Best Team Memorial Petitioner Nlujaa Gurjeet Singh Memoria

SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Monday, June 17, 2024

Printed For: 22LLB104 Monarch Trivedi, Dr. RML National Law University
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
© 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
rd
3 NLUJAA Gurjeet Singh Memorial National Moot, 2022
Best Team Memorial - Petitioner
The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indri

Under Article 32 of
The Constitution of Indri, 1950
In the Matter between:
Ramta Jogi & Ali Baksh … Petitioner;
Versus
Union of India and Others … Respondent.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations 4
Index of Authorities 5
Statement of Jurisdiction 8
Statement of Facts 9
Issues Raised 11
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRI?
1.1 Fundamental Rights of the Petitioners Are Violated
1.2 Right to Approach SC under Article 32 Is A Fundamental Right in
itself
1.3 Availability of Alternative Remedy Is No Bar To Seek Writ Under
Article 32
2. WHETHER THE SPECIAL TWIN CONDITIONS FOR GRANTING OF
BAIL STANDS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 & 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDRI?
2.1 Principle of Equality
2.2 Unreasonable Classification & The Test of Arbitrariness
2.3 Right To Speedy & Fair Trial & Grant of Bail
3. WHETHER SECTION 50 OF PMLA STANDS VIOLATIVE OF THE
PROVISIONS OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
3.1. Investigating Officers Under Section 50 Shall Be Considered As
‘Police Officers’
3.2. Persons Summoned Under Sec 50 Shall Be Considered ‘Accused’
4. WHETHER REVERSE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER UAPA STANDS
VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?
4.1. Presumption of Innocence Compromised
4.2. National Interest Over Individual Liberty
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 12
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 15
PRAYER 34
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art. Article
CrPC Criminal Procedure Code
ECIR Enforcement Case Information
Report
ED Enforcement Directorate
ed. Edition
FIR First Information Report
GOI Government of Indri
HC High Court
Hon'ble Honourable
i.e. That is
IEA Indian Evidence Act
IPC Indian Penal Code
TADA Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act
POTA Prevention of Terrorism Act
PMLA Prevention of Money Laundering
Act
Sec. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
UAPA Unlawful Activities Prevention
Activities
UKA United Kingdom of Azerica
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
Ors. Others
NDPS Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances
NHRC National Human Rights
Commission
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAWS PAGE NO.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State of NCT of Delhi 32

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI 15
Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab 23
Bodhisattawa v. Subhra Chakraborty 17
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. UOI 19
Coffin v. United States 31
D.S. Nakara v. UOI 21
Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh 17
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 21
Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. UOI 14
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (regd.) Sindri v. 17
UOI
Gopal Das v. The State 26
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar 23
K R Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu 21
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra 30
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra 30
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab 26
Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nair v. 18
The State of Madras
L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI 15
Magan Lal Chaggan Lal v. Municipal Corporation of 20
Greater Bombay
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI 16, 22
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI 15
Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani 25
Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. UOI 20
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, UP 17
Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. 14
R v. Oak 31
Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India 15
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras 17
Sanjay Chandra v. CBI 22, 30
Seema Silk and Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement 31
Shabnam v. UOI 16
Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India 23
Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu 19
State of Kerala v. Raneef 23
State of Madras v. V.G. Row 16
The Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose 26
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UOI v. KA Najeeb 23
Woolmington v. DPP 30
BOOKS PAGE NO.
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 1408-1416 17, 25, 28
(8th ed. 2018, LexisNexis)
Dr. Janak Raj Jai, Bail Law and Procedures, 207, 12-15
219, 220, 221, 227, (7th ed. 2016, Universal
Publishing)
S.P. Tyagi, Criminal Trial Law, Practice & 24, 25, 26
Procedure, Vol. II, 1212-1224 (7th ed. 2019,
Vinod Publications (P) Ltd.)
R.P. Kathuria, Supreme Court on Criminal Law 16-20
1950-2016, Vol. I, 1.1029, 1.1046, 7.464,
7.471 (9th ed. 2017 LexisNexis)
R.K. Naroola et al., The Law of Prevention of 13, 14
Money Laundering - An Analytical Commentary
on the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 89-99 (2020, OakBridge Publishing Pvt.
Ltd.)
STATUTES
Constitution of Indri, 1950
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Arms Act, 1959
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner approaches the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Constitution of Indri.
Article 32: (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this
Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders
or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever
may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court
by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other
court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any
of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended

except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Ramta Jogi and Ali Baksh are two engineers, who moved to the
United Kingdom of Azerica (UKA) to pursue their graduation in
Computer Science from University of Bostono. Following graduation,
Ramta and Ali got jobs in ‘Ameron’ and ‘Flirtbook’ respectively.
Previously, they had been awarded the highest scholarship named
‘Roses’ by the Government of Indri (GoI). Later on, both of them left
their jobs and moved back to Indri where they resided together in a
small chawl near the city of Faizabad, Ughra Pradesh.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On 20th February 2022 around 11 p.m., a 15-year-old boy noticed a
truck parked outside Ramta and Ali's premises and witnessed them
loading huge trunks. However, one of the locks of the trunk broke open
and big machine guns fell out. The boy informed his father, Toofan
Singh, an ex-cop who then immediately informed the town inspector of
Faizabad. Shortly after that the police force surrounded their premise.
They attempted to escape but were arrested by the police. After the
search, a hidden basement beneath the premises of Ramta and Ali
filled with tons of arms and ammunition and huge liquid cash was
found. All the acquired evidence with the cash was then sent for the
forensic examination.
INVESTIGATION
In the further investigation, it was revealed that Ali and Ramta had
links with left-wing and right-wing extremist groups and were
supplying illegal weapons to carry out ‘unlawful activities’ within the
territory of India for the past 5 years. Accordingly, an FIR under
sections 13, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act,
1967; section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 read with section 120B of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 was registered against them. The following
day, they were produced before the jurisdictional magistrate who
remanded them to 15-day police custody.
Upon scrutinizing the bank accounts, the police further found that
they were receiving crores of rupees from various shell entities and held
crores of crypto currency. The seized phone and laptop also revealed
that they were operating their business of illegal weapons through the
platform of ‘Dark Web’. During the interrogation no concrete
explanation was given by Ramta and Ali when the police confronted
incriminating evidence against them. The local police involved the
Directorate of Enforcement owing to the association of liquid cash and
registered an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) under
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

