Mission Impossible Karl Neufelds Holy Wa

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38
Mission Impossible: Karl Neufeld’s Holy War

Propaganda Trip to Medina (1915)
Martin Strohmeier
Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cyprus,
Nicosia, Cyprus
m.strohmeier@ucy.ac.cy
Abstract
This article deals with Karl Neufeld’s trip to Medina, undertaken in the framework of
German efforts to incite insurrections with the aim of destabilizing British rule in the
Muslim world. His specific task was to spread propaganda in the Hijaz and the Sudan;
he made it only to Medina, from where he was expelled by the Ottoman government
after a stay of six weeks. Neufeld’s diary on which this article is mainly based is the only
source about how Holy War propaganda was actually disseminated. Therefore, it goes
beyond the existing literature and adds new insight into the discussion of German
expeditions organized to counter British influence in the Middle East during the First
World War. In contrast to most of the other enterprises, Neufeld accomplished certain
goals, which does not, however, change the overall picture that the “jihād made in
Germany” was a failure.
Materials used include files from the archive of the German Foreign Office (Politisches
Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt: pa-aa), the Sudan Archive Durham (Durham University
Library: sad), and narrative sources, as well as the pertinent research literature.
Keywords
Germany – Ottoman Empire – First World War – jihād – Holy War – Hijaz – Medina
– Karl Neufeld
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/15700607-61020003 Downloaded from Brill.com03/13/2021 12:24:33PM
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the cc by by 4.0 license. via free access
2 strohmeier
1 Introduction: the First World War and the “jihād made in

Germany”*
Islam played a major role in the strategies of the main opponents in the
Middle East in World War I: the Central Powers (Ottoman Empire, Germany,
Austria-Hungary), on the one hand, and the Entente (Britain, France,
Russia) on the other hand. Already in the late nineteenth century, Sultan
ᶜAbdülḥamīd, based upon his claim to be caliph of the entire Muslim umma,
had developed Pan-Islam (ittiḥād-i islām) as state doctrine. Although primar-
ily espousing Turkish nationalism, the Young Turk leadership also utilized
Pan-Islam for wartime mobilization. In November 1914 the Sheykh ül-Islām
proclaimed the Holy War (jihād). The German government was seeking ways
to destabilize Russian and British rule in the Near East and Western Asia by
inciting Muslim revolt (also known as the “jihād made in Germany”).1 Britain
countered these policies by advocating an Arab caliphate and stirring up the
Arabs against Ottoman rule.2
In the summer of 1915, when Karl Neufeld’s mission, described in detail
below, was underway, the military and political situation in the Middle East
presented a mixed picture. The fortunes of war had not yet favoured either
side decisively. Ottoman forces had suffered a crushing defeat in the Caucasus
and Eastern Anatolia in early 1915. At the Dardanelles, the campaign of the
Allies had failed and warfare had stalled. In Mesopotamia, Britain won minor
victories over the Ottomans (before they besieged and defeated British forces
* Thanks are due to the reviewers and especially Rainer Brunner for his helpful comments.
1 From the vast literature on this subject suffice it to name just a few titles: Christiaan Snouck
Hurgronje, The Holy War “Made in Germany” (New York and London: Putnam’s Sons, 1915).
Jihad and Islam in World War I. Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck
Hurgronje’s “Holy War Made in Germany”, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Leiden: Leiden University
Press, 2016). Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, “Djihad ‘Made in Germany’: Der Streit um den Heiligen
Krieg 1914–1915”, Sozial.Geschichte 18 (2003), 7–34. Tilman Lüdke, Jihad made in Germany.
Ottoman and German propaganda and intelligence operations in the First World War (Münster:
lit, 2005). Mustafa Aksakal, “‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman origins of the 1914
Jihad”, War in History 18:2 (2011), 184–99. – German propagandists such as Eugen Mittwoch,
the head of of the “Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient” (Intelligence Bureau for the East) since
May 1916, distinguished between a “Holy War” (jihād) of Muslims for their religion and a holy
war in which Turkey and Germany fought for their survival as nations in a “world of foes”:
Deutschland, die Türkei und der Heilige Krieg (Berlin: Verlag Kameradschaft, 1914), 3–4. For a
recent overview of the historical roots and modern use of the term jihād, see Josef van Ess,
Dschihad gestern und heute (Berlin-Boston: de Gruyter, 2012).
2 Timothy J. Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule 1920–1925: The Sharifian Solution
(London: Frank Cass, 2003), 313–14.
10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Downloaded from Brill.com03/13/2021 12:24:33PM
via free access
mission impossible 3
in Kūt al-ᶜAmāra in April 1916) and repulsed the first Turkish attack on the
Suez Canal. In Egypt, then a British protectorate, there were fears that the
Sultan-Caliph’s call to jihād would fall on fertile ground. On the other hand,
contacts between the sons of the Sharīf of Mecca, Ḥusayn ibn ᶜAlī, with Arab
secret societies and negotiations with Britain (McMahon-Ḥusayn correspond-
ence) indicated that the Hashemites might support the Entente by proclaim-
ing an uprising against their nominal Ottoman overlords.3
2 The Hijaz in the First World War and German propaganda cam-
paigns in the Middle East
In the Hijaz, the situation had become tense since the outbreak of the First
World War, arousing a sense of insecurity in the Sharīf.4 From the outbreak
of the war, the government urged Ḥusayn to supply troops and participate in
the jihād, testing his loyalty while at the same time depriving him of Bedouin
fighters he could have used against the Ottomans. The government’s demand
became a contentious issue for many months (summer 1914-February 1916)
until finally, after the first unsuccessful attack on the Suez Canal, Ḥusayn
promised to contribute soldiers from the Hijaz for a second expedition, but
that was never to happen due to the Hashemites’ rift with the Ottomans.
Yet another factor at work concerned one target group of German propa-
ganda: the Bedouins who constituted the majority of the population in the
Hijaz. According to T.E. Lawrence, an admittedly unreliable and biased wit-
ness, the Germans, after their jihād-propaganda had failed, resorted to incit-
ing “national” feelings among them, thereby giving rise to two developments:
the Arab revolt and an “intensely national tribal opinion”.5 Furthermore,
3 Eliezer Tauber, The Arab Movements in World War I (London: Frank Cass, 1993).
4 The situation in the Hijaz is discussed in more detail by Joshua Teitelbaum, The Rise and Fall of
the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia (London: C. Hurst&Co., 2001). Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young
Turks. Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918 (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 185–92. Ernest C. Dawn, From Ottomanism to
Arabism. Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana-Chicago-London: University of
Illinois Press, 1973), 16–30. Martin Strohmeier, “Fakhri (Fahrettin) Paşa and the end of Ottoman
rule in Medina (1916–1919)”, Turkish Historical Review 4 (2013), 192–223.
5 The Arab Bulletin 32, 26 November 1916, in The Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in
Cairo, 1916–1919, ed. Robin Bidwell, vol. I (London: Archive Editions, 1986), 483. Specifically,
Lawrence claimed that Bedouins had become aware of the “principle of nationality” due to
the fighting between nations in the Great War. On the other hand, he argued that a nation-
state was anathema to tribes, which is in line with conventional wisdom that tribal groups are
almost immune to nationalism.
Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

via free access
4 strohmeier
while German-Ottoman cooperation in general was not without tension,

German enterprises were particularly viewed with suspicion in the Hijaz.
On the one hand, the Ottoman leadership did not want their ally to become
aware of the empire’s weakness there.6 On the other hand, German presence
in and around the Holy Cities could provoke local reactions, especially since
German-Ottoman cooperation was denounced in Ḥusayn ibn ᶜAlī’s news-
paper, al-Qibla, which likened German influence in the Ottoman Empire to
colonial rule.7 This, then, was the background (perhaps largely unknown to
him) against which Neufeld undertook his trip to Medina.
The “Memorandum for the revolutionization of the Islamic territories of our
foes”, penned by Baron Max von Oppenheim8 in October 1914, constituted a
plan of action for Turco-German war strategies.9 The Holy War declared against
the Entente would lead to throwing off “alien rule”. To this aim, apart from war-
fare proper, mixed propaganda and military campaigns would be carried out in
6 In this, the Ottomans seem to have succeeded because Medina in particular was for
foreign powers a “black hole” from where they received hardly any information: Kayalı,
Arabs and Young Turks, 160.
7 M. Talha Çiçek, “Visions of Islamic Unity: A comparison of Djemal Pasha’s al-Sharq and
Sharīf Ḥusayn’s al-Qibla periodicals”, WI 54 (2014), 460–82, here 479–80.
8 There has been much controversy about Oppenheim’s role, which varies from spiritual
father of the Holy War (“Abu Jihad”) to a largely unpolitical Orient enthusiast whose real
interest lay in archaeology and ethnography. The former interpretation is supported by,
among others, Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, “Max von Oppenheim und der Heilige Krieg. Zwei
Denkschriften zur Revolutionierung islamischer Gebiete 1914 und 1940”, Sozial.Geschichte
19 (2004), 28–59, here 31. Gottfried Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg. Flugblätter
und Flugschriften in arabischer, persischer und osmanisch-türkischer Sprache aus einer
Sammlung der Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert
(Frankfurt a.M.-Bern-New York-Paris: Peter Lang, 1990), 30. This opinion is disputed by
Salvador Oberhaus, “Zum wilden Aufstande entflammen”. Die deutsche Ägyptenpolitik
1914–1918. Ein Beitrag zur Propagandageschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges. Ph.D. diss.
Universität Düsseldorf 2006 (www.d-nb.info/98320537X/34) (accessed May 15, 2013). The
latter view of an apolitical Orient devotee is presented by Wilhelm Treue, “Max Freiherr
von Oppenheim – Der Archäologe und die Politik”, Historische Zeitschrift 209 (1969),
37–74. A middle course is taken by Martin Kröger, “Revolution als Programm. Ziele und
Realität deutscher Orientpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg”, in Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung,
Wahrnehmung, Analyse, ed. Wolfgang Michalka (Weyarn: Seehamer Verlag, 1997), 366–91.
9 Alexander Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht. Geheime Dienste und Propaganda im
deutsch-österreichisch-türkischen Bündnis 1914–1918 (Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau, 2012),
229–30; Marc Hanisch, “Max Freiherr von Oppenheim und die Revolutionierung der
islamischen Welt als anti-imperiale Befreiung von oben”, in Erster Weltkrieg und Dschihad.
Die Deutschen und die Revolutionierung des Orients, eds. Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch
(München: Oldenbourg, 2014), 13–38, here 16–17.

via free access
certain areas of the Middle East.10 The expeditions of Werner Otto von Hentig,
Oskar von Niedermayer, Fritz Klein,11 and Wilhelm Wassmuss attempted,
with mixed results, to get Afghanistan on the side of the Central Powers or to
carry out operations together with indigenous tribes in Western Iran against
British and Russian troops.12 Another form of propaganda and intelligence
work would be conducted from consulates or centres to be established in
several cities of the region.13 With regard to South-West Arabia, according to
Oppenheim’s scheme, German posts facilitating such work were to be cre-
ated in Mecca and Medina, but also in places such as Maʿān, Jidda, Yanbuʿ and
Ḥudayda.14 British and Italian footholds across the Red Sea in Sudan, Eritrea,
and Abyssinia clashed with German interests further south, thus they were tar-
get areas for such operations. Oppenheim favoured assigning two prominent
Austrian Oriental experts, Rudolf Carl von Slatin15 and Alois Musil (the latter
of Czech origin),16 to lead rebellions in Egypt and win over Bedouins of central
Arabia.17
The German expeditions to South-West Arabia had several tasks in com-
mon. They were to assess public opinion and the loyalties of those in power, to
develop and spread propaganda for the Central Powers, and to recruit agents
to dispatch to Sudan and Abyssinia to carry out agitation against Britain.
There were at least two such missions. In October/November 1914, the Arabist
10 In that context, foreign agents, too, were to be hired, evidence for which is contained in
a document (not seen) in the Prime Minister’s Archive/Başbakanlık Arşivi: “Regarding
the issue whether Mehmed Türki Efendi [perhaps Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Tūnisī al-Turkī,
mentioned below], currently in the field, should be given leave in order to spread
propaganda for Baron Unihaim [most probably Oppenheim, ms] in Medina”, Maarif
Nezâreti Mektubi Kalemi, Dosya 1211, Gömlek 56, 6.9.1915.
11 Veit Veltzke, Unter Wüstensöhnen. Die deutsche Expedition Klein im Ersten Weltkrieg, 2nd
updated ed. (Berlin: Nicolai, 2015).
12 Loth and Hanisch, Erster Weltkrieg und Dschihad, 10. Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht,
250ff.
13 Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht, 37: “…im Ersten Weltkrieg in Deutschland (besass)
Auslandspropaganda einen geheimdienstlichen Charakter”, illustrating the dilemma
in which Neufeld found himself, namely publicity versus secrecy. On Oppenheim’s
definition of propaganda, see Tim Epkenhans, “Geld darf keine Rolle spielen”, Archivum
Ottomanicum 19 (2001), 120–63, here 121.
14 Ibid., 121–25, 135; cf. the studies of Oberhaus and Kröger, cited above, note 8. Donald M.
McKale, War by Revolution. Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the era of
World War I (Kent, Ohio and London: Kent State University Press, 1998).
15 1857–1932, served in the British administration in the Sudan from 1879 onwards. Captive of
the Mahdiyya 1884–95; he became Inspector-General of the Sudan in 1900 (until 1914).
16 1868–1944, theologian by education and explorer of Arabia.
17 Epkenhans, “Geld darf keine Rolle spielen”, 132–33.

