YEAR 10 • Nº 196 FEBRUARY 09th, 2024

JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS AND OCEANPOLITICS

BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
ISSN 2446-7014

Russia-Ukraine Conflict:
Russian capabilities in the Black Sea

and a further 10 articles in this edition

BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
No 196 • february 09th, 2024
Boletim Geocorrente is a biweekly publication from EDITORIAL BOARD
the Conjuncture Assessment Group (NAC), which is
connected to the Department of Research and Post BRAZILIAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE'S
Graduation (SPP) at the Naval War College (EGN). DIRECTOR
Rear Admiral Gustavo Calero Garriga Pires
The NAC monitors the International Conjunction
under the theoretical lens of Geopolitics and Ocean SUPERINTENDENT OF RESEARCH AND
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integrating society to the topics of defense and national Rear Admiral (Retd) Marcio Magno de Farias Franco e
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of knowledge on crises and international conflict while EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
aiming to meet the demands of the Naval Staff. Captain (Retd) Leonardo F. de Mattos (EGN)
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articles regarding current issues from 10 different Prof. Dr. Rafael Zelesco Baretto (EGN)
macro-regions: South America; North and Central
America; Sub-Saharan Africa; Middle East and North ASSISTANT EDITORS
Jéssica Germano de Lima Silva (EGN)
Africa; Europe; Russia and former USSR; South Asia; Noele de Freitas Peigo (Facamp)
East Asia; Southeast Asia and Oceania; Arctic and Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (UFF)
Antarctica. Furthermore, one can find the “Special Victor Eduardo Kalil Gaspar Filho (EGN)
Topics” section, regarding some latent issues in
International Relations. GRAPHIC DESIGN
Pedro Nobre Vecchia (UFRJ)
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 196 • February | 2024

CONJUNCTURE ASSESSMENT GROUP
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
..
Carolina Vasconcelos de Oliveira Silva (PUC-Rio)
Franco Napoleão A. de Alencastro Guimarães (PUC-Rio)
Isadora Jacques de Jesus (UFRJ)
João Victor Marques Cardoso (UNIRIO)
José Ricardo de Oliveira Araujo (UFRJ)
Luísa Barbosa Azevedo (UFRJ)
Mariana Bastos Fraguito (UFRJ)
Nicole Eduarte Silva Chifunga (UFF)
Vanessa Passos Bandeira de Sousa (ESG)
SOUTH AMERICA
Bruna da Silveira Eloy (UFRJ)
Fernanda Carvalho Calado Coutinho (UFF)
Gabriel Augusto Almeida da Silva (UFRJ)
Luciano Veneu Terra (UFF)
Pedro Emiliano Kilson Ferreira (Univ. de Santiago)
Rafael Henrique de Almeida Bandeira Araujo (UFRJ)
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Gabriel Paradela Heil (UFRJ)
Kaike Ferreira Mota (UFRJ)
Taynah Pires Ferreira (UFRJ)
Victor Cabral Ribeiro (PUC-Rio)
Victor Eduardo Kalil Gaspar Filho (EGN)
ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
Gabriela Paulucci da Hora Viana (UFRJ)
Gabriele Marina Molina Hernandez (UFF)
Jayanne Balbino Soares (UFF)
EUROPE
Guilherme Francisco Pagliares de Carvalho (UFF)
Maria Victoria R. Scarlatelli de Menezes (PUC-Rio)
Marina Autran Caldas Bonny (UFRJ)
Millene Sousa dos Santos (UFRJ)
Rafaela Caporazzo de Faria (UFRJ)
EAST ASIA
João Pedro Ribeiro Grilo Cuquejo (Kobe University)
Marcelle Torres Alves Okuno (EGN)
Maria Eduarda Araújo Castanho Parracho (UERJ)
Philipe Alexandre Junqueira (UERJ)
Rodrigo Abreu de Barcellos Ribeiro (UFF)
Thomas Dias Placido (UFSC)
3
RESEARCHERS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Amanda Neves Leal Marini (ECEME)
João Gabriel Fischer Morais Rego (ECEME)
Maria Clara Vieira Schneider Vianna (UFRJ)
Melissa Rossi (Suffolk University)
Pedro Nobre Vecchia (UFRJ)
Vitória de França Fernandes (UFRJ)
RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Gabriel Willian Duarte Constantino (UFRJ)
José Gabriel de Melo Pires (ECEME)
Luiza Gomes Guitarrari (UFRJ)
Pedro Mendes Martins (ECEME)
Pérsio Glória de Paula (Saint Petersburg University)
Rafael Esteves Gomes (UFRJ)
SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
Guilherme de Oliveira Carneiro (UFRJ)
Maria Gabriela Veloso Camelo (PUC-Rio)
Matheus Bruno Ferreira Alves Pereira (UFRJ)
Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (UFF)
SOUTH ASIA
Eduardo Araújo Mangueira (UFRJ)
Gabriela Siqueira Duarte dos Santos (UFRJ)
Lucas Mitidieri (UFRJ)
Maria Fernanda Császár Lima Ferreira (UFRJ)
Rebeca Vitória Alves Leite (EGN)
Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira (PUC-Rio)
SPECIAL TOPICS
Raquel Torrecilha Spiri (UNESP)
Victor Magalhães Longo de Carvalho Motta (UFRJ)
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 196 • February | 2024
 INDEX
SOUTH AMERICA EAST ASIA

