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Competing structural powers and

challenges for the EU's structural
foreign policy
a b
Stephan Keukeleire & Tom Delreux
a
University of Leuven/College of Europe, Leuven International
and European Studies (LINES) Institute, Parkstraat 45, box 3602,
3000, Leuven, Belgium
b
University of Louvain, Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-
Europe, Place Montesquieu 1, box L2.08.07, 1348 Louvain-la-
Neuve, Belgium
Published online: 28 Jan 2015.
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To cite this article: Stephan Keukeleire & Tom Delreux (2015) Competing structural powers
and challenges for the EU's structural foreign policy, Global Affairs, 1:1, 43-50, DOI:
10.1080/23340460.2015.983730

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 Global Affairs, 2015
Vol. 1, No. 1, 43–50, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2015.983730

Competing structural powers and challenges for the EU’s structural foreign
policy
Stephan Keukeleirea* and Tom Delreuxb
a
University of Leuven/College of Europe, Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) Institute,
Parkstraat 45, box 3602, 3000, Leuven, Belgium; bUniversity of Louvain, Institut de sciences politiques
Louvain-Europe, Place Montesquieu 1, box L2.08.07, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
(Received 14 October 2014; accepted 31 October 2014)
Downloaded by [109.121.70.141] at 06:38 08 February 2015

This article contends that, in order to understand global affairs, not only crises and conflicts
need to be examined, but also long-term processes which result from the competition
between structural powers. These structural powers have the potential to set or influence the
organizing principles and the rules of the game in other countries and regions as well as the
international system in general. The article focuses on the European Union’s potential as a
structural power. Examining where the EU has succeeded and where it has failed to behave
as a structural power, it argues that the EU is losing the structural power game against
competing structural powers in its neighbourhood, specifically Russia in the EU’s eastern
neighbourhood and the multifarious phenomenon of “Islamism” in the EU’s southern
neighbourhood.
Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy; European Union; Foreign policy; Islamism;
Russia; structural foreign policy; structural power

Introduction
Most observers of international politics tend to focus on crises, violent conflicts and wars, as well
as on the use of hard power as the main determinant of the outcome of international confronta-
tions. Developments in the last couple of years provide sufficient reasons to justify such a per-
spective, with the often violent fall-out of the Arab revolts, the invasion in Libya, the military
coup in Egypt, the Israeli attack on Gaza, the Syrian civil war, the rise of and fight against
“Islamic State” (IS), the Russian annexation of Crimea and the wars in eastern Ukraine, the
Central African Republic or other African countries.
In this article we assume that, in order to understand global affairs, not only crises and con-
flicts need to be examined, but also long-term processes which result from the competition
between structural powers and which do not directly (or immediately) lead to military conflicts.
These structural powers include the USA, the EU, Russia, China, but also “new” types of powers
such as the multifaceted phenomenon of “Islamism”. They are “structural powers” since they
have the potential to set or influence the organizing principles and the rules of the game in
other countries and regions as well as the international system in general. They thereby influence

*Corresponding author. Email: stephan.keukeleire@soc.kuleuven.be

© 2015 European International Studies Association

 44 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux

in a more profound or “structural” way the shape and status of international politics today. In order
to gain insights in these deeper dynamics, the question is then which powers are successful over
the long term in shaping the rules of the game that are followed in other countries and regions or at
the global level? Or in other words: which powers conduct an effective structural foreign policy,
enabling them to promote their preferred structures? This article focuses on the European Union’s
potential as a structural power. Examining where the EU has succeeded and where it has failed to
behave as a structural power, it argues that the EU is losing the structural power game against
competing structural powers in its neighbourhood.
The article is structured as follows: in the following section, we briefly explain the nature of
structural foreign policy. Then, we point to factors that contribute to success or failure of structural
foreign policy, giving a couple of examples of a successful structural foreign policy of the EU.
Turning to the failures of the EU’s structural foreign policy, we subsequently explain why the
EU’s structural foreign policy of the last two decades failed towards its eastern and southern
neighbourhood. We pay attention here to two of the EU’s main competing structural powers:
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Russia in the East and Islamic movements and actors in the South.

