COVERAGE FOR JURISDICTION

A. BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

An invention patent is a government-issued grant, bestowing an exclusive right to an inventor over a
product or process that provides any technical solution to a problem in any field of human activity which
is new, inventive, and industrially applicable.
Section 28, R.A. No. 8293: Right to a Patent. The right to a patent belongs to the inventor, his heirs, or
assigns. When two (2) or more persons have jointly made an invention, the right to a patent shall belong
to them jointly.

A. GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL, INC. VS. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF

TRADEMARKS, G.R. NOS. 196372, 210224, 216104 AND 219632, AUGUST 9, 2022.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ginebra San Miguel, Inc. (GSMI) in their dispute with
Tanduay Distillers, Inc. over the exclusive right to use the mark "GINEBRA" for gin products,
recognizing GSMI's acquired secondary meaning and distinctiveness and rejecting Tanduay's
arguments of genericness and lack of likelihood of confusion.
FACTS:
GSMI filed an application for the registration of the mark "GINEBRA" for its gin products. The
Bureau of Trademarks (BOT) rejected the application, stating that the mark is generic and cannot
be registered. GSMI appealed to the Director of the BOT and the Intellectual Property Office (IPO)
Director General, but both appeals were unsuccessful. GSMI filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the appeal. GSMI filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CA denied it. GSMI then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the term "GINEBRA" is a generic mark or a distinctive mark that may be registered by
GSMI.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of GSMI. The Court held that "GINEBRA" is not a generic
mark but a distinctive mark that has acquired secondary meaning. The Court recognized GSMI's
extensive and continuous use of the mark since 1834 and its association with GSMI's gin products.
The Court also considered the survey results showing that the public associates the mark
"GINEBRA" with GSMI and its gin products. The Court rejected Tanduay's arguments of
genericness and lack of likelihood of confusion, stating that the mark "GINEBRA" is distinctive
and has acquired secondary meaning.
RATIO:
The Court's decision is based on the principle that a trademark is any distinctive word, name,
symbol, or device used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish their goods from
others. The Court recognized that "GINEBRA" is not a generic term but a distinctive mark that
has acquired secondary meaning through GSMI's extensive and continuous use. The Court also
considered the survey results as evidence of the public's association of the mark with GSMI and
its gin products. The Court rejected Tanduay's arguments, stating that the mark "GINEBRA" is
distinctive and has acquired secondary meaning, and that there is a likelihood of confusion between
GSMI and Tanduay's gin products.
FACTS:
Ginebra San Miguel, Inc. (GSMI) and Tanduay Distillers, Inc. (TDI) are in a dispute over the use
of the mark "GINEBRA" for gin products. GSMI filed a trademark application for the mark
"GINEBRA" in Class 33 for gin products. TDI filed a trademark application for the mark
"GINEBRA KAPITAN" for the same goods. GSMI opposed TDI's application, claiming it
infringed on its prior rights to the "GINEBRA" mark. The Intellectual Property Office (IPO)
denied GSMI's opposition and allowed the registration of TDI's mark. GSMI appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the IPO's decision. GSMI filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether TDI's use of the mark "GINEBRA KAPITAN" for gin products infringes on GSMI's prior
rights to the "GINEBRA" mark.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of TDI and upheld the decisions of the IPO and the Court of
Appeals. The Court held that the mark "GINEBRA" is generic for gin products and cannot be
exclusively appropriated by GSMI.

B. MANUEL T. ZULUETA VS CYMA GREEK TAVERNA CO., G.R. NO. 205699,

JANUARY 23, 2023.
Zulueta's trademark application for the mark "CYMA & LOGO" is denied due to his bad faith and
knowledge of the prior use of the trademark by Cyma Partnership, affirming Cyma Partnership's
ownership of the trademark.
FACTS:
Zulueta claimed to have conceptualized the Greek restaurant "Cyma" and formed a partnership
with Raoul Goco called "Cyma Greek Taverna Company" (Cyma Partnership). Zulueta filed a
trademark application for the mark "CYMA & LOGO" in his own name. Cyma Partnership also
filed a trademark application for the mark "CYMA GREEK TAVERNA AND LOGO" a few
months later. The Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines-Office of the Director General
(IPOPHL-ODG) rejected Zulueta's trademark application, stating that Cyma Partnership is the
owner of the trademark based on their prior use and registration. Zulueta appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the IPOPHL-ODG's ruling. Zulueta filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Zulueta's trademark application for the mark "CYMA & LOGO" should be denied due
to his bad faith in filing the application and his knowledge of the prior use of the trademark by
Cyma Partnership.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied Zulueta's petition and affirmed the denial of his trademark application.
The Court upheld Cyma Partnership's ownership of the trademark.
RATIO:
The Court emphasized that registrations obtained in bad faith are void ab initio and unregistrable.
The Court ruled that Cyma Partnership validly obtained a Certificate of Registration and ownership
over the trademark. The Court stated that Zulueta's trademark application was filed in bad faith
because he had knowledge of the prior use of the trademark by Cyma Partnership. The Court held
that Zulueta's alleged rights to the partnership do not justify the registration of the trademark in his
name.

B. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

A. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, G.R. NO. 119528,
MARCH 26, 1997.
The case revolves around the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to issue a
temporary operating permit to an air transport operator without a legislative franchise, with the
Supreme Court ruling in favor of the CAB's authority to issue the permits based on previous court
decisions and the delegation of powers by Congress.
FACTS:
The case involves a dispute between Philippine Airlines (PAL) and Grand International Airways
(GrandAir) over the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to issue a temporary
operating permit to GrandAir without a legislative franchise. On November 24, 1994, GrandAir
applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the CAB. PAL opposed the
application, claiming that the CAB has no jurisdiction to hear the application without a legislative
franchise. The CAB asserted its jurisdiction and denied PAL's opposition. The CAB issued a
Temporary Operating Permit to GrandAir. PAL filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the CAB. PAL then filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition, arguing
that the CAB exceeded its powers and jurisdiction in considering GrandAir's application and
issuing the temporary permit. PAL contends that a legislative franchise is required for anyone to
engage in air transport services, and only Congress can grant such a franchise.
ISSUE:
Whether the CAB has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or
a Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator without a legislative franchise.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of GrandAir and affirmed the authority of the CAB to issue the
permits. The Court held that Congress has delegated the power to regulate the issuance of licenses
for the operation of public utilities to administrative agencies, including the CAB. The Court
emphasized that the CAB's authority is not unlimited and is subject to specific limitations set by
Congress. The Court found that there is nothing in the law that requires a legislative franchise for
the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary Operating
Permit. Therefore, the Court dismissed PAL's petition and directed the CAB to continue hearing
GrandAir's application.

B. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. NO. L-40245,
APRIL 30, 1975.
The case involves the imposition of a fine on Philippine Air Lines, Inc. for making an unauthorized
flag stop, with the Supreme Court ruling that the Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to
impose fines and/or civil penalties to ensure compliance with government regulations.
FACTS:
The case involves the imposition of a fine on Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) for making an
unauthorized flag stop. PAL's flight from Tuguegarao to Manila made a flag stop at Baguio City
without prior approval from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to pick up 20 passengers who
could not be accommodated in its regular flight. The CAB imposed a fine of P5,000.00, which was
later reduced to P2,500.00 upon a motion for reconsideration. The case was appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which certified it to the Supreme Court as a question of law regarding the CAB's
authority to impose penalties under the Civil Aeronautics Act.
ISSUE:
Whether the CAB has the authority to impose fines and/or civil penalties for violations of the Civil
Aeronautics Act.
RULING:
The CAB is fully authorized by law to impose fines and/or civil penalties to ensure compliance
with government regulations.
RATIO:
The CAB exercises general supervision and regulation over air carriers and has the power to
investigate violations of the Civil Aeronautics Act and take necessary action to prevent further
violations. The CAB also has the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm administrative
decisions or orders of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator regarding the imposition of civil
penalties or fines. Depriving the CAB of the power to impose fines would undermine its effective
supervision and control over air carriers and the enforcement of rules and regulations for public
safety and convenience in air transportation.

C. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) in the Philippines has jurisdiction over a variety of cases involving civil
service employees and government agencies. Its jurisdiction includes administrative cases related to
personnel matters, ethical standards, and employment-related disputes within the civil service.
Disciplinary Cases involve complaints against civil service employees for violations of laws, rules, or
regulations, including misconduct, inefficiency, incompetence, neglect of duty, and insubordination
Administrative Complaints & Grievances hears complaints and grievances related to personnel actions
such as appointments, promotions, transfers, and other employment-related
Personnel & Employment Disputes matters involve issues such as tenure, eligibility for positions,
reinstatement, and salary disputes
Ethical and Integrity Cases hears cases involving violations of ethical standards and conduct by public
officials and employees, as outlined in Republic Act No. 6713.
Retirement and Pension Cases handles cases related to retirement and pension benefits, including
disputes over eligibility and entitlements.
Appeals from Lower Civil Service Agencies hears appeals from decisions made by lower civil service
agencies regarding employment-related matters and personnel actions
Decisions and Orders on CSE oversees civil service examinations and may hear cases related to the
administration of these exams,
Other Civil Service Matters has jurisdiction over other civil service matters that may arise, including cases
involving civil service classifications, salary standards, and other employment conditions
A. BUENAFLOR VS. RAMIREZ, JR., G.R. NO. 201607, FEBRUARY 15, 2017.
A civil service employee appeals the dismissal of his case by the Regional Trial Court, arguing
that it lacked jurisdiction and should have been brought before the Civil Service Commission. The
Supreme Court agrees, emphasizing that cases involving civil service employees fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
FACTS:
Jose R. Ramirez, Jr. was appointed as Executive Assistant III and Assistant Accountant by
Chairman Eufemio Domingo of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) on August 27,
2001. Chairman Domingo resigned on September 28, 2001, and petitioner Cesar D. Buenaflor
succeeded him. Buenaflor terminated Ramirez's employment on the same date, claiming that his
tenure had expired as the position of Executive Assistant was personal and confidential, and
therefore co-terminous with the appointing authority. Ramirez filed a complaint in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) to declare his dismissal null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals decided the case in accordance with the law and existing
jurisprudence, considering the alleged errors in its findings and the timeliness of the Notice of
Appeal filed by Buenaflor.
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not declaring that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the civil service-related case, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Buenaflor, emphasizing that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
cases involving civil service employees. The Court held that the CSC has exclusive jurisdiction
over disciplinary cases and personnel actions affecting civil service employees, including
appointment or separation from the service. The complaint filed by Ramirez challenged the
validity of his termination, which falls under the jurisdiction of the CSC. Therefore, the RTC
should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court also declared that the decisions
or orders rendered by courts without jurisdiction are void and ineffectual.
RATIO:
The Court based its decision on the jurisdictional provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,
which vests the CSC with the power to hear and decide administrative cases, including contested
appointments and cases involving civil service employees.

