G.R. No.

101535 January 22, 1993

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION,
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, RAUL ABRICO, RODRIGO
VASALLO, EDUARDO A. SIBBALUCA, and BENIGNO M. MANASIS, respondents.

**Facts:**
The case involves a petition challenging the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). The petitioner, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC),
was held liable to private respondents Raul Abrico, Rodrigo Vasallo, Eduardo A. Sibbaluca, and
Benigno M. Manasis for various employment-related claims, including salary differentials,
overtime pay, vacation and sick leave, and completion bonus differentials.

The private respondents were deployed by PNCC to Iraq as security guards under individual
appointment contracts dated April 15, 1985. These contracts, submitted to the POEA and
validated on April 22, 1985, provided for a US$350.00/month salary. However, a second
overseas contract was executed on May 12, 1985, modifying the salary to US$260.00/month.
Private respondents were repatriated after the two-year contract period, and upon their return,
they filed a complaint before the POEA.

**Issues:**
1. Whether the complainants are entitled to salary and overtime pay differentials.
2. Whether the complainants are entitled to vacation leave and sick leave differentials, bonus
differential, and night shift differential.
3. Whether complainants Raul Abrico and Rodrigo J. Vasallo are entitled to promotional pay
differential.

**Ruling:**
The POEA ruled in favor of the complainants on the first and second issues, awarding them the
salary and overtime pay based on the original contract's monthly rate of US$350.00. It also
granted vacation and sick leave differentials, bonus differentials, and denied the remaining
claims. The NLRC affirmed the POEA decision.

The petitioner (PNCC) appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA erred in applying Article
34(i) of the Labor Code and in determining the applicable employment contract. The NLRC
upheld the POEA decision, emphasizing the PNCC's admission that the contracts dated April
15, 1985, were amended on May 12, 1985, without the required approval.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the public
respondents. However, the court found no sufficient grounds to annul the NLRC decision,
stating that the administrative decision may only be set aside upon clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the NLRC decision, relying on exhibits, certification from
the POEA, and the PNCC's admission as evidence.

The PNCC contested the decision, arguing that the April 15, 1985 document was a mere
notice/offer of employment and not a binding contract. The court, however, applied the principle
of liberal interpretation in favor of laborers, emphasizing the special treatment and liberal
interpretation of labor contracts under labor legislation.

In conclusion, the court upheld the NLRC decision, rejecting the petitioner's claims and affirming
the awards granted to the private respondents based on the original contract's terms.

G.R. No. 152012 September 30, 2005

LAND AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and ABV ROCK GROUP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIANITO C. ESQUILLO, Respondent

**Facts:**
Marianito C. Esquillo was employed as a structural engineer by ABV Rock Group (ABV) in
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, facilitated by the local placement agency, Land & Housing
Development Corporation (LHDC). Esquillo's employment began on July 27, 1989, with an initial
monthly salary of US$1,000.00, which increased over time due to performance and contract
renewals until it reached US$1,300.00 per month. His employment contract was supposed to be
valid until July 26, 1995, but it was prematurely terminated on November 17, 1994, citing
"reduction of force" as the reason.

Esquillo filed a complaint for breach of contract and/or illegal dismissal before the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, which was referred to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for adjudication. The Labor Arbiter ruled in Esquillo's favor, ordering ABV
to pay him his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract from December
19, 1994, to July 26, 1995, amounting to US$9,447.00.

ABV appealed the decision to the NLRC, which reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and
dismissed Esquillo's complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA), however, reversed the NLRC's
decision, ruling that Esquillo was entitled to his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion
of his contract, in addition to what he had already received from ABV.

**Issues:**
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in considering an issue of fact raised for the first time on
appeal.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Labor Arbiter's decision that rendered the
release and quitclaim executed by Esquillo null and void and granted him additional monetary
awards.
**Ruling:**
The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the CA did not err in considering the issue raised for the first
time on appeal, as the facts surrounding the validity of the quitclaim were essential to resolving
Esquillo's entitlement to additional monetary claims.

Regarding the validity of the release and quitclaim, the SC held that although employees may
sign such agreements, they are not necessarily barred from claiming benefits to which they are
legally entitled. The SC emphasized that agreements that result in workers receiving less than
their legal entitlement are closely scrutinized and may be set aside if they are found to be
contrary to public policy.

