r Academy of Management Perspectives

2020, Vol. 34, No. 4, 434–457.

https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2019.0007

A R T I C L E S
THE DARK SIDE OF GROUP BEHAVIOR: ZOMBIE
APOCALYPSE LESSONS
MARKUS HÄLLGREN
Umeå University

DAVID A. BUCHANAN
Cranfield University

How will groups of survivors behave in a doomsday scenario? Will there be competition
for scarce resources? Will they collaborate in reconstruction? While we cannot research
these questions directly, we can find clues in four places. First, there are historical
examples of apocalyptic events. Second, social identity theory offers explanations of
group behavior. Third, there have been studies undertaken of group dynamics in ex-
treme contexts. We discuss the limitations of these three sources, before turning a
fourth—a fictional account—in search of ideas. Adopting a narrative theoretical lens,
we consider “the theory on offer” in the television series The Walking Dead, which
portrays a zombie apocalypse. We find that group behavior is shaped by the nature of
survivor group composition, and by the properties of the doomsday context that they
face. We demonstrate the potential for the emergence of a dark, violent side of group
behavior. We illustrate a methodological solution to the problem of researching extreme
contexts using “speculative fiction.” And, by exploiting the zombie movie genre, we
address the “failure of imagination” that can increase society’s vulnerability to un-
foreseen events. Our analysis has implications for organization theory as well as for
policy and practice in doomsday scenarios.

