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Palahniuk
Palahniuk
Palahniuk
Andrew Hewitt
My contribution to this series of articles in Telos is not that of an historian
or a social theorist, and it does not deal with totalitarianism in anything
other than a rather spectral sense. To this extent, it might seem a little
out of place. This essay concerns itself not with the analysis of a specific
historical society that might (or might not) be characterized as totalitarian,
but with the way in which a certain sense of the totalitarian has shaped the
self-understanding of liberal Western popular culture. It starts from two
very different points. At the level of theory, I examine avenues of political
thought—specifically critical of totalitarianism—^that have been blocked
by the historical events of the latter half of the twentieth century. At the
level of cultural representation, however, I begin with an artifact of popular
culture that I take as typical of certain trends in the representation of "fas-
cism"—that term being understood, in this case, in its broadest and most
imprecise sense as something disruptive to the liberal ideals of tolerance
and non-violence. The essay will veer, then, rather perilously between the
sublimity of high theory and the ridiculous thrill of a Hollywood action
movie. In the process, I wish to argue for the operation of two apparently
contradictory understandings of totalitarianism within public cultural dis-
course. The first—^which I will call the terror of the totality—opposes the
open consensus of civil society to the closed order imposed from above by
the state apparatus. The second—which I will call the terror of the frag-
ment—opposes that same consensus to the threat of chtonic or atavistic
violence arising from below. This latter is totalitarian insofar as it derives
either from conviction—^the belief in a truth whose totalizing claims can-
not be squared with the pragmatic give-and-take of liberal debate, and
104
MASOCHISM AND TERROR 105
2. I take the term from Andre Glucksmann, Les maitres-penseurs (Paris: Grasset,
1977). The work typifies the project of the so-called nouveaux philosophes of the post-
1968 backlash in France. Themselves imbued with the ideology and rhetoric of the 1968
student uprisings, these thinkers nevertheless reacted strongly against that intellectual
tradition to challenge the potentially totalitarian thrust of Hegelian Marxism. Often over-
looked outside France—and overshadowed by the more successful intellectual exports of
poststructuralism, whose intellectual rigor they lacked—these thinkers signaled the disaf-
fection of radical thinkers in Europe with the systematicity and rigidity of leftist political
theory. In the current context, they are interesting for the way in which—like Horkheimer
and Adomo—they, too, take up the putative implication of the concept of totality so crucial
to Hegelian thought in the ideological workings of totalitarianism.
MASOCHISM AND TERROR 107
the Soviet case, by contrast, terror relied both upon the total power of its
agent and upon the fragmentation of any social or civil unit capable of
resisting it. It could happen everywhere, it could happen anywhere. Even
where a binary logic of "them" and "us" was invoked to justify purges,
the very nature of the purge was paradoxically oriented toward "us" rather
than "them." The purgative and self-devouring nature of Stalinism made
it almost impossible to know whether one was terrorizer or terrorized.
Indeed, this uncertainty is the condition ofterror, the final intemalization
of an extemal power structure. In this sense, then—^according to a "logic"
that I would characterize as the "fragmented" operation of terror—one
cannot truly speak of the subject of terror. Terror, in this formulation,
would be a discourse and practice in which the status of the subject is itself
called into question: Am I subject or object of the purge? Can there be a
subject of the purge? Is the purge the process whereby the true historical
subject is to be effected?
What I wish to suggest—in an historical leap—is that it is this "frag-
mented" or "fragmenting" aspect ofterror (i.e., its dialectical and disruptive
operation rather than its total power) that presages the terrorist ofthe twenty-
first century. The suicide bomber is not just one form of terrorist, but the
very realization ofterror in all its dialectical rigor. Rather than explore this
claim in the geopolitical terms of East-West confrontations, however—a
field of which I know less than nothing—I wish to explore cultural shifts
within the cultural representation and theorization of power in Westem
Etirope. I do so in order to demonstrate ways in which this concept of
terror has arisen as a dialectical response to forms of "totalitarianism" still
perhaps best explained by Horkheimer and Adomo—^whatever the pat-
ent shortcomings of their analysis at the level of political formations. My
observations, therefore, belong in a volume considering the recrudescence
of totalitarianism as an analytic category only insofar as that attenuated
notion of the totalitarian operative in Dialectic of Enlightenment might be
said to retain some interpretive value.
