Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804–809

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/rser

Failure mode and effect analysis for photovoltaic systems

Alessandra Colli n
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, 11973 NY, USA

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an inductive and conservative system reliability analysis
Received 18 May 2014 approach, here applied to photovoltaic system. A system is a complex combination of components and
Received in revised form sub-components, where technical and disciplinary interfaces apply in their mutual interactions. FMEA
27 March 2015
processes the individual analysis of each system's sub-component with the task to identify the various
Accepted 2 May 2015
failure modes affecting each part, along with causes and consequences for the part itself and the entire
system. In the proposed analysis the system's component and sub-components have been identified
Keywords: from the design of the Northeast Solar Energy Research Center (NSERC) photovoltaic research array
FMEA located at Brookhaven National Laboratory's (BNL). The complete FMEA analysis is presented, along with
Photovoltaic systems
the applied ranking scales and final results. The approach is discussed in its benefits and limitations, the
Reliability
latter mainly identified in the limited amount of open source information concerning failure prob-
abilities for the photovoltaic system parts.
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
2. The FMEA process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
3. The system model and its components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
4. The available data and the scoring system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
5. The FMEA table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809

1. Introduction impairments affecting the PV system, to improve the confidence

in this renewable energy source.
Electric utilities and grid operators face major challenges from So far, the most of the photovoltaic-related reliability analysis has
an accelerated evolution towards an extensive integration of focused on modules [1] and balance of system (BOS) separately [2].
variable renewable energy sources into the electric power grid, Only in recent years the shift of focus to grid integration has required
such as solar photovoltaic (PV). The integration of such a variable considering the entire system. The purpose of this paper is to present
energy source into the existing, sometimes weak or overloaded, and discuss the complete results of a failure modes and effects analysis
electric grid requires an adequate risk-informed decision making (FMEA) developed for a PV system [3]. To the author's knowledge,
approach. The ideal grid integration design for PV systems should there are no complete and detailed FMEA analyses for PV systems
optimize the mutual benefits between the grid and the PV system including risk ranking information published to date. This work
itself; this has to take into consideration the PV source variability, represents part of the background investigations needed to develop
availability, reliability, as well as the stability of the electric grid. a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) for PV systems [4], to investigate
The aim is to reduce or promptly intervene with outages and safety-related and energy-production-related risks. For this reason, the
FMEA has been preferred to other methods, such as Taguchi [5,6].
The system under analysis is a simplified model having all
the principal components and sub-components as from the design
n
Tel.: þ 1 631 344.2666. of the Brookhaven National Laboratory's (BNL) Northeast Solar
E-mail address: alessandra.colli@gmail.com Energy Research Center (NSERC) research array. The analysis aims

