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 CHAPTER XXI
THE SCHEMES OF CATHARINE II

I came to Russia poor; but I will not die in debt to the Empire;
for I shall leave her the Crimea and Poland as my portion.—
Catharine II.

I N the spring of the year 1787 the ablest potentate in Europe set out
on a State progress to the newly annexed provinces in the South of
her Empire. It was carried out with an energy and splendour which
illustrated the union of the forethought of the West with the barbaric
splendour of the East. A great flotilla of galleys bore the Sovereign, her
chief courtiers, the ambassadors of Great Britain, Austria, and France,
and numerous attendants down the course of the Dnieper to the city of
Kherson near its mouth. By day the banks were fringed with throngs of
the peasants of Little Russia, brought up to order, while ever and anon
the shouts of Cossacks, Calmucks, and Circassians impressed the
beholders with a sense of the boundless resources of that realm. By
night the welkin flared with illuminations; and the extent of the resting-
places, which had arisen like exhalations at the bidding of her
favourite, Prince Potemkin, promised the speedy inroad of civilization
into the lands over which the Turk still held sway. In truth, far more
impressive to the mind’s eye was the imperious will of which these
782
marvels were the manifestation, the will of Catharine II.
At her invitation there joined her near Potemkin’s creation, the city
of Ekaterinoslav, another monarch of romantic and adventurous
character. Joseph II of Austria, head of the Holy Roman Empire, now
reluctantly turned towards the eastern conquests to which she had
long beckoned him. Together they proceeded on the progress
southwards to Kherson, which they entered under a triumphal arch
bearing the inscription in Greek, “The way to Byzantium.” A still more
impressive proof of the activity of her masterful favourite awaited them.
Potemkin had pushed on the work of the new dockyard at Kherson;
and as a result they witnessed the launch of three warships. The
largest, of 80 guns, was christened by Catharine herself, “Joseph
783
II.”
Thence the imperial procession wended its way to the much-prized
acquisition, the Crimea. In that Tartar Khanate the fertile brain and
forceful personality of Potemkin had wrought wonders. It was but four
years since the Empress, in her joy at the annexation of that vantage-
ground, had pointed on the map to the little township of Akhtiar, re-
named it Sevastopol, and ordered the construction of a dockyard and
navy. Now, in June 1787, as the allied sovereigns topped the hills
which command that port, the Hapsburg ruler uttered a cry of surprise
and admiration. For there below lay a squadron of warships, ready, as
it seemed, to set sail and plant the cross on the dome of St. Sophia at
Constantinople.
Hitherto Joseph II had not shown the amount of zeal befitting an
ally and an admirer. True, he had not openly belied the terms of the
compact of the year 1781, which had been his sheet-anchor amid the
storms of his reign. But that alliance had been the prelude to vast
schemes productive at once of longing and distrust. They aimed at
nothing less than the partition of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The
glorious days of Prince Eugène were to be recalled, and, on the
expulsion of the Tartar horde over the Bosphorus, Austria was to
acquire the Turkish lands which that warrior had gained for her by the
Peace of Passarowitz (1718), namely, the Banat of Temesvar, the
northern half of Servia, and the districts of Wallachia as far as the
River Aluta. The only direct gain to Catharine was to be the Tartar
territory north of the Black Sea as far as the Dniester. As for Moldavia
and Wallachia, they were to form an independent kingdom under a
Christian Prince (a plan finally realized in 1858); and the remainder of
the Balkan Peninsula was to be ruled by the favourite grandson of the
Empress, Prince Constantine.
Outwardly this partition seemed to offer a fair share to Austria. But
it was soon clear that the grasping genius of Muscovy would transform
the nominally independent kingdoms of Constantinople and Roumania
into feudatories and bar to Austria the way to the Lower Danube, the
Aegean, and the Lower Adriatic. Not yet were the lessons of the first
784
partition of Poland forgotten at Vienna. Then, too, the Austro-
Russian compact had but slightly advanced the interests of Joseph II
in Germany. Catharine had done little to further his pet scheme of the
Belgic-Bavarian Exchange; and, apart from feminine fumings, she had
not seriously counteracted the formation of the League of German
Princes whereby Frederick the Great had thwarted that almost
revolutionary proposal (1785). Probably this accounts for the
reluctance of Joseph to give rein to the southward impulses of the
Czarina in that year. At its close Sir Robert Murray Keith, British
Ambassador at Vienna, reported that the Czarina’s tour to Kherson
was postponed, and four days later he recorded a remarkable
conversation in the course of which the Emperor revealed his dislike of
the dangerous schemes then mooted for the partition of the Turkish
Empire. “I can tell you for certain,” he said, “que si jamais tous les
coquins se rompent avec l’Empire Ottoman, France is firmly
determined to strike a bold stroke by making herself mistress of Egypt.
This I know with certainty from more quarters than one; and M. Tott
himself told me at Paris that he had travelled through all Egypt by
order of his Court to explore that country in a military light and to lay
785
down a plan for the conquest of it.”