ED under sec 50 of PMLA directed Ramta and Ali to appear before the
authority and testify. Further ED had also sought production warrants
for their custody from the Special Court. Initially, 6 days were granted
which then got extended by another spell of 9 days. They returned to
the judicial custody after 15-days of interrogation.
BAIL
Ramta and Ali separately applied for bail in qua the FIR registered
by the police of Faizabad and the ECIR registered by the ED. However,
the two Special courts constituted under UAPA and PMLA respectively
rejected the bail applications citing the special twin condition under the
impugned provisions.
They then challenged the orders of the two Special Courts before the
jurisdictional High Court of Illahabad where they also sought interim
bail till the HC finally decides their fate. Interim bail was denied. The
HC upheld the special court's decision of citing the special twin
conditions and rejected the grant of bail application.
They have been in jail for 80 days and have decided to file a Writ
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indri before the Supreme
Court of Indri challenging the vires of the provisions of UAPA and PMLA.
ISSUES RAISED
I) WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRI IN THE
PRESENT CASE?
II) WHETHER THE SPECIAL TWIN CONDITIONS FOR
GRANTING BAIL IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 & 21 OF THE
III) WHETHER SECTION 50 OF PMLA STANDS VIOLATIVE OF
PROVISIONS OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
IV) WHETHER REVERSE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER UAPA
STANDS VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRI IN THE
PRESENT CASE?
It is humbly argued before the Hon'ble court of law that the
impugned provisions of UAPA & PMLA challenged under the present writ
petition filed by the petitioners holds meritorious caliber. The
application of special twin conditions in the grant of bail and the powers
granted to the officers of ED to conduct an investigation as a judicial
proceeding under sec 50 of PMLA outrightly violates the fundamental
rights of the petitioners. Furthermore, it is submitted that having
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
regard to the substantial nature of constitutional issues involved in the

present case, the SC ought to hold the writ petition maintainable for it
is the custodian of fundamental rights, and has marked powers of
judicial review under the ambit of Article 32. Lastly, the availability of
an alternative remedy under Article 226 is no bar to the maintainability
of the present petition.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE SPECIAL TWIN CONDITIONS FOR
GRANTING BAIL IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 & 21 OF THE
It is most humbly submitted that the special twin conditions for
granting of bail under section 43D and 45 of the UAPA and PMLA act
respectively are unconstitutional. It violates both article 14 which
ensures equality and equal protection before the law as well as article
21 of the constitution of Indri that ensures right to life and personal
liberty. As is stated under article 13(1) that any law inconsistent with
provisions enshrined in part III of the constitution shall to that extent
be deemed void.
ISSUE III: WHETHER SECTION 50 OF PMLA STANDS VIOLATIVE
OF PROVISIONS OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
It is humbly argued before the Hon'ble court of law that section 50
of PMLA which grants unbridled powers to the office of ED to
investigate, issue a summons and record statements on oath not only
encroaches upon the conventional principles of evidence laid under
section 25, 26 and 27 of IEA, 1872 but also violates the fundamental
rights of the petitioners granted under Article 20(3) and 21 of the
Constitution of Indri.
ISSUE IV: WHETHER REVERSE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER UAPA
STANDS VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED?
It is submitted before the Hon'ble SC that the sec 43D (5) proviso
and sec 43E of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 poses
reverse onus of proof on the petitioners which violates their
fundamental rights, right to remain silent and safeguards of fair trial
and natural justice. Moreover, in the mentioned precedents it has
already been laid that the foundational evidential burden to prove the
accusation always remains on the prosecution which transgresses the
provision of the same act.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
1.1 Fundamental rights of the petitioners are violated
It is humbly maintained before the Hon'ble court of law that the
present petition filed by the petitioners under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of Indri challenges the constitutionality and the vires of
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the provisions constituted under UAPA and PMLA which includes the
special twin condition stated under sec. 43D and sec. 45 of the
respective Acts, the reverse onus of proof UAPA lays on the accused and
powers granted to the office of ED to conduct an investigation as a
judicial proceeding which is transparently unconventional to the well-
settled principles of evidence established under sec. 25, 26 & 27 of IEA.
UAPA & PMLA come under the category of special statutes that are
enacted to guard the integrity, sovereignty, and security of a nation.
Their nature of being a special statute is majorly cited as a reasonable
ground for the restriction on the basic fundamental rights of the
persons tried under these Acts, but in the instant case, it is the petition
filed by the petitioners that contends otherwise.
1.1.1 Infringement of fundamental rights
Fundamental rights mark the base of seeking relief under Art. 32.
The Hon'ble court has time and again recognized that the constitutional
validity of a legislation can be challenged when any of the fundamental
1
rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution have been violated.
Therefore, the violation of fundamental rights is the sine qua non of the
exercise of the right to approach SC.2
Unless a question of enforcement of fundamental rights arises, the
jurisdiction of SC under Article 32 cannot be invoked where the
maintainability of a writ petition must show the existence of some
fundamental right of the petitioner that ought to be adjudicated, held
in
Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India3
For the maintainability of the present petition, it is expedient to note
that the restrictions inflicted by the impugned provisions of UAPA &
PMLA directly encroaches upon the ‘guaranteed’ fundamental rights of
the petitioners enshrined under Art. 14, 20(3) & 21. The special twin
condition under sec 43D of UAPA and sec 45 of PMLA put a stringent
restriction on the grant of bail which is a part of Art. 21 through two
conditions.
Apart from that, the petitioners having been summoned and
interrogated under sec 50 of PMLA, where authorized officers are bound
to record the statements made by the accused, render them in a
position where their right to remain silent and right against self-
incrimination have been infringed by the office of ED. Therefore, the
petitioners in the present case have rightfully approached the court
with appropriate proceedings laid under Art. 32(1) i.e. for the
enforcement of their fundamental rights.4
1.1.2 Power of judicial review of SC
The Apex court has not only been granted with the powers to issue
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
writs or orders or direction but has also been conferred powers to