Have you ever had to kill people because they had
already killed your friends and were coming for you
next? Have you ever done things that made you feel
afraid of yourself afterward? Have you ever been
covered in so much blood that you didn’t know if it
was yours or walkers’ or your friends’? Huh? Then
you don’t know. (Michonne, The Walking Dead; Kang
& Slovis, 2015)
How will any survivors of an apocalyptic event
behave? Will there be a violent struggle for scarce
resources? Will they organize peacefully and share
expertise to begin the process of reconstruction? Or
will other patterns of behavior emerge? What are the
implications for policy and practice, for national and
regional agencies, and for survivor groups? We can-
not research these questions directly, but we can find
clues in four places. First, there are historical exam-
ples of extreme events. Second, social identity theory
(SIT) offers explanations of inter- and intragroup be-
havior. Third, there has been research undertaken on
434
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teamwork in general, and on teams in extreme con-
texts. Finally, we can explore fictional doomsday ac-
counts as a source of inspiration and ideas. The first
three of these sources offer limited guidance: the past
is only a partial guide to unknown future events; it is
not clear whether and how SIT applies in doomsday
scenarios; and most research on “extreme teams”
focuses on groups whose members are specially
chosen, who know each other well, who have orga-
nizational support, and who are trained to deal with
specific, often common emergencies (fires, accidents,
natural disasters; H ällgren, Rouleau, & De Rond,
2018). In contrast, a doomsday scenario creates
groups of untrained, unskilled strangers thrown
together at random in situations in which social
structures are absent, with little hope of help. Our
investigation thus sits at the far end of the “extreme”
continuum; a mass extinction of humankind has yet
to happen. To explore behaviors in this context we
turn, therefore, to a fictional account of a doomsday
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan
setting: that portrayed in the television series The
Walking Dead (hereafter, “TWD”), set in the after-
math of a zombie apocalypse. We view TWD as “social
science fiction” or “speculative fiction” (Reed &
Penfold-Mounce, 2015), examining “the theory on
offer” and exploring how and why groups become
violent toward their own members and other groups
with fatal outcomes.
Our research question is significant, for two rea-
sons. First, the costs of man-made and natural di-
sasters and catastrophes are rising. Global losses
reached their highest ever figure in 2017, due to
hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding. Total economic
losses from over 300 events were US$337 billion,
and more than 11,000 lives were lost (Bevere,
Schwartz, Sharan, & Zimmerli, 2018), and there is
no reason to believe that these losses will be less in
future. With geopolitical developments, events such
as genocide, terrorism, and war are likely to recur.
Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) reviewed the evi-
dence for links between climate variation and inter-
personal and intergroup conflict, including riots,
land invasions, and civil war. An inability to antici-
pate the unusual dilutes society’s coping capabil-
ities. The attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the
World Trade Center in 2001 (“9/11”) are examples of
“failures of imagination” (Salter, 2008: 233). But, as
Weick (2005: 425) noted, an attack similar to that of
9/11 was foreseen—by a senior U.S. counterterror-
ism official whose ideas about terror attacks came
from the novels of Tom Clancy, not from government
intelligence sources. From a policy perspective, we
need to anticipate the nature and impact of these
events in order to prepare adequate responses. Sec-
ond, an analysis of TWD suggests that groups in ex-
treme contexts can display a dark side—as shown in
the opening quote, presented above, from one of the
characters, Michonne. Teamwork is considered to be
benign, but knowledge of the dangers of groups may
be key to survival in an extreme context. Our findings
offer an important caveat for individuals and groups
in a doomsday setting, as we illustrate the conflicts
and challenges that can arise in a situation of con-
tinuous existential threat. The aim of this article,
therefore, is to develop a framework for explaining
group behavior in a doomsday scenario. As extreme
contexts heighten the significance of “routine” is-
sues (Hällgren et al., 2018), our insights may also be
of interest to “normal” organizations facing intra-
and interteam conflicts, and to teams facing exis-
tential threats.
What are the contributions from this analysis?
If TWD is a plausible theory of postapocalyptic
435
behavior, the conclusions are pessimistic. After 10
years, groups of survivors have not yet learned how
to live together peacefully. Their relationships re-
main soured by lack of trust and violence. Collabo-
rative periods occur, but these are shattered by
events. The “theory on offer” from TWD explains the
dark side of group behavior through five features of
the extreme context. First, the zombie threat is ever-
present, appearing in different forms and at different
times, commanding constant vigilance, and perpet-
uating fear and anxiety. Second, choices between
courses of action (e.g., how to obtain resources, en-
sure survival, deal with “difficult” members and
other groups) are always controversial and critical,
leading to intragroup disputes that can become
violent. Third, other groups are as much a threat as
zombies; experience teaches the survivors to be
vigilant and untrusting, accentuates social closure,
and leads to violence rather than compassion. Fourth,
groups turn to “strong” but idiosyncratic leaders—not
for their leadership capabilities, but because they ap-
pear to promise security. Finally, leadership roles are
constantly contested—by group members who dis-
agree with decisions and actions, and by other groups
that are affected by another leader’s actions.
We first assess current research into extreme con-
texts. Then, we explore the potential value of his-
torical analysis. Third, we examine SIT for clues to
group behavior in a doomsday setting. Fourth, we
examine what is known about “extreme teams.”
Fifth, we explain our rationale for developing theory
from “speculative fiction.” Sixth, we develop a model
explaining “dark-side” behaviors of individuals and
groups. Finally, we summarize the study’s contribu-
tions, and the implications for further research, policy,
and practice.
DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS AND OTHER
EXTREME CONTEXTS
A “doomsday scenario” can be defined as an
event, or sequence of events, involving an existential
global threat. The Global Challenges Foundation
(Wariaro, Leyre, Ingdahl, Ng, & Hägg, 2018) has
stated that our world faces many such threats: as-
teroid impacts, supervolcanoes, weapons of mass
destruction, anthropogenic climate change, ecological
collapse, natural pandemics (e.g., avian flu, coronavi-
rus, Ebola, Middle East respiratory syndrome, severe
acute respiratory syndrome, Zika fever), biological
and chemical warfare, the deliberate or accidental
release of engineered viruses, terrorist attacks, rogue
artificially intelligent systems, and geoengineering
436 Academy of Management Perspectives
failures, among others. These may be low-probability
events, but they can have a high impact, and Wariaro
et al. (2018) concluded that it would be prudent to be
prepared.
Research has focused on extreme events affecting
single organizations and sectors (Buchanan & Denyer,
2013). But the literature is theoretically, empirically,
and methodologically diverse (Bundy, Pfarrer, Short,
& Coombs, 2017; James, Wooten, & Dushek, 2011;
Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, & Zhao, 2017)
and there is no consensus as to what counts as “ex-
treme.” A unified theory of extreme contexts may be
unhelpful, as organizations operate across a range
of hazardous conditions, and diverse perspectives
can enhance our ability to deal with diverse threats.
Also, technological volatility, the Holocaust of World
War II, and a school shooting are hardly comparable
in their extremes. We thus need a context-sensitive
approach, to identify differences and similarities be-
tween examples (Johns, 2006, 2017). Hannah, Uhl-
Bien, Avolio, and Cavarretta (2009: 899) distin-
guished between crises, extreme events, and extreme
contexts. They noted that the term “crisis” is used to
refer to a spectrum of events, from copyright infringe-
ment to natural disasters. To qualify as “extreme,” they
contended, an event must have the potential to gener-
ate unbearable outcomes, and overwhelm an organi-
zation’s resources. An “extreme context” is defined by
Hannah et al. (2009: 898) as:
. . . an environment where one or more extreme events
are occurring or are likely to occur that may exceed
the organization’s capacity to prevent and result in
an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical,
psychological, or material consequences to—or in close
physical or psycho-social proximity to—organization
members.
The category of “extreme” depends on the interpre-
tations of “massive,” “extensive,” “unbearable,” and
“intolerable” held by those involved. A doomsday
scenario is categorically an extreme context, with
events exceeding even a society’s capacity to prevent
or manage them.
Research in this area has grown as the incidence
and costs of extreme events have increased. A review
of leading journals from 1980 to 2015 identified
138 empirical articles exploring extreme contexts
(H ällgren et al., 2018). Extreme settings act as
“pressure cookers,” heightening the importance
of routine issues such as teamwork. Developing a
context-sensitive approach, H ällgren et al. (2018:
117) distinguished between settings, wherein
events are “related” or “unrelated” to the context,
November
and the prospect of an event taking place, whereby
events have a “potential” or an “actual” occurrence.
Four extreme contexts emerged, as illustrated in
Figure 1; “risky” (related and potential; herein,
team research focuses on training and structure);
“emergency” (related and actual; with a focus on
managing high stress situations); “disruptive”
(unrelated and actual; with an emphasis on im-
promptu teams managing natural disasters and
terrorist attacks); and “surprising” (unrelated and
potential).
Hällgren et al. (2018) observed that disruptive
and surprising contexts are the least researched,
with most studies focusing on risky and emergency
categories. Theoretically possible, the “surprising”
quadrant has received the least attention, as this
concerns studies of incidents that have not hap-
pened and that are unrelated to an organization’s
activities. Doomsday scenarios are located in this
“surprising” quadrant. Accordingly, to explore the
properties of surprising contexts, we must use
imagination—making fiction a natural choice as a
source of ideas. Fiction can set our imagination free,
but within a structured narrative context.
There are other “surprising” contexts, such as
alien encounters, nuclear war, and violent weather.
So, why choose zombies as a vehicle for addressing
our research question? A zombie attack is an iconic
example of an event in the “surprising” quadrant,
and a zombie movie can take us into this previously
unresearched area (Buchanan & Hällgren, 2018). A
zombie attack also fits the Oxford English Dictio-
nary definition of a doomsday “end of the world”
scenario. A zombie attack is thus a plausible proxy
for the effects of other unpredictable doomsday
threats such as devastating climate change or an
incurable pandemic (see also Postscript: COVID-19,
below). Life under constant existential threat is
likely to produce similar behaviors regardless of the
source of the danger. It is not the triggering event
itself that is important, therefore, but the behavior
triggered by a doomsday scenario. Zombie movies
typically focus less on them, and more on us—on
the collapse of social structure, on group behavior,
on our fear of others (Bishop, 2009; Getz, 2016).
This focus contrasts with other doomsday movies
such as Armageddon (an asteroid threatens Earth
and roughnecks are sent to blast it away; Bruckheimer,
Hurd & Bay, 1998), or The Apocalypse (parents search
for their child in a similar situation; Latt & Rimawi,
2007). Our interest lies with survivor behavior
when social structures and institutions have col-
lapsed, leading us to the zombie genre: Will the shared
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan
FIGURE 1
A Typology of Extreme Contexts
Contexts activities
Related
Potential Risky
Events
occurrence
Actual Emergency
concern for survival foster collaboration and group
cohesion? Or will there be competition for scarce
resources?
A SHORT HISTORY LESSON
Before considering other contemporary research
in this field, let us first ask whether historical ex-
amples of apocalyptic events offer guidance with
regard to survivor behavior in extreme contexts.
Three brief illustrations indicate the potential of this
line of inquiry. The first concerns the bombing of the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August
1945. Survivors were reported to be apathetic and
listless, doing little to help one another. Their be-
havior was attributed to the scale of destruction, the
realization that Japan had lost the war, and radiation
sickness (Hersey, 2002; U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey, 1946). Infrastructure, emergency services,
and medical facilities in these cities were destroyed,
but relief efforts from other parts of the country were
quickly mobilized.
The second concerns the “Little Ice Age,” which
occurred between the 14th and 19th centuries, in-
volving a cooling of the northern hemisphere. This
may have been caused by reduced solar radiation,
volcanic activity, glaciation, and variations in Earth’s
orbit, as well as climate variation. In the exceptionally
cold winters in Europe and North America, rivers and
inland waterways froze, and sea ice closed harbors to
shipping. Crops failed. Livestock could not be main-
tained through the winters. The social consequences
were severe. Drought, famine, food riots, and disease
were common. Criminal behavior increased, includ-
ing robbery, murder, sex offenses, and violent scape-
goating of marginalized groups. Witchcraft trials
became popular, as magic was linked to weather-
437
Unrelated
Surprising
Disruptive
making (Behringer, 2009; Blom, 2019). The third il-
lustration concerns the rugby team air crash in the
Andes in 1972. Having lost hope of rescue, the survi-
vors resorted to eating their dead friends. Although
encouraged by the others, though, some refused and
died (Parrado, 2007).
We can identify from these brief accounts three
implications for our current argument. First, the
consequences of an apocalyptic event (nuclear at-
tack), isolated event (plane crash) or process (climate
change) depend on the prevailing social, cultural,
economic, geopolitical, and technological condi-
tions. The nature of weaponry and war—including
the possibility of nuclear war (Sagan, 1993)—has
changed radically since the mid-20th century. Climate
change can have disastrous geopolitical outcomes
(Burke et al., 2015; Dalby, 2017). Understanding past
events is informative, but we must be careful to avoid
the “failure of imagination” trap (Salter, 2008), and
discount future possibilities, however unlikely they
may seem.
Second, although it may appear that generalizing
from incomparable historical settings is a challenge,
it may be possible to identify patterns in responses to
extreme events. Using comparative historical case
analysis, political science has identified similar
patterns in complex, idiosyncratic situations such as
national revolutions (Goldstone, 2003). Perrow’s
(1999) theory of interactive complexity, which ex-
plains hi-tech disasters, draws on studies of single
instances of idiosyncratic failures in a range of
markedly different settings.
Third, there is no shortage of historical events to
study, from the Irish potato famine in the mid-19th
century to the coronavirus pandemic that began in
China in 2019. Many such incidents have attracted
research interest, such as an earthquake in Italy
438 Academy of Management Perspectives
(Lanzara, 1983), Hurricane Katrina (Majchrzak,
Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007), and the Black
Sunday fires in Australia (Shepherd & Williams,
2014). In most cases, there is rich archive material
and first-hand testimony—and, for recent events,
living witnesses. Thus, to confront our “failure of
imagination,” there are many postapocalypse movies
from which to draw ideas, their prevalence reflecting a
contemporary cultural preoccupation (Getz, 2016;
Rubinson & Mueller, 2016). Wikipedia identifies 100
postapocalypse movies made between 2010 and 2019.
Researchers interested in doomsday studies have a
rich stream of historical archive material and con-
temporary popular culture to mine for theoretical in-
spiration as well as guidelines for policy and practice.
GROUPS BEHAVING BADLY
SIT argues that groups protect their own resources
and status by excluding others (Parkin, 1979; Weber,
1978). Tajfel and Turner (1979) regarded intergroup
prejudice, discrimination, and hostility as social
rather than as interpersonal phenomena. We are the
“in-group” and they are the “out-group.” SIT is thus
a particularly relevant perspective where a clash
of interests leads to intergroup disputes, such as in
high-stress military situations (Brown, 2000; Wildman,
Fiore, Burke, & Salas, 2018)—or in the event of a zom-
bie apocalypse. Two key concepts of SIT are in-group
bias and social closure.
In-group bias involves antagonism and hostility be-
tween dominant and subordinate groups (unless the
latter believe their status is legitimate). In-group bias
appears even in groups that have been created at ran-
dom for experimental purposes wherein there is no
preexisting hostility. SIT argues that in-groups look for
negatives in out-groups and discriminate against them
to enhance their own self-image. Groups also dis-
criminate internally, against those who are “not one of
us.” “Social closure” (social exclusion) can be defined
as “the processes by which groups monopolize access
