TEAM CODE: TC_101

GURUCHARAN DAS MEMORIAL

1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2024

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF NEW BHARAT

UNDER ARTICLE 133 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW BHARAT

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

MR. AARAV………………………………………………………………. APPELLANT

V.

MS. ZARA & ORS………………………………………………………… RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC PAGE NO.

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3-5

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 6-8
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 9
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 10-11
5. ISSUES RAISED 12
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 13-14
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 15-32
8. PRAYER 33

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

& And

A.I.R All India Reporter

ALL. Allahabad

Anr. Another

A.P. Andhra Pradesh

Art. Article

Auth. Authority

Bom Bombay

Const. Constitution

CRC The Convention on the Rights of the Child

Ed. Edition

Govt. Government

Guj. Gujarat

GWA Guardians and Wards Act

H.C High Court

H.P. Himachal Pradesh

HMA The Hindu Marriage Act

Hon’ble Honorable

i.e. That is

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 ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights

IDA Indian Divorce Act

IPC Indian Penal Code

I.T Act Information Technology Act

KAR. Karnataka

Ld. Learned

Ltd. Limited

M.P. Madhya Pradesh

No. Number

Ors. Others

Para Paragraph

Pg. Page No.

Raj. Rajasthan

ss. Sections

Sec Section

S.C. Supreme Court

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

S.C.R Supreme Court Reports

S.C.W Supreme Court Weekly

S.M.A Special Marriage Act

Supp. Supplement

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 T.N. Tamil Nadu

Tri Tripura

u/s under section

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

U.S. United States

U.T. Union Territory

U.O.I Union of India

UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of

the Child

v. Versus

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

INDIAN CASES
➢ Adi sivachariyargal nala sangam v. govt. of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2016 SC 209.
➢ B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy (2005) 3 SCC 313.
➢ Babu Digumarti v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & anr, AIR 2017 SC 150.
➢ Chethana Ramatheertha v. Kumar V. Jahgirdar, AIR 2001 SC 2179.
➢ Debika Chakraborty v. Pradip Chakraborty, AIR 2017 Calcutta 11.
➢ Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, 1981 SCR (2) 516
➢ Gobind Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh,AIR 1975 SC 1378.
➢ Justice K. S Puttaswamy v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 3081.
➢ Kamla Devi v. Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1987 HP 34.
➢ Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
➢ Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
➢ Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli (JT 2008 (6) SC 634)
➢ Meera Agarwalla Bansal and ANR. v. Shyam Sundar Agarwalla (2002) DMC 593
➢ Mohan Kumar Rayana v. Komal Mohan Rayana, (2010) 5 SCC 657.
➢ Nemchand vs khemrajn, AIR 1973 raj. 200.
➢ Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu (2008)9 SCC 413: AIR 2009 SC (SUPP) 732.
➢ Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, AIR 2002 SC 2582
➢ R.V. Srinath Prasad v. Nandamuri Jayakrishna (2001) 4 SCC 71
➢ Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu. AIR 1995 SC 264.
➢ Ramkripa S/O Shyamlal Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Appeal (crl.) 370 of 2007.,)
➢ Ravi Kumar v. Julmidevi (2010) 4 SCC 476.
➢ Salome v. Dr. Prince D. Immanuel Madras HC (C.M.A.(MD)Nos.238 of 2012 and 239 of 2012)
➢ Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. AIR 2017 SC 150.
➢ Shayana Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SCC 1388.
➢ Shaziaaman Khan & ANR. v. State of Orissa & Ors. SLP Crl. No. 7290 of 2023.
➢ Sheila AB. Das v. P.R Sugasree(2003) 3 SCC 62.
➢ Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) 5 S.C.R165
➢ Sri Arun Das v. Smt. Aparna Das, AIR ONLINE 2021 Tri 115.
➢ State of Karnataka v. Sri Bhagya Lakshmi, 2013, ILR 1998 KAR 478.

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 ➢ State of Karnataka v. Umadevi 2006 4 SCC 1.
➢ State v. Shailesh, CRL.A. 1025/2018) (2019)
➢ Sukhendu Das v. Rita Mukherjee, AIR 2017 SC 5092
➢ V. Bhagat v. D Bhagat (Mrs.), AIR 1994 SC 710.
➢ V. Vimala v. Veeraswamy (1991) 2 SCC 375.
➢ Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit (2002)3 SCC78

INTERNATIONAL CASES

➢ White v. White (2001) A.C. 596.

➢ Allgeyer v. Louision. 165 US 578 (1897).
➢ Olmstead v. U.S, 277 US 438, 478(1928).

STATUTES

➢ The Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act 21 of 2000).

➢ The Constitution of New Bharat.
➢ The Penal Code of New Bharat, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
➢ The Special Marriage Act, 1954. (Act 43 of 1954).
➢ The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
➢ The Indian Divorce Act, 1869.
➢ Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
➢ Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973.

BOOKS

➢ M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 907 (Kamal Law House, Calcutta, India, 8thedn., 2018).
➢ Dr. J. N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India 291 (Central Law Publication, 30-D/1 , Moti Lal
Nehru Road ,Prayagraj, India , 60th edn., 2023).
➢ K.D. Gaur, Textbook on Indian Penal Code, 1423 (Universal Law Publishing - An Imprint of
Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon-122002, Haryana, India, 8th., 2023).
➢ Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 607 and 865 (Universal Law Publishing - An
Imprint of Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon-122002, Hariyana, India, 36th edn., 2019).
➢ Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law (Allahabad Law Agency, 24th edition).

