Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Week 1 Wong Historical Lessons About Contemporary Social Welfare 2011 History, Historians and Development Policy

    Uploaded by

    eeluan77
    5 views10 pages

    Original Title

    Week 1 Wong Historical lessons about contemporary social welfare 2011 History, historians and development policy

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    5 views10 pages

    Week 1 Wong Historical Lessons About Contemporary Social Welfare 2011 History, Historians and Development Policy

    Uploaded by

    eeluan77

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    of 10
    History, historians and development policy A necessary dialogue Edited by C.A. Bayly, Vijayendra Rao, Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock A joint product of Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester, Development Research Group, World Bank, and History & Policy, wwwzhistory and policy.org Manchester University Press Manchester and New York isnibuted exclusively in che USA by Palgrave Macmillan ‘Copyright Menchester Universty Press 2011 ‘Wide copsight i dhe volume 2 whole i ete in Manchester University Pes, copys ia individ ebspters belong other especie authors, nt! ao chapter may be reproduced wily ‘orn pat withoor ie expeespemmilon in writing ofboth aor and puis. bled by Manchester Unvesiy Ps Oto Rd, Mine} 900 O sud Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue. New York, NY 10010, USA Contents “winerancherennivessipress cou Dsributedexcsvly he USA by Palgrave Macmln, 175 Bh Avene, New orb, NY 10010, 054 Distributed exchstvely sn Canada bp [UBC Pres, Univrtyof Sits Columbia, 2029 West Mil, YYmeowver 8, Canada V6T 122 ‘Bltch Library Cataloguing ic-Pubikcation Data ‘List of tables and figures page vit ‘Acalogue record for tht book i arb frown the Bah tbeary ist of contributors x «Preface and acknowledgements x brary of Congress Calogag f-Publton Data ape for Part verview of key issues 1s 970 071308576 hantack 1 How and why history matters for development policy 3 1598 978 0718088772 perce Mic Sion See end oyna mo pied 2004 2 Indigenous and colonial origins of comparative economic lopment: he cate of colonial India and Aftica 3” ‘The publaier has no responsi forthe perststence o accuricy of URLs for exer or any development: the case of colonial Indi hp etwas ft eh bol and dusted game hs op oe CA.Biy on ich wet, wil oman cues or prope ; Commentary: History, time and temporality in development discourse 6s ‘na Kot Part IL: Historical contributions to contemporary development policy issues Soci pteion t 3 Social security as a developmental institution? The relative efllacy of poor reef provisions under the English Old Poor Law 75 Rca Sah 4 istorial lestons shout contemporary soci welfare Chinese puzees and global challenges 303 oo Bining Pint ee as Commentary: Why might history matter for development poy? 117 by Bal & Bn I, Glasgow avi Kamba 192 shine ed rane ey ng Wo now wheter the i ite han the fomer sce woud ao be teresting to veel atoncemenn were ay socaby ncifeendnte a oe wan on ie other, 2 ‘The tec as ofthis claim ist be found ix Wrigley and Schoficd (1981 236-40) 4 Historical lessons about contemporary social welfare: Chinese puzzles and global challenges R. Bin Wong ‘Explaining China's past to find approaches to our common future ‘Welook out tthe world atound us and see problems and posstbilites created by ‘our social practices, We have some basle ideas about where conditions aze better and where they are worse, on the bass of which our thinking about development secks co create the traits found in good conditions elsewhere. The history that ‘ypically matters to Development Studies is of two kinds. There is the implicit selon ftom certain European experiences, a set of related political, social and economic changes that collectively define modern conditions, a heady brew fo be sure buc I will suggest in this chapter it remains inadequately nourishing _ for our appetites to construct beter Facores, Alternatively, history’s other lessons snvolvefullures elsewhere, oft explained by elther the limitations of the natives ore less worthy intentions of external actors conceived variously as benefac- _ ors and oppressors. We completely miss another kind of potential historical Iesson, one chat explains @ non-westem case through its continued reworking of | Giller practices and priorities. When these efforts addzess large issues we deem _ store general imporcance, understanding the historical lesson can matter not ‘marely for a particular case but for our understanding of global sssues more generally ‘This chapter considers issues of social welfare and political accountability. It dugues, contrary to the general implications of research and scholarly observa- “Bos, levels of social welfare need not always vary positively with levels of “democratic practice. 