In these words we have probably the reason for the deferring of
the Russian schemes against Turkey. They are also noteworthy, as
they must have tended to deepen the distrust which Pitt and
Carmarthen felt for France. Her chief Minister, Vergennes, figured as
the protector of Turkey against Russia, recalling thereby the policy of
Louis XV’s reign, which in 1739 availed to tear away from Austria the
conquests of Prince Eugène and restore them to the Sublime Porte.
But under this show of championship there seems to have lain an
alternative policy, that of furthering the partition of Turkey, provided that
France acquired Egypt, and some other vantage posts in the Levant.
As we have already seen, France was busy in Egypt and the Orient
with schemes which probably would have startled the world had she
rivetted her hold on the Dutch Netherlands in the year 1787.
 The accession of the facile and dissolute Frederick William to the
Prussian throne in 1786, and the preoccupation of England and France
in the Dutch crisis which followed, now left Joseph free to comply with
the request of the Czarina that he would join her in the journey to the
Crimea. After long hesitations he reluctantly gave his assent. His aged
Chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, the champion of the connection with
Russia and France, advised him to direct the imperial conferences
towards the Bavarian Exchange and the dissolution of the
Fürstenbund. Catharine willed otherwise. Under her influence the
views of Joseph underwent a notable orientation. He came back to
Vienna virtually pledged to a war for the partition of Turkey.
The change in Joseph’s policy was a tribute to the potency of the
Czarina’s will. In her personality, as we have already seen, there were
singular powers of fascination and command. Her vivacity and charm,
varied by moods of petulance or fury, made up a character feminine in
its impulsiveness and of masculine strength. The erstwhile Princess of
Anhalt-Zerbst, who by a series of audacious intrigues, and probably by
the murder of her consort Peter III, had become the greatest autocrat
of the century, still retained the intellectual freshness of youth. Her
character and career present a series of bizarre contrasts. The poverty
of her upbringing, the dissolute adventures of her early life, and the
outrageous crimes of her womanhood would have utterly tainted a
personality less remarkable and attractive. But in the loose society of
St. Petersburg it had long been customary to gloze over lapses of
virtue by easy descriptions, like that which the stately rhetoric of Burke
applied to the chivalry of Versailles, that “vice itself lost half its evil by
losing all its grossness.”
Certainly the intellectual keenness and social witcheries of the
sorceress threw a charm over her rout. French and German
philosophers praised her learning and wit, but innate shrewdness kept
her from more than a passing dalliance with the unsettling theories
which were to work havoc in France. Here as in her amours she
observed some measure of worldly prudence; so that no favourite
could count on a long reign of pillage. Thus, whether by whim or by
design, she kept devotion and hope ever on the stretch; and one might
almost apply to her, even at the age of fifty-nine, Shakespeare’s
description of Cleopatra:
 Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale
Her infinite variety; other women cloy
The appetites they feed; but she makes hungry
Where most she satisfies.

Like the “serpent of old Nile,” Catharine had many weaknesses;

and they might have worked her ruin in the more strenuous age which
followed; but fortune brought her to the front at a time when Frederick
the Great desired the friendship of Russia, and when Hapsburg policy
vacillated between the conservatism of Maria Theresa and the
viewiness of her son Joseph. Thus the Czarina could work her will on
the decaying Powers, Turkey and Poland, and raised the prestige of
her Empire to unimagined heights.
A few shrewd observers were not dazzled by this splendour. Sir
James Harris, who went as British envoy to Russia in 1778 to cultivate
the friendship, and if possible the alliance, of Catharine, rightly probed
the inner weakness of her position. It lay in the suddenness of her rise,
the barbarousness of her people, the unblushing peculations of
Ministers and officials, and the shiftiness of Muscovite policy. This last
defect he traced to the peculiarities of the Empress herself, which he
thus summed up: “She has a masculine force of mind, obstinacy in
adhering to a plan, and intrepidity in the execution of it; but she wants
the more manly virtues of deliberation, forbearance in prosperity, and
accuracy of judgment, while she possesses in a high degree the
weaknesses vulgarly attributed to her sex—love of flattery and its
inseparable companion, vanity; [and] an inattention to unpleasant but
salutary advice.” Six years later he sharpened his criticism and
described her as led by her passions, not by reason and argument; her
prejudices, though easily formed, were immovable; her good opinion
was liable to constant fluctuations and whims; and her resolves might
786
carry her to any lengths. Such, too, was the opinion of the Comte
de Ségur, the French ambassador, who wrote about the Turkish
schemes renewed in 1787: “We are so accustomed to see Russia
throw herself offhand into the most risky affairs, and Fortune has so
persistently helped her, that there is no accounting for the actions of
787
this Power on the rules of a scientific policy.”
 This peculiarity was far from repelling Joseph II. While pluming
himself on the application of reason to politics, that crowned
philosopher forgot to take counsel of her twin-sister, prudence. On his
polyglot Empire, which already felt the first stirrings of the principle of
nationality, he imposed centralizing laws, agrarian, social, and
religious, which speedily aroused the hostility of those whom he meant
to uplift. Along with all this he pushed on schemes which unsettled
Germany, Belgium, and Poland; and now, as if all this were not
enough, he was drawn into the vortex of the Turkish enterprises of
Catharine.