Security crisis in Ecuador........................................................................................5 A geopolitical analysis of the Taiwanese elections................................................12

The ambitious strengthening of Colombia’s national defense system in 2024........6
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Economic perspectives for Cuba.............................................................................7
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The role of the Namibian Navy in the South Atlantic...............................................8
EUROPE
Instability in Serbia and the complex geopolitical arena of the Balkans..................9
Under the sea: Chinese interests on the ocean floor............................................13
SOUTH ASIA
Bangladesh’s election results: the tumultuous journey of Bengali politics and the
Awami League ......................................................................................................14
ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
The new Indian Antarctic station: a new range for national technological
capabilities.............................................................................................................15

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

A new moment in the Middle East: “return” of the Islamic State after a period of
contention..............................................................................................................10
RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Selected Articles & Defense News........................... 16
Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Russian capabilities in the Black Sea............................11
Geocorrente Calendar.............................................. 16
References............................................................... 17
Risk Map.................................................................. 18

RISK MAP
By: Kaike Mota

For more information on the criteria used, see page 18.

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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 196 • February | 2024
 SOUTH AMERICA
Security crisis in Ecuador
O n early January of 2024, Ecuador was struck by a
series of violent events, such as kidnappings of police
officers, a television studio being invaded, the jailbreak
of criminal leaders and incursions inside universities
by armed groups. Those events have led President
Daniel Noboa to officially declare the existence of an
“internal armed conflict” in the country and utilize the
armed forces for the combat of groups associated with
drug trafficking and organized crime, as a militarization
strategy. Vis-à-vis that scenario, one must question: what
are the challenges and implications of this strategy, and
what other factors boost the crisis?
In recent years, Ecuador has faced an increase in
insecurity, marked by high homicide rates. According to
the Ecuadorian Organized Crime Observatory (OECO in
Spanish), the country registered a record-breaking 7,878
homicides in 2023, in contrast to the over 1,187 of 2019,
making the country the most violent in South America,
with a rate of 45 homicides per 100 thousand people.
The militarization strategy is not exclusively
Ecuadorian, as countries such as Colombia and Mexico
face similar challenges. Historical pressure from the
United States (US), based on the perception of a frailty
in justice and public safety systems, has motivated a
recurrence in the employment of armed forces for the
5
Bruna da Silveira Eloy
maintenance of public order. This phenomenon is made
clear vis-à-vis the incapacity of states to contain the
advancement of drug trafficking, due to the designation
of the groups as terrorist as well as the cartels’ violence.
Furthermore, one can observe an internationalization of
criminal organizations, especially those of Colombian
and Mexican origin. The growing sophistication of these
groups, as seen by the Los Choneros cartel, and its ties
to the Sinaloa cartel, from Mexico, indicate complex
dynamics that exceed borders.
In addition, institutional frailty in many instances of
government, characterized by corruption, the dissolution
of the Ecuadorian Congress in May of 2023 (Boletim
183) and the assassination of presidential candidate
Fernando Villavicencio in August of that year, aggravate
the challenge of more efficiently countering criminal
structures, due to difficulties in domestic coordination.
In summary, militarization emerges as an imperative
response to the security crisis in Ecuador, but its efficacy
remains uncertain vis-à-vis the complexity of the
scenario. In addition to that approach, it is essencial to
coordinate efforts and reform domestic and international
cooperation in order to overcome subjacent structural
causes to the issue, such as the presence of domestic
criminal groups and institutional fragility.
Source: Insight Crime
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n196.p05.
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The ambitious strengthening of Colombia’s national defense system in 2024
S ince the beginning of the Gustavo Petro administration
in August of 2022, Colombia has been directing its
efforts towards more notorious stages of military power.
Through a project aimed at materializing the Integral
Defense System (Siden, in Spanish) — which seeks
to coordinate actions by the armed forces and develop
strategic capabilities in the medium and long term for
facing operational difficulties in defense and national
security — the country anticipates to fully bring to
life its military ambitions until 2024. The project,
costing approximately US$ 1.136 billion, will cover