1 suggest instead that technologies of rule that enable concerns for social welfie can exist quite independently of Buropean-derived "des and institutions of politial representation and government administration, | Gould these non-European practices suggest ways to approach social welfare llenges beyond the specific case of China, which is the main subject of this sy eens deve pir caper 0, our wextbook understanding about socal wei challenges inthe contemporary world may want to incude some new historical Lessons ‘Chana’ durabilcy a8 teritorial unit is frequently noted by both specialists and in more general dscussions, but it is more often assumed and ken 25 8 vraniral fet than is laken asa condition to be explained. Since no other fmnperial ae in world history has bequeathed to its successors in the twenty frst century 2 ovemament har continues to rale most ll the territory and afar vaster popult- vhee chan was once ruled by an emrpie, China's reproduction of agrarian empire wo be considered 4 major subject in world history This ehapter takes om ony mall pare of this subject that connects quite decty to the capacities and asmmitments of the contemporary Chinese state toward tts subjects. In pattc- his chapter suggests how politcal accountability noth the elghtesath ‘cory and in contemporary China is achieved through balancing cxotraTocal {etasovshi in ways that facitate spatial integration through: attention tO ety droves, Tis is not to say that Chinese governments have consistently satisfied ctl welfare concezns far froma i. Buc the state's suocestes have been sntinately Tred to such satisfactions, These successes have had relatively litle to do with democratic practices, a least a¢ conventionally conceived, and for this season sofa a diferent perspective on thinking about how social welfare isues might tbe addressed in what continues to bea quite undemocratic world, Social spending and democracy: contexts for variation ‘The proposition that democracies will spend more on socal welfire than despoue regiznes makes intalive sense, If deinoeacies make policies according fo the will of the people, they will certainly favour public needs more than 3 despotic regime will since the latter seks to maximize the despor’s interests anc welfare over those of his subjects. The economist Peter Lindert, for example ocuments a reationship beoveen democracy aud social spending in bis to- “lume study Groving Pllc (Lindert 2004), which begins in the ate nineteenth Teomury among countries that have varying amounts of politcal representation th an example perhaps more familiar t those engaged in development studies ‘martya Sen has famously contased Chinese and Indian efforts at famine relief fo support the proposition that famines are less likely to take place the more ‘hemowratic the regime. in brief, he observes that no major famine has ever ake face fa any country with a multiparey democracy with regular elections and Wath a reasonably free press’ (Sen 2002: 287).The finding hokis across rich and: ‘poor democracies and is further supported by contrasts between China and Inds China ‘managed to have pethaps the largest fisnine in zecorded history, daring 1989-1962, in which 23-30 million people died, while the mistaken public policies were not revised for thee years through tke fimine. tn Tada, on tbe Biher hand, despite its bungling ways, large famines stopped abrupdy with canoe et ache snetaiinn na mitinarty democracy (the last such ei ne set omen il wali Chine pal an otal cating famine, “the great Bengal famine,” had occurred in 1943)’ Sen 2002: 287). The basic proposition appears to be a causal one ~ democaacies do not have famines and the logic is 2 political one. Rulers who need to be re-elected and who are subject to a free press cannot hide disasters and cannot afford to address them because people will not vote to continue them in power should they fil €0 address famine issues. The logic is a reasonable and general application of interest-based actions by government and citizens faced with a major social clas ke famine that people belicve the government can interven to prevent, Innocent of Chinese history, the China-India contrast makes persuasive sense. If, however, we consider the existence in eighteenth-century China of complex Iange-scale famine relief campaigns and the storage of tons upon tons of gran for relief of seasonal food supply shortfall, it becomes les clear that the degree of democratic accountability can explain goverament interventions to meet social \welfire needs. The contrast of eighteenth-century conditions in China with those Jn the late 1950s demands some explanation that doesn't depend on levels of democratic accountability since such concepts seem ill-conceived to apply to Ch dh ie hing enced emir of Chine ory ‘Avbrief lesson in Chinese history 1a dhe elghteenth-cennury Qing Empire, we ind a well-ordered society in which the state spends considerable suis on water conto, on food supaly storage, and ‘taj famine rele? campaigns. The sate alo stressed education; fom tne to time officials in different provinces made special efforts to establish schools to feucate poorer boys wha could not afford private school or cators to prepare them for the studies needed to take the civil service examinations. Officials in some parts of the Empire also workee with local elites to establish orphanages tnd range for suppor: of indigent widows. Socal spending in eighteenth. century China vas ofiea substan. Just water control works alone likely avenged come 5.5 milion tels amnualy tn dhe rald-eighteenth century sn these ‘ame years bureaucratic salaries toaled some 6 million taels annually and the routine coms for the military