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.05.056
1364-0321/& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804–809
to identify the failure modes affecting the system's sub-components
and to list possible causes and effects.
Despite the approach is now common for PV applications, FMEA
analyses have been performed in other renewable energy areas,
such as wind energy [7,8].
2. The FMEA process
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is an established semi-
qualitative reliability engineering approach to systematically evaluat-
ing system design on a component-by-component basis to identify
failure modes and their effects on system function and other system
components. It can support fault tolerant design, testability, safety,
logistic support and related functions. This bottom-up technique has
been an essential tool for industries such as the aerospace and aut-
omobile industries, the semiconductor industry [9], and the nuclear
industry [10,11]. Government agencies (such as the Air Force and the
Navy) require that an FMEA is performed on their systems to ensure
safety as well as reliability. The automotive industry has adopted the
use of FMEA to support the design and manufacturing/assembly of
automobiles.
Kumamoto and Henley [12] recommend several uses for the
FMEA:
1) Identification of critical components for fail-safe design,
failure-rate reduction or damage containment.
2) Identification of components requiring particularly stringent
quality control.
3) Formulation of special requirements to be included in specifi-
cations for suppliers.
4) Formulation of special procedures, safeguards, protective
equipment, monitoring or warning systems.
5) Distribution of project funds across these areas.
Although there are various types of FMEA (design, manufactur-
ing process, equipment, system) and for different applications
(hardware to software), the principal aim of this approach is to
support the early identification of potential problems and address
them before accidents happen.
The FMEA presented in this work has the task to identify failure
modes along with possible causes and effects for a grid-connected
PV plant. The FMEA process followed along this study is shown by
the block diagram in Fig. 1. It requires to identify the system
model, its components, sub-components, requirements, descrip-
tions, and, when useful, also functional diagrams. Failure modes
are investigated at the system's sub-component level, according to
the desired level of depth in the analysis. For each failure mode a
severity (S), occurrence (O) and detection (D) rating is defined and
rated according to subjectively defined scales, based on available
information and supported by expert opinion and evaluation. The
rating system involves expert opinion and a level of subjectivity
which is typical of rating systems based on a scales defined by
the user.
The combination of the three ratings defines an overall risk
measure, the risk priority number (RPN), which indicates the
relevance of each failure mode in affecting the PV system.
Villacourt [13] describes this approach in relation to the semi-
conductor industry. The RPN is calculated for each failure mode
according to the following equation [5,6, 13, 14]:
RPN ¼ S  O  D
A high RPN is a critical indicator for corrective action considerations
on identified sub-components. The RPN simplifies the computation
of the criticality number adopted in the failure mode effect and
criticality analysis (FMECA) by requiring only the probability of
805
Fig. 1. Block diagram representing the FMEA process followed along this study.
failure (occurrence) and the severity classification; however, the
RPN extends the criticality number approach by incorporating the
detection likelihood rating. This is crucial in evaluating PV systems
since system downtime directly leads to power supply interruption
and financial losses when energy purchase agreements or feed-in
tariffs are in place. Thus, quick, efficient detection of failures is cri-
tical, and the RPN is implemented such that the detection of failures
is a conscious goal of the FMEA application.
The FMEA is a systematic, inductive, and conservative techni-
que for failure analysis and it is here performed ahead of the
development of more complex system-level methods such as fault
trees (FT) and event trees (ET) analysis, combined into the
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). In further research developments
at BNL, we will use the FMEA primarily as an investigation to
support the development of a PRA model and identify elements
and failures to be represented in the PRA in relation to the rest of
the system. A fundamental difference between the FMEA and PRA
is actually that the former is focusing on individual components,
while the latter is modeling the interactions between components
in the entire system, thus providing a holistic overview.
3. The system model and its components
To perform the FMEA analysis, the PV system will be repre-
sented by a simplified model reporting all the components as by
design. Fig. 2 shows the simplified model used for the FMEA and
based on the BNL's NSERC photovoltaic research array configura-
tion. The diagram shows that the system is mainly built in 3 blocks:
(i) source system, (ii) string combiner, and (iii) power conditioning
system.
The NSERC array design is in real much more complex than the
simplified model shown in Fig. 2, which has the only purpose of
identifying the sub-components to consider in the FMEA. In its
present development the NSERC array reaches a rated power of
ð1Þ
518 kWp and includes a total of 1672 PV modules, rated 310 Wp
each. The modules are arranged in strings of 19 modules each.
Combiner boxes merge 11 strings to reach the input of a single
inverter's module. The 3 plant inverters are actually modular, and
allow the independent management of each set of 11 strings. All
806 A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804–809

Fig. 2. The simplified PV system diagram showing the components and sub-components considered in the analysis.