DIFFERENT CASE DIGEST FROM REPORTERS

FACTS
The Respondent, appointed as Executive Assistant III and Assistant Accountant by Chairman Eufemio
Domingo of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), faced termination when Chairman Domingo
resigned and petitioner Cesar D. Buenaflor took over. The petitioner terminated Ramirez citing the
expiration of his tenure, as the position of Executive Assistant is deemed coterminous with the appointing
authority. Ramirez contested his dismissal in the RTC, while the petitioner argued that Ramirez should have
pursued administrative remedies through the Civil Service Commission (CSC) before resorting to legal
action. RTC: The court found the petitioner guilty of unlawful termination as they failed to prove that
Ramirez's employment was coterminous with Chairman Domingo's. Despite filing a motion for
reconsideration (MR), it was denied. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the petitioner,
filed a notice of appeal, but it was dismissed by the RTC for being filed out of time, as indicated by the
registry return card. Appellate Court (CA): The petitioner sought to challenge the RTC's decision through a
petition for certiorari. However, the CA dismissed the petition due to technicalities. The petition lacked
essential information such as the date of the petitioner's counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, the current PTR number of the petitioner's counsel, and the actual
addresses of the parties. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied as they failed to
disprove the RTC's records showing the delay in receiving the order.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not declaring that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil service-related case, which is under the sole jurisdiction of
the CSC.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) lacked jurisdiction
over the case. Ramirez's complaint, challenging the validity of his termination and seeking the RTC's
intervention, fell under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), as mandated by the
Constitution and related laws. The RTC had no authority to hear such matters concerning civil service. Even
though Buenaflor raised this issue in his defense, the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction from the outset. When a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, any actions it takes
are void. Thus, the RTC's decision was ineffective and did not become final, despite the attempted appeal
by Buenaflor. This principle has been upheld in previous cases such as Nazareno v. Court of Appeals and
National Housing Authority v. Commission on Settlement of Land Problem.
Therefore, the Court grants the petition for certiorari, annuls the resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dismisses Civil Case No. 01-4577-8, entitled Jose R. Ramirez v. Hon. Cesar D. Buenaflor, and orders the
respondent to cover the costs of the suit.

B. SAN FELIX VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 198404, OCTOBER 14,
2019.
A police officer in the Philippines is dismissed from service after being found guilty of dishonesty
for allowing someone else to take a qualifying examination on his behalf, with the court ruling
that the Civil Service Commission has the authority to investigate anomalies and irregularities in
civil service examinations and impose appropriate sanctions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Melvin G. San Felix, a police officer in the Philippines, was charged with dishonesty
for allegedly allowing someone else to take a qualifying examination on his behalf. The Civil
Service Commission (CSC) found that the picture and signature on the application form and seat
plan were not identical to those on San Felix's Personal Data Sheet (PDS). The CSC concluded
that San Felix conspired with another person to impersonate him during the examination.
ISSUE:
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to conduct investigations and render administrative decisions
based on alleged anomalies in police entrance and promotional examinations, considering that its
authority to administer such examinations has been withdrawn after the creation of the National
Police Commission (NPC).
RULING:
The court ruled that the CSC has the authority and jurisdiction to investigate anomalies and
irregularities in civil service examinations and impose appropriate sanctions. The CSC is the
central personnel agency of the government and is tasked with promoting morale, efficiency,
integrity, and accountability in the civil service. The CSC has the power to administer and control
civil service examinations and hear and decide administrative cases.
RATIO:
The court based its ruling on the provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law, which
grant the CSC the power to enforce the merit system and administer civil service examinations.
While the NPC has the exclusive power to administer police entrance and promotional
examinations, the CSC still has jurisdiction to investigate anomalies and irregularities committed
during these examinations.

DIFFERENT CASE DIGESTOF REPORTER

FACTS
The petitioner, Melvin G. San Felix, a police officer in the Philippines, was accused of dishonesty by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). The allegation was that he allowed someone else to take a qualifying
examination on his behalf. The CSC claimed that San Felix conspired with another person to impersonate
him during the exam. Discrepancies between the picture and signature on the examination documents and
San Felix's personal data sheet suggested that the signatures were not made by the same person.
ISSUE
WON the Civil Service Commission (CSC) still has the authority to investigate and make administrative
decisions regarding alleged irregularities in police entrance and promotional exams, even though its power
to conduct these exams was revoked after the establishment of the National Police Commission (NPC).
RULING
The court affirmed that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) retains the authority and jurisdiction to
investigate irregularities in civil service examinations and apply appropriate penalties. As the central
personnel agency of the government, the CSC is responsible for upholding morale, efficiency, integrity, and
accountability in the civil service. Even though the National Police Commission (NPC) has exclusive
authority over police exams, the CSC still has the power to probe and address anomalies that occur during
these tests. This ruling is grounded in constitutional provisions and civil service laws, which empower the
CSC to enforce the merit system and oversee civil service exams. Despite not conducting the specific exams
in question, the CSC's jurisdiction extends to investigating dishonest acts by civil servants, including false
statements on personal data sheets. Therefore, the decision to dismiss San Felix from service and impose
penalties was upheld, albeit with a modification excluding accrued leave credits from forfeiture of
retirement benefits.

D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
The Commission on Audit (COA) is the Philippines' Supreme State Audit Institution. The Philippine
Constitution declares its independence as a constitutional office, grants it powers to audit all accounts
pertaining to all government revenues and expenditures/uses of government resources and to prescribe
accounting and auditing rules, gives it exclusive authority to define the scope and techniques for its audits,
and prohibits the legislation of any law which would limit its audit coverage.

A. ENCINAS VS. AGUSTIN, ET AL., G.R. NO. 187317, APRIL 11, 2013.
A provincial fire marshal is dismissed from service after demanding payment from subordinates in
exchange for not reassigning them to remote areas, leading to a series of appeals that ultimately
uphold his dismissal for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
FACTS:
Respondents, PO1 Alfredo P. Agustin and PO1 Joel S. Caubang, were Fire Officer I in Nueva
Ecija. Petitioner, Carlito C. Encinas, was the Provincial Fire Marshall. Petitioner allegedly
demanded a payment of P5,000 from respondents in exchange for not being reassigned to far-flung
areas. Respondents decided to pay petitioner but failed to deliver the full amount. Petitioner issued
instructions to reassign respondents. Respondents filed a letter-complaint with the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) for illegal transfer of personnel. Respondents also filed a joint affidavit/complaint
with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) accusing petitioner of violation of Section 4 (c) of
Republic Act No. 6713. Petitioner was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. The Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the BFP
recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against petitioner. The CSC Regional
Office (CSCRO) found petitioner administratively liable and ordered his dismissal from service.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CSCRO. Petitioner appealed
to the CSC main office. The CSC affirmed the findings of the CSCRO and ruled that there was no
forum-shopping committed by respondents. The CSC found substantial evidence to hold petitioner
administratively liable. Petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
denied petitioner's appeal, ruling that there was no forum-shopping and that there was substantial
evidence to hold petitioner administratively liable. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied by the CA. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents were guilty of forum-shopping.
Whether there was substantial evidence to hold petitioner administratively liable.
RULING:
Respondents were not guilty of forum-shopping. There was substantial evidence to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial.

B. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PH VS. COA, G.R. NO. 177131, JUNE 7, 2011.
The Boy Scouts of the Philippines and the Commission on Audit engage in a legal battle over the
audit jurisdiction of the COA, with the Supreme Court ultimately ruling in favor of the BSP,
declaring it a private corporation and not subject to COA's audit jurisdiction.
FACTS:
The case involves the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) and the Commission on Audit (COA).
The BSP argues that it is a private, non-stock, and non-profit corporation and therefore not subject
to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. The COA claims that the BSP is a government-owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC) and therefore falls under its audit jurisdiction. The BSP argues that
it is a private corporation because it is composed mostly of members from the private sector and
its funds come from private sources such as membership dues and property rentals. The COA relies
on a previous Supreme Court ruling that declared the BSP both a GOCC and a government
instrumentality. The COA argues that the BSP's functions have a public aspect, its governing body
includes government officials, and its funds are subject to government audit.
ISSUE:
Whether the BSP falls under the COA's audit jurisdiction.
RULING:
The Supreme Court rules in favor of the BSP and dismisses the petition. The Court finds that the
BSP is a private corporation and not a GOCC. The Court emphasizes that the BSP is not owned or
controlled by the government, its funds come from private sources, and it does not receive any
appropriation from Congress. The Court notes that the BSP performs public functions but that does
not automatically make it a GOCC. The Court declares that the specific provisions in the BSP's
charter that create it as a private corporation are unconstitutional.
RATIO:
The Court examines the BSP's charter, which states that its purpose is to promote the ability of
boys to do useful things for themselves and others, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic
consciousness, and responsibility. The Court notes that the BSP is classified as an attached agency
of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS), further supporting its status as a
government instrumentality. The Court rejects the BSP's argument that it is a private corporation,
pointing out that it falls under the category of "other corporations, institutions, and entities for
public interest or purpose created by law" as defined in Article 44 of the Civil Code.

C. COA VS. FERRER, G.R. NO. 218870, NOVEMBER 24, 2020.

In the case of Commission on Audit v. Ferrer, the Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on
Audit has full authority over government account audits and that the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction unless there are exceptional circumstances, affirming the finality and executory nature
of disallowances made by the COA.
FACTS:
The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte,
Jr., the former Governor of Camarines Sur, against the provincial auditors and the Commission on
Audit (COA). The COA issued Notices of Disallowance (NDs) for various disbursements made
by Villafuerte during his term as Governor. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the motion to
dismiss filed by the provincial auditors. The provincial auditors filed a petition with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed by Villafuerte.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COA and the provincial auditors. The COA has primary
jurisdiction over issues involving disallowances. The RTC does not have the authority to directly
determine questions on COA's alleged grave abuse of discretion. Allowing trial courts to issue
writs of certiorari against NDs issued by provincial auditors would cause unnecessary delay in the
audit process and burden the already saturated trial court dockets. The NDs issued by the COA
had become final and executory as Villafuerte failed to file an appeal within the reglementary
period. The RTC could no longer alter the disallowances and should have dismissed Villafuerte's
petitions. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that
have already attained finality.
RATIO:
The COA has full authority over government account audits. The RTC has no jurisdiction unless
there are exceptional circumstances. The COA has primary jurisdiction over issues involving
disallowances. The RTC does not have the authority to directly determine questions on COA's
alleged grave abuse of discretion. Allowing trial courts to issue writs of certiorari against NDs
issued by provincial auditors would cause unnecessary delay in the audit process and burden the
already saturated

D. FERNANDO VS. COA, G.R. NOS. 237938 & 237944-45, DECEMBER 4, 2018.
The case of Ferdo v. Commission on Audit establishes that the Executive Committee of the Metro
Manila Film Festival is subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction due to its status as a government
instrumentality and the public nature of its funds.
FACTS:
Bayani F. Fernando served as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Metro Manila Film
Festival (MMFF) from 2002-2008. The Commission on Audit (COA) issued an Office Order
authorizing a special audit on the disbursements of the Executive Committee for the years 2002-
2008. The audit revealed that Fernando received disallowed amounts from the Committee,
including payments sourced from non-tax revenues. The COA issued Notices of Disallowance
against Fernando, ordering him to pay a total amount of P3,000,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Committee of the MMFF is subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.
RULING:
The Executive Committee of the MMFF is subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.
RATIO:
The COA has the authority to audit the Committee as it is considered a government instrumentality
and its funds are public in nature. The Committee is an office under the Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), a government agency tasked with administrative functions for the local
government units in Metropolitan Manila. The Committee's funds, even if sourced from non-tax
revenues and private donations, are considered public funds due to the public purpose for which
they were solicited.

E. PAGCOR VS. COA, G.R. NO. 230818, JUNE 15, 2021.

Former officers of PAGCOR challenge the COA's disallowance of a ficial grant to a private
association, leading to a ruling that COA has the authority to audit all PAGCOR funds and the
disallowance was proper, while holding the officers personally liable and denying a stay order.
FACTS:
Former officers of PAGCOR, Efraim C. Genuino and Rene C. Figueroa, challenged COA's
disallowance of a financial grant. Both Genuino and Figueroa were included in a Notice of
Suspension issued by COA, suspending the payment of financial assistance granted to PVHA for
a flood control project. Figueroa argued that his inclusion in the notice was wrongful as he was
only an alternate signatory and did not have custody of the funds. Genuino argued that the grant
was in furtherance of PAGCOR's corporate social responsibility. The notice of suspension was
lifted, but a Notice of Disallowance was subsequently issued, disallowing the payment of the
financial grant to PVHA as it was found to be a private association. Both Genuino and Figueroa
appealed the disallowance, but their appeals were denied by COA. Figueroa's petition was
dismissed, upholding the disallowance of the financial assistance to PVHA. Figueroa was held
personally liable for the disallowed transaction. Genuino's petition was summarily dismissed for
being filed out of time, but the COA later corrected itself and agreed that Genuino's petition was
timely filed. Genuino was also held solidarily liable for the disallowed amount as the official who
approved the grant.
ISSUE:
Whether the COA's audit jurisdiction over PAGCOR is limited.
Whether the disallowance of the subject transaction was proper.
Whether petitioners may be held personally liable for the disallowed transaction.
Whether a stay order may be issued in favor of Figueroa.
RULING:
The COA has the authority to audit all funds of PAGCOR, regardless of the source. The
disallowance of the financial grant to PVHA was proper. Petitioners are personally liable for the
disallowed transaction. A stay order cannot be issued in favor of Figueroa.
RATIO:
The COA has the authority to audit all funds of PAGCOR based on its constitutional power to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of government
entities, including government-owned or controlled corporations