about 18 million tes annually (Zhou 2007 24-9). Water control expencitures thus ran (o nealy 20 percent ofthe amounts spect on military mainzenance and over half the amount budgeted for ofScil salaries. Chinese offeals understood that the maritime regions of te Empire posed ‘afferent opportunities and challenges than the landlocked interior. The sighteenth-century stare had lule need for revenues from naridime trade and ‘yas fr more interested in contolling the Buropean merchant presence on ‘Chinese sol; interior regions presented varied social and natural environments ‘hae officals sought to sabilize culturally and develop economically (Wong | 2004). The stare, moreover, showed special awareness of the needs of more 10s 106 Han Rss ed ddan ply peripheral and poorer regions to which it sent resounees in efforts to mae the grav econoray more viable for populations that were im some places growing juicy becrase of migition (Wong 1997: 105~39, Wong 1999: 210-45). Teas owt promoting fo dnc imnortance of materially secure about promoting food supply security and t ‘onulaoa tthe poll fortanes of rues go bk 1 pres Canes Polieal thought and took various Instatonal forms over the two thousan years in which imperial rule was the norm more often than not. Ideas about te playing 2 considerable rmoting market-based economic growth and the stat | Saget a treet temas renal Fegion® Inspired a variety of polices in the last aillennium Imperial rule, including the eleventh-century policies of Wang Anshi to develop jant-led growth in the eighteenth ‘tate monopolies to management of mirchant-led gr century (Smith 1991, Millward 1998), Finally, a.sres.om the welfare of rural ms took on growing visiblcy after the fourteenth century as the propor fron of people living in urban sculements appears to have declined; socal snbilty reached far beyond the ety walls within which most European notions of pubic order were conceived. * Coro be convenient to attribute Chinese policy-making simply t0 saan rloped over many ceaturles. But politi ally specific politcal ideology chat develops Thetoric alone seems inadequate to explain the differences between China ad orope regarding soclal spending before the advent of democracies. Henry 1V in sinteenth-ceneary France is reputed to have promised a chicken fr every pot and ‘sighteenth-century Frederick the Great in Prussia professed 2 concern for uma ‘pellet the same time ashe spent most of his tite and energy, a well as bis Jubjects’ zesourees, on war-inaking. Our awareness of limited efflcacy of welfare hetorie in European cases prepared, atleast Indirectly, an earlier generation of Scholars studying Chinese history to be skeptical of the practical relevance of evolence. ‘political claims to paternal bent a With the opening of Qing ayansy archives in the 19805, sthoas ha sained a more empirically grounded understanding of sate sctivites, including those related #0 social welfve (Will and Wong 1997). What we continue so struggle with is an explanation of the chotces the Qing state made to embark ring people ranch sajor programs. Se hae suggested hata x conquering pop fhm beyond the Get Wal fic spars ned ele Tn cia tan dba lonfsading these on CP HoT governance This factor may explain some ofthe motivation, chough also seems that late seventeenth and eighteenth-century emperors were nutored in texts aad 7 internalized a set of Confucian political beliefs that made eheix efforts more tha the anxious insteumental acts of leaders who saw themselves as foreign andl cus tn special need of acceptance by those they ruled. Part of the explanation no doubt les in the greater importance of warfare and military spending to early ‘modern European rulers than late imperial Chinese emperors, In the two centuries before Lindert’s late eighteenth-century baseline far =~ vine im envial spending frst in England and then on the nineteenth: ise ses ot eter sl ele Cine poke bl ges ‘century Furopean continent, socal spending was more likely to be shouldered by toe orem I Ey evermen al Chay by rigs sts formed 4 highly visible part of were efforts, For thelr pats, centalizing governments were busier with state-building which meant rising monies to build bureaucracies and armies (Tily 1975, 1992), Buropean state-makers competed with each other for waritory and taxable populations, seeking t0 lumprove heir geopolitical strength a the expense of other states. In contrast, the Chinese Bmpire was not part of a set-of similar competing states, While the agrarian empire faced various smi-nomadic groups who could cause difficulties along shifting frontiers, the general patern in earlier centuries had been for northern tribes to depend on a unified Chinese Hmpire to be a richer and more dependable source of goods than a weak and fragmented empire could possibly be, Nomads had, in other words, an interest ia negotiating favorable terms for cachange and gif-giving with a song rather than a weak agrarian empire ‘The Chinese state was only overthrow once between the late fourteeath and ‘atly twentieth centuries and in that case the conqueror not only established ‘coat over all of the previous dynasty’ territories, but also extended the Empires northem and western territories. Under dese general conditions, the need for military expenditures di not, indeed