to positions of power to the detriment of other groups”
(Minefee, Rabelo, Stewart, & Young, 2018: 80). This is
achieved with discriminatory evaluation (“they are not
as good as us”), knowledge and resource hoarding, and
the preservation of dominant group identities.
Kulkarni and Sommer (2015) described social closure
at work on the basis of language differences. Minefee
et al. (2018) observed how social closure leads to the
underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities in
business schools.
In organizational settings, Ashforth and Mael (1989)
claimed that in-group favoritism is common, and does
November
not require leadership support or member interde-
pendence. However, “us and them” distinctions are
more sharply drawn in competitive situations (p. 25).
Ashforth and Mael (1989) also observed that SIT pre-
dicts that “much intergroup conflict stems from the
very fact that groups exist, thus providing a fairly
pessimistic view of intergroup harmony” (p. 31, italics
in original). Will this pessimistic view be reflected in a
doomsday scenario?
The contact hypothesis, or intergroup contact theory,
offers an approach to improving intergroup relations
(Allport, 1954). It argues that, in the right conditions,
communication between members of different groups
encourages mutual understanding and the weakening of
prejudice. Conditions favorable to this approach include
having groups of equal status and background, common
goals, intergroup cooperation, wider social support, and
informal interaction with out-group members, to en-
courage the development of friendships.
This perspective can inform our understanding of
group behavior, although a full review of SIT is be-
yond the scope of this article. It is not clear whether
SIT applies to doomsday scenarios, but it prompts
interesting questions. Will survivors identify with
their own groups, or with the group of all survivors?
How will random groups of strangers deal with
members who do not “fit”? If in-group bias remains
common, what are the implications? Will the contact
hypothesis hold good for groups of survivors who
share common challenges and goals? Or, in a context
where collaboration may be key to well-being and
survival, will the context itself encourage within-
and between-group antagonism and hostility?
TEAMWORK IN EXTREME CONTEXTS
Teamwork is considered desirable to achieve or-
ganizational goals, group cohesion, a caring envi-
ronment, and high reliability (Edmondson & Harvey,
2017; Katzenbach & Smith, 1993). Much work has
focused on team composition, and on how teams
influence individual behavior. Studies have ex-
tended to extreme contexts, and, although high-
lighting aspects of the dark side of teams, they reveal
little about groups in doomsday settings. As we shall
see, groups may have a much darker side than past
research has revealed.
The dark side of team behavior was seen in the
Hawthorne studies, where members punished those
who contravened group norms by painfully “bing-
ing” them on the arm (Roethlisberger & Dickson,
1939). Barker (1993: 426) argued that self-managing
teams increase “concertive control,” taking a
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan
confrontational tone to new members who do not
comply with group norms, telling them that, “If you
come in late and you don’t wanna do anything to
correct it, you’re gone.” Milgram (1965) showed that
people would obey experts in positions of authority
and deliver electric shocks to others. In the Stanford
Prison experiment, Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo
(1972) demonstrated how an “us and them men-
tality” led to abusive group norms among “normal”
students. Browning (1992) posited that ordinary
people perform atrocities as they feel they are
“doing their part” in not leaving these acts for
others. More recently, Kwan (2019) contended that
teams often feel threatened by requests to collab-
orate with other groups because this means sharing
resources, sacrificing autonomy, and weakening
their reputation. Teams may thus refuse to share
information, or overload others with information,
and exclude others from meetings about issues of
common concern. Kwan (2019) cited an example of
this “collaboration blindspot” from an insurance
company—hardly an extreme context. However,
will we see similar group failures to collaborate in a
doomsday setting?
Studying teams in extreme settings can be chal-
lenging (Maynard, Kennedy, & Resick, 2018). Driskell,
Salas, and Driskell (2018: 444) noted that “what we
don’t know regarding teams in extreme environments
far exceeds what we do know.” Most research fo-
cuses on “extreme action teams” that work in spe-
cific settings: SWAT teams (Hillmann et al., 2005),
film crews (Bechky, 2006; Bechky & Okhuysen,
2011), special forces (Fraher, Branicki, & Grint,
2017; Simons, 1998), health care, and firefighting
(Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006; Valentine &
Edmondson, 2015). These teams handle life-and-
death issues, but their training and experience
“normalize” such work. Despite training to handle
their emotions, military teams do experience stress,
fear, and anxiety, which can increase interper-
sonal friction and reduce cooperation with others
(Driskell et al., 2018; Goodwin, Blacksmith, & Coats,
2018; Wijnmaalen, Voordijk, Rietjens, & Dewulf,
2019). As noted earlier, however, the survivor groups
in which we are interested are caught up in events
without any prior training or experience.
What can we learn from religious cults and sports
teams? Stinchcombe (2005) suggested that cults en-
courage darker behaviors by intruding in people’s
lives. Rosander, Granström, and Stiwne (2006) noted
that extreme religious activities have roots in social
control. Some gangs exercise social control by asking
new members to confirm their commitment through
439
violence (Bubolz & Lee, 2019), while others refrain
from violence because it is bad for business such as
drug dealing (Venkatesh, 2008). Some groups that
emerge in TWD resemble cults or gangs in their
leadership and members’ behavior, including vio-
lent initiation tests. It is more difficult to find clues to
behavior in extreme contexts from sports teams
whose training, goals, and rules make them unreli-
able proxies (Pescosolido & Saavedra, 2012).
Research in this area has emphasized contextual
explanations for behavior rather than individual
dispositions. But the contexts studied are not com-
parable to a doomsday setting, where there is no so-
cial infrastructure or opportunity for team member
selection and training, and only one shared goal—
survival. We must therefore consider the differences
between the behavior of well-trained, organization-
based teams in risky and emergency contexts and
the random groups of strangers facing disruptive and
surprising contexts (Hällgren et al., 2018). That is,
how will untrained and inexperienced groups of
strangers behave in a doomsday context in which
they face persistent existential threat? This is a novel
area for investigation.
APOCALYPSE AT THE MOVIES: USING FICTION
AS A RESEARCH TOOL
Social science fiction attracts significant criticism.
In positivist, hypothetico-deductive epistemology,
fictional accounts in general—and single cases in
particular—have no status (Czarniawska, 1997). In-
terpretive, constructivist epistemology may be more
sympathetic, but critics observe that fiction and re-
ality are opposites; scholarly journals report empir-
ically grounded facts while novels and movies
contain stories invented by authors (Rhodes &
Brown, 2005). Actions and outcomes in stories are
driven not by social forces or generative mecha-
nisms, but by the whims of authors. How can we infer
causality or develop theory from such accounts?
Recognizing these criticisms, we offer two re-
sponses, epistemological and pragmatic. From an
epistemological standpoint, Latour and Woolgar
(1986), in their study of laboratory work, showed
that what appears to be “hard science” involves a
subjective “fact-establishing method” designed to
persuade others. Also dismissing the “fiction versus
reality” dichotomy, Savage, Cornelissen, and Franck
(2018, pp. 977–978) noted that fictions “hold real
power over people in that they shape how people
make sense of organizations and are thus very much
the essence of organizations.” Fictions can thus be
440 Academy of Management Perspectives
seen as other ways of exploring reality, rather than as
counterpoints to empirical truths. From a pragmatic
standpoint, let us recall McGrath’s (1981: 179) ob-
servation that “all research strategies are seriously
flawed; often with their very strengths in regard to
one desideratum functioning as serious weaknesses
in regard to other, equally important, goals” (em-
phases in original). To overcome this problem,
McGrath advocated using an array of methods. Fic-
tions may be seriously flawed, methodologically, but
they can complement traditional approaches by in-
spiring fresh ideas and insights, and by suggesting
theoretical possibilities, which may then be consid-
ered using other procedures.
Adopting a narrative theoretical lens, we can use
fictional accounts to study settings that are impos-
sible to research directly. This approach is not
mainstream, but has grown in popularity (Bryman &
Buchanan, 2018; Kalkman, 2020; Soetaert & Rutten,
2014; Zundel, Holt, & Cornelissen, 2013). The case
for using “speculative fiction” or “social science
fiction” as a research tool has three strands. First,
fictional accounts allow researchers to observe be-
havior in extreme contexts safely, as in, for example,
Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Cordesman, 2001), Step-
ford Wives and Matrix (Czarniawska & Gustavsson,
2008), Swedish crime drama Martin Beck (Buus,
2009), and Battlestar Galactica (Fey, Poppe, &
Rauch, 2016). Godfrey, Lilley, and Brewis (2012:
542) suggested that the movie Jarhead is a proxy for
how “the civilian body entering the military be-
comes ‘disciplined,’ ‘gendered,’ and ‘cyborgian’ in
carefully coded ways such that what emerges is a
‘military body’ capable of performing the labor that
the organization requires of it.” Similarly, Otto and
Strauß (2019) based their study of the emotional di-
mensions of working life and family on a novel.
Second fiction serves as:
[A] thought-provoking medium that researchers can
use to get inspiration and ideas—a fruitful starting
point for organizational analysis, as it gives a much
different and more expansive view of organizational
and institutional life than the prevailing scientific–
professional manner of studying organizations. (Savage
et al., 2018: 977)
Phillips (1995) observed that film narratives are often
deliberately idiosyncratic, illustrating outliers and
the extraordinary, which can be particularly valu-
able from a research perspective.
Third, narratives are implicit theories, explaining
how outcomes are achieved through a sequence of
events in a given context over time (Bell, 2008;
November
Phillips, 1995; Savage et al., 2018; Wright, 1975).
Discussing Western movies, Wright (1975: 128)
argued:
[A] narrative is not just possibly an explanation; it is
inevitably an explanation. It explains how a certain
situation came about from a prior situation. To ex-
plain this change, the story presents all of the infor-
mation necessary to understand the change.
Hassard and Buchanan (2009: 632) likewise postu-
lated that “feature films can be viewed as theoretical
narratives, case studies, and proxy documentaries,
and as a source of primary data which can be useful
with regard to theory development and testing.”
They noted that film narratives often portray the
extreme, the unusual, and the inaccessible, rather
than the typical (and more readily studied).
Penfold-Mounce, Beer, and Burrows (2011) illus-
trated the use of social science fiction in their anal-
ysis of the television series The Wire. Asking if this
is “better sociology” than sociologists produce,
they noted that viewers are encouraged to conduct
“thought experiments,” to explore and test ideas,
possibilities, and consequences of actions. Holt
and Zundel (2014: 578) argued that the power of
The Wire as a research vehicle lies with how social
conditions are:
. . . investigated and expressed using fiction, espe-
cially the opportunity to show passion (conviction),
to evoke the world from within (expressive power),
and to remind us of what is particularly human in the
unfolding of events (tragedy).
Links between fiction and reality can be seen in
suicides that mimic movie suicides (Jamieson &
Romer, 2011), and in how movies about paratroopers
feed into real paratroopers’ self-image (Thornborrow
& Brown, 2009). However, we must also consider the
choice of fiction that research can usefully use. Why
have we chosen the surreal setting of a zombie
apocalypse?
THE ZOMBIE MADNESS IN
OUR METHODOLOGY
To create realistic accounts, some movies and
television programs are based on field and docu-
mentary research. Examples include the movie 13
Days (Buchanan & Huczynski, 2004) and the tele-
vision series The Wire (Holt & Zundel, 2014).
Zombie movies may be seen as having little value as
they are surreal, exaggerated, gruesome, or “off
limits.” However, Barry and Elmes (1997) noted that
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan
effective narratives require two properties that are in
tension; credibility (believability) and defamiliari-
zation (novelty). Credible narratives can appear fa-
miliar and mundane, while novel narratives, such as
zombie fiction, can be unbelievable. Nevertheless,
novel narratives may be better able to trigger inter-
esting, fresh ideas, by encouraging viewers to see
things in new and different ways. Even zombie
movies, in the characters’ behavior, must maintain a
level of realism to be plausible; their popularity
suggests that the genre has broadly struck this
balance.
The zombie genre has not previously been used as
a medium for researching group behavior. Our in-
spiration is thus unusual. Based on comic book
novels (2003–2019) written by Robert Kirkman, the
AMC television program The Walking Dead has run
from 2010 to 2019, which allows for an in-depth
exploration of the characters and within- and
between-group relations. Zombies have been seen as
a metaphor for the apocalypse, or simply for “the
anxiety of the day” (class, race, gender, sexuality,
consumer capitalism, uncontrolled immigration,
war, famine, climate change [Boluk & Lenz, 2011;
Stratton, 2011]). Bishop (2009) noted that the zombie
genre became popular after 9/11, as a channel for
social fears. Asma (2014) argued that zombies are
“beneficial foes” who invite us to consider creative
solutions to unanticipated problems. Reed and
Penfold-Mounce (2015) saw TWD as stimulating
the sociological imagination, informing a range of
social and organizational themes. Locatelli (2016)
explored what TWD reveals about conflict and war.
Zombies have been used to trigger fresh thinking in
real-world training, education, and development.
Coker (2013) used the zombie apocalypse novel
World War Z (Brooks, 2006) to teach strategic stud-
ies; the book is now a film (Pitt, Gardner, Kleiner, &
Bryce, 2013). According to Coker (2013), the Sutter
Roseville Medical Center in California has a zombie
apocalypse drill. In 2012, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (2018) published an online
guide for dealing with the living dead; preparing for a
fictional attack provides tips for dealing with real
disasters. Drezner (2015) used the example of a
global zombie attack to explore theories of interna-
tional politics. Reed and Penfold-Mounce (2015)
used TWD to examine consumerism, interpersonal
relations, and gender and race relations. The United
States Strategic Command (2011) uses a training
exercise titled “Counter-Zombie Dominance Opera-
tions” to stimulate creative thinking and develop
441
disaster preparedness. These examples show how
the zombie metaphor can be used to generate prop-
ositions about human behavior in settings that we
have yet to experience, and inform strategies for
dealing with the unpredictable.
Zombie movies are valuable, therefore, not be-
cause they portray everyday life, but because they
challenge our assumptions, and allow us safely to
study a novel, rich, and complex extreme context
where we can observe the behaviors of those in-
volved as they confront multiple problems over a
prolonged period. Paradoxically, the behavior that
we observe in movies may be more realistic than
the responses captured by traditional methods
(interviews, questionnaires, focus groups). Movies
thus give us another lens, which brings to life the
characters and events involved, generating a rich,
culturally embedded, temporally sensitive under-
standing of the phenomena in which we are inter-
ested (Langley & Tsoukas, 2010).
INTRA- AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR IN TWD
Fictional narratives are implicit theories, explain-
ing how outcomes are achieved through a sequence of
events in a given context over time (Savage et al., 2018;
Wright, 1975). The question driving our analysis thus
concerns “the theory on offer,” concerning how
groups and their members behave in an apocalyptic
setting. Fictional narratives convey meaning from
author to audience. Our approach thus relies on a
constructivist perspective, in which the interpretation
of viewers or readers is as valid as the author’s (Barry &
Elmes, 1997; Czarniawska & de Monthoux, 1994).
What follows, therefore, is our reading—one of several
possibilities—of group behavior in TWD.
The following analysis is inductive, grounding
theoretical observations in the evidence from the
narrative and its context. Our understanding of the
characters, groups, and events in TWD is informed
by watching the programs, and by drawing on fan
websites (FANDOM TV Community, 2020; Forever
Dreaming, 2020; Skybound Entertainment, 2020).
We begin by developing a timeline that describes
encounters with other groups of survivors. We then
consider the key features of the apocalyptic context
facing our survivors, and how these features may
encourage “dark-side” behaviors. Throughout the
analysis, the authors took turns to propose alterna-
tive interpretations until we reached agreement. Fi-
nally, we chose 10 representative events that illustrate
the emergent nature of the analysis, which is the basis
of our theoretical framework.
442 Academy of Management Perspectives November

