* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 10.04.2023

Date of decision: 01.06.2023

+ CS(OS) 601/2022 & I.As. 15957/2022, 20302/2022

GEETA ANAND ..... Plaintiff
Through: Ms.Malavika Rajkotia &
Ms.Akriti Tyagi, Advs.

versus

TANYA ARJUN & ANR. ..... Defendants

Through: Mr.Prosenjit Banerjee,
Mr.Aaditya Vijay Kumar,
Ms.Liza M. Baruah &
Mr.Akshit Mohan, Advs. for D-
1 with D-1 present in Court.

JUDGMENT

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
I.A. 606/2023
1. The present application has been filed by the defendant no.1
under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in
short ‘CPC’) seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute raised in the
plaint lies with the Family Court in terms of Section 7(1) Explanation
(d) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Family
Courts Act’).
CASE OF THE PLAINTIFF

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 2. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff, who is the
mother-in-law of the defendant no.1 and the mother of the defendant
no.2, praying for the following reliefs:
“a. Pass a decree of Permanent Injunction
in favour of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant No. l her relatives, agents,
associates and/or employees thereby
restraining them from visiting or entering the
Suit Property at No. 26, Anand Lok, New
Delhi-110049 and interfering in the peaceful
life of the Plaintiff,
b. Award the cost of the present suit in
favor of the Plaintiffs and against the
Defendants.”

3. It is the case of the plaintiff that she, along with her Company
AG Industries Pvt. Ltd., acquired the Suit Property bearing no. 26,
Anand Lok, New Delhi-110049 vide Sale Deeds dated 23.03.2007,
02.11.2004 and 02.11.2004. The defendant no.2 is the son of the
plaintiff and was residing with her in the suit property.
4. The defendant no.1 and defendant no.2 entered into a wedlock
on 10.12.2005, and have been blessed with two children.
5. The plaintiff avers that the defendant no.1 was aggressive and
abusive towards her and, therefore, in May, 2019, the plaintiff asked
the defendants to move out of the Suit Property, but allowed them to
live at her residential apartment at A-109, 9th Floor, DLF King's Court,
Greater Kailash Part II, New Delhi-110048.
6. The plaintiff further avers that in the last week of June, 2022,
the defendants, through a family friend, reconciled their inter se
dispute and entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated
28.06.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MOU’). The plaintiff is
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 also a signatory to the MOU. In terms of Clause 6 (b) of the MOU, it
was agreed that the defendant no.1 shall move into the DLF property
and remove her belongings and stop access to the suit property unless
particularly invited by the plaintiff. Clause 6(c) of the MOU states that
the plaintiff, in turn, would repay the loan taken on the DLF property
and, thereafter, transfer the DLF property to the defendant no.1 and
the children of the defendants.
7. The plaintiff asserts that while she performed her part of the
obligations under the MOU, the defendant no.1 resiled out of the
same, alleging that the MOU had been signed under duress. The
plaintiff asserts that the defendant no.1 again started intimidating and
harassing the plaintiff while whimsically barging into the suit property
against the plaintiff’s wishes and threatening to squat there until her
illegal demands are met.
8. The plaintiff bases her cause of action to file the suit as under:
“45. That the cause of action for filing the
present suit arose on 28.06.2022 when Tanya
signed the MoU and agreed to vacate the Suit
Property within 7 days of the completion of the
renovation work. It again arose on 29.08.2022
when Tanya failed to comply with the MoU
and vacate the Suit Property. The cause of
action again arose on 30.09.2022 when Tanya
unilaterally reneged from the MoU. The cause
of action is still continuing and subsisting as
Tanya has been visiting the Suit Property
against Ms. Anand's wishes and threatened to
squat there until her illegal demands are met.
Ms. Anand fears that Tanya, while in the
house, may create more trouble and cause
harm to Ms. Anand.”