What I wish to retain from Horkheimer and Adomo might only be
termed "totalitarian" by way of a conflation all too common in their
analysis: namely, a pervasive confusion of "totality" and "totalitarian"
that derives from Adomo's oft-quoted dictum from Minima Moralia, "The
whole is the un-tme" {Das Game ist das Unwahre). Any self-closing, self-
legitimating system that projects itself as a totality is liable to the chaise of
totalitarianism from the perspective of Dialectic of Enlightenment. Indeed,
108 ANDREW HEWITT
3. One sees this tendency already in the early 1960s with the influential work of
Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New
York: Free Press, 1962). The concept reaches an apogee of sorts thirty years later in the
famous work of Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free
Press, 1992). Fukuyama has, of course, since revisited some of the fundamental tenets of
his earlier work.
MASOCHISM AND TERROR 109
the face of a woolly and poorly articulated capitalism, and their weakness
in the face of a capitalism that needs no explicit articulation. Recently,
Slavoj Zizek has refuted, in a masterful manner, the misguided criticism
leveled at poststmcturalist theory that its putative reduction of "reality" to
little more than a series of discourses or textual operations leaves no place
for the critique of ideology. Such critics argue that if we have nothing but
discourse, we have no standard for assessing the tmth content of denota-
tive statements and, therefore, no grounds for distinguishing between truth
and misrepresentation. As Zizek points out, however, what has resulted
from such theories is a new concept of ideology, in which a supposedly
"post-ideological" consumer capitalism would, in fact, exemplify the very
operation of ideology."
In an argument I will retum to later in a quite specific cultural context,
Zizek claims that ideology does not consist in the simple mis-representa-
tion of a fact or reality. Ideology is, instead, the construction of a reality of
which the misrepresentation is itself a crucial and disavowed component.
In other words, if "reality" is x, ideology is not simply any discourse that
misrepresents that reality as y (as the classic theory of false conscious-
ness would have it). Instead, ideology is the condition x, which is made
possible only by the very act of misrepresentation y. Ideology exits the
realm of mere representation (the reproductive realm of the superstmc-
ture) and becomes constitutive, performative, dynamic, and productive.
In such a formulation, ideology follows the logic of disavowal: "I know,
but..." This disavowal is not simply a failure to penetrate to the tmth of
things—an unfinished project of self-enlightenment—but the condition
of possibility of continuing to live at all under the present conditions. In
short, ideology becomes a precondition of individual and collective good
health, rather than the symptom of an illness to be cured. The very theories
that have been held by some as responsible for disempowering a critique
of ideology have, in fact, allowed us to see the operation of ideology in its
new context. This is a position with which Adomo would certainly have
had much sympathy. For Adomo, tmth always inhered in the "split," in
the conscious and unconscious, institutionalized and quotidian separation
of discourses. The tmth is not x, ideology is not 7; rather, ideology is the
condition x that is made possible only by the belief;'. Indeed, y need not
even be a belief, and tends instead to the condition of an action.
5. Kenneth Turan, review of Fight Club, directed by David Fincher, Los Angeles
Times, October 15,1999. A Google search of Fight Club and the term "fascism" tums up a
bewildering amount of debate about the political position ofthe film.
MASOCHISM AND TERROR 111
job it is to visit car crash sites, calculate the rate of failure of car parts, and
weigh the resulting insurance claims against the cost of redesigning the
cars, he is paid to subject bodies—corpses—^to an economic calculation.