via free access
6 strohmeier
Bernhard Moritz made it to Jidda, where he managed to distribute propaganda

materials.18 Although it is true that the writer Max Roloff, at the same time
as Moritz, was entrusted with a mission to Mecca, disguised as a Muslim, it is
highly probable that he never travelled to the Hijaz and that his report was a
fabrication.19 While the Africa specialist Leo Frobenius managed to cross the
Red Sea, he came only as far as Eritrea and did not reach Abyssinia, where
he was to persuade the emperor to enter the war on the side of the Central
Powers.20 In the meantime, the Ottomans, too, had become suspicious because
they perceived Germany as a rival rather than the much-cited “comrade in
arms” and considered German activities as a threat to their own ambitions in
the Middle East.21
Yet another mission took place. At long last it appeared that the strategists
in Berlin had found the right man for their insurgency project: the German
writer and entrepreneur Karl (Charles) Neufeld, who had acquired fame as
the “prisoner of the Khalīfa”. In contrast to Moritz, Roloff and Frobenius, he
actually stayed for several weeks in Medina (July-September 1915). This was
facilitated by the fact that he had converted to Islam and spoke Arabic fluently.
Neufeld was not a swindler like Roloff, nor was he a self-important windbag
like Frobenius, and, unlike Moritz, he seems to have been sociable and easy
to handle.22 He also participated in the Stotzingen mission (1916), which took
place at a time when the initially high hopes placed in the expeditions had
already faded.23
18 Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht, 232–35. Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express.
The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s bid for world power (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2010),
146–47. McKale, War by Revolution, 170–72. The result of Moritz’ travels (1905–15) was
his splendid book with more than 100 photographs taken by himself and, in the case of
Mecca and Medina, by friends of his: Bilder aus Palästina, Nord-Arabien und dem Sinai
(Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1916).
19 Lüdke, Jihad made in Germany, 149–52, takes Roloff’s claims at face value. McKale, War
by Revolution, 62; Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht, 235–36; and McMeekin, The Berlin-
Baghdad Express, 97, express serious doubts regarding the authenticity of Roloff’s travels.
20 The most thorough treatment of Frobenius’ mission is by Rocío Da Riva, “Lawrence of
Arabia’s forerunner. The bizarre enterprise of Leo Frobenius, aka Abdul Kerim Pasha,
in Arabia and Eritrea (1914–1915)”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes
99 (2009), 29–111.
21 Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht, 242–46; McKale, War by Revolution, 65–66; McMeekin,
The Berlin-Baghdad Express, 153–66.
22 Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht, 234.
23 Martin Strohmeier, “The ‘very real bogey’. The Stotzingen-Neufeld mission to the
Hijāz (1916)”, Arabian Humanities 6 (2016) (online: https://journals.openedition.org/
cy/3098?lang=en).

via free access
The running of these missions was hampered by confusion and bickering

over responsibilities and authority in the various departments of the relevant
ministries (Foreign Office, Colonial Office and General Staff).24 The activities
which were to grow out of Oppenheim’s programme suffered from a lack of
organization, preparation and resources.25 Ultimately, the German expedi-
tions were failures, as they did not bring about the hoped-for Muslim revolts
and destabilization of British rule. Yet, they were not entirely without success.
Britain was compelled to invest huge financial, military and human resources;
troops were tied up, too, which would have been needed at the Western fronts.
Moreover, the missions aroused among the British an excessive “feeling of
being threatened”26 or, in the words of Lawrence, “the very real bogey”.27
In recent years, a growing number of publications have dealt with the noto-
rious “jihād made in Germany”. However, hardly anything is known about how
that propaganda was spread “on the ground” (i.e., how people were addressed
and influenced, and which methods, materials and instruments were used). In
fact, Neufeld’s diary provides the only detailed account of such efforts. At the
same time, his notes yield insight into the views held by his interlocutors, most
of whom were religious dignitaries.
3 Karl Neufeld: Dropout, Entrepreneur, Prisoner, Agent
Neufeld was born in Western Prussia in 1856 and died in Beelitz near Berlin
in July 1918.28 He left the universities in Leipzig and Königsberg without a
degree and established himself first in Cairo in 1880 as entrepreneur and inter-
preter for the British army and in the mid-1880s in Aswān. On a business trip
to Kordofan (1887), he was taken prisoner by supporters of the Mahdiyya and
carried off to Omdurman, where he spent 12 years, mostly in chains; he is often
mistakenly referred to as “prisoner of the Mahdi”, although the Mahdi was
already two years dead when Neufeld was captured.29 He was liberated during

25 Hans-Ulrich Seidt, Berlin, Kabul, Moskau. Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer und Deutschlands
Geopolitik (Munich: Universitas, 2002), 56–57.
27 Thomas Edward Lawrence, Secret Despatches from Arabia (London: Golden Cockerel,
1939), 159, cited by Konrad Morsey, T. E. Lawrence und der arabische Aufstand 1916/18
(Osnabrück: Biblio, 1976), 73.
28 Obituary in Der Neue Orient iii:8 (1918), 391–92.
29 Charles Neufeld, A Prisoner of the Khaleefa. Twelve Years’ Captivity at Omdurman (London:
Chapman&Hall, 1899); German edition: Karl Neufeld, In Ketten des Kalifen. Zwölf Jahre

via free access
8 strohmeier
the reconquest of the Sudan under Kitchener in 1898. Subsequently, he wrote

his memoirs of the years in imprisonment and settled again in Aswān with his
Abyssinian wife, with whom he had two children (he was also married to a
British nurse, Charlotte Emma Neufeld née Netherton, in Cairo with whom he
had one daughter).30
3.1 The Origins of Neufeld’s Trip to Medina

Neufeld’s comfortable existence was interrupted when the First World War
broke out. Kicked out of Egypt by the British for being a national of an enemy
country, and thus having lost his livelihood, Neufeld travelled to Germany.31
On his way, he offered his services at the German Consulate in Naples and pro-
posed to send messages and agents to Egypt and the Sudan in order to work
against British interests.32 Although his suggestions were met with reserva-
tions by the diplomats of the Wilhelmstrasse, because two decades earlier he
had alienated German and British authorities with his behaviour during the
last years of his captivity in Omdurman, he was eventually hired.33 About four
months later, Neufeld arrived in Palestine.34 It seems that he worked mainly as
Gefangenschaft in Omdurman, 3rd ed. (Berlin and Stuttgart: W. Spemann, 1899). Already
during his captivity he had an Arabic alias: “Abdalla Nufell”, A Prisoner, 151; later variants
such as ᶜAbdallāh Naufal al-Almānī were in circulation. The name ᶜAbdallāh is often given
to converts to Islam.
30 The genealogy of Neufeld’s family is complicated and cannot be described here. I am
grateful for the help of Phil Lloyd, a distant relative of Neufeld on his British wife’s side and
a fellow researcher of Neufeld.
31 It seems that by 1914 Neufeld had already moved from Aswān to Omdurman: pa-aa, R
21137, L 367955–57, enclosure to memo Nadolny, Political Section of General Staff to
Foreign Office, 6 December 1915; cf. sad 191/3/64–66 (23 September 1914).
32 pa-aa, R 21124, Ambassador Flotow, Rome, to Foreign Office, 29 September 1914: “Arrival
of expelled person from the Sudan and Egypt because of fears he would stir up the
population…”; pa- aa, R 21124, Flotow to Bethmann Hollweg, 12 October 1914: “He…is
dominated by the burning desire to serve his fatherland in every way and to harm the
British as much as possible.”
33 “Tagebuch” (Diary), 2: “I will prove to the gentlemen diplomats that they erred in their
judgement of me.” (on this diary, see below, note 37); Karl Friedrich Schabinger Freiherr
von Schowingen, Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter. Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen eines
kaiserlichen Dragomans (Baden-Baden: ca. 1967, typescript), 118: Propaganda and
information were to be carried out by diplomats and officers: “Thus only military and other
experts and no adventurers!” Probably Neufeld was regarded by the diplomats as precisely
such an “adventurer”, which was not completely wrong given his earlier biography.
34 Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht, 233, note 30. In his memo “Eindrücke C. Neufeld über
‘Aufstand im Hidjas’, Gemal Pascha und Nachrichtendienst während seines Aufenthaltes
in Damaskus”, pa-aa, R 13879, enclosure to memo Neufeld to Wesendonk, 23 December
1916, K 196952–70, Neufeld erroneously claims that he was active in the Sinai already in
Summer 1914.

via free access
an interpreter for Major Hans von Ramsay, who was carrying out a topograph-
ical survey and a study for the water works in the Sinai.35 With his background
knowledge of the geography and culture of the region and of Arabic (he did
not speak Turkish), and particularly by being a Muslim, Neufeld seemed to be
the ideal agent for plans to incite Muslims worldwide against the Allies in the
name of a Holy War.
In April 1915 it was decided to carry out missions aiming at inciting revolts
in the Sudan with agents infiltrating from the opposite coast of the Red Sea
(i.e., the Hijaz and Yemen). Neufeld was put under the command of Major von
Ramsay, who would also be responsible for releasing the measly pay in instal-
ments in accordance with Neufeld’s progress on his journey.36 For various rea-
sons, funds did not arrive in time, so that he was unable to continue his trip
from Medina. This circumstance played a decisive role in the eventual failure
of his enterprise.
3.2 Neufeld’s Diary

During his travels from Jerusalem to Medina and back, and later from Damascus
to Istanbul, Neufeld kept a diary in which he recorded observations, reflec-
tions, conversations, expenditures, and information gathering, as well as his
religious feelings.37 What are the formal characteristics of the diary? In part,
it is a travelogue and includes itineraries. From June 7 until July 12, the entries
cover his travels via Palestine to Medina. From September 1 to September 23,
he returned from Medina to Istanbul, spending a couple of days in Jerusalem,
Damascus and Aleppo. From September 24 to October 12, the diary describes
his activities in Istanbul. The diary is neither exclusively private nor official. It
was intended to inform Neufeld’s commissioning authority (i.e., the Foreign
Ministry and other state agencies) about his activities and experiences; there
35 Hans von Ramsay (1862–1938), an officer of the “Schutztruppe” for the German colonies
in Africa. He was a member of the Sinai campaign and the attack on the Suez Canal in
Spring and Summer 1915, see Theodor Wiegand: Sinai (Berlin-Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter,
1920), 15. pa-aa, R 21137, L 367955, enclosure to memo Nadolny, Political Section of General
Staff to Foreign Office, 6 December 1915; pa-aa, R 21138, Political Section of General Staff
(Nadolny) to Foreign Office, 4 January 1916. Rudolf Holzhausen, “Die deutsch-türkischen
Operationen gegen den Suez-Kanal und im Sinai-Gebiet während des Ersten Weltkriegs”,
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3 (1957), 156–63, here 160. Armee-Zeitung Jildirim
18 (18.7.1918), 2. Tagebuchberichte von Hellmut Ritter (Nr. 5), Jerusalem (26 April 1915),
(http://carl-heinrich-becker.de/hellmut-ritter-1913–33), accessed 20 November 2019.
36 Neufeld was to receive 40 Ltq. monthly plus travel expenses as well as an amount of 1000
pounds sterling for the mission to the Sudan: Lüdke, Jihad made in Germany, 171.
37 His “Tagebuch C. Neufeld 7.vi.15 bis 12.x.15 (Reise nach Medina)” about his trip to and stay
in Medina is included in file R 21141, L 368668–831, pa-aa; Lüdke, Jihad made in Germany,
170–77, offers a summary.