the inverter outputs finally merge into a 1MVA transformer to Table 1

reach a second step-up transformer at the network interconnec- Component and sub-components of the PV system.
tion point. The plant is grid-connected to the electric grid of BNL
Component Sub-component Failure rate (failures per
and operated independently by the laboratory. The need for unit-hour)
independence from the utility in terms of plant management is
required by the reconfigurable characteristic of the plant to meet PV module Module 1.35E-06a
various research needs in the field of grid integration and smart Junction box/bypass diode 6.77E-07a
Connectors 4.51E-07 a
grids. An additional purpose of the array is to evaluate the PV Encapsulantion 4.06E-06 a
module's performance and degradation in the specific Northeast Rack Rack structure 2.44E-05 a
US climate conditions. Grounding/lightning 1.62E-05 a
However, the FMEA approach looks at the failure modes of the protection system
Cable Aerial cables 1.05E-06b
single components and is less interested in the combinations of
Underground cables 7.00E-07 b
them. The interest in the complexity of the design comes up when String Fuse 2.17E-07 b
the combined system analysis is performed, which is the case the combiner Disconnect 6.96E-07 b
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach. Power Reverse polarity diode 2.26E-07 a
The performed analysis includes all the plant components up to conditioning Fuse 2.17E-07 b
Breaker 4.00E-07 b
the grid interconnection point: PV modules and their rack support Inverter 1.75E-04 a
structures, DC subsystem with string combiner, and power con- Disconnect 6.96E-07 b
ditioning system with inverter and transformer. From the per- Transformer 4.22E-07 b
spective of the FMEA development, it is important to know the Protective relays 2.28E-07 b
details at the level of the sub-components. Table 1 lists the system a
Value extrapolated by elaboration of the data available in Ref. [15].
components and the associated sub-components. Functional dia- b
Value from Ref. [13].
grams have been consulted when more complex elements are
considered, such as the case of the inverter or the transformer. by specific databases or report for electric sub-components (such
as [7]), the first limitation specified above has been the most
difficult to overcome. PV operation and maintenance companies
4. The available data and the scoring system are not prone to release their data, thus the quantitative informa-
tion on the failures of PV specific components has been based on a
The qualitative aspects of the FMEA analysis, including the single publication in the PV reliability field reporting failure
identification of failure modes, causes and consequences, are statistics [15]. Table 1 shows the failure rates, expressed in failures
based on a large amount of literature easily available in the area per unit hour, considered for each sub-components.
of PV reliability and degradation studies, as well as studies on the The scoring system for the failure modes has been developed on
electric components. The major problems encountered along the and adapted to the available data and information, expressing both
development are actually related to the quantitative information, quantitative values and subjective evaluations from expert opinions,
namely failure rates or failure probabilities, and they are: (i) the as typical in this kind of approach. Tables 2–4 show the ranking
lack of PV specific open-source databases or data collections of criteria developed respectively for the severity, the occurrence and
quantitative information on failures of specific sub-components the detection ratings. Each ranking system follows a scale from 1 to 5.
and (ii) the sometime outdated quantitative information reported In all the three cases 1 denotes the best situation, while 5 is ass-
in available databases for electric elements. Assuming that we ociated to the worst situation. The scales have been implemented on
should not expect extreme variation in the failure rates reported the basis of [9], following 5 basic criteria. However, differently from
 A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804–809 807

Table 2
Severity ranking criteria.

Rank Description

1 Minor failure/degradation, hardly detected, no influence on the system performance

2 Failure/degradation will be detected by plant owner/operator and/or will cause slight deterioration of parts or system performance
3 Failure/degradation will be detected by plant owner/operator, will create dissatisfaction, and/or will cause deterioration of parts or system performance
4 Failure/degradation will be easily detected by plant owner/operator, will create high dissatisfaction, and/or will cause extended deterioration of parts and system
relevant non-functionality/loss of performance
5 Failure/degradation will result in non-operation of the system or severe loss of performance

Table 3
Occurrence ranking criteria.

Rank Description

1 Unlikely – failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-7

2 Remote probability – failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-6
3 Occasional probability – failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-5
4 Moderate probability – failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-4
5 High probability – failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-3 and E-2

Table 4
Detection ranking criteria.

Rank Description

1 Almost certain that the problem will be detected (chance 81–100%)

2 High probability that the problem will be detected (chance 61–80%)
3 Moderate probability that the problem will be detected (chance 41–60%)
4 Low probability that the problem will be detected (chance 21–40%)
5 None/minimal probability that the problem will be detected (chance 0–20%)