could not, fuel the growth of the Chinese state in the manner taking place In Furope-To the contrary, the Chinese ‘ate already had a civil service bureaverscy with 2 broad strategy of rule, which indluded social spending. The politcal logic of mainialning a stable agrarian empire cle for eeuring Te marl seu of he pease’ poplin Te ‘ighteenth-century Chinese state eanslated this general commigment into policies for opening new arable land, maintaining water ways and inrgation works, and spreading agricultal and bandieraét technologies fam economic cores to peripheries, Cne ‘of the more expensive operations they mounted required massive efforts to build and maintain a system of eivitan grain reserves snd in times of extreme deprivation they made extaordinary efforts at fnine © relief (Will 1990, Will and Wong 1991), Famine relief issues were enmeshed in broader concerns about state inter- vention to stabilize social conditions across an agrarian empire. The eighteenth- ‘century state provided what we would call today collective goods — peace, ecurity. and economic infrastructure. Major projects required spectal efforts to {)). Duobilize monies and manpower; these campaigns made it possible £0 make cra epairs and even improvements in water control managernent The govern- ‘owns development of granary system to store hundreds of thousands of tons of grain for sle and loan to needy people also depended on major campaigns Since these campaigns were intermistent, people felt tle need or desire to create dle principles for_negotinting with offcals Over how. such they owed in nouey or labour service. They tied whenever possible to evade or deflect the vate’ demands, a practice far easier than attempting to develop formal and ‘plicit rules to govern negotiations. The routine presence of the late smmperial 107 108 Hits dlp ley see was ited ~ not upg since reese vast agin ceipoe a inthe cighenth enary sexton erento cond Fe sour efonine slew ar agate ke aang altary camps. Wr sbould be sles ta the denon of sasining am agra empires uo fom toe of ng ompeng Sa ner a Ete See the Ss ithe ps sacs a popaons a rough compari we cous ge are see eb dtm Eom tae spurte sol experiences igh abo te tony cmpneble he Purpeen soos fm much of ou ase ane vEnntoy 2h modem sate foation and ronoe development The Cane SSperetcs toate Ive yet been inexpted Ins maser eacoeging 1) Winn be deows ivi th aoe le ers ead ft erent rence fhe Chinese at sete nthe surR pono of seuss nay al be ine when te posi ohne esns cn a eat be pose Gea the vary re imation of adnnisasve ops npn pole ones bso hes tole burr oer + ge ry rea poplin dened on enrougngpstie reasons between cue and Teak, No ples ene cold commang te cote reourers © pes city one sbjennTo be sues» sate ha need t fe sce pertain ison of good ale and implement pote heats some thetine came tone sehioig std intenons oc were needs igure fronieny th gens for loc socal oder xpresed Ip Conan pita Meloy apd plemented through nso designed to gromess such = socal eet, pie depended on seeing socal ee especatos of at ruber of loc commis. Sackl weline {G5 piel biiy wee incimnelyconzeted, bok fn he retro te Toner ann the socal pcos we in observe ad nae Snce thus prcice emerge with nae he Hees nor isons of anor pesca we hv dents a context are fom fe onventony Peper oil ete concerns proving anesthe sce see hal yon arg sal ore co age pes ne populations Thee Chea ce gps yp fer ri sings iy to rege srs ange wa nen cov goveraens more Encnch met oe comers for socal elie sad sono prose The Susy of tie posty as been ey t gre since we kw haste Perle were nom fee Obed i some stbsegses perods of Chines sect aces conning farther the posse ener elton of Chines Total cio contemporrycllnge tore goer, ome pres veal hiner snaon In wich the egheensetry lope of pol Shecos absent needed lsc Hens but expan vl wl Chine es cdl henge ‘Nineteenth-century sorrows and twenticth-century tragedies 4 nineteenth-century China, taxation begins to Increase dramatically at mid- ‘century and bureaucratic effort is shifted from social spending to railitary and. defense matte, The relative amounts of Chinese government expenditures devoted to social spending go down as military-related expenditures increase from the eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries, while the opposite trend ‘occurs in Burope. The intial military threats and subsequent diplomatic esolu- ‘ions with European powers begun in the late 1830s were followed by massive sid-century zebellions, and subsequent continning institutional innovations in Fespoose to western challenges. The previous prionty placed on social welfare expenditures was no longer possible, the central government's influence over local conditions increasingly limited. The oentval goverment was in fact successful in mobilizing ever larger revenues; it learned how co use western principles and practices of bank borrowing and public debt. But these kinds of successes were not accompanied by a continued capacity to fulfill the agenda for rule articulated and implemented in the previous century. Wail these liaitations ‘were not themselves directly responsible for the collapse ofthe dynasty ~ foreign pressures and the stresses created by them were far moze smaportant — forma- lating prinetples of rule after 1911 would include concern for local social order, fren when no central government ruling the territory of the Qing dynasty was able to establish Itself until 1949. 