On the plane he meets Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt), a charismatic figure who
seems able to express all the fhistrations the meek hero cannot. On arrival
at his home, the narrator finds his building on fire and leams that his own
apartment has blown up for some unexplained reason. In a loving fiash-
back, the narrator meanders through the apartment, Ikea catalog in hand,
ordering articles, as captions and prices float over the screen, tuming the
apartment itself into an illustration from the very catalog from which he
orders. The catalog provides reading matter for a visit to the bathroom, as
our hero continues to consume new items even as he evacuates what he
has already consumed. Capitalism, we are to understand, is an extremely
efficient system of digestion.
At a loss and bereft of all worldly goods, the narrator fishes from his
pocket the card of Tyler Durden, a soap salesman, and calls asking to be
taken in for the night. Tyler lives in an abandoned and dilapidated house
in a deserted, post-industrial part of town. The two become close, with the
narrator becoming gradually, but never explicitly, infatuated with Tyler
(indeed, the degree of the erotic attraction is decidedly higher in Chuck
Palahniuk's 1996 novel than in thefilm).*On their first drunken night out,
Tyler dares our hero finally to vent his anger and punch him. From this
humble beginning, the idea for weekly bare-knuckle fight clubs develops,
and soon an underground set of franchises has fight clubs springing up
nationally, spreading word ofthe famous Tyler Durden. By this point, the
narrator has given up the nine-to-five, blackmailing his boss into offering
him a comfortable early retirement package. Dissatisfied with his life, he
has trouble sleeping and begins attending self-help groups for a variety of
fatal diseases from which he does not suffer. The groups embarrass him at
first, as he is obliged to "share" with fellow sufferers emotions that he is not
feeling. With practice, however, he realizes that he does begin to experi-
ence the necessary emotions, and the groups become a necessary catharsis
to him. He meets another "faker" (Maria, a mess of a femme fatale, played
by Helena Bonham-Carter), whom he despises for threatening to blow his
cover. However when the desperate and self-dramatizing Maria attempts
suicide, Tyler rescues the heavily dmgged woman from her apartment, and
together they begin a torrid affair, whose accompanying noises keep the
In political terms, one can certainly see how the sadist's violence—a vio-
lence that "confirms him in his inalienable power and gives him a supreme
certitude"—accords with the "totalizing" aspect of totalitarianism. It
centralizes power and renders it absolute. But for the masochist, too, "pun-
ishments and suffering allow the exercise of the evil they once prohibited."
Hardly more comforting, this—a fascism of the little guy that seeks to
secure its legitimacy through the intricate series of contracts and formali-
ties central to the practices of the masochist. If we recall the nature of the
Rousseauian social contract that lies at the very heart of Enlightenment
social theory itself, we cannot but be struck by its "masochistic" tenden-
cies according to the above formulation. The social contract consists of
the surrender of partial individual will to the paradigmatic subjectivity of
the volonte generale, the surrender of the self to the Self, so to speak. The
payoff for the original suffering is participation in the power that represses
and therefore liberates us.
Unlike some—such as Zizek and Eric Santner—I am deeply suspi-
cious of the recent reemergence of the masochistic episteme in a putatively
oppositional form, and of the whole accompanying discourse of redemp-
7. Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty & Venus In Furs, trans. Jean
McNeil (New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp. 39-40.
114 ANDREW HEWITT
tive violence that can be traced back to the more messianic writings of
Benjamin.' It was a rather different Benjamin who, in his famous (by now,
one might almost say infamous) essay on "The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction," developed the crucial notion of the "aestheti-
cization of politics." The terms in which that concept is described could
hardly be more pertinent to the visual delights offered by Fincher's film:
8. See Slavoj I'lzek, The Sublime Object ofIdeology (London: Verso, 1989); and Eric
Santner, "Miracles Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud, and the Matter of the Neigh-
bor," in The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, ed. Slavoj Ziiek, Eric L.
Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2006).
9. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), p. 241.
10. The ambiguity inherent in this shot runs through the entire film: the audience's
metacritical distance from the characters' own scopic pleasure is subverted into a second
form of pleasure. The structure of this pleasure is essentially masochistic. Elsewhere in the
film, for example, we share a subversive joke with Tyler—in his evening-time capacity as
movie projectionist—as he splices frames of penises from hardcore pom into family mov-
ies, traumatizing an audience that cannot quite admit or grasp what it thinks it has just seen.