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OTHER AUTHORITIES

❖ CONVENTION
➢ United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.
❖ LAW COMMISSION REPORT
➢ Law Commission of India, 257th Report on Reforms in Guardianship and Custody (May,
2015)

WEBSITES

➢ https://www.scconline.com.
➢ https://www.manupatrafast.com.
➢ https://indiankanoon.org.
➢ https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article.html.
➢ https://www.livelaw.in.
➢ https://blog.ipleaders.in.

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat has the jurisdiction in this matter under Article 133 of the
Constitution of New Bharat.

Article 133 of the Constitution states that :

Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to civil matters

(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil
proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies under article 134A-

(a)that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and

(b)that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in article 132, any party appealing to the Supreme Court under clause
(1) may urge as one of the grounds in such appeal that a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of this Constitution has been wrongly decided.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, no appeal shall, unless Parliament by law otherwise
provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of one Judge of a High
Court.

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

➢ A matrimonial dispute between an inter-religious couple unfolds.

1. In the city of Gaunagar (State of Nilachal Pradesh) New Bharat, renowned for its cultural
diversity, a matrimonial dispute unfolds between two individuals, Aarav (a Hindu) and Zara (a
Muslim), who entered into an inter-religious marriage despite vehement opposition from their
families.
➢ A genuine bond of love and affection despite societal expectation and opposition.
2. The day Zara stepped into Aarav's home, met with a cold reception as the family, deeply rooted
in tradition, could not fathom the union of their son with someone from a different faith. As
days turned into weeks, the disdainful gazes of the family strangely transformed into care and
affection. Aarav's family now got to know that Zara is the only Daughter of a renowned
businessman of the city. Driven by greed and societal status, Aarav's family showered Zara with
feigned affection, masking their true intentions behind a facade of hospitality. However, Zara,
with her discerning eyes, could see through the charade, and in deep beneath yearned for
genuine acceptance and love of family which money could not buy.
3. Despite of so many challenges and different attempts of radical groups to nullify their marriage,
Aarav and Zara stood united by the threads of their genuine affection and found solace in each
other's support. And as time flew by, five years had passed since their marriage and by the time
they have also been blessed with, 'Aashi'...their girl child aged 3 years.

➢ The couple was dealt with a cruel fate.

4. One day, Aarav's childhood best friend, Raj, who had become well-settled in Canada, visited
India, and Aarav was overjoyed to see him after so many years. Raj proposed Aarav and Zara
to visit the serene hill station of "Rasauli", to which both Aarav and Zara eagerly agreed upon.
It was the first time in years that Aarav and Zara were going somewhere together, leaving
behind the weights of their troubles.
5. As the trio embarked on their journey to 'Rasauli, Aarav and Zara were filled with an
unparalleled sense of happiness. But cruel fate dealt them a sharp blow. It seemed like someone
had cast an evil eye on Aarav and Zara's blissful abode!
6. A private moment captured on video, meant only for their eyes, was maliciously leaked onto
social media, tarnishing their reputation beyond repair and leading to character assassination
and threats. Overnight, Aarav and Zara's settled world shattered, leaving them reeling in
disbelief and despair.
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➢ The petition for divorce by Mrs. Zara
7. Subsequently Zara fell victim to the radical group of her faith and filed for divorce before the
Family Court of Gaunagar on the ground of irreconcilable differences due to religious
disparities, invasion of privacy through online platforms. Zara accuses Aarav of posting
sensitive information on social media and also alleges of cyber stalking, however, Aarav insists
on maintaining the union.
➢ The judgment of Learned Family Court later upheld by the Hon’ble High Court
8. The Family Court granted a divorce, Moreover a significant portion of the marital assets and
the custody of the minor children was given to Zara, and the High Court of Nilachal Pradesh
upheld the decision of the family court.

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 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1: HOW DOES THE COURT BALANCE THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AGAINST SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS AND OPPOSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTER-
RELIGIOUS MARRIAGES?

ISSUE 2: TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000, BE

INVOKED TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS FROM MISUSE OF PERSONAL CONTENT ON
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS?

ISSUE 3: WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN

INTERPRETING FAMILY LAW PROVISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTER-RELIGIOUS
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCE?

ISSUE 4: TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE COURT CONSIDER EACH PARENT’S

INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHILDREN’S LIVES WHEN DETERMINING CUSTODY
ARRANGEMENTS?

ISSUE 5: HOW DOES THE COURT ASSESS THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
ASSETS, AND WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE WEIGHED IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS
CASE?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: HOW DOES THE COURT BALANCE THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AGAINST SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS AND OPPOSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTER-
RELIGIOUS MARRIAGES?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that The Special Marriage
Act,1954 provides a legal framework for the marriage of people belonging to different religions or
castes. In the present case, from being a woman of such a religion which gives an emphasis on modesty
she has faced vehement opposition from their families and so many challenges and different attempts
of radical groups to nullify their marriage. Still she stood united with Aarav by neglecting all the
societal expectations and oppositions but in return Mr. Aarav not only infringed her privacy but also
shattered her trust, tarnishing her reputation beyond repair and leading to character assassination and
threat.

ISSUE 2: TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000, BE

INVOKED TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS FROM MISUSE OF PERSONAL CONTENT ON
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that the Information
Technology Act,2000 gives the individuals the right to seek remedies in case of misuse of their personal
content on social media. The respondent being a reasonable woman of sound mind and dignity is
incapable of posting sensitive information of herself on social media, hence leaving the appellant who
has been cyber stalking the respondent, in a position of posting sensitive information on social media,
committing the invasion of privacy of the respondent under Section 66E and 67A Of the Information
Technology Act,2000.