In Esquillo's case, the SC found that his dismissal was unjustified, entitling him to the salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. The SC determined that the amount
Esquillo received as settlement under the quitclaim was not a reasonable settlement
considering his entitlement to additional benefits under his employment contract. Therefore, the
release and quitclaim were declared null and void, and Esquillo was entitled to the additional
monetary claims as ruled by the CA.

Ultimately, the SC denied ABV's petition and affirmed the CA's decision, ordering ABV to pay
Esquillo the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract, in addition to what
he had already received from ABV.

G.R. No. 103525 March 29, 1996

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED
WORKERS' UNION (NAMAWU-MIF), respondents.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed by a union against Marcopper Mining Corporation for
underpayment of wages. On July 24, 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision in favor of the
union, ordering Marcopper to pay wage differentials to its rank-and-file workers retroactive to
May 1, 1987. The Labor Arbiter based the decision on the provision in the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) that excluded the wage increase from being credited to any future increases
mandated by law.

Marcopper appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but the
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's ruling. Marcopper then filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the NLRC.
Issues:

1. Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter's
decision.
2. Whether the computation of the wage increase should be based on the basic wage without
the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) or the integrated basic wage that includes the COLA.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled against Marcopper, upholding the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC. The key issue revolved around the computation of the wage increase, specifically
whether it should be based on the basic wage without the COLA or the integrated basic wage
that includes the COLA.

The Court held that as of May 1, 1987, Executive Order No. 178 mandated the integration of the
COLA into the basic wage. Therefore, the computation of the wage increase should be based
on the integrated basic wage. The Court rejected Marcopper's argument that the intention of the
parties at the time of the CBA's execution should prevail, emphasizing that compliance with the
law is mandatory and beyond contractual stipulations.

The Court also noted that a CBA is not an ordinary contract and is impressed with public
interest. It must be construed liberally in favor of labor, consistent with the State's policy of
affording protection to labor.

In summary, the petition filed by Marcopper was dismissed, and the decisions of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC were affirmed by the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. L-2779 October 18, 1950

DANIEL SANCHEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed by the plaintiffs (appellees) against the defendants
(appellants) for the sum of P2,210 plus interest, claiming it as one month's advance pay due to
them. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts, and the municipal court rendered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, the
defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered a decision
ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs varying sums with legal interest. The defendants
then appealed to the Supreme Court purely on a question of law.
Issue:

The primary issues in the case are:

1. Whether the plaintiffs, including those paid on a monthly and daily basis, are entitled to the
benefit granted in article 302 of the Code of Commerce.
2. If entitled, whether their waiver of such benefits, as stipulated in their employment contracts,
is legal and valid.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding in favor of the plaintiffs. The
Court determined that the plaintiffs, as commercial employees, come within the purview of
article 302 of the Code of Commerce. Article 302 provides that, in cases where no special time
is fixed in the contracts of service, any party may cancel the contract upon giving a one-month
notice. The factor or shop clerk, in such cases, is entitled to the salary due for that month.

The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the use of the word "temporary" in the
contracts indicated a term of employment. It clarified that the term "temporary" in this context did
not signify a special time of employment under article 302 but rather pertained to the
computation of pay.

Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the waiver made in advance by the plaintiffs of
the benefits granted by article 302 is void as it goes against public policy. The Court emphasized
the constitutional mandate to promote social justice and protect labor. It stated that labor, being
in a less advantageous bargaining position, should be shielded from abuses. Therefore, a
waiver made under the forceful intimidation of urgent need cannot be considered free and
voluntary.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding in favor of the
plaintiffs, and ordered the appellants to pay the specified sums with legal interest.

G.R. No. 186621 March 12, 2014

1
SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN, INC. and/or ESTANISLAO AGBAY, Petitioners,
vs.
JESUS J. COMING, Respondent.

**Facts:**
- Respondent, Jesus J. Coming, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages,
non-payment of holiday pay, 13th-month pay, and service incentive leave pay against
petitioners, South East International Rattan, Inc. (SEIRI), and Estanislao Agbay.
- Respondent alleged that he was hired by petitioners as a Sizing Machine Operator in 1984
and was later dismissed without lawful cause in 2002.
- Petitioners denied hiring respondent and presented evidence to support their claim, including
Employment Reports to the Social Security System (SSS), certifications from SEIRI's suppliers,
and affidavits from individuals stating that respondent worked for them.
- The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent, finding him to be a regular employee of SEIRI
and ordering petitioners to pay various monetary awards.
- The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
dismissing the complaint.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari, and the CA
reversed the NLRC's decision, reinstating the Labor Arbiter's decision with modifications.
- Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising several
issues regarding the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the evaluation of
evidence, and the computation of back wages.