the construction of a light frigate and a self-propelled
artillery system. However, this modernization does not
happen just because, as it relates to the foreign threats
that the country faces. Therefore, what can one expect
from Siden’s development in Colombia’s defense and
security?
Amid the process of renewing its strategic capabilities,
Colombia has advanced in actions related to the
strengthening of its military forces. For the Colombian
navy, there was a US$ 430 million investment for the
construction of its first-ever Strategic Surface Platform
(PES), which, through a partnership between shipbuilding
Multimission Frigate Prototype Damen Sigma 10514
6
Gabriel Augusto
companies Cotecmar and Damen Shipyards Group,
presented a new light frigate: PES 10714C, which will be
armed with equipment from South Korea, Spain, France
and Italy. In turn, the army — through a US$ 407 million
investment — has acquired Elbit System’s ATMOS, a
6x6 155mm/52 caliber self-propelled artillery system
which allows for autonomous operation and automatic
loading so as to increase firepower.
In contrast, notorious investment in the armed forces
during the Petro administration highlight the Colombian
government’s urgency for a modernization of its assets,
considering the recurrent threats to the country’s
sovereignty, such as Venezuela’s incursions for countering
drug trafficking, potential Russian surveillance in areas
bordering Venezuela, and diplomatic tensions with Israel
in opposition to the latter’s actions in Gaza.
Therefore, one can notice that the Siden’s unfoldings
already outline the profile of military restructuring
sought by Colombia for 2024, with investments in more
modern equipments that adapt to the complex domestic
and regional realities of Bogotá. Thus, the country can
be considered a player capable of employing new means
to dissuade potential threats to its defense and security.
Source: Poder Naval
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 NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Economic perspectives for Cuba
A mid scarcity of basic items and energy instability,
Cuba faces grave economic crisis (Boletim 135). The
COVID-19 pandemic and harder economic embargoes
imposed on the island by the Trump (2017-2020) and
continued by the Biden (2021-) administrations worsen
the problem. For 2024, the Cuban government has
presented a plan for macroeconomic adjustments aiming
to reduce government spending. However, the measures
presented have proved themselves counterproductive to
socioeconomic stabilization in the country. Considering
the current scenario, one must question what are the
potential economic perspectives for Cuba, considering
domestic and international aspects.
The ongoing Cuban economic scenario is indeed the
result of a series of those different factors. In that sense,
the COVID-19 pandemic has directly affected one of the
country’s main economic sectors, the tourism industry. In
addition, the imposition of new sanctions by the United
States has particularly aided in the island’s economic
strain (Boletim 104). Consequently, one can observe
a contraction of the country’s GDP in 2023, as well as
inflation unmanageability. As a means of stabilizing
the island’s economy, President Miguel Díaz-Canel has
announced a series of macroeconomic adjustments, which
include increases in the electricity bill and modifications
in the rules for State subsidies over basic items.
Source: Translating Cuba
7
Taynah Pires Ferreira
The current plan for economic recovery, however,
imposes new challenges to Cuban society and does not
present specific measures for reducing food scarcity
and energy instability. In that scenario, the government
shall develop strategic plans aiming to allocate resources
for a boost in food production so as to safeguard the
autonomy of local distribution. Furthermore, the energy
crisis proves a need for diversification of energy sources,
given that 80% of the country’s energy comes from oil
derivatives, according to the International Energy Agency
(IEA). One shall also point out that the lack of foreign
investment represents an obstacle for Cuban growth. In
that sense, one can highlight Russia’s role as a strategic
partner, as Russian companies have demonstrated interest
in key sectors of the Cuban economy, such as agriculture,
industry, energy, and others (Boletim 174).
In summary, the adoption of measures granting
autonomy for the provision of basic items and energy
sovereignty in the country can indeed be considered
relevant. Such adjustments require the implementation
of plans that aim at Havana’s strategic development,
prioritizing agriculture, energy and tourism. It is also
adequate to think about ways to attract foreign investment,
building upon economic and commercial growth while
affirming Cuba’s sovereignty.
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 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The role of the Namibian Navy in the South Atlantic
N amibia, located in the West African coast, is the
target of many foreign interests due to the presence
of multiple energy resources. The country possesses
the Port of Walvis Bay, one of the largest in the region,
which has direct access to the main global trade routes
and receives approximately 3,000 ships per year, totaling
5 million tons of cargo. In addition, the discovery of
offshore oil reserves was announced by the National
Petroleum Corporation of Namibia (NAMCOR) in
January of 2024. This is the fourth significant discovery
in the region after the discovery of the first one, in 2022
— hailed as a new hope for the country’s economic
development. These discoveries naturally attract a
growing number of extra-regional players. Thus, one
must question: what is the role of the Namibian Navy in
this scenario?