via free access
10 strohmeier
is no evidence that he was told to keep a diary. The entries refer to the past (i.e.,
mainly his life in the Sudan), to recent developments of the war in Europe and
to present activities in Medina, as well as to his future travel plans. He made
notes frequently; from time to time he revised the cursory notes into larger par-
agraphs.38 The 157-page typescript is preceded by a two-page list of “contents”,
although it is a rather incomplete index, with page numbers listing subjects
and persons mentioned in the diary.
The diary is a significant document for several reasons: it sheds light on the
“strategy of implementing revolutionary propaganda” (“Revolutionierungs-
strategie”) and as such is the only document of its kind, possibly because most
missions were too occupied with themselves – safety issues, political circum-
stances, strange and unsuited mission members. It provides insight into the
attitudes of personalities in Medina regarding the war, and it demonstrates
that the Ottoman authorities did not want the German ally to learn of the vol-
atile political situation and their lack of control in Arabia. Neufeld writes in
some detail about his discussions in Medina, in which he tried to convince
influential locals to lend support to the Turco-German cause. This allows us to
check the veracity of his arguments and the information he communicated.
Neufeld’s account does not compare favourably with the writings of Richard
Burton39 and John Lewis Burckhardt40 about Medina. These are superior in
form, content, description and literary value. There are two main reasons
for this: in contrast to other visitors, he went there with the specific task of
spreading propaganda as commissioned by German authorities, and he never
intended to publish his diary. In addition to the very mundane need to make
a living, he was motivated by patriotic fervour, anger at Britain and religious
feelings.41
Neufeld presents himself as a skilful person, capable of organizing the trip,
guiding his subordinates (the Yemenis), and communicating smoothly with
his interlocutors. Able to live frugally and to make sacrifices, he was a man full
of stamina, who had survived captivity in Omdurman. Above all, he was a fear-
less individual in view of the uncertainties and adventures which awaited him
on his trip, although he admitted occasionally in his diary that he was aware
38 “Tagebuch”, 114–17.
39 Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Bernhard
Tauchnitz, 1874).
40 Travels in Arabia, ed. W. Ouseley, vol. 2 (London: Henry Colburn, 1829).
41 Neufeld’s ethnographic observations, which add to our knowledge of the situation of
pilgrims and the ḥajj-business, Ramadan festivities and certain Bedouin customs, have
been left out here due to lack of space.

via free access
of threats that an “enlightened European”42 would face in Medina. However,

Neufeld left no doubt that he regarded himself as a Muslim.43
With ethnocentric notions typical of his time, he perceived Europeans, and
especially Germans, to be superior to Turks and Arabs, doubted the latter’s
abilities to perform without European guidance, and treated locals in a pater-
nalistic manner. On the other hand, in his ethnographic statements regarding
the Bedouins of the Medina region, he refrained from expressing the negative
views of Bedouins as primitive troublemakers often held by Middle Eastern
city dwellers or Ottoman officials.44
3.3 From Jerusalem to Medina: Preparations and Propaganda

The diary starts on June 7, 1915, the day Neufeld (coming from Jerusalem)
reached Ḥafīr,45 where he met his companions, the four Yemeni stokers from
the German supply vessel “General”.46 The next three weeks were spent with
preparations for the trip, such as hiring mounts, picking up wages, and making
arrangements with officers in charge of the mission. The itinerary (between
Bersheeba and Jerusalem) of the first two weeks was meandering, probably
indicating the difficult logistics of money transfer and provision of animals.
On the evening of June 23, the party paused at the German orphanage in Bir
Salem/Biʾr Sālim.47 Here, Neufeld describes the “high spirits” when Major von
Rabius applauded “new German victories and successes”,48 without, however,
sharing the optimism, as the situation of the ‘Turkish comrade in arms’ in
Palestine was worrisome. He attributed desertions and difficulties with sup-
plies and discipline to the fact that “the Oriental is a different human being
42 “Tagebuch”, 99.
43 Ibid., 41: “That I am a true believer and do not only pretend to be a Muslim.” The statement
in a short biography of Neufeld in a Foreign Office report that he was forced to convert to
Islam is exaggerated, to say the least: pa-aa, R 21124, L 365247, Flotow Embassy Rome to
Foreign Office, 29 September 1914. His conversion seems to have been voluntary, but the
circumstances of his imprisonment might well have contributed to his adoption of Islam:
A Prisoner, 150–51.
44 Mostafa Minawi, “Beyond Rhetoric: Reassessing Bedouin-Ottoman Relations along the
Route of the Hijaz Telegraph Line at the End of the Nineteenth Century”, Journal of the
Economic and Social History of the Orient 58 (2015), 75–104, here 77, 85.
45 Roughly 60 kms southwest of Beersheba.
46 This vessel was originally a trading ship which now served as the crew’s quarter: Josef
Drexler, Mit Jildirim ins Heilige Land. Erinnerungen und Glossen zum Palästina-Feldzug
1917–1918 (No place: Selbstverlag des Verf., 1919), 5.
47 One of the German-Protestant Schneller educational institutions in Palestine, situated on
the outskirts of Ramla.

via free access
12 strohmeier
from the European due to climate and food, habit and disposition; he is not
capable of achieving what the European achieves”.49
Returning to Jerusalem, an ᶜilm-ü khaber was issued (i.e., a confirmation
that the group was travelling on official instructions and entitled to claim
rations for men and animals). On the evening of July 3, the party finally set
out on its journey. During a stop in the Jordan valley the next day, with other
travellers arriving, Neufeld had his first opportunity to spread the “truth” about
the war. He tried to refute the view that the Maghrebis in the French army
had inflicted “heavy losses” on the Germans. One of his interlocutors thought
that Neufeld was a Tunisian merchant, a suspicion which Neufeld confirmed
by inventing the legend that he “had escaped the French regime with great
difficulty in order to embark on the long-pledged ḥajj to Medina and Mecca”.50
He then addressed the miserable situation of the North Africans in the French
army. He portrayed them as brave warriors, but, inadequately equipped, they
were not able to withstand the cold climate, dying as “cannon fodder” by the
thousands. Those who survived did not want to sacrifice themselves for their
“oppressors” and, seeking cover, were shot by their French fellow soldiers. In
contrast, the North Africans who were taken prisoner by the Germans were
treated very well and now strove to fight alongside the Turks and the Germans.
The North Africans, Neufeld deplored, did not know that Germany was a friend
of the caliph and Islam.51
He continued that the Ottoman Empire had been divided among England,
France and Russia before the war.52 A new caliph, Ḥusayn Kāmil, had been
installed with British support, and Egypt had been annexed.53 At the end of
the discussion Neufeld thanked God that “He sowed mutual friendship into
49 Ibid., 10.
50 Ibid., 16.
51 There were not many desertions. Perhaps the most celebrated North African deserter was
the Algerian officer Rabah Boukabouya, see Peter Heine, “Ṣāliḥ ash-Sharīf at-Tūnisī, a North
African Nationalist in Berlin during the First World War”, Revue de l’Occident Musulman et
de la Méditerranée 33 (1982), 89–95. Concerning the treatment of North African soldiers
in the French army see Christian Koller, „Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt“.
Die Diskussion um die Verwendung von Kolonialtruppen in Europa zwischen Rassismus,
Kolonial- und Militärpolitik (1914–1930) (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001), 96–98, 108, 125–28;
he comes to the conclusion that the “cannon-fodder” thesis can be neither proved nor
disproved.
52 Agreements among the allies (France, Great Britain, Russia) concerning territorial claims
or divisions of areas of the Ottoman Empire were concluded only in Spring 1915: Jörn
Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs, 4th ed. (Munich: Beck,
2014), 484–85.
53 “Tagebuch”, 18. Ḥusayn Kāmil had been appointed sultan of Egypt, but not caliph.

via free access
the hearts of the Germans and Muslims so that together they could destroy
the world of their enemies and restore the old glory of the Muslim empire.”54
At another resting place, in Sir (today Wādī al-Sīr, close to Amman), a village
with a predominantly Circassian population, Neufeld again took the opportu-
nity to speak about the war; here, the conversation was hampered by the fact
that many locals did not understand Arabic. Their questions concerned the
weapons and vehicles used (e.g., cannons and submarines), as well as the war
theatres, especially the battles at the Dardanelles. They were afraid that their
relatives deployed there would fall victim to the much greater numbers and
technical superiority of the Allies. Neufeld tried to reassure them by pointing
out that France and Britain employed their best forces at the European fronts,
while Ottoman troops under the command of German officers achieved excel-
lent results. In Amman, a group of people gathered around Neufeld, who –
through dispatches from the Agence Milli – were better informed than the vil-
lagers of Sīr about the war. The local military commander helped Neufeld in his
“intelligence work” by emphasizing the positive role of German officers in the
Ottoman army. Major von Ramsay told the Turkish commander that Neufeld
was travelling on his instructions to the Sudan (i.e., at this point, no secret was
made of the mission).55
On July 8, the train started moving. Neufeld made the acquaintance of the
commander of the railroad troops between Damascus and Medina, “Cheri
Bey” (probably Khayrī), who helped him and his party to find space in the
overcrowded train.56 Their destination, Medina, was reached on the eve of 1
Ramadan 1333/12 July 1915.57
4 Neufeld in Medina
“Cheri Bey” and a Medinese by the name of “Abdelrhami”58 (probably ᶜAbd

al-Ghanī), who became his pilgrimage guide (muzawwir), arranged for Neufeld
55 Ibid., 29.
56 Ibid., 30. Emil Ludwig, on the basis of what Neufeld told him, wrote in Berliner Tageblatt
und Handels-Zeitung no. 577 (11 November 1915): “After Maan and El Ula the Turkish officer
[possibly “Cheri Bey”/Khayrī] who had chatted with him in such a friendly manner just
a short while ago, looked at him [Neufeld] suspiciously. Does the infidel want to go to
Medina? The German, however, stepped into the corridor in front of the compartment
and began to pray silently as if he did not know that he was being watched.”
58 Apart from “Abdelrhani”, there are two other spellings for this person: “Abdel Rani” (86)
and “Abdelrahni” (102).

via free access
14 strohmeier
to be put up at the house of a certain Ibrahim. Awaiting somewhat anxiously

the fasting month of Ramadan, which was to start the next day during the
hottest season, the almost sexagenarian wrote: “May God grant strength and
abstinence, as well as a strong stomach in order to get through this starvation
diet of 30 days without dire consequences.” But something else was even more
important for him:
Today I will pray as the first German at the grave of the Prophet. This is a
great event for me which, if I manage without failure, will be of utmost
importance for my task and will make my work much easier. If I also suc-
ceed in performing the prayers and carrying out the duties at the Kaʿba
and at Arafat (ᶜArafāt) which are obligatory for Muslims, I will be able
to obtain the right to wear the “Tajia of Mecca”59 and to be called ‘Hage
Abdalla’ [Ḥājj ᶜAbdallāh, ms], and then my words will be trusted. Further-
more, Muslims will not be suspicious of me and I can count on the help
of every Muslim, particularly against Christians such as the English and
the French.60
Thus Neufeld’s stay in Medina combined both the personal experience of what
he called ḥajj (in reality, it did not qualify as such) and his political mission. By
using the phrase “my adopted co-religionists”, he left no doubt that he regarded
himself as a Muslim.61 However, in strange contrast to the significance he
attributed to his visit to the Prophet’s grave, praying at the Ḥaram was a brief
affair which he performed on the evening of his arrival after having attended a
public bath (ḥammām).62
59 Cf. also “Tagebuch”, 98: “Tagia”; ṭāqiyya, a skullcap. As a matter of fact, there is no specific
headdress distinguishing the ḥājj. Tradition demands that the head of male pilgrims not
be covered.
60 “Tagebuch”, 32. Neufeld’s claim is difficult to verify. The relevant literature: Marcel Behrens,
“Ein Garten des Paradieses”. Die Prophetenmoschee von Medina (Würzburg: Ergon, 2007);
F.E. Peters, The Hajj. The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1994) do not list any German Muslim to have visited the Prophet’s
grave before him. Johann Wild (visited Medina in 1607) was the slave of a Persian and
had converted for the sake of convenience: Augustus Ralli, Christians at Mecca (London:
William Heinemann, 1909), 34–39. Ulrich Jasper Seetzen travelled as a pro forma convert
to Medina in 1809/10: Ibid., 68.
61 “Tagebuch”, 32–33.
62 Ibid., 33. Every visitor to Medina was compelled right after arrival and ablutions to go to
the shrines, especially the Ḥaram.

