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SSRN Id4794204
SSRN Id4794204
Abstract
Processes of disaster risk creation are outpacing the achievements of disaster risk reduction
initiatives. Preventing risk creation is consequently an objective recognised by major disaster
frameworks. However, there exists a gap in our understanding of the processes contributing to risk
creation, with the existing body of knowledge lacking conceptual clarification to guide empirical
applications. This review distils how disaster scholarship either implicitly or explicitly theorises the
concept of disaster risk creation by employing a semi-systematic scoping strategy and thematic
analysis of the literature. Disaster risk creation is inferred to be the process, or set of processes,
through which risk is constructed (by human actors) in relation to (socio-)natural hazards. The major
themes emerging from scholarly enquiries into risk creation are identified as (1) risk-creating
developments, (2) risk production in relation to risk reduction efforts, and, intersecting these
themes, (3) the multi-scale nature of risk creation. To avoid disaster risk creation and question the
continued establishment of risk-creating path dependencies, we identify a need for future research
to look both at ongoing and changeable, as well as more distal, trajectory-setting processes. The
outcomes of this review have the potential to enrich and advance the application of disaster risk
creation within the field of disaster studies, inspiring the further interrogation and eventual
deconstruction of disaster risk creation processes.
Keywords
Wisner (2019) suggests a need for the conceptual clarification and empirical documentation of the
DRC process - the ‘hidden’ counterpart of DRR. Research centring on the concept remains limited
(Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2021b), with the existing pool of literature not yet comprehensively reviewed.
This review attends to this need by charting how the concept of DRC has been explored to date.
Preventing DRC is an objective recognised by major disaster frameworks (UNDRR, 2015b), so it is
hoped that such a review inspires the further interrogation, and eventual deconstruction, of the
enclosed processes. This review seeks to answer:
Here, we briefly specify the scope and analytic bounds within which this research is situated. This
review does not attempt to comprehensively collate insights on all components broadly contributing
to disaster occurrence or disaster risk. Despite literature reinforcing the prevalent discourse that
disaster risk is created at the intersection of hazards, vulnerability, and exposure (e.g. Alves et al.,
2021), it is beyond the scope of this paper to synthesise all ways this interface has been studied. This
element of the discourse can be furthered at the reader’s discretion via the abundant literature on
vulnerability paradigms, disaster frameworks (e.g. the PAR model), and root causes of disaster. While
recognising the ensuing discussion cannot be detached from such discourses, this review looks
explicitly at ‘disaster risk creation’ as a theoretically important and distinct (set of) process(es).
2 Methods
We used a semi-systematic scoping strategy to identify a broad range of literature reporting on
disaster risk creation (Munn et al., 2018; Snyder, 2019). A semi-systematic approach was adopted on
the basis that a fully systematic approach, defining strict upfront search and inclusion criteria, would
lack a predefined base of commonly accepted DRC-related terminology (e.g. Petticrew & Roberts,
2008). It was also anticipated that many scholars would discuss risk creation processes implicitly,
rendering a fully systematic approach inadequate to capture the plurality of ways the concept is
discussed (Snyder, 2019). An iterative exploration of literature discussing DRC informed the initial
search string, which utilised preliminarily identified DRC-related terms. We searched publication
titles, abstracts, and keywords in the Scopus database in November 2023 using the following: (
creat* OR construct* OR generat* OR produc* OR driv* OR increas* ) W/3 "disaster risk*". ‘W/3’
narrows the search to instances where “disaster risk” lies within three words from any of the
bracketed terms. The use of ‘*’ in the search string enabled the inclusion of multiple variations of
each term, with creat*, for instance, encompassing terms such as create(s), creating, creation, and
created. We limited our search to books, book chapters, articles, and reviews.
From the initial Scopus search, 400+ studies’ titles and abstracts were screened according to
iteratively designed inclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria, at its broadest, required studies to
describe any (set of) human-driven process(es) leading to a heightened state of disaster risk. This
was the understanding of DRC adopted by the authors upon conception of the screening process.
‘Increasing’, for example, would have to be framed in a way that aligned with this definition to be
included in the analysis component of the review. The review specifically targeted natural hazard-
related risk, so any isolated discussion of (e.g.) finance or business-related risk was excluded.
Examples of excluded topics from the initial search thread comprised references to (1) ‘creating’
disaster risk models, frameworks, policies, or knowledge, (2) ‘increasing’ disaster risk management,
reduction, monitoring, or governance efforts, or talking generally to (3) an ‘increased (trend in)
disaster risk’ to contextualise a study, without suggesting there will be any discussion or analysis of
risk-enhancing processes. Studies which appeared to discuss risk-creating processes in their abstracts
were later excluded from the review if there was no further expansion in the main body text. After
initial screening, we identified 150 studies for inclusion.