Structural foreign policy: shaping the rules of the game

The competition between structural powers refers to the rivalry between powers that have the
capacity and will to determine or influence political, legal, economic, social and other rules of
the game. They can do so through their existing power position in global affairs (which is
often the case for the USA) and/or through a comprehensive “structural foreign policy” that
actively tries to shape and influence the rules of the game in other parts of the world (which is
often attempted by the EU). In other publications we have explained in more detail the nature
of structural foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014; Keukeleire, Justaert, & Thiers,
2009). Here, it suffices to focus on the two crucial dimensions of the qualification “structural”
in structural foreign policy, as this will also help to understand the competition between structural
powers and the success and failures of the EU’s policy.
First, the objective of a structural foreign policy is to influence or shape structures in a given
space (i.e. a country, society, region or global level). Structures consist of relatively permanent orga-
nizing principles, institutions and norms that shape and order in a given space the various interrelated
sectors (such as the political, legal, economic, social or security sector). What is important is that
these organizing principles are not just norms that are proclaimed but that these are made operational
and put in practice through a complex set of formal and informal institutions and norms (Keukeleire
& Delreux, 2014, p. 28). Examples of such organizing principles that are interpreted and made oper-
ational in quite different ways are “democracy”, “sovereign democracy” or “autocracy”; “rule of law”
or “Sharia law”; “free market economy” or “state-controlled economy”.
The second key aspect of the qualification “structural” is that the objective is to produce sus-
tainable effects: the goal is “not simply to shape or influence structures, but to do so in such a way
that these structures develop an enduring character and become relatively permanent, including
when external pressure or support has disappeared” (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 29–30).
The sustainability of structures depends on material factors, including the translation of the orga-
nizing principles into functional institutions and mechanisms, that are supported by the necessary
financial means, and that are able to generate visible and tangible results for elites and population
in a given area. Sustainability also depends on immaterial or ideational factors: the extent to which
structures are seen as legitimate and become (or are) part of the belief system and identity of the
people concerned (population as well as elites). This legitimacy and related internalization
process is facilitated if structures and structural changes take into account indigenous contexts,
preferences and sensitivities.
 Global Affairs 45

The EU as a structural power: successes and failures

The main success of the EU’s structural foreign policy is probably its policy towards the central
and eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin wall, ultimately leading to their acces-
sion to the EU. In the most recent decade, the EU managed to conduct a similar policy towards the
Western Balkan countries. Indeed, enlargement and accession policy is the EU’s most powerful
structural foreign policy in its immediate neighbourhood (Noutcheva, 2012; Smith, 2011). The
EU managed to support these countries in their structural transformation of political, economic,
legal and societal areas, leaving behind the communist organization of their countries and for
what concerns the Western Balkans also the civil war context.
The EU’s successful policy towards the central and eastern European countries is often taken for
granted. The EU indeed promoted reform processes which were congruent with the existing internal
preferences in these countries; it could offer the ultimate reward of EU accession; and it could also
count on NATO to deal with the hard security dimension in the region. Nevertheless, supporting the
transformation of more than 10 countries into relatively stable, peaceful and economically thriving
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countries is not that evident. The success becomes striking when one compares it to the policies of
the USA, Russia, China or other powers in the world vis-à-vis their neighbourhoods. In the last two
decades, none of these structural powers has been as successful as the EU in stabilizing, restructur-
ing and increasing the welfare of a dozen of their neighbouring countries. A case in point is the pro-
blematic political, socio-economic and security situation in Central America and the failure of the
USA to assist these countries in pursuing a positive transformation process.
By contrast, the EU did not succeed in being equally successful in its wider neighbourhood.
Nevertheless, on paper, the EU seemed to possess an impressive set of instruments for supporting
structural transformations and for strengthening prosperity, stability and security in the surround-
ing countries. In 2004, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which pro-
vided an overarching framework for the EU’s structural foreign policy towards the countries in
eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East and northern Africa (see Keukeleire &
Delreux, 2014, pp. 250–271). This ENP was made operational through detailed Action Plans
for each country and was complemented by other policy instruments, including political dialogue,
Association Agreements, additional regional frameworks such as the “Eastern Partnership” and
the “Union for the Mediterranean”, as well as considerable financial resources through the “Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy Instrument” (Lannon, 2012; Whitman & Wolff, 2012). Taken
together, the EU had endowed itself with a comprehensive toolbox to support the ENP countries
in adopting the European rules of the game: through support for political, economic and insti-
tutional reforms; support for strengthening democracy, good governance, rule of law and
human rights; and through the promotion of economic modernization and liberalization, including
a partial integration in the internal market and a participation in the EU’s sectoral programmes.
Although the nature of the EU’s foreign policy toolbox in the various countries was similar,
the results in terms of successful structural foreign policy differed considerably. Indeed, whereas
the EU could present successes as a structural power in its relations to countries in central and
eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, it largely failed with regard to its broader neighbour-
hood. The ENP did on the whole not induce the expected structural reforms, notwithstanding
positive effects in some of the ENP countries. The EU’s performance in the ENP did not
improve even after the EU critically reviewed the ENP after the Arab revolts in 2011–2012 by
launching the so-called “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern
Mediterranean” (European Commission and HR/VP, 2011, 2012). Whereas the EU presented
its policy under the principle “more for more”, the EU’s policy was perceived as being rather
“more of the same” – and the outcome characterized by the same limited structural impact as
before (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 266–267; Lehne, 2014).
 46 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux

The failure of the EU’s structural foreign policy to bring sustainable structural changes
towards the eastern and southern neighbourhood relates to the fact that the ENP reflected more
the EU’s internal policy agenda than it resonated with the specific demands, priorities and sensi-
tivities of the regions concerned. This also explains why the endogenous support for the structural
changes was rather weak. The advantages offered by the EU were also too little and too ambig-
uous to stimulate and help the partner countries to accept the costs and risks related to accept new
rules of the game. Moreover, even after more than a decade, the ENP did not manage in providing
visible and tangible advantages for the elites and population in the various countries. In particular,
it was not able to provide a structural answer to the problematic socio-economic situation of a
large part of the population (Martin, 2012).
Through its long-term acceptance of dictatorships and only limited support for newly demo-
cratized countries, the EU was also out of touch with some societal dynamics that were taking
place in several ENP countries, including the quest for freedom and, in the Mediterranean,
increasing importance of the religious dimension. This explains why, when the Arab revolts
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suggested that the population in several Mediterranean countries at least wanted fundamental pol-
itical reforms, the outcome of the democratic elections indicated that people wanted to organize
their society on the basis of rules of the game that are markedly different from what the EU had in
mind (Peters, 2012).
The problem for the EU is not merely that it failed as a structural power but also that it increas-
ingly has to face competing structural powers: Russia in the eastern neighbourhood and a variety
of Islamic actors and movements in the southern neighbourhood. These competing structural
powers not only increasingly reject the rules of the game promoted by the EU for the internal
organization of states and societies, but also manage more and more to promote their preferred
rules of the game in the EU’s wider neighbourhood.

Russia as a traditional competing structural power

Contemporary media and scholarly attention to Russia primarily focuses on Russia’s annexation
of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine where separatist forces are supported by Russia.
However, without ignoring the challenge these conflicts present for the EU, a too exclusive
focus on the military and territorial dimension of the conflict risks diverting the attention from
the more fundamental challenge which Russia poses for the EU as a structural power, and
which also points to the failure of the EU as a structural power.
In the decade after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the EU has failed to develop an
effective structural foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia that supported the fledgling Russian state in
successfully implementing sustainable political, economic, legal and societal transformation.
As Russia was not integrated in the EU’s wider political and economic integration project,
Russia increasingly reasserted its own identity, strength and geopolitical ambitions. This goes
in parallel with a gradual rejection of the western rules of the game (related to a pluralist
society, a pluralist democratic system, human rights and rule of law) and the promotion in
Russia of concepts such as “sovereign democracy” (with one party dominating the political
system), an increased control of society and politics and the explicit defence of traditional
values and societal structures. Interestingly, the ideas of the Russian leaders in this sense
match underlying currents in Russian society with regard to Russian identity and to the restoration
of Russia as a great nation (see Laenen, 2012; Romanova, 2015).
Russia acted more and more as an assertive structural power in its own “near neighbourhood”.
It actively promoted its own rules of the game in the various countries in eastern Europe, the Cau-
casus and Central Asia and provided far-reaching material support to several countries in these
regions (such as through cheap energy supplies) in order to induce elites and populations to
 Global Affairs 47