F. TAISEI SHIMIZU JOINT VENTURE VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. NO. 238671,
JUNE 2, 2020.
In a dispute over unpaid billings for the construction of the New Iloilo Airport, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Commission on Audit (COA) does not have exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
against the government, and cannot interfere with the decisions of other courts or tribunals.
FACTS:
Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture (TSJV) filed a petition against the Commission on Audit (COA) and
the Department of Transportation (DOTr). TSJV won a contract for the construction of the New
Iloilo Airport, but some of their billings were left unpaid. TSJV filed a Request for Arbitration and
Complaint with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) seeking payment for
various money claims. The CIAC granted some of TSJV's claims in its Final Award. TSJV moved
for the execution of the Final Award, but the DOTr opposed and stated that the award should be
referred to the COA for approval. TSJV filed a petition with the COA for enforcement and payment
of the arbitral award.
ISSUE:
Does the COA have exclusive jurisdiction over money claims due from or owing to the
government?
In the exercise of its audit power, may the COA disturb the final and executory decisions of courts,
tribunals, or other adjudicative bodies?
RULING:
The COA's primary jurisdiction over money claims due from or owing to the government does not
preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over the same subject matter by another adjudicatory body,
tribunal, or court. The COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against the government,
but other tribunals and courts may also have concurrent jurisdiction over such claims. The COA's
jurisdiction is limited to liquidated money claims. The COA cannot interfere with the findings of
a court or tribunal that decided an unliquidated money claim involving issues requiring the exercise
of judicial functions or specialized knowledge and expertise. Once a court or other adjudicative
body validly acquires jurisdiction over a money claim against the government, it exercises and
retains jurisdiction over the subject matter to the exclusion of all others, including the COA. The
COA has no appellate review power over the decisions of any other court or tribunal. The COA is
also devoid of power to disregard the principle of immutability of final judgments. The COA's
exercise of discretion in approving or disapproving money claims that have been determined by
final judgment is akin to the power of an execution court. The COA's jurisdiction over final money
judgments rendered by the courts pertains only to the execution stage. The COA should restrict
itself to determining the source of public funds from which the final and executory arbitral award
may be satisfied.

ADDITIONAL LANG
Considering that TSJV and DOTr had voluntarily invoked CIAC’s jurisdiction, the power to hear and decide
the present case has thereby been solely vested in the CIAC to the exclusion of COA. Both parties accepted
the CIAC’s final award and neither one sought review with the Court of Appeals of the Supreme Court.
Being a specific law, EO No. 1008 providing for CIAC’s exclusive jurisdiction prevails over PD 1445, granting
COA the general jurisdiction over money claims due from or owing to the government. For this reason
alone, the COA should have stayed its hands from modifying the CIAC’s final arbitral award, let alone from
claiming exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The COA’s primary jurisdiction over money claims due from
or owing to the government does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over the same subject matter
by another adjudicatory body, tribunal or court. There is nothing in the Constitution, laws or even COA
rules expressly granting the COA original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims due from or owing
to the government.
There are two types of money claims which may be brought before the COA. First, there are money claims
pursued as an original action for collection of payment. Second, are those money claims that arise from a
final and executory judgment of a court or arbitral body. As a rule, COA’s original jurisdiction is actually
limited to liquidated money claims. The COA’s power of audit review over money claims already confirmed
by final judgment of a court or other adjudicative body is necessarily limited. Once a court or other
adjudicative body validly acquires jurisdiction over a money claim against the government, it exercises and
retains jurisdiction over the subject matter to the exclusion of all others, including COA.
Lastly, COA has no appellate review power over the decisions of any other court or tribunal. It is devoid of
power to disregard the principle of immutability of final judgments. The COA’s exercise of discretion in
approving or disapproving money claims that have been determined by final judgments is akin to the
power of an execution court.

E. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION

The Commission shall perform, among others that may be conferred by law, the following functions:
- To formulate and adopt an arbitration program for the construction industry;
- To enunciate policies and prescribe rules and procedures for construction arbitration;
- To supervise the arbitration program, and exercise such authority related thereto as regards the
appointment, replacement or challenging of arbitrators; and;
- To direct its officers and employees to perform such functions as may be assigned to them from time to
time. [Section 6, E.O. 1008]
Jurisdiction of CIAC The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes, which arose from,
or is connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines whether
the dispute arose before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach
thereof. These disputes may involve government or private contracts. [Section 4, E.O. 1008]
May include but is not limited to: a. Violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; b. Violation
of the terms of agreement; c. Interpretation and/or application of contractual provisions; - amount of
damages and penalties; - commencement time and delays; - maintenance and defects; - payment default
of employer or contractor and ; - changes in contract cost. [Section 4, E.O. 1008]