It is a mistake to assume that Joseph had no practical aims in
view. He hoped to acquire from Turkey territories which would open up
trade on the Adriatic and the Lower Danube, and he counted on
strengthening the Russian alliance to which he trusted for the
furtherance of his aims in Germany and Belgium. Yet rarely has a
monarch formed a resolution more fraught with peril. In truth it resulted
from the mastery gained by an abler and more determined nature over
one that was generous but ill-compacted, daring but unsteady. Had the
Emperor surveyed the situation with care, he must have seen that it
favoured Catharine rather than himself. She was beset by no troubles
at home; while his lands, especially the Pays Bas, heaved with disloyal
excitement. She had appeased the Turcophile feelings of France by
granting a favourable commercial treaty; and Montmorin, the
successor of Vergennes, was weaker in himself and less able to
support the Sultan. In short, Catharine had her hands free, while
788
Joseph had them full.
The alliance between Russia and Poland at this time acquired new
vitality. During her triumphal tour Catharine received the homage of her
former lover, Stanislaus, King of Poland, and received from him the
promise of the help of 100,000 Polish troops for the Turkish war, and
“likewise for any other contest”—a phrase aimed against Prussia, if
she dared to intervene. The value of the promise soon became open to
doubt. The monarch in Poland had long been a figure-head, while the
real power lay with the powerful and ambitious nobility, which, under
the lead of the Czartoryski and Potocki families, ever chafed at
Muscovite ascendancy, and now declined to help Catharine in
humbling their natural ally, the Sultan. In 1790 their views were to
prevail; but, for the present, the resources of Poland seemed at her
beck and call.
The prospects of Catharine therefore were brilliant in the extreme.
But for once Fortune played her false. After the departure of the
Emperor from the Crimea, and while she still fondly surveyed the
warlike preparations at its new dockyard, there came news of the
alarming prospects for the harvest in Russia. “The Empress,” wrote
Fitzherbert on 24th July, “almost immediately after leaving the Crimea
fell under a great and visible depression of spirits, accompanied at
times with violent gusts of ill humour; and in this state remained with
very little intermission till our arrival here [Czarko-zelo].” He ascribed
these moody humours to the failure of the corn crop, which
necessitated the immediate purchase of 5,000,000 roubles’ worth of
foreign grain, and the distribution of Potemkin’s army in widespread
cantonments.
To wage a great campaign while bread stood at famine prices was
impossible. In this predicament the Empress decided to hide her
retirement by a parade of diplomatic bluster. She despatched to
Constantinople a special envoy, Bulgakoff, to lay claim to the
Principality of Georgia, and to submit this and other matters in dispute
to the mediation of France and Austria. The move was dexterous; but
in such a case the success of a game of bluff depends on the
adversary not perceiving the weakness of which it is the screen. Now,
the Sublime Porte, though usually inert, divined the secret, and
resolved to withstand these endless affronts. During thirteen years
orthodox Moslems had writhed under the humiliations of the Treaty of
Kainardji (1774), which acknowledged the complete independence of
the Tartar Khans of the Crimea and the Kuban valley, and in vague
terms admitted the Czarina to be the protectress of the Christian
subjects of the Porte. In 1783, thanks to Austrian support, Catharine
seized the Crimea; and now she laid claim to Georgia. The cup of
humiliation was full; and the pride of Moslems scorned to drink it.
The despatches of Sir Robert Ainslie, British ambassador at
Constantinople, show clearly enough the motives that prompted that
Government to strike an unexpected blow. On 25th June 1787 he
reported to Carmarthen that the Porte looked on the journey of the
Czarina and her warlike preparations as designed to wear out the
patience and the resources of the Turks, who already were said to
have 240,000 men ready near the Danube, and others in Asia. If, he
added, she did not explain her present conduct, “I am afraid they will
commence hostilities,” and “strike a home blow in the Crimea.” On
10th July he stated that there could be no solid peace so long as
Russia held the Crimea in defiance of the Treaty of Kainardji. “The
honour of the Sultan, the security of this Empire, the interest of the
Mahometan religion, and those [sic] of justice all require that ... the
independence of the Crimea should be re-established. It is true, the
Porte agreed to the cession; but that act, torn from her weakness, was
involuntary and unjust. In short, it can only be binding until a good
opportunity offers to cancel its effect. This, my Lord, seems the opinion
of the Cabinet and the motive of their extensive preparations, but they
are diffident of success and afraid to attack unless Russia herself
furnishes pretext.” He adds that the Turkish Ministers believed
Bulgakoff’s mission to be designed to “spin out the summer”; but that
789
the Turkish levies could scarcely be kept together.
As for the temporizing offers of mediation from France and Austria,
the Porte would have none of them, and refused to accept any in
which Great Britain had no share. The Grand Vizier cherished the
hope that Austria and Russia were not really united by treaty, and
seemed to desire, rather than to avoid, a rupture. On 30th July the
Reis Effendi asked our ambassador what England would do in case of
a Russo-Turkish War. Ainslie replied that she would “keep strict
neutrality,” and strongly urged the need of peace. “Never will we
purchase peace on the dishonourable terms held out by Russia,”
replied the Turkish Minister, and he added with oriental subtlety that,
unless she gave way, war must come “before many months are
elapsed.” Ainslie thought that this portended war in the spring of
790
1788.