follow its model and leadership. With its plans to expand the Eurasian Customs Union, Russia
also promoted regional integration initiatives to counter the EU’s move to the East, which was
also one of the immediate causes of the crisis in Ukraine (Keukeleire & Petrova, 2014).
The structures promoted by Russia were not only supported by leaders in various former
Soviet Union republics, but also by part of the population in these countries (see Adomeit,
2012; Freire & Kanet, 2012). This was also the case in allegedly more EU-minded countries,
as it appeared in Ukraine in 2010 with the victory of the party of the Moscow-oriented Yanuko-
vych. The recent conflict in Ukraine therefore not only reflects the coercive power used by Russia
or the EU’s mismanagement of the crisis, but also the large internal differences within the Ukrai-
nian population about the political, economic and societal structures on which Ukraine should
build its future.
This in turn reflects the failure of the EU in the preceding decade to provide effective support
for sustainable structural reforms to the population and elites in Ukraine as a whole (after the 2004
Orange revolution), in Georgia (after the 2003 Rose revolution) and in other former Soviet repub-
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lics. The EU promoted the adoption of new rules of the game in these countries, but did not
manage to help them in turning the general organizing principles into operational and functioning
structures with tangible positive effect for the population (Wilson & Popescu, 2009). This implied
that there was no general consensus that the EU’s political, economic, societal and normative
model is advantageous and fitting for these countries at large. A different – and for the EU
more positive – interpretation of the Ukrainian crisis is, however, also possible: it might well
be the case that the considerable number of people supporting the protests on Maidan Square
and opposing the Russian interventions indicated a strong support for the western rules of the
game.

Islamism as a competing complex and multifaceted structural power

Looking at the situation in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, attention tends to go also in this
case to the most urgent and dramatic crisis in this area today: the rise of the “Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) or “Islamic State” (IS) and its spectacular military successes,
leading to control over ever larger parts of Iraq and Syria. However, when focusing mainly on
ISIL/IS as a terrorist organization or the phenomenon of jihadism (and jihadists coming from,
and returning to, Europe), as is often the case in western media, one risks disregarding the
more complex nature of ISIL/IS and the broader structural transformations in the EU’s southern
neighbourhood which seriously challenge the EU as a structural power.
The rise of ISIL/IS and the declaration of the “caliphate” can be situated within the broader
context of the complex and multifaceted phenomenon of Islamic actors, movements, networks
and states that are in a fierce contest – among themselves as well as with western actors – to deter-
mine the rules of the game in the Mediterranean and beyond. We examine this phenomenon under
the general denominator “Islamism”, thereby taking into account the many variations in which
“Islamism” expresses itself. We contend that Islamism is a formidable structural power in the
same league as the USA, Russia, China or the EU, despite being a multifaceted “power” that
does not fit within the traditional conceptions of international relations. Or, it may be such a frigh-
tening competing power precisely because it does not fit in the conventional categories of the
West (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 294–298).
Common to all manifestations of Islamism is that they not only question or reject the western
conception of separating religion and politics, but also assert the relevance of religion, and in
some cases also the dominance of religion over politics. It is based on the claim that Islam is
able to structure all aspects of life, with a central role for the Quran and for the Sharia as a divinely
inspired legal framework that structures politics, economics, business and finance, education,
 48 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux

social relations and family relations. Different interpretations exist though about the extent to
which a literal reading of the founding religious texts is required and to which Islamic and
non-Islamic structures can be combined. Nevertheless, structures are promoted that are not
always compatible and that are in some cases totally incompatible with those supported by the
West (see Azzam, 2006; Denoeux, 2002; Thépaut, 2012).
Islamism is a strong competing power as a result of the combination of the clear Islamic orien-
tation and legitimation within an increasingly religious society, the organizational strength and
expertise in shaping political, socio-economic and societal structures and the abundant financial
resources which allow for tangible and visible results (such as the provision of social aid as well as
for investments in the major economic sectors). This is one of the major differences with the EU
and the West at large, which both before and after the 2011 Arab Spring failed to promote effec-
tively political, socio-economic and other structures that were perceived by the population as
useful, legitimate and taking into account the Islamic identity (Lannon, 2012).
One key dimension of structural power emanating from Islamism is the activist structural
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foreign policy of the Islamic states, even if they also compete with each other for influence
and often also actively oppose each other. Important in this context are the wealthy Gulf states
such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar (with the former mainly supporting Salafist movements and
the latter movements and parties linked to the Muslim Brotherhood), Iran (which promotes a
whole range of Shia movements, parties and networks) and increasingly also Turkey, which
from a western perspective can be considered as the most “moderate” Islamic power (see
Tocci, Maestri, Özel, & Güvenç, 2012). It is from this point of view problematic for the EU
that it did not manage to maintain a positive relationship with Turkey as candidate EU
member state and structural power in the region. Another major dilemma for the EU – and in
broader terms for the West – is that it is dependent on the Gulf states for trade, energy supply
and regional stability, including the fight against ISIL/IS, but that simultaneously factions
within the Gulf states actively support ISIL/IS and that the Gulf states themselves can be seen
as competing structural powers.
The EU also saw its legitimacy as a structural power undermined as a result of its selective
promotion of democracy and its selective or reluctant acceptance of electoral results in its
southern neighbourhood (as could be seen in the reluctance to accept the victory of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and, before, the rejection of the victory of Hamas in Palestine).
More fundamentally, this also undermined the legitimacy of democratic political structures as
such, as “democracy” was increasingly considered in those countries as mainly serving
western interests instead of representing a universally valid way to structure the political realm
(see Pace & Seeberg, 2009; Peters, 2012). It is within this context of disillusionment with the
West’s – including the EU’s – selective promotion of democracy and pluralism that a more
strict interpretation could flourish of the Sharia as the main basis for the structuring of politics
and society.
The challenge for the EU and the West is even larger when keeping in mind that the multi-
faceted phenomenon of Islamism is certainly subject of the blurring of the inside/outside
divide in foreign policy: the boundaries of the “umma”, or community of the faithful, have
indeed stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities, with a shared sense of belonging to
a common faith (Azzam, 2006, p. 1119). From this perspective, it is of vital interest for the
EU to develop a sophisticated answer to the demands with regard to socio-economic and societal
integration of a growing Muslim community both inside and outside Europe. This is not only
important because of the potential threat posed by the return of “European” jihadists. It also
matters in order to counter a growing feeling of alienation among a part of the European
Muslim population which may become increasingly attracted by Islamic rules of the game as
useful alternatives for or complements to western structures.
 Global Affairs 49