ISSUE 3: WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN

INTERPRETING FAMILY LAW PROVISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTER-RELIGIOUS
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCE?

It is humbly contented that The Special Marriage Act, 1954 provides a legal framework for the marriage
of people belonging to different religions or caste. It must be taken into considerations when
interpreting family law provisions in the context of inter-religious marriages that the consent of the
family or the community or the clan or the state or executive is not necessary, once the two adult
individuals enter into a legal wedlock. In the present case the the respondent has faced irreconcilable
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differences due to religious disparities and her privacy was also invaded which amount to cruelty, a
valid and considerable ground of divorce under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

ISSUE 4: TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE COURT CONSIDER EACH PARENT’S

INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHILDREN’S LIVES WHEN DETERMINING CUSTODY
ARRANGEMENTS?

It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that Maternal custody
guarantees emotional security and consistency for the child, fostering familial connection and offering
a nurturing atmosphere. The sole maternal custody will be the best interest for the child because Mr.
Aarav has invaded the privacy as well as modesty of the mother of the child, so giving custody to Mr.
Aarav can be detrimental.

ISSUE 5: HOW DOES THE COURT ASSESS THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF

MARITAL ASSETS, AND WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE WEIGHED IN THE
CONTEXT OF THIS CASE?

It’s humbly submitted that The special Marriage Act ,1954 does not have specific provisions regarding
distribution of marital assets but asset division is determined by the court, based on principles of
fairness and equity. In the present case the respondent deserves to keep a significant portion of marital
assets due to post divorce maintenance of the respondent and due to the maintenance of the child.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: HOW DOES THE COURT BALANCE THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AGAINST SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS AND OPPOSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTER-
RELIGIOUS MARRIAGES?

1.1 It is humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that
societal expectation promotes endogamy. Inter-religious marriages are a stigma in the society as it is
mostly believed to be a matter of forced conversion. In contradiction to societal expectation of an
opposition in the context of inter religious marriages the legislature has enacted special law to provide
for a unique form of marriage by registration wherein the parties to the marriage do not have to
renounce their religion. The Special Marriage Act, 19541 provides a legal framework for the marriage
of people belonging to different religions or castes. It governs a civil marriage where the state sanctions
the marriage rather than the religion.

1.2 It is humbly and respectfully submitted to duly note the following scenarios that are pertinent
to the present matter:

➢ Despite vehement opposition the respondent was genuinely involved in the relationship.
In the instant matter, despite vehement opposition from their families and so many
challenges and different attempts of radical groups to nullify their marriage, Aarav and
Zara stood united by the threads of their genuine affection and found solace in each
other's support. And as time flew by, five years had passed since their marriage and by
the time they have also been blessed with, ‘Aashi’ their girl child aged 3 years.2 The facts
of the case clearly imply that despite of societal expectations and opposition in context of inter-
religious marriages, the respondent whole heartedly participated in the society of her husband
and was fully committed to the conjugal life.

1. The Special Marriage Act, 1954.

2. Statement of Facts, Para 3.
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➢ The respondent faced cold reception from appellant’s family
It is humbly and respectfully submitted that at the initial stage of the matrimony the respondent met
with cold reception from the family members of the appellant and could see through the greed and
feigned affection of her in-laws due to her father’s financial background.3 It is also humbly and
respectfully submitted that the respondent was facing religious disparity since the beginning of the
union due to disdainful gazes, charade and facade of hospitality of her in-laws. These eventually
amount to mental cruelty as in deep beneath she yearned for genuine acceptance and love of
family.4 In the case of V. Bhagat v. D Bhagat (Mrs.) (1994).5 Mental Cruelty can broadly be defined
as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not
possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature
that the parties cannot reasonable be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the
wronged party cannot be reasonably be asked to put up with such continue to live with the other party.
Despite of all the mental pressure she continued her conjugal life blinded by love, loyalty, and charm
for her partner.
➢ The respondent suffered from mental cruelty due to invasion of privacy through online platforms
It is humbly and respectfully submitted that a private moment captured on video was maliciously
leaked on the social media6, provided that the video was meant only for their eyes.7 It was Mr. Aarav
who not only infringed her privacy but also shattered her trust, tarnishing her reputation beyond repair
and leading to character assassination and threat. Women being a vulnerable section of the society are
exposed to a greater damage to reputation as compared to men. The respondent being from minority
Muslim community who kept her religion intact despite of her inter-religious marriage, was shattered
as she was stripped off her modesty both as a female and a woman following the ethics of modesty
according to her religion.8

3. Statement of Facts, Para 2.

4. Statement of Facts, Para 2.
5. V. Bhagat v. D Bhagat (Mrs.), AIR 1994 SC 710.
6. Statement of Facts, Para 6.
7. Statement of Facts, Para 6.
8. Quran 24:31 Yusufaly, Shakir, Quran 33:59, The Quran 24:30-31.

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In the case of Ramkripa s/o Shyamlal Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh9 the Supreme Court
held that "the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex...the culpable intention of the accused is the
crux of the matter". Essentially, 'modesty' is understood as a woman's sexual dignity and autonomy that
is acquired by her birth.