Following this, we thematically analysed the selected literature with the aim of providing an
overview of the dominant ideas and patterns emerging from the assessed texts (Braun & Clarke,
2006). The primary search string enabled the identification of papers deemed to have conceptual
overlaps with the central term (DRC), i.e. talking to processes by which people and social processes
are actively enhancing disaster risk. All texts were imported into NVivo software for qualitative
content analysis to determine common patterns surrounding DRC. Inductive qualitative coding was
first used to capture how the concept of disaster risk creation and its offshoot terminologies are
defined in academic literature. Through a parallel phase of inductive coding and categorisation we
thematically clustered sources, processes, and products of DRC identified in the reviewed literature.
Examples of source codes included ‘development pressures’, ‘build back better ideologies’, ‘systemic
constraints’, ‘risk subjectivities’; process codes included ‘band-aid DRR solutions’, ‘urgency in decision
making’, ‘marginalised populations’; and product codes included ‘inadequate structures’, ‘hazard
proximity’, ‘displaced risk’. These codes experienced multiple iterations and were ultimately
categorised according to the major themes of the ensuing discussion.
3 Findings
Scholars note that we have constructed and continue to construct risk(y) societies, with socially- and
structurally-induced vulnerabilities woven into their very fabrics (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2022; Coates &
Warner, 2023) (see Figure 1). Literature presents processes of disaster risk creation as intertwined in
distinct social assemblages (e.g. Dickinson & Burton, 2022), contextually situates instances of DRC in
case examples, and relates them to diverse forms of governance. A point of divergence in empirical
scholarship is whether patterns of risk creation are discussed retrospectively, focusing on ‘realised
risk’ manifest in past events (e.g. Uehara et al., 2022), or in an anticipatory fashion. As an example,
Guadagno & Guadagno (2021) discuss processes of disaster risk construction via a retrospective
analysis of disaster damage. Rumbach & Németh (2018, p. 341) argue for the equal importance of
assessing the ongoing accretion of risk, specifically in urban developments, to bring light to unjust
Figure 1. (In)tangible and (un)intentionally inequitable influences interacting across spatiotemporal scales,
culminating in disaster risk creation (DRC). The presented sample of risk-creating components are extracted
from scholarly enquiries into DRC.
We interpret DRC to be the process, or set of processes, through which risk is constructed (by human
actors) in relation to (socio-)natural hazards. Through this review, attention is drawn to the sources,
processes, and products of DRC. We begin the review by exploring definitions of DRC. We then
unpack the risk-creating nature of development decisions, risk production in relation to DRR efforts,
and finally, the multi-scalar nature of processes of risk creation. The latter of these incorporates
development and DRR-related processes but focuses squarely on interrogating the significance of,
and relations between, different scales of influence in DRC. We end the review by discussing some
proposed means of avoiding DRC, although recognise such discussions are in their infancy.
The role of hazard generation in risk creation is explored across the reviewed studies. Cheek et al.
(2023), for instance, note new hazards are generated through the interactions of the built
environment with existing hazards, using the landfill-induced heightened incidence of seismic
liquefaction in Tokyo as an example. Aronsson-Storrier (2020) and Derakhshan et al. (2020), along
similar lines, respectively note increased landslide and seismic disaster risk succeeding fracking and
wastewater injections. Rumbach & Németh (2018) speak to the construction of risk via ‘multi-storied
concrete buildings’ on hillslopes, exacerbating slope failure incidence. Within this context, a
secondarily generated downslope hazard via collapsed building debris is also observed. Such
phenomena have been referred to as ‘socio-natural’ hazards, “generated at the intersection of
human practices and environment” (Lavell et al., 2023, p. 132). Commonly aligned (hazard-
exacerbating) processes broadly include climate change and environmental degradation, with the
spatial scales of causality and impact not always aligned (Alcántara-Ayala, 2021). One example of risk
creation through climate change is reported by Shang et al. (2023), who note the associated melting
of permafrost increases the risk to building foundations whose stability is influenced by the thermal
regime of the surrounding permafrost. Poudel et al. (2023) explore another example whereby
Some scholars diverge from explicitly discussing hazard generation as a risk-creating element,
framing “exposure and vulnerability as the main ingredients” (Alcántara-Ayala, 2021, p. 324), with
exposure further depicted a necessary determinant of DRC (Ehrlich et al., 2018; Lavell et al., 2023).
Alcántara-Ayala (2021) suggest disaster risk results when landslide exposure emerges via rural
transformations and the stationing of socio-economic activities on hazard-susceptible land.
Contrasting more hazard-oriented conceptualisations of DRC are both Lewis and Kelman (2012) and
Kelman (2018), who primarily centre their discussions on ‘vulnerability drivers’ and ‘vulnerability
creation’. Dickinson & Burton (2022, p. 203) complement this standpoint by suggesting DRC “is a
process that increases vulnerability”. Chipangura et al. (2017) note the dominance of hazard
framings across the Zimbabwe disaster risk management system, critiquing the resultant silencing of
vulnerability and theistic framings, with the latter labelled key components in the social construction
of risk. Covarrubias & Raju (2020) explicitly use the vulnerability paradigm to investigate the role of
the political-economic system as a ‘vulnerability creator’. Clark-Ginsberg et al. (2021b), Jerolleman
(2019), and Sarmiento (2018) likewise centre vulnerability in their DRC framings.