4m the era of warlords that followed the dynasty’ fall, as well as the decade of Nationalist rule and subsequent years of Japanese invasion and civil war with the Communists, there was no central government seeking to sustain social order ‘ough the maintenance of local welfare stendards. Political iastability and -niltary curmoil reduced the country to a fax more chaotic condition then could ‘uve even been imagined in the eighteenth century. China couldn't use the principles and practices of social welfare provision to create political order until | miltary security had been once again achieved, Such an outcome was by no séans a foregone conclusion, There could have been a mix of successor states ‘nore similar fo those that followed other cases of agrarian empire across Furasia. ‘That Chia in 1949 was once again a uniffed country, he government of which | aimed sovereignty over most al of what had been the eighteenth-century Qing Empire's greatest extent, did however mean that the challenges of ruling local Societies from a distant center once again entered onto the government's political agenda ‘The Communist sate zeintroduced a form of centralized feaiures woul een famliar fo a mid-eighteench-century ruler or his E plas The central sate TEEREETC TOS TOSTEY Gre SG oT taetion ‘émoving from lower levels of government any stanutory opportunities to raise ‘evenues. The central government claimed to control authority over personnel, decisions throughout the country and implemented a set of principles for D) ecting and placing its officials, different in substance to be sure fom late 109 Hs ees of deo iy ia prin, at sarin asumptons aot ho he ene cosets iho soon to mi of pole and breast cetee, Most eran 0 Sheu theme of is pes the cent gverene embraced ts espon- Shu fx securing and hopely improving the exonoc condions of pests nd were srs the cour The fst several years of Communist ul eee een abe sueceslestorton of econo sity and seal rer omnny wacked by iyperiation aad servation, Bae wo ese sucess as ‘eang eet tes Wi thetean fo cea soc order wh some minal Minune sccty Thee achievements vere mk however sour because the we Ndoogr demoed sor hang and apne f9 eosomie deepen “pe unngile vo undsed yeas caer and mon importa. he sate Treated olf pervson and curio a exceling hoe alse exer rom the government's elus pur of what Mao Zedong ale ‘conn wou thse ico scold ec op a rept Hw poper esomses fo povernmestexhoatans fr eve gate “Ten tas bnew seni eras tisowealy inmasiie Chinese sate of the te 19505 fr les ble seen condiens tha sheen ery reecesor was. Taner oh ara feat inane hats mi ewenteth-y veo sate wth» Br ages hueancraty commited © mao interven dons in local social and economic life could snrowe Jess.able chan amide snightornthoconhing sinte limited by pre-industrial technologies to ameliorate fasine conditions. se. Fist, the af Two contrasts in particular help us to begin to resolve the surprise. Fist the, 4 mid-eighteenth-century Chinese central govemument received monthly grain His es abut eager cel wean Cin usage! alls movements proved inadequate, officials could themselves travel to large grain ‘markets and arrange purchases and transport of grain to their jurisdictions with great need. They would not do so, however, without fist making use of the grain They stored tn official granaries intended to ameliorate seasonal fluctuations in {grain prices with spring sales and auturmm purchases after new harvests brought down prices. In contrast China in the late 1950s had suffered a major disman- ting of the earlier commercial networks so that there was no economic systein hrough which price signals could influence flows of grain or to which officials could appeal for help in relieving supply shortages from areas with better harvests, ‘Changes in economic organization and administrative capacities matter more 'o explaining chis Chinese contrast than do differences in deiocratc Ideology ‘nd instivations. Similarly, the dramatically open response top Chinese officals have made 1 the spring 2008 earthquakes in Sichuan results from a desire 0 mobilize both domestic and foreign support in relief efforts and a desire to be seen as responsive to popular suffering The US of course remains far more a ‘dqqnocracy than China despite its hurricane relief effarts filling fir short of what the Chinese have mounted for its earthquakes, Thus, t would seer the relation- ship between degree of democracy and responsiveness of government to social isaster is conditioned by other factors quite independent of democratic ‘impulses, Theories about public choice predicated on democratic forms of decision- |. aking cannot help us explain the eighteenth-centary Qing's levels of social spending. Nor can a narrow focus on political ideologies get us very far in , ecpkining why Qing state social spending was higher in absolute and propor- / Nonal terms than in European states of the same era since Furopean rulers also fade suong statements about the importance of thee subjecs” elle. Pnally sch Gieories cannot help explain Use contrasts between Chinese condita in | the-mid-cighteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, Economic