exercise judicial review to test out the constitutionality of a legislation.
The SC in the present case has an extensive original jurisdiction to test
out the constitutionality of legislation under Art. 32.
The power of judicial review granted to SC and HC was recognized as
a constituent of basic structure doctrine which subjects the legislative
actions to the scrutiny of a superior court whereby the test of a
statute's constitutional validity can never be ousted or excluded, held in
5
the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI
The courts have been of the view that if certain provisions of a
legislation arbitrarily or excessively infringe the fundamental rights of
the petitioners, it cannot contain the quality of being a reasonable
restriction. A balance between the freedom of a person and the social
control permitted to the state has to be achieved.
1.1.3 Test of ‘reasonable restriction’
In the case of State of Madras v. V.G. Row6 the SC lays a prominent
interpretation of the phrase reasonable restriction’ posed on the
exercise of fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the
Constitution as: ‘It is important in this context to bear in mind that the
test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each
individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general
pattern, of reasonableness, can be laid down as applicable to all cases’.
Therefore, it is only suitable to disregard the special status of UAPA &
PMLA and the test of the impugned provisions should be made solely on
the basis of its direct relation to the fundamental rights of the
petitioners and its nature of application.
In the case of Shabnam v. UOI7., the Apex court relying on the
8
landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi v. UOI held that the right to life
and personal liberty has many elements. Human dignity is the first and
foremost which may include the presumption that every person is
innocent until proven guilty, the right of the accused to have a fair trial
as well as a speedy trial, which are all part of human dignity. The SC
further read the principle of reasonableness into the procedure
contemplated by Article 21, holding that it must be right and just and
fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.
Establishing the prima facie infringement of the fundamental rights
of the petitioners and the adequate powers of the SC, the petition
ought to be considered for the further adjudication.
1.2 Right to approach sc under article 32 is a fundamental right
in itself
Art. 32 constitutes the basic right of citizens to seek constitutional
remedies which works on the doctrine ‘Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium’, i.e.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
‘where there is right, there is a remedy’. Courts have time and again
acknowledged the role of SC as ‘Sentinel on the qui vive’. The right to
seek remedy under Art. 32 is contained in Part III of the Constitution of
Indri which makes it a fundamental right in itself.9 Right to approach
SC under Art. 32 is not only conferred as the cornerstone of the
10
democratic edifice raised by the constitution but has also been
recognized as one of the most highly cherished rights11.
It not only confers powers to SC but also lays upon a duty to guard
and uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens of the country. The
SC has affirmed that fundamental rights are not only intended to
protect an individual's basic rights but they are based on high public
policy which makes these rights the essence of the Constitution and
obliges the Apex court to render its duty as its custodian. The court
cannot refuse to entertain or issue an appropriate writ unless it is
provided by the Constitution itself.12 In the present petition, the SC has
a constitutional obligation to discharge its role of the ‘guarantor’ which
is also invested with the petitioners as their fundamental right to seek
constitutional remedy under Art. 32.
1.3 Availability of alternative remedy is no bar to seek writ under
article 32
The power granted to approach SC under Art. 32 and the right to
approach HC under Art. 226 fall in the category of constitutional
remedies whereby both the courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. The
petitioners having the liberty to approach any of the courts, filed a writ
petition under Art. 32 invoking its original jurisdiction and the
contention of availability of alternative remedy cannot become a bar
against the petitioner's right to access SC directly. The Apex court has
acknowledged that it is not necessary to approach HC first and then
knock on the doors of the SC.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble court that Art. 32 is a
fundamental right in itself, whereas Art. 226 is a constitutional right. In
13
the landmark judgment of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras
rejecting the preliminary objection of the respondents, the court held
that SC cannot refuse to entertain writ petitions merely on the ground
of availability of an alternative remedy because it is a fundamental right
and casts a duty on the court to protect the interest of citizens upon
the infringement of their fundamental rights.
In Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nair v. The State of
14
Madras , the SC elaborated on the scope of Art. 32 and rightfully
elucidated, “the view that this court is bound to entertain a petition
under Art. 32 and to decide the same on merits may encourage
litigants to file many petitions under Art. 32, instead of proceeding by
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
way of a suit. But that consideration cannot by itself be a cogent reason