Although vulnerability is centralised in many DRC discourses, Lizarralde et al. (2021) problematise
conceptualisations of DRC as synonymous with vulnerability creation, noting alignment with a
‘radical constructivist approach’ neglects hazard-related discourses. Peters (2021) explicitly
distinguishes between vulnerability creation and DRC in conflict contexts, seeing the former as only a
partial insight into the processes contributing to DRC. The author does, however, report the majority
influence emanates through vulnerability creation (p.5). It is important to note that vulnerability is
not an entirely unproblematic concept, often abused in disaster studies (Cannon, 2022) by failing to
account for the fact “those facing systemic oppression are made vulnerable” or “vulnerabilised” by
agents and institutions (von Meding & Chmutina, 2023). We observe that DRC might work to draw
specific attention to the processes and sources of risk creation which are often left unaccounted for
in vulnerability discourses (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2022).
Many DRC discussions centre themselves in urban contexts, with risk creation manifest in structural
development processes via (e.g.) the consolidation of capital and populations onto hazard-
susceptible or otherwise unsuitable land, hazard generation, and processes of socio-spatial
marginalisation (Castro et al., 2015; Guadagno & Guadagno, 2021; Lavell et al., 2023; Pagett, 2021;
Rumbach, 2014; Sulfikkar Ahamed et al., 2023). Disaster risk can thereby be viewed as a reflection of
socio-spatial configurations (Ramalho, 2019; Meriläinen & Koro, 2021), created in the production of
The following sections are framed around three inductively derived themes, depicted in Figure 2. The
first relates to the foundations of risk-creating development decisions, the second to the processes
involved in upholding such tendencies, and finally, to the general product of these processes.
The tendency for decision-makers to view disaster risk as low-priority next to demands for property
development is echoed across the literature (e.g. Barclay et al., 2019), with a lack of risk-oriented
land-use planning potentiating DRC (Su et al., 2021; Vogel et al., 2022). The deficient regard for
disaster risk in urban development decisions could, in part, be fuelled by the incongruous training of
Clark-Ginsberg (2020a) reports the creation of risk is unavoidable in complex urban settings since
there are inescapable trade-offs in risk. However, when trade-offs are made between development
and disaster risk, short-term ‘development’ goals and economic interests are often the prioritised
objectives (Chmutina et al., 2021; Hilhorst & Mena, 2021). Profit-seeking frequently prioritises DRC
over DRR (Clark-Ginsberg, 2020b) and decision-making powers often lie with actors who gain from
the risk they emplace on others (Alcántara-Ayala et al., 2023). This process of prioritisation appears a
core risk-generating process, and economic interests prove to be a strong governing force (Aronsson-
Storrier, 2020; Kennedy, 2013). In Castro et al.'s (2015) study, the consolidation of informal
settlements in at-risk areas followed desires for ‘economic advancement’ in two cities in Chile. Such
processes are often overlooked (Berg & De Majo, 2017), likely given their fundamentality to the
continuity of the (heavily desired by those benefitting) ‘economic status quo’ (Cheek et al., 2023).
There exists a lack of accountability to ‘intertemporal fairness’ in relation to DRC in land-use planning
decisions. A socially or politically induced notion of urgency in addressing economic concerns
(Hilhorst & Mena, 2021) and near-range visions in national policy development and investments
encourage risk-enhancing decisions by neglecting temporally-removed risk (Alcántara-Ayala et al.,
2023; Barclay et al., 2019; Marincioni & Negri, 2020; Stevenson & Seville, 2017). The immediate
‘need’ for settlement or transport infrastructure is, for instance, reported to supersede risk-related
concerns, motivating development on floodplains (Coates & Warner, 2023). At an individual decision-
making level, land pressures, feelings of prosperity, and the potential for income generation can all
encourage trade-offs which favour short-term (risk-creating) development gains (Murnane et al.,
2016; Paci-Green et al., 2020; Rumbach & Németh, 2018). The attention drawn to the competing
‘needs’ of today and the future brings attention to the fundamental subjectivities in how risk is
defined. Even the framing of today’s needs as ‘urgent’ versus future risks only a ‘potential’ by
Murnane et al. (2016) is reflective of the seemingly dominant tendency to prioritise short-term gains.
There is some consensus on the risk-creating implications of rapid and ‘poorly planned’ urbanisation
processes (Dickinson & Burton, 2022; Kumar & Bhaduri, 2018; Lucatello & Alcántara-Ayala, 2023).