We ourselves become victims of that very gesture, however, when Fincher himself inter-
cuts such a shot into the credits at the films conclusion. (Fincher is rightly famed for his
use of credit sequences.) We are—by this conclusion—both distanced from and implicated
in the film's aestheticization of violence. More than this, we are implicated precisely by
the very gesture of distancing: critique has become a form of affinnation. Our complicity
is the belief >' without which the filmic x would not be possible. The critique of ideology
has become the predominant medium for the propagation of ideology insofar as it fails to
grasp the way in which ideology does not merely represent, but actually operates. This, I
would argue, is the central paradox of Fincher's film and the characteristic gesture of what
MASOCHISM AND TERROR 115
"What's being requested is not 'Can I hit you?' but 'Will you hit
me?'...The point is: 'I need to get shaken, I need to feel something. I
need that punch in the nose that wakes me up.'... It's not being proposed
that violence directed outwards has some sort of purgative or cathartic
effect.""
one might term the new "masochistic" discourse on neo-fascism. We consume the critique
of consumerism: we gaze at Pitt's personally-trained, sculpted body, as it in tum mockingly
gazes at the ubiquitous bodies of underwear models on billboards, to the accompaniment of
Norton's voice-over telling us how "I felt sorry for guys packed into gyms." The masoch-
istic pleasure of the fight club is projected onto the audience: we laugh at the poor suckers
who are unwittingly subjected to inter-spliced snippets of pom, and laugh all the harder
when we realize that we ourselves are the suckers.
11. Norton is a particularly eloquent actor, and his comments are taken from an inter-
view with Craig McLean entitled "Public Enemy Number 1: Edward Norton," The Face.
December 1999, p. 71.
116 ANDREW HEWITT
physical and aestheticized ethics of bodily impression. There ltirks here the
fantasy of a redemption through the suffering of violence, a fantasy that
today extends, I think, to the broader belief that a confi-ontation witb—or
subjection to—the violence inflicted by anti-Enlightenment ideologues
might somehow redeem liberalism from its own torpor.
The question Fight Club raises with respect to new discourses on
neo-fascism is: what happens to the subject in recent cultural attempts to
re-connect with a more visceral form of "experience"? If the physical body
has become the irreducible core of experience—^the locus of pain—^what
relation does it entertain to metaphysical or even discursive notions of
subjectivity? I would claim that the discourse of "fascinating fascism" that
emerged in the 1960s involved a critique of the category of experience as
a medium for reconnecting with more "authentic" notions of subjectivity.
The cultural engagement with fascism at the time—and the questioning
of the role of affect in political life—actually made possible a theory of
ressentiment that we only now see resurfacing mfin de siecle fiirtations
with neo-fascist iconography or topoi. The new discourse, I propose, expe-
riences metaphysical subjectivity as precisely the thing that stands in the
way ofa new aesthesis. It is the body itself that serves as a final residue of
authenticity. We are reduced to a metaphysics of the physical. Though a
much-touted postmodern irony has left us suspicious of unproblematized
notions of authentic cultural expression—that is, the ability or need of
the subject to express itself and the capacity of language for such expres-
sions—what we are left with is, quite literally, an ideology of impression,
the scarred impressions upon the body that mark its "authentic" engage-
ment in the world.
The invitation extended to the other to infiict pain on me reconfigures
the ethical scenario that Nietzsche describes in On the Genealogy of Mor-
als as the essence of ressentiment: "Every sufferer instinctively seeks a
cause for his suffering," Nietzsche writes, "more exactly, an agent: still
more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering—in short,
some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his
affects, actually or in effigy."'^ As described by Norton in his interview,
the ptirgative function of violence is no longer paramount, whereas for
Nietzsche, "the venting of his affects represents the greatest attempt on
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy OfMorals andEcce Homo, trans, and ed.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 127.