1.3 It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the respondent was stripped off the following
fundamental rights by her husband:

➢ Violation of right to live with dignity under Article 21

The invasion of privacy through online platform due to Mr. Aarav posting sensitive information
on social media resulted in the violation of right to life. Right to life constitutes that one person
has the right that he/she can live his/her life with all due respect and dignity guaranteed under the
Constitution. As stated in recent judgment of Right to Privacy's, “To live is to live with dignity.”10.
The Supreme Court also interpreted the concept of right to life to mean right to dignified life.11
In the case of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 197812, the Supreme Court gave a new dimension
to Article 21 and held that right to live is not merely a physical right but includes within its ambit
the right to live with human dignity. Human dignity involve all those rights and freedom which
enable a person to live life without encroachment upon his/her self-respect, pride and safety.
In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi (1981)13, the Supreme Court per Justice
Bhagwati declared that the right to life under Article 21 protects a broader right to “live with human
dignity.” The Court also stated, “Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence.”

9. Ramkripa S/O Shyamlal Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh ,2007(Appeal (crl.) 370 of 2007).
10. Justice K. S Puttaswamy v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 3081.
11. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
12. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
13. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, 1981 SCR (2) 516.
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➢ Violation of freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
under Article 25
Every religion freely professed, practiced and propagated implies the concept of modesty and modest-
wear. Every religion has an underlying concept of modesty in an implied sense and in Islam modesty
is given huge importance through the verses of Holy Quran14. Islam and modesty have similar relation
which soul bears to the body. In literal meaning, modesty is the behavior, manner, or appearance
intended to avoid impropriety or indecency. In Arabic, the word used for modesty is ‘haya’. The
concept of modesty in Islam defines the boundaries with respect to decency that is set for every
Muslim in terms of attire, speech, actions, and behavior. According to Ba Haya Naujawan, the
attribute that protects from the act that is disliked in the sight of Allah Almighty and his creation is
called ‘modesty’.

1.4 Thus, the malicious exposure of the video encroached upon Zara's modesty as a dignified women
and as a women freely practising her religion which expressed important to modesty. Religion is
based on faith and deprived of faith religion means nothing.15
Religious faith comes as a package deal and there is no "la carte" option, to pick and choose. Religion
is a matter of faith, and not of logic. It is not open to a court to accept an egalitarian approach, over a
practice which constitutes an integral part of religion. The Constitution allows the followers of every
religion, to follow their beliefs and religious traditions.16

1.5 Thus, leading a conjugal life against societal expectations and opposition, Zara was deprived of
several fundamental rights and thus eventually resorted to her faith and agreed to dissolve her
marriage due to religious disparity.

14. Surah Nur Ayat: 31, Translation by Saheeh International.

15. Adi Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu (2016) 2 SCC 11.
16. Shayara Bano v. UOI, AIR 2017 SCC 1388.

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ISSUE 2: TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000, BE
INVOKED TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS FROM MISUSE OF PERSONAL CONTENT ON
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS?

2.1 It is humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that the
Information Technology Act, 200017 can be certainly invoked to protect individuals from the misuse of
personal content on social media platforms.

2.2 The respondent humbly contend that the following scenarios must be duly noted:

➢ Mr. Aarav has posted sensitive information on social media

It is humbly and respectfully submitted that in the instant matter “a private moment captured on
video, meant only for their eyes, was maliciously leaked onto social media, tarnishing their
reputation beyond repair and leading to character assassination and threats.”18 The
respondent being a reasonable woman of sound mind and dignity is incapable of posting sensitive
information on social media through online platforms, provided she is an eminent party to the
video. It is absurd to even assume that she would have leaked the sensitive content, hence leaving
the appellant who has been cyber stalking the respondent, in a position of posting sensitive
information on social media.
➢ Invasion of privacy through online platform
It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the posting of sensitive information on social media
by the appellant has led to invasion of the respondent’s right to privacy under Article 21 and
tarnishing her image beyond repair. Right to Privacy is vested within Right to life and personal
liberty under Article 21. Right to life enshrined in Article 21 has been liberally interpreted so as to
mean something more than mere survival and mere existence or animal existence.19It therefore
includes all those aspects of life which go to make a man's life meaningful, complete and worth
living. The Right to Privacy is not just a common law right, not just a legal right, not just a
Fundamental Right under the constitution. It is a natural right inherent in every individual.

17. The Information Technology Act, 2000

18. Statement of Facts, Para 6.
19. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SCR (2) 621.

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 Privacy with its attendant values assures dignity to the individual and it is only when life can be enjoyed
with dignity can liberty be of true substance. As stated in recent judgment of Right to Privacy's, "To live
is to live with dignity." 20
In Gobind Singh v. State of M.P21, the Supreme Court, through a three-judge bench stated that privacy
is a concern for an individual and is a part of the concept of liberty. Furthermore, in the case of R.
Rajagopal v. State of T.N.22 more popular as the Auto Shankar case, the scope of right to be left alone
was widened. The bench of the Supreme Court, decided to give a constitutional status to Right to Privacy
stating that it is “implicit in the right to life and personal liberty”. The personal liberty in Art.21 is of the
widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty,23 secrecy24
human dignity25, limited and protected communication,”. The Supreme Court of India also interpreted
the concept of right to life to mean right to dignified life in Kharak Singh Case26.