But on 16th August the Sultan struck swiftly and hard. Doubtless
he had heard news of the famine in Russia and the dispersion of
Potemkin’s forces. It was clear that for a time the would-be aggressor
was reduced to the defensive. Was it not well, then, to deliver the blow
rather than wait for it to fall in the next year, and perhaps from both
Austria and Russia? True, the Turks were not ready—they never were
so. But their recent successes over the Mameluke Beys in Egypt and
the rebellious Mahmoud Pacha in Albania emboldened them to take a
step which completely surprised all the Cabinets of Europe. On 16th
August, after a long conference with the Grand Vizier, Bulgakoff and
five members of his suite were apprehended and marched off to the
Seven Towers, there to be kept in close custody. This was the Turkish
way of declaring war to the knife. The Porte defended it on the ground
791
of outrages to its flag at Kinburn and Sevastopol; but the incident
added rancour to the hatred of Catharine, and she swore to glut her
revenge upon the insolent infidels. Her rage was all the greater
because for once she was outwitted. Fitzherbert, on hearing of the
792
novel declaration of war by the Turks, stated to Carmarthen that it
must have upset all her calculations, for he knew that the blustering
language used by Bulgakoff “was in fact intended to produce the
793
contrary effect.”

* * * * *
These events were destined potently to influence the career of Pitt.
In one respect they affect his reputation; for Catharine in her fury
794
accused him of inciting the Turks to attack her. The charge was not
unnatural. She had long shown her spleen against England in bitter
words and hostile deeds. More than once she thrust aside Pitt’s
overtures for an alliance; and she rejected his proposals for a
commercial treaty while she granted that boon to France (January
1787). Further, the outbreak of war in the East came very opportunely
for Great Britain and Prussia at the crisis of the Dutch embroglio and
enabled the Court of Berlin confidently to launch its troops against the
Patriots in Holland. The tilt given from Constantinople to the delicately
poised kaleidoscope of diplomacy had startling results. The mobile
Powers—Russia, Austria, and France—were fixed fast, while the
hitherto stationary States, Prussia and England, were set free for swift
action.
Nevertheless it is untrue that the tilt came from Pitt and
Carmarthen. They still clung to the traditional British policy of
befriending Russia, which Fox had enthusiastically supported. Our
Government instructed Fraser at St. Petersburg to express regret at
the outbreak of war and to offer, conjointly with Prussia, our good
services for the restoration of peace. Pitt also informed Vorontzoff,
Russian ambassador in London, of his desire for a good understanding
with Russia, and stated that he would not oppose acquisitions of
Turkish territory. All the evidence tends to prove that he strove to
prevent hostilities, which must upset the existing order in the East and
probably end in a general war. As the concern of Prussia was equally
great (it being certain by the end of 1787 that Austria would join in the
war) the two Protestant Powers drew together for joint action though
795
not, as yet, for actual alliance.
In fact, we find here the reason of the coyness of Pitt in framing
that compact. He still preferred to have Russia, rather than Prussia, as
an ally. But his advances to Catharine ended with the impossible retort
that he must recall Ainslie from Constantinople. Nevertheless it was
not till the middle of March 1788 that Pitt took a step displeasing to her
796
by forbidding her agents to hire Russian transports in England. The
Empress showed her annoyance at these strict notions of neutrality by
797
publicly receiving the famous American privateer, Paul Jones.
Pitt’s attitude towards Austria was at first equally friendly. On 14th
September 1787 Carmarthen sent to Vienna assurances that the
Russo-Turkish War would make no difference to the friendship of
George III for Austria, and that we should maintain “the determined
system of this country to contribute as far as possible to the
continuance of the public tranquillity, or to its speedy restoration if
unhappily it should be interrupted.” By these and other proposals Pitt
and Carmarthen vainly sought to detach Austria from Russia, and also
to conjure away the spectre of a Triple Alliance between France,
Russia, and Austria, which long haunted the courts of Whitehall. Early
in 1788, that ghost was laid by the Austrian attack upon the Turks,
which France had striven to avert, and Pitt felt free to accept the
proffered alliance of Prussia which, as we saw in Chapter XVI, finally
798
came about in August 1788.
The campaign of that year is devoid of interest. Scarcity of bread
on the Russian side and the usual unpreparedness of the Turks
clogged the operations, which led to a sharp conflict only at one point.
The fortress of Kinburn, recently acquired by the Russians,
commanded the estuary formed by the converging Rivers Dnieper and
Bug. It stood opposite the Turkish fortress, Oczakoff, which was
deemed the chief bulwark of the Ottomans in the East. Early in
October 1788 they made an attempt to seize Kinburn as a prelude to
the hoped-for conquest of the Crimea. But in that fortress was a
wizened little veteran, who ate bread with the soldiers, startled them at
dawn by his cock crows, and summarized his ideas on tactics by the
inspiriting words: “At them with the cold steel.” The personality of
Suvóroff was worth an army corps, for it was bound up with triumph.