The TWD Narrative identity, and some have “cult”-style leaders. This
timeline prompts three observations. The first is that
At the time of writing (6th of October, 2019), TWD
other groups of survivors are potentially as much of a
has run for nine seasons, with 131 episodes, covering
threat to our core group as are the walkers. This is
a notional period of 10 years. The cast includes about
apparent from the first encounter that they have with
400 named actors, of whom only six appear in more
Dave, Tony, and Randall. Having captured the in-
than 100 episodes, with 156 surviving for only one
jured Randall, they cannot let him go in case he leads
episode (Internet Movie Database: www.imdb.com).
his hostile group back to Hershel’s farm.
The six characters who appear most often are Rick
A second observation is that, when another group
Grimes, Carl Grimes (Rick’s son), Daryl Dixon, Carol
appears to be friendly and supportive, that may not
Peletier, Maggie Greene, and Michonne (her full
be the case—as with the Hunters, for example. Third,
name is given as “Michonne Hawthorne” in the
members of our core group quickly learn that their
comic book series). Scientists have been unable to
first reaction on meeting another group must involve
treat a new and mysterious virus. Those who are
suspicion and mistrust, which in turn often leads to
infected die, but are reanimated and are driven to eat
violent conflict that can be fatal for some of those
others. Those who are bitten and not eaten die, are
involved. Most of our core group’s encounters with
reanimated, and become “walkers.” Given the death
other groups and communities end badly for some-
rate, social infrastructure breaks down as officials,
one. Fourth, intra- and intergroup conflicts are con-
emergency services, and the military are killed or
sistent across the timeline. At times, core group
abandon their posts. Some refugee camps are estab-
members have doubts about how to treat others. But
lished, which the few survivors try to reach, but these
soon, another conflict draws the doubting members
are quickly overrun. Some survivors establish their
back toward vengeance. There is little discernible
own camps, with varied success. The lead character
pattern of the conflicts becoming any less even when
in TWD is Rick Grimes, a small-town deputy sheriff.
the relative safety of the communities is formed. The
At the beginning of season 1, Rick awakes in a
situation is rather the opposite, as communities re-
deserted hospital from a coma, having been shot
quire resources that put them in contact with others
some days earlier when arresting a suspect.
and signal that resources exist, which attracts groups
The survivors face a constant threat from walkers,
of villains.
who are attracted by noise and smell. Walkers can be
The presence of other groups and communities is
killed by a blow to the head (e.g., bullet, machete,
not the only characteristic of the context in which
bat). The survivors form groups and communities in
our core group finds itself. Other dimensions of the
what they hope will be safe locations. We follow a
context have an impact on our core group’s situation,
“core” group, mainly led by Rick (this later becomes
emotions, and behavior, and can in turn contribute to
the foundation for four relatively stable communi-
conflict within the group or conflict with another
ties). Over time, the core group is separated by events
group or community. There are five main charac-
or by choice, but the core group remains centered
teristics of this apocalyptic context: predatory zom-
around Rick. Initially the core group searches con-
bies (and the fact that any death is a threat, as victims
stantly for food, other resources, and shelter. Its
are reanimated); the scarcity of all kinds of resources,
members also face threats from other groups of sur-
including safe shelter; the need often to choose be-
vivors who cannot always be trusted. In this context,
tween equally undesirable options; the presence of
tensions erupt between group members, and be-
other groups; and the absence of law and order.
tween the different groups of survivors. Lethal vio-
These context features contribute to intra- and in-
lence becomes the norm. These conflicts remain
tergroup conflict through a combination of fear and
unresolved after 10 years.
anxiety, competition for resources (food and shelter),
mistrust of others, disagreements over critical deci-
sions, and insecurity.
The TWD Timeline and Context
From the 131 episodes, we selected 52 incidents of
Table 1 shows the narrative timeline, based chro- significant conflict. “Significance” is of course sub-
nologically on the other survivor groups and commu- jective. Core group members disagree about many
nities who are encountered by our core group—their issues; which way to go, whose turn it is, when to
leaders, group characteristics, and how their inter- leave, who will carry out which tasks. Simple dis-
actions with our core group turn out. Some groups agreements of this kind, which are resolved without
give themselves names, emphasizing their distinct drama, were not counted. Of the 52 significant
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan 443

