JUDGE COMPILED

/// good faith Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt

motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.18 17 Balsamo v. Judge Suan 458 Phil. 11 (2003).
18
Id. at 23, citing Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000); Rallos
v. Gako, Jr., 385 Phil. 4 (2000).); Calleja v. Santelices, 384 Phil.
595 (2000); Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176 (1995).
/// Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that
respondent judge erred in issuing the questioned order, he
cannot be held liable for his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith.33 A Castaños v.
Escaño, Jr., 251 SCRA 174 (1995).
ORAL////// is administratively indicted for gross ignorance of
the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for
acquitting the accused who was charged before his court with
acts of lasciviousness. Parenthetically, respondent is not
accused of rendering an erroneous judgment spawned in bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption; much less is immorality
imputed to him.
//// At that time, complainant had plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies available to him under the rules. He could have filed a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari from the
Order of denial dated March 17, 2004 but he did not. What
complainant failed to do as a judicial remedy, he cannot revive
through an administrative complaint against these court
employees. It bears pointing out that it was only on August 26,
2008 or more than four years since the Order of March 17,
2004 was issued when the complainant unfairly turned his ire
on these innocent and helpless respondents by wrongly
accusing them in this administrative case.
Clearly, this is a frivolous and baseless complaint. The
respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously performing
their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as
provided by the Rules. Complainant apparently filed this
complaint primarily to divert the attention of his client from his
shortcomings as its counsel, if not to simply harass the
respondents. At this juncture, the Court finds it worth quoting
again the conclusion of the Investigating Justice Lazaro-Javier,
to wit:
Complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against
respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The
evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his
cause, showed that it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his
duties to his client and to the court, as well. The evidence
likewise showed that contrary to complainant’s accusation,
respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules,
and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession
or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure.1âwphi1 Verily,
complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and
mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this
unnecessary battle. Precious time, energy and expense were
wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for
some other lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public
service. [Emphases supplied

34
As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to disciplinary
action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that
they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives,
or improper considerations.3535 Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad,
395 Phil. 352, 365 (2000), citing Guerrero v. Villamor, 296 SCRA
88 (1998).
The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the
higher courts. The filing of an administrative case against the
judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies
provided by law, neither is it complementary or supplementary
to such actions.36 36 Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236,
July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 27, 42 citing Bello v. Diaz, 459 Phil. 214
(2003) With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v.
Abesamis3737 341 Phil. 299 (1997). is instructive:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies
against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against
errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or
in construction or application of procedural or substantive law
or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character
(i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or
neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition,
a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
/She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the
rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that
does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints
were premature because judicial remedies were still available//
…… She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature
since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the
respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the
complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
There is no dispute that Bote, at the time of the incident, was a
municipal mayor—a government official. However, the records
are bereft of any indication that, during the incident, he was
acting as such, or on behalf of or upon authority of the State.
Indeed, as factually found by the CA, Bote was acting as
a private individual or in his personal capacity, and the incident
arose from a private dispute between Bote and SPCPI involving
a private property. While his wrongful acts may give rise to
criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities at the same time,
each must be determined in accordance with applicable law.
However, there is no proof that the error was attributable to a
conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice (In
re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA
107, 119). "As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous" (48 C.J.S. 974).
/ If for every error of a judge — although we do not find any in
the case of respondent — he should be punished, then perhaps
no judge, however good, competent and dedicated he may be,
can ever hope to retire from the judicial service without a
tarnished image. Somehow along the way he may commit
mistakes, however honest. This does not exclude members of
appellate courts who are not always in agreement in their
views. Any one belonging to the minority opinion may generally
be considered in error, and yet, he is not punished because
each one is entitled to express himself. This privilege should
extend to trial judges so long as the error is not motivated by
fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or any other evil motive. /// DE
LA CRUZ et.al. vs. JUDGE CONCEPCION, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan,A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 August 25,
1994
////////On respondent judge’s close friendship with Santos,
such fact did not render respondent judge guilty of violating
any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with
Santos did not influence his official conduct as a judge in the
cases where Santos was a party.41 Complainant failed to present
any convincing proof that respondent judge gave any undue
privileges in his court to Santos, or that Santos benefited from
his personal relations with respondent judge, or that
respondent judge used his influence, if any, to favor Santos.
However, it would have been more prudent if respondent judge
avoided hearing the cases where Santos was a party because
their close friendship could reasonably tend to raise suspicion
that respondent judge’s social relationship with Santos would
be an element in his determination of the cases of
Santos.42 This may erode the trust of the litigants in respondent
judge’s impartiality and eventually, undermine the people’s
faith in the administration of justice.43 Judges must not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his
fairness, impartiality and integrity.44
LONGYEARS ////She further claimed, among others, that in her
long years of government service, she had performed her
duties with utmost responsibility and efficiency, guided by the
principle that "public office is a public trust;" that in her entire
service, it was the first time that she was charged with an
administrative offense which was obviously motivated by
personal ire; and that as she was nearing her mandatory
retirement age, she would not risk her long years of
government service by peddling a bribe from a party in a case
////By parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring
that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot
likewise be given effect.
MISCONDUCT/// The Court, however, agrees with the
Investigating Judge that the act committed by Mabalot cannot
be considered as "misconduct," not being related to the
discharge of her official functions. There is no proof that her act
of threatening Judge Bueaventura through words and text
messages were related to, or performed by taking advantage
of, her position as Branch CoC. In administrative proceedings,
the burden of proving the acts complained of, particularly the
relation to the official functions of the public officer, rests on
the complainant.32 In this regard, Judge Buenaventura failed to
prove such relation. The Investigating Judge was, therefore,
correct in concluding that Mabalot acted in her private
capacity. Thus, she cannot be held liable for misconduct, much
less for gross misconduct.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of his
official duties.20 Judge Buenaventura v. Mabalot, A. M. Nos. P-
09-2726 & P-10-2884, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 1, 17, citing
Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, A.M. No. P-10-2788,
January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 633, 638.
20
Id. at 16.
Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against
Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his
class discussions, they cannot be considered as "misconduct."
They are simply not related to the discharge of his official
functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable
for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
///avbuse "'Abuse' means 'to make excessive or improper use
of a thing, or to employ it in a manner contrary to the natural
or legal rules for its use. To make an extravagant or excessive
use, as to abuse one's authority' (Black's Law Dictionary Fifth
Ed., p. 11). It includes 'misuse' (City of Baltimore v.
Cornellsville & S.P. Ry, Co., 6 Phils. 190, 191, 3 Pitt 20, 23). The
word 'grave', as modifier in 'grave abuse of discretion' which
is akin to 'grave abuse of authority' means 'wanton and
capricious' (Caoile vs. Puno, SP-0022, June 19, 1971, cited in
Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, p. 270).

"'Grave abuse of authority' may thus, be defined as the use or

misuse of one's authority in a wantonly and capriciously
excessive or extravagant manner contrary to the natural or
legal rules for its use.