Maritime presence in the South Atlantic is indeed
crucial for the promotion of security and cooperation
between the countries that compose Namibia’s strategic
context. Brazil plays a significant role in that process, as
it is present in the region since the establishment of the
South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS),
in 1986. Furthermore, Brazil has also supported, through
its own navy, the formation of that of Namibia, and has
a maritime cooperation agreement in place since 1994.
Source: National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia
National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia announces discovery of offshore oil block in Orange Basin.
8
Mariana Fraguito
Since then, the African State has been reaffirming its
maritime power through naval exercises and cooperation
with regional and foreign navies.
An example of the presence of foreign powers is that
of the Indian navy, through a mission by the INS Sumedha
patrol vessel on Walvis Bay in November 2023, aimed
at strengthening preexisting friendship ties with African
countries. India’s intention, with its rampant economic
growth, can be cooperation with important countries in
the context of African energy (Boletim 183), aiming to
expand its regional influence and access to resources for
sustaining its own growth. Therefore, this performance
can be a cause for concern in the region.
Namibia’s case is important for demonstrating how
a safe and stable maritime space is essential for the
development of economic activities. In that sense, the
Namibian Navy is crucial for the guarantee of safety of
navigation, the conduction of search and rescue (SAR)
activities and the maintenance of underwater lines of
communication, especially due to the relevance of the
Port of Walvis Bay. Thus, one can highlight the relevance
of aid from the Brazilian Navy and the potential for
Brazilian companies to participate in the enlarging of the
Namibian Navy's capabilities.
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 EUROPE
Instability in Serbia and the complex geopolitical arena of the Balkans
T he Balkans are a territory of historical unrest: since
the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, countries
in the region have, since the 1990’s, tried to seek out the
European Union (EU) without entirely abandoning their
ties to Russia. In addition to these regional dynamics are
the countries’ own domestic tensions, a consequence of
the local independence processes. That is indeed the case
for Kosovo, a Serbian territory which has declared
independence but is not yet recognized by Serbia,
which is a candidate for accession into the European
Union (EU), but has resisted the bloc’s pressures and
did not impose sanctions on Russia after the start of
the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In December of 2023,
after its parliamentary elections, Serbia saw the rise of
nation-wide protests contesting the voting results, amid
which there were allegations of Russian influence. In
that scenario, this article seeks to analyze the current
instability in Serbia as well as the rapprochement between
the Balkan countries and Russia.
Protests asking for new elections have led thousands
of Serbs to the streets, suggesting that the results, which
were favorable to the current president, would have
been a fraud orchestrated by his party. The Serbian
government, in turn, stated that the EU would be
supporting the protests, in somewhat of a de-stabilization
campaign. However, a representative of the European
Commission has denied the accusations, claiming they
are similar to Russian propaganda. In a certain manner, the
9
Maria Clara Vieira Schneider Vianna
sociopolitical instability sparked by the protests is once
more elevated to a dispute between the EU and Russia.
The EU tends to act with caution towards Serbia due
to the tensions regarding Kosovo’s independence, which
is recognized by most of the bloc’s members. But, the
growing Russian presence in the Balkans creates a rush
for the EU’s need to reinforce its position in the region.
In addition to this context, there is the Hungary-
Russian rapprochement, which happened some time
before the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a union of two
countries with interests of expanding their influence on
Serbia and the Balkans as a whole. One must highlight the
overcoming of the Hungarian obstacle in the release of
assistance for Ukraine during the EU Summit on February
1st of this year. Budapest having turned to Moscow meant
it took a step away from the EU and the Western bloc,
making support to Belgrade a strategic asset for the
strengthening of Russia-Hungary relations. Thus, the
articulation of Hungarian interests in its neighbor Serbia,
alongside the possibility of a new front — although not
immediately military — in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
represents the historical Russian strategy of exploring
European socioeconomic problems.
Upon that scenario, one can conclude that the situation
in the Balkans reflects not only Serbia’s domestic
challenges, but also a complex arena of geopolitical
rivalry, which will demand a cautious approach by the
European Union.
Source: Gis Report
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 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
A new moment in the Middle East: “return” of the Islamic State after a period of contention
T he Geopolitics of the Middle East are characterized
by intra and interstate conflict, in which the notorious
and always present domestic and foreign players bring
forth a high number of elements into the conjuncture
analysis. By observing the return and the presence of the
Islamic State (ISIS) in the region, this claim becomes