Poudel et al. (2023) describe the development path of Kathmandu Valley as ‘haphazard’, lacking pro-
poor, risk-informed urban plans. Providing an important contrast to conceptions that a lack of land-
use planning potentiates DRC, Clark-Ginsberg et al. (2022) demonstrate that if flooding is framed as a
product of ‘inadequate state control’ in council guidelines, the implementation of regulatory, control-
oriented risk management measures may be promoted. This is problematic since adopting planning
approaches that overlook informal local systems can also generate risks (Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2020).
It is thus important to stress that although DRC may emerge in unplanned spaces, the creation of risk
will not (necessarily) be averted by retaining centralised development controls, especially where
alternate agendas (besides equitable DRR) shape the motivations of developers. So, although
informality may be a ‘feature’ of DRC, it can be central to cities’ functioning (e.g. in Freetown - Clark-
Ginsberg et al., 2022) and working with rather than against informality is therefore essential to
addressing DRC.
Land tenure and security, as well as housing ownership, are of relevance to the discourse on DRC
since they shape the anticipated permanency of infrastructure. Insecure housing or land tenureship
can result in a risk-enhancing tendency towards lower quality housing materials, with a comparative
incentive to invest in structures where tenure is secure (Rumbach, 2014; Skwarko et al., 2024; Unger
et al., 2017). Deficient urban services are also noted to be heightened by tenure insecurities in
informal settlements, with the associated ‘conditions of fragility’ contributing to DRC (Peters et al.,
2022). Rectifying issues of insecure tenure could thus be one means of working with conditions of
informality to undermine related risk-creating construction practices.
The socio-political and geographic marginalisation of such settlements is implied by Peters et al.
(2022) to result in risk-creating fragilities. Sandoval & Sarmiento (2020) analyse national urban
development guidelines discussing (jointly) the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
(SFDRR) and informal settlements. No clear means towards facilitating DRR in these contexts are
identified in the reports, nor is the recognition of urban development processes’ role in DRC
(Sandoval & Sarmiento, 2020). The attempted management of unplanned spaces is (unsurprisingly,
given the observed policy neglect) noted to facilitate DRC. Parida et al.'s (2023) study site in
Bhubaneswar hosts risk-creating tendencies via ‘adaptive’ slum redevelopment processes.
Purportedly used as a ‘risk governance tool’, the process is interpreted to neglect consideration of
potential conflicts, only focus on select risks, and construct spatially differentiated risks and
opportunities. There appears limited guidance for incorporating ‘informal’ spaces into planning
The idea of ‘risk-informed development’ is seemingly redundant in its intentions if risk definitions
can be so easily manipulated to attend to alternate agendas. If particular ‘organising principles’
shape how risk is perceived, they can influence adopted actions by making certain interpretations of
reality more convincing (Chipangura et al., 2017). Local knowledge may be liable to manipulation
where it is forced to conform to ‘experts’’ prior generated disaster risk knowledge and conceptions.
Risk-related concerns surrounding livelihoods and community may therefore be neglected where
local perspectives are “socially constructed as less reliable and therefore irrelevant” (Espia &
Salvador, 2017, p. 87). Coates (2021) reports from Brazil, for instance, that people wishing to return
to their affected residencies post-disaster were more concerned with losing their community or
commuting distances than the risk posed by mudflows. While such concerns are sidelined in
‘arbitrary’ DRR-related decisions, those with the money to influence decisions are blatantly better
accounted for (Coates, 2021). The imposition of top-down, technocratic decision-making approaches
discount grassroot experiences and legitimise externally-defined conceptions of hazards (Clark-
Ginsberg et al., 2021; Wisner, 2022), undermining capacities to escape conditions of risk (Tagalo,
2020). Decisions to label places ‘at-risk’ additionally have down-the-line impacts on levels of
investment in places with implications for homeownership, creating risk by limiting disaster relief
capacities (Jerolleman, 2019). Competing ideologies in what is deemed a risk to any given community
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Oliver-Smith et al. (2017b) present disaster risks as socially constructed both in terms of human
actions and risk perception. Aligning with the latter, Renn & Klinke (2015, p. 26) suggest risks can be
conceptualised as mental constructs “created and selected by human actors”. Although scholars
talking to the social construction of risk are not primarily referring to these ‘mental’ constructs (e.g.
van Riet, 2021), this perspective is pertinent to the DRC discourse as it helps critique how risk is
considered and thus managed. Since disaster risk exists in our minds as a result of constructed
narratives, it is pertinent to note that risk narratives are subjective and liable to the influence of
social actors (Coates & Warner, 2023). The notion of ‘disaster’ is also fundamentally a product of
subjective construction processes (Lizarralde et al., 2021). Thus, important to discussions of DRC is
the level of meaningful accountability to subjective and multiple experiences and perceptions of
disaster risk.