He now waited within the walls of Kinburn until the Turkish fleet landed
5,000 choice Janissaries below the town. Then by a furious sally,
flanked by a charge of ten squadrons of horse on the wings, he broke
up that fanatical band and drove it into the sea. Only 700 Turks
survived. The affair was not of the first importance, but it heartened the
Russians for the greater enterprises of the next year.
Meanwhile Catharine, fuming at the sorry beginning of her war of
conquest, upbraided her ally with his tardiness in coming to her help.
But Joseph was in a difficult situation. The ferment in the Netherlands
and Hungary was increasing. The close union of England and Prussia
in Dutch affairs caused him much concern; and, as we have seen in
Chapter XIV, the French Ministry was fain to huddle up the disputes in
Holland, partly in order to be free to support the Sultan. Montmorin
resolved to thwart the partition of the Turkish Empire and brought
pressure to bear upon Kaunitz, who ever looked askance on oriental
799
adventures. Nevertheless, by the month of November Joseph had
decided on war. The Austrians made a discreditable attempt to
surprise Belgrade; and in February 1788 war was declared.
The ensuing campaign was fertile in surprises. As often happens,
the Allies waited for one another to start the campaign, and thus lost
the early part of the summer. The Russians, owing to the armament of
the Swedes and the incapacity of Potemkin, did far less than was
expected; and the brunt of the Ottoman onset finally fell upon the
Austrians. Joseph was compelled to fall back towards Temesvar on the
night of 20th September; and a panic seized the Imperialists. That
motley host, mistaking the shouts of its diverse races for the war cry of
the Turks, fired wildly upon the supposed pursuers; and the Ottomans,
hearing the babel din, finally pressed on the rout and captured 4,000
men and a large part of the artillery and stores. Pestilence completed
the work begun by the Moslems; and thus it came about that the
efforts of 200,000 Austrians effected nothing more than the surrender
of Chotzim and three other frontier strongholds of the second rank.
The disgrace dimmed the lustre of their arms, undermined the health
of the Emperor, and gave new heart to Hertzberg and the numerous
enemies of the Hapsburg realm.

* * * * *
The chief cause of this ignominious failure is ultimately traceable to
an influence that had long been at work far away, namely, the restless
ambition of Gustavus III of Sweden. In the summer of the year 1788
that monarch suddenly drew the sword against Catharine, and from
the vantage ground of his Finnish province marched towards St.
Petersburg. This threatening move compelled the Empress to recall
part of her forces, condemned the rest of them to the defensive, and
thus exposed the Austrians to the spirited attack above described.
Seeing that Pitt was held to be ultimately responsible for these
events, we must pause here to sketch the character and career of
Gustavus III. Of the three monarchs dealt with in this chapter he is not
the least interesting. Rivalling Catharine in intellectual keenness and
moody waywardness, he excelled her in generosity, virtue, and
chivalry. There is in him the strain of romance which refines the
schemes, and adds pathos to the failures, of Joseph II; but the Swede
excelled the Hapsburg alike in grit, fighting power, charm, and
versatility. He was a bundle of startling opposites. Slight of figure,
naturally delicate and pensive, he threw himself eagerly into feats of
daring and hardihood. By turns poet and humourist, playwright and
warrior, devout but an incorrigible intriguer, he lured, enthralled,
browbeat, or outwitted the Swedish people as no one had done since
the days of Charles XII. In truth he seemed a re-incarnation of that ill-
starred ruler, especially in his power of calling forth the utmost from his
people, and leading them on to feats beyond their strength. From the
midsummer day of 1771 on which the young King opened his Estates
with a speech from the throne, it was clear that his iron will and
captivating address might regain for the Crown the power torn from it
some years before by the Caps, the faction of the opposing nobles and
burghers. Fourteen months later Gustavus struck his blow. Despite the
Russian gold poured in for the support of the Caps, the King gained
the people and the army to his side, locked the recalcitrant Senate in
their Chamber, overthrew the usurped authority of the Riksdag, and
thenceforth governed in the interests of his people. It was
characteristic of him that he prefaced his coup d’état by the first
performance of a Swedish opera, the libretto of which he had himself
800
revised.
Thenceforth “the royal charmer” governed at will, and Sweden
regained much of her old prestige. The traditional alliance with France
was renewed; and for a time the jealous Catharine seemed to
acquiesce in the new order of things at Stockholm. In reality she never
ceased to intrigue there, as also at Warsaw, seeking to recall the days
of schism and weakness. The extravagance of Gustavus played into
her hands. Little by little the factions regained lost ground; the Riksdag
of 1786 threw out all but one of the royal measures; and the King was
fain to govern more absolutely.