via free access
Neufeld was afraid that he might be taken for a non-Muslim, which would
have had “fatal consequences”.63 On the first day, it turned out that this con-
cern was not unjustified. One of the pilgrims who stood close to him asked:
“With what right do you stand next to that man [his muzawwir] in front of the
Prophet’s grave?” Neufeld responded calmly: “With the right of every believer.”
The man threatened to become violent and asked him about his origin. He
answered that he was from the Sudan, with ᶜAbd al-Ghanī adding that he was
from Kordofan. The man insisted: “Not from Omdurman?” which Neufeld con-
firmed by saying that he had “a wife and a house” there. The man who had
become suspicious was satisfied with these explanations.
Accompanied by the local guide and his four Yemenis, Neufeld was fairly
safe. Through his manners, his knowledge of Arabic and his prayers, he was
able to convince the people he met of his sincerity.64 According to his impres-
sion, the locals were aware that he was not a born Muslim of Arab descent.
However, by following the rites and openly declaring to be a German, he was
apparently accepted as an equal member of the umma.65
Secondly, he feared that his identity as the “prisoner of the Khalīfa” (i.e., his
“Sudanese past”) would be discovered and hamper his mission. But when he
was indeed recognized as such, this did not have negative consequences. In
any case, he left people in the dark about his travel plans.66 There were peo-
ple in Medina who had heard about or had even met Neufeld in the Sudan.
One of them was the ᶜālim “Ahmed Mohammad Cheir” (Muḥammad Khayr),
who had just returned from al-Qaḍārif. “Cheir” confirmed straight away that
Neufeld was indeed the “prisoner of the Khalīfa”.67 He encouraged the German
agent to help fight against the British in Egypt and the Sudan. But Neufeld was
on his guard beause he did not rule out that “Cheir” and others secretly sym-
pathized or were cooperating with the British (which some of them in fact
did, see below). Neufeld also met “an old acquaintance from the Sudan” by the
name of “Mohamed Ali el Arag” (Muḥammad ᶜAlī al-ᶜAraj or Aᶜraj?), which
meant that it was futile to deny his identity.
A third concern was that his stay could be discovered by the Ottoman
authorities, putting the rest of his journey at risk. As it turned out, the Ottoman
63 Ibid., 33.
64 “Tagebuch”, 34–35.
65 Ibid., 38–39.
66 Ibid., 97.
67 Ibid., 58–59.

via free access
16 strohmeier
authorities did learn of his presence in Medina, which eventually led to abort-
ing the mission.68
4.1 Neufeld’s Contacts and Acquaintances

While Neufeld already knew “Cheri Bey”/Khayrī, the first people he met in
Medina were a certain “Abdelrhani”/ ᶜAbd al-Ghanī and his brother, both pil-
grimage guides and therefore the right people to familiarize him with rites and
customs; they were to accompany him on many occasions during the follow-
ing six weeks. It took more than a week until he was introduced as “Scheich
Abdalla Nofal el Almani” [Shaykh ᶜAbdallāh Naufal al-Almānī] by “Cheri Bey”
to several important and influential personalities in Medina.69 Most of them
were religious scholars, and as such they could serve as potential dissemina-
tors of Neufeld’s messages.
Perhaps the most prominent ᶜālim he spoke to was the “pro-German”70
“Shaykh”/ustādh “Hamdan al Wanui” (i.e., Ḥamdān al-Wanīsī al-Qusanṭīnī,
1856–1920). In the diary he is called a “Moroccan by birth”, although in fact he
was from Algeria. al-Wanīsī was born and educated in the city of Constantine.
After teaching for a quarter of a century at the city’s Great Mosque, he moved
to Medina, probably due to restrictions imposed upon him by the French
colonial administration.71 He taught at the Prophet’s Mosque and was con-
sidered a leading expert on ḥadīth.72 When Enver and Jemāl Pasha visited
the city in March 1916, in their effort to emphasize the bond between Turks
and Arabs, as well as promote the Holy War, they were briefed about various
aspects of jihād by several ᶜulamāʾ, including al-Wanīsī.73 The Algerian became
a mentor of the first generation of North African reform-minded Muslim the-
ologians. Foremost among them – in Constantine – was ᶜAbd al-Ḥamīd Ibn
Bādīs (1889–1940), who spent three months with his former tutor in Medina
in 1912.74 Two other pioneers of the nascent reform (iṣlāḥ) movement, who
68 Ibid., 104; see below.

70 pa-aa, R 21139, “Propaganda…” (L 368115, 6), enclosure to memo Mittwoch to Nadolny, 9
March 1916.
71 There are different dates given for his arrival in Medina: 1904 and 1910; Neufeld (“Tagebuch”,
43) writes that al-Wanīsī came to Medina “many years ago”.
72 Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shāmikh, al-Taᶜlīm fī Makka wa-l-Madīna ākhir al-ᶜahd
al-ᶜuthmānī, al-ṭabᶜa al-thāniyya (Riyāḍ: Dār al-ᶜUlūm, 1402/1982), 63.
73 Muḥammad Kurd ᶜAlī, al-Riḥla al-anwariyya ilā l-aṣqāᶜ al-ḥijāziyya wa-l-shāmiyya (Bayrūt:
al-Maṭbaᶜa al-ᶜIlmiyya Yūsuf Ṣādir, 1334/1916), 265–66.
74 “Ben Bādīs”, EIThree (http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_25284). James
McDougall, A History of Algeria (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017), 139. Dictionary

via free access
became its leaders in the interwar period, were members of al-Wanīsī’s cir-
cle (ḥalqa) for several years: Muḥammad Bashīr al-Ibrāhīmī (1889–1965) and
Ṭayyib al-ᶜUqbī (1889–1960). The latter (“Muhammad El Tajib el Oghbi”) was a
largely unknown “young, ambitious and talented man of letters” when Neufeld
met him. However, the German consulate in Damascus had become aware of
him because he had praised Germany’s war success in Syrian newspapers.75 In
Medina, al-ᶜUqbī already displayed the traits of a “firebrand” (Gellner). He was
reprimanded by al-Wanīsī and Neufeld for angering the al-ᶜAwālī Bedouins
with fiery speeches. The German had to restrain him in his efforts to preach
the Holy War, demonstrating how insensivities among the population could
counteract propaganda.76
Shaykh “Mahmud Schoël” (i.e., Maḥmūd Shuwayl, 1885–1953) was born in
Medina (hence al-Madanī) but had his roots in Egypt. He taught as profes-
sor (mudarris) at the Ḥaram al-Sharīf.77 He seems to have stayed for a while
in Egypt, where he came into contact with nationalist circles and fell out of
favour with the British rulers in Egypt, who forced him to leave the country.
Shuwayl’s political leanings were doubtful to Neufeld when he first met him; in
fact, he suspected him of being a British spy. Only later did Neufeld realize that
things were more complicated: while Shuwayl was not an agent in the service
of African Biography, eds. Emmanuel K. Akyeampong and Henry-Louis Gates, vol. 1

(Oxford-New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 14–16. https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/
‫( عبد_الحميد_بن_باديس‬accessed January 23, 2020); https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/
‫( محمد_البشير_اإلبراهيمي‬accessed January 23, 2020).
75 He was born in Sidi ᶜUqba (hence the nisba al-ᶜUqbī) in Algeria and died in Algiers. His
family moved to Medina when he was six years old. The Ottoman authorities accused him
of harbouring Arabist views; he was banished to Anatolia in 1917. In 1919 he was appointed,
according to his own testimony, editor-in-chief of the newspaper al-Qibla, but in 1920 he
left for his native Algeria, cf. Mazin Salah Mutabbakani, “Tayyib el-Ukbî”, in: https://
islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/tayyib-el-ukbi, accessed February 12, 2019. al-ᶜUqbī was an
antagonistic and controversial figure, frequently at loggerheads not only with the colonial
administration but also with his collaborators in the “Association of Muslim Algerian
scholars” (Jamᶜiyyat al-ᶜulamāʾ al-muslimīn al-jazāʾiriyyīn), like al-Ibrāhīmī, with whom he
fell out more than once. He is known to have had Wahhabi leanings, stemming from his
many years in the Hijaz. Cf. Martin Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars:
imperialism, politics and society (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
2005), 251; Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1981, repr.1995), 157. https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/ ‫( ط ّيب _ العقبى‬accessed January 19,
2020).
76 “Tagebuch”, 133–34; see also below.
77 Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, al-Aᶜlām. Qāmūs tarājim li-ashhar al-rijāl wa-l-nisāʾ min al-ᶜArab
wa-l-mustaᶜribīn wa-l-mustashriqīn (Bayrūt: Dār al-ᶜIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1979), vol. 7, 174.

via free access
18 strohmeier
of Britain, he defended the British administration in Egypt.78 Neufeld tried to

talk Shuwayl out of his views, arguing that the Egyptians themselves had to
become active in order to have some say after a victorious war.
It was Shuwayl who introduced Neufeld to “Mohamed Saman” (i.e.,
Muḥammad al-Sammān), who stayed at the same lodging as the German.79
This person was the Sudanese head of the mystic order of the Sammāniyya,
an offshoot of the Khalwatiyya order.80 al-Sammān himself, Neufeld inti-
mated, was not a person he could count on, because of his lack of “energy”.
But al-Sammān provided a piece of information that was important for the
mission: according to a letter from a certain “Sidi Ali” from Omdurman, the
Sudanese were ignorant about the war between Turkey and Britain. “Sidi Ali”
was none other than Sayyid ᶜAlī al-Mīrghanī. Neufeld described him as a “good
friend” on whom he “strongly” counted for his mission.81 Enlisting al-Mīrghanī
would indeed have been a coup for jihād-propaganda in the Sudan because, as
the leader of the Khatmiyya (= al-Mīrghaniyya) order, he commanded a large
following and was therefore highly respected by the British.82 However, the
idea to get al-Mīrghanī to support the Turkish-German side was a pipe dream,
as the coming years would show. al-Mīrghanī remained critical of, but loyal to,
the British.83
Among Neufeld’s contacts was also “Said Ahmad al-Berezengi” (i.e., Sayyid
Aḥmad b. Ismāᶜīl b. Zayn al-ᶜĀbidīn al-Barzanjī, 1878–1916?/1919?). He served
78 pa-aa, R 21137, von Lossow Embassy Constantinople to Political Section of General Staff,
enclosure, 13 November 1915, L 367913–17. “Tagebuch”, 41, 45–46, 63–68, 84, 87, 114.
79 Ibid., 126.
80 Armine Willis, “Religious confraternities of the Sudan”, Sudan Notes and Records 4:4 (1921),
175–94, here 182.
81 “Tagebuch”, 126–28.
82 The Khatmiyya was the most important Sufi order in the Sudan before the emergence of
the Mahdiyya and cooperated with the Turco-Egyptian administration. During the rule of
the Mahdists, the Khatmiyya vanished, but reappeared and gained its old strength after
the reconquest: M.W. Daly, Empire on the Nile. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1878–1934 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, Paperback edition), 122–23. See also Albrecht
Hofheinz, “Sons of a hidden imam: The Genealogy of the Mīrghanī”, Sudanic Africa
3 (1992), 9–27.
83 In November 1914, al-Mīrghanī assured the British of his loyalty, chastising the Ottoman
government for having become “a mere plaything in the hands of the Germans”, sad
192/2/238. A few weeks before Neufeld wrote these lines, Wingate had recommended
al-Mīrghanī for a kcmg: Daly, Empire on the Nile, 166; see also John Esposito/John O.
Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 82. Gabriel
R. Warburg, “From Anṣar to Umma: sectarian politics in the Sudan, 1914–1945”, Asian
and African Studies 9:2 (1973), 101–53; John O.Voll, “Mirghani, ᶜAli al- (ca. 1879–1968)”, in
Dictionary of African Biography, vol. 4, 227–28.

via free access
as imām and khaṭīb at the Prophet’s Mosque, as did (his cousin/brother?)

Sayyid Zakī b. Aḥmad b. Ismāᶜīl al-Barzanjī (1877–1945), who acted as Shafiᶜite
mufti and president of the canonical court (raʾīs al-maḥkama al-sharᶜiyya).84
One of Neufeld’s interlocutors was a teacher at a state school, the polyglot
“Mohamed Saleh il tunesi il Turki” (i.e., Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Tūnisī al-Turkī).85
Nothing is known about him, but his help was important as he had already
cooperated with German authorities and received pamphlets.86
A person of some standing mentioned in the diary is “Said [Sayyid?] Elhalem
Said Mohammed Eletebi” (i.e., Muḥammad al-ᶜAttābī). He served in the gov-
ernments of Sultan ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz (1894–1908) and ᶜAbd al-Ḥāfiẓ (1908–12) in
Morocco and resigned when French influence increased under Sultan Yūsuf,
particularly since al-ᶜAttābī maintained relations with Germans to the extent
that he was given official protection (“Schutzbefohlener”). He showed Neufeld
letters of recommendation by the Mannesmann brothers.87 Seeing no future
for himself in Morocco, he fled to Medina, the “port of refuge of all (sc. dis-
missed or persecuted, M.S.) politicians from the Muslim world”.88
84 Mausūᶜat Makka al-Mukarrama wa-l-Madīna al-Munawwara, vol.4, eds. ᶜAbbās Ṣāliḥ