The effect of framing is such that equal but differentially presented problems can conjure disparate
decision outcomes (Fischhoff, 1995; Kahneman, 2003). With actors able to choose the risk lens that
fits their preferred discourse, DRC can thereby be inadvertently (or immorally) potentiated. Positivist
risk framings among DRR staff can, for instance, lend to a narrow conception of risk as a probability
(Tagalo, 2020). What results is the operation of DRR agendas and activities in line with this
conception of risk. Bodine et al. (2022) put forward that relocation decisions often follow and are
shaped by one type of hazard event and relocation processes need to be more accountable to multi-
hazard threats. Their case shows that while reducing storm surge exposure, relocated persons face
increased flood exposure. Marchezini (2020) similarly shows that in the face of competing hazards,
certain hazards have favoured weightings in political agendas. In Lizarralde et al.'s (2021) study,
residents were taught that constructing on slopes was unsafe; these teachings nonetheless resulted
in risk-creating construction practices, as risk was also contingent on structures being able to
withstand hazards. The prioritisation (and associated sidelining) of certain risks or risk components
can thus contribute to DRC (Parida et al., 2023).
A related stream of discussions emerging from the literature concerns how risk comes to be defined
as ‘acceptable’; a challenge in the face of contrasting risk conceptions (Fuentealba, 2021). Dickinson
& Burton (2022) frame DRC as playing a key role in “creating unnecessary increases in vulnerability
and disasters”. We should question who has the power to define what an ‘unnecessary’ level of
vulnerability or incidence of disaster is. Thomalla et al. (2018, p. 1) similarly refer to a ‘tipping point’
beyond which risk-taking developments exceed “tolerable and acceptable risk levels”, but again, who
is defining ‘tolerable and acceptable’? Determining risk acceptability is not a technical conundrum,
and although ‘experts’ can contribute, social negotiations and the inclusion of psycho-cultural risk
parameters are critical (Cienfuegos, 2022; de Oliveira Santos et al., 2021; Huang, 2018; Murnane et
al., 2016). Yet, locally-defined risk elements remain on the periphery of urban planning decisions
(Poudel et al., 2023). There also appears a temporality to places and decisions being perceived as
‘risky’, with competing priorities able to take precedence and facilitate DRC where risk conceptions
are low. Shifts in risk perception occur through time in the face of felt risk (see Hartmann, 2011), with
patterns of risk creation reemerging with time post-disaster (Surjan & Shaw, 2009).
Disaster education can be utilised as a means of shaping risk perspectives to uphold the status quo
and dominant political ideologies. Coates' (2021) study hones in on an example of a DRR programme
manipulated by political concerns, which influence the design, delivery, and reception of initiatives,
yet are frequently left uninterrogated. Key appears how the framing of causal components leads to
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With approaches to addressing any said risk through development influenced by whether
components are framed or perceived as risk-enhancing, there is a need to examine the im/explict
values accounted for in the risk definitions shaping policy and practice (Espia & Salvador, 2017). As
Matthewman (2015, p. 154) observes, the “right risk culture can make all of the difference”.
The idea that specific actors or processes put people at-risk is articulated across the reviewed
literature, highlighting agency in the creation of risk (e.g. Earle, 2016; Paci-Green et al., 2020). Those
responsible for DRC are either inferably or directly noted, but where ‘risk-creators’ are highlighted
they are, on the most part, not the same groups as those with the risk imposed on them (Wisner &
Lavell, 2017). Ríos (2015) emplaces direct responsibility on provincial and municipal governments
and developers in producing uneven disaster risk spaces, with the capital (or social) gains associated
with DRC largely inaccessible to the groups fronting the consequences. When risk is offset to
marginalised populations in this way, inequitable and unjust patterns of risk emerge (Clark-Ginsberg,
2020b). Powers regulating global economies disregard concerns for social justice, resulting in the
continued imposition of risk “on those least likely to benefit” (Linarelli et al., 2018, p. 226). Given
those constructing vulnerability in pursuit of ‘economic development’ and those risks are
subsequently allocated to are seldom one and the same, it appears key to question whom economic
gains are expensing (Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2021). DRC is subsequently reported as “a product of
inequity” by Clark-Ginsberg et al. (2021b, p. 449), with Thomalla et al. (2018) drawing specifically on
distributive equities in development-related trade-offs.
With certain groups embodying a disproportionate share of the risks relative to the associated
benefits, DRC is a perpetuation of social injustices (Jerolleman, 2019). Social injustice produces
disaster risk and is embedded in the spaces we construct (Chmutina & von Meding, 2022; Poudel et
al., 2023), with cases illustrated in Haiti (Cheek et al., 2023), Latin America, and the Caribbean (Lavell
et al., 2023). The creation of such ‘spatially unjust’ settlements are commonly noted products of
neoliberal development models (Sandoval et al., 2021). Despite competing structural forces there is
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We identify three main themes (Figure 3) within the disaster risk reduction – production arena: (1)
inequitable access to DRR measures as creating risk, (2) DRR measures that paradoxically create risk,
and (3) DRR measures that fail to combat DRC, thereby enabling such processes to prevail.
Figure 3. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) or production? Adjusting DRR’s possibility space encourages activities
that do not just reduce select risk components while upholding risk-creating systems, but holistically reduce
risk by ensuring equitable access and actively targeting risk creation.