SUBMISSION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE

DEFENDANT NO.1
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 9. As noted hereinabove, the defendant no.1 has filed the present
application stating that, as the suit seeks an injunction ‘in
circumstances arising out of matrimonial relationship’, the exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of the plaintiff is with a Family
Court in terms of the Section 7 (1) Explanation (d) of the Family
Courts Act.
10. In support of the above objection, the learned counsel for the
defendant no.1 has placed reliance on the judgment of a learned Single
Judge of this Court in Avneet Kaur v. Sadhu Singh & Anr.,
2022/DHC/2453.
SUBMISSION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PLAINTIFF

11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, placing
reliance on the judgment of this Court in Manita Khurana v. Indra
Khurana 2010 SCC OnLine Del 225; and Meena Kapoor v. Ayushi
Rawal & Anr. 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2481, submits that this Court
has held that a claim of a third party to a marriage, even if she be the
mother of one of the spouses, cannot be adjudicated before the Family
Court. She submits that where the claim is based on the exclusive
ownership of the Suit Property, merely because certain facts leading to
the cause of action refer to the marital relationship of the defendants,
that would not make the suit filed by the mother-in-law as one seeking
injunction ‘in circumstances arising out of a matrimonial relationship’
to be adjudicated only by a Family Court.

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 12. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, placing reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Assa Singh (D) by LRs v. Shanti
Parshad (D) by LRs & Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1064; and of this
Court in Manpreet Kaur v. Harjyot Singh 2020 SCC OnLine Del
2487, submits that the ouster of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is not
to be readily inferred. Such ouster must be either explicit, express or
clearly implied. She submits that in similar circumstances, not only
various suits have been entertained by Civil Courts including this
Court, but also decreed by the Civil Courts. She submits that this
Court would not infer the ouster of the jurisdiction on account of the
Family Courts Act.
13. As far as the judgment in Avneet Kaur (supra) is concerned, the
learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the same is not good law,
as it does not refer to the prior judgment of this Court in Manita
Khurana (supra). She submits that the same is also distinguishable on
facts inasmuch as there was no agreement between the parties
whereunder the wife/daughter-in-law was to leave the house of the
mother-in-law. She submits that in the said case, the husband had also
transferred the ownership of the suit property in favour of his mother
when the litigation between the parties therein began and they were
separated.
14. She submits that in the present case, the cause of action is based
on the MOU, whereunder, the defendant no.1 had agreed to vacate the
Suit Property and shift to the DLF property. It has no concern with the
matrimonial relationship between the defendants.

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 SUBMISSION IN REJOINDER BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANT NO.1

15. In rejoinder, the learned counsel for the defendant no.1, placing
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Board of
Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.
(2005) 2 SCC 673, submits that in view of the apparent conflict
between the judgments of this Court in Avneet Kaur (supra) on one
hand and Manita Khurana (supra) and Meena Kapoor (supra) on the
other, this Court should place the same before the Hon’ble Chief
Justice to be placed for hearing before a Larger Bench.
16. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.
Vanitha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District
and Ors. (2021) 15 SCC 730, the learned counsel for the defendant
no. 1 submits that the suit property would be the shared household of
the defendant no.1 and, therefore, reliance on the MOU by the
plaintiff would not empower this Court with the appropriate
jurisdiction.
17. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.A.
Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida (2003) 4 SCC 166; and of this Court in
Vidyanidhi Dalmia v. Nilanajana Dalmia 2008 SCC OnLine Del
371, he submits that the Family Courts Act being a Special Act
created for reconciliation of the disputes of certain kinds, should be
construed liberally and not in a restrictive sense, as is being contended
by the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
18. The learned counsel for the defendant submits that the judgment
of this Court in Manita Khurana (supra) is distinguishable as in the
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 case the husband of the defendant therein was not a party to the suit
and the learned Judge distinguished the cited judgment on that score.
He submits that in the present suit, husband of the defendant no.1 has
been impleadead as the defendant no.2 and, therefore, the judgment in
Manita Khurana (supra) shall not be applicable.
ANALYSIS AND FINDING
19. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels
for the parties.
20. In my view, there appears to be an apparent conflict between
the interpretation placed on Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the
Family Courts Act in Avneet Kaur (supra) on one hand, and Manita
Khurana (supra) and Meena Kapoor (supra) on the other.
21. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 reads as under:

“7. Jurisdiction.—(1) Subject to the other

provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall—
(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction
exercisable by any district Court or any
subordinate civil Court under any law for the
time being in force in respect of suits and
proceedings of the nature referred to in the
Explanation; and
(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising
such jurisdiction under such law, to be a
district Court or, as the case may be, such
subordinate civil Court for the area to which
the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.
Explanation.—The suits and proceedings
referred to in this sub-section are suits and
proceedings of the following nature, namely:—
(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties
to a marriage for a decree of nullity of
marriage (declaring the marriage to be null
and void or, as the case may be, annulling the

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 marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or
judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;
(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as
to the validity of a marriage or as to the
matrimonial status of any person;
(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties
to a marriage with respect to the property of
the parties or of either of them;
(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or
injunction in circumstance arising out of a
marital relationship;
(e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as
to the legitimacy of any person;
(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;
(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the
guardianship of the person or the custody of,
or access to, any minor.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this
Act, a Family Court shall also have and
exercise—
(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a
Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX
(relating to order for maintenance of wife,
children and parents) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be
conferred on it by any other enactment.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

22. In Manita Khurana (supra) (authored by Rajiv Sahai Endlaw,

J.), the learned Single Judge of this Court was considering a petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arising out of the
dismissal of an application filed by the petitioner therein seeking
transfer of the suit to the Family Court. The suit had been filed by the
mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law seeking ejectment and
recovery of mesne profits from the property of which she claimed
exclusive ownership. The learned Single Judge, interpreting

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 Explanation (d) of Section 7 (1) of Family Court Act, observed and
held as under:

“16. The only clause of the Explanation to

Section 7 of the Act which can be said to bring
within its ambit a suit of the nature as in the
present case, is Clause (d).

17. What is however significant in the present

case is that the husband of the petitioner is not
a party to the suit. The Kerala High Court has
had occasion to consider whether a suit to
which persons other than spouses are a party
would continue to be governed by the Family
Court Act or not. A Single Judge of the Kerala
High Court in Shyni v. George, AIR 1997
Kerala 231, held that merely because a
stranger to the marriage (in that case the
father-in-law) is also impleaded in the suit
along with the husband on the ground that the
property of the wife or a portion of it also has
been handed over to him would not take away
the suit from the purview of the Family Court. It
was further held that the jurisdiction of the
Family Court is not confined to proceedings by
one spouse against another and that so long as
the suit is of one spouse against the other, the
suit would be maintainable in the Family Court
even if for the purpose of seeking relief in
respect of the cause of action put forward in the
suit, the suing spouse is forced to implead
persons other than the other spouse or include
the close relatives of the other spouse. It was
further held that the cause of action if common
could not be permitted to be split up by filing a
suit against the husband in a Family Court and
against the father-in-law in the Civil Court.
However, in the same judgment, it was
observed that a suit for partition in which a
party to a marriage claims a share in the
property not only along with her husband or as
against her husband but also along with the
various other members of the joint family would
be totally different from a case where a wife
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 files a case for recovery of her exclusive
property against her husband and someone else
who is holding the property on her behalf like
the father-in-law in that case. On the aforesaid
reasoning,in Devaki Antharjanam v. Narayanan
Namboodiri, AIR 2007 Kerala 38, another
Bench of the Kerala High Court held that a suit
for partition in which not only the husband and
wife but their children were also parties did not
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Family Court and as such the decree in the suit
passed by the Civil Court could not be held to
be void. The reasoning was that the property
belongs not only to the parties to the marriage
but to others as well. It was further held that
where other parties to the suit are merely a
proforma party or a party with whom the money
or the property of the parties to the marriage or
either of them is entrusted or where the third
party claims through either or both the parties
to the marriage or a legal representative of a
party to a marriage or a person in possession of
property of the parties to the marriage,
notwithstanding such third party being party to
the suit, the exclusive jurisdiction to try the suit
would still be of the Family Court; however
where there is a sharer to the property other
than the parties to the marriage, such a sharer
could not be compelled to bring a suit for
partition before the Family Court merely
because the other sharers were married to each
other. However, a Division Bench of the Kerala
High Court in Joseph v. Mariutn Thomas,
MANU/KE/0034/2006, held that the claim of a
stranger over a property over which the wife
had a charge for her maintenance was not
required to be adjudicated in the Family Court.
It was held that Section 7 excludes the
jurisdiction of the civil Court only in certain
matters which are relating to proceedings
between parties to a marriage; however, the
claim of a total stranger could not be covered
by Section 7 of the Act.