Tāshkandī and Aḥmad Zakī Yamānī (London: Mu’assasat al-Furqān li-l-Turāth al-Islāmī,
2010), 624. ᶜAlī Ḥāfiẓ, Fuṣūl min tārīkh al-Madīna al-Munawwara (Jidda: Shirkat al-Madīna
al-Munawwara li-l-Ṭibāᶜa wa-l-Nashr, no date), 47. The Barzanjīs, a family of Kurdish stock
originating from Sharazur, had held the office of Shafiᶜite Mufti since the seventeenth
century. Sayyid Aḥmad b. Ismāᶜīl b. Zayn al-ᶜĀbidīn al-Barzanjī was also a member of the
Ottoman Parliament in 1914: Ahmed Abushouk, “A Sudanese Scholar in the Diaspora: Life
and Career of Ahmad Muhammad al-Surkitti in Indonesia”, Studia Islamika (Indonesian
Journal for Islamic Studies) 8:1 (2001), 55–68, here 61–62. See also Shāmikh, al-Taᶜlīm, 63.
85 In the diary, his name is written “Mohammed Saleh il Tunissi”, 46, 55–56. pa-aa, R 21139,
“Propaganda in Mekka, Medina und dem Hedschas” (L 368115, 6), enclosure to memo of
Mittwoch to Nadolny, 9 March 1916; pa-aa, R 21137 (L 367902–07), enclosure to memo of
von Lossow to Political Section of General Staff, 13 November 1915. He is not identical with
the well-known Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Sharīf al-Tūnisī.
86 See also “Tagebuch”, 55–56.
87 German entrepreneurs who became very influential in Morocco (1906–14): cf. Lutz
Hatzfeld: “Mannesmann, Reinhard”, in Neue Deutsche Biographie 16 (1990), 62–63. Otto
Mannesmann tried unsuccessfully to organize an expedition from Libya in order to incite
uprisings in the framework of the “Revolutionierungsstrategie” (August 1914), see: McKale,
War by Revolution, 146ff.
88 pa-aa, R 21137, L 367901–2, enclosure to memo of von Lossow to Political Section of
General Staff, 13 November 1915; “Tagebuch”, 115, 133. Herbert Landolin Müller, Islam,
ǧihād („Heiliger Krieg“) und Deutsches Reich. Ein Nachspiel zur wilhelminischen Weltpolitik
im Maghreb 1914–1918 (Frankfurt a.M.-Bern-New York-Paris: Peter Lang, 1991), 297–98.
al-ᶜAttābī was being considered as a collaborator for the “Nachrichtenstelle”. His name is
also given as Abu Nasr Muhammad El-Atabi, “the Moroccan Mujahid”: Mohammed Abed
Jabri, “Evolution of the Maghrib Concept. Facts and Perspectives”, in Contemporary North

via free access
20 strohmeier
Shaykh al-ᶜUmarī from Morocco was an important contact. He had lived

for thirty years in Medina and taught at the Ḥaram. Of Bedouin origin and
interested in Bedouin manners and customs, he introduced Neufeld to the
Bedouins in the vicinity of Medina. It is striking that many of Neufeld’s inter-
locutors were North African scholars. As people opposed to the French rule of
their countries of origin, they were an important target group for propaganda
against the Entente.
Neufeld already knew two people from the Sudan, about whom no bio-
graphical information is available. One was the aforementioned Muḥammad
al-Khayr, a long-time resident of Medina and teacher at the Ḥaram. According
to Neufeld, he had been an opponent of the Mahdi and the Khalīfa.89 His local
contacts included “Auad el Mulhis” (probably ᶜAwaḍ?/ᶜAwwād al-Mulḥis90),
a tribal shaykh, with whom Neufeld formed a special relationship and about
whom more will be said below.
These people constituted a significant segment of Medina’s religious estab-
lishment and a promising core group of disseminators. However, the fact
that it was “Cheri Bey”/Khayrī Bey who introduced Neufeld to them calls into
question the German agent’s activities in the city of the Prophet. Why should
a high-ranking military officer bring a dubious person such as Neufeld into
contact with these prominent Medinese personalities except for reasons of
surveillance? A German eccentric, an alleged convert to Islam on pilgrimage
accompanied by four Yemenis: these were sufficient reason to watch him care-
fully. Therefore, I can only speculate that Khayrī was assigned to keep an eye on
him and to learn more about his intentions. Seen in this way, their meeting in
Africa. Issues of Development and Integration, ed. Halim Barakat (London and New York:
Routledge, 1985), 65.
89 “Tagebuch”, 58–59, 61, 82–83. Neufeld, A Prisoner, 145–59.
90 Also written “el Mulchis”: “Tagebuch”, 117. I was not able to find any information about
this person except for a reference in pa-aa, R 21142, 6th report of Stotzingen, 16 July
1916 (5), cited below. ᶜAwwād’s tribe was the Ḥarb, which comprised nomads as well as
settled people; his clan was perhaps the Banū ᶜAmr or ᶜAwf. The former owned most of
the date groves near Medina, which ties in with the information in Neufeld’s diary. The
book by ᶜĀtiq ibn Ghayth al-Bilādī, Nasab al-ᶜArab: qabīlat Ḥarb, ansābuhā, furūᶜuhā,
tārīkhuhā wa-diyāruhā, 3rd ed (Makka: Dār Makka, 1404/1984), does not name the shaykh.
A tribal leader by the name of ᶜAlī al-Milhis (i.e., the first “i” replacing the “u” in Mulḥis;
vocalizations of tribal names being often a matter of conjecture, see Werner Ende, “The
Nakhāwila, a Shiite community in Medina. Past and Present”, WI 37:3 [1997], 263–348, here
292) belonging to the ᶜAwf sub-section of the Ḥarb with its land (dīra) east of Medina
(between the Hijaz and al-Qaṣīm) is mentioned in Gazetteer of Arabia (Simla: Government
Monotype Press, 1917), Vol. I, 750.

via free access
the train was not an accident but rather part of a scheme.91 On the other hand,
the fact that several of these people (Shuwayl, “Cheir”) spoke positively about
Britain (knowing that such statements would be regarded as treason in times
of war) must mean that they did not suspect they were under surveillance.
It is obvious that the Ottoman authorities perceived Neufeld to be a sus-
picious person, even a spy who should be removed from the Hijaz without
delay. But this does not necessarily mean that his contacts in Medina were
of the same opinion. His own impression was that, once he had gained their
trust, they would consider him to be a good source of information concerning
the war, because otherwise they would have to rely on censored government
media. News flow from the Muslim world had been considerably reduced due
to the massive drop in pilgrim numbers since the outbreak of the war.
The gatherings Neufeld held numbered 20 or so people, but it can be
assumed that the real number of those who were exposed to his propaganda
must have been greater. In any case, supplying information, spreading dis-
information and discussing the war situation with them, he appears to have
accomplished a crucial aim of the mission. Obtaining access to these promi-
nent scholars was a success, even if this had been partially set up for him. It is
futile to speculate whether he was able to turn people against the Allies and to
win them over to the German-Turkish cause.
4.2 The World at War: Propaganda in the City of the Prophet

In between prayers at the Ḥaram al-Sharīf, the gatherings took place at the
homes of Barzanjī, Neufeld, Khayrī, al-ᶜUmarī and ᶜAwwād al-Mulḥis. They
also met at the manākha, a bustling square, indicating that the German agent
was not particularly cautious. His discussions with interlocutors focussed on
world politics and particularly the war situation. He described the origins of
the war by employing the “allegory of the competing merchants”:
A merchant has a new neighbour who is more efficient than he is. By

satisfying the needs of his customers better and more cheaply, he at-
tracts many clients away from the other merchant. Instead of trying to
match the new merchant by offering better and cheaper goods, he gath-
ers friends and relatives, attacks his rival with clubs and other weapons.
He tries to kill him, to loot and destroy his shop. That’s the true reason.92
91 Neufeld made it easy for Khayrī as he asked him to draft a telegram in Turkish to one of
Neufeld’s superiors in Jerusalem: “Tagebuch”, 37–38.
92 “Tagebuch”, 51. Emil Ludwig, based upon his interview with Neufeld, related this episode
in the following way: “Naive, clever and brooding as he is, the Arab tries to interpret the

via free access
22 strohmeier
In this way, Neufeld accused Britain of having provoked a “global conflagra-

tion”.93 The assassination of the heir apparent, Franz Ferdinand, of Austria-
Hungary had not been the true cause of the war but had only triggered what
the Entente had already been preparing for years. Their objective, he contin-
ued, was the division and annihilation of Austria, Germany and the Ottoman
Empire.94 However, God had foiled these plans and helped Turkey by sending
the “Goeben” and the “Breslau” so that the Russian attacks could be beaten
back.95 Now Turkey, Neufeld explained, was preparing for another attack
against British forces in Egypt.96 His listeners wanted to know why there was
no news about German successes in Europe. Neufeld ignored the question
and simply predicted that the French would “get a bloody nose” at the long
defensive line from Alsace to the North Sea.97 Responding to the question
why Germany did not move against Britain, Neufeld evasively said that such
large-scale attacks required time. Before moving against Britain, Russia and
France must be “finished off”.98
clamour of the Occident. When this German sat together with Arabs, he explained to
the Orientals who use so many allegories the quarrel between England and Germany by
employing the parable of the older and younger merchant, concluding: ‘Look, England
wishes to compensate its friends whom it drew into the war: Russia shall receive Stambul
and France Syria – England itself shall receive the Hijaz and the Yemen, it shall receive
you!’ That primitive interpretation had its effect. However, some learned men may well
have known better, saying of Germany: ‘We know – Bismarck – Treaty of Berlin’”: Berliner
Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung no. 577, 11 November 1915.
93 “Tagebuch”, 82: “It (Britain, ms) knows that this time it will be held responsible for
the butchering of millions of people, for the destruction of billions of assets which its
leaders have caused by ordering this global conflagration in order to destroy the peaceful,
industrial and commercial work of its rival. God is just and the punishment will be
commensurate with the crime”, Neufeld told his listeners.
94 This piece of Neufeld’s “war news” stood facts on their heads by claiming that the
warmonger was Britain and not Germany. It is true that none of the Great Powers wanted
to keep the peace at all costs. Today there is a consensus that Germany and Austria-
Hungary were chiefly responsible for the outbreak of the war, see: Gerd Krumeich, “The
War Imagined: 1890–1914”, in A Companion to World War I, ed. John Horne (Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 3–18; John F.V. Keiger, “The War Explained: 1914 to the Present”,
ibid., 19–31.
96 The first attack at the Suez Canal had failed in early 1915.
97 France lost around half a million soldiers in 1914/15 in what was mostly positional warfare.
The number of German soldiers killed amounted to approx. 80,000, see: Jonathan Krause:
“Western Front”, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed.
by Ute Daniel, Patere Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and
Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin. Berlin 2015-11-11. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10765.
98 “Tagebuch”, 79–82. After Russia had inflicted defeat on Austria-Hungary in March 1915, it
was forced to evacuate Poland in May 1915; however, the war on two fronts would prove
disastrous in the long run.

via free access
Neufeld praised German and Ottoman military power, pointing out the
superiority of German weapons and fighting spirit. When news about the
German conquest of Warsaw went around, there was relief and joy among
his friends.99 When he told his audience that the Allies had suffered “great
losses” at the Dardanelles,100 they expressed doubts about the strength of the
Ottoman army, so that Neufeld felt compelled to defend the Turkish soldiers
and officers.101 England’s power, Neufeld said, was overestimated.102
It was not an easy matter to win over his interlocutors, for their opin-
ions about Britain were by no means completely negative. Muḥammad ᶜAlī
al-ᶜAraj, the Sudanese acquaintance, told Neufeld that there was dissatisfac-
tion with the British in the Sudan, but by treating the leaders “kindly”, they
were able to keep the population acquiescent.103 Muḥammad al-Khayr (the
other Sudanese interlocutor) also spoke positively about England’s behav-
iour in the Sudan, such as not keeping the believers from their faith.104
When Neufeld criticized the Egyptians for not resisting British occupation,
Shuwayl remarked that the British administration of Egypt was “beneficial”
because, after all, the Egyptians said to themselves: “British rule is better for
the Egyptians than Turkish.”105 Neufeld boasted that he was able to change
Shuwayl’s opinion.106 But the latter’s political loyalty was questionable,
because he had admitted that the Sharīf was a good friend. It is not without
irony that a former employee of the British in Egypt, first liberated by them
in the Sudan and later thrown out of the country, now presented himself as
a staunch adversary of Britain, whereas Sudanese and Egyptian addressees
of that very propaganda and colonial subjects almost defended Britain. Such
99 “Tagebuch”, 88–89: “Now the war will be over soon…Now the Germans will make short
work of the British. The pilgrims will return and with them income and prosperity”. Emil
Ludwig, based on his interview with Neufeld, wrote (Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-
Zeitung, no. 577, 11 November 1915): “When the cable with the daily reports from Stambul
reported the fall of Warsaw, half of Medina gathered in front of the German’s house…But
already in the morning a learned shaykh [al-ᶜUmarī, ms] who lectured at a nearby mosque
on Ramadan nights, had woken him up and broken the news: ‘Listen, my friend: Warsaw
has fallen. Know: Abdul (sic), the telegraph official, is my Koran student, he told me. In the
evening they will make it public. But you shall know in the morning!’”
100 The combined British-French offensive was pushed back by the Central Powers until July
1915.
102 Ibid., 49.
103 Ibid., 83–84, 132 a.
104 Ibid., 60–61.
105 Ibid., 63–64.
106 Ibid., 65–67.

via free access
24 strohmeier
views indicate that Holy War propaganda in these countries might not have
fallen on sympathetic ears.
Bedouins, the majority of the population in the Hijaz, figured prominently
on Neufeld’s agenda. In line with his task to enlist support for the war, he
remarked to ᶜAwwād, the aforementioned shaykh of a sub-section of the Banū
Ḥarb, that to his astonishment he had not encountered any Hijazi Bedouins
participating in the Sinai campaign.107 The shaykh replied that in fact a few
of his tribesmen were involved, but his tribe mainly had the responsibility
of protecting the Holy Places from enemy attacks. For that reason, the Sharīf
had not allowed more fighters to leave. When Neufeld asked him bluntly if he
could promise to send several thousand men, ᶜAwwād answered in the affirm-
ative but complained about broken promises regarding the pay.108 Neufeld
concluded that the Bedouins would go to battle for the Sultan at Ḥusayn’s
behest.109 He was never to send fighters to the Sinai (except perhaps the few
mentioned by ᶜAwwād).
Neufeld’s claim that the Bedouins were “definitely on the Ottoman govern-
ment’s side” was clearly wishful thinking.110 The Sharīf of Mecca had managed
to extend a large degree of control over Bedouins in the Hijaz in the pre-war
years.111 While indeed some tribes would join the Arab revolt, others did not,
with loyalties dividing even families of shaykhs (e.g., the Billī).112 In particu-
lar, the Ḥarb did not unanimously support the Sharīf.113 The situation was
complicated by some tribes changing sides during the revolt.114 This complex
state of affairs, and a general aversion of Bedouins to long-term commitments,
clash with Neufeld’s sweeping statement that the tribes were loyal to the
107 See above, 3.