**Issue:**
The main issue is whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and
respondent, Jesus J. Coming.

**Ruling:**
The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision and ruled in favor of respondent, finding that an
employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and respondent. The Court
considered the evidence presented by both parties and concluded that substantial evidence
supported respondent's claim of employment with SEIRI. The Court also emphasized that
doubts in labor cases are resolved in favor of the laborer. Consequently, the Court affirmed the
CA's decision and ordered petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank
of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now
BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary
of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section
15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer,
promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval,
shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program:
Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles
provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].Provided, however, That compensation and
wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance
with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between
two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of
the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19
and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that
this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims
that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of
which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.
Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection
clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and –file BSP employees. Respondent
on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it
is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the “fiscal and administrative
autonomy” of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as
counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees is based on
real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to “establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.”

Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it
distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater
benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP
receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the
salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients
of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees
are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing
higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist
of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is
they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in
accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all."Any act of
Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before
it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the
more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no
specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as
a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them
from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the
politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and
iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be
asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless
discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS, G.R. NO. 47800, DECEMBER 2, 1940

**Facts:**
- Maximo Calalang, as a private citizen and taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition against several respondents, including the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, Director of Public Works, Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Mayor
of Manila, and Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
- The petition challenged the resolution of the National Traffic Commission recommending the
prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles from certain streets during specified hours, as well as the
subsequent approval and enforcement of these regulations.
- The regulations were based on Commonwealth Act No. 548, which authorized the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

**Issues:**
1. Whether Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
2. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated under Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute
an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion.
3. Whether the rules and regulations infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice.

**Ruling:**
1. The court held that Commonwealth Act No. 548 did not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
granted to them was to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly, and
their power was limited to ascertaining the facts and circumstances upon which the application
of the law is predicated. Thus, the delegation of power was not to make the law but to execute
it, which is permissible.
2. The court ruled that the regulations were enacted in the exercise of the state's police power to
promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads. They were aimed at public
convenience and welfare, and the state has the authority to interfere with personal liberty,
property, business, and occupations to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. Therefore, the regulations did not unlawfully interfere with legitimate business or trade or
abridge personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
3. The court held that the regulations were not in conflict with the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice. Social justice is achieved through measures legally
justifiable or extra-constitutionally, and the regulations were consistent with the state's objective
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and bringing about the greatest good
to the greatest number.

**Conclusion:**
The writ of prohibition prayed for by Maximo Calalang was denied, and costs were imposed
against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004

JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC.
and VICENTE ANGELES, respondents.

Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28,
1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private
respondent to pay the monetary claims.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s dismissal is illegal and if not, entitles them benefits.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the dismissal is legal and entitles them of payment of benefits.

Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while
dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer
to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When
the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full back wages are mandated under
Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be
granted.

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the
employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee
before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision
to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the
employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days
prior to the effectivity of his separation.

From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause
under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons
under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but
due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due
process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed.

In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it
should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with
the procedural requirements of due process.

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was
established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent,
however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known
addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the
private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to
the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.

The Court ruled that respondent is liable for petitioners’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th
month pay without deductions. The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an
additional income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same so as
“to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional
income, the 13th month pay is included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code.

An employer is prohibited under Article 113 of the same Code from making any deductions without the
employee’s knowledge and consent.

G.R. No. L-7586 January 30, 1957

NARCISA B. DE LEON, LVN PICTURES, INC.,

SAMPAGUITA PICTURES, INC., LEBRAN PICTURES, INC, INC., AND PREMIER PICTURES,
INC., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, EULOGIO R. LERUM, JOSE HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
BARTOLOME, NICOLAS CABRERA, JOSE RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

**Facts:**
- The plaintiffs sought to recover damages and injunctive relief against the defendants, with the
exception of the National Labor Union, Eulogio R. Lerum, and Jose J. Hernandez (president and
secretary of the union).
- The defendants, excluding the National Labor Union, Eulogio Lerum, and Jose Hernandez,
were accused of picketing the Dalisay Theater, owned by Narcisa B. de Leon and operated by
co-plaintiffs, to secure reinstatement to their former jobs.
- The theater had been operated jointly by motion picture firms LVN Pictures, Inc., Premier
Productions, and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. The lease of the land to the Filipino Theatrical
Enterprises ended on August 14, 1951.
- After the expiration of the lease, possession of the theater building was turned over to Narcisa
B. de Leon, who demolished the old building and constructed a new Dalisay Theater.
- On August 31, 1951, a contract was executed among the plaintiffs for the joint operation of the
new Dalisay Theater. The theater reopened on January 10, 1952, with a new set of personnel.
- On the reopening date, about thirty persons, including the defendants (except Eulogio Lerum
and Jose Hernandez), members of the National Labor Union, picketed the theater, displaying
placards with slogans against the theater's management and urging patrons not to patronize the
Dalisay Theater.