for denying the fundamental right of a person to approach this Court for
the enforcement of his fundamental right which may, prima facie,
appear to have been infringed.”
Considering the arguments presented above, it is contended that the
court ought to hold this petition maintainable as substantial issues of
law are involved which directly call upon the test of reasonability to be
determined for the adjudication of the constitutionality of the various
provisions of UAPA & PMLA.
2. WHETHER THE SPECIAL TWIN CONDITIONS VIOLATES
ARTICLE 14& 21 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDRI?
It is respectfully submitted that section 43D and 45 of the UAPA and
PMLA that deal with the stringent conditions of granting bail are
unconstitutional because they are inconsistent with Part III of the
constitution. The impugned section violates Art. 14 and 21 of the
constitution of Indri which are enshrined in part III of the constitution
and are fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen.
Art. 13(2) states that the State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made in
contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be
void.
In the present case, the rights of the petitioners who are under trials
are being infringed due to the stringent provisions of granting bail
under UAPA and PMLA. Hence, Art. 13(1) bar any law to be above the
fundamental rights, section 43D and 45 of the UAPA and PMLA should
be void.
2.1 Principle of equality
Right to equality is one of the basic features of the constitution and
is an eminent part of fundamental rights provided to the people of
Indri. Equality doesn't mean equal treatment unjustly but instead
implies that all people in similar circumstances may be treated equally
in hopes of equal justice. The right to equal justice of the petitioners is
being hindered due to a long period of incarceration.
15
The case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. UOI , deals with the meaning
and scope of Art. 14 and whether the equal protection of laws have
been infringed under it. The court held that the impugned act made an
arbitrary selection of the company and its shareholders for
discriminating and giving hostile treatment which is an infringement of
Art. 14 and hence the relief shall be granted.
16
In the case of Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu , the
concepts of equality before law and equal protection of law were
differentiated. The SC held that the expression equality before law
means that the state has an obligatory duty to refrain from preforming
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
any act which is discriminatory in nature. And that the term equality
before law is a very dynamic concept with various aspects within itself.
One such aspect present in the provision of equality before law is that
there should be an absence of any privilege for a person against law or
a person being above the law. Another observation was that the term
equal protection of law was introduced in the 14th amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America and it states that there
should not be any privileges or favoritism towards any person or any
group of persons.
The equality clause emphasizes on two things as enshrined in the
Art. 14 and as contended above, that all individuals being governed
under this law shall be given equal treatment and should have equal
protection before the law. The petitioners are being denied such a
principle on the grounds that the special acts have exceptional powers
to override general laws that provide for these equal treatment
provisions, special twin conditions are one such provision override a
principle of equality. Hence, to protect the individual interests of
petitioners being held as undertrials for an elongated period of time
special twin conditions need to be struck down.
2.2 Unreasonable classification & the test of arbitrariness:
While protection of fundamental rights is the most essential part of
the constitution, our constitution is known for balancing rigidity and
flexibility. Hence, right to equality provides a loophole where if a law
can substantiate a reasonable classification based on intelligible
differentia with a rational nexus for the object to be sought by the
classification, then a law can override the principle but such statute
need not be arbitrary or discriminatory and violate Art. 14 at any cost.
In Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. UOI17, the court struck down the
special twin conditions holding them violative of the Art. 14 and 21 of
the constitution. It was held that sec. 45 of PMLA stands violative of
Art. 14 and 21 on grounds that its application on granting of bail is
manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory and unjust to the undertrials. It
also included that this section included punishments for part A offences
which had nothing to do with money laundering which violated a
person's right and was discriminatory.
There are several succeeding judgments that followed the precedent
set by the Nikesh Tarachand case (Id.) wherein the courts reiterated
the observations laid in the case and upheld the striking down of the
amendments made in section 45 regarding the special twin conditions.
In Magan Lal Chaggan Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
18
Bombay a special procedure by two sec. of the statute to evict the
occupants of government or municipal premises. Mere fact of
classification does not release the special law from the equality clause.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A law more drastic and prejudicial will override the equality clause and
thus is in violation of Art. 14. Furthermore, the statute becomes invalid
if it fails to meet the reasonable classification but if the statute provides
guidelines, express or implied to the executive to perform the test of
reasonability only that part of action will be invalid and not the entire
statute.
In D.S. Nakara v. UOI19 it was held that there was an unreasonable
classification without intelligible difference and without a rationale
nexus for the object to be sought by the pension scheme. The provision
made unnecessary classification between those who retired prior and
after the application of the provisions and made two classes of persons
without intelligible differentia. The court also observed that the
provision was either arbitrary in nature because of the unreasonable
classification or it was discriminatory to pensioners retiring prior, both
situations violated the right to equality and stand violative of Art. 14
hence were struck down.
In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi20, it was held “Wherever
therefore there is arbitrariness in state action whether it be of
legislature or of the executive or of “authority” under article 12, article
14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such state action.
In fact, the concept of reasonable and non-arbitrariness pervades the
entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through
the whole of the fabric of the Constitution.”
In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu21, a “new doctrine” came into
perspective namely the “arbitrariness test”. This followed the
contention of the court that Art. 14 includes a right against
arbitrariness against any state action. This eliminated any vagueness
on part of the state's action and violation of fundamental rights on their
part.
22
The case of K R Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu deals with
striking down the 1986 Act because it classified horse racing as a public
purpose and interest of the general public where there was no such
benefit to the public and it was simply gaming according to the 1974
Act and such gambling shall be prevented. The court held that the state
government cannot take over the functioning of the race club and the
provisions in the 1986 Act were arbitrary and discriminatory and
needed to be struck down as a violation of the Art. 14 as it fails the test
of arbitrariness.
The statute of special twin conditions makes an unreasonable
classification between undertrials under statutes such as PMLA, UAPA,
NDPS etc. UAPA is the successor to the stringent statues of TADA and
POTA as they were violative of fundamental rights as well, but UAPA
seems to have failed to be a just law that upholds the right of equality.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the period of incarceration is limited up to 180 days, the