2.3 It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the following provisions of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 shall be invoked:

➢ Punishment for violation of privacy under Section 66E of Information Technology Act, 2000
Section 66E of the Information Technology Act, 2000 “penalises publishing or transmitting the
images of a private area of any person without his or her consent, under circumstances violating the
privacy of that person.”27
In the instant matter there is no express context of “free consent” to capture the private video by the
respondent. Even if it may be assumed that the consent was “Free”,28

20. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 3081.

21. Gobind Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378.
22. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.
23. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
24. Allgeyer v. Louision. 165 US 578 (1897).
25. Olmstead v. U.S, 277 US 438, 478(1928); Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597.
26. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
27. The Information Technology Act, 2000.
28. Babu Digumarti v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & anr AIR 2017 SC 150.

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 The appellant must be held liable under this Section as he published and transmitted a private video
without the consent of the respondent to violate her privacy.
➢ Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit act, etc. in
electronic form under Section 67A of Information Technology Act, 2000
It is humbly and respectfully submitted that in the instant matter, the Appellant must be held liable
under the said provision as he published and transmitted sexually explicit act in electronic form.
In the case of Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr.29 The Delhi High Court
upheld the validity of this provision, emphasizing the importance of regulating the dissemination of
sexually explicit material to protect society, especially children, from exposure to harmful content
online. The court's ruling highlighted the need for stringent measures to combat the proliferation of
such material on digital platforms.

2.4 It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the actions of the appellant makes him liable
under several provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860

➢ Voyeurism under Section 354C of Indian Penal Code, 186030

It is pertinent to mention that the appellant being a man captured the images of the respondent in form
of a video while she engaged in a private act in circumstances, even if the respondent consents to
capture the act, but she never consented to their dissemination to third persons where such image or
act is disseminated.31 In the case of State of Karnataka v. Sri Bhagya Lakshmi 32. In this case, the
Karnataka High Court ruled on the interpretation and application of Section 354C, which deals with
voyeurism. The court held that secretly capturing or disseminating images of a person engaged in a
private act without their consent constitutes an offense under this provision. The case reaffirmed the
importance of protecting individuals' privacy and dignity, particularly in the context of technological
advancements that facilitate such violations.
In the case of State v. Shailesh33, Justice Susheel Bala Dagar held that voyeurism is a ridiculous type
of enjoyment for men whereas it causes mental trauma to women. Such acts infringe the Right to
privacy of women and she feels unsafe in the places which are generally meant to be safe for women.

29. Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., AIR 2017 SC 150.
30. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
31. State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1.
32. State of Karnataka v. Sri Bhagya Lakshmi ,2013.
33. State v. Shailesh, Crl.A. 1025/2018) (2019).

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➢ Stalking under Section 354D of Indian Penal Code, 1860
It is pertinent to mention that the appellant being a man monitored the respondent through internet, and
other electronic forms leading to cyber stalking which is punishable under the said section.
➢ Defamation under Section 499 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
It is humbly contended that the appellant by way of publishing sensitive content through social media
has defamed the respondent by tarnishing her reputation beyond repair and leading to character
assassination and threats.
In defamation cases, the publication of defamatory material is an important aspect that needs to be
established. The term "publication" refers to making the defamatory material available to a third party,
either intentionally or negligently.
The publication is to be considered defamatory only when it decreases the reputation of someone before
other persons.34
➢ Sexual Harassment by Electronic modes under Section 509B of Indian Penal Code, 1860
It is pertinent to mention that the appellant by his transmission of obscene video clip of the respondent
has caused harassment and mental agony to her.
Through the case of Ramkripa S/O Shyamlal Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007)35,
the Supreme Court held that "the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex...the culpable intention of
the accused is the crux of the matter". Essentially, 'modesty' is understood as a woman's sexual dignity
and autonomy that is acquired by her birth.

Thus, it is humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that
the appellant has not only committed actions that leads to the invoking of The Information Technology
Act,200036 but also several provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

34. Nemchand v. Khemrajn, AIR 1973 raj. 200.

35. Ramkripa S/O Shyamlal Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Appeal (crl.) 370 of 2007.,)
36. The Information Technology Act,2000

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ISSUE 3: WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN
INTERPRETING FAMILY LAW PROVISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTER-RELIGIOUS
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCE?

3.1 Inter-religious marriages and divorce falls under the ambit of Special Marriage Act, 1954. The
Special Marriage Act,1954 provides a legal framework for the marriage of people belonging to
different religions or caste. It governs a civil marriage where the state sanctions the marriage rather
than the religion. This enactment of solemnizing marriage by registration is resorted to by Hindus,
Non-Hindus and foreigners marrying in the country who opt out of the ceremonial marriage under
their respective personal laws. These inter-religious marriages are solemnized under Section 4 of
the Special Marriages Act, 195437 which states conditions relating to solemnization of special
marriages. It must be taken into considerations when interpreting family law provisions in the
context of inter-religious marriages that the consent of the family or the community or the clan or
the state or executive is not necessary, once the two adult individuals enter into a wedlock which is
lawful and legal. The absolute right of an individual to choose a life partner is not in the least
affected by matters of faith.
3.2 Intimacies of marriage and divorce lie within a core zone of privacy which is inviolable.
It must be taken into consideration that there are several grounds based on which the court shall
pass a decree to dissolve the marriage of an inter-religious couple. Section 27 of the Special
Marriages Act,195438 states the grounds based on which a petition for divorce may be presented
by either husband or wife.
3.3 In the present matter it is pertinent to mention that two individuals Mr. Aarav (a Hindu) and
Ms. Zara (a Muslim) entered into an inter-religious marriage despite vehement opposition
from their families.39 Their marriage was solemnized under Special Marriages Act,1954 as they
continued to follow their own religion, though the above-mentioned considerations were taken into
account in the context of their marriage and divorce yet there are certain factors that need to be
noted for upholding the judgment of the learned Family Court.

