Prop: Acquittal in trap cases on the factual basis

 Satvir Singh vs. State of Delhi (20.08.2014 - SC) : MANU/SC/0750/2014

39. After careful observation of the above-mentioned facts

and evidence on record and on careful examination of the
aforesaid rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties,
with reference to the extracted portion of the evidence of PW-2,
PW-3 and PW-9, we are of the considered view that the
prosecution has failed to prove the demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification by the Appellant from the complainant PW-
2, upon whose evidence much reliance has been placed by the
learned Counsel for the Respondent.

40. We, accordingly answer the point No. 2 in favour of the

Appellant that exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the High
Court to reverse the judgment and order of acquittal is not only
erroneous but also suffers from error in law and liable to be set
aside. Accordingly, we answer the point Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of
the Appellant.

 K.P. Kolanthai vs. State (09.08.2019 - MADHC) : MANU/TN/6220/2019

52. In the instant case, the foundation of the Prosecution case

of the demand made by the Appellant for bribe has, as observed
already, been shaken to a great extent. In any event, it casts a
grave doubt on the events that were alleged to have taken place in
the matter of pre-trap proceedings, giving bribe to the Appellant
and recovery of bribe money from the Appellant. The version of
the Prosecution, as to demand and receipt of the bribe money, as
narrated by the Prosecution witnesses, is suspicious and does not
inspire any confidence. Serious doubts arise as to the manner in
which bribe was stated to be demanded, offered and received, as
also to the place where the offer and receipt took place. The
Prosecution has miserably failed to prove the foundational facts,
viz. demand, acceptance and recovery of the amount of illegal
gratification, beyond all reasonable doubts. When the
 Prosecution is not able prove its case by proving the foundational
facts, it cannot take advantage that the Appellant/accused has
not come out with a probable explanation in defence. Therefore,
this Court is of the opinion that the Prosecution has not been
able to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond all reasonable
doubts.

53. As already discussed above, the entire circumstances,

under which the case was stated to be registered, the trap
witnesses being summoned even prior to the registration of the
case, the bribe is alleged to be accepted by the accused, are
highly suspicious and shrouded with doubts and as such, it is
difficult to sustain the conviction on the basis of such dubious
evidence.

54. In view of the above infirmities and inherent

improbabilities, this Court has to necessarily come to the
conclusion that the entire trap proceedings was bristled with
suspicious circumstances and doubts, as the Prosecution, before
raising presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, has miserably failed to establish the
foundational facts regarding guilt of the accused by cogent
evidence, whereas the Appellant has rebutted such presumption
by preponderance of probabilities and thereby, the Appellant is
entitled to be acquitted.

 P. Subbarayudu vs. The State of AP (17.07.2023 - APHC) :

MANU/AP/1200/2023

33. In Satvir Singh (8th supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court

while holding that the demand acceptance of the bribe was not
proved, restored the order of acquittal granted by the trial Court.
It was a case where the trial Court acquitted the accused and the
High Court of Delhi reversed the order of acquittal and the
Hon'ble Apex Court restored the order of acquittal. So, what is
evident from the above is that for an offence under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d) R/w. Section 13(2) of the PC Act, the proof of
demand acceptance of bribe are sine-qua-non and further to
 draw a presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act, those facts
are to proved necessarily.

 KrishanChander vs. State of Delhi (06.01.2016 - SC) :

MANU/SC/0003/2016

35. Further, in the case of Satvir Singh v. State of Delhi

MANU/SC/0750/2014 : (2014) 13 SCC 143, this Court has held
thus:

34. This Court, in K.S. Panduranga case has held that

the demand and acceptance of the amount of illegal
gratification by the accused is a condition precedent to
constitute an offence, the relevant paragraph in this regard
from the abovesaid decision is extracted hereunder: (SCC
pp. 740-41, para 39)

39. Keeping in view that the demand and

acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification is
a condition precedent for constituting an offence
under the Act, it is to be noted that there is a
statutory presumption Under Section 20 of the Act
which can be dislodged by the accused by bringing
on record some evidence, either direct or
circumstantial, that money was accepted other
than for the motive or the reward as stipulated
Under Section 7 of the Act. When some
explanation is offered, the court is obliged to
consider the explanation Under Section 20 of the
Act and the consideration of the explanation has to
be on the touchstone of preponderance of
probability. It is not to be proven beyond all
reasonable doubt. In the case at hand, we are
disposed to think that the explanation offered by the
accused does not deserve any acceptance and,
accordingly, we find that the finding recorded on
that score by the learned trial Judge and the stamp
of approval given to the same by the High Court
cannot be faulted.
 36. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the approach of both the
trial court and the High Court in the case is erroneous as both the
courts have relied upon the evidence of the prosecution on the
aspect of demand of illegal gratification from the complainant-Jai
Bhagwan (PW-2) by the Appellant though there is no substantive
evidence in this regard and the Appellant was erroneously
convicted for the charges framed against him. The prosecution
has failed to prove the factum of demand of bribe money made
by the Appellant from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2),
which is the sine qua non for convicting him for the offences
punishable Under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the PC Act. Thus, the impugned judgment and order of
the High Court is not only erroneous but also suffers from error
in law and therefore, liable to be set aside.