only more based on the reality of the facts. Regarding
the actions by extra-regional players, in the beginning of
January, vis-à-vis the scenario of ISIS’s expansion, the
United States confirmed the deployment of 1,500 military
personnel to Iraq and Syria, aiming to help counter ISIS.
Considering that scenario, what implications does ISIS’s
ressurgence have in regional geopolitics?
Despite containment after its peak period of activity,
between 2014 and 2017 — when it commanded and
controlled significant pieces of territory in the Middle
East based on the promotion of terror, coercion and fear
—, ISIS has never ceased to exist, as it has conducted
actions of insurgence and low intensity in small pieces
of land, especially in Syria and Iraq. However, in recent
weeks the group has claimed large-scale acts, more
notoriously the attacks during the 4-year anniversary of
the death of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, as well as
10
Amanda Marini
the death of Iraqi soldiers and an attack on a church in
Turkey. It is worth highlighting that Soleimani was the
commander of the Iranian troops that faced and militarily
defeated the terrorist group in the past decade, therefore
the present bombings carry also a high symbolic value,
serving as a vivid illustration of the group’s intentions to
return to its former glory.
For such, ISIS has conducted geopolitical shifts,
especially in the fields of defense and security, as its
main source of revenue is looting, smuggling and the
sale of artworks and archaeological artifacts in the
illegal market, in addition to kidnappings and drug
trafficking. Another aspect of the geopolitical domain is
that the Islamic State, aiming to re-establish its influence,
becomes one more variable with region-wide capabilities
among the also strong players, such as Iran and Saudi
Arabia — especially in the current context of conflict
between Israel and Hamas, the latter a paramilitary player
with which ISIS possesses hostilities and differences.
Thus, the implications of ISIS’ return are built upon its
capacity to not only impact and involve various players,
but also to alter the local geopolitical course of such an
unstable region.
Source: Critical Threats
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 RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Russian capabilities in the Black Sea
D ue to its strategic location and traditional status as
a zone of Russian influence, the Black Sea is of
utmost importance for Moscow, considering that it is
also where one of the most important ports in Russia,
Novorossiysk, is located. Therefore, the Kremlin will
naturally invest in resources and efforts in the region,
aiming to preserve its control vis-à-vis the projects of
its global adversaries, as is the case during the Russia-
Ukraine conflict. In that scenario, one can notice that
the Russian armed forces have been facing problems for
power projection in the region. Thus, one must question:
what are the current Russian capabilities for power
projection in the Black Sea?
The Black Sea is of great importance in Russian
international strategy. Firstly, it is a maritime region
where it is possible to sail during the entire year, without
the risk of freezing. Another important point is how the
Black Sea can help Russian projection over the Middle
East and Mediterranean, especially through naval means,
considering the geographic proximity of these subregions.
For instance, it was only after the Russian annexation of
the Crimean peninsula, in 2014, that the country started
to have direct participation on the conflicts in Libya and
Syria. Regarding that scenario, the expansion of the North
11
Rafael Esteves
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in recent decades
has undermined Russian control over the region. That
has allowed for an aggressive strategy from Moscow to
maintain its influence, one exemplified in the hostilities
with Ukraine.
At the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
Moscow could greatly overshadow Kyiv’s naval power
projection through the destruction of its surface assets.
Still, the Russian navy has neither obtained full control
of the coast nor incapacitated Ukrainian armed forces
from conducting maritime operations in the western
portion of the Black Sea, which can be confirmed by the
multiple drone attacks on Russian vessels, such as with
the Ivanovets corvette in early February. Those difficulties
compromise Russian military operations and facilitate
Ukrainian attacks on Crimea.
Vis-à-vis that scenario, one can perceive the attack on
the Russian corvette as a demonstration that Russia does
not have an absolute power projection over Ukraine, with
Kyiv being capable of elaborating successful operations
in the western Black Sea. Such issues lead to difficulties
for Russian military personnel and the vulnerability of
Russian bases on the Crimean Peninsula.
Source: Poder Naval
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 EAST ASIA
A geopolitical analysis of the Taiwanese elections
T he first week of 2024 have been challenging
to China’s strategic surroundings due to events
involving allied and bordering countries. However, the
presidential election in Taiwan is the one with the greatest
potential for mobilization of the Chinese armed forces,
and the most influent one for the national interests of
the Chinese leadership, for Chinese-American relations,
and for the global economy. Considering this scenario,
one shall ponder over the potential consequences of the
Taiwanese election results.
In Taiwan, the main political topic of the presidential
elections is the relations between the island and
the continent. The victory of Lai Ching-te of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with 40,05% of
votes, demonstrates that criticism towards Beijing is
sedimented in domestic public opinion. However, if it is
true that the domestic scenario in Taiwan is challenging
to Beijing’s interests, the post-election geopolitical
scenario was favorable.
Two days after the election, Nauru’s president
David Adeang announced the recognition of the
People’s Republic of China and the cut of ties with
the Republic of China. The number of countries which
recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty has decreased, and now
stands at 12. Ever since the DPP assumed power, ten
countries have cut ties with the island: Burkina Faso,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Kiribati,
12
Philipe Alexandre
Nauru, Nicaragua, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe and
Solomon Islands
In addition, according to the spokesperson of China’s
chancellery on January of 2024, over 100 countries and
international organizations have reiterated commitment
to the One China principle. One can highlight the
declaration by United States (US) president Joe Biden,
on January 13th, that the US does not support the island’s
independence. The primary aim is to avoid armed conflict
vis-à-vis an allegedly emancipating move by Taipei, which
counts on international support. According to estimates
by Bloomberg Economics, a war in Taiwan would cost
US$ 10 trillion, affecting surrounding communication
lines and the global supply chain, as well as causing
deterioration of the island’s GDP — considering that it is
the largest global supplier of semiconductors — in 40%,
and Chinese and American economies in 16,7% and
6,7%, respectively, in the first year of conflict.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the result of the
Taiwanese elections alters its relations with China, US-
China relations or the global economy, as the costs of
an armed conflict in the region are too big, and no side
is willing to risk anything in the short and medium term.
The low probability of war, as well as Washington’s
consideration of the status quo and the loss of Taiwanese
international recognition, are factors that have given
Beijing strategic advantages.
Source: WorldView
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n196.p12.
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Under the sea: Chinese interests on the ocean floor
I n January of 2024, Beijing announced the results of its
newest oceanic research. According to CGTN news
network, researchers have completed a 1:1,000,000 scale
study of the deep-sea configuration at the South China
Sea (SCS), discovering 36 new geological formations
in the seafloor and presenting the official names —
in Mandarin — of 384 underwater structures. The
scientific profit of these studies is of utmost importance
for China, but one shall also question the geopolitical
gains that come with the consolidation of underwater
research.
The SCS is one of the most tense regions in the
current world scenario (Boletim 192). Being the stage
for territorial dispute between China and Southeast
Asian countries, it is also part of important trade routes
and contains oil and gas reserves, as well as rare earth
minerals. In strategic terms, studying the SCS sea floor
is crucial for the production of maps and nautical charts.
For the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), that
represents an advantage, especially regarding the use
of submarines, as, for protecting the claimed areas, the
PLAN uses dissuasion, distributing its contingent of Jin
Type 094-class submarines along the nine-dash line (a
13
Maria Fernanda Császár
line used for demarcating China’s territorial claims in
the SCS). In addition, Beijing aims to consolidate the
exploration of the SCS’s natural reserves, an endeavor
that demands mapping of geological structures.
Beijing’s objectives are ambitious and, in order
to bring them to life, the government has adopted an
approach that makes use of many different sectors of
society. Under the aegis of the Military-Civilian Fusion
Strategy, the oceanic research conducted by China blurs
the lines between civilian and military instances. Many
of the vessels used for the survey are associated with the
PLAN or to organizations close to it, such as the Chinese
Academy of Science. The use of these research vessels
sparks concerns not only in the SCS, but also in the Indian
Ocean (Boletim 193), as many countries question the real
intentions of China’s research missions.
In summary, the South China Sea’s ocean floor
is now one more domain for Chinese projection.
Whether through the naming of underwater structures
or the activities of civilian and military vessels, Beijing’s
intentions are notorious. Vis-à-vis growing tensions in the
region, one shall now observe the disputes that unfold,
and the waves that it can cause in the Pacific Ocean.
Source: SCMP
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n196.p13.
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 SOUTH ASIA
Bangladesh’s election results: the tumultuous journey of Bengali politics and the Awami League
O n January 7 , amidst election boycotts and mass
th
arrest of opposition members, Sheikh Hasina
secured her fourth consecutive term as Prime Minister
of Bangladesh. Vis-à-vis a fractious domestic political
environment, and given the country's relevance as a
rising key player in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR),
one shall see as imperative an overview of the Bengali
political landscape under the rule of the Awami League.
The oldest political party in Bangladesh, the Awami
League emerged in 1949, after the partition of the Indian
subcontinent between India and Pakistan and before the
establishment of Bangladesh. The then-East Pakistan
Awami League initially solidified itself as a progressive
and secular movement focused on the interests of the
Pakistani Bengali population. Following Bangladesh’s
independence in 1971, the League led the country’s
reconstruction under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman — founder of the Bengali State and father of
the current Prime Minister —, with his foreign policy
dictum of “friendship to all, malice towards none.”
Despite the economic crisis and famine in the immediate
post-independence period, the League made remarkable
strides, such as the introduction of parliamentarism, the
rehabilitation of millions of refugees sheltered in India,
the establishment of the Constitution of Bangladesh, and
the signing of the India-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty.
14
Gabriela Santos
After Mujibur's assassination in 1975, the League
returned to power from 1996 to 2001, and from 2009
onwards —, both periods happening under the leadership
of Sheikh Hasina and being marked by political
conflict, particularly with the main opposition party, the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
Human rights violations, political assassinations,
problems with transnational migration, and electoral
fraud have shaped the tumultuous Bengali history, which
recently seems to have taken an autocratic turn. Contrary
to the enduring political turmoil at home, however, the
League continues to fare reasonably well in international
circles, as Dhaka becomes an important player in the
Indo-Pacific and attracts the attention of global players
seeking to consolidate their positions in the IOR (Boletim
194).
Hasina tends to continue Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific
policies in favour of greater regional stability. However,
the chaotic scenario surrounding the recent elections is
challenging. Several players have pressured the League
to uphold democratic values, and the United States
criticised the “unfair and violent elections.” Given that
the country benefits significantly from foreign investment
and aid, the democratic backsliding in Bangladesh could
threaten its economic development and the resilience of
the Awami League.
Source: ACLED Data
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n196.p14.
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 ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
The new Indian Antarctic station: a new range for national technological capabilities
A s one of the States with the largest technological
and developmental potential, India has a significant
presence in Antarctica, and indeed it seeks to gradually
improve its polar infrastructures so as to do justice to
the country’s capabilities (Boletim 162). In December
of 2023, the government began construction of a new
Antarctic station, to both replace station Maitri and
reinforce Indian activities on the South Pole.
During the 1950s, the issue of Antarctic governance
could not arrive at a solution that satistfied all seven
territorial claimants and other States interested in the
continent, creating tensions between Western enemies
and allies, especially during the early years of the cold
war and the post-nuclear world. In 1956, following
its independence and decolonization processes, India
decided to take its Antarctic claim to the UN and
leave the continent’s management in the hands of the
organization. The measure found strong opposition
from Argentina and Chile, and was at last replaced by
the Antarctic Treaty, but it indicated that India watched
closely the Antarctic issue and adopted a stance on
governance which went against that imposed by the
British Empire during the years of colonization.
Although country initially assumed a decolonial
position regarding Antarctica, Indian interests in the
Source: UPSC
15
Gabriele Hernandez
region have changed their shape with time. The country
became a consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty
in 1983 — similarly to Brazil — and has built three
research stations since: Dakshin Gangotri, Bharati and
Maitri. The latter was inaugurated in 1998, with a service
life of only ten years, but it has managed to stay active
until the present day. In addition to the replacement of
station Maitri, the government has also announced the
creation of its first-ever polar research vessel (PRV),
guaranteeing that India wil remain independently in the
continent, reinforcing its regional interests, for the next
decades.
Antarctica is the last frontier for Indian maritime
strategy in the Indian Ocean, and its ocean floor is
included in the country’s energy exploration. The Indian
strategic surroundings are also located in an area of
growing Chinese influence, which indicates that regional
matters, although very far, affect Antarctic geopolitics
in the large framework of its governance. The Indian
challenges, however, involve the establishment of its
own Antarctic policy and the assimilation of a strategy
to unite objectives in foreign policy, defense, energy
and the environment, as, in addition to the phantom of
imperialism, India has to deal with a Chinese presence
that moves closer and closer to its own ambitions.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n196.p15.
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 SELECTED ARTICLES & DEFENSE NEWS
By: Captain (Retd) Leonardo F. de Mattos
► Bridging Gaps Between the Geosciences and National Security
EOS, Chirico, Peter. Molnia, Bruce. Nguy-Robertson, Anthony. Opstal, Dan.
► A New Concept: Military Assistance to Protect the Environment
RUSI, Milburn, Richard.
► American Greatness and Decline
PROJECT SYNDICATE, Nye Jr, Joseph.
► The Next Global War
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Brands, Hal.
► Naval Special Warfare Will Have to Fight Differently
U.S NAVAL INSTITUTE, Cropsey, Seth.

GEOCORRENTE CALENDAR
Click on the boxes to acess the references: By: Maria Fernanda Császár

FEBRUARY
Main events on February 08 - 22

08-09 09-10 12-14 13-14

30

BELGIUM AUSTRALIA UNITED ARAB FRANCE

CLIMATE CHANCE EUROPE 7th INDIAN OCEAN EMIRATES MINISTERS MEETING OF
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
SUMMIT 2024 CONFERENCE WORLD GOVERNMENTS
AGENCY
SUMMIT

14 16-18 11-21
17-18 20-23
30-05

INDONESIA GERMANY ETHIOPIA THAILAND

PRESIDENTIAL MUNICH SECURITY 37th ORDINARY SESSION ASIA PACIFIC FORUM
ELECTIONS CONFERENCE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE ON SUSTAINABLE
AFRICAN UNION DEVELOPMENT

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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 196 • February | 2024
 REFERENCES

• Security crisis in Ecuador
OÑA, Pablo Velasco; QUEVEDO, Carolina Andrade. Ecuador: puntos clave
para comprender la ola de violencia. Le Grand Continent, jan. 18 2024.
Access on: jan. 19 2024.
PINZÓN, Catalina Gil. Ecuador, don’t follow in the footsteps of Colombia and
Mexico. El País, jan. 19 2024. Access on: jan. 19 2024.
• The ambitious strengthening of Colombia’s national
defense system in 2024
SAUMETH, Eric. Colombia proyecta la materialización completa de su
Sistema de Defensa Nacional para 2024. Infodefensa, jan. 15 2024. Access
on: jan. 19 2024.
SAUMETH, Eric. Colombia y la materialización de su Sistema Integral de
Defensa Nacional. Infodefensa, apr. 18 2022. Access on: jan. 30 2024.
• Economic perspectives for Cuba
CARRANZA, Julio. Cuban economy on the threshold of 2024: crisis,
challenges and opportunities. OnCuba News, dec. 29 2023. Access on: jan.
18 2024
KNOBLOCH, Andreas. Cuba’s economic crisis: Will a paradigm shift help?.
DW, jan. 04