institutions and Gneetan quality pce data were ustliy quite rable in this period, Prvinea ‘ls forwarded wo te centre monthly soamaries based onthe high and low | pris of ea gino loa market in ach count aeralg some foo vor province, delivered to them evry ten days. With such information, cnt ovemnment officals were ina sorpiingly good position compared with oes Te socal sciences approach issues of pute cance and socal «pending In rove eighteent-conary world to ancipste harvest howls and rising pricey vary of ways Ezonomste seek ways to make voter choice about govemet across. a space as large as Europe for a population larger than many Buropestt j plovided goods and services approach in logic their consumes cholces for private sets ba sogeie In compara, ofl n the ae 1950 were expect gMMag ges on the are, ba he tine difleness betwen vng aad uke rovepon ver growing output fom he formation of communes which conc: Ag pbicases make posible varios alternative mechanisms for deidng pon how trated nny production and cousumption decisions seoss many atual igs a spending norrately sho take lace, Politi scents and soecogiee Fa nforhuton about grain harvetecbvactd te ails of leaders to lale MI ae more lkely to adress some combloaion of organizational and neteovk, gust how bad conditions became im many area, Second, mid-eighteenth-centiry Jesus of decision-making on socal speading to make clear how pelide! a : | somecions mater and how organize interest groups make their volees heard oor harvests sick ont eh MME Mich of what we lear Is about snyckutonal stings ta hanced inden sone of rin were sor ce When : ae tr aed wooing to rue! condone When mast bet MUMMIES oces and we do so through a st of pracsls etpotvie hos werner <{_ administrative capacities seem useful for the temporal contrast within China, but 4 how might we contrast the general approzch to social spending to China today. ‘with other parts of the world? Does history mattes, and if so how? Ww nd lary suri wl ded ply ‘values and analytical understandings. When Chinese study these foreign cases they focus on what they can consider the technical or scientific features of public finance and social spending so that the possiblities of borrowing from these advanced experiences and fitting them within a Chinese contest becomes more plausible But how ean they or we understand the formation and relevance of these Chinese contexts? The argument for how history matters centres oa the role of carlerstae practices for constructing and sustaining such a large teritory under a centalized bureaucratic regime and the proposition that the stategies and preferences that animated those earlier practices can still matter today, even amidst conditions that both we and the Chinese perceive in fundamentally different terms discursively For example, observers of China's reform-era changes have sometimes marveled atthe open willingness of the goverament 0 tolerate diverse experimentation as it changes Ics instutional rules. Same China specialists have offered functionalist explanations of wiy such flexibility as ‘been demanded by the circumstances for the reforms to succeed, but this begs the question of why the Chinese succeeded at being flexible when so many ‘others do not approach institutional change with such an open and flexible manner. One set of reasons for this flexibility, T suggest, has to do with the naturalized quality of experimentation that comes out of earlier recognition of variation in the manner ia which local order was sustained and extended. For instance, certain local institutions, including granaries and schools, were intended to be created and maintained by local elites who shared the Confucian polities] and social ideology of offletals; che actual roles of elites and officials, varied across China with officials playing a larger role where lites were fess common, less wealtay and less willing These variations were very much accepted in the eighteenth century In the 1920s and 1930s, innovations and successes at promoting socal order athe local level, most notably the conservative Confucian reformer Liang Shuming's efforts in Shandong province, could become models, chat central government affcils wished to spread more widely, in ways no: so dissimilar fiom how the Communist party state in the 1960s attempted to promote ‘learning fiom Dazhai’ as model of self-reliance ina poor agricultural region. Ina similar vein, the ete imperial state had for centuries promoted 2 very general agenda of orthexiox cultural practices regarding weddings and funerals and ancestor worship, while allowing tremendous variety of local deities to be ‘worshipped as people desired typically intervening only in rare instances when officials feared that some sect might threaten political sablity There is, in other ‘words, a bassin history for permitting great variation in local social and politcal practices that form the unstated context for the ways in Which evonomic reform experimentation has taken place, Where a long history of fiscal administration exists, as is the case in China, the ways m which taxation policies change is enmeshed In che transformation of existing practices with innovations and changes working only ia so far as they sol esos co mtr al wale CRn used yl lies solve thelr targeted