**Issues:**
1. Whether the picketing carried out by the defendants was illegal and caused disturbance to
public peace.
2. Whether there was an existing employer-employee relationship between the plaintiffs and the
defendants during the picketing.
3. Whether peaceful picketing is protected by the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution.
**Ruling:**
1. The trial court found that the picketing, consisting of walking peacefully back and forth on the
public sidewalk and displaying placards, did not disturb the public peace at the place. There was
no clear and present danger of destruction to life or property or other forms of breach of the
peace. Therefore, the acts of the defendants were not deemed illegal.

2. It was noted that after the defendants were dismissed from their work at the old Dalisay
Theater, the showhouse came under entirely different management when it reopened. There
was no existing employer-employee relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants during
the picketing. The purpose of the picketing was the reinstatement of the defendants' services in
the new Dalisay Theater under new management.

3. The court affirmed that peaceful picketing is not illegal, even in the absence of an
employer-employee relationship. Peaceful picketing is considered a part of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution.

**Conclusion:**
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and there was no pronouncement as to costs. The
defendants' picketing activities were deemed legal, and there was no existing
employer-employee relationship during the picketing. Peaceful picketing was recognized as a
protected expression of freedom of speech.

G.R. No. 195540 March 13, 2013

GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondent.

**Facts:**
- Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of Equitable PCI Bank (respondent) in 1985, securing a ₱2,000,000.00 loan.
- Due to the petitioner's failure to settle the loan, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage on December 13, 2000, and acquired the mortgaged properties for ₱3,500,000.00.
- Petitioner, in a letter dated March 8, 2001, expressed its intent to redeem the foreclosed
properties but was informed by respondent that such redemption was not possible due to the
registration of the certificate of sale.
- Petitioner filed a complaint on December 7, 2001, asserting that the one-year redemption
period under Act No. 3135 should apply, not the shorter period in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that petitioner's attempt to redeem was late and
not valid, as the person who negotiated lacked proper authorization.
- The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that petitioner failed to
justify why R.A. No. 8791 should be declared unconstitutional.
**Issues:**
1. Whether Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, shortening the redemption period for juridical persons,
is applicable to a real estate mortgage executed in 1985.
2. Whether Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 violates the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of obligation of contracts.
3. Whether Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 discriminates against mortgagors who are juridical
persons, violating the equal protection clause.

**Ruling:**
1. The Court affirmed the applicability of Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, even though the real
estate mortgage contract was executed in 1985. The amendment was validly applied to shorten
the redemption period.
2. The Court ruled that Section 47 did not violate the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of obligation of contracts. It modified the time for the exercise of the right of
redemption but did not divest juridical persons of that right.
3. The Court held that the different treatment of juridical persons and natural persons under
Section 47 was based on reasonable classification, considering the nature of the properties
foreclosed. The classification was deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the
ownership of commercial or industrial properties.

**Conclusion:**
The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was deemed constitutional and validly applied to the case,
shortening the redemption period for juridical persons.

G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER INTERNATIONAL

SHIPPING, INC., CREAMSHIP MANAGEMENT INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP., EASTGATE
(INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS KALAYAAN OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP.,
INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP., JZEL COMPANY, INC. , LAINE SHIPPING AGENCY CORP.,
MARINERS SERVICES, CORP., MARITIME SERVICES & MGT., INC., MID OCEAN (PHILS.)
MARINE AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-PHIL. GROUP, INC., PHIL. MARINE
CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.) INC.,
TRANS-MED (MANILA) CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR AND
THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, respondent.

**Facts of the Case:**

The case involves a challenge to Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, and Memorandum Circular
No. 05, series of 1994, issued by the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). The petitioners, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., and
other licensed manning agencies, contest the legality and constitutionality of these resolutions,
which sought to amend and increase the compensation and other benefits provided under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.