TABLE 1
Other Survivor Groups in TWD
Group or community Leader Group features Outcome of contact

Unnamed Dave, Tony, unknown Group of 30, many of them are dangerous Rick tries to negotiate a truce, but there is a
Randall shoot-out and Randall is injured and
captured; if they let him go, he could
return with his friends. Shane breaks his
neck
Hershel’s farm Hershel Greene Hershel and daughter Maggie allow Forced to abandon the farm when it is
Rick’s group to stay on their farm overrun by walkers. Core group forms
with Rick as the leader
Woodbury The Governor Loyal to the Governor, violent Core group loses secure location and is
dispersed
The Prison NA Group of prisoners with no leader One prisoner tries to kill Rick, the others
are assimilated; the prison becomes
home, and a first community led by Rick
emerges. The Prison community
dissolves when the Governor attacks
Claimers Joe (violent sadist) Violent scavengers Rick kills Joe and takes the group’s
equipment
Hunters, Terminus Chris (Hunter) Cannibals Core group exterminates the Hunters
Atlanta police, Grady Dawn Police officers use survivors as (sex) For ransom, core group takes a prisoner
memorial hospital slaves from the other community, but Beth dies
in failed exchange
Alexandria (safe zone) Deanna Monroe Seen as too trusting and naı̈ve by Rick Monroe is killed, Rick takes over.
Alexandria becomes the first
community with Rick as leader
The Wolves Aphid Paints a “W” on the forehead of victims Wolves invade Alexandria, killing Erin;
Carol kills them
The Hilltop Gregory Walled farming community, and refugee Friendly community; Saviors are defeated
camp, extorted and later at war with and many killed. Maggie takes over as
Saviors leader, kills Gregory. Core group
separates. The Hilltop become the
second community
Saviors, The Sanctuary Negan Extort other communities—including Some of Rick’s group are killed; prolonged
Hilltop, Alexandria, Scavengers, and war when members of communities die.
the Kingdom—for resources Daryl later becomes the leader of the
fourth community, Sanctuary
The Kingdom King Ezekiel Walled farming community, and refugee Initially refuse to fight with Rick and
camp, extorted by and later at war with Maggie’s groups; later join the fight. The
Saviors Kingdom with Ezekiel and Carol as
leaders becomes third community
Oceanside Natania Living hidden at a campground after Try to kill Tara, who escapes; initially
being exposed to Saviors; killing on refuse to fight, but betrayed by Tara and
sight forced to give weapons to communities;
Natania killed by accident
The Scavengers Jadis (Anne) Based at a junkyard trying to live Scavengers promise to fight Saviors, but
peacefully betray the communities to fight for the
Saviors; later change sides to support
the communities
unnamed Georgie Small group living in a van, trading Provide knowledge of innovations to build
knowledge with communities a new civilization
unnamed Magna Small group of survivors trying to Not allowed to join Alexandria but invited
survive to join the Hilltop
The Highwaymen Ozzy Prey upon travelers by theft and Negotiations with Carol and Ezekiel make
extortion them protectors of the Kingdom
The Whisperers Alpha Disguise themselves by using skins of Lydia, abused child of Alpha, joins
walkers; territorial, killing intruders Hilltop; all-out war with communities
after intrusion on Whisperers’ territory
444 Academy of Management Perspectives
incidents, we selected 26 that involved within-group
conflict and 26 that involved between-group conflict
(both from a core group perspective; when we refer to
the “core group,” this includes the members, even if
temporary, of the group that Rick and others are part
of). Incidents were categorized as involving “intra-
group conflict” when they involved leadership con-
test within the group (argument or fight); dispute over
a leader’s decision; one group member killing another
(or others), often in revenge; disagreement over killing
or saving a member of another group; decision
whether to allow someone to (re)join the group;
allowing others to be killed by walkers; members
leaving when they disagree with group behavior; or
punishing (even killing) group members who do not
obey the rules or who challenge the leader.
These incidents were further categorized into five
main forms of intragroup conflict: heated argument,
violent (often fatal) argument, leadership contests,
exclusions, and killings. Incidents were categorized
as involving “intergroup conflict” where they in-
volved leadership contest between groups (argu-
ment or fight); capture of the resources (food,
weapons, place of safety) of another group by force;
kidnap or capture for ransom; shoot-out; revenge
killings; killing someone perceived to be a threat to
the group or community; blackmail and extortion;
betrayal (siding with one group after telling another
group they were on their side); deceit, such as
promising shelter while hiding cannibalistic inten-
tions; slavery; forced labor; or territorial disputes.
These incidents were further categorized into five
main forms of intergroup conflict: competition for
resources, kidnap and ransom, cannibalism, revenge
killing, and all-out war. Space constraints prevent us
from describing all 52 incidents. We thus describe
one representative illustration of each of these 10
forms of conflict.
Intragroup Conflict 1: Heated Argument—“This
Isn’t a Democracy”
Heated arguments are common in this context.
Tensions are always brewing, over group leadership,
and over roles within the group, for example. Other
arguments arise over resources, plans, other com-
munities, antagonistic individuals and groups, the
risks involved in scavenging, and exposure to
walkers. In the following exchange, Rick has just
killed Shane, his former friend and colleague (see
Intragroup Conflict 5: Killings, below). The other
group members are questioning his leadership, and
Carol is trying to convince Daryl to lead instead.
November
Daryl refuses, believing in Rick. Carol and Maggie try
to force Rick to take action.
MAGGIE: I’m not. . . I’m not sitting here, waiting for
another herd [of walkers] to blow through. We need to
move, now!
RICK: No one is going anywhere.
CAROL: Do something!
RICK: I am doing something! I’m keeping this group
together, alive. I’ve been doing that all along, no
matter what. I didn’t ask for this. I killed my best
friend for you people, for Christ’s sake! You saw what
he was like, how he pushed me, how he compromised
us, how he threatened us. He staged the whole Ran-
dall thing, led me out to put a bullet in my back. He
gave me no choice. Maybe you people are better off
without me. Go ahead. I say there’s a place for us, but
maybe it’s just another pipe dream. Why don’t you go
and find out yourself? Send me a postcard. Go on,
there’s the door. You can do better? Let’s see how far
you get. No takers? Fine. But get one thing straight.
This isn’t a democracy anymore.
Themes evident in this incident include disagree-
ment over killing a core group member, a serious
challenge to Rick’s leadership (raised voices, Rick
spitting and waving his gun), and Rick establishing
himself at this point as an autocratic leader (this will
change later).
Intragroup Conflict 2: Violent Argument—
“Kill Negan”
How to deal with adversaries is a constant source
of argument. Should they be treated kindly, or killed?
One of the most dangerous groups of adversaries is
the Saviors, led by their cult-like leader, Negan. After
fighting for over a year, the Saviors and Negan are
finally beaten. Several of the Saviors are killed but
many are saved, including Negan. Those who are
saved are allowed to join the communities, but Negan
is kept in a cell. The surviving Saviors live in the
Sanctuary. Rick lives in Alexandria, where Negan is
imprisoned. Maggie and Daryl, living at Hilltop, con-
spire to kill Negan themselves, to avenge the deaths of
those they loved, and to protect themselves should he
escape. But Rick wants to build a more civilized world
and believes that killing Negan would make him a
martyr. Daryl plans to take Rick on a detour on his
motorcycle while Maggie goes to Alexandria to kill
Negan:
RICK: That was the way, back there. Pull over. Pull
over! What is this?
DARYL: You know exactly what this is.
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan
RICK: I already called it in. Maggie’s not making it
through those gates.
DARYL: Yeah, that message didn’t go through.
RICK: You messed with the relay?
DARYL: This time, man, it’s gonna go the way it was
supposed to.
Rick picks up his radio to call Alexandria to stop
Maggie, but Daryl knocks the radio from his hand.
Rick lunges at him and they fight.
Themes evident in this incident include disagreement
over killing a member of another group, tension be-
tween the options of compassion and revenge, and self-
protection. Some core group members see others as a
threat, and others want to build a more civilized world.
Intragroup Conflict 3: Leadership Contests—“Kill
Maggie, Hang Gregory”
Three years after the zombie outbreak, the commu-
nities live in relative peace. At the Hilltop, Gregory has
been the leader since the authorities (the U.S. Federal
Emergency Management Agency) abandoned them.
Gregory tries to strike a deal with the Saviors, a com-
peting violent community that has been extorting them.
Maggie challenges his leadership. They hold an elec-
tion at Hilltop, and Maggie wins. Gregory is bitter and
wants to reclaim his leadership. To accomplish this, he
sets Earl up with a bottle of whisky. Gregory tells Earl
that Maggie is responsible of the death of their son, that
Maggie should not be in charge of Hilltop, and that Earl
should kill her. Gregory then arranges for Maggie to go
to the cemetery, where Earl waits and tries to stab her.
Earl does not succeed, and gives Gregory away. Maggie
arranges for Gregory’s public hanging the following day.
MAGGIE: You tried to have me killed ’cause you’re too
chicken-shit to do it yourself.
GREGORY: Margaret, you need to sit down. You obvi-
ously have a head injury.
MAGGIE: You want to lead this place? You can’t even
murder someone right.
GREGORY: This place? I built this place! None of this
would exist if it wasn’t for me.
MAGGIE: Do you even give a crap about all of the stupid
shit that you have done? After all the chances that
you’ve been given? No.
GREGORY: They’ll all know that you did this. Earl
attacked you because you got his son killed!
MAGGIE: I don’t want to do this. But people need to
understand that at Hilltop, the punishment fits the
crime. [Daryl hits Gregory’s horse. The rope tightens
around his neck. His body twitches then becomes still
as the Hilltopians watch.]
445
Themes in this incident include a leadership contest
(one of many), the loser seeking revenge, the killing
of an ex-leader, and Maggie’s autocratic leadership.
With exception of Ezekiel, every leader is challenged
by someone, due to power issues or disagreements
over policy. Maggie became the informal leader at
Hilltop because of her skills and charisma; she is a
rare example of a democratically elected leader.
Several of her council members try to talk her out of
hanging Gregory, but the decision is hers. This de-
cision comes with a cost, cementing her directive
leadership, and differentiating her from the rest of
the community.
Intragroup Conflict 4: Exclusions and
Isolations—“Did You Kill Karen and David?”
In season four, the core group has lived in relative
peace in the prison, growing crops and keeping ani-
mals without the interference of other groups and
with little zombie activity. However, some of the core
group contract a virus and become ill. If they die,
they become walkers. Carol decides to kill those who
are sick, without a discussion. This leads to tensions
with Rick, who has transformed from a dominant
leader to taking up farming with a more peaceful
attitude. According to Carol, the decision had to be
made. Rick asks Carol:
RICK: Carol, did you kill Karen and David?
CAROL: Yes. They would have drowned in their own
blood. They were suffering. I made it quick. We
needed the bodies gone. We needed to stop it from
spreading. They were the only ones who were sick.
They were a threat. I was trying to save lives.
[Carol, Rick, and others leave for a supply run to find
medicine to cure the infection, and find some in an
abandoned veterinary college. The debate between
right and wrong continues:]
CAROL: Rick, I killed two people and you haven’t said a
word about it.
RICK: What do you want me to say?
CAROL: It’s not about what you say. It’s about facing
reality. It always comes for us and, over and over
again, we face it so that we can live. You can’t just be a
farmer, Rick. You’re a good leader. Better than I
probably gave you credit for.
RICK: I never murdered two of our own. Just one
[Shane]. He was gonna kill me.
CAROL: So were they. They were gonna kill all of us.
RICK: You don’t know that.
CAROL: If you thought it would save Judith or Carl,
would you have done it then or would you have just
gone back to your crops and hoped it’d all be okay?
446 Academy of Management Perspectives
You don’t have to like what I did, Rick. I don’t. You
just accept it.
RICK: They might have lived, Karen and David, and
now they’re dead. That wasn’t your decision to make.
When the others find out, they won’t want you there.
And if they don’t make it back, if everybody dies of
this thing and it’s just the two of us, with Judith and
Carl, with my children, I won’t have you here.
CAROL: Rick, it’s me. I thought you were done making
decisions for everyone.
RICK: I’m making this decision for me.
CAROL: I could have pretended that everything was
gonna be fine. But I didn’t. I did something. I stepped
up. I had to do something.
RICK: No, you didn’t.
Themes evident in this incident include disagreement