undertrials such as in the case of KA Najeeb (supra) have spent more
than 5 years in prison without a trial, unless a breach of fundamental
right is brought up.
So, the only option an undertrial has to get bail is to apply for his
fundamental rights against this draconian law which is what the
petitioners are doing in the present case. Their bail applications have
been rejected countless times citing the restrictions posed by the
special twin conditions which makes an unreasonable classification of
undertrials and is arbitrary in nature which violates Art. 14 directly.
Hence, they should be granted bail and the special twin condition's
provisions shall be overridden by the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the constitution.
23
After the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI , the law has witnessed
Art. 21 in a new light where its powers are not restricted to protection
against executive action but also extend against legislation depriving a
person of personal liberty.
2.3 Right to speedy & fair trial and grant of bail:
Right to speedy trial is not a new right. It is embedded in our
24
constitution in terms of Art. 14 and 21 thereof. The court in Sanjay
25
Chandra v. CBI held that the accused shall be granted bail subject to
certain conditions observing that detaining undertrial prisoners for an
indefinite period violated Art. 21 of the constitution. While considering
the grant of bail, various aspects were also taken into account such as
severity of charge and punishment, relieving the accused of
imprisonment, relieving the burden of the state, pending trial period,
the accused's responsibility to submit to jurisdiction and to be in
attendance of the court whenever his presence is required, not to
threaten witnesses etc. In order to ensure and safeguard the process.
In the State of Kerala v. Raneef26, a question of violation of Art. 21
of constitution arose when there seemed to be a delay in trial and the
accused had already spent 66 days in judicial custody and the court
found it one of the most basic and important factors in consideration of
the bail.
27
In UOI v. KA Najeeb , it upheld the state of Kerala's ruling that bail
may be granted to the accused because he has spent more than half of
his sentence in prison without even a trial proving his guilt or innocence
and that investigation still had pending witnesses and accounts which
would keep him incarcerated for a long period of time impending his
right of speedy trial under Art. 21 and violating his personal liberty.
28
In Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. UOI , it was held that right to speedy
trial under Art. 21 is fundamental right and courts can grant bail to the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
accused even after limitations set by special provisions like sec. 43D.
29
In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar , it was held that if a
person is being deprived of his life and personal liberty under Art. 21,
the procedure must be reasonably fair and just and shall in way be
ambiguous and arbitrary and that the state cannot avoid its duty to
provide a speedy trial to the undertrials in incarceration.
In the recent case of Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab30, the appeal
of petitioner for grant of default bail was allowed citing that the right to
default bail is not simply a statutory right under the provisions of the
code but is also a part of the procedure established by law under Art.
21 of the Constitution of Indri and such right shall be granted after
fulfilling of the first proviso of the sec 167(2).
Hence, following the above precedents, in the present case the
petitioners have been languishing in jail for about 80 days with the
investigation still pending and their right of speedy trial of petitioners
are being hindered and thus their right to life and personal liberty are
being violated under Art. 21 of the constitution of Indri.
3. WHETHER SECTION 50 OF PMLA VIOLATES PROVISIONS OF
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
3.1 Investigating officers under section 50 shall be considered as
‘police officers’
Evidence in a trial constitutes the most significant tool in
determining the conviction of a person for which the IEA, 1872
supplemented by the provisions of CrPC, serves as the principal statute
governing various legal aspects related to the same but with the
enactment of special criminal statutes like PMLA & UAPA, the
conventional and well-established rules of evidence are being
encroached upon which not only poses a threat to the safety of legal
rights of the undertrials but also stands violative of the fundamental
rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution of Indri. In the instant
case, having been summoned under section 50 of PMLA and on staying
under 15-day custody with the office of ED, the petitioners have
challenged the constitutionality and the vires of the sec 50 of PMLA as
being violative of sec. 25 & 26, 27 of the IEA.31
Sec. 25 & 26 of IEA provide that no confession made to a police
officer shall have the capacity of being admissible in a court of law
which is supplemented by sec 161 & sec 162 of CrPC. On the other
hand, sec 27 of IEA, lays out how much information received from the
accused may be proved. The general motive behind the inclusion of
these provisions is to safeguard the fundamental rights of the
undertrials and to prevent the abuse of machinery of law at the hands
of investigating officers.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 50 of PMLA however, renders immoderate powers to the

authorized officers to issue a summons, call for documents and record
statements on oath, whereby they can summon ‘any person’ as they
deem fit for the purpose of investigation. The most repressive part of
this section is that every such proceeding will be deemed as a ‘judicial
proceeding’ within the meaning of sec. 193 and sec. 228 of IPC.
Therefore, statements recorded by the authorized officers can be used
against an accused in a court of law which directly violates the well-
settled principles established under sec. 25, 26 & 27 of the IEA.
With the unchecked empowerment of the authorized officers under
the Act, it is always a contention that investigating officers may force or
coerce a person into stating against himself, which can be used against
32
him in a court of law. In the case of Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani the
Hon'ble court of law held that compelled testimony is evidence
procured not merely by physical threats or violence but by psychic
torture, atmospheric or environmental pressure, tiring interrogative
proximity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and alike. The court
highlighted the position of a police officer and held that a person in
authority over the accused and the insistence on answering is a form of
pressure.
Thus, sec. 25, 26, and 27 of IEA which negate the admissibility of
such confessions as made to the police officer have been acknowledged
by the courts of laying a check & balance on the activities of a police
officer. Even if it is contended that PMLA is a special statute, the
application of sec. 25, 26 & 27 of IEA cannot be overlooked. It has to
be seen through a broader spectrum considering its aim to prevent the
blatant abuse at the hand of the executive machinery of a country.
Besides, authorized officers under sec. 50 shall be deemed to be
considered as police officers under the ambit of sec. 25 of IEA, because
of the similarity of their powers and discharge of function. In the case
33
of S. Fernandez v. The State , the observations and the decision held
by Calcutta HC is a notable one. The court took reference of a wide
range of precedents and held that as sec. 25 of the IEA was enacted to
ensure the purity of the administration of justice & Customs, the
officers who exercise powers substantially analogous to that of a police
officer, should be limited by the provision of sec. 25 under IEA.
34
The Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose , It was held by Garth, C.J.
as: “in construing the 25th sec. of the Evidence Act of 1872, I consider
that the term ‘police officer’ should be read not in any strict technical
sense but according to the more comprehensive and popular meaning.”
Another observation of Garth, C.J., runs thus: “I think it better in
construing a sec. such as the 25th which was intended as a wholesome
protection to the accused to construe it in its widest and most popular
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
signification”. In another case of Gopal Das v. The State35, the court