The petitioners raised several grounds for their challenge:

1. The POEA does not have the authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and
workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels, as only Congress
can do so.
2. Even if the POEA has such authority, it violated the standards for its exercise.
3. The resolutions are unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection and
non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
4. The resolutions are not valid acts of the Governing Board because the private sector
representative mandated by law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of
the POEA.

**Issues:**

1. Whether the POEA has the authority to promulgate resolutions affecting the compensation
and benefits of Filipino seamen.
2. Whether the resolutions violated constitutional provisions on equal protection and
non-impairment of contracts.
3. Whether the absence of the appointed private sector representative invalidates the acts of the
Governing Board.

**Ruling:**

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling against the petitioners on all grounds. Here
are the key points of the ruling:

1. **Authority of POEA:** The Court upheld the rule-making authority of the POEA, citing
previous jurisprudence and the mandate given to the POEA under Executive Order No. 797.
The Court found that the resolutions were a valid exercise of the POEA's power of subordinate
legislation.

2. **Constitutional Challenges:** The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments that the
resolutions violated the equal protection and non-impairment of contracts clauses of the
Constitution. It found that the resolutions were based on reasonable classification and were in
conformity with the standards prescribed by law. Additionally, the Court held that the resolutions
were valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, enacted under the police power of the State.
3. **Validity of Governing Board's Acts:** The Court also dismissed the argument regarding the
absence of the appointed private sector representative on the Governing Board, stating that it
did not invalidate the acts of the Board. The Court emphasized that the creation of the POEA
and the appointment of its members were separate issues, and the absence of the third
member did not affect the validity of the Board's actions.

In conclusion, the Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it, affirming the validity of
the challenged resolutions issued by the POEA Governing Board.

G.R. No. L-45647 August 21, 1987

MANUEL, Q. CABALLERO and LELITA A. CABALLERO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., as Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
FERNANDO ESCONDE, GREGORIO BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK RODRIGUEZ,
respondents.

Facts:
The case involves a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus filed by spouses Manuel
and Lelita Caballero against private respondents. The Caballeros claimed ownership of land in
Gingoog City and filed a petition for injunction, alleging that the respondents illegally entered the
land and harvested coconut fruits without their consent. The respondents, acknowledging
ownership but asserting tenancy rights, moved to have the case dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, arguing that it falls under the agrarian domain. The judge initially issued a temporary
restraining order but later suspended the proceedings pending comment or certification by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform in accordance with PD 1038.

Issue:
The main issue is whether the referral of the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform under PD
1038 is constitutional and if it violates the right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling:
The court ruled that PD 1038, which mandates referral of cases involving landlord and tenant to
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, is constitutional. The law aims to prevent harassment of
tenants and protect them from oppressive litigations. The court clarified that the Secretary's
preliminary determination is not binding on the court, and the judiciary retains the power to
confirm, reverse, or modify it after due hearing. The contention that it encroaches on judicial
independence was deemed meritless.

Regarding the argument that the law causes delays, the court acknowledged bureaucratic
challenges but emphasized that the petitioners' run-around experience resulted from their
actions rather than flaws in the law. The court upheld the constitutionality of the law, stating that
it is not within its jurisdiction to question the wisdom of PD 1038.

Finally, the court recognized the right to a speedy disposition of cases but clarified that it is a
relative term. It considered factors such as the length of delay, reasons for the delay, assertion
of the right, and prejudice caused. While acknowledging bureaucratic red tape, the court
concluded that the challenge must demonstrate that the law itself, not its administration, impairs
constitutional rights. In this case, it found that the law is constitutional but directed the trial court
to proceed with the case, setting aside the suspension order issued by the judge on January 10,
1977.

G.R. No. 119381 March 11, 1996

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES, NATIONAL MINES & ALLIED
WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU), MARCOPPER EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (MELU),
respondents.

**Facts:**
Petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation, a company engaged in mining operations, granted its
employees a year-end profit bonus in December 1994. The National Mines and Allied Workers
Union and its local chapter, Marcopper Employees Labor Union, filed a preventive mediation
case with the Department of Labor and Employment, alleging unfair labor practices regarding
job evaluation and discrimination in the bonus distribution.

The conciliation proceedings failed, and the union filed a notice of strike. Despite the
Department of Labor and Employment's order enjoining any strike, the union went on strike on
February 27, 1995. The Secretary of Labor and Employment issued an order certifying the
dispute for compulsory arbitration and directing the striking workers to return to work. Petitioner
Marcopper issued a notice to return to work, but only a few workers complied.

**Issue:**
Whether the Secretary of Labor and Employment gravely abused his discretion in ordering
petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation to accept workers who defied the return-to-work order
issued by the Secretary himself.