108 “Tagebuch”, 129–30.
109 Ibid., 130.
110 pa-aa, R 21137, L 367912, enclosure to memo von Lossow to Political Section of General
Staff, 13 November 1915. One year later, when the Arab revolt had begun, Neufeld toned
down his wording to “most of the tribes” were loyal to the state, pa-aa, R 13879, Neufeld
to Captain Blankenburg, Political Section of General Staff, October 8, 1916, K 196943–51,
(enclosure) “Bekämpfen des Aufstandes”, 2.
111 Teitelbaum, The Rise and Fall, 54–56.
112 Max von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen. Vol. 2: Die Beduinenstämme in Palästina,
Transjordanien, Sinai, Ḥedjāz (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1943), 329. For the loyalty of
Sulaymān (Sulaymān Rifāḍa or Rufāḍa with full name: D.G. Hogarth, Hejaz before World
War I [Cambridge: Oleander, 1978], 57) vis-à-vis the Ottomans see T.E. Lawrence, Seven
pillars of wisdom. A triumph (Harmondsworth: Penguin Repr., 1965), 119.
113 Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, 373.
114 Ibid., 329.

via free access
state.115 Equally simplistic was his assertion that the Bedouins were “fanatical”
Muslims.116
Commenting on the triangle of state (dawla), Sharīf and Bedouins, Neufeld
writes that the Sharīf in general was respected by the Bedouins and even con-
sidered a “holy man”. In conflicts between the government and the Bedouins,
he emerged as a “saviour” who helped them to obtain justice by “mediating”
between the government and them. The government, for its part, sought to
play off both against each other. Ultimately, however, the Bedouins had the
whip hand because both the Sharīf and the government needed the Bedouins
rather than vice versa.117 Contrary to Neufeld’s claims, it was the state, as recent
research has revealed, which mostly kept the upper hand, even if Bedouins and
nomads in general were always a challenge to its authority and could cause dis-
ruptions. The specific conditions of their way of life (i.e., eternal insecurity and
vulnerability to natural disasters, droughts, famines, and epidemics) ensured
that they usually came out on the losing side.118
A controversial issue in Neufeld’s conversations with Bedouins was the Hijaz
Railway, which they believed had damaged their interests. He had a hard time
to convince them that they had been wrong regarding their resistance against
the railway, and that they had gained from its construction. A case in point
was the Hijazi Bedouins’ dependence on supply trains sent by the Ottoman
115 pa-aa, R 13879, Neufeld to Captain Blankenburg, Political Section of General Staff, October
8, 1916, K 196943–51, (enclosure) “Bekämpfen des Aufstandes”, 2; “Tagebuch”, 116; Anthony
B. Toth, “Last battles of the Bedouin and the Rise of Modern States in Northern Arabia,
1850–1950”, in Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Dawn Chatty
(Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006), 49–77, here: 64.
116 pa-aa, R 21137, L 367912, enclosure to memo von Lossow to Political Section of General
Staff, 13 November 1915. – About the Bedouins’ attitudes towards Islam see Heikki
Palva, “North Arabian Bedouin’s conception of the Beyond”, Studia Orientalia (Helsinki)
70 (1993), 75–80.
117 “Tagebuch”, 68–75.
118 Toth, “Last Battles”, 64; Kurt Franz, “Zur Einführung: Institutionelle Mechanismen
zwischen Staat und Nomaden”, in Verwaltete Nomaden: Mobile Viehzüchter und
Dienstleister zwischen Autonomie und staatlicher Anbindung, ed. Kurt Franz (Halle:
Orientwissenschaftliches Zentrum, 2007), 1–13, here 2–3. This is not to say that there were
no examples of collaboration of the Ottoman bureaucracy with Bedouin tribes, even to
the extent that the latter took over state functions, see M. Talha Çiçek, “Negotiating power
and authority in the desert: the Arab Bedouin and the limits of the Ottoman state in Hijaz,
1840–1908”, MES 52:2 (2016), 260–79.

via free access
26 strohmeier
administration during the first two years of the war.119 He argued that railways
in general always turned out to be beneficial, as he had observed in the Sudan,
where there had also been resistance to the building of railways.120
Difficulties in getting his messages across were not restricted to ideological
and political issues, as there were also practical and religious factors. The use
of modern technology for propaganda was very limited. A cinematograph, sent
by the German Embassy in Istanbul to al-Tūnisī, could not be used due to a
lack of films and because the administration of the Ḥaram al-Sharīf refused to
provide electricity.121 al-Tūnisī owned a “schapirograph”, a nineteenth-century
copying machine, but did not have any paper to copy war dispatches sent to
him occasionally from Haifa with a delay of a month or so. The dispatches of
the Agence Milli arrived daily but were viewed sceptically. Illustrated news-
papers, maps and pictures, Neufeld wrote, were a cheaper and more efficient
way to influence public opinion and to “fight the lies of the Entente” than more
advanced technical means such as moving pictures. The latter were sometimes
“censured” by drawing a dash between neck and head, thereby removing the
life from the image or making the head unrecognizable.122 In this context,
he proposed to reestablish the newspaper al-Madīna al-Munawwara,123 with
Shuwayl and Ṭayyib al-ᶜUqbī as contributors.124
119 A brother of ᶜAwwād admitted the following (“Tagebuch”, 120–21): “You may be right. We
have already realized that we were wrong to fight against the construction of the railway
to Medina. The train now brings us many more pilgrims and in reality we now have
much more work for our camels than before. Especially now it has become clear to us
what a big advantage the train has brought us. We would die of hunger if the train did
not bring food from the north every day.” The supply trains (e.g., mentioned in Neufeld’s
memo to Blankenburg, pa-aa, R 13879, 8 October 1916) became less frequent and were
eventually discontinued sometime in 1917. The Bedouins rejected, however, the extension
of the railway to Mecca which Neufeld advocated. To the best of my knowledge, there
is no estimation of the income losses of the Bedouins caused by the railway. Benjamin
Claude Brower, “The Hajj by Land”, in The Hajj. Pilgrimage in Islam, eds. Eric Tagliacozzo
and Shawkat M. Toorawa (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016), 87–112; still worth
reading is the older article by Hans-Jürgen Philipp, “Der beduinische Widerstand gegen
die Hedschasbahn”, WI 25:1–4 (1985), 31–83.
120 “Tagebuch”, 119–21, 128. It is unclear which railway and region in the Sudan Neufeld is
referring to.
121 Ibid., 55–56.
122 Ibid; pa-aa, R 21137, L 367903–05, enclosure to memo of von Lossow to Political Section of
General Staff, 13 November 1915.
123 It had been founded by “Memun Abul Fadl” and directed by him and “Muhammad Kamel
al Hadsche”, but was closed due to lack of funds: pa-aa, R 21139, L 368117–21. Saᶜīd Maʾmūn
Abū l-Faḍl (1891-?), a Hijazi by descent, was a collaborator of the “Nachrichtenstelle” and
member of the Frobenius expedition (1914/15), see above. I was not able to identify his
co-editor Muḥammad Kāmil al-Ḥajjī.
124 pa-aa, R 21139, L 368120.

via free access
As for his method of delivery, Neufeld explained that, rather than giv-
ing lectures, he “answered questions, fought erroneous opinions and drove
away doubts”.125 He addressed his audiences in a paternalistic way: “I talked
to them like one speaks to older children.”126 Neufeld doubted the useful-
ness of official “news rooms” because these were viewed suspiciously by the
Ottoman government; he argued in favour of private social gatherings: “In
those countries news must be offered in small quantities until the people
have got used to their taste. And if it tastes good, the Oriental, the big child,
soon wants more.”127
Neufeld brought only illustrated newspapers with him. He felt it was too
dangerous to take other propaganda materials on his journey.128 In any case,
many of the leaflets and brochures produced by the “Nachrichtenstelle für
den Orient” (Intelligence Bureau for the East) were not available until August
1916.129 Some of the topics dealt with in these brochures were reflected in
Neufeld’s conversations, like the Entente powers as enemies of Islam, Germany
as a friend of the Muslim world, and German victories at the European bat-
tlefields.130 In contrast to Oppenheim’s grandiose schemes, Neufeld preferred
more modest measures. He requested that the Foreign Office send maps of the
theatres of war and pins with differently coloured pinheads in order to chart
the progress of the Allies against the Entente.131
Neufeld undoubtedly identified with his mission. He was not a reckless
propagandist, but generally exhibited restraint. He seems to have had an acute
sense of how far he could go in terms of spreading propaganda. One possible
exception was his demand that ᶜAwwād dispatch more fighters to the Sinai,
which, however, does not seem to have angered the Bedouins. On the other
hand, when the aforementioned incendiary al-ᶜUqbī campaigned for partici-
pation in the Holy War among Bedouins in a “tactless manner”, thereby antag-
onizing them (confirming Lawrence’s assertion regarding the failure of Holy
125 “Tagebuch”, 50–51.

126 Ibid., 114; cf. Epkenhans, “Geld darf keine Rolle spielen”, 125: the “Nachrichtenstelle” was
“…to produce war reports adapted to the Oriental psyche…”.
127 pa-aa, R 21137, L 367902–07, 13 November 1915; pa-aa, R 21139, L 368117–18, “Propaganda…”,
enclosure to memo Mittwoch to Nadolny, 9 March 1916.
128 “Tagebuch”, 46, 55.
129 pa-aa, R 21142, A 21227, 10 August 1916.
130 Gottfried Hagen, “German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental
Studies”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24:2 (2004), 145–62,
especially 151–54; Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg, passim.
131 pa-aa, R 21139, L 368116 (7), “Propaganda in Mekka, Medina und dem Hedschas”, enclosure
to memo Mittwoch to Nadolny, 9 March 1916.

via free access
28 strohmeier
War propaganda among the Hijazi Bedouins), some Bedouins would almost
have killed him, had the German not brought him into line.132
Several questions regarding Neufeld’s propaganda cannot be answered. Did
he improvise his conversations or did he follow written instructions from the
Foreign Office or the “Nachrichtenstelle” on how to proceed?133 To what extent
would Neufeld have been familiar with debates about the war in imperial
Germany? After all, he had lived abroad for 30 or so years, except for his stay
in Britain and Germany around the turn of the century, and his short stint in
Berlin in winter 1914/15.
In addition to his mission, Neufeld took an interest in the customs and tra-
ditions of Bedouins settled close to Medina.134 His main source of informa-
tion, apart from contacts with the Bedouins proper, was the above-mentioned
shaykh al-ᶜUmarī. He had studied Bedouin life, to which he felt attached
through his descent. In particular, al-ᶜUmarī was interested in the customs and
unwritten, yet precisely observed, Bedouin laws. Legal matters were almost
never taken to court, but rather to their shaykhs. People having business with
Bedouins, such as merchants, would try to find an influential Bedouin to look
after their interests. A “protective agreement” would be entered into. In this
way, the partner became a “protégé” or “adopted member of a tribe” (ḥalīf,
lit. “ally”; i.e., two people who swore an oath of mutual obligation).135 In this
capacity, he had the same rights as the tribesmen, and the official sealing of
this reciprocal agreement took place at a ceremonial banquet. The Bedouin,
too, now enjoyed the protection of his partner for life, and both would con-
sider themselves as friends. The conclusion of the agreement was preceded by
a period of probation because the obligations entered into were considerable,
and their non-fulfilment was sometimes punishable with the death penalty.
132 Ibid., L 368120 (9 b); “Tagebuch”, 133–34. Neufeld does not specify the reason for the
Bedouins’ indignation. Possibly it was al-ᶜUqbī’s Wahhabi leanings which angered them,
all the more if they were indeed Shiᶜites.
133 Neufeld mentions his “story about my conversion” (“Tagebuch”, 40) but does not elaborate.
The lie about his flight from Tunis (16), which served to explain his pilgrimage to the Hijaz,
was a sudden inspiration, as he admitted.
134 “Tagebuch”, 68–75, 90ff. Neufeld’s interest in Bedouins had been sparked in the Sudan.
I have included here three reports about the “revolt in the Hijaz” in which Neufeld
comments on the Bedouins in the Hijaz. All three were penned after the stay in Medina;
two were written after the Stotzingen mission.
135 pa-aa, R 21137, L 367907 ff. Neufeld has the form “khalef”. Perhaps he used the “k” before
the “h” to denote the voiceless “ḥaʾ”, as he was certainly aware that this word had nothing
to do with the root “khalafa”.

