The metaphysical foundation of democracy

Horacio Cid.

The end of the State is freedom.

Spinoza.

Introduction

Democracy, the hegemonic form of government at present, is at the same time the most
embraced by some and repudiated by others, this is due to the incorrect interpretation of its
postulate which, without further ado, has been distorted throughout political history for purposes
that are far removed from the best known maxim: government by the people. The present work
will not only elucidate this matter, but will also delve into the principle that sustains the concept
of democracy so that with this knowledge it will be possible to understand in a better way the
reason for the opposite attitudes towards it.

The concept of democracy to be dealt with in this paper is based on the meaning stipulated by
Hans Kelsen in his General Theory of Law and the State (2010), where he establishes the
differences between this political system and the others are based on the legal point of view.
With this distinction, the two types of constitutions dominant hitherto are presented, which, by
their mode of employment, give us the trichotomy of hegemonic forms of government:
monarchy, aristocracy and autocracy. These three can be combined into two groups, namely
monarchy on the one hand and democracy and aristocracy on the other.

This last group is made up of two forms that at first seem contrary, but by problematizing their
foundation (which is the same for all three) we discover the similarity between them. This
foundation, which has not changed since antiquity, was introduced by Aristotle as τάξις, which
defines the state as an order (Politics, Book III, 1274 b, 1278 b). This is a juridical order within
the constitutions, and since these themselves give validity to the state, they are from where the
power of the state emanates. Therefore the power of the modern state is based "on the validity
and efficacy of the juridical order", or in other words on its constitution.
Having established this principle, we have that the difference is based on the legislation of the
same, and therein lies the necessary distinction for the formation of the two groups previously
presented. In the first group (the monarchical state) the legislator is the monarch himself; in the
other group we have a dichotomy: in the aristocratic state the legislation is established by the
dominant group within the state, while in the democratic state the legislation is in charge of the
total population represented by elected officials. This distinction between the two is based, then,
on the idea of political freedom which, according to Kelsen, is obtained when the individual
finds a coincidence between what he ought to do (social order) and what he wants to do (2010, p.
337). Therefore, the distinction between the two constitutions is based on a difference of ideals,
ideals which in turn are based on two principles, one democratic and the other aristocratic.

The metaphysics of democracy

First demonstration: on the possibility of an a priori distinction of ideals

The basis of the democratic ideal must therefore be guaranteed through political freedom which,
as described above, Kelsen conceives of only one way: by the individual "insofar as his
individual will is in harmony with the 'collective' (or 'general') will expressed in the social order"
(2010, p. 339). This is guaranteed when the individual participates in the creation of the social
order while being subject to it.

This guarantee based on harmony must be established as several individual wills that through
their communion create a general will, not as the ascription of an individual will to a set of
individual wills that have already formed a general will. With this resolution we can see why
democracy is demeaned, since following the second "mode of communion", which has been the
one that has been mostly adopted throughout history, it is inferred that the democratic ideal
moves away from the totality of the people to only take into account a determined group within
it. However, this could not be more erroneous since, as has been stipulated above, this second
mode is none other than the aristocratic principle which, because in its origin it is intrinsically
united to the democratic one, these two can be considered as one, thus resulting in confusion.

This is easy to avoid if one has a transcendental knowledge of the common origin of these two
very similar ideals. With this knowledge the first metaphysical glimpse is manifested to us,
which is grounded thanks to the abstraction of the second principle of pure understanding which,
established by Kant, dictates: "in all phenomena, the real which is an object of sensation
possesses intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree" (2013, p. 203). If we consider the common origin
of these two ideals (democracy and aristocracy) as one phenomenon the analogy may be correct
insofar as the principle states that the intensive magnitude (the degree), which for this exercise
will be analogized to the two ideals, of one phenomenon is different in comparison to another
occasion, in other words, the degree is conditioned a context determined by the subject; therefore
it is concluded that even if the phenomenon in question is the "same" this is not so. This first
metaphysical discovery is nothing more than a practical use of reason (practical in the sense that
the precept established by Kant is being abstracted and analogized in the present discourse, not
the Kantian sense of practicality) with which, as is known, is the basis of understanding.

With this first approach to the original democratic principle, the necessary bridge is established
for the attainment of the primary objective of this section, namely, the demonstration of the
democratic principle as a metaphysical principle. This will be possible thanks to another practical
use of reason.

Second demonstration: will as the condition of possibility of political freedom

Based on the premise of the democratic ideal, already explained in the previous section, the
subjective part of this opinion is abstracted, namely, the will. This, which is subject to
individuals, means within the social order its determination, leading to consider it within political
freedom, as the condition of possibility of the latter. The individual will is, then, problematized
under the social order as the self-determination of the individual who seeks through it the
participation within it. However, on this occasion the will is not used as a guarantee but as a
basis.

The will, according to Kant, is grounded by reason (thus giving rise to the other practical use of
reason, which on this occasion subscribes to the Kantian sense) because this, in one of the two
meanings given by the author, supposes the capacity for self-determination towards the
realization of an object that corresponds to its due representation (2011, p. 69). Again, it will be
necessary to analogize this thesis with the concepts established throughout this discourse. To this
end, the object that seeks to be realized will be interpreted as autonomy, which subsumes within
it the concept of self-determination insofar as this concept is qualified as the faculty to access a
political freedom, which will be interpreted as the representation of the object.

The thesis, in its origin, refers to a question: Is mere reason sufficient to determine the will? It
will be resolved through our interpretation. Taking into account that the human will is a capacity
inherent to every rational entity, it is presupposed that in it there is a determining root that cannot
be found outside itself, thus establishing that the will is delimited from the subjectivation of a
principle common to all individuals, which is the autonomy of the will. This is demonstrated by
the fact that it is the faculty of an individual to establish and fulfill himself laws that govern his
actions, and this is something that is found in every human being because through this
self-determining exercise he fulfills an end in himself.

This demonstrates not only that the principle of self-determination is autonomous will, but also
proves what was said before, that this is apodictically the condition of possibility that sustains the
idea of political freedom.

Closure

This paper is entrusted with demonstrating that politics, in a more general sense and focusing on
the particular case of democracy, is based on metaphysical principles. These were exposed
through reason, which is in itself a critique from which the world as a whole is problematized.

Having completed this critique of democracy, all that remains is to speculate on the practical
implications that this transcendental knowledge presupposes for those who have it. One of them
would be, of course, the feasibility of democracy as the best form of government for modern
times or whether it is only called to be so in the ideal spectrum of politics.

Bibliography
Kant, I. (2011). Cri que of Prac cal Reason. Madrid: Alianza.

Kant, I. (2013). Cri que of Pure Reason. Mexico City: Taurus.

Kelsen, H. (2010). Teoría General del Derecho y del Estado. Mexico City: UNAM.