MASOCHISM AND TERROR 117
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
118 ANDREW HEWITT
This meaning says, so to speak, the winner keeps the war in hand. It
leaves the hands of the loser; it says, the winner conquers the war for
himself, makes it his own property, the loser no longer possesses it and
must live without it To win or lose a war reaches so deeply, if we
follow the language, into the fabric of our existence that our whole lives
become that much richer or poorer in symbols, images and sources.'^
If this is so, Benjamin asks, then how is it that Germans of the right can
so obsessively cling to the experience? Having traced the stages traversed
in coming to terms with the loss, he notes that "what finally distinguishes
the latest effort from earlier ones in the process involved here is the ten-
dency to take the loss of the war more seriously than the war itself"'* This
intemalization of loss—this paradoxical affirmation of lack as the very
basis of identity—marks the apotheosis of "the novel assertion that it is
precisely this loss of the war that is characteristically German."" In other
words, rather than re-appropriating "the means of identification" in a revo-
lutionary affirmation of the war's true significance, the fascist internalizes
lack—ontologizes alienation—as the very condition of (German) subjec-
tivity. In the case of Fight Club—we might say, by way of analogy—what
first seems like the dismissive refusal of a merely specular identification
(with the model) in the name of a more authentic (bruised) identity is in
fact an attempt to establish identity through pain as the inchoate experi-
ence of lack. "What's being requested is not 'Can I hit you?' but 'Will you
hit me?'... The point is: 'I need to get shaken, I need to feel something. I
need that punch in the nose that wakes me up."'
Even the fiippant coinage of the term "body fascism" to describe the
culture the protagonists resist—"I felt sorry for guys packed into gyms"
—tells us something about the intended political valence of this scene.
Our authentic heroes favor a visceral, embodied, "real" subjectivity over
the politically suspect lures of the imaginary. They do not need an armored
fascist body to smooth over the fractures of some injured psyche. Like the
soldiers wounded in war, who thereby escape the need to relive the war
as trauma, their bruised bodies serve as the guarantee of an intact psyche.
18. This is a position developed in the polemical essays of the so-called Expres-
sionism Debate, waged in the exile journal Das Wort in the 1930s, most specifically in
"Expressionism: Its Significance and Decline," Internationale Literatur 1 (1934). The
thesis is developed and brought to a head in GyOrgy Lukdcs, The Destruction of Reason,
trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin, 1980).
19. Pahhnmk, Fight Club, p. \23.
120 ANDREW HEWITT
In Japan they cany on the strangest of trades: the sale of coal made from
human bones. All their powderworks are engaged in producing a new
explosive substance more lethal than any yet known. This terrible new
mixture has as its principle element coal madefrombones with the qual-
ity of violently absorbing gases and liquids.^"
20. F. T. Marinetti, Selected Writings, ed. R. W. Flint (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1971), p. 82.
21. Theodor W. Adomo, "Freudian Theory and the Structure of Fascist Propaganda,"
in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New
York: Continuum, 1982), pp. 118-37.
MASOCHISM AND TERROR 121
The standard notioti ofthe way fantasy works within ideology is that of
a fantasy-scenario that obfuscates the true horror of a situation: instead
of the full rendering of the antagonisms that traverse otir society, for
example, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole.... Suf-
fice it to recall the safety instructions prior to the take-off of an airplane.
Aren't they sustained by a fantasmatic scenario of how a possible plane-
122 ANDREW HEWITT
23. Saul Friedlander, Reflections of Nazism: an Essay on Kitsch and Death, trans.
Thomas Weyr (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
24. Susan Sontag, "Fascinating Fascism," in Under the Sign of Saturn (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980), pp. 73-105.
25. Susan Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork
Essay Reconsidered," October (1992): 3-41. Her arguments are taken further by Lutz
Koepnick, "Fascist Aesthetics Revisited," M>tfemwm/Aforfe/7i/fy 6, no. 1 (January 1999):
51-74.