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 18. A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court
in Rakhi v. Jayendra, MANU/MH/0799/2008,
has held that the Family Courts Act which is a
special legislation and creates a forum and
mechanism for beneficial and effective
enforcement of existing rights cannot be
construed to bring within its jurisdiction what
was not intended and expressed so. In that case
the suit filed by the father-in-law for an
injunction restraining the daughter-in-law from
entering the house which he claimed to be
belonging to him absolutely was held not
transferrable to the Family Court.

19. I respectfully agree with the Division Bench

of the Kerala High Court and the view
aforesaid of the Bombay High Court. The claim
of a third party to a marriage even if she be the
mother of one of the spouses cannot be
adjudicated before the Family Court and to the
prejudice, on the aspects noted hereinabove, as
to procedure, appeal, limitation, of such third
party. It may be noted that the
respondent/plaintiff in the present case is
claiming absolute title to the property not as the
representative or trustee of the husband of the
petitioner/defendant and/or through the
husband of the petitioner/defendant but in her
own capacity as the widow and nominee of her
deceased husband. It is also significant that
though the petitioner/defendant is admitted to
have been inducted into the suit premises owing
to the marriage with the son of the
respondent/plaintiff but that is not the cause of
action for the suit. The cause of action for the
suit is the refusal of the petitioner/defendant to
vacate the house of which the
respondent/plaintiff claims to be the exclusive
owner. Merely because certain facts leading to
the cause of action referred to the marital
relationship of the petitioner/defendant would
not make the suit as one in circumstances
arising out of a marital relationship. The
language of Clause (d) of Section 7 is peculiar.
The words “circumstances arising out of
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 marital relationship” do not qualify the words
“suit or proceeding” but qualify words “order
or injunction”. Thus, the order of injunction
sought from the Court has to be in
circumstances arising out of marital
relationship. The order sought in the present
case of eviction of the petitioner/defendant and
of recovery of mesne profits from the
petitioner/defendant does not arise out of a
marital relationship but arises out of exclusive
ownership claimed by the respondent/plaintiff
of the property and the occupation thereof by
the petitioner/defendant without authority
and/or after the authority has ceased.

xxxxx

22. I do not find any ambiguity or absurdity in

the view hereinabove taken. No case of
nullifying the-object of the statute is also found
to have been made out. The literal
interpretation does not permit the Family
Court to have exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit in the present case.”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. The judgment in Manita Khurana (supra) was relied upon and
followed by another learned Single Judge of this Court (Mukta Gupta,
J.) in Meena Kapoor (supra), wherein it was held as under:
“13. The facts of the present case are similar
to the facts in Manita Khurana Vs. Indra
Khurana (supra). In the present case, the
plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the
suit property having purchased the same by
way of a registered sale deed dated 29th
August, 2014 and seeks the relief of injunction
against the two defendants. Merely because
the two defendants are married and the
defendant No.1 has taken the plea that some
money in the purchase of the suit property and
the construction thereof was spent from the
earnings of defendant No.2 which plea of
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 defendant No.1 would be hit by the Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act,
2016, the relief in the present suit cannot be
said to be between the parties to the marriage
with respect to the property of the parties or
either of them.. Consequently, the preliminary
objection raised by the defendant No. 1 that
the present suit is not maintainable and should
be tried by Family Court is dismissed.”
(Emphasis supplied)