over “mercy killing” two sick people of the prison
community; a loss of trust in the killer, Carol; excluding
Carol from the core group; and justifying this on the
grounds of self-protection. Such exclusions are com-
mon. Sometimes, core group members decide to leave
themselves due to disagreements with the rest of the
group. Carol and Morgan leave the core group due to
the violence in which they do not want to be involved.
Intragroup Conflict 5: Killings—“Call It What
It Is—Murder”
Disagreements often lead to violence, and one ex-
ample is in the showdown between Rick and Shane.
In a later episode, the core group holds a funeral for
Dale, who was killed by a zombie. Dale felt that the
group was losing its humanity when they decided to
kill Randall, the captured stranger. In his funeral
speech, Rick tells the others that the way to honor
Dale is to prove him wrong, and to keep their hu-
manity by caring for strangers. The first step is to
move everyone into Hershel Greene’s farm and to
start organizing defenses. Shane challenges Rick’s
ability to lead the group, and kills Randall on his own
initiative. Shane makes up a story about Randall es-
caping after starting a fight. But Rick pulls Shane’s
story apart as they search for Randall in the forest,
and suspects that Shane will now kill him:
RICK: So, this is where you plan to do it?
SHANE: It is a good place as any.
RICK: At least have the balls to call this what it is.
Murder. You really think they will buy whatever
bullshit story you cook up?
SHANE: There is no story. I saw that prisoner shoot you
down. I ran after him. I snapped his neck. It ain’t going
to be easy but Lori and Carl will get over you.
RICK: Why? Why now? I thought we worked this all out?
November
SHANE: We tried to kill each other man! You think we
would just forget about it all?
RICK: You gonna kill me in cold blood? Screw my wife,
have my children call you “dad”? Is that what you
want? I know you. You won’t be able to live with this.
SHANE: What do you know about what I have to live
with? You got no idea what I can live with! What about
what you can do? Here I am. Come on. Raise your gun!
RICK: No. No, I will not. You gonna have to kill an
unarmed man.
Shane pulls his gun as Rick raises his hands. When
he is close enough, Rick pulls his knife and stabs
Shane to death. Themes in this incident include
killing a member of another group, self-protection, a
leadership challenge, and then Rick killing the
challenger to assert himself.
Intergroup Conflict 1: Competition for
Resources—“Other Groups Want What We Have”
Initially, the survivors are concerned about the
threat from walkers and about how to find shelter
and resources to survive until the next day. Over
time, the survivor groups increase in size as they find
each other. The core group quickly learns that other
groups may have different interests than joint sur-
vival. In the competition for resources, other groups
are looking after themselves. Repeatedly, they find
that other groups and their members cannot be
trusted, as they try to take resources by force, vio-
lently or by threat. For example, the core group is
attacked by another group. Its members capture one
man, Randall, whom they interrogate:
RANDALL: They have weapons. Heavy stuff, auto-
matics. But I didn’t do anything.
RICK: Your boys shot at my boys, tried to take this farm.
You just went along for the ride? You’re trying to tell
me you’re innocent?
RANDALL: Yes! These people took me in. Not just guys.
A whole group of ’em. Men and women, kids too. Just
like you people.
Illustrating the ongoing competition for resources and
shelter, themes in this incident include group self-
interest, mistrust of others, taking resources by force,
and the normalization of violence. This episode is
aptly called “Judge, Jury, Executioner,” highlighting
the lack of law and order. The core group decides to
kill Randall because he represents a threat. Rick,
however, is convinced by Hershel to spare Randall’s
life. Shane disagrees, and kills Randall himself, which
creates the leadership showdown. Later, the Saviors
kill members of Rick’s group to establish their
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan
dominance (see Table 1). Normalized violence seems
to be a consequence of the constant exposure to exis-
tential threat. The walkers remain a threat but the main
enemies are either within the groups themselves, or
from other groups.
Intergroup Conflict 2: Kidnap and Ransom—“Two
Hostages In Exchange”
In this incident, the core group has been living
peacefully in the prison for some time, and has taken up
farming. When its members encounter the Governor,
leader of the Woodbury community, they have a new
adversary. He wants the prison because it is easier to
protect. The Governor and his group attack the prison
with heavy weapons, including a tank, and hold
Michonne and Hershel hostage in exchange for the
prison:
RICK: Let ’em go right now. I’ll stay down here. Talk as
long as you want. But you let ’em go. You got a tank.
You don’t need hostages.
GOVERNOR: I do. This is just to show you I’m serious. Not
to blast a hole in our new home. You and your people,
you have till sundown to get out of here or they die.
RICK: Doesn’t have to go down this way.
GOVERNOR: I got more people, more firepower. We need
this prison. There it is.
RICK: It’s not about the past. It’s about right now. There
are children here. Some of them are sick. They won’t
survive.
GOVERNOR: I have a tank. And I’m letting you walk
away from here. What else is there to talk about? I
could shoot you all. You’d all shoot back. I know that.
But we’ll win and you’ll be dead. All of you.
RICK: Doesn’t have to be like that.
GOVERNOR: Like I said, it’s your choice.
Themes evident in this incident include hostage
exchange, mistrust, threats, and violence. Kidnap-
pings and ransoms are common in TWD, generating
loss of trust.
Intergroup Conflict 3: Cannibalism—“They Ate
Bob’s Leg!”
The leader of the Terminus community, Gareth, is
killed along with other members of his group. They
captured members of the core group for food, and
had already eaten Bob’s leg.
GARETH: I know that you’ve been out there, but I can
see it. You don’t know what it is to be hungry. You
don’t have to do this. We can walk away. And we will
never cross paths again. I promise you.
447
RICK: But you’ll cross someone’s path. You’d do this to
anyone, right? Besides, I already made you a promise.
Themes in this incident include scavenging, parasit-
ism, and revenge killing – showing how past wrongs
escalate into violent conflicts between communities.
Intergroup Conflict 4: Revenge Killing—“I Lied”
During seasons 7–9 of TWD, the core group joins
the peaceful Alexandria community. The members
soon face a new adversary in the Saviors, a commu-
nity led by Negan. When called upon, this group
kneel and cry, “I am Negan,” suggesting that their
leader is not one but all of them, and that they share
the leader’s responsibility. The Saviors survive by
extorting other communities for resources. Rick and
his group decide to fight, and Abraham, Glenn, and
Sasha, among others, are killed. In season 8, Rick and
Morgan decide to kill a group of Saviors in revenge.
Before Rick and Morgan find them, though, the
Saviors knock them out and tie them up in an aban-
doned house, along with one of their wounded
friends. As Rick and Morgan wake up, the Saviors are
debating their fate. They are worried about Negan’s
anger. But they may make things better by bringing
back Negan’s nemesis, Rick.
JARED, SAVIOR: Rise and shine, curly. You ready to do
some walkin’? Yeah. Of course you are. Pack it up,
boys! We’re ditchin’ the dead weight and movin’ on.
RICK: Wait! My truck’s not far. We can get ’em to the
Hilltop’s doctor. They could come back with us. You
all could. You didn’t want this. You made a split-
second choice, and you chose wrong, but it’s not too
late. You cut us loose, you cooperate, we’ll give you a
fresh start. A chance to become part of our commu-
nity, to become one of us. I’m giving you my word.
JARED, SAVIOR: You asshats aren’t dumb enough to be-
lieve that.
SAVIOR: We can hear him out. We could talk it over.
Walkers! We’re surrounded!
RICK: Thing is, we’ve already killed you.
SAVIOR: Some coming in! Some coming in!
MORGAN: You’re too weak to take on this herd alone.
Cut us loose. Give us our weapons. We can help you!
JARED, SAVIOR: Nobody’s cutting anybody loose! I’m
killing these pricks right now.
At this point, one of the other Saviors strikes Jared
down and unties Rick and Morgan who join the fight
against the zombies. Rick and Morgan initially honor
their deal with the Saviors but soon turn around to
fight them as they see there is a chance to make it out
alive.
448 Academy of Management Perspectives
SAVIOR: Come on! We gotta find a way out!
MORGAN: Hey, give me the stick! We’re almost out. Go
on ahead.
SAVIOR: Son of a bitch! Aah! You said. . . You said. . .
MORGAN: I lied.
Themes evident in this incident include cult-style
leadership, mistrust, betrayal, and revenge killing.
The Saviors need help to save their friend. Jared does
not trust Rick and Morgan, who betray and attack the
Saviors to get their revenge and escape.
Intergroup Conflict 5: All-Out War—“I Was
Supposed To Die”
Except for a few that become allies (the Hilltop, the
Kingdom, Alexandria, Oceanside, and eventually
the Sanctuary), other communities are adversaries
that incite all-out war with the core group. This in-
cludes the Governor and Woodbury, Negan and the
Saviors, Gareth and the Terminants, Anne and the
Scavengers, and Alpha and the Whisperers. War in-
volves defeating the “enemy” by setting traps and
fighting for resources, weapons, shelter, and revenge.
The Whisperers are led by Alpha. They disguise
themselves with masks made from the skins of
walkers, and whisper to each other among walkers to
avoid being recognized as human. The communities
and the Whisperers have a series of escalating fights
that culminate when people from the core group
(dispersed across Hilltop, Alexandria, and Kingdom)
have to cross the Whisperers’ territory. People’s heads
are put on spikes to mark their border; cross the border
and the Whispers will unleash a herd of walkers.
Siddiq is the sole survivor of the “Fair Massacre”:
SIDDIQ: I was taken with the others. I was supposed to
die with them. I was ready to. Then, Alpha whispered
in my ear, “Tell them.” Something hit me, and every-
thing went black. And when I woke up, I was alone.
What happened was evil. And I think she left me alive
to tell you that story. To scare you and to drive us all
apart again. But I want to tell you a different story. See,
before the end, Ozzy, Alek, and DJ found us [former
antagonists living from extortion] and they gave us an
opening. And everyone fought back. And what they did
was more than brave. ’Cause they defended each other.
And they sacrificed for each other. And some of them,
they didn’t even know each other, but they still fought
like they did. Like they were family. ’Til the very end.
And in the end, their time was cut short, but ours keeps
going. So we have to keep going. For them and for all of
us. We need to honor them, and we need to remember
these friends, our family, died as heroes.
November
Themes evident in this incident include adversarial
communities with defined borders, and continuing
violence, self-sacrifice for others. All-out war may be
unavoidable in this context.
The above-described 10 examples arose often be-
cause the groups were simply there, competing for
resources, shelter, and survival. The examples il-
lustrate that ordinary people, such as a police officer
(Rick) and a gym teacher (Negan), can perform
atrocities (Browning, 1992), and that people will
look up to these authorities and obey them (Milgram,
1965) to prove their commitment (Bubolz & Lee,
2019). TWD thus suggests that in-group bias and
social closure are exaggerated in this competi-
tive, high-stress context (Ashforth & Mael, 1989;
Wildman et al., 2018). We might have speculated
that the common threat and shared goal of survival
would lead to group cohesion. But no. Ten years into
this zombie apocalypse, the ability of groups to co-
exist peacefully is low. The core group has many
opportunities to collaborate with others, but is rou-
tinely involved in conflict. Mistrust is a life insur-
ance policy. Other groups are not just a threat to
autonomy (Kwan, 2019) but to survival.
Table 2 summarizes the recurring themes of
within-group conflict: mistrust, disputes, leadership
contests, exclusion, revenge killing. Table 3 sum-
marizes the recurring themes of between-group
conflict: mistrust, scavenging, parasitism, securing
resources with threats and violence, kidnap and
ransom, hostage exchange, revenge killing, territo-
rial claims, violence between communities. These
behavior patterns are recurring, and are not confined
to the incidents described here. The SIT concepts of
in-group bias and social closure do not contemplate
such extreme behaviors. The explanation for these
tensions and conflicts seems to lie in part with
properties of the surprising doomsday context, and
in part with the composition of the groups and
communities themselves and the challenges that
they face.
A THEORY OF DARK-SIDE GROUP BEHAVIOR
Will the survivors of a doomsday event fight for
scarce resources? Will they organize peacefully? Or
will other behavior patterns emerge? We sought to
answer these questions by exploring the “theory on
offer” in the zombie television series TWD. The
“dark-side group behavior theory” (DGBT) that
emerges appears to have three dimensions.
First, context is an actor in this drama, not the stage
on which the narrative unfolds. The human actors
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan 449

