sekaligus tidak menjejaskan keputusan yang
telah dibuat oleh Responden ke atas Pemohon.
 Shaikh Mohd Ibrahim Shaikh Omar
[2022] MLRHU 1235 lwn. Tan Sri Dr Haili Dolhan & Yang Lain pg 23

Kesimpulan

[62] Secara kesimpulannya, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa tiada

sebarang ketakakuran prosedur yang telah dibuktikan berlaku di dalam kes ini
dan oleh itu permohonan Pemohon adalah ditolak dengan kos sebanyak
RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur.