7 ir for writing is highlighted by critical analysis of decisions of the Supreme Court. ‘The structure of the text of each chapter of the book outlines the general rules and exceptions in Statutory Construction in 2 reader-friendly format. Professor Pilares has made it convenient properly initiated into these rules. Professors of ind the book as an excellent guide in developing class in Statutory Construction. Finally, legal ef find comfort in the neatly woven development of jurisprudence discussed by the author for every rule and concept on the subject. I commend Professor Pilates for having taken up my challenge for him to see this academic project to its logical conclusion, He hhas made the Ateneo Law School proud of this work. I continue to pressure him to pursue his next home-grown academic endeavors. Sedfrey M. Candelaria ‘Doan, Ateneo Law School (2012-2018)FOREWORD Statutory Construction as a field of study in law is an essential cross-cutting tool in judieial decision-making and legal advocacy Professor Ricardo M. Pilares If has provided learners in ‘clearly defined methed and approach in studying and Statutory Construction through the priam of established law. His flair for writing is highlighted by critical analysis of decisions of the Supreme Court. ‘The structure of the text of each chapter of the book outlines the general rules and exceptions in Statutory Construction in @ reader-friendly format. Professor Pilares has made it convenient for students to be properly initiated into these rules. Professors of ily find the book as an excellent guide in developing thy ji for a class in Statutory Construction. Finally, legal researchers will definitely find comfort in the neatly woven development of jurisprudence discussed by the author for every rule and concept on the subject: 1 commend Professor Pilares for having taken up my challenge for him to see this academic project to its logical conclusion. He thas made the Ateneo Law School proud of this work. I continue to pressure him to pursue his next home-grown academic endeavors. Sedfrey M. Candelaria Dean, Ateneo Law School (2012-2018)PREFACE Thave been teaching Statutory Construction in Ateneo Law ‘School since 2008. ‘This gave me an opportunity to study the subject ‘matter more deeply and develop an outline that can help first year ny students understand the subject, and also help lawyers, judges and members of the law academe in their practice of the profession. I have always believed Statutory Construction is a very interesting subject that entails a lot of subject the interpretation of written words, resulting somet unpredictability in how eaees are decided by the Courts, At the same time, Statutory Construction is a very powerful tool, as historical landmark cases more often than not, are decided on the ‘Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and the laws. The interpretation of statutes using different principles or rules of construction can sometimes result in different, and sometimes, contradictory, meanings. As law practitioners, we should embrace this unpredictability and power, because we are, after all, advocates, Tt took me several years to finish writing this book, as work, teaching and family commitments have taken over my time. Fortunately, I have a very inspiring wife, Atty. Richie Ramos- Pilares, who convinced me to find time to complete this project. [am also very fortunate to be supported by former Ateneo Law School ‘Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, who dedicated resources from the Ateneo ‘Law School for this undertaking, and who kept on asking me how I am doing with this book. For the greater glory of God. Ricardo M. Pilares IIICONTENTS CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1. Def Cha 3. Purpose. ‘Theories of Interpretati CHAPTER II: SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION ‘Subject of Construction; Types of Laws... 1 i i - 2 a, 4. Implementing Rules 5. Ordinances... Parts of a Statute. 1 2 3. Enacting Clause. 4 Body... : 5. Headnotes and Epi 6. % & — Bffectivity Clause. CHAPTER IIL: VERBA LEGIS AND RATIO LEGIS; ‘MEANING AND INTENT InBOO CHAPTER IV: PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION General Principles of Construction... 1. Law Construed as a Whole... 2 Presui 4, Construction to Render Provisions Effectiv Legislative Policies and Preeumpii 1. Penal Laws. Prescriptive Periods .. Constitutional Construction a. Framework i b. Self-Executing vs. Non Self-Executing Provisions... Beengmaer Administrative Construction CHAPTER V: CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES IN A STATUTE, Construction of Contents of a Statut and Phrases; Punctuation . General Words Construed General 5, Punctuation Marks... 6. Use of Specific Words. And/Or 148 148 192 156 159 162 162 169 175 176 E> pp one e. Exceptions f Periods g Plural Words and Singular Word: ‘Association and Relationship of Words, Phrases and Provisions... Noscitur a Sociis... jusdem Generis... Express Mention and Implied Bxclusion CHAPTER VI: EXTRINSIC AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION 2 Legislative 3. Contemporaneous Circumstances. 4, Legislative Practice; Reference to Other Statute: Statutes Borrowed from Foreign Jurisdictions. 6. Preference .. CHAPTER VII: CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICTING PROVISIONS: Statutes In Pari Materia. Rules on Resolving Statut in Pari Mat 1. Special Law versus General Law. 2. Substantive Law versus Procedural Law... 3. Earlier Law versus Later Law; Amendment and Repeal .. CHAPTER VIII: PROSPECTIVITY AND RETROACTIVITY Prospective and Retroactive Laws in General Prospectivity of Law: Retroactivity of Statutes 236 243 243 251 255D. Prospect 1p and Retrontvty of Jui Dessione CHAPTER IX: INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS ) ‘A. Background |. Definition I, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution vests judicial Supreme Court and such other courts established by ‘oversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been fave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess af jurisdiction Itis defined as“ jurisdietion.”" ‘The exercise by the courts of judicial power in resolving actual controversies often times requires the construction of statutes as ‘meaning and intention of the authors of the law :pplication to a given case, where that intention sgiven case is not explicitly provided for in the law.” This case involves the interpretation of Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code, which classifies as non-mailable written or printed matter containing information concerning, among others, “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme." Caltex promoted a contest where CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION |2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES Darticipants were to that a hooded gas pu 2, Characteristics of Construction Based on the definition provided by the Court in Caltex, statutory construction may be broken down into the following characteristics: ¥ Court of Apveuls, G.R, No. 73418, 8 ——_ CHAPTER. INTRODUCTION a he logialature, lends itselfto subjectivity For example, one rule of construction is called the doctrine of last antecedent. Under this doctrine, qualifying words or phrases the period of publ provision, In Philippine American Drug Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,” the question raised before the court is whether or not the premium on the dollar charged by the bank of the petitioner- importer for the purchase of foreign exchange should be included in the computation of the advance sales tax for landed cost of the oods imported by the petitioner. Tho logal provision involved is Section 183@) of the then Tax Code, which provides in the percentage tax for imported goods shall be paid in adi of foreign exchange should not be considered as a “similar charge” 8 contemplated under Section 183(B) of the Tax Code invoking ejusdem generis, because the bank charge is not similar to the charges specifically enumerated in the provision. The Court disagreed with Court farther held that the doctrine of usdem generis is le of construction adopted as an aid to ascertain and give cffect to legislative intent but that the same “should not be given Ota Gazeta orn a newopancr of general citelaion nthe Philppioos in otherwise provided.” "GR, No, 1.18032, 31 August 1980.‘ STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES such wide application that would oper feat. the purpose of the law.” These eases show that the mero fact that the words of the statute are organized in a manner contemplated by a rule of construction does not automatically mean that such rule should be applied ‘The canons of construction should he considered as a rules of construction which are neither universal nor con¢ in application. Thus, “[ilt should be applied only a8 a means of fent which is not otherwise manifest and the legislature.” Theoretically, the question before requires the interpretation of a statute is vel, determining legislative intent ‘means that a judge must determine, among other things, whether hhe or she should rely on the literal import of the law as written or whether to rely on canons of construction and go beyond the written text. The rule is that construction is not necessary when the law is clear. However, determining whether a law is clear or not by itself could be a complicated process, There are several tests in determining whether a provision of a law is clear or ambiguous, all of which requires a certain degree of judgment and subjectivity. Once ambiguity is established, it will then be up to the judge to ascertain which canon of construction should be used in order to determine legislative intent. As shown in the Phi Drug Co, decision, a canon of construction is not conclusive simply because the words used in the statute, or the syntax of the provision, calls for the application of the same. In fact, using different canons of construction can result in different interpretations. The challenge, ‘therefore, is to convince the court that the canon used i the conclusion is the correct evidence of legislative intent, ‘It is @ mistake to assume that the judiciary has a ing and consistent theory of construction. However, tent objective and purpose of construction, which i the deternina ion o i purpose varies, and an advocate should be mindful of this reality." ‘Primero . Cour ofA wi peal, GAR, Noe. L-48468 to 48460, 22 November 1088 ell, Mastoring Statutory Interpretation (2nd Fal), 2013, CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION 5 6. It Involves the Deter ‘The primary effect to the inte tion of Legislative Intent is to ascertain and give of the legislature." The determination of legislative intent is the primary consideration."* In Senarillos v. Hermosisima,'* the Court held that the judicial interpretation of statutes constitutes part of the law as of the date the law was pasted, since said construction merely establishes the ive intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. Thus, intended by the legislature in enacting the same. In Torres v. Limjap, "tho Court, quoting Sutherland, legislative intent as the vital part and essence of the law, to {In the interpretation and construction of a statute the intent of the law-maker should always be ascertained part, the essence of the and the primary rule of construction is to Jin and give effect to that intent, The law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent ‘with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper TiPeople v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 19190, 26 November 1922. ‘pafiada y, Yulo, GR. No. 48575, 91 May 1535. 8G,R. No. 172400, 4 February 2008, "%G.R, No, 84385, 21 September 1981.8 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES course is to start out and follow the true intent h harmonizes best with the conte! objects of the legislature, (Vol. Statutory Construction, pp. In Araneta v. Dinglasan,)* the Court held be tested according to its results, that is, the Jaw in question must be sought for in its nature, tl be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and to the Constitution. The question whether the executive orders issue mmmonwealth Act No. 671 conned have any of eft tat the ext of C.A. 671 does not have an expiration date as to its effectivity (and thus, necessitating a new repealing law). The court held that since Article VI of the Constitution already provides that the law that may be passed by thorizing the President to carry out a declared national 18 of war or national emergency shall bbe “for a limited period,” there is no need for a separate repealing Jaw, since by its nature, a law intended to address an emergency, such as C.A. 671 must be temporary in nature and that it was approved with t in vi c. It Is Necessary When the Legislative Intent Cannot Be Readily Ascertained fram the Words Used in the Law as Applied under a Set of Facts. Acursory readingof the ruling in Caltex may lead to. eon¢ that courts need to construe the provisions of the law at all as long as a party to a case raises an issue on the aj law in a given case. This reading is contrary to a long line of eases wherein the Supreme Court consistently held that where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction but only application.” In fact, this is considered as the eardinal rule, In one case, the court held: "he > TnlaG N.94986, 2 eptame 18, o ‘No. 1-2044, 26 August 1949, ” = st Coat el No the Fiipone Corot opens ie 8; ity Bank and Trust Comy te ned Pa in anastasia 1426, 28 Murch 1989; Republic of 8. 103862 and 105276, 25 November Regional Trial Cour, a ining Company, Inc, etal, v, dela Ross, CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION 7 Acardinal rule in statutory construction is that when. is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, no room for construction is only room for application. meaning and applied ‘This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index anim! sermo, or ‘speech is the index of intention.’ Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or ‘from the words of a statute there should be no departure.” he Court held that “it is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and whore there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction.” Furthermore, in People v. Mopa,* the Supreme Court held that its first and fundamental duty is to apply the law. The court further held that “(cJonstruction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.” From these only if it is literal application of the law is either impossible or inadequate. The burden then is on the party arguing for the need to go beyond the literal meaning of the words used in a statute and construethe samein order todetermine its applicability under a given set of circumstances. In Caltex, therefore, the court was convinced by Petitioner's arguments why it is necessary to determine whether the promotional scheme falls within the prohibitory provision of Section 1084 of the Revised Administrative Code in view of the uncertainty of its applicability under the circumstances therein. Construction is necessary only if the law is ambiguous. Thus, “the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.” A statute **Bolosv. Bolos, G.R. No, 186400, 20 October 2010. 29 Jenuary 1999, 30 August 1967. lies supplied. *Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nieclas, oeos Norts, G.R, No. L:34568, 28 March 1988,8 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES is said to be ambiguous whon “it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either two Ot more sensen."» In one case where the accused claims that as a lessee of 9 Fishpond dae er adinanc hich require ny owner or manager of ishponda’ to pay a municipal tax, the Supre Court held that the ordinance is not perfectly vague as to peavan application and held that the accused is eovered by the ordinance, a lessee can be considered as a manager. The court further held that the test to determine whether a comprehensible standards that “men of common nnocescarily guess at ite meaning and differ a intend an a The courts must ascertain ofa statute is of Teter would lead It cannot be presumed that lat courts should construe laws as to avoid the true meaning of a statute “where the languay deubetal meaning, or where adherence to the str injustice, absurdity or contradictory provisions, since an ambigui calling for construction may arise when the consequence of « eral interpretation of the language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable of mischievous result, ar one at variance with the policy of the legislation as @ whole; and the real meaning of the statute is to be ;red, even though it seems to conflict with the ‘Supreme Court held that .» will operate unjustly or lead to absurd results, the evident meaning of the law should be rojected. Based on the foregcin determining whether a sta construction: 129%, 28 November 2000, 1 Auuat ly 204 1988, Sse ato Romualder v Nel 106077, 23 July 1989 (iting 82 C38 680. Pople v. Na Sandiganbayan, Spee v Mende (CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION Je or inadequate is impos! When literal appli (fest of Impo: 5. When # Tiveral interpretation of siatute leads to 90 wre abeurd, unreasonable OF Hee res oF unjeetMpriance with the policy of the Meee) one a vert of absurdity or Unreasonablencss' 4. It Isa Judicial Function under the jn MeCulloch Dick the court held that sige ape he duty and ultimate power t0 just as the Philippine system of government, the & eaipme the laws is vested in the judicia} department Guty and ultimate power to legislate ‘Tho case of Endenciav. David isillustrative, This case involves the constitulionality of Section 13 of R.A. No. 090 which subjects to roe eee tax the salaries of judicial officers. Prier te Endencia, the Supreme Court held in Perfecto v. Meer that pursuant to Section 9, “Article VILL of the 1935 Constit judicial officers are exempt salaries, on the ground that from the payment of income on # tune hon and collection of income tax constitutes a desresse Pio oftheir salaries during their term of office, which is prohibited under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1985 Constitution. eeeaine of the courts ruling in Perfecto, Congress enacted RA. Na 590, Section 13 of which provides that “[alo salary wherever waived by any publie officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is herehy declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution oF by law." In Endencia, the Supreme Court struck down this provision of R.A. No. 590 and hele: [As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto cave that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,1% in that decis authorize a1 Be nae nike wey 4 the collection of income tax on Republic Act No. 590: ape Mgosivetioa 2:op SEC. 13. No salary wherever received Y Public officer of the Rep pines shall be considered my lere pt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a dimi compensation Fixed by the Con ‘no salary wherever received by an : any public Republic aatually inducing Soda e considered as exempt from the inco proceeds to declare that payment af ad income : ‘of his compensation. Can Leglalature validly do this? May the Legislature ecrhcts declare the collection of income tax on the salary of & Public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrosee of his salary, after the Supreme Court has fied an hhave to go back to the fundamental principles regan, separation of powers. me ‘Under our system of constitutional government, eonet nment, the Legislative department is assigned the’ power cee a lan. The Executive departaone yo ake with the execution or cat Jaws, But the interpretation and a bolong exclusively to the Ju Pathority to interpret and apply the laws extends Ganotitution. Before the courts CBN determing where, ra ON | (CHAPTER |. INTRODUCTION will have to interpret and id law, but also of the law is constitutional oF not, ascertain the meaning not onl a pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide Whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there ia, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. Whenitisclear that a statute transeresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts: to declare the act unconstitutional because ‘annot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing: and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the eourts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course ‘wouldlead to the destructionof the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggesti political ay of the judi Under the American system of constitu- tional government, among the most important functions intrusted to the judiciary are the in- terpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely conneeted power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. By legislative fiat as enunciated in Section 13, ‘Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation, that action might be taken by cies in disregard of the judgment tribunals.sTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES ear example of interpretation meaning of the phrase ‘which s during their continuance in office,’ found in 3, ‘Aptile VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of erpreting the Constitution ‘The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ‘The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates 2 constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an atta: in the courts, by a declaration that gislature under our task and the power to hem. This is find instability inj Under w i (CHAPTER |. INTRODUCTION constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers." that statutory construction ot preclude Congress from ‘enacting curative legislations. In fact, R.A. No. 590 in the Endencia ‘an be considered as a curative legislation. The court, however, rruled that R.A. No. 590 conflicts with a provision of the Constitution providing for the non-diminution of the salaries of judicial officers. Under the principle of hicrarchy of laws, R.A. No. 590 is void as it ‘with the provision of the Constitution, which is supreme Purthermore, the contemporaneous construction agencies tasked with the implementation of the same is highly per- .e Supreme Court held that “the principle that the construction of a statute by the executive officers Jhose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great ordinarily control and construction of statutes 80 firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no by the courts, is authorities need be cited to support it.”® In Laxamana v. Baltazar,* the question before the Court pertains to the reconciliation of Sec- tion 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code. The issue arose after the mayor of Sex- consent of the provincial board, and invok- ing the Revised Blection Code, appointed Jose Laxamana as mayor. Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC. 2195. — Temporary disability of mayor. — Upon the occasion of the absence, suspension, or other of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general electionsraTuTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES 2 rl is a clear example of interprotation or ascerts the meaning of the phrase ‘whic! the vce, This act of interpreting the Con: y part thereof by the Legislature is an defined and established province and j of the Judiciary. ‘The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, ‘or act declaratory of what the law its passage, s0 as to any binding weight with the courts. A of its meaning as used else the legislature would be usurping @ judici function in defining o term. ‘The legislature cannot, upon passing a Jaw which violates a constitutional provision, We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is ‘more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere specific portion of after the courts have 7 by interpretation and applied itn a decisio: surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a eysem, a final court determination of a Gata Suda interpretation of the law oof 1¢ Constitution may be undermined or ev. by aaubeoquent and diferent ntorpetaion ofthe la Constitution by the Legislative department. neither wiee nor desirable, besides being ive of the fundamental principles of our (CHAPTER [. INTRODUCTION constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.” tutory construction not preclude Congress from mms. In fact, R.A. No, 590 in the Endencia curative legislation. The court, however, ruled that R.A. No, 590 conflicts with a provision of the Constitution providing for the non-diminution of the salaries of jt fficers. Under the principle of hierarchy of laws, R.A. No. conflicts with the provision of the Constitution, which is supreme over all laws. Furthermore, the contemporaneous construction of laws by agencies tasked with the implement suasive.” Thus, the Supreme Court held that “the princi contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control and construction of statutes by the courts, is 90 firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.” In Laxamana v. Baltazar, the question before the Court pertains to the reconciliation of Sec- tion 2199 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code. The issue arose after the mayor of Sex- moan, Pampanga, was suspended. The vice mayor, pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code, assumed office. However, the provin- cial governcr, with the consent of the provincial board, and invok- ing the Revised Election Code, appointed Jose Laxamana as mayor. Soction 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC, 2195, — Temporary disability of mayor. — Upon the oceasion of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice- ‘Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes. Wiindencia v. David, G.R, Nos. -6355-56, 31 August 1958. (itations omitted) Lim Hoo Ting v. Central Bank of the Philipines, G.R, No, 1-10668, 244 STATUTORY CONS On the other hand, Section 21(a) of the Revised Blection Code Secretary of the Department of sion of provincial held that in case of suspension or disability of the mayor. the viee mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the office ofthe mayor, and if the vice mayor {s unavailable, the office shall be discharged by the first councilor. “wihlere a statute has received a interpretation and the statute as ‘practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily roceives, and ix regarded as retation of the law.” Furthermore, ihe rule x x x is based upon the theory that the legislature is ous interpretation of a statute, 'y an administrative body or executive officers 1 oF enforcing the law, and rpretation upon re-enactment.” statutes do not enjoy the yreme Court, which interpreted is re-enacted, presumptively the correct in ‘a bureau head could not operate ial netion hecause a CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 16 ration is the determination jes or maxims a8 to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law." Under the principle of effectivenoss, “a statute must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute." The purpose of construction is to discover the intention of the law, and not to ereate doubt. In City of Baguio v. Naga,” the Court held ‘Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws, It is thus not difficult to stray away from the true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind goal we seek. The office of statutory interpretation, words of a well-known authority, ‘the true interpretation is to ascertain the meaning terpretat ‘hey ‘are only valuable when they subserve ‘this purpose.’ In fact, ‘the spirit or intention of a statute the letter thereof.’ A statute ‘should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding. sseary, the letter of the law.’ By this, we do not ‘correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry ‘out and give due course to’ its true intent.” 4. Theories of Interpretation ‘Thoro are varying theories in statutory interpretation. Some of these theories are discussed below. Firet, under the textualist theory, or originalism, the words uused in the statute takes preceden is because their main GR, Neo 1.28100, 28 February 1980.“STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES 6 ‘ve insufficient. Moderate text vefor to extrinsic eourees as a means to confirm and verify the pla meaning of interprotation. The strength of the plain meaning ru lies on its simplicity. Its strength, however, also gives rise to weakness, that is, words often do not mean the same to everyone. Furthermore, there is a false belief that Tanguage has intrinsic meaning. Language evolves, and the meaning of words evolves ‘Second, intentionalism or originalism, focuses on le intent “in the fand} elected, represent tbody choose of meaning are found to jonalism doos not require the establishment of ic sources of construction, the original intent have primacy in the determination ofits meaning. Greater emphasis is placed on the original intent of the drafters of the law and this requires a review of legislative history and legislative deliberations. ‘The main strength of this approach lies on its consistency with the objective of constructi oquires the court to inquire into the lature who wrote the law. However, its this book, the Philippines, iduals coming from different backgrounds and with ions. ‘The Supreme Court even recognized that iable source ofinterpretation n of but a few members of ly participated in the deliberation of a law, and cessarily shared by the other members ic application of intentionalist e between general legislative intent and |. The former refers to the general intention ‘whole, while the latter rofers to the jslature in writing a specific section ot watntute. Intentionalism, which at its extreme focuses LN (CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION in the sense that on epecific legislative intent, could be mislead intention that the it fails to view the statute in light of the legislature intended in the statute as 2 w! ‘The third theory, purposivism or the legal process theory, focuses on determining the problem that the legislature is seeking to address." Thus, interpretation is made with a view to the public poliey that the statute seeks to advance. Philippine Supreme Court decisions shows that we do not adopt a single, unitary theory of construction. It may be rgued that while our Courts are moderate textualists in theory, in focusing on the plain meaning theory of construction, they are, on the other hand, intentionalists and purposivists in approach. This je evidenced by the fact that while the Court prioritizes the plain meaning rule as the objective manifestation of legislative intent, the Court has not hesitated to state that if the language of the statute th its epirit or ratio legis, then the latter should prevail, While this could lead to some degree of inconsistency in jurisprudence, the fact that our legal system does not adopt a single theory of construction gives the Courts flexibility in advancing its interpretation of a statute. An analysis of is inconsistent B. Related Legal Principles |A study of the subject of statutory construction requires an understanding of some basic legal prineiples discussed below. 1. Separation of Powers ‘The government consists of three great branches, the executive, legislative, and the judiciary. ‘The relationship among these three great branches is governed by certain constitutional principles, including the principles of sey of powers and checks and balances. The court deseribed t jonship in Angare v. Electoral Commission, ** thus: ‘The separation of powers is a fundamental principle inoursystem of government. [tobtainsnot through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each “elim, Mastering Statutory Interpretation (nd Bd), 2013. aid. ‘Sethe, Mastering Statutory Intonpretation (2nd Fa), 2013, GR. No. 45081, 15 uly 1990 PoSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND GASRS: department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its ‘own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the thre s are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. xx x But in the mai with deft strokes the executive, the le of the governmet functions and however, sometimes makes one leaves off and the other begins. In i itement, the great landmarks to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which ean be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. ‘As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and ty, but as much a3 it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression o wvereignty however limited, has tatablished a republican government intended to operate ‘and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of Ghecks and balances, and subject to specific limitations Gnd restrictions provided in the said instrument, The mn gets forth yf governme’ jatribution of powers would be mere verk CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in ur Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express Constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not {0 speak of its historical origin and development there, hhas been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period ct more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this ng power is granted, if not expressly, by clear mm from [Slection 2 of [Alrticle VIII of our ‘The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope ‘and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary a3 the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to ional boundaries, it does not assert any rriority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed Judicial supremacy’ which properly is the power of judicial review ‘under the Constitution. ven then, this power of judicial ited to actual cases and controversies to x after full opportunity of argument by the ‘and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice oF expedieney of to abide by the Constitution but also because the judician in tho dotertsinaion of actual cases and controversies ‘must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the goverament.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES, But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of Jameg Madison, the syatem itself is not ‘the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voiee to pronounce ,., the authority of their constitution” In the is, then, must the success of our ding years to come be tested in the ;pino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.** Under the principle of separation of powers, the Constitution vests in the legislative branch of government the power to enact laws, in the exeoutive branch, the power to execute laws, and in the judicial branch, the power to interpret laws. As held in Zndencia Dauid, the interpretation and application of laws is vested in the judicial department of government. The principle of separation of powers likewise imposes « limitation to judicial power. Considering that the logislatureia vested with the plenary power to legislate, the power ofthe courts is limited to the interpretation of the laws enacted by the legislature and not to legislate, which is vested exclusively in tho logislative branch of government. In Tafada v. Yulo,* petitioner Juan Tafiada was labat, Tayabas. Upon reaching ner was directed by the Judge of First Instance of Tayabas (acting uj Department of Justice) to cease to act as to the provisions of Section 203 of the Revised Admit as amended by Act No. 3829 (which took effect on 1931) which provides in part that “the proses justices of the peace who shall completed szty fie years of age ary first, nineteen hundred an ireo.”™ Petitioner argued that he is not covered by the mandatory retirement age under Act No. 3899 because he reached the age of 65 on 5 October 1934, or after “tinier mapped. fo ™~ (CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION effectivity of Act No. 3899. The respondent eee seruction of Act No. 3899 is called fo, cone Gefect in the language of the law used when inearprotatis ff would lead to a conclusion that only those j f tere io turnod 68 years old Before (and not afer) the elfecsvity Of Act No. 2699 aze covered by the mandatory retirement Prov Deciding for the petitioner, the Supreme Court held that Be who became 65 years of age on & October 1934 (after the effectivity of Act No, 2899) was not included in a law which required justices o the peace 65 years of age to cease to hold office on 1 January 1933. ‘The court held: In substantiation of what has just been said, fe is ofcourse fundamental thatthe determination of islative intent is the primary consideration. However, ie is equally fundamental that that legislative intone must be determined from the an te itgelf This principle mus be adhered to event 1c court be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the Legislature Intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction and hhidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be sought out. To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, anc an amendment of a law by judi to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret. Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this instance, as in the past, we aim to do. But counsel in his memorandum concedes ‘that the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the legislative intent’, and at the hearing in response to questions was finally forced to admit that what the Government desired was for the court to insert words and Pt in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subjectSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CARs fer, and the purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to been embraced. The former is liberal construction In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, et al the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered on 14 November 1956 a judg. ment in a case against the defendant. A copy of the decision was served on the defendant on 21 November 1956 and the judgment became final and executory on 21 December 1955. On 21 December 1965, NAMARCO, the successor in interest of the winning party, filed an action for revival of judgment, The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that the action has already prescribed because Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that an action for enforce. ment of judgment shall prescribe in 10 yeurs. It ruled that more than 10 years had passed from the time the judgment bocame final and executory in 21 December 1956, because under Article 13 of the Civil Code a year is a period of 365 days, and since the years 1960 and 1964 are leap years, the action for revival of judgment was filed two days late. NAMARCO argued that Article 1144 of the Civil Code should be interproted to mean 10 calendar years. The Supreme Court rejected NAMARCO's argument and held: ‘The very conclusion thus reached by appellant appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision ie of the Philippines, limiting the year’ — as the term is used in our (CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION srlgsted, Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that pur Code, ‘whenever months that, pursuant to Art. 7 of ‘calendar’ months, unless they are ‘designated by name,’ in which case ‘they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have’ This concept was, lat ines, by Section 13 of the Revised ative Code, pursuant to which, ‘month shalll be understood to refer to a calendar month.’ In the language of this Court, in People va. Del Rosario, ‘with the approval we have reverted ta the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month,’ with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned ‘months, days or nights,’ ours has added thereto the term ‘years’ and explicitly ordains that ‘it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days’ Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein ithout ignoring, if, cannot be uphe! Art. 13 of our Civil Code, 13 of The Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If publ demands a reversi bodied in the Revised Admi through legit eed, prior to the approval of the {upreme Court thereof had held, wh WW spoke of months, or‘solar’ month, in the absence ie contrary. Such provision was Code of Spain, subsequently In Director of Prisons v. Ang Chio Kio.* it was held that “{elourts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws but only in the interpretation and application of law.” Furthermore, considering that the intent of the legislature is to be ascertained and enforces is intent expressed in the words of the statute, if said G.R. No, 29181, 27 August 1969 (emphasis supplied). "G.R. No. /-80001, 23 June 1970 Moy 1986, (Emphasis supptiod)a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES 've intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, th , under the guise of interpretation, “speculate ae 4, nt and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology op ind “the courts cannot assume some purpose in no’ way ‘ then construe the statute to accomplish this supposed re by the course of such apy not make or supervi interpretation, Court should shy away ary funetion of a co-equal otherwise, this would lead doctrine of separation of led only by subsequent ones, ‘ance shall not be excused to the contrary. ired a law to be ineonsistent ie former shall be void and the acts, orders and they are not contrary rehy of laws, the Philippine ‘ws, und as such, acts of Congress, 42995, 15 Fobruney 1996, (CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION excoutive agencies exercising quasi-legislative functions and local Togislative bodies must he consistent with the Constitution. 3. Stare Decisis ‘The maxim stare decisis et non quieta non movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) is embodied in [Article 6 of the Civil Code which provides that “[jJjudicial decisions ‘applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.” It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should bo deemed settled and closed to further argument.” The principle is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and judicial decisions.” Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet or the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The Si ing the last word on what the lay .¢ Court is described as hav- the decisions of the Supreme Court. In Luzon. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., etal. the Supreme Court described the significance of the principle of stare decisis as follows: Incach volume of Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Chief Justice Castro's preface cites tho governing principle of precedents and stare decisis ‘which has given consistency and stability to the law’ by which lawyers and litigants may know the law in concrete controverted ceases, thus: In his famous ess: h of the Law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes defined law as a prediction of what the court will do. ‘The prediction is based on precedents. The governing principle, which has given consis- "De Moss, of al v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils. Ine, G.R. Nos. 188063.70, 19 August 2008, “Department of Transportation and Communications v. Crus (. ‘7e2s6, 28 July 2008 * oR N ‘People, Sabina GR. No $0061, 27 February 1974, “Albart v, Count of Prat Instance of Manila (Br. VD, eal, CLR. No, sonar te Br. VD, etal, GR No, 126964, "OR No, -20886, 18 November 1978{STRUCTION: CONCERTS AND CASES (CHAPTER. INTRODUCTION 2% STATUTOR ility to the law, is stare decisis et ww past precedents ‘non-winning crowns under the terms of the ‘Number as been settled). Fever’ promo. They reckon that, by virtue of the principle bf stare decisis, the aforementioned cases have already Settled the issue of whether or not petitioners PCPPI statutory law and iigants seeking Sid PEPSICO are Liable to holders of non-winning “349” troverted cases, jgations, should tency and stabi and the judges in adversa bbe well posted on precedent rrisprudence of this Court by force of the provision of of the outcome of Patan and De Mesa eases having ruled ‘sed in the case at bar, they cot on the very same mnstitute binding decisions wrecedents on how Pepsi ‘349' litigations must be the laws or the Constitution posed of, On the other hand, respondents Pagdanganan and ‘Such precedents and form part of our leyal system “Article 8 of the new Civil Code that °J tem of the Philippines’ Lumahan justify the non-application of the principle of stare decisis by stating that ‘it is required that the legal etal. v. Pagdanganan, Tights and relations of the parties, and the facts, and individuals holding °348 the applical ,, the issue and evidence are exactly 1 "Number Fever” campaign the same, (Gio) as those decided in the cases of Rodrigo, iced the number 349” as ‘Mendoza Jater the de Mesa x x x. They contend, me night of the however, that ‘a comparison of the subject cases show ed of reports that numerous people ‘that they are not the same nor identical x x x as evident were tryi ing crowns with incorrect security jn the different queations of law, the findings of facts and wes Petitioners issued a statement explaining the mistake and in the different quentmvolved in’said cages =x." In fac, |, offered to redeem the non-winning crowns respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan particularly fargue(a] that the basis oftheir action is Breack of Contract a complaint with the Regional ‘complaint. The Court of Appeals, while that of the Rodrigo and Mendoza cases involved of the Regi ‘Trial Court. On complaints for Specific Performance. petitioners raised, among others, ‘The petition is meritorious. led by ws already been di ae aaa ple of ‘There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa, including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning the ‘Number {PSICO fault the appellate Fever’ promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. ‘Courts pronouncemen Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and ndova, Rodrigo, Patan and Lumahan are among those holding supposedly winning ‘949 Pepsi/7-Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable caps. Said crowns and/or resealable caps already been stare decisis. The "G00 No, WIM, 12 October 206,cy STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES filed separate complaints for specific performance/sum of money/breach of contract, with damages, all against petitioners POPPI and PEPSICO. In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the al action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same tas those in the decided cases of Mendoza and Redrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to be argued. The issue has een settled and this Court’s final decision in the said cases must be respected. ‘This Court's hands are now tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant petition. ‘The principle of stare decisis ef non quieta movere (to.adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which Jhed) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil ART. 8, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the logal system of the With the above provision of law, in tandem with that the appellate court committed reversible error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory decisions = those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the Pepsi ‘349’ cases are concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court ll adhere to that principle and apply it future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In the case at bar, therefore, we have no alternative but to uphold the that the correct security code is an essential, nay, critical, requirement in order to become entitled to the amount printed on a ‘349° bearing crown and/or resealable cap. xxx 7 “Nn (CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION = ‘The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other jing a similar situation. It is founded on yy for securing certainty and stability im ‘does not require identity of or privity unmistakable from the wordings Code. It is even said that statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.” Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, , the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished. To reiterate, there is naught that is left to be brought to court. Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace. However, for the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to apply to another case, the factual circumstances of the precedent and the case to which itis applied must be substantially the same. A different factual milieu in a subsequent case can be used as justification for the non-application of stare decisis. Furthermore, for the doctrine of stare di principle of law laid down case must pert dictum. A dictum is to apply, the the Supreme Court in the precedent issue of the case and not morely obiter ‘ion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court and made without argument, ‘or full consideration of the point, not the proffered deliberate opinion ibid, Citations omitted; emphasis supplied. Chin Hui v. Rodrigues, etal, GLR. No. 137571, 21 September 2000,2 “STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: CONCEPTS AND CASES of the judge himself, As such, mere dicta is not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.* Finally, it is also important to consider that notwithetanding the principle of stare decisis, the Supreme Court not precluded aoe ecvaning ite mind and reversing a previous GOc\r that it laid tro aE TREVIIL, Section 43) ofthe Philippine Const wtion ies se art that "no doctrine or principle of Jaw laid down by the Court jaa decision rendered en banc or in a division May ‘be modified or se a eet except by the Court sitting en bane” In case of a reversal of a previous doctrine by the Supre be asked is how would other simi ght of the doctrinal change wis-2-uie the Print le of stare decisis. In Ting v. To that “the interpretation or jes a part of the law as of the date the statute is ena fis only when a prior culing ond, and a different view is adopted, that the jectively in favor of partios ‘and have acted in good fait ted” and that Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporstio™ CHAPTER Il. SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION ‘Subject of Construction; Types of Law A ry construction is used to interpret various legal instroments including the Constitution, statutes, administrative regulations and ordinances. 1, Constitution Constitutional law is defined as “that branch of public law of & state which treats of the organization and frame of government, the seat e and powers of eovereignty, the distribution of political and governmental authorities and functions, the fundamental principles Hv hae to regulate the relations of government and subject, and wich prescribes generally the plan and method according to which the affairs of the state are to be administered.” It forms part er bttieal law, which is defined as the “branch of law which deals idk the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of the territory.”* ‘The Philippine Constitution is the supreme law of the land, ‘and the Supreme Court described it as “the basic and paramount Taw to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highestofficials ofthe land, must defer.” Consequently, any act of the government or of a public offcial or employee contrary is legal, null, and void.* ‘Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd Ba. *Macarola v. Asuncion, AM. No, 183,31 May 1982. Fae Jadicil nad Bar Council, eal, G.R. No, 203242, 27 July 2012, ‘Mia. a