TABLE 2
Summary of Intragroup Conflict Themes
Timeline Examples Themes

“Beside the Dying Fire” (season 2, episode 13)
“The Obliged” (season 9, episode 4)
“A New Beginning” (season 9, episode 1)
“Isolation,” “Indifference” (season 4, episode
3; season 4, episode 4)
“Better Angels” (season 2, episode 12)
Heated argument: “This isn’t a democracy”
Violent argument: “Kill Negan”
Leadership contests: “Kill Maggie, hang
Gregory”
Exclusions: “Carol, did you kill Karen and
David”
Killings: “Call it what it is—murder”
Disagreement over killing a group member
Leadership challenge; autocratic leadership
Disagreement over killing a member of
another group
Revenge versus compassion; self-protection
Leadership challenge; loser wants revenge
Killing an ex-leader; autocratic leadership
Disagreement over killing sick group members
without discussion
Loss of trust; killer excluded from group; self-
protection
Killing a member of another group; self-
protection
Leadership challenge; leader kills challenger

are fearful, anxious, and insecure; they face constant
disagreements, and are forced to compete with
others whom they learn to mistrust. The character-
istics of the surprising context driving those re-
sponses include existential threat, the constant
search for resources, critical choices between equally
unpalatable options, the absence of law and order,
and the presence of other groups. As Rick says to
a group member in episode 2, “People do things
when they’re afraid.” Johns (2006: 386; 2017) has
defined “context” in terms of the organizational op-
portunities and constraints that influence behavior.
A doomsday context is defined more by threats and
challenges, which have the potential to trigger a dark,
violent side to survivors’ behavior, concerning con-
flict both within and between groups. SIT views in-
group bias and social closure not as interpersonal
but as social phenomena. DGBT sees these behav-
iors also as contextual phenomena. Groups may be
more likely to act in compassionate and collabora-
tive modes in disruptive contexts (Lanzara, 1983;
Majchrzak et al., 2007) when the threat is tempo-
rary, but may display exclusionary and violent be-
haviors in surprising contexts in which the threat is
continuous.
Second, the composition of survivor groups, and
the challenges that they face, combine to generate
tension and conflict within groups, along with sus-
picion and social closure with regard to other groups.
Doomsday context groups have different character-
istics, and face different challenges, compared with
the “extreme action teams” that have been the focus
of past research (i.e., Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011;
Edmondson & Harvey, 2017; Fisher, Hutchings, &

TABLE 3
Summary of Intergroup Conflict Themes
Timeline Examples Themes

“Judge, Jury, Executioner” (season 2,
episode 11)
“Too Far Gone” (season 4, episode 8)
“Four Walls and a Roof” (season 5, episode 3)
“Still Gotta Mean Something” (season 8,
episode 14)
“The Calm Before” (season 9, episode 15)
Competition for resources: “Other groups want Group self-interest; mistrust of others
what we have” Taking resources by force; normalized
violence
Kidnap and ransom: “Two hostages in Hostage exchange for secure location
exchange” Mistrust; threats and violence
Cannibalism: “They ate Bob’s leg!” Scavenging; parasitism
Revenge killing
Revenge killing: “I lied” Cult-style leadership; mistrust and
betrayal
Revenge killing
All-out war: “I was supposed to die” Adversarial communities with defined
borders
Continuing violence
450 Academy of Management Perspectives
Sarros, 2010). The former are formed by chance and
exposed to unfamiliar settings, while the latter are
specially selected, trained, and exposed to largely
familiar settings. Extreme teams have a backup net-
work, whereas doomsday groups have only problems
and challenges. These contrasts and their implica-
tions are summarized in Table 4. DGBT thus sees
conflict within and between groups stimulated not
simply by the existence of these distinct groups
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989), but also by group composi-
tion, and the nature of the challenges that the groups
have to face and the problems they have to solve.
Only two of the five conditions for the contact
hypothesis to be effective are present: (1) groups of
equal status and (2) common goals. There is limited
intergroup cooperation (Table 1), no wider social
support, and few opportunities for informal interac-
tion to develop mutual understanding and friend-
ships (Allport, 1954). In this context, interaction
between groups appears more likely to lead to further
conflict than to mutual understanding and collabo-
ration (see also Kwan, 2019). Our findings suggest that
this conflict arises in conditions of sustained threat
and lack of resources that reinforce the “us and them”
mentality, which in turn legitimizes dark side group
behaviors. Adding to the SIT literature, our findings
show that this mentality is inconsistent, changing
over time to produce and reproduce old and new
conflicts.
TABLE 4
Extreme Action Teams and Doomsday Context Groups Compared
Extreme action teams
Membership:
c members specially selected
c members trained in task requirements
c accustomed to working with each other
c common, shared experiences
c team leaders formally appointed
c leadership appointments based on skills
Support mechanisms:
c team is likely to be one of many
c different teams collaborate in common task
c threats understood with training
c wider organizational support structures
c required resources are supplied
c clear goals
c rewards for goal achievement
c few sanctions for failing to achieve goals
c means to achieve goals broadly agreed
c regular, predictable pacing of activities
Risky and emergency contexts encourage
collaboration and consensus within the team, and
cooperation with other teams is taken for granted.
November
Third, the levels of within- and between-group
conflict in a doomsday context go beyond the rivalry,
antagonism, and discrimination predicted by SIT
(Kulkarni & Sommer, 2015; Minefee et al., 2018).
Intragroup conflict takes many forms: heated and
violent arguments, leadership contests, and the
isolation, exclusion, and killing of “undesirable”
members. Similarly, intergroup conflict involves
competition for resources, kidnap and cannibalism,
betrayal, revenge killing, and intergroup war. Much of
the within- and between-group violence that we ob-
served in the examples above is learned behavior;
failure to learn can be fatal. The main existential threat
to survivors—zombies—are often weaponized to
punish those who are expelled from a group, and in
conflicts between communities. DGBT thus predicts a
normalization of levels of violence that would be un-
imaginable in routine organizational settings. This
seems to be broadly consistent with behavior seen in
actual extreme contexts (Behringer, 2009; Blom, 2019;
Parrado, 2007; see also COVID-19 postscript, below).
Our theory of dark-side group behavior from TWD is
summarized in Figure 2, which depicts the extraor-
dinary levels of intra- and intergroup conflict with
reference to (a) characteristics of the doomsday con-
text, (b) the membership of survivor groups, and (c)
the problems and challenges that they face. DGBT
thus offers pessimistic conclusions. But these are
based on the observation that group behavior is
Doomsday context groups
Membership:
c members drawn together by chance
c no prior training for this situation
c members have not worked together before
c members have different social backgrounds
c no mechanisms for appointing leaders
c groups choose autocratic “cult” leaders
Problems and challenges:
c group may be isolated and alone
c groups compete with others for resources
c threats never before encountered
c no social or organizational support structures
c resources have to be scavenged
c contested goals (other than survival)
c no rewards for goal achievement
c failure to achieve goals will be fatal
c means to achieve goals unclear and disputed
c unpredictable threats needing rapid responses
Surprising contexts generate tension and conflict
within the group, and suspicion and extreme social
closure with regard to other groups.
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan 451