The Russo-Turkish War now gave him the chance for which his
restless spirit longed, namely, to attempt to recover part at least of the
trans-Baltic lands ceded to Russia, and to dissolve a secret Russo-
Danish alliance which aimed at the overthrow of the present régime in
Sweden. He therefore allied himself with the Sultan on condition of
receiving a yearly subsidy of 1,000,000 piastres. He further sounded
the Courts of Berlin, Warsaw, and Paris, but received no
encouragement. At London, as we have seen, his overtures at
Christmas 1787 were set aside. They were renewed in the spring of
1788, and received more attention, it being then the aim of Pitt to bring
some of the secondary States into the projected Triple Alliance. But the
ardent spirit of Gustavus far outleaped the mark. His demands for
money were suspiciously large. “Sweden,” so Carmarthen wrote to
Harris on 20th June 1788, “has a most voracious appetite for
subsidies, but from the enormous extravagance of her demand has put
801
it out of our power to proceed further at present on that head.”
This was fortunate; for Gustavus was then preparing to throw down
the gauntlet to Russia. Early in July he set sail for Helsingfors, and
launched at Catharine a furious ultimatum, bidding her cede Carelia
and Livonia to the Swedes, and restore the Crimea to the Sultan. On
the receipt of that astonishing missive the imperial virago raged, wept,
and swore by turns. The crisis was indeed serious. In and near St.
Petersburg were only 6,000 troops.
Nevertheless she acted with her wonted vigour. She called up the
Militia; and her fleet, commanded by Admiral Greig and officered
largely by Britons, prepared to dispute with Gustavus the mastery of
802
the Gulf of Finland. In this it succeeded. It dealt the smaller naval
force of the Swedes a severe check, and soon cooped it up in
Sveaborg. Meanwhile the advance of the Swedes from their Finnish
province on the Russian capital was stopped by a mutiny of the
officers, which soon spread to the rank and file. The causes of this
event are still obscure. The admirers of Gustavus ascribed it to the
factiousness of nobles and the bribes of Catharine. The Swedish
Opposition, and also Charles Keene, British envoy at Stockholm,
explained it as the natural outcome of the extravagance and ambition
of the monarch who, not content with violating the constitution and
ruining the finances of his realm, wantonly plunged it into a struggle for
which he had not prepared. Consequently, when his ill-clad and ill-fed
militia found that the Russian raids into Finland were a myth, and that
the only enemies were royal ambition and famine, they at once
thwarted the former by constituting the army as a “confederation,” and
declaring their resolve for peace. If there must be war with Russia, let it
803
be declared legally by a freely elected Diet at Stockholm. The
Swedish crews at Sveaborg, where food and warlike munitions were
alike wanting, partly joined in the movement; and the universality of the
discontent, which compelled Gustavus to return helplessly to
Stockholm, is perhaps sufficient proof that influences were at work
more widespread than party spirit and more potent than foreign gold.
However the fact may be explained, it is certain that the Swedes,
when almost within striking distance of the Russian capital, halted,
sent offers of an armistice, and then retreated into Finland. Catharine
was saved; but after the capture of Oczakoff from the Turks she vented
her spleen in one of her icily brilliant mots: “As Mr. Pitt wishes to chase
me from St. Petersburg, I hope he will allow me to take refuge at
Constantinople.”
It was natural for the Empress to suspect England and Prussia of
complicity in the Swedish enterprise; for she herself in a similar case
would have egged on Gustavus. But the evidence in the British
archives proves that neither George III nor Frederick William, Pitt nor
Hertzberg, had a hand in the matter. George III and Pitt loved peace
because it was economical. Through the spring and summer they were
trying to effect a pacification. On 16th May 1788 the Foreign Office
sent off a despatch to Ainslie urging him to co-operate with Dietz, the
Prussian Minister at the Porte, in order, if possible, to pave the way for
a joint mediation of England and Prussia with a view to a pacification in
the East; but he was to beware of entering into other plans that the
Court of Berlin might have in view, a hint against the ambitious scheme
of exchanges now forming in Hertzberg’s brain. On Swedish affairs the
despatch continued thus: “The Swedish armament causes much
speculation both in Russia and elsewhere: the avowed purpose is the
necessity of having a respectable force in that Kingdom while Russia is
804
fitting out so formidable a fleet.” From this and other signs it is clear
that Pitt and Carmarthen, far from expecting war in the Baltic, were
intent on plans for stopping it on the Danube and Black Sea.
As for Frederick William, he did not desire war in the North,
because it must curtail his pleasures; and Hertzberg, because peace
would leave him free to weave his plans more systematically. Ewart,
our active and zealous envoy at Berlin, who knew Hertzberg
thoroughly, informed Carmarthen on 19th June that Prussia was very
805
cautious as to forming any connection with Sweden. Nine days later
he reported that Gustavus had made an alliance with Turkey, but
probably would not attack Catharine unless she sent a fleet from
Cronstadt round to the Mediterranean. On 25th July, after referring to
the Swedish declaration of war against Russia, he added that the
Court of Stockholm hoped for the support of Prussia only so far as to
keep Denmark quiet. As for himself, he had rebuked the Swedish
806
envoy.
In truth the action of Gustavus annoyed both England and Prussia.
They expressed to him their disapproval of his conduct in strong terms.