24. A reading of the above judgments would show that both the
judgments have held that where a suit seeking eviction/injunction is
filed by the mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law based on her
exclusive title to the property, the same cannot be said to be a suit ‘in
circumstances arising out of marital relationship’ to be tried
exclusively by a Family Court.
25. On the other hand, in Avneet Kaur (supra) (authored by C.
Hari Shankar, J.), the learned Single Judge of this Court has
interpreted Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act,
observing and holding as under:
“21. Unquestionably, the dispute in this case
revolves around Clause (d) of explanation to
Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act. A mere
glance at the provision indicates that it has
been worded in careful and cautious terms. It
states that a suit or proceeding for an order or
injunction in circumstances arising out of a
marital relationship would lie exclusively
before the Family Court.
22. What has to be seen is whether the
circumstances in which the order or injunction
is sought in the present case arise out of a
marital relationship. The test is not whether
the cause of action, forming the basis of the
prayer for injunction, arises out of a marital
relationship or whether the marital
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 relationship is the reason for the grievance
ventilated by the plaintiff. All that has to been
seen are the circumstances in which the
injunction is sought. Once the Court identifies
the circumstances, if those circumstances arise
out of a marital relationship, Clause (d) of the
Explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family
Courts Act would ipso facto be attracted.
23. Explanation (d) in Section 7 (1) of the
Family Courts Act does not, either expressly
or by necessary implication, require the
parties to the lis to be husband and wife.
Clearly, in so opining, the learned SCJ has
effectively re-written the statutory provision.
There is nothing in Clause (d) of the
explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family
Courts Act in which indicates that the clause
would apply only where the litigation is
between husband and wife. For the clause to
apply, all that is required is that (i) there is a
marital relationship, (ii) the martial
relationship has resulted in a certain set of
circumstances and (iii) the order or injunction
which is sought in the suit is sought in those
circumstances.
24. Applying these tests to the case at hand,
if one examines the plaint, and the case set up
by the respondents in the plaint, it is clear that
the circumstances in which injunction has
been sought by them have arisen out of the
marital relationship between the petitioner
and Pardip. Had the petitioner not married
Pardip, she would never had been the
daughter-in-law of the respondents, she would
never had come to stay in the residence of the
respondents, the respondents would never had
given her any permissive licence to reside
therein, and the entire chiaroscuro of events,
which have been emphasised in the plaint by
the plaintiffs, to highlight the alleged ignominy
and persecution to which petitioner allegedly
subjected the respondents, would not be in
existence. The fact that the petitioner married
the respondents’ son was the foundation of the
relationship that emerged between the
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 petitioner and the respondents, and it was in
the circumstances which arouse out of that
relationship that the entire dispute between the
respondents and the petitioner, as per the
allegations contained in the plaint, filed by the
respondents, arose.
25. The words “arising out of” have been
held, by the Supreme Court, in several
decisions, to be words of wide amplitude. One
may refer, in this context, to the judgments of
the Supreme Court in Renusagar Power
Company Ltd. v. General Electric Co.,
Dhanrajmal Govindram v. Shamji Kalidas
and Doypack Systems Ltd. v. Union of India.
In State of Orissa v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
the Supreme Court held that the expression
“arising out of” is wider in scope than the
expression “arising under” and would include
maters not only “arising under” but also
matters “connected with” the instrument
under consideration in that case.
26. Applying the understanding of the
expression “arising out of” as contained in the
afore cited decisions of the Supreme Court, it
is clear that the circumstances in which the
allegedly offending acts of the petitioner,
against the respondents, from which the entire
dispute in the suit filed by the respondents
against the petitioner germinated, arose out of
the marital relationship between the petitioner
and the respondent.
27. I deem it necessary to emphasize, in this
context, that Clause (d) of the explanation to
Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act does not
envisage a causal relationship, i.e. a
relationship of cause and effect, between the
marital relationship and the circumstances in
which injunction was sought. All that is
required is that the circumstances in which
injunction was sought arose out of the marital
relationship. A holistic reading of the case set
up by the respondents against the plaintiff in
suit 12114/2016 clearly indicates that the
circumstances in which injunction was sought
by the respondents against the petitioner did
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 arise out of the marital relationship between
the petitioner and Pardip, the son of the
respondents.
28. That being so, in my view, the case
squarely falls within Clause (d) of the
explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family
Courts Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)