held that the broader perspective of sec. 25 under IEA should be
interpreted to ensure its underlying intent and purpose.
In the case of Mohammed Fasrin v. State36, while trying the case
involving the admissibility of a confession to the officers empowered
under NDPS Act, the court observed that evidence given by an accused
while being in custody constitutes a weak piece of evidence and there
must be some corroborative evidence to support it. But in the instant
case, sec. 50 of PMLA renders the investigation a status of judicial
proceeding by which all the confessions or statements recorded become
a concrete piece of evidence that can be used against them. The
authorized officers, in this case, had powers that gave them an upper
hand in laying a case around the accused. And, owing to the reality of
police brutality and coerced recording of statements, it is rarely
possible that the accused tried under these stringent Acts get a chance
at a fair investigation which is a part of their fundamental rights.
37
In the landmark judgment of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab , the
SC while observing the validity of sec. 15 of the TADA, laid out certain
guidelines to be followed by the officers recording the statements of the
accused as a part of an investigation. And, here it is pertinent to note
that nothing of the sort has been provided under PMLA. The SC
specifically lays emphasis on the existence of certain safeguards when a
confession is either reduced to writing or recorded on any mechanical
device in order to avoid the possibility of extortion of false confessions
at the hands of officers empowered therein. The court was rational in
placing the reality check by stating that even though evidence recorded
under sec 15 is admissible, it is left to the judicial wisdom of the court
trying out the case to verify its authenticity.
Under sec 50 of PMLA, the powers of the authorized officers are not
only broader than the powers of officers under sec 15 of TADA, but it
also lacks safeguards to ensure voluntary submissions of the persons
summoned. Lack of safeguards attracts a lack of accountability,
rendering the officers in a much more independent and unsupervised
position over the accused. The dissenting opinion of the learned judge,
38
K. Ramaswamy in this case is of utmost importance to test out the
validity of the powers vested in the officers under sec 50 of PMLA which
is as follows; “Conferment of judicial powers in higher degree of the
police will erode public confidence in the administration of justice”.
Invoking its jurisdiction under sec 12 of the Protection of Human
Rights Act, 1993 the NHRC expressed its unanimous opinion that the
special laws were against the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence and encroached the constitutionality of the guaranteed
39
rights. While the arrest rate of ED is fairly high, its conviction rate is
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
majorly low. Therefore, for the reasons cited above sec 50 fails in its
purpose to secure a fair investigation for the accused owing to its
unreasonable and unfair set of clauses.
3.2 Persons summoned under sec 50 shall be considered
‘accused’
The compulsory attendance to the summons issued under sec. 50 of
PMLA and the compelling legal obligation to state the truth or produce
documents violates the right of the petitioners against self-
incrimination granted under Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution of Indri and
also infringes provisions of Sec. 91 of CrPC.
Based on the principle, “Nemo tenetur prodere accussare seipsum”
i.e. “No man has to accuse himself”, the right of a person against self-
incrimination finds its roots under Art. 20(3) and Art. 21 of the
Constitution. Every accused has a right to remain silent and be treated
fair under his investigation of trial but sec 50 of PMLA binds the persons
summoned to state the truth, which is unfair, arbitrary, and harsh on
their rights.
Through a plethora of judgments, it has been the observation of the
courts that investigating authorities under PMLA do not function in the
capacity of police officers and neither a person called upon through
summons can be deemed to be an accused. The reason stated for not
disclosing the capacity with which a person is summoned i.e. as a
witness or as an accused is that it is too early to render them a status
40
of any such nature. Even if we consider this argument, in the present
case it does not apply. In the instant case, it is transparent from the
facts that the petitioners were subjected to various incriminating
evidence against them in the interrogation which itself makes them
witnesses against themselves which outrightly violates their
fundamental rights.
With the powers granted under sec. 50 of PMLA, an authorized officer
can record statements on oath and call for the production of
documents, under which sec. 50(3) binds the persons to state the truth
and sec. 50(4) renders it as a judicial proceeding. Now, upon being
summoned, if a person discloses false information, they can be charged
for perjury, whereas if they state the truth, it amounts to self-
incrimination. A person's silence suffers contempt of the court. All of
these provisions are draconian considering the nature of the offense.
The provisions support testimonial compulsions and violate the very
basic constitutional principles of natural justice and the right to a fair
trial.41
4. WHETHER THE REVERSE BURDEN OF PROOF VIOLATES THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED?
4.1 Presumption of innocence compromised
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Owing to the special twin conditions which are stringent and their
implementation is more binding than general statutes due to its
overriding effects, the immediate denial of bail or the apprehension of
reverse burden of proof on the accused is discriminatory, arbitrary and
negatively effects the idea of the procedure established by law under
article 21. The presumption of guilt violates the principle of right to fair
trial and the right to remain silent affecting the core fundamental rights
of the citizens.
The principle that a person should be considered innocent unless and
until proven guilty is of fundamental importance of procedural fairness
in the criminal law. In plain sense, according to the provisions of
reverse burden of proof, instead of the prosecution proving the guilt of
the accused it is the accused that has to prove his innocence. This
reverse onus of proof burdens the accused to testify his innocence
concerning self-incrimination or infringing his right to remain silent.
The ‘doctrine of presumption of innocence?’ here is in contrast with
provisions of sec. 43D (5) and sec 43E of UAPA. According to sec 43E, if
the accused is charged under sec 15 of the act and substances such as
arms, ammunition or explosives are discharged from him, the accused
will be considered guilty unless he rebuts the presumption. Similarly,
as per sec 43D (5) if the grounds are provided to the court to believe
that accusation is prima facie true, the accused will be denied the bail
and the presumption to prove his innocence will then lie on him.
Presumption of innocence is a standard component of fair trial rights
contained in international human rights treaties such as in Art. 11 (3)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Art. 14 (2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of which Indri is a
member. It is inseparably related to the burden of proof. The party that
bears the onus/responsibility to prove a certain fact during the course
of a trial is termed to have burden of proof according to sec 101 of IEA.
The right of self-incrimination under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution of
Indri protects the accused from testifying against himself i.e. during
such circumstances the burden of proving the innocence would lie on
the accused rather than the prosecution to prove his innocence.
According to Art. 20(3)- “no one can be compelled to be a witness
against himself.” according to this provision:
a. the accused is presumed to be innocent,
b. it is for the prosecution to establish his guilt and
c. the accused need not make any statement against his will
42
The court in the case of K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra
observed that, “In India as it is in England, there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused as a general rule, and it is the duty of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused.”
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prominently in Woolmington v. DPP43, discussing over one golden