challenges withouc exacerbating difflcuties in mecting some other set of concerns. A good example of this i the chronic underfunding of local government, a phenomenon made more severe since the mid-1990s, even Jn those areas where local government socal spending had increased in the previous decade, During the 1980s and into the 1990s, those loeales where township and vile enterprises (TVE) blossomed, which included many ofthe aeas with previously vibrant commercial economies before 1949, indeed ‘ypleally for centuries, relied on revenues from these TVE asa saurce to fund local ‘fucation, health and housing. As che ental government initiated a seris of tax tefoums to reverse is slipping grasp over taxes as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and as a share of total ax revenue (lower levels of government were increasing their relative shares), local governments previously able co engage in considerable social spending faced growing constraints. There ‘were aso local governments where TV had not become a significant economic Akiver of groweh and they continued to lack the ability to make many socal ~ expenditures. sn counts cing much TF, loaf ered toa ee andes ‘pon agra! honeols who cold iad to bea the idee Rest sulle systema data sce ho Bernsen an Et preset Bras fon Chinese study psd i 1998 soggetng ine peut te adore mee severly reed wo income, suggesting lat wate Pacts tegreve sen vege (Serastein na 132008199) The poles ith al esosn sane ser che mié-18905 to 3 plas redcion In aghcltberoevalg tumang milano fs exp tage ogee! the prove cas ta the end t agetiel naton in 2006, This thane esi symbolically becuse mils te end of rune on aren sea ure ot fal suppor, which ase had bee fr much of the wo towed eo ef impena a history ss wel for any polishes inte secs cena ‘acang the Teoples Republic iio Roe ser yeas of rls ital erm, te nd tapi nation reece the ton cage bling pace i Chee sce ~an rtaniong and indian socay ne Stal bse The ways in whic trent lee of esate tap ne cote of eh Began vt Io governnent ah ining the ery need seit spending flowed by cena gorrment fot ple + gener Pott of new sources of een. Raton among lees of goretonea rearing the lying sn caring of fsa eens wil so dou rove tyes sn changing Crucial among the challenges othe fora efor tron sre ta arenes ubuizng nor edstaliing is how to delop able ea te fcc senting The pele is boul sons at bas — preter abit poe compared wit plas thir urbasing end inderiang Dit cae considered spa of rer plea ive as do Senet ind 18, who wee Ebimporanot of local emo asne actin chose hee et ba ne 0 eis on eto py (Berastein and L8 2003, 2008). The essay appears in a volume, Taxon aud Sta- aldng in Doping Counts: Copcty and Const. (Brautigam et al, 2008), which evelops the theme of consent of the governed to taxes as a key way to build democratic gorernance. Amidst poverty, however, some resource transfers have to be azempted if poverty isto be alleviated and social goods and services provided. “The problems within China that result from such a situation provide a partial parallel 1 those that emerge for smaller countries that are poor and rural whese foreign aid is a criti! source of potential help that often gets used ineffectively and inappropriately It is possibie that officals in poor regions of Cina are prone to rent seeking as there are fewer ways to amass wealth than there are in more ‘dynamic economic areas. ‘The difference between the international and Chinese cases is that the later, 1 argue at Jeast in part for reasons with a long historical background, 1s committed. to these transfers and as they are ‘national’ in scope, the forms of social identity and perceived interests and concerns will be far different than those beeween donor countries and the developing world. Bus whac makes these teansfers possible bas litte to do with democracy or even with consent in any espe, consciously formulated manner. Historically, Chinese were drawn to make decisions fevouring public expenditures because these helped to maintain peace and prosperity across their empire. Their situation contrasted sharply with carly modern European rulers wiiose public expenditures went to war-making Chinese governments began to take social expenditures seriousiy at an earlier date than they did and thus they present from a European perspective something of a puzzle, which we can solve once we move outside a frame of reference in ‘which Suropean experiences supply the norms. For thelr part, Eropean states n0 longer compete miliarlly with each other, and we can even see some resource flows related to economic welfare issues across those states that belong to the. European Union; while these will never resemble closely what takes place in ‘China because the ideological and institutional bases of governance in China and Europe will long remain diferent, it changes our view of haw social spending generally and tansfers specifically develop when we introduce historical perspectives beyond those supplied by Burope. Conclusion Whatever the prospects and problems of fiscal transfers to fund social spending generally what we see in China isa persistest concern by the central government to promote economic development and social services across both regional divides and urban-rural divides, each of which is