via free access
The Bedouin, then, was responsible for the life and limb, as well as the posses-
sions, of his ḥalīf.136
Neufeld’s “most ardent wish” was granted when al-ᶜUmarī introduced him to
the above-mentioned “full-blooded Bedouin shaykh” by the name of ᶜAwwād
al-Mulḥis. After sizing each other up at one or two meetings, Neufeld, accom-
panied by Ḥamdān, al-ᶜUmarī, Shuwayl and other acquaintances, was found
worthy to be invited to ᶜAwwād’s house. In a solemn ceremony which followed
al-ᶜUmarī’s explanations, Neufeld was made ḥalīf of ᶜAwwād and adopted by
his tribe as “akhīnā” (“our brother”).137
This was an extraordinary event in several ways. First, Neufeld and ᶜAw-
wād had known each other for only about three weeks. A probation period,
as alluded to by al-ᶜUmarī and commensurate with the grave implications
of the ḥalīf-status, had not taken place. Secondly, obligations under the
terms of this status concerned the shaykh more than Neufeld. Regarding the
mutuality of the agreement, what could the Bedouins have expected from
him, a visitor whom they hardly knew? It was even more remarkable that
the ḥalīf/khāwī-obligation was actually met by ᶜAwwād. In May 1916, when
Neufeld was on his way to the Yemen, he was escorted by him from al-ᶜUlā to
Yanbuᶜ (i.e., through territory which was not under the influence of the Ḥarb,
but was dīra of the Billī and Juhayna tribes, neither of whom were on friendly
terms with the Ḥarb, but perhaps honoured ᶜAwwād’s role as ḥalīf/khāwī).
Thus the friendship Neufeld had established with the shaykh had paid off.
But who were these Bedouins on the outskirts of Medina? Neufeld himself
does not mention the name of the tribe, but we learn from Major Othmar
Freiherr von Stotzingen that ᶜAwwād was a shaykh of the Banū Ḥarb and lived
136 “Tagebuch”, 68–69, 91.The terms ḥalīf and khāwī (“companion”) used by Neufeld are
complex concepts in Bedouin social life and law which cannot be described here.
Basically, they revolve around the terms “protection” and “safe conduct” enjoyed by a
member of one’s own tribe, of another tribe or a stranger with whom a relationship has
been established in the way referred to above. Crucially, the tribe as such and not only an
individual member is involved, see Patrica Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law. The
Origins of Islamic Patronate (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 51–52; Abdulaziz H.
Al Fahad, “Raiders and Traders. A Poet’s Lament on the End of the Bedouin Heroic Age”, in
Saudi Arabia in Transition. Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change, eds.
Bernard Haykel et al. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015), 231–62, here 247, 260; H.R.P.
Dickson, The Arab of the Desert. A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Sa’udi Arabia
(George Allen&Unwin, 4th ed. 1967), 125–26.
137 “Tagebuch”, 121–25. In his report “Propaganda in Mekka, Medina und dem Hedschas”
(pa-aa, R 21139, enclosure Mittwoch to Nadolny, Political Section of General Staff, 9 March
1916, L 368122, 10), Neufeld writes that the shaykh became his “blood brother” (khāwī).

via free access
30 strohmeier
a settled life in the date-palm groves situated close to Medina.138 Most of these
settled Bedouins belonged to the particular Shiᶜite group called nakhāwila (“the
date-palm people”). Neufeld remains silent about their religious affiliation.
There are a few remarks which point to suspicions and sensitivities between
these Bedouins and the townsmen in a rather vague way, but this was often the
case and did not only concern the nakhāwila. He reports that he was “intimi-
dated” by inhabitants of Medina when he announced his intention to visit the
Bedouins. He also stresses that al-ᶜUmarī discussed the Bedouin theme with
him only behind closed doors, because, according to the scholar, especially
people in the pilgrim’s business like the muzawwir did not want foreigners to
learn about the battle for shares, as this might decrease their profit. al-ᶜUmarī
emphasized that even long-time residents of Medina were well advised to stay
away from this thorny issue.139 On the other hand, there is no evidence that
Neufeld’s ᶜulamā’-acquaintances and the Bedouins, particularly their shaykh
ᶜAwwād al-Mulḥis, avoided each other; in fact, they participated in ceremonial
dinners and seemed to mix with each other easily. al-ᶜUmarī even lived among
the Bedouins, who had helped him to build his house. Therefore, in view of the
sensitivities and strains which prevailed between the Sunni establishment of
Medina and the nakhāwila, it appears rather unlikely that Neufeld’s Bedouins
actually belonged to this peculiar Shiᶜite group.140
5 Return to Istanbul
After several weeks, Neufeld was faced with a serious dilemma. On the one
hand, continuing to stay in Medina could result in being expelled, thus thwart-
ing his intention of crossing the Red Sea. On the other hand, there were no
prospects of continuing his journey, mainly for lack of funds.141 Jemāl’s order
138 Stotzingen notes in his sixth report (pa-aa, R 21142, 16 July 1916, p. 5): “During the trip,
he (Neufeld, M.S.) gathered some interesting information about the Bedouin upheavals
from the Bedouin shaykh Auwad, with whom he was friendly, of the Ben El Harb tribe.
The sheykh and members of his tribe escorted Neufeld from El Ula to Jambo.” In pa-aa,
R 13879, K 196941, enclosure Neufeld to Captain Blankenburg, Political Section of General
Staff, 8 October 1916, Neufeld writes: “So that Awadel Mulchis was able to offer and to
conclude with me the alliance of friendship that had so brilliantly proved itself on my last
journey.”
139 “Tagebuch”, 68, 116.
140 On the nakhāwila see Ende, “The Nakhāwila”; Gazetteer of Arabia, vol. I, 745–50; vol. ii,
1120. Hogarth, Hijaz, 38–39.
141 “Tagebuch”, 88: “If I had had all the money I needed, I’d be long gone by now.” Cf. also ibid.,
94–95.

via free access
to leave Medina and return to Jerusalem relieved him of such worries. In the
meantime, he had become well-known. Not only had he met prominent inhab-
itants; he had also become acquainted with government officials, for exam-
ple, at the telegraph office – not to mention “Cheri Bey”, whom he had met on
the train – even though he tried to minimize his contacts with the Ottoman
authorities.
On August 30, Neufeld’s muzawwir, ᶜAbd al-Ghanī, brought bad news which
“struck me like a bolt out of the blue.”142 He was informed by the muḥāfiẓ143
that Jemāl Pasha had ordered his departure and provided him with documents
for a speedy transport on the Hijaz Railway.144 Neufeld’s presence in Medina
must have angered the Ottoman authorities, and it was rather surprising that
he had not been expelled earlier. Was his visit to the muḥāfiẓ on the occasion of
the ᶜīd al-fiṭr some two weeks earlier the straw that broke the camel’s back? As
much as he brooded about the reasons for Jemāl’s order, he could not find any
specific reason why he was being thrown out just then.145 He remembered von
Ramsay’s words: “Take care that no one learns of your trip!”146 However, secrecy
and propaganda were hardly compatible, and this had been Neufeld’s dilemma
ever since his arrival in Medina. Neufeld’s acquaintances, too, were puzzled as
to why he was being booted out.147 Neufeld left Medina on September 1 and
arrived in Jerusalem on September 7.
The following day, Neufeld went to Jemāl Pasha’s headquarters on the Mount
of Olives. The latter plainly asked him why he had left for Medina without per-
mission. The German argued that, as the Pasha had not been in Jerusalem at
the time, he had travelled with the permission of Major von Ramsay, under
whose command he was; he had assumed that Ramsay would inform Jemāl.
142 Ibid., 131. There is a document probably referring to Neufeld’s expulsion from Medina in
the Başbakanlık Arşivi: “Regarding the removal of the deceiver Doktor Abdullah Hovel
[Hovel wrong for Novel= Naufel=Neufeld?], a friend of Ambassador Prince Hohenlohe
[as a matter of fact, Neufeld mentions Prinz Hohenlohe in his “Tagebuch”, 135] and a
close collaborator of the Germans, from Medina”: Telegram from the Ministry of Public
Instruction to the province of Syria”: Dahiliye Nezâreti, Şifre Kalemi Dosya 56, Gömlek
106, 21 September 1915; document not seen. Prince Hohenlohe is Ernst ii. zu Hohenlohe-
Langenburg (1863–1950) who acted as ambassador extraordinary in Constantinople
during the Great War.
143 Baṣrī Pasha, see Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, 257, note 115.
144 In the order Neufeld was addressed as “Shaykh Abdallah”: “Tagebuch”, 131.
145 Back in Istanbul, Neufeld was received by counsellor von Neurath. After the meeting, he
confided to his “Tagebuch” (153–54): “The most likely reason for my dismissal is that the
Turkish government does not seem to like seeing German propaganda in Arabia.”
147 Ibid., 131.

via free access
32 strohmeier
The General doubted that the inhabitants of Medina had recognized him
as a Muslim or that his life had been in danger. When Jemāl asked what had
actually been the purpose of his journey, Neufeld said that he had planned to
visit his family in the Sudan. However, in the course of the conversation he
admitted that he was on a political mission. Jemāl’s dressing down induced
him to take refuge in contradictory and flimsy excuses, which revealed that
the German authorities had not provided him with a convincing cover. A
propaganda-cum-reconnaissance expedition, inadequately planned and
funded and poorly camouflaged as a “family reunion”, was bound to go wrong;
in short, it was a mission impossible.
On September 11, Neufeld left for Damascus, where he met Consul Loytved
and Oppenheim. The conversation with the latter was rather brief.148
Apparently, the Baron was preoccupied with taking pictures of the maḥmal,149
and with talking about his pet project, the “Depeschensäle”. Once Neufeld men-
tioned his interlocutors in Medina, Oppenheim started to show more interest.
However, the encounter of the propagandist and the driving force behind the
jihād-project did not lead to an in-depth exchange of ideas, because Neufeld
was under pressure to leave for Aleppo.150
Through Aleppo, Islahiye, the Taurus and Konya, Neufeld travelled by train
and on horseback to Istanbul, where he arrived on September 23.151 During the
next weeks, he met several Ottoman and German officials, whom he informed
about his trip. On October 5, Neufeld rented a typewriter and hired a secretary
to type up the “old diary”.152 The last entry is dated October 12. Neufeld must
have left Turkey sometime in late October or early November.153
6 Repercussions
Several newspaper articles about Neufeld’s trip to Medina appeared in

November 1915 and in subsequent months. Without having conclusive
148 Ibid., 141 a and b. Oppenheim was, of course, familiar with Neufeld’s past; he had been one
of the main donors for attempts to liberate Neufeld from imprisonment in the Sudan, see
“Rechenschaftsbericht und Rechnungslegung des Carl Neufeld-Komitees”, Berlin 1898.
149 F.Buhl-J.Jomier, “Maḥmal”, EI (2), vol. vi, 44–46.
150 “Tagebuch”, 139–42.
151 Ibid., 142ff.
152 There are many inconsistencies, especially regarding names and terms in Arabic. Neufeld
did not standardize spellings.
153 pa-aa, R 21137, L 367899–900, Lossow to Political Section of General Staff, 13 November
1915.