37. The Special Marriages Act, 1954, s.4.

38. The Special Marriages Act, 1954, s.27.
39. Statement of Facts, Para 1.

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3.4 It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the learned Family Court granted divorce on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences due to religious disparities and invasion of privacy through online
platforms. The Hon’ble High Court has upheld the decisions of the Family Court due to the following
reasons:
➢ Irreconcilable difference is the valid ground for granting divorce
It is humbly and respectfully submitted that in the present dispute Mrs. Zara and Mr. Aarav faced
irreconcilable differences based on the fact. Firstly, the respondent always yearned for genuine
acceptance and love of Mr. Aarav’s family which she could never get due to the family being
deeply rooted in tradition and could not fathom the union of their son which someone from
a different faith.40 Secondly, Mr. Aarav invaded the respondent’s privacy through online platforms
and not only stripped off her modesty as a women but also a women having faith in modestly
practicing her religion. These condition amounts to mental cruelty which is a valid ground for
divorce. Irreconcilable differences led to such a situation where there is no scope of reconciliation
thus leading to breakdown of marriage irretrievably.
➢ Cruelty under section 27(d) of Special Marriages Act,195441
The legal concept of cruelty and a kind of degree of cruelty necessary to amount to a matrimonial
offence has not been defined by any statute of the legislature relating to marriages and divorce.
The accepted legal meaning in England as also in India of this expression, which is whether
difficult to fine, has been ‘conduct of such character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health
(bodily or mental), or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such damage.
In V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat42, the Apex court observed that mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) can
broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the party such mental pain and suffering as
would make it not possible for that party to live with the other.
Section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriages Act, 195543 is similar to that of Section 27(d) of the Special
Marriages Act,1954 and hence the same definition can be applied. According to Hindu Law,
irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not considered as a valid ground for divorce but the court
in the case of Salome v. Dr. Prince D. Immanuel44, following the precedents, has held
irretrievable breakdown of marriage a valid ground for divorce. To prevent the appellant from
more cruelty, the appeal of divorce has been allowed.

40. Statement of Facts, Para 2.

41. The Special Marriages Act, 1954, s.27(d).
42. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337.
43. The Hindu Marriages Act, 1955, s. 13(1)(ia).
44. Salome v. Dr. Prince D. Immanuel Madras HC (C.M.A.(MD)Nos.238 of 2012 and 239 of 2012).

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Unlike the case of physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct evidence. The
feeling of anguish, disappointment and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can
only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partner of
matrimonial life have been living45. To amount to cruelty there must be such willful treatment of the
party which caused suffering in body or mind either as an actual fact or by way of apprehension in such
a manner as to render the continued living together of spouses harmful or injurious having regard to
the circumstances of the case46.

3.5 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan47A Constitution
Bench delivered a unanimous judgment and held that the Supreme Court can directly grant a divorce
on grounds of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ under Article 14248 of the Constitution.

3.6 In the case of Sukhendu Das v. Rita Mukherjee49, if the Courts find that the marriage is totally
unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down irretrievably, even if the facts of
the case do not provide a ground in law on which the divorce could be granted then the court has
exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

3.7 Under Article 142(1)50 of the Constitution the Supreme Court has the discretion to dissolve the
marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown. This discretionary power is to be exercised to
do ‘complete justice to the parties’ wherein the Court is satisfied that the facts established shows that
the marriage has completely failed and there is no possibility that the parties will cohabit together, and
continuation of the formal legal relationship is unjustified.

3.8 Thus, it is pertinent to mention that the learned Family Court has rightly considered the provision
of family law in context of inter-religious marriage and divorce between Mr. Aarav and Mrs. Zara and
was accurate in granting the divorce on ground of irreconcilable differences due to religious disparities
and invasion of privacy through online platform.

45. Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, AIR 2002 SC 2582.

46. Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit (2002)3 SCC78.
47. Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) 5 S.C.R165.
48. The Constitution of New Bharat, Article. 142.
49. Sukhendu Das v. Rita Mukherjee, AIR 2017 SC 5092.
50. The Constitution of New Bharat, Article. 142(1).

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ISSUE 4: TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE COURT CONSIDER EACH PARENT’S
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHILDREN’S LIVES WHEN DETERMINING CUSTODY
ARRANGEMENTS?

4.1 It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that Maternal custody
guarantees emotional security and consistency for the child, fostering familial connection and offering
a nurturing atmosphere. Mothers typically exhibit a profound comprehension of their children's
requirements and are more sensitive to their emotional welfare. Additionally, mothers often assume the
role of primary caregivers, possessing intimate familiarity with their child's daily routine and
preferences. Entrusting guardianship to the mother ensures that the child's upbringing remains
steadfast, maintaining stability and a sense of reassurance during a difficult period of bereavement and
adaptation. Hence, the learned Family Court was right in awarding sole custody to Mrs. Zara.