FIGURE 2
A Theory of Dark-Side Group Behavior

Characteristics of a “surprising” doomsday context:

dangerous “walkers”—any death is a threat

constant search for resources and shelter
choices between equally unpalatable options
absence of law and order
other groups

Characteristics of survivor groups:

members drawn together by chance
no prior training for this situation
Leads to… members have not worked together before
members have different social backgrounds
fear and anxiety no mechanisms for appointing leaders
insecurity; no penalty for criminal acts groups choose autocratic “cult” leaders

disagreements Challenges and problems:

competition group may be isolated and alone

mistrust groups compete with others for resources
threats never before encountered
no social or organizational support structures
resources have to be scavenged
contested goals (other than survival)
no rewards for goal achievement
failure to achieve goals will be fatal
means to achieve goals unclear and disputed
unpredictable threats needing rapid responses

Encourages…

tension and conflict within the group, and

suspicion and exclusion of other groups

Intragroup conflict: Intergroup conflict:

heated argument competition for resources and shelter

violent argument kidnap and ransom
leadership contests cannibalism
exclusion and isolation betrayal and revenge killing
killings all-out war

contextual. What will happen in different doomsday settings? In researching this article, we considered
settings? What contextual properties influence group consulting studies of aid workers following man-
behavior? How do group composition and the nature made and natural disasters, assuming that aid groups
of the challenges affect group behavior in different act with compassion in helping survivors.
452 Academy of Management Perspectives
During the writing of this article, however, the
Charity Commission for England and Wales (2019)
published a report into the behavior of staff at Oxfam
GB following the earthquake that struck Haiti in
2011, involving the sexual exploitation and abuse,
bullying, and intimidation of those caught up in the
disaster, and selling aid services for sex. Four staff
were fired and three resigned, including the country
director. The organization’s culture and safeguard-
ing practices were criticized; the post-disaster con-
text in Haiti was described as “destabilized with no
definable infrastructure including public services”
(p. 15). Do we blame the individual aid workers, or
the context (organizational and country) in which
they found themselves—or both?
IMPLICATIONS
Implications for Research
Doomsday settings are difficult to research di-
rectly. However, as suggested earlier, there are many
well-documented historical examples of extreme
events, as well as recent extreme events in relation to
which both documentation and living witnesses are
likely to be available (often accompanied by televi-
sion newsreel accounts). Many of these events serve
as proxies for more extreme doomsday scenarios. In
addition, there are many fictional accounts of apoc-
alyptic situations, in novels, television series, and on
film. Social science fiction allows us to study con-
texts that are otherwise inaccessible. Fictional ac-
counts invite us to imagine the unimaginable, to
anticipate outcomes, to consider responses. There is
no reason, therefore, why research should not extend
into the fourth “surprising” quadrant of contexts that
have yet to be experienced directly (Figure 1;
Hällgren et al., 2018). SIT recognizes the importance
of features of the social context (i.e., group bound-
aries, statuses, legitimacies; Ellemers, Spears, &
Doosje, 2002). However, an interesting research
agenda derives from the observation that SIT pays
less attention to the wider physical, environmental,
cultural, and temporal context, or to conditions
(threats and challenges) generated by unusual or
extreme events—all of which appear to influence
group affiliations and behaviors.
Our argument and methodology may also be of
interest to researchers studying organizational mis-
behavior and the role of violence—an issue that has
long been recognized (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999;
Van Fleet & Van Fleet, 2014) but has not attracted
much research attention. One exception is the study
November
of Australian military advisers during the Vietnam
War, in which Fisher et al. (2010) concluded that
emotional stressors in complex, violent contexts en-
courage and legitimize further violence. Lindebaum
and Courpasson (2019) advanced the counterintuitive
thesis that organizational violence can drive excellent
work performance, citing the movie Whiplash (Blum,
Estabrook, Litvak & Lancaster, 2014) as evidence.
Should we consider whether the “dark” side may be
“bright” in some contexts, for some stakeholders? We
hope that this research community may be inspired to
adapt our methodology to their own projects.
Implications for Policy
We know, from considering historical instances of
extreme events, that the past is not a good guide to the
future. How can we overcome the failures of imagi-
nation that appear to have allowed some previous
disaster to occur (Salter, 2008; Weick, 2005)? One
key policy recommendation, therefore, for national
and regional agencies concerns the use of fictional
accounts to imagine doomsday scenarios and to
stimulate (or “war game”) creative responses. Fiction
exposes us to unfamiliar settings, encouraging us to
anticipate how novel events might unfold. Thus, it is
not realism but the creative process that is important.
Policy responses to the kinds of threats illustrated in
TWD might involve:
• damage limitation strategies, so that hospitals,
prisons, and camps can temporarily shelter the
population
• recognizing the futility of quarantine processes
once an illness has affected a significant propor-
tion of the population
• preparation of infrastructure for organizations
critical to social resilience, enabling them to re-
main flexible in the face of the changing nature of
threats
• advice to the population, such as what to do, what
not to do, what to expect, the need for resources,
and where to find them
• advice to survivors, including training in group
dynamics, leadership, and conflict resolution
• on both a policy level and between communities,
keep everyone informed to become stronger against
foes, and for avoiding unnecessary conflict.
Cordesman (2001) offers a terrifying example of this
fiction-inspired approach in his account of the pos-
sibilities for novel terrorist (and state actor) attacks
using biological and radiological weapons. His cat-
alog of potential real-world threats is based on the
2020 Hällgren and Buchanan
“Buffy paradigm,” referring to the ever-changing and
unpredictable threats faced by the heroine in the
television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer. Lewis
(2018) offered an equally terrifying and disturbingly
plausible fictional account of the misunderstandings
and errors that lead to a nuclear attack on the United
States by North Korea in 2020.
Implications for Practice
Survivors in a doomsday scenario should be aware
that, in a context in which collaboration with others
may be key to survival, conflict is a more likely out-
come. Mistrust of others, as mentioned earlier, is a form
of life insurance. After 10 years, our example’s survi-
vors have not learned how to live together peacefully.
Periods of collaboration occur, but these are soon
shattered by events. TWD shows how group cohesion
can be temporary, as prolonged existential threat cre-
ates intra- and intergroup tension and violence. Other
groups become threats to be eliminated. Members of
groups brought together at random bring different
ethics, attitudes, skills, and experience, creating ten-
sions that are exacerbated by fear and anxiety. This is
often how project teams in a variety of industries are
assembled too, and such teams work under constant
time and resource pressure. A popular tutorial exercise
asks, “Who would be on your ideal zombie apocalypse
team?” (Gartley, 2018). DGBT suggests that the “obvi-
ous” combination (doctor, engineer, farmer, gender
balance) may be inadequate, and that the “right”
combination of skills and aptitudes should account for
a wider range of contextual factors (e.g., fighter,
weapons expert, athlete, negotiator, survivalist, crea-
tive problem-solver, coach–counselor).
Social science fiction allows us to conduct specu-
lative research in settings that are otherwise inacces-
sible, and can encourage us to reflect on aspects of our
individual and collective behavior that we might
prefer to overlook. But a zombie apocalypse? This
could never happen. TWD is a fictional—surreal—
television series. Before we discount the theory on
offer from this source, however, we should consider
the following: If we were to find ourselves in a similar
postapocalyptic setting, surely we would not behave
as badly as those groups on the television—would we?
POSTSCRIPT: COVID-19
Would this analysis of the “dark side” of groups in
extreme contexts have enabled us to predict behavior
during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2019–2020? In
detail, no. But the behavior patterns seen during the
453
pandemic do echo those in depicted in TWD. In
December 2019, this flu-like virus, transmitted by
close contact, coughing, and sneezing, emerged in
the Chinese city of Wuhan. Despite quarantine and
travel restrictions, it quickly spread to other coun-
tries, and was declared a pandemic in March 2020 by
the World Health Organization. As in zombie
movies, there was no cure or vaccine for COVID-19,
which had a fatality rate of 1% to 4%. Normal in-
fluenza is fatal in 0.1% of cases. COVID-19 did not
create a doomsday scenario, but its consequences
nevertheless were frightening. Violence erupted
even before the disease began to spread, starting in
March 2020 with a “viral” video of shoppers in
Sydney, Australia, fighting over toilet rolls, of which
there was no shortage. If people will fight for non-
scarce resources of marginal significance in the ab-
sence of immediate threats, how will they behave
when faced with actual shortages of essential goods?
“Dark-side” behavior escalated further. Super-
market shelves in some countries were stripped bare.
In the United States, sales of weapons soared. Stores
in the United Kingdom designated special shopping
hours for vulnerable groups—the elderly and health-
care workers—who were then assaulted by younger
shoppers anxious to get their own supplies. In En-
gland, when asked to move back from a serious in-
cident, large crowds coughed and spat at emergency
workers who were standing guard. Many countries
closed their borders and introduced population
lockdowns.
These outcomes suggest that a zombie apocalypse,
wherein similar behaviors are shown, is a good proxy
for “dark-side” behavior in general, and other ex-
treme, catastrophic, doomsday scenarios in particu-
lar. As for the COVID-19 pandemic, there was some
good news: the terrorist militant group ISIS, con-
cerned for the safety of its members, issued a Euro-
pean travel ban.
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Markus Hällgren (markus.hallgren@umu.se) is professor
in management at Umeå University. He leads the TripleED
research program and is co-coordinator of the international
research network Organizing Extreme Contexts. His re-
search interests include team dynamics, methods, and
human behavior in extreme contexts such as mountain-
eering expeditions, the police, and zombie apocalypses.
David A. Buchanan (david.buchanan@cranfield.ac.uk) is
emeritus professor of Organizational Behaviour at Cran-
field University School of Management, and has a doctor-
ate from University of Edinburgh in Scotland. He has
published widely on aspects of organizational behavior
and research methodology. His current research interests
include crisis leadership, change management, and orga-
nization politics.