thread of presumption rule, the court stated- “it is always to be seen
that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt
subject to the defense of insanity and subject also to any statutory
exception. If at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a
reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the
prosecution or the prisoner, the prosecution has not made out the case
and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.”
Further, sec 43E of the act which puts the burden of proof on the
accused deprives a person of his liberty, reputation, and dignity. As and
when the prosecution just has to show prima facie evidence it eases
their work to a substantial degree as it only includes providing the
actus reus of the crime. The guilt of the accused is presumed based on
minimal evidence and the fact that accused has to establish absence of
mens rea makes UAPA arbitrary and unreasonable as the failure to
discharge the presumption of guilt on accused will result in his own
conviction which further stands in contravention to fundamental liberty
and human dignity of the accused raised under article 21 of the
constitution.
44
In the case of Sanjay Chandra v. CBI , the SC observed that “there
are better chances of preparing and presenting the case by the accused
while he is out on bail.” And as providing the prima facie evidence is
much probable, the accused finds himself incarcerated as the onus of
proving his innocence is much burdensome. Drawing towards the
present case, there are sufficient facts which can be used as proving
the prima facie guilt of the petitioners which will put the burden of
proof on their shoulders and failure to rebut will lead to their conviction
which again infringes the right to fair trial.
In the famous case of R v. Oaks45 case, Justice Dickson was of the
view, “the presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty
and human dignity of any and every person and if an accused bears the
burden of disproving on a balance of probabilities an essential element
of an offence, it would be possible to convict him despite the existence
of a reasonable doubt”.
In another foreign case, Coffin v. United States46, the presumption of
innocence is “The undoubted axiomatic and elementary and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of criminal law.”
In Seema Silk and Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement47, it was
observed- “Reverse burden as also statutory presumptions can be
raised in several statutes for example, the Negotiable Instruments Act,
Prevention of Corruption Act, TADA, etc. Presumption is raised only
when certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution. The
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
accused in such an event would be entitled to show that he has not

violated the provisions of the Act.” Thus, it is explicit that unless the
foundational facts are not established by the prosecution, a mere
charge under a statute would not be enough for the presumption to
apply.”
The establishment of the prima facie burden falls on the prosecution
however in accordance to sec. 43E, the accused is beforehand
presumed to be guilty which thus falls in contravention to the
presumption of guilt and directs towards statutory omission.
4.2 Fails the objective of UAPA
It is to be noted that sec 43D(5) and sec 43E hold an arbitrary
balance between societal interest and the rights of an accused. These
provisions focus more on assessing the prima facie guilt of the accused
and if the guilt is established it will create an irrebuttable presumption
in favor of the state than the accused who can jeopardize the suit. This
might authorize the wrong implementation of the provision and lead to
the detention of people who are not capable of being a risk to society or
tampering with the evidence.
It is also contended that as proving the prima facie accusation is
straightforward, the “proviso to sec 43D (5) makes it difficult to grant
bail which in some instances leads to low conviction and high-rate of
detention. As per NCRB report, among all persons who have been
incriminated under UAPA only 2.2% are found guilty.
The fact that citizens find themselves being incarcerated for a long
period and some even die in incarceration evidently directs towards not
only the breach of the right to life & dignity but also the arbitrary use
and failure of the actual objectives of the Act.
As mentioned in Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State of NCT of Delhi (supra)
“The requirement of being satisfied that an accused is not guilty under
TADA or POTA meant that the court must have reasons to prima facie
exclude guilt whereas the requirement of believing an accusation to be
prima facie true would mean that the court must have reason to prima
facie accept guilt of the accused persons, even if on broad
probabilities.”
In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has
to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the
opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under
the other special enactments. By its very nature, the expression “prima
facie true” could mean that the evidence against the accused concerned
in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted or
rebutted by other evidence. It becomes sufficient on the face to
establish a given fact or the chain of facts that can constitute the stated
offence easily. Due to which it leads to substantial detention or
incarceration and low rates of convictions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India48, wherein it was