4.2 It is humbly contended that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat shall upheld the decision
of the family court and the Hon’ble High Court and adhere to awarding sole custody to Mrs. Zara due
to the below mentioned reasons:

➢ Mr. Aarav and his family members are unfit to be involved in the child’s life
Mrs. Zara shall be the parent responsible for their 3 years old daughter Aashi as she has already
been a victim of invasion of privacy through online platform and cyber stalking by Mr. Aarav. The
respondent humbly contends that Mr. Aarav must be penalised under the Information Technology
Act, 2000 and various priorly mentioned provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Mrs. Zara
was met with cold reception from Mr. Aarav’s family and their disdainful gazes strangely
transformed into care due to their greed after knowing Mrs. Zara’s parental status. She
yearned for genuine acceptance and love of the family which money could not buy but
unfortunately she could see through the charade51 All of the above mentioned facts has led to
mental harassment and cruelty towards Mrs. Zara.
Therefore, the custody of child must not be given to Mr. Aarav as it would be detrimental for the
welfare of children52.

51. Statement of Facts, Para 2.

52. Nil Ratan Kundu & anr. v. Abhijit Kundu (2008)9 SCC 413.
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➢ Welfare of the child must be of paramount importance
When the question of custody arises, the primary factor of consideration by the courts will be the
welfare of the child, which includes a safe environment for the upbringing of the child.
The ethical background and mental condition of the applicant is important to be considered while
giving custody of the minor child. A balance has to be struck between the attachment and sentiments
of the parties towards the minor children and the primary aspect of the welfare of the minors, which
is of paramount importance53. Custody of children under the age of five should be awarded to the
mother as mothers are believed to be better suited to provide care and nurture young children.
‘Aashi’.... their girl child aged 3 years54 shall be kept under the sole custody of her mother as being
a girl child she would reasonably require the company of her mother55. receive the best upbringing
and protection from their mother.56
The welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and not the rights of the parties, the child is
not a chattel or a ball that is bounced to and Welfare of the child is the focal point57
Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 189058 describes about the guidelines to be considered
consistently with law to which the minor is subject in appointing of the guardian, for welfare of the
minor.
The Apex Court also held in the case of Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu (2008)59 that the welfare
of a child is not to be measured merely in terms of money or physical comfort, but the word "welfare"
must be taken in its widest possible sense so that the tie of affection cannot be disregarded. The court
observes parens patriae60 jurisdiction in child custody matters i.e., the problem has to be solved with
a human touch where the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor child61.

53. R.V. Srinath Prasad v. Nandamuri Jayakrishna (2001) 4 SCC 71.

54. Statement of Facts, Para 3.
55. Mohan Kumar Rayana v. Komal Mohan Rayana, (2010) 5 SCC 657.
56. Chethana Ramatheerthav. Kumar v. Jahgirdar AIR 2004 SC 1525.
57. Shaziaaman Khan & anr. v. State of Orissa & ors. SLP Crl. No. 7290 of 2023.
58. Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, s. 17
59. Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu (2008)9 SCC 413: AIR 2009 SC (SUPP) 732.
60. A doctrine that grants the inherent power and authority of the states to protect persons who is legally unable
to act on their own behalf.
61. Sheila AB. Das v. P.R Sugasree (2003) 3 SCC 62.
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➢ Sole custody of the child is for the ‘Best Interest of Child’.
The respondent humbly and respectfully states that the Child Custody Cases rely on the concept of
"Best Interest of the Child / Welfare of the Child." Article 3.1.62 of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (Convention) requires "the best interests of the child" to be the "primary
consideration" "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies."
Furthermore, the similar concept has been defined under Section 2(9) of the Juvenile Justice Act,
200063 which states that "best interest of child" means the basis for any decision taken regarding the
child, to ensure fulfilment of his basic rights and needs, identity, social well-being and physical,
emotional and intellectual development. It is in the interest of the State that children should be
properly brought up and educated and the State as parens patriae is duty bound to look to the
maintenance and education of the children. The Constitution being alive to this aspect of the matter
incorporated it as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter-IV 39(f)64 While
determining the best interests of the child, "child's ordinary comfort, contentment, intellectual,
moral and physical development, his health, education and general maintenance and the favorable
surroundings" should be taken into consideration65.
The respondent humbly contends that since paramount importance is given to the doctrine of best
interest of the child, the court will usually abstain from disturbing the custody by way of
transferring the custody of the child from one parent to the other. The Apex court in the case of
Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli66, held that it was not desirable to disturb the
custody of the child and, therefore, the order of the High Court giving his exclusive custody to the
father with visitation rights to the mother was maintained. Thus, it is not desirable to disturb the
custody of child and sole custody shall be upheld.

62. The Government of India has acceded on the 11th December, 1992 to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
adopted by the General Assembly of United Nations, which has prescribed a set of standards to be adhered to
by all State parties in securing the best interest of the child.
63. Juvenile Justice Act, 2000(CIT.) s.2(9).
64. Meera Agarwalla Bansal and anr. v. Shyam Sundar Agarwalla (2002) DMC 593.
65. Kamla Devi v. Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1987 HP 34.
66. Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli (JT 2008 (6) SC 634).

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➢ Courts have the power to pass such orders /decree as it may seem just and proper with
respect to custody.
As per Section 38 of Special Marriage Act, 195467 and Section 41 of Indian Divorce Act,
186968 the Courts have the power to pass such orders /decree as it may seem just and proper with
respect to custody. Courts may intervene to safeguard the child’s best interest, stressing elements
such as emotional and financial stability, as well as the capacity to offer a caring environment.
Thus, to conclude, it is humbly and respectfully submitted that the sole custody of the child
awarded to Mrs. Zara must be upheld as it is in the best interest and welfare of the child. The child
is of a very tender age and is not a pen which can be taken out from one pocket and put in another.
It is pertinent to mention that the appellant is unfit of being awarded of any parental rights as he
himself shall be liable for invasion of privacy of Mrs. Zara leading to tarnishing of her reputation
beyond repair, character assassination and mental cruelty.