On 29th August Carmarthen wrote to Ewart censuring the action of
Gustavus, but adding that the Allies must intervene to stop the war in
807
the Baltic. Pitt also, on hearing of the Danish armament, resolved to
save Gustavus from utter ruin. On 1st September he wrote as follows
to Grenville (not, be it noted, to Carmarthen): “We had before written to
Berlin with power to Ewart to send an offer of our joint mediation if the
King of Prussia agreed, and this seems now the more necessary. Our
intervention may prevent his [Gustavus] becoming totally insignificant,
808
or dependent upon Russia, and it seems to me an essential point.”
Eight days later Carmarthen assured the Prussian Court of his
809
satisfaction that it would join in the proposed mediation.
The crisis was indeed most urgent. Catharine was thinking far less
of flitting to Constantinople than of ousting Gustavus from Stockholm.
Her treaty with Denmark contained secret clauses which bound that
Court to alliance with her in case of a Russo-Swedish war; and the
young Prince Royal of Denmark, though by marriage a nephew to
Gustavus, was only too eager for a campaign which promised to lead
to the partition of the Swedish kingdom. The excellent navy of the
Danes, and their possession of Norway, gave them great facilities for
the invasion of the open country near the important city of Gothenburg;
and, that once taken, they could easily master the South, and leave
the factions at Stockholm to complete their work.
Fortunately there was at Copenhagen one of the ablest of British
envoys. Hugh Elliot, brother of Sir Gilbert Elliot, was a man of spirit and
resource. His demeanour and habits of mind were as much those of a
soldier as of a diplomatist; and nature had endowed him with the
810
stately air and melodramatic arts which avail much at a crisis. For
some time past he had suspected the ambitious views of the Prince
Royal of Denmark, who despite his minority, ruled the land through the
all-powerful Minister, Count Bernstorff. Their conduct was now sinister.
Ostensibly they regretted that their treaty with Russia compelled them
to attack Sweden, and welcomed Elliot’s suggestion of British
811
mediation as a means of preventing such a calamity. Possibly this
was Bernstorff’s real conviction; for Elliot found out later that the
Russian party had sworn to ruin him unless he favoured a warlike
policy.
Certain it is that Bernstorff had instructed Schönborn, the Danish
envoy in London, to use honeyed words to Carmarthen, which virtually
invited England’s friendly mediation. In reply Carmarthen “told him that
the King lamented extremely the rupture which had taken place
between Russia and Sweden, and assured him of His Majesty’s
earnest desire to contribute as far as possible to the restoration of the
tranquillity of the North.” Carmarthen sent off a special messenger to
Elliot to enable him to propose immediately the mediation of England,
812
Prussia, and Holland between Denmark and Sweden. Bernstorff
received this offer on 25th August in the friendliest manner, and
promised to check the warlike ardour of the Prince Royal. Four days
later Elliot had an interview with the Prince in the hope of refuting the
persistent rumours that England had incited both the Sultan and the
King of Sweden to attack Russia. The Prince accepted his denials, but
assured him that the Danes must fulfil their treaty obligations to
Russia.
This serious news led Pitt once again directly to intervene in
diplomatic affairs, and to draft the despatch of 9th September to Elliot.
He there stated that the instructions already sent off to him, and to
Ewart at Berlin, manifested the earnest desire of the British
Government for the ending of hostilities in the Baltic, “which might be
injurious to the balance of power in that part of the world.” He deplored
the aggressive intentions of the Danish Court, as being alike opposed
to its real interests and certain “to extend the mischiefs of the present
war in a manner which cannot fail to excite the most serious attention,
and to have a great effect on the conduct, of all those Courts who are
interested in the relative situation of the different Powers of the
813
Baltic.”
Pitt, then, deeply regretted the outbreak of war in the North, but
none the less resolved to prevent the threatened dismemberment of
Sweden. The Prussian Court held even stronger views on the subject,
and expressed its indignation at the Danish inroad into Sweden “after
the repeated assurances given by the Danish Minister of pacific and
814
moderate dispositions.” So keen was the annoyance at Berlin that
Frederick William resolved to draw up a Declaration that, if Denmark
attacked Gustavus, 16,000 Prussians would forthwith invade the
Danish Duchy of Holstein. Ewart at once informed Elliot of the entire
concurrence of Prussia with England, and thus enabled him to play a
daring game. On the evening of 17th September, acting on the advice
of Ewart, he resolved to take boat for the Swedish shore, and proceed
to the headquarters of Gustavus. The news which finally prompted this
decision was that the Swedish monarch had decided to accept the
815
proffered mediation not of the Allies, but of France. Elliot hoped to
reverse this decision and to secure the triumph of British and Prussian
influence at the Swedish Court. He had not, it appears, received Pitt’s
despatch cited above, or even the special Instructions sent a little
earlier; but he knew enough to warrant his speaking in lofty tones,
which were destined to dash the hopes of Catharine and the Prince
Royal of Denmark.
We left Gustavus at Stockholm. There he did his best to quell the
discontent of the burghers; but it is probable that a Revolution would
have broken out but for the threat of a Danish invasion and the
impending loss of Gothenburg. The national danger tended to still the
strife of parties; and the King, commending his queen and children to
his people, rode away to Dalecarlia in order to arouse the loyal miners
and peasants of that region against the invaders. Though he
harangued them on the spot where Gustavus Vasa made his
memorable appeals, their response was doubtful; but, having raised a
816
small band, he proceeded towards the threatened city.