held that “no one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when
undertrial perforce remains in jail giving rise to possible situations that
may justify invocation of Art. 21.”
The provision of reversal of the burden of proof does not satisfy the
Oakes test. The Supreme Court had affirmed in Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab (supra), that the application of Sec. 20(8) of Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, which was a very stringent
provision for granting bail, could be justified on the presumption that
the trial of the accused would take place without undue delay. Contrary
to this, the accused generally spends many years in jail as an undertrial
prisoner when charged under UAPA. Evidently, the objective of the Act
is being achieved at the cost of injustice to the majority of the people
charged under this Act.
It is respectfully proposed that a criminal justice system which
believes in using reverse burdens in order to promote public welfare
fails to recognize that such a measure is in fact self-defeating and does
not reflect a society that believes in equity and justice. As Paul Roberts
writes, “legal rules relating to the burden and standard of proof in
criminal trials promote individual freedom and are bulwarks against
oppression. They are not to be dispensed with, either directly or by
more circuitous means.”
Owing to the above arguments it shall be contended that the reverse
burden of proof that is issued upon the accused by sec. 43E is already
violating the principle of “innocent until proven guilty” and taking an
accused guilty due to prime facie allegations coming to be true. The
petitioners are already being denied bail on unwarranted principles of
special twin conditions and subsequently they are to defend themselves
against the prime facie accusations found through investigation even
before a trial commences. Hence, this accusation and the responsibility
on the accused to defend himself in a court of law violates the
fundamental rights.
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and
the authorities cited, it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Supreme
Court of Indri may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1) That, the writ petition filed under Article 32 ought to be held
maintainable
2) That, the impugned provisions of UAPA & PMLA be considered
unconstitutional
And/or, pass any other order as it deems fit in the interest of justice,
equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Petitioner shall duty bound forever pray.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
———
1
Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P., (2003) 4 SCC 104
2
Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. UOI, (2000) 6 SCC 715 : AIR 2000 SC 2544
3
Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India, 2010 SCC OnLine SC 411
4
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI, (1984) 3 SCC 161
5
L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, (1997) 3 SCC 261
6
(1952) 1 SCC 410 : AIR 1952 SC 196
7
(2015) 6 SCC 702
8
(1978) 1 SCC 248
9
Bodhisattawa v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490 : AIR 1996 SC 922
10
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, UP, AIR 1963 SC 996
11
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (regd.) Sindri V. UOI, (1981) 1 SCC 568 : AIR 1981 SC
344
12
Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457
13
1950 SCC 436 : AIR 1950 SC 124
14
1 JILI (1958-1959) 421
15
1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC 41
16
(1992) 2 SCC 643
17
(2017) 13 Scale 6098
18
(1974) 2 SCC 402
19
(1983) 1 SCC 305
20
(1981) 1 SCC 722
21
(1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555
22
(1996) 2 SCC 226
23
(1978) 1 SCC 248
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
24
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 5 Scale 617
25
(2012) 1 SCC 40
26
(2011) 1 SCC 784
27
(2021) 3 SCC 713
28
(1996) 2 SCC 616
29
(1980) 1 SCC 108
30
(2020) 10 SCC 616
31
Moot Proposition, p. 12.
32
(1978) 2 SCC 424
33
AIR 1953 Cal 219
34
(1) ILR 1 Cal 207
35
AIR 1959 P&H 113
36
(2019) 8 SCC 811
37
(1994) 3 SCC 569
38
Id.
39
Kunal Ambasta, Designed for Abuse: Special Criminal Laws and Rights of the Accused, 1, 6
-9 (2020) https://www-scconline-
com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/Members/SearchResult.aspx (Last accessed on 21st March,
2022 at 8.00 p.m.)
40
Vakamulla Chandrashekhar v. Enforcement Directorate, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12810
41
Sneha Hooda, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: An Analysis from Lens of
Principles of Law of Evidence, Vol. 3 International Journal of Law Management & Humanities
997, 1005-1009 (2020), https://www.ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/Prevention -of-Money-
Laundering-Act-2002-An-Analysis-from- Lens-of-Principles -of-Law-of-Evidence.pdf.
42
AIR 1962 SC 605
43
(1935) UKHL 1
44
(2012) 1 SCC 40
45
[1986] 1 SCR 103
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
46
156 US 432 (1895) : 39 L.Ed. 481
47
(2008) 5 SCC 580
48
(1996) 2 SCC 616
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/
regulation/ circular/ notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be
liable in any manner by reason of any mistake or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice
rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All
disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The authenticity of
this text must be verified from the original source.

Best Team Memorial Petitioner Nlujaa Gurjeet Singh Memoria

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Best Team Memorial Petitioner Nlujaa Gurjeet Singh Memoria

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Monday, June 17, 2024

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indri

Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State of NCT of Delhi 32

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

regard to the substantial nature of constitutional issues involved in the

writs or orders or direction but has also been conferred powers to

way of a suit. But that consideration cannot by itself be a cogent reason

While the period of incarceration is limited up to 180 days, the

Sec. 50 of PMLA however, renders immoderate powers to the

signification”. In another case of Gopal Das v. The State35, the court

Prominently in Woolmington v. DPP43, discussing over one golden

accused in such an event would be entitled to show that he has not

In Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India48, wherein it was

You might also like