[9], the numerical scale has been set 1 to 5 instead of 1 to 10; this
because the additional sensitivity given by a range of scoring values
for a selected single criterion has not been considered necessary in
this work, given the limitations already expressed on the quantitative
data available. Consequently, the RPN values are ranked on a scale
between 1 and 125; also in this case, the smaller the RPN the better,
the larger the worse.
5. The FMEA table
The details of the FMEA analysis are shown in Table 5. Potential
failure modes, causes, effects and ratings up to the overall risk
priority number are listed for each sub-component of the system.
The identification of causes has been performed by looking to
the PV system in a holistic way and trying to expand the view to
possible uncommon events, based on the outcome of discussions
with different experts.
The potential effects have been focused on the fundamental
purposes of this analysis, which involve: (i) security of electricity
supply (energy output), (ii) technical damages and (iii) human
safety.
The risk priority numbers show three major contributors to the
PV system reliability: in first place the inverter, and the grounding/
lightning protection system; in a second position the modules,
intended as active components, such as cells and contacts.
However, it is interesting to notice that even components with
low risk priority number could present a high detection rating
value, which indicates a minimal probability that the problem can
be detected during normal operation. This calls for the importance
of a regular maintenance routine, to avoid unexpected problems
when less wanted. In this framework, an existing extension of this
FMEA work has been done in collaboration with George Washing-
ton University [16]. The work points at the use of a surprise index
(SI). The surprise index is based on the information score of the
failure mode probability. By weighting the risk priority by the
failure mode's information score, we are increasing the influence
of extremely unlikely, yet extremely catastrophic, events in risk
management decision contexts. This also decreases the amount of
prominence placed on relatively likely events in the decision
context. Thus, if an increasing RPN indicates a higher priority for
redundancy investments, the SI should be used to prioritize the
development of contingency plans [16].
6. Conclusions
The application of the FMEA approach has been discussed and
demonstrated for PV systems. The methodology proved the inverter
and the ground system of the PV field to show the highest values of
the RPN, calculated according to Eq. (1). This is in line with what
reported in existing literature [15] and with the experience person-
ally discussed with some PV plant operators. However, the FMEA
shows also the importance of maintenance activities for the early
detection of some hidden failure modes that could not affect
immediately the plant, but could degenerate into a system problem
if not promptly handled.
Despite the use of FMEA and risk analysis techniques in the PV
industry [17], the lack of publically available FMEA analysis for PV
systems makes it difficult to validate the results. Interactions with
industry, working groups and researchers in the PV field have been
used to support the development and understand the proper level
of details to be considered for a meaningful evaluation in respect
to the available numerical information. Future analyses along with
808 A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804–809

Table 5
FMEA table.

Potential failure Potential causes Potential effects Severity Occurrence Detection Risk
mode rating rating rating priority
number

Module (active components – cells and contacts)

Loss of electric Shorts, arcs, open contacts. No energy output, safety, fire 5 2 3 30
function
Impairment of High series resistance, low shunt resistance, aging, Reduced energy output, hot spot damage 4 2 4 32
electric shading, soiling.
function
Junction box/bypass diode
Open contacts Disconnections, improper installation, corrosion No energy output 5 1 3 15
Short, arc in Damaged insulation, aging, animals, lightning No energy output, safety, thermal 5 1 2 10
contacts damages, fire
Poor contact/ Material defects, oxidation, aging Reduced energy output, no energy output, 4 1 4 16
intermittent thermal damage
Shorted diode Material defects, aging, thermal stress, mechanical Reduced energy output, loss of module 4 1 4 16
(end-to-end) stress, electrical stress, material contamination, power, overcurrent
processing anomaly
Open diode Very high resistance, material defects Reduced energy output, thermal damages 3 1 5 15
in module, fire, safety
Parameter change Material defects, aging, continuous thermal stress Reduced energy output, improper 3 1 5 15
in diode intervention. loss of module power,
overcurrent
Connectors
Open Damage, disconnection, animals, vandalism, strong No energy output 5 1 2 10
wind, pulled cables
Poor contact/ Corrosion, improper installation, lightning damage Reduced energy output, no energy output, 5 1 4 20
intermittent thermal damage
Short Damages, improper installation, disconnections, No energy output, safety, thermal 4 1 5 20
animals, vandalism damages, fire
Encapsulation
Loss of air Bad lamination, high voltage stress, hot spots, high cell/ Humidity/water/contaminant entrance, 2 2 5 20
tightness module temperature, corrosive effects in the module increased degradation, reduced energy
structure, aging, damage from frame distortion, cleaning output, no energy output
actions, extreme wind, snow load, vandalism, animals,
lightning, earthquake, accidental impacts
Rack structure
Loss of Improper installation, damages, extreme weather Front glass breakage, cell damages, frame 4 3 1 12
configuration conditions, excessive thermal expansion/contraction, distortion, reduced energy output, no
earthquake energy output, safety
Brackets Strong wind, improper installation, earthquake, Unstable configuration, loss of modules 3 3 2 18
detachment accidental impacts
Grounding/lightning protection system
Open or Corrosion, improper installation, lightning, mechanical Safety, module damage, reduced energy 4 3 4 48
ineffective damage, too high resistance output.
Aerial cables
Open Faulty cabling, material aging, animals, vandalism, No energy output, safety 5 2 2 20
extreme weather conditions, earthquake
Short, arc Cracks/ruptures on cables, insulation failure, aging, No energy output, safety, fire 5 2 2 20
animals
Excessive wear Improper system design Reduced energy output, thermal damages 3 2 4 24
Underground cables
Open Faulty cabling, material aging, animals, vandalism, No energy output, safety 5 1 2 10
extreme weather conditions, earthquake
Short, arc Cracks/ruptures on cables, insulation failure, aging, No energy output, safety, fire 5 1 2 10
animals
Excessive wear Improper system design Reduced energy output, thermal damages 3 1 4 12
Fuse
Fails to open Bad system configuration, construction defect, Excessive increase of current in the 4 1 4 16
mechanical defects, improper maintenance system, overheating, safety, arcs, fire
Slow to open Bad system configuration, construction defect, Excessive increase of current in the 4 1 4 16
mechanical defects, improper maintenance system, overheating, safety, arcs, fire
Premature open Bad system configuration, construction defect, No energy output 5 1 2 10
mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Disconnect
Open without Bad system configuration, construction defect, No energy output 5 1 1 5
stimuli mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Does not open Faulty switch, damages to structural parts, flashover/arc, No disconnection, safety, fire, arcs 4 1 4 16
improper maintenance, aging
Reverse polarity diode
Short (end-to- Material defects, aging, thermal stress, mechanical No protection against reverse currents 2 1 4 8
end) stress, electrical stress, contamination, processing
anomaly
Open Very high resistance, material defects No energy output 5 1 1 5
Parameter change Material defects, aging, continuous thermal stress Activation with different variable range 3 1 5 15
Breaker
 A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804–809 809

Table 5 (continued )

Potential failure Potential causes Potential effects Severity Occurrence Detection Risk
mode rating rating rating priority
number

Open without Bad system configuration, construction defect, No energy output 5 1 1 5

stimuli mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Does not open Faulty switch, damages to structural parts, flashover/arc, No disconnection, safety, fire, arcs 4 1 4 16
improper maintenance, aging
Inverter
Fails to transfer Contact damage, card/board problem, software failure No energy output 5 4 1 20
(within working conditions), ventilation obstruction,
extreme weather conditions, vandalism.
Degraded output MPPT unbalance, extreme weather conditions Reduced energy output 4 4 3 48
Transformer
Open Extreme weather conditions (including lightning), No energy output 5 1 1 5
flooding, earthquake, explosion, exposure to non-
electric fire/burning, shorting, aging
Short Insulation breakdown, damages to structural parts, Reduced energy output, no energy output, 5 1 1 5
water/particles in oil, transient overvoltage disturbance, safety, fire
continuous overvoltage, shorting, lack of protective
device, improper maintenance, aging
Parameter change Failure of tap changer, damages to structural parts, Loss of efficiency, improper energy output 3 1 2 6
improper maintenance, aging
Protective relays
Fails to trip Inadequate protective device, improper setting of Loss of protection resulting in electrical/ 4 1 2 8
protective device, improper maintenance, aging structural damages with reduced energy
output, no energy output, safety, fire,
explosion
Spurious trip Bad system configuration, corrosion, aging, lack of No energy output 5 1 1 5
maintenance or improper maintenance
Short Inadequate protective device, improper setting of Loss of protection resulting in electrical/ 4 1 3 12
protective device, improper maintenance, aging structural damages with reduced energy
output, no energy output, safety, fire,
explosion

the access to system information and data for a statistically rele-
vant time span for the system operation could provide the vali-
dation of the results. This is a first attempt to provide a complete
FMEA analysis for PV systems and it required a substantial work in
collecting information. However, despite the limitations given by
the lack of validation of the results with published work, the work
has highlighted a large set of failure modes along with causes and
effects that will feed a probabilistic risk analysis for safety-related
and production-related issues.
The application of traditional reliability, hazard analysis and
risk analysis techniques into new environments, such as PV, are
possible [18] and desirable for reliability improvements and risk-
informed decision making.
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