13
Jerolleman (2019) contends the emplaced localised or individualised responsibility to reduce losses
ignores inequities in DRC and the associated constraints affected groups have in accessing protection.
DRC thereby shadows ‘the commodification of safety’ (Jerolleman, 2019). Power relations are vital in
understanding participation in DRR initiatives, with disparate constraints and opportunities notable
relative to social groups’ inclusion in risk governance structures (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2022; Collins,
2018). Nonuniform accessibility to DRR infrastructure in ‘lower-value’ or ‘informally-settled’ areas is
seen to parallel the creation of risk (Akola et al., 2023; Coates, 2021). The systematic exclusion of
those residing in informal settlements from governing bodies’ DRR and preparedness activities, as
well as related decisions, can also force these groups into a state of dependence on NGOs for risk-
reducing services (Peters et al., 2022). This marginalisation process is noted to create risk through
vulnerability production.
DRR-motivated slum-clearance projects in Nairobi, Lagos, and Bangkok are reported to have
destabilised informal modes of risk governance (Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2020). Without an enforced
responsibility to anticipate and account for the risks created in such initiatives, the fundamental
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Contrasting the dominant conception of DRC as a pre-event process, post-disaster risks have also
been noted to be created by ineffective or inefficient response processes (Hao & Wang, 2020;
Hilhorst & Bankoff, 2022). Hilhorst & Mena (2021) provide an account of social resistance to the
lockdowns employed in response to COVID-19, which ultimately proved a means of DRC. A common
feature of post-disaster settings in relation to DRC is the urgency under which decisions are made
(e.g. Thomalla et al., 2018). Speedy construction in such settings may be celebrated and strived for
(e.g. in Aceh post-2004) over minimising risk or ensuring livelihoods are supported (Cheek &
Chmutina, 2022). Peters (2021) reports, for example, how in the southeast Bangladeshi mountains
flood and landslide-related risks were increased by the rapid construction of roads and shelter to
host Rohingya refugees.
Disaster management agencies have explicitly been posed as enablers of DRC. Clark-Ginsberg et al.
(2021b) look at the ‘organizational roots’ of DRC by investigating how disaster management agencies,
specifically the United States’ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), create risk. They
responsibilise FEMA for its role in DRC, purporting such agencies embody biases that mean
supposedly resilience-enhancing initiatives can be inhibited by distributive, procedural, and
contextual inequities (Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2021b). This can be through the sidelining of certain
voices in decisions or prioritisation of ‘expert’ risk understandings resulting in inequitably beneficial
measures (Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2021b). If DRM frameworks, plans, and policies reflect only the
dominant ideologies, risk framings and perceptions (Cheek & Chmutina, 2022; Espia & Salvador,
2017), certain risks or risk components may ‘unintentionally’ (or otherwise) be left unaddressed,
culminating in DRC (Parida et al., 2023). Resultantly, decisions to employ DRM measures can be risk-
creating when they fail to account for other risk elements. DRM policy controls instated in areas of
high disaster recurrence can, for instance, restrict basic government service provision, leaving at-risk
populations without services that would ultimately enhance their coping capacities (Lavell et al.,
2023).
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Risk management stimulated by politically constructed feelings of urgency has created a multitude
of risks by facilitating adherence to political or financial elites’ ulterior motives over legitimate and
locally-driven risk concerns (Parida et al., 2023). Coates & Warner (2023, p. 6) point to a case of
forcible resettlement in Rio de Janeiro, where powerful actors’ motives are disguised as post-
disaster ‘resilience-enhancing’ measures but attend to their “longstanding policy of forced removal
of the poor”. The manipulation of post-disaster environments to serve underlying political agendas is
also reported by Hilhorst & Mena (2021) who discuss the securitisation of emergency responses as
an instrument to serving ulterior political objectives, such as oppressing populations, media, and
opposition groups. They describe how governments use the ‘state of exception’ arising in response
landscapes to employ ‘urgent’ actions and agendas, sidelining all competing issues to address the
prioritised threat, with these actions presented as an objective necessity. Aase (2021) presents a
case in which one threat (the COVID-19 pandemic) was used to accelerate the relocation of Rohingya
refugees, overriding resistance aligned with the risk-creating potential in forcing their inhabitation of
hazard-prone relocation sites. Enforced ‘risk-reducing’ relocations post-flood can additionally
increase risks via non-access to post-flood compensation for households choosing to remain in-situ
(Samaraweera, 2023). Displaced persons’ voices and needs are continually marginalised in disaster
plans (Peters, 2021; Rumbach et al., 2020) and post-disaster settings could be more equitably and
inclusively planned for outside this state of emergency (Bodine et al., 2022), overturning risk-
creating forms of risk governance.