On his way he met the British envoy at the town of Carlstadt. For
eleven days Elliot had searched for the King, and now found him
without troops, without attendants, and with a small following of ill-
armed peasants (29th September, 1788). Bitterly the monarch
exclaimed that, like James II, he must leave his kingdom, a victim to
the ambition of Russia, the treachery of Denmark, the factious treason
of his nobles, and his own mistakes. Thereupon Elliot replied: “Sire,
give me your Crown; I will return it to you with added lustre.” He then
told him of the offer of mediation by England and Prussia on his behalf.
At first, mindful of his engagements to France, Gustavus hesitated to
accept it. Had he known that Elliot was acting without official
instructions he might have slighted the offer. In truth, Elliot was acting
only on the general direction, that he was “to prevent by every means
any change in the relative situation of the Northern nations.” If this
formula was vague, it was wide; and it sufficed, along with the more
definite support from Berlin, to decide the fate of Sweden. Gustavus at
once resolved to place himself wholly in Elliot’s hands. The latter
therefore made his way to the Danish headquarters; while the King
817
proceeded to Gothenburg. At that fortress the spirit of the defenders
was as scanty as the means of defence. But affairs took on a new
aspect when, at nightfall of 3rd October, a drenched and weary
horseman sought admittance at their gate. A tumult of joy arose in the
town when it was known that Gustavus was in their midst, the
precursor of succouring bands. Now there was no thought of
surrender.
Nevertheless, things would have gone hard with the burghers had
the Danes pushed their attack home. This they seemed about to do.
Elliot in his interview at their headquarters made little impression on
the Prince Royal and the Commander-in-Chief, the Prince of Hesse.
Their kinship to Gustavus seemed but to embitter their hostility; and
they undoubtedly hoped, after the reduction of Gothenburg, to
dismember the Swedish realm, and aggrandise the closely related
houses of Russia and Denmark. They pressed on to Gothenburg and
made ready for an assault. But in the meantime Gustavus, receiving
help from seamen on British vessels in the harbour, encouraged the
citizens to make ready and man the guns. So firm a front did the
defenders present that the Danes on 9th October assented to Elliot’s
offer of an armistice of eight days. Within that time the Prussian
Declaration reached their headquarters, and lust of conquest now gave
way to fear of a Prussian invasion of Jutland. Again therefore Elliot
succeeded in prolonging the armistice, which finally was extended to
six months (13th November–13th May 1789).
It is clear, then, that the initiative boldly taken by Ewart and Elliot,
backed by the threats from Berlin, saved Sweden from a position of
acute danger. The King of Sweden himself confessed in a letter to
Armfelt that Elliot’s grand coup in effecting an armistice had saved his
kingdom, had restored the balance of Europe, and covered England
with glory. Erskine, British Consul at Gothenburg, also declared that
but for “the spirited and unremitted exertions of Mr. Elliot, there is not a
doubt but this city and province would have fallen into the hands of the
818
enemy on their first advancing.” Elliot also described his
achievements in flamboyant terms, which were called forth by an
unmerited rebuke of our Foreign Office, that his instructions were to
819
restore peace, not to threaten the Danes with war. His reply of 15th
November ran as follows: “The success of my efforts has been almost
miraculous.... Had I arrived at Carlstadt twenty-four hours later than I
did; had I negotiated with less energy or success at Gothenburg than
what has drawn upon me the resentment of Russia and the abettors of
the boundless ambition of that Court, the Revolution in Sweden was
compleated, and a combination formed in the North equally hostile to
England and Prussia.” He then charged Bernstorff with duplicity in
expressing a desire for peace, “while the Danes were marching on an
almost defenceless town, the capture of which decided irrevocably the
fate of Sweden and the Baltic.”... “Six weeks after my arrival in Sweden
a victorious army of 12,000 men, animated by the presence of their
Prince, in sight of a most brilliant conquest, were checked in their
progress by my single efforts; were induced to evacuate the Swedish
territories, and consented to a truce of six months.... Perhaps in the
annals of history there is not to be found a more striking testimony of
deference paid by a foreign prince to a King of England than what the
Prince Royal of Denmark manifested upon this trying occasion.” He
then stated that the efforts of the Prussian envoy were of no avail
owing to the dislike in which he was held; and that only his [Elliot’s]
influence availed to undo the harm caused by a violent action of
Gustavus III in the middle of October.
It would be interesting to know what Pitt thought of this bombast;
but on 5th December Carmarthen guardedly commended the
magniloquent envoy, and urged him to gain over Denmark to the Triple
Alliance; for, as Catharine had now declined the mediation of the
Allies, while Gustavus had accepted it, Denmark could justly refuse her
demands for help in the next campaign. Ostensibly Denmark refused;
but, owing to the profuse expenditure of the Russian Embassy at
Copenhagen (estimated by our chargé d’affaires, Johnstone, at £500 a
820
day ), Catharine gained permission to have fifteen warships from the
White Sea repaired in that dockyard.