Conclusion
Looking at the EU as a structural power and analysing the EU’s competition with other struc-
tural powers in its neighbourhood, we argue that the EU is not merely losing ground in inter-
national affairs due to its poor handling of violent crises in its neighbourhood such as in
Ukraine, the Middle East or northern Africa. There is indeed more going on: the EU and
the West at large are mainly losing ground because they largely failed in the last two
decades to shape and create sustainable rules of the game that provide security, stability
and economic welfare to people in other parts of the world – and the EU’s neighbouring
regions in particular.
In other words, the EU’s main problem is not in the first place that it is not a hard power with
strong military and diplomatic capacities or that the Union insufficiently evolved into that direc-
tion (because member states never wanted the EU to become such a power). Rather the EU
failed to become an effective structural power with an effective structural foreign policy.
This is particularly remarkable because the EU had on paper the instruments to develop such
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a policy. The EU failed over the long term in the surrounding regions to influence and shape
political, legal, socio-economic and other structures that proved to be sustainable, effective
and legitimate, not only in the eyes of the EU, but also from the perspective of the population
and elites in these regions.
Having failed to help create a wealthy, stable and security environment in it neighbourhood
and beyond, the EU is now increasingly confronted with competing structural powers which
may prove to be more successful in shaping the rules of the game and structures which will
determine political, economic and societal life in other regions. As demonstrated in this
article, these competing structural powers include Russia in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
and “Islamism” in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. Whereas the competition between
Russia and the EU (and the West at large) still fits within the old parameters of power compe-
tition and territorial disputes, the challenge posed by the multifaceted phenomenon of Isla-
mism is possibly even more complex as it does not fit the traditional western
conceptualizations of international relations and as traditional foreign policy answers seem
to be inappropriate here.
Given this observation about the EU’s competing structural powers, how can the EU
strengthen its structural foreign policy? First of all, such an improvement entails primarily the pro-
motion of structures and rules of the game that can be operationalized and adapted to the specific
societal and socio-economic contexts of the countries in its eastern and southern neighbourhood.
Importantly, in order to make sure that the EU is seen a relevant and legitimate structural power,
the EU’s structural foreign policy should lead to tangible and visible results for societies and the
daily lives of citizens in the countries in their neighbourhood. Furthermore, more acceptance and
relevance for the EU can also be achieved by a greater openness at the side of the EU for the fact
that the organizing principles of society and politics in the countries concerned might be different
than the principles applied in the West.

Notes on contributors
Stephan Keukeleire is Jean Monnet Professor in European foreign policy at “Leuven International and Euro-
pean Studies” (LINES) of the University of Leuven (KU Leuven) and visiting professor at the College of
Europe (Bruges). He is a co-author, with Tom Delreux, of The foreign policy of the European Union (2nd
ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
Tom Delreux is associate professor of political science and EU politics at the “Institut de sciences politiques
Louvain-Europe” (ISPOLE) at the University of Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve). He is a co-author, with
Stephan Keukeleire, of The foreign policy of the European Union (2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
 50 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux

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