3.3.3. DRR measures that fail to combat processes of DRC, enabling them to prevail
Without insinuating disaster studies has not “achieved a good deal” through existing initiatives,
Wisner (2019, p. 61) suggests work towards risk reduction remains ‘trapped’. DRR institutions are
seen as shying away from challenging the ‘harsh realities’ of DRC, focusing instead on delivering
normatively positive (‘risk-reducing’) outcomes (Alexander, 2016). There exists a persistent and
overwhelming focus on corrective and compensatory risk management (Lavell & Maskrey, 2014),
otherwise termed ‘symptom management’ (Raikes et al., 2021). Socially-constructed ‘emergency
imaginaries’ help in sustaining symptom management over system reform in post-disaster
landscapes (Aase, 2021). While such measures can temporarily offset disaster events or lessen their
impacts, they systematically fail to address risk-creating processes (Chmutina et al., 2021), and
cyclically reinforce response-dominated systems, impeding the instigation of transformational
approaches (French et al., 2020; Oliver-Smith et al., 2017b). DRR that fails to account for risk-creating
processes will only further compound them, lending to an ever ‘uphill battle’ and hindering progress
in reducing net risk levels (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020; Raikes et al., 2021).
Wisner (2019, 2020) proposes the term DRR might even be distracting from the issue of DRC, with
associated terminology only perpetuating solutions adhering to inequitably-balanced agendas rather
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In the same way nature is used to render disaster risk an unavoidable aspect of socio-political
systems, so too is the framing of vulnerability as an uninterrogated ‘weakness’ of certain individuals
or groups - instead of seeing them as fundamentally ‘vulnerabilised’ or made vulnerable (von Meding
& Chmutina, 2023), perpetuating paternalistic forms of DRM (Bankoff, 2001). Problem framing
influences the solution space and subsequently adopted solutions, so under this mindset, DRR will
continue to embody approaches that fail to critique nor overturn the conditions driving DRC, instead
re-embedding inequalities. Influential frameworks, such as SFDRR, have been rendered apolitical
projects given their lack of critique of power in their vulnerability discourses (Chmutina et al., 2021).
Identified ‘vulnerable persons’ are therein provided access to support but no means towards
questioning the risk-creating conditions they are afforded (von Meding & Chmutina, 2023). Such risk
framings can perpetuate beliefs that “vulnerability is a regrettable state of being that must be
responded to with charity, but not system change” (von Meding & Chmutina, 2023, p. 369), thereby
upholding the very systems that create risk. With the core of DRC noted to lie in unjust social
structures, more politically-oriented DRR interventions are encouraged (Clark-Ginsberg, 2017).
In their analysis, which takes DRC back to the educational roots of practitioners, Chmutina & von
Meding (2022) suggest that since higher education practices in engineering disciplines are founded in
‘objectivity’, they embody apolitically-oriented curricular. Their study argues this reinforces
ineffective, technocratic practices among built environment practitioners who assume disasters can
be avoided by ‘taming’ nature. Uncritically apolitical DRR pedestals ‘objective’ problem-solving and
‘technical fixes’ (Gaillard, 2019). Viewing these as neutral solutions only perpetrates risk by leaving
the value biases of practitioners unquestioned and overlooking the fact risk is socially-constructed
(Chmutina & von Meding, 2022). The issue raised here is not that technical solutions cannot in some
sense reduce risk, it is instead that it so commonly overrides the parallel need for transformation in
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A lack of knowledge on risk drivers and components could be fuelling this ability to turn a blind eye
to processes of risk creation. Ruiz-Cortés and Alcántara-Ayala (2020), for instance, suggest weak
policies exist and create risk because of knowledge deficiencies. Anticipating decision outcomes may
be difficult in complex systems (Stevenson & Seville, 2017), but to what extent is this excusable for
the undue neglect for thorough analysis of forms of DRC? The idea of decisions being ‘blind to risk’ is
correlated with a lack of political will to ensure investments are systematically and equitably risk-
informed, laying the grounds for DRC (Chmutina et al., 2021; Wisner, 2020). There are resultingly
instances where DRC processes have not just been neglected, but intentionally concealed, with
urban developers making risks ‘invisible’ to conform to real estate pressures (Acuña et al., 2021). This
intentional concealing is clearly inexcusable, but there is not always a clear line separating intentional
actions from the unintended. A means of concealing processes in DRC can be seen in the attribution
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DRC is not confined to the tangible processes tied to the primary incidence of felt risk, so why do we
continue to treat disasters as time-bound events (Huang, 2018; Meriläinen & Koro, 2021)? Even
major frameworks, such as SFDRR, do little to engage with far-off processes, focusing instead on
measuring event-based impacts, such as the number of damaged facilities attributed to disasters
(Chmutina et al., 2021; Wisner, 2020). Given the temporal disparities that exist between processes of
DRC and felt impacts, it is critical to undermine narratives of a bound disaster ‘event space’. “Events
are merely processes made visible” (Matthewman, 2015, p. 136); this can be the process of
neoliberalism, systemic exclusion, environmental degradation, or any other risk-creating practice
observed in this review. Assuming there exists a detached period before a disaster ‘event’ disguises
the entangled risk-creating socio-economic and political processes in this temporal realm (Aronsson-
Storrier, 2022; Bosher et al., 2021; Cheek & Chmutina, 2022; Fuentealba, 2021). This vail of
intangibility likely enables symptom management and other ‘easy fixes’ to prevail over the
prevention of obscured risk-generating processes (Poudel et al., 2023; Thomalla et al., 2018; Tran &
Shaw, 2007). Although reactive risk reduction efforts can be seen as a normative good, they detract
attention “from other times and spaces that could be better loci for intervention” (Coates & Warner,
2023, p. 1). Oliver-Smith et al. (2017a) likewise indicate a need to move away from an exclusive
concentration on the ‘disaster site’ to sites of policy creation and execution.