**Ruling:**
The Court granted the petition and set aside the Secretary of Labor and Employment's order
directing petitioner Marcopper to accept returning workers pending resolution of the labor
dispute. The Court emphasized that returning to work after an assumption or certification order
is an obligation, not an option, and failure to comply results in loss of employment status. The
Secretary's tolerance of the union's defiance of the return-to-work order and the Department of
Labor and Employment's orders constituted grave abuse of discretion.

The Court directed the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to expedite the
conciliation proceedings, set the case for hearing, terminate the compulsory arbitration
proceedings within sixty days, and resolve the dispute within thirty days from submission for
resolution.

G.R. No. 170351 March 30, 2011

LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION - ALU - TUCP, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY - ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.

**Facts:**
- The case involves a dispute between the Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees
Union – ALU―TUCP (petitioner Union) and the Philippine National Oil Corporation-Energy
Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC), a government-owned corporation engaged in energy
exploration and development.
- PNOC-EDC operates geothermal projects, including the Leyte Geothermal Power Project,
composed of Tongonan 1 Geothermal Project (T1GP) and Leyte Geothermal Production Field
Project (LGPF).
- Petitioner Union demanded recognition as the collective bargaining agent for employees
working on PNOC-EDC's projects. However, PNOC-EDC did not recognize the union.
- In 1998, as the project was nearing completion, PNOC-EDC served termination notices to
employees who were members of the petitioner Union.
- The petitioner Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) on the grounds of unfair labor practices, and subsequently staged a strike.
- The Secretary of Labor intervened, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
- The NLRC ruled in favor of PNOC-EDC, declaring the termination of employment as valid and
the strike illegal.
- The petitioner Union filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
- The CA affirmed the NLRC decision, prompting the petitioner Union to file an appeal by
certiorari before the Supreme Court.

**Issue:**
1. Whether the officers and members of the petitioner Union are project employees of
PNOC-EDC.
2. Whether the officers and members of the petitioner Union engaged in an illegal strike.
**Ruling:**
1. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the NLRC and CA that the officers and members
of the petitioner Union are project employees of PNOC-EDC. Their employment contracts
indicated specific projects or phases of work with fixed periods of employment. Therefore, upon
completion of the project or substantial phase thereof, their employment could be validly
terminated.
2. The Supreme Court also affirmed the NLRC and CA's ruling that the petitioner Union
engaged in an illegal strike. Despite the petitioner Union's contention that they only engaged in
picketing and protest activities, the records showed that they filed a Notice of Strike and staged
a strike without complying with the legal requirements, such as conducting a strike vote,
observing the cooling-off period, and filing the notice of strike within the prescribed period.

As a result, the petition was denied, and the decision of the CA was affirmed. Costs were
imposed against the petitioner Union.

G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales &
Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.

**Facts:**
Four informations were filed against Serapio Abug, the private respondent, on January 9, 1981,
in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City. These informations alleged that
Abug operated a private fee-charging employment agency without securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor, charging fees and expenses and promising employment in Saudi Arabia to
four individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash these charges, arguing that he was accused of
illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations, which he claimed did not
constitute an offense under Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, the Labor Code.

**Issue:**
The main issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, particularly
whether the requirement of dealing with two or more persons is an indispensable element for an
act to constitute recruitment and placement under the Labor Code.

**Ruling:**
The Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of dealing with two or more persons is not an
essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code. Any of the acts mentioned in Article 13(b), such as canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, will constitute recruitment and
placement even if only one prospective worker is involved.
The court interpreted the proviso in Article 13(b) as creating a presumption that an individual or
entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever they are dealing with two or more
persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made. This
presumption is not an exception to the basic rule but merely a rule of evidence. The words "shall
be deemed" in the proviso create a presumption or prima facie evidence of engaging in
recruitment and placement.

The court emphasized the importance of this interpretation in strengthening the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking
employment abroad. The decision set aside the orders to quash the informations against the
private respondent and reinstated the charges.

G.R. No. 208686 July 1, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALELIE TOLENTINO a.k.a. "Alelie Tolentino y Hernandez," Appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant Tolentino was charged with illegal recruitment and 5 counts of estafa under Article 315 (2a) of
the Revised Penal Code.