124 ANDREW HEWITT
lin. It was this murder that was to rally the student movement into more
direct and radical political violence. Konkret, meanwhile, was a cleverly
populist mix of politics and pom for the chattering classes, whose editor
at the time was Ulrike Meinhof—soon to become infamous as one ofthe
leaders ofthe so-called Baader-Meinhof Gang of urban terrorists. Entitled
"Violence" ["Gewalt"], the article theorizes political violence as
28. "Gewalt," Konkret 6 (1968), reprinted in Vorwdrts! Nieder! Hoch! Nie Wieder!
40 Jahre Konkret: Eine linke deutsche Geschichte 1957-1997, ed. Hermann L. Gremliza
(Hamburg: Konkret Verlag, 1997), p. 114. (All translations ofthis article are my own.)
29. Deleuze, Mjioc/iwffi, pp. 18-19.
128 ANDREW HEWITT
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Slavoj Ziiek, "The Ambiguity ofthe Masochist Social Link," in Perversion and
the Social Relation, ed. Molly Anne Rothenberg, Dennis A. Foster, and Slavoj 2i4ek (Dur-
ham, NC: Duke UP, 2003), p. 120.
130 ANDREW HEWITT
Strategy [of revolutionary violence] is risky and ambiguous (it can easily
regress into a proto-fascist macho logic of violent male bonding), this risk
has to be assumed—^there is no other way out ofthe closure ofthe capital-
ist subjectivity."^' Like Brad Pitt sneering at the underwear model—and
I trust that Slavoj would graciously accept the comparison, if not by the
argument that drives it!—Zifck is tendentially identifying subjectivity
with a form of totalitarian closure. Again echoing the protagonists of Fight
Club—a film he obviously admires—^Zizek argues that "violence should
primarily be conceived as self-violence, as a violent reformation of the
very substance of a subject's being. "^* The political stakes, meanwhile, are
stated quite clearly: "Sadism," he argues, "involves a relation of domina-
tion, while masochism is the necessary first step toward liberation.""
Taking Fight Club as my prime example, I hope that I have demon-
strated how there has been a shift in filmic violence away from expressive
and cathartic violence and toward an "impressive" and affective self-vio-
lence. While there is by now a long tradition of thinking sadistic violence
in relation to enlightenment, the relation of such violence to enlightenment
is one of what we might call "parallel negation": its structures—as Lacan
demonstrates—are homologous, but in a parodistic sense, so to speak. With
masochism, the relationship is different. Enlightenment, here, is predicated
upon submission rather than liberation. Deleuze indicates how sadism and
masochism should be thought as distinct epistemological structures rather
than as two terms of a dyad, and it is obviously simplistic to think of
them in terms of active and passive. Nevertheless, I do believe that there
lies a greater danger right now in the intellectual fiirtation with masoch-
ism than in any temptation to sadistic—or expressive—violence. There
is something defiating about the conclusion to Fight Club, something a
little too clever in the revelation that the narrator and Tyler Durden—fol-
lower and leader—are one and the same. But the revelation perhaps tells
us something about what is currently going on at that second level of my
argument here, within the realm of academic theory. If we need to reject
the simple opposition of sadist and masochist as complementary terms
within the same discourse, we can nevertheless think the discourse of
sadism in general as the disavowed projection of the masochist. In other
words, the sadist might not be the other who completes my scenario of fan-
tasized violence, but rather the subject position I must myself disavow.^*
The "internal" and "extemal" forms of terror can no longer be separated,
because the latter functions as the disavowed discourse of the former.
If the danger of a "sadistic"—or so-called "black"—enlightenment was
the hollowing out of any positive sense of enlightenment, a "masochis-
tic" episteme, I believe, awaits a dangerous redemption from outside. It
becomes political theology. However, it is only from the perspective of
our own discursive distinction of profane and divine—a distinction that is
itself profane—that the "outside" agent of redemption need be character-
ized in theological terms. Benjamin himself had multiple formulations for
his angel of history—some of which stressed its mundane historical nature
rather more than its angelic one, we should remember. The challenge, I
believe, is to redeem theory from the spell of redemption and the lure of
political theology.