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Samaraweera (2023) draws attention to the importance of considering and accounting for wider
system structures when analysing its individual components, with structural foundations shaping
individuals’ behaviours and the implications of those behaviours. Covarrubias & Raju (2020) find the
lens of neoextractivism useful for its multi-scalar positioning enabling examination of local-level
processes of DRC and their connection to regional politico-economic arrangements. In their study, to
understand disaster risk governance they deem it essential to begin from the guiding economic and
socio-political principles shaping ‘development’ practices. Cheek & Chmutina (2022) further this
discussion on global-state interactions, reporting on states’ drive towards compatibility with the
global economy, suggesting global capital trends thereby help define national economic and legal
structures. Regarding legal structures, Aronsson-Storrier (2020) analyses the role of international law
in DRC, stating that while some laws (e.g. on human rights) help enforce DRR, others (e.g. investment
law) provide opposing forces. The role of international investment law in perpetuating disaster risk is
only furthered by governments’ pressure to pursue various foreign investments and the associated
absence of risk-creating safeguards (Wisner, 2020).
Systems constrain the ‘possibility space’ within which development and DRR processes are
undertaken, resulting in a seemingly self-fuelling cycle of risk creation. Possibility spaces are bounded
(abstract) places wherein political ideologies have defined the realms of potentiality in decision-
making (Dittmer, 2014; McGowran & Donovan, 2021). Recovery processes are, for instance,
implicated in DRC by re-establishing the risk-producing systems wherein they emerge and are
structurally constrained (Cheek et al., 2023).
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Avoiding DRC will entail stakeholders and at-risk populations attaining a greater understanding of the
factors driving risk and support in strengthening disaster risk governance systems (Alcántara-Ayala,
2021). FORIN appears to be a versatile tool which has been employed in response to a desire to
interrogate processes of risk creation (Wisner, 2016). Understanding processes and trajectories of
DRC and communicating them in a meaningful way could help change attitudes towards risk-creating
decisions (Alcántara-Ayala, 2018). This process of understanding may, however, not be so simple.
Competing narratives of risk creation (e.g. Lizarralde et al., 2021) may inhibit groups from attaining a
collective acceptance of who or what processes are responsible for, or involved in, DRC. Lizarralde et
al.’s (2021, p. 10) study respondents question the ascription of DRC “to local corruption and socio-
political dynamics versus colonial crimes, American politics, or pollution in industrialized nations”.
Despite observed successes of community-based DRR, the localisation of blame and promotion of
efforts centred on individual responsibility to address risk will not negate the ongoing processes of
risk creation that require broader structural changes (Clark-Ginsberg, 2020b; Sandoval et al., 2023).
The prevalence of competing trade-offs and systemic constraints outlined in this review should not
insinuate that the problem of DRC is too embedded in our societal norms and practices to overturn.
Instead, the bearers of inequitable risk should be empowered to demand change from those creating
it through meaningful community dialogues (Clark-Ginsberg, 2020a; Coates, 2021). Empowering
marginalised groups can help “shift the dynamics of the futures-in-the-making”, i.e. manipulating
present-day DRC processes to overturn risk-creating trajectories (McGowran & Donovan, 2021, p.
1607). Countering presently problematic BBB ideologies, disaster memories could be utilised to shift
discourse, practice, and culture towards resisting DRC (Fuentealba, 2021). Attempts to draw focus to
risk-creating processes “are often edited out, marginalized or ignored, as they may strike sensitive
chords among authorities and special interest groups” (Oliver-Smith et al., 2017b). Further research
would thus be welcome into ways of overcoming identified forms of resistance and competing
priorities, navigating towards systems which favour the avoidance rather than creation of disaster
risk. Recognising ways of overcoming resistance (e.g. in the private sector) towards crossing sectoral
boundaries, for instance, is one means through which such groups’ contributions to DRC could be
mitigated (Clark-Ginsberg, 2020b). Breaking such silos and cultivating collective concern for DRC
should help embed disaster risk concerns into development practice (Lavell et al., 2023) - this could
be achieved in part through greater convergence research (Lakhina et al., 2021; Peek et al., 2020).
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