Tolentino represented to the 5 complainants that she could secure work for them in Korea and that she is
capable of processing their visas and other documents for their travel and employment in Korea. Private
complainants gave and delivered partial payments to Tolentino for medical examination and processing of
their documents for work in Korea. Tolentino misappropriate, misapply and convert the payments to her
own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the complainants. Sometime in January
2002, private complainants met with appellant Tolentino for signing of contract. Howver, the names
written on the employment contracts were not private complainants’ name. Appellant explained that the
contracts were supposedly for other applicants who sought her services but later backed out. Appellant
assured them that original contracts bearing their names would subsequently be provided. Private
complainants signed the contracts and paid their second partial payment.

On February 2002, private complainants received information that the CIDG arrested appellant for illegal
recruitment. Private complainants demanded the return of their partial payments. Subsequently, private
complainants were able to secure a certification from POEA that appellant was not licensed to recruit
workers for overseas employment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant committed Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment
Committed by A Syndicate punishable by life imprisonment and maximum penalty of P1,0000.00 under
RA 8042.

RULING:

Yes. RA 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," established a
higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of the migrant workers, their families and overseas
Filipinos in distress. RA 8042 also broadened the concept of illegal recruitment for overseas employment and
increased the penalties, especially for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed
by a Syndicate, which are considered offenses involving economic sabotage. Part II of RA 8042 defines and
penalizes illegal recruitment for employment abroad, whether undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority or by a licensee or holder of authority.

Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for overseas
employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not; and (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under
Section 6 of RA 8042. On the other hand, a licensee or holder of authority is also liable for illegal
recruitment for overseas employment when he or she undertakes any of the thirteen acts or practices [(a)
to (m)] listed under Section 6 of RA 8042. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, the offense of
illegal recruitment must be committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

In Section 7 of RA 8042, enumerates the

penalties:

SEC. 7. Penalties.
–

(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.

Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed If the person illegally recruited is less
than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.

The penalty imposed by the trial court in this case for large-scale illegal recruitment, which constitutes
economic sabotage, is life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000. Section 7 of RA 8042 provides that the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱500,000 nor more than ₱1,000,000 shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Said article further provides that the
maximum penalty shall be imposed if committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Thus, the
proper penalty in this case is life imprisonment and a fine of ₱1,000,000.

G.R. No. 181245 August 6, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JIMMY ANG @ ANG TIAO LAM and HUNG CHAO NAN, appellant.

**Facts:**
Appellant Jimmy Ang @ Ang Tiao Lam & Hung Chao Nan was charged with illegal recruitment
in large scale, in violation of Section 6 (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). The charges were based on the period between November
1999 and June 23, 2000. Appellant was accused of conspiring with an unknown individual,
representing themselves as having the capacity to recruit Filipino workers for employment
abroad. The accusations involved willfully and unlawfully recruiting individuals for factory work in
Taiwan, charging and accepting fees greater than specified by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and failing to deploy the recruited workers or reimburse their incurred expenses.

**Issue:**
The main issue revolved around appellant's liability for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Appellant argued that there was a lack of evidence showing he did not secure a license or
authority to recruit or deploy workers, which, according to him, was a crucial element for the
charge of illegal recruitment.

**Ruling:**
The Court ruled against the appellant, emphasizing that the absence of a license or authority
was not a required element for the crime charged under Section 6 (l) and (m) of Republic Act
No. 8042. The court pointed out that appellant's engagement in recruitment and placement of
workers, coupled with the failure to deploy the workers and reimburse their expenses, sufficed
to establish the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

Appellant's admission that he engaged in recruitment activities and received money for
documentation and processing costs, coupled with the non-deployment of the workers and
non-reimbursement of expenses, led to the affirmation of his guilt. The Court held that
appellant's offense constituted economic sabotage, justifying the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine. The initially imposed fine of P100,000.00 was increased to P500,000.00 in
accordance with Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042.

The Court of Appeals' decision affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment, with modifications,
was upheld, and the petition was denied.
G.R. No. 107084 May 15, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DELIA SADIOSA y CABENTA, accused-appellant.

**Facts:**
Accused-appellant Delia Sadiosa was charged with illegal recruitment based on incidents that
occurred between January 1992 and March 1992 in Pasay City, Metro Manila. The information
accused Sadiosa of unlawfully recruiting individuals for employment as domestic helpers
abroad, knowing that she was not a duly licensed job recruiter. Sadiosa allegedly made false
representations to four complainants, promising them employment in Kuwait as domestic
helpers in exchange for payments totaling P8,000 each, plus additional fees for passports.
Despite receiving the money, Sadiosa failed to fulfill her promises and deploy the complainants
abroad.