via free access
evidence, I believe that these texts can mainly be traced back to an interview
he gave to Dr. Emil Ludwig, who resided in Turkey as a “special correspond-
ent” during the war.154 Certain details in the articles resemble closely Ludwig’s
account; apparently, he was the first to report on Neufeld’s trip.
Ludwig’s piece, entitled “German news from Arabia”, is dated
“Constantinople, end of October”, but was published only on November 11, a
delay probably timed to allow for Neufeld’s departure from Constantinople,
in order not to give the Ottoman government further cause for complaint.155
Declaring Neufeld to be the first German to visit Medina, the journalist
describes him as Arab in appearance, in terms of manners, dress and fluency
in the language. The account, based on the interview with Neufeld, largely
corresponds to the exchanges recorded in the diary.
Yet, there are several discrepancies and additions. Neufeld claimed that,
after his work with the German military in the Sinai Peninsula, he travelled
to the city of the Prophet as a “private person”. This was to serve as a cover up;
however, the diary leaves no doubt that he went to Medina on the instruction
of German authorities, who by the time of the interview were certainly inter-
ested in dissociating themselves from their agent’s activities.
The article describes the controversy among religious scholars about the
Sultan being a kāfir for collaborating with Christian rulers in the present war.
The view prevailed that it was allowed to accept the help of unbelievers, for “the
enemies of the Muslims were the enemies of the Germans”. Clearly, Ludwig’s
article was intended to strengthen German sentiment for the war efforts on the
part of the Ottomans, and the Arab “hatred” of the British, which the German
government hoped to capitalize on.
One day after Ludwig’s article appeared, The New York Times of November 13
printed a brief piece based on a report of the Overseas News Agency. It included
only a small part of the above points. The most important message was con-
tained in the incorrect headline: “(Neufeld) Reports anti-British uprisings in
Arabia”, thus putting a spin on his activities.
A longer and more colourful rendering (“Bronzed like a native son of the
desert…only white man who ever openly inspected” Medina) of Neufeld’s trip
appeared in The Salt Lake Tribune on January 2, 1916.156 There are several aspects
which are also included in Ludwig’s report, but are described more vividly here.
The Salt Lake Tribune suggested that the German went on his own initiative
to Medina; none of the three articles mentions that he travelled on the order
154 The interview took place at the Pera Palas Hotel on October 4: “Tagebuch”, 156. It seems
that Ludwig (1881–1948) was the only correspondent to report on Neufeld’s mission.
155 Ludwig sent the article to Neufeld on October 8, probably for corrections and additions.
156 https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/details?id=14775555, accessed August 10, 2020.

via free access
34 strohmeier
of the German Foreign Office. The article also claimed that “Egyptian spies in
the service of England…tried in every way to inflame the natives against him
by calling him an infidel and ‘Christian dog’”. According to the paper (a point
missing in Ludwig’s article), Neufeld had been told by pilgrims that “the jehad
(holy war) is fastly becoming general in all Mohammedan countries”, which
was certainly all grist to his mill. The Salt Lake Tribune falsely depicted Neufeld
as an “organizer” of “Arabian tribes on the peninsula of Sinai for an invasion of
Egypt”. To sum up, what distinguishes Ludwig’s account from the other reports
is that he took pains not to portray Neufeld as an instigator of insurgency.
Neufeld’s superiors like Othmar von Stotzingen and academics such as
Martin Hartmann expressed restrained or even derogatory views of Neufeld
and his work. The former, who had spent four months with Neufeld under
difficult conditions, characterized him in the following way: “Neufeld knows
how to communicate with Arabs, and they enjoy listening to him, but they
do not attach any significance to his words. He accepts all information with a
childish gullibility and agrees to every activity with a youthful lack of deliber-
ation…here, where he is regarded everywhere as a charming and harmless sto-
ryteller.”157 This statement should be taken with a large pinch of salt. Although
Stotzingen had observed him from up close, he was hardly in a position to
judge Neufeld’s dealings, because he did not speak Arabic.
Hartmann barely knew Neufeld. The professor at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Universität Berlin and collaborator of the “Nachrichtenstelle” evaluated him
mainly on the basis of his reports to the Foreign Office (but apparently not
the diary, although they overlap in part). Echoing Stotzingen’s assessment,
Hartmann characterized these reports as suffering from “generalizations”.158
Neufeld may not have had a talent for analytical thinking, but, when compared
157 Stotzingen assessed Neufeld (pa-aa, R 21142, sixth report, Damascus, July 16, 1916) as
follows: “The time I spent with Mr. Neufeld over four months convinced me of his good
intentions and zeal to make himself useful. However, I have grave doubts about whether
he is the suitable person to operate advantageously in the Sudan…Perhaps it would be
possible for this well-intentioned, elderly, at the moment nearly destitute man…to be
employed in another city in the Middle East where he could be assigned to a consul who
would sift and pass on the intelligence he gathers with great diligence but little discretion.”
158 Hartmann wrote that he issued his reference for Neufeld with reservations because his
reports “suffered from the defects of empty talk”. Neufeld would be “able to gather facts
provided he received a proper introduction and constant advice to work methodically”,
pa-aa, R 21142, Hartmann to Mittwoch, 23 December 1916. The reference included the
following remark: “I found (in his reports, ms) elements which are not without interest. It
seems that he knew how to adapt to the population and thus gained a vivid picture of the
conditions.”

via free access
with the better-phrased memos of German diplomats, his dispatches at least

contained observations and appraisals difficult or impossible to find else-
where. After all, Medina was a “black hole”, from where almost no information
was available.159
Regarding his future employment, Major von Ramsay and Oppenheim
thought that Neufeld could be of use for a Sudan expedition,160 whereas Eugen
Mittwoch doubted his suitability to inspect the “news rooms” (“Lesesäle”)
in Arabia, even under the supervision of a diplomat, an idea proposed by
Hartmann.161
In sum, there was a consensus that Neufeld was suitable for collecting infor-
mation, due to his knowledge of Arabic, his adaptability and communication
skills, but that his judgement was not highly rated. Neufeld’s working style
simply did not fit into any patterns familiar to diplomats, military officers and
academics. His unconventional and stubborn behaviour, as well as his outsider
existence, was not conducive to a favourable reception by those tasked with
evaluating him. To be sure, Neufeld was not a shrewd agent. But the way he
associated with locals and engaged the Medinese scholars in his propagandis-
tic efforts demonstrates a mix of chutzpa and disarming naiveté, which appar-
ently outweighed any reservations they may have had about him. His affability
and communication skills made him a “useful agent”, as was pointed out by the
Arab Bureau.162
7 Conclusion
In the present article, an attempt has been made to contextualize Neufeld’s mis-
sion to Medina in the framework of German efforts to instigate uprisings with
the aim of undermining its enemies’ rule over their Muslim subjects. While
this study does not alter the general view that the “jihād made in Germany”
was a failure, it sheds light on several aspects of the Holy War project which
hitherto have not been treated.
159 Neither the German nor the British Foreign Office had much intelligence about Medina.
After the establishment of the Arab Bureau (1916), news from the Hijaz, albeit still minimal
from Medina, increased.
160 pa-aa, R 21137, Lossow to Political Section of General Staff, 13 November 1915.
161 pa-aa, R 21142, Mittwoch to Foreign Office, 29 December 1916. On Mittwoch, see above,
note 1.
162 The Arab Bulletin 13, 1 August 1916, 135–36. The British knew that Neufeld was in the Hijaz
in the Summer of 1915, although it is unclear when they learned about it: sad 160/1/99,
Hogarth to Wingate, 27 July 1916.

via free access
36 strohmeier
Firstly, in contrast to all other missions undertaken with this purpose,

Neufeld was actually able to disseminate the propaganda intended to rally sup-
port for the German-Ottoman alliance. Concretely, he spoke about German
victories at the Western fronts, praised the cooperation of Turks and Germans,
tried to allay fears expressed by locals about the outcome of the war and the
fate of their relatives in the field and cast a negative light on British adminis-
tration in Egypt and the Sudan. Neufeld claims that he was able to change the
opinions of some individuals who had expressed sympathy for Britain. To this
extent, his activities can be deemed partly successful. That he was “adopted”
by a Bedouin tribe and made a “blood brother” of their shaykh was quite a
coup and was to pay off in the context of the Stotzingen mission (1916). It is
open to discussion what his contacts in Medina actually thought about him.
Apparently, he was able to gain their confidence.
There is a second reason why Neufeld’s mission can be credited with some
accomplishments, namely by taking into consideration the adverse circum-
stances of his mission. The German authorities had sent him to Medina know-
ing full well that the mission was endangered without Jemāl Pasha’s consent.
Moreover, fearing that he might spend the money too freely, authorities did
not provide him with a sum large enough to continue his mission beyond the
Hijaz.
Neufeld’s achievements are all the more remarkable as his contacts would
have had every reason for suspicion and doubt. A German and a ḥājj with no
particular hurry to get to Mecca, who was identified as the once famous “pris-
oner of the Khalīfa”, accompanied by four Yemenis, passed himself off as a
Tunisian merchant (or a German merchant with a Tunisian background?), and
sent telegrams to German officials asking for money and instructions – such
a person must have aroused mistrust. That the Ottomans did not want him
in the Hijaz, because they considered this to be interference in their affairs, is
obvious. However, his interlocutors, the Sunni scholars, probably did not see
things the same way. They perceived an opportunity to promote the jihād and
obtain information independently of Ottoman official sources.
One may ask whether the relative success of the mission might have been
the result of a more or less accidental meeting with “Cheri Bey”/Khayrī, the
high-ranking Ottoman official, or, quite the reverse, of the set up referred to
above. In other words, without Khayrī’s introduction, Neufeld might have had
difficulties in performing his task.
The Foreign Office, the General Staff and the “Nachrichtenstelle” evidently
chose to ignore his limited accomplishments, perhaps because they had
already realized that the Holy War project was not going to yield the expected

via free access
results. In part, the general disinterest may have been due to his not enjoying
much respect in Berlin.
Neufeld’s dilemma was that he had to engage in propaganda while keep-
ing a low profile, two things which were incompatible. Ultimately, his trip to
Medina, due to the resistance of the Ottoman leadership (about which the
Germans knew but chose to ignore) and the practical obstacles turned out to
be a mission impossible. That Neufeld was nevertheless back on yet another
mission to the Hijaz only half a year later is quite another story.163
Caption for Neufeld’s photograph:
The picture is also included in Berliner Illustrirte [sic] Zeitung 47, 21 November
1915, 646. (https://argonnaute.parisnanterre.fr/ark:/14707/a011446544408TmI-
qMZ/9877232a63), accessed 23 October 2019. I chose to include the same pic-
ture from the Library of Congress due to its better quality.
The photograph shows Karl Neufeld on the balcony of one of his houses (prob-
ably “Pension Neufeld”) in Aswān; according to the caption it was taken in the
years 1910–1915. It seems that he lived alternately in Aswān and Omdurman
from 1912 onwards (sad 181/3/54–57, 12 June 1912). He was expelled from Egypt
in the second half of September 1914 (see footnote 30). The picture is most
probably the last known photograph of Neufeld. At the time it was taken, he
was in his mid-fifties.
163 Strohmeier, “The ‘very real bogey’”.

via free access
38 strohmeier
bain news service, publisher. herr neufeld., ca.1910. [between and ca. 1915]
photograph. https://www.loc.gov/item/2014699635/.

via free access

Mission Impossible Karl Neufelds Holy Wa

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Mission Impossible Karl Neufelds Holy Wa

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mission Impossible Karl Neufelds Holy Wa

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Mission Impossible: Karl Neufeld’s Holy War

1 Introduction: the First World War and the “jihād made in

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

while German-Ottoman cooperation in general was not without tension,

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

Bernhard Moritz made it to Jidda, where he managed to distribute propaganda

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

The running of these missions was hampered by confusion and bickering

3 Karl Neufeld: Dropout, Entrepreneur, Prisoner, Agent

24 Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht, 230.

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

the reconquest of the Sudan under Kitchener in 1898. Subsequently, he wrote

3.1 The Origins of Neufeld’s Trip to Medina

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

3.2 Neufeld’s Diary

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

of threats that an “enlightened European”42 would face in Medina. However,

3.3 From Jerusalem to Medina: Preparations and Propaganda

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

“Cheri Bey” and a Medinese by the name of “Abdelrhami”58 (probably ᶜAbd

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

to be put up at the house of a certain Ibrahim. Awaiting somewhat anxiously

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

4.1 Neufeld’s Contacts and Acquaintances

68 Ibid., 104; see below.

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

of African Biography, eds. Emmanuel K. Akyeampong and Henry-Louis Gates, vol. 1

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

of Britain, he defended the British administration in Egypt.78 Neufeld tried to

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

as imām and khaṭīb at the Prophet’s Mosque, as did (his cousin/brother?)

84 Mausūᶜat Makka al-Mukarrama wa-l-Madīna al-Munawwara, vol.4, eds. ᶜAbbās Ṣāliḥ

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

Shaykh al-ᶜUmarī from Morocco was an important contact. He had lived

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

4.2 The World at War: Propaganda in the City of the Prophet

A merchant has a new neighbour who is more efficient than he is. By

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

In this way, Neufeld accused Britain of having provoked a “global conflagra-

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

107 See above, 3.

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

125 “Tagebuch”, 50–51.

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38

Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38 | 10.1163/15700607-61020003

Several newspaper articles about Neufeld’s trip to Medina appeared in

10.1163/15700607-61020003 | Die Welt des Islams (2021) 1-38