A. SPOUSES ANG VS. DE VENECIA, G.R. NO. 217151, FEBRUARY 12, 2020
A dispute between homeowners and their neighbor over damages caused by a construction project
raises the question of jurisdiction for the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
The court rules that the CIAC does not have jurisdiction as there was no construction contract
involved, and orders the trial court to resume the proceedings.
FACTS:
The case involves a dispute between homeowners, Drs. Reynaldo Ang and Susan Cucio-Ang, and
their neighbor, Angel Margarito D. Caramat Jr. The spouses Ang own a two-storey residential
house in Makati City, while Angel started construction on a five-storey commercial building on
the adjoining lot. The spouses Ang noticed cracks in their walls and misalignment of their gate and
doors, which they suspected were caused by the construction works. They hired an architect who
confirmed that the foundation of their house was exposed and moved due to the deeper excavation
for Angel's building. The spouses Ang sought mediation and repairs, but the issue remained
unresolved. They then filed a complaint against Angel, his contractor, and other parties involved,
seeking damages for the damage to their property.
ISSUE:
Whether the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) has jurisdiction over a suit
filed by a homeowner for damages caused by a construction project undertaken by their neighbor.
RULING:
The court ruled that the CIAC does not have jurisdiction over the case and ordered the trial court
to resume the proceedings. The court found that the CIAC's jurisdiction is limited to disputes
arising from or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the Philippines. In this case, there was no construction contract between the parties,
and the spouses Ang's cause of action did not proceed from any construction contract. The court
emphasized that the CIAC's jurisdiction is not over the contract itself but over disputes arising
from or connected to the contract. Since the dispute in this case did not arise from a construction
contract, the CIAC does not have jurisdiction.
RATIO:
The court based its decision on the provisions of the law establishing the CIAC and the nature and
function of the tribunal.

B. CE CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS. ARANETA CENTER, INC., G.R. NO. 192725,

AUGUST 9, 2017
CE Construction Corporation (CECON) successfully appeals to the Supreme Court to reinstate
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's decision, awarding them a total sum of
P231,357,136.72, after the Court of Appeals incorrectly characterized their contractual
arrangement with Araneta Center, Inc. (ACI) as a lump-sum fixed price.
FACTS:
CE Construction Corporation (CECON) and Araneta Center, Inc. (ACI) were involved in a
construction project for the redevelopment of Araneta Center Complex. CECON submitted a bid
for the project, indicating a tender amount of P1,449,089,174.00. ACI verbally informed CECON
that the contract was being awarded to them, but no formal contract documents were executed.
ACI made changes to the project, including the inclusion of an office tower and the removal of
certain equipment from CECON's scope of work. The project cost was adjusted multiple times.
CECON filed a Request for Adjudication with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) after experiencing delays and disputes with ACI. The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal awarded a
total sum of P217,428,155.75 to CECON, which was later modified to P231,357,136.72. ACI filed
a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, which modified the award in favor of CECON to
P114,324,605.00 and increased the award to ACI to P31,566,246.20. CECON filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in characterizing the contractual arrangement between
CECON and ACI as immutably one for a lump-sum fixed price.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in characterizing the contractual
arrangement between CECON and ACI as immutably one for a lump-sum fixed price. The CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal did not act in excess of jurisdiction in its decision. The Supreme Court
emphasized the technical expertise and authority of the CIAC in resolving construction disputes.
The factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal should be given deference, and exceptions to
its findings should only be made in cases where the integrity of the arbitral process has been
compromised. The Supreme Court reinstated the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's decision,

C. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA) VS. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION, AND
HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION G.R. NO. 129169,
NOVEMBER 17, 1999.
The case involves a dispute between the National Irrigation Administration and Hydro Resources
Contractors Corporation over a construction contract, with the main issue being whether the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission had jurisdiction over a dispute arising from a
contract executed before its creation, and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Commission's
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
The case involves a dispute between the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and Hydro
Resources Contractors Corporation (HYDRO) over a construction contract. In 1978, NIA awarded
HYDRO the contract for the construction of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. HYDRO
completed the project in 1982 but claimed that it still had an account receivable from NIA for the
dollar rate differential of the price escalation clause. After unsuccessful negotiations with NIA,
HYDRO filed a request for adjudication with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC). NIA argued that CIAC had no jurisdiction over the dispute because the construction
contract was executed before the CIAC was created in 1983. CIAC ruled that it had jurisdiction
over the dispute, and the Court of Appeals upheld this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether CIAC had jurisdiction over a dispute arising from a construction contract that was
executed before the creation of CIAC.
RULING:
CIAC did have jurisdiction over the dispute.
RATIO:
As long as the parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of the forum they choose,
their agreement falls within the jurisdiction of CIAC. NIA's active participation in the arbitration
proceedings indicated its agreement to submit the dispute to CIAC. The jurisdiction of CIAC is
over the dispute itself, not the contract. The dispute arose when CIAC was already constituted, so
the arbitral board was exercising current jurisdiction, not retroactive jurisdiction.
Additional Rulings:
NIA's defenses of laches and prescription are evidentiary in nature and should be resolved at the
trial of the case on the merits. The issue of prescription and laches cannot be resolved

F. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise: a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as
herein provided: 1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL CASES
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
or the Bureau of Customs;
 Less than One Million Pesos
 No specified amount claimed
 More than One Million Pesos
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally
decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes,
fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes
and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall
be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection
cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS UNDER THE TAX CODE Under Section 253 of the NIRC, any person who violates
the provisions of the Code or causes someone to commit a violation, and those who willfully assisted
them, will be held liable.
● Foreign National – immediate deportation;
● Public officer or employee – maximum penalty and perpetual disqualification from holding any public
office, to vote and to participate in the election; and
● Certified Public Accountant – automatic cancellation of certification
A. CIR VS CTA & QL DEVELOPMENT, INC., G.R. NO. 258947, MARCH 29, 2022.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue challenges the cancellation of a deficiency tax assessment
for the taxable year 2010 on the ground of prescription, but the Court dismisses the petition and
upholds the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals Division, finding that the right to collect taxes
had prescribed.
FACTS:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
against the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Second Division and QL Development, Inc. (QLDI). CIR
challenges the cancellation of a deficiency tax assessment for taxable year 2010 on the ground of
prescription. CIR served a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and a Formal Assessment Notice
(FAN) to QLDI. QLDI failed to file a protest within the 30-day period provided by law. CIR issued
a Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) and ordered QLDI to pay the deficiency taxes
QLDI filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied by the CIR. QLDI filed a Petition for
Review before the CTA Division, questioning the validity of the assessment and the prescription
of the CIR's right to collect taxes. CTA Division cancelled the assessment on the ground of
prescription
ISSUE:
Whether the CIR's right to collect taxes had already prescribed
RULING:
The Court dismissed the Petition and upheld the Resolutions of the CTA Division. The CIR availed
itself of the wrong remedy by filing a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly with the Court
The proper remedy was to file an appeal by way of a petition for review with the CTA En Banc.
The CTA Division had jurisdiction over the case, including the issue of prescription. The Court
held that the CIR's right to collect taxes had prescribed. The CIR had three years from the date of
mailing of the FAN to collect the assessed deficiency taxes,