26. I must, at the outset, note that in Avneet Kaur (supra) the
attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to the earlier
judgments of this Court in Manita Khurana (supra) and Meena
Kapoor (supra). The learned Single Judge, therefore, observed that the
petition raised an issue which is to a large extent res integra.
27. A reading of the above judgments would show that there is an
apparent conflict of opinion between Manita Khurana (supra) and
Meena Kapoor (supra) on one hand and Avneet Kaur (supra) on the
other, on the interpretation, ambit and the scope of Explanation (d) of
Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. While in Manita Khurana
(supra) and Meena Kapoor (supra), the learned Single Judge(s) of this
Court have held that the claim of a third party to a marriage, even if
she be the mother of one of the spouses, cannot be adjudicated before
the Family Court, and that the Suit seeking eviction based on title to
the Suit property would be maintainable, in Avneet Kaur (supra), the
learned Single Judge has held that such a Suit would not be
maintainable as the foundation of the dispute is the marriage.
28. In Sabina Sahdev & Ors. v. Vidur Sahdev, (order dated
07.03.2018 passed in CRL M.C. No. 878/2018), a learned Single
Judge of this Court, faced with a similar situation of conflicting
opinions of two Benches of Co-equal strength on the issue of interim
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 maintenance to a wife under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, relying on Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
Community (supra), placed the issue before Hon’ble the Acting Chief
Justice to, in turn, place the same before a Larger Bench for settling
the issue. The same course had been adopted by the Supreme Court in
O.M. Bhargava (Dead) by LRs v. Satyavati Bhargava and Others,
(1994) 4 SCC 662, when confronted with contradictory views taken
by two Benches of co-equal strength.
29. In view of the above, I deem it appropriate to adopt the same
course in the present application. I am further persuaded to adopt this
course by the fact and the submission of the learned counsels for the
parties that there are many suits pending before this Court and before
the learned District Courts which would involve similar question of
jurisdiction and, therefore, it would be in the interest of justice that
this issue is authoritatively decided by a Larger Bench.
30. The following issues are framed for consideration of Hon’ble
the Chief Justice if these are to be referred for determination by a
larger Bench:-
ISSUES
(a) Whether a suit for possession/injunction filed by the in-
laws of the defendant or either of them, claiming themselves or
either of them to be the exclusive owner of the property of
which the possession is sought or with respect to which
injunction is prayed for from or against the defendant/daughter-
in-law, is to be tried exclusively by the Family Court

Signature Not Verified

Digitally Signed By:SUNIL
Signing Date:03.06.2023
16:29:35 CS(OS) 601/2022 Page 17 of 18
 established under the Family Courts Act, and the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court is barred?
(b) Whether the impleadment or non-impleadment of the
husband of the defendant/son of the plaintiff has any effect on
the maintainability of such a suit before a Civil Court?

31. The Registry is directed to place the matter before Hon’ble the
Chief Justice for appropriate directions, at the earliest.
32. List the application for further orders on 25th August, 2023.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
JUNE 01, 2023
RN/Anuj/DJ

Signature Not Verified

Digitally Signed By:SUNIL
Signing Date:03.06.2023
16:29:35 CS(OS) 601/2022 Page 18 of 18