67. Special Marriage Act, 1954 s.38

68. Indian Divorce Act, 1869 s.41
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ISSUE 5: HOW DOES THE COURT ASSESS THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
MARITAL ASSETS, AND WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE WEIGHED IN THE
CONTEXT OF THIS CASE?

5.1 It is humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of New Bharat that
Courts consider many factors when deciding how to divide up property under equitable distribution
rules. These factors may include the contributions each spouse made to the other person’s career and
to acquiring marital property; the assets, income, and earning potential of each spouse and the living
standard enjoyed during the marriage. When equitable distribution rules apply, this doesn’t necessarily
mean marital property (and marital debt) is divided equally. It means the goal is to create a fair division
of assets based on the factors relevant to the situation. Marital assets are those built up by parties during
the time of marriage.

5.2 Unfortunately, there’s a lack of specific laws addressing matrimonial property and its fate post
divorce, leaving courts to rely on discretionary powers, often favoring separate ownership principles.

5.3 It is humbly submitted that, Courts take into account various factors when determining marital
assets distribution after divorce, Courts first take ascertain ownership or title over the property in
question. Several Judicial Precedents shed light on this matter:

➢ Joint Ownership with Contributions from Both Spouses:

In cases of joint ownership where both spouses contribute, the property is divided proportionally based
on their respective contributions. To determine the share of each spouse, the court takes into
consideration individual equity over the property.

➢ Joint Ownership with Sole Contribution from One Spouse:

When only one spouse financially contributed to a jointly owned property, the court usually divides the
property equally between them. However, if the contributing spouse proves full payment from their
known sources, they may acquire the entire property, regardless of joint ownership.69

69. Sri Arun Das v. Smt. Aparna Das, AIR ONLINE 2021 Tri 115.
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 ➢ One Spouse Holds Title, but the Other Contributed:

In situations where one spouse's name is on the property deed but the other contributed financially, the
court determines if it's a benami transaction. If proven otherwise, the property's legal owner may claim
it entirely. However, if the non-titled spouse proves financial contribution, they're entitled to a share,
with the burden of proof on them.70

5.4 In the instant matter the Hon’ble Court shall consider the following scenarios:

(I) The Special Marriage Act 195471 does not have specific provisions regarding distribution
of marital assets:
It’s humbly submitted that The Special Marriage Act, 1954 does not have specific provisions
regarding distribution of marital assets. Couples opting for marriage under this act follow the
principles outlined within it. Asset division is determined by the court, based on principles of
fairness and equality.
(II) The Ld. Family Court Rightfully gave a significant portion of marital assets to the
respondent:
It’s humbly submitted that the respondent deserves to keep a significant portion of marital assets
as the relationship between the respondent and the appellate has generated needs which should be
met. Firstly, because post divorce maintenance and property division are of paramount importance
because they signify the status of women within marriage and their contribution to the marriage
which the society often fail to acknowledge. Secondly, the respondent has been awarded the sole
custody of their 3 year old daughter Aashi, which attracts a major source of need. A child is the
major source of need. Post divorce each party and their children shall have enough to supply their
needs which is must be set at a level as close as possible to the standard of living previously
enjoyed. Thirdly, the legislature fail to acknowledge the non- financial contributions made by the
women in an household. In White v. White72 it was already settled that domestic and financial
contribution should be treated equally. It clarified that Section 25(2)(f) of the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 197373 does not refer to contribution which each has made to the parties’ accumulated
wealth but the contributions they have made and will continue to make to the welfare of the family.

70. Debika Chakraborty v. Pradip Chakraborty, AIR 2017 Calcutta 11.

71. The Special Marriage Act, 1954.
72. White v. White (2001) A.C. 596.
73. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, s. 25(2)(f).

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5.5 In the case of V. Vimala v. Veeraswamy (1991)74:

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the wife’s standard of living,
recognizing her contributions to the household. This case underlined the need to consider the wife's
financial security post-divorce.

5.6 In the case of B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy75:

The Supreme Court recognized the right of a wife to reside in the matrimonial home. This case
highlighted the need to secure a wife’s residence, considering it a significant part of marital assets

5.7 In the case of Ravi Kumar v. Julmidevi (2010)76:

The Supreme Court of India underscored that a wife is entitled to maintenance that allows her to live
with dignity. The court emphasized that the husband’s duty to support his wife

74. V. Vimala v. Veeraswamy (1991) 2 SCC 375.

75. B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy (2005) 3 SCC 313.
76. Ravi Kumar v. Julmidevi (2010) 4 SCC 476.

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 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, AUTHORITIES CITED AND ARGUMENTS

ADVANCED, IT IS MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED THAT THE HON'BLE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW BHARAT BE PLEASED TO:

1. UPHELD the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Nilachal Pradesh.

2. INVOKE the relevant provisions under The Information Technology Act, 2000

3. UPHELD the sole custody of the child to the

4. REVIEW division of matrimonial assets.

AND/OR

PASS ANY OTHER ORDER IT MAY DEEM FIT, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUITY
AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF REPSONDENT

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