a preference and concern we can see in earlier centuries, The differences in today’s conditions, however, transform the nature of che challenges. Regarding regional disparity, it was @ far easier task to imagine diffusing best technologies before the original Industrial Revolution and the subsequent changes that have ansformed ie ons bat senor sacl elie Chis use lle halen uch of thelr public goods investment went to water control, grain storage, the challenge is to extend the higher rates of social spending in cities to rural yeas near thera, This effort seeks 10 lessen patt of the legacy of the instientional- aed divide between urban and rural China for the first three decades of the People's Republic, 2 divide that helped China escape the massive problems of ‘overpopulation and underemployment in many Third World cities before the past three decades of economic growth makes it easler to ponder how urban advane ‘ages, many of them associated with higher Jevels of social spending, can be titended to the countryside, The Chinese state takes a far more activist role in sddressing what it considers the challenges of regional disparities and urban- _ rural gaps than we would anticipate in other parts of the world. One could argue that they must do so because their rapid growth rates make the challenges more ~sliegt chan they would be were the economic transformation taking place at a slower rate. Yet, it does seem that urban—rural gaps remain pronounced in many parts of the developing world without the level of effort devoted to them that we see in China. If these impressions ean be substantiated more fully, 2 cage for a variety of ways in which history matters to explaining patterns of social spending asa fearuze of a larger set of issues about political accountability within and beyond democracies scems well worth making across te world generally References ‘emsten, Thownas and Xiaobo Ln (2003). Tn witha Repesntaon in Canepa Buel Chins, Cambricige: Cambridge University Press Bemstein, Thomas and Xaobo To (2008). “sation and coercion in rural Chin sa Deborah Brautigam, Oild-Helge Feldstad and Mick Moore (eds) Tamtoe and Sae- Bulag io Derdoplg Cou Copcty end Come, New York: Cambridge University Pres, pp. 89-113 Brautgam, Deborah, Odd Helge jeldstad and Mick Moore (eds) (2008). Txt ant State Salling in Dain Coad Cepaty and Cnet, NewYork: Cambridge University ress ‘ilward, James (1998). Ban! te Pes: Eemomy, Sty ant Bmpr in Qig Cat! Ase 1758-1864, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press ‘inven, Pete (2004). Gein Pic See peaking nd Noman Grmth Sn te Bight Cnty YL 1, NewYork: Cambridge Universy Press Sen, Amartya (2002). Rutonlty oul Fen, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Smith, Pal (1991) Tang Hen’ Sorbus: Hoses, Euersmts, aa he Dette of Scho a Ins, 10741224, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Reese ‘ily, Charles (ed) (1975). The Ruan of Nao Sater ix Wena Sue, Princeton, N} Princeton University Press Tilly, Charles (1992). Cosco, Capital an! Frypan Stes AD 9901992. Maken, MA Blackwell ‘Will, Pierv-fenne (Hhorg Forster, ans) (1990). Busey anf Famine in Kghnath-Ceany (Cis, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press us ne sy seis eo ded ey Will, lene ftienne and. Bin Wong (1991). Nourish te Pople Tae Ste Cian Gray Ste i Cling, 1680-1850, Ann Arbos, Ml: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies ‘Wong, R. Bin (1997). Chine Iam: Hier Change nd the Limits of Baap Beaten, Thats, NY! Cornell University Pest ‘wong, K. Bin (1999) "The political economy of agrarian Chins and its nade lege sm Timothy Brook and Gregory Blue (eds) Chim ani Cola: Gases of Sooo Roo, Cambridge: Camiridge University ress, pp. 2105 ‘Wong, R Bin (2004), ‘Relationships betwreea the political eoononnles of maritiae and ‘guaran China, 1750-1850", in Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-Keong (eds) Masime (Chins in Test, 1750-1850, Wlesbacan Hamassowiz Verlag, pp. 19-31 ‘how, Zc (2002). We Qug exh jig yur (Research on late Qing fiscal éminis- ‘eston), Jinan a shushe Notes 1 “These igure ae suggestive only; othr military expenditures not part of the rontine pattern were also made in some years Oficial salaries do noe indicate the full est of ‘xdniuiscaton as fees and sacaxes were collected 0 pay for staff a the local Teves ad in some cases to enrich oficials beyond what was deetned reasonable or consid- cre av ‘CoMMENTARY Why might history matter for development policy? Rayi Kanbur' ‘When econoriiss analyze development policy the first requirernent Isa descrip Lion’ of the economy ~ of individuals, households, firms, farms and any other relevant entities, how they behave and how they Interact. Typically, the interaction {is modelled as being through markets, mostly competitive although every now and then non-competitive interactions, and non-market interactions are also Incorporated. Having setup the ‘non-policy’ outcome (that is to say, without the policy of specific interest) the policy is introduced and the consequences are ‘worked our given the model of the econoray specified earlier Those in the new political economy school might also try to endogenize the policy choice itself, by in tum modelling the policy and political process, the incentives of che

    You might also like