ADDITIONAL ISSUE AND RULING

ISSUE
The core of the issue is whether the CIR's right to collect taxes had already prescribed.
RULING
On the merits of the case, the CIR attributes grave abuse of discretion to the CTA Division when it assumed
jurisdiction over QLDI's Petition for Review. The CIR claims that QLDI's failure to file a valid protest to the
FAN/FLD rendered the assessment against it already final, executory, and demandable. As such, the
assessments are not subject to judicial scrutiny, as it is already beyond the CTA Division's jurisdiction. The
CIR's argument must fail in light of Section 7(a)(1) of Republic Act No. (RA) 1125, as amended by RA 9282,
which confers upon the CTA the jurisdiction to decide not only cases on disputed assessments and refunds
of internal revenue taxes, but also "other matters" arising under the NIRC. SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA
shall exercise: (a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided: (1) Decisions of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue [Code] or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue[.]
(Emphasis supplied). The fact that an assessment has become final for failure of the taxpayer to file a
protest within the time allowed only means that the validity or correctness of the assessment may no
longer be questioned on appeal. However, the validity of the assessment itself is a separate and distinct
issue from the issue of whether the right of the CIR to collect the validly assessed tax has prescribed. This
issue of prescription, being a matter provided for by the NIRC, is well within the jurisdiction of the CTA to
decide.

B. CITY OF MANILA VS. GRECIA-CUERDO, G.R. NO. 175723, FEBRUARY 4, 2014.

The Supreme Court denies the petition of the City of Manila, affirming the dismissal by the Court
of Appeals, as the issues raised became irrelevant due to the final decision of the Regional Trial
Court granting the tax refund, and clarifies that the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari in local tax cases.
FACTS:
City of Manila filed a special civil action for certiorari to reverse the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in a tax refund case. Petitioners: City of Manila, represented by Mayor Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., and Ms. Liberty M. Toledo, the City Treasurer of Manila. Respondents: SM Mart,
Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware
Philippines, Inc., Watson Personal Care Stores, Phils., Inc., Jollimart Phils., Corp., Surplus
Marketing Corporation, and Signature Lines. City of Manila assessed taxes against the private
respondents for the taxable period from January to December 2002. Private respondents paid the
assessed taxes under protest and filed a complaint for refund or recovery of illegally and/or
erroneously-collected local business tax with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. RTC
granted the private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM).
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC. Petitioners filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA, but the CA dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, ruling that the appellate jurisdiction over the complaint for tax refund lies with the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
ISSUE:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the complaint for tax refund or if it lies with the CTA.
RULING:
The petition has become moot and academic because the RTC had already rendered a decision in
the main case, granting the tax refund to the private respondents. The decision had become final
and executory, and a writ of execution had been issued. The issues raised in the petition were no
longer relevant.
RATIO:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

PANDAGDAG LANG
ISSUE
Whether the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
RULING
The Court ruled that the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 by expanding the jurisdiction of
the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction. “Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise: a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided: xxx3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction; xxx”
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with
the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is
anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative
motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of
any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that
a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court
decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case. Based
on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take
cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case
is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as
quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.
c. FIDELA D. FERNANDEZ VS. CEASAR R. DULAY, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE & OIC-RD GERRY O. DUMAYAS, BIR REVENUE REGION NO. 10, CTA
CASE NO. 9908, MARCH 24, 2023.
NO CASE DIGEST AVAILABLE
Petitioner Fidela D. Fernandez filed a Petition for Review praying that the tax assessment issued to him by
the Respondents Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) be declared void ab initio and ordering the
Respondent to refund the amount paid as a compromise to Petitioner. The Petitioner argued that the
assessment could never become final, executory and demandable, as it is void for having been issued in
violation of due process. In view of the invalid assessment, there was nothing to compromise. On the other
hand, the Respondents countered that the decision of CIR on administrative compromise is discretionary
and does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Likewise, due process was observed in the service of BIR notices. In ruling, the Court was not convinced,
the decision of the CIR in relation to the exercise of his power to enter a compromise that is tainted by
failure to abide by the parameters set by law, is subject to the CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Respondents failed to prove that the assessment notices were actually received by the
Petitioner. Considering that the subject assessment was issued in violation of the Petitioner’s right to due
process, the same is void. Correspondingly, there being no valid assessment, there is no basis to deny the
Petitioner’s request to pay a compromise settlement. Hence, the Petition was GRANTED, the assessment
notices were CANCELLED and SET ASIDE, and the Respondents were ORDERED to REFUND to the Petitioner
the amount paid as a compromise settlement.

d. PET PLANS, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, CTA CASE NO.
10002, MARCH 23, 2023.
NO CASE DIGEST AVAILABLE
ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE CANCELLED DUE TO SET-IN OF PRESCRIPTION Petitioner Pet Plans, Inc. filed a
Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR), which denied its request for reconsideration of the Final Decision on Disputed Assessments,
citing prescription as defense. The Petitioner averred that it received the Formal Letter of Demand/Final
Assessment Notice (FLD/FAN) beyond the three (3) year period to assess. On the other hand, the
Respondent countered that its right to assess the Petitioner has not yet prescribed and that the
assessment of withholding taxes is imprescriptible.
In ruling, the Petitioner was able to overturn the presumption that it filed false returns. Accordingly, the
three (3)- year prescriptive period to issue tax assessments applies. Moreover, the Court held that the
Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) and Withholding Tax on Compensation (WTC) assessments are not
imprescriptible. Accordingly, the assessment is void because it was only issued on 3 June 2009 at the
earliest, which is beyond the three (3)-year prescriptive period for the Respondent to assess.
Consequently, the deficiency tax assessment is NULL AND VOID for being issued beyond the prescriptive
period.

G. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

Refers to the independent Quasi-Judicial regulatory agency created pursuant to Republic Act No. 9136, as
defined in Section 4(n) of the Republic Act No. 9513.
OBJECTIVES
1.To promulgate/approve rules, regulations, guidelines and policies. 2. To enforce rules, regulations
including issuance of permits and licenses. 3. To resolve cases (rates and other cases) and disputes. 4. To
promote consumer interest. 5. To become a dynamic organization of professional people with the highest
degree of technical competence and integrity.
A. NON VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 239168, SEPTEMBER 15, 2020.
Officials of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) are charged with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for extending the competitive selection process (CSP) requirement for
power supply agreements (PSAs) in the electric power industry, but the Supreme Court dismisses
the charges, ruling that the extension was done in good faith and in response to legitimate concerns
raised by stakeholders.
FACTS:
Petitioners are officials of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) who were charged with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case revolves around the extension of
the competitive selection process (CSP) requirement for power supply agreements (PSAs) in the
electric power industry. In 2001, the ERC was created as a regulatory body to enforce the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) and ensure consumer protection and competitive operations
in the power industry. In 2015, the ERC issued Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015, which required
distribution utilities (DUs) to undergo a competitive selection process (CSP) in procuring power
supply agreements (PSAs). The CSP requirement aimed to ensure transparency and obtain the best
price offers from suppliers. The ERC had not yet issued the guidelines for the CSP at that time.
Various stakeholders, including Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), raised concerns and
sought clarification on the legal implications of the CSP requirement. In response, the ERC issued
Resolution No. 1, Series of 2016, which extended the effectivity of Resolution No. 13-2015 from
November 6, 2015, to April 30, 2016. MERALCO allegedly entered into seven PSAs on April 26,
2016, and filed them with the ERC on April 29, 2016. Respondent Alyansa Para sa Bagong
Pilipinas, Inc. (ABP) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court,
challenging the validity of Resolution No. 1-2016. The Supreme Court granted ABP's petition and
declared Resolution No. 1-2016 void ab initio. ABP also filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging the petitioners with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict the petitioners and their co-respondent, Jose
Vicente B. Salazar, for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Ombudsman denied. The petitioners then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, challenging the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause.
ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against
the petitioners.
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and dismissed the charges against the petitioners. The
Court held that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause, as
the extension of the CSP requirement was done in good faith and in response to legitimate concerns
raised by stakeholders in the power industry. The Court emphasized that the determination of
probable cause is a factual matter, and the Ombudsman's finding must be supported by substantial
evidence. The Court found that the Ombudsman failed to consider the legitimate concerns raised
by stakeholders and wrongly concluded that the petitioners acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court also noted that the nullification of Resolution
No. 1-2016 in a separate case does not automatically equate to a finding of probable cause against
the petitioner.

B. ALYANSA PARA SA BAGONG PILIPINAS, INC. VS. ENERGY REGULATORY

COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 227670, MAY 3, 2019.
The Supreme Court rules that the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) committed grave abuse
of discretion in postponing the implementation of the Competitive Selection Process (CSP),
resulting in the disapproval of power supply agreements (PSAs) and emphasizing the importance
of transparency and competition in the electricity industry to protect the public interest.
FACTS:
The case involves the postponement of the implementation of the Competitive Selection Process
(CSP) for the procurement of power supply agreements (PSAs) by distribution utilities (DUs) in
the Philippines. The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) unilaterally postponed the date of
effectivity of the mandatory CSP twice, first from June 30, 2015, to November 7, 2015, and then
from November 7, 2015, to April 30, 2016. The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a circular
mandating the CSP and requiring coordination between the DOE and the ERC in implementing
the guidelines and procedures for the CSP. The ERC's postponement of the CSP without
coordination with the DOE was deemed to be in excess of its jurisdiction and a grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether the ERC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the ERC Clarificatory
Resolution.
Whether the PSAs between Meralco and its power suppliers should be disapproved for failure to
comply with the requirements of the 2015 DOE Circular and the CSP Guidelines.
RULING:
The ERC did not have the statutory authority to postpone the date of effectivity of CSP and amend
the 2015 DOE Circular. The ERC's unilateral postponement of CSP for 305 days was without
authority and constituted grave abuse of discretion. The PSAs between Meralco and its power
suppliers should be disapproved for failure to comply with the requirements of the 2015 DOE
Circular and the CSP Guidelines.

C. NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ENERGY

REGULATORY COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 217196, AUGUST 27, 2020
The case involves the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) challenging the
Energy Regulatory Commission's (ERC) assessment fee, but the Supreme Court ruled against
NGCP, stating that they failed to follow proper administrative procedures and should have pursued
an appeal instead of a petition for certiorari.
FACTS:
Petitioner: National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP). NGCP is a private corporation
with a legislative franchise to operate and maintain the nationwide transmission system of the
Philippines. NGCP filed an application for the renewal of its Certificate of Authority as a
Wholesale Electricity Spot Market-Metering Service Provider (WESM-MSP) with the respondent,
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). ERC informed NGCP of an assessment fee that needed to
be paid for the renewal of its Certificate of Authority. NGCP paid the fee under protest and sought
reconsideration, claiming exemption under its legislative franchise. ERC denied NGCP's request
for exemption and issued the Certificate of Authority. NGCP filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy. NGCP then filed
a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Was certiorari the proper remedy for NGCP to challenge the ERC's Letter-Resolution?
Assuming NGCP followed the proper quasi-judicial procedure, is a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals the correct remedy to challenge the ERC's Letter-Resolution?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
RATIO:
NGCP violated the doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The ERC has primary administrative jurisdiction over cases contesting
fees assessed and imposed by the agency itself.