**Issue:**
The appellant challenged the trial court's decision on various grounds, including the sufficiency
of the information, the clarity of the judgment, and the application of the law to the facts of the
case.

**Ruling:**
The court rejected the appellant's arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that
the information sufficiently charged Sadiosa with illegal recruitment in large scale, despite being
labeled simply as "illegal recruitment." The court emphasized that the substance of the
allegations, rather than the specific legal provisions cited, determined the nature of the offense.
The court also noted that Sadiosa's defense of acting on behalf of another individual did not
absolve her of liability, especially since she failed to present evidence to support her claim.

The court found the prosecution's evidence, including the testimonies of the complainants and a
witness from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, credible and established
beyond reasonable doubt that Sadiosa engaged in illegal recruitment. Consequently, the court
affirmed Sadiosa's conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment, a fine of P100,000, and reimbursement of the amounts defrauded from the
complainants.

In summary, the court upheld the trial court's decision, finding Sadiosa guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale and affirming the corresponding penalties imposed.

G.R. Nos. 115338-39 September 16, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE, accused-appellant.

**Facts:**
- Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati based on complaints initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda
Generillo, and Rosamar del Rosario.
- The charge of illegal recruitment in large scale involved the recruitment and promise of
employment abroad to three individuals without securing the required license or authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment.
- The charge for estafa involved false pretenses of having the capacity to send Elenita
Marasigan to work abroad, inducing her to give money, which Ortiz-Miyake then appropriated for
personal use.
- Ortiz-Miyake pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were tried jointly.
- Marasigan testified as the only witness among the three complainants in the illegal recruitment
case, while the two other complainants were abroad and unable to testify.
- Marasigan testified that she was promised a job in Taiwan by Ortiz-Miyake for a fee, paid
Ortiz-Miyake a total of P23,000, and was later informed that she couldn't depart for Taiwan as
promised.
- Witnesses related to Generillo and Del Rosario's cases were presented by the prosecution but
lacked personal knowledge of the transactions.
- The Makati court convicted Ortiz-Miyake of both crimes based partly on a previous decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque involving estafa charges against Generillo and Del
Rosario.
- The judgment sentenced Ortiz-Miyake to life imprisonment and a fine for illegal recruitment in
large scale, and imprisonment for estafa, along with reimbursement of amounts to the
complainants.

**Issue:**
- Whether the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale is valid, considering the sufficiency
of evidence and adoption of facts from a previous estafa case.

**Ruling:**
- The court finds the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale erroneous due to insufficient
evidence and improper adoption of facts from a previous estafa case.
- Illegal recruitment in large scale requires evidence of the offense being committed against
three or more persons, which was not sufficiently established.
- The adoption of facts from a previous estafa case violates the right of the accused to confront
witnesses against them.
- The conviction is modified to simple illegal recruitment based on evidence of illegal recruitment
against Marasigan.
- Ortiz-Miyake is also convicted of estafa based on evidence of false pretenses and
appropriation of funds from Marasigan.
- Sentences for both crimes are modified accordingly, with reimbursement ordered for the estafa
case.
- The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

G.R. No. 120141 April 21, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORNA B. GUEVARRA, JOSIE BEA and PEDRO BEA, JR., accused-appellants.

**Facts:**

1. Lorna B. Guevarra, Josie Bea, and Pedro Bea, Jr. were charged with illegal recruitment by a
syndicate in large scale.
2. They were accused of recruiting individuals from Sto. Domingo, Albay for a job placement in
Malaysia, without any license or authority to do so.
3. The accused collected placement fees from the victims ranging from ₱30,000 to ₱5,000
each.
4. The victims were promised lucrative jobs in Malaysia with high salaries and free board and
lodging.
5. The victims were also assured that they would be met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by their
prospective employer, but they were left stranded upon arrival.
6. The victims eventually returned to the Philippines without finding any work in Malaysia.

**Issue:**

Whether the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment by a
syndicate in large scale.

**Ruling:**

The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding the accused-appellants guilty of illegal
recruitment by a syndicate in large scale. The Court found that the accused engaged in acts of
recruitment by promising profitable employment to the victims and collecting placement fees
without the necessary license or authority. The Court also noted the unity of purpose among the
accused, establishing a common criminal design. The defense of denial raised by the accused
was deemed unsubstantiated against the testimonies of credible witnesses. The Court found no
ill-motives on the part of the complainants to falsely accuse the accused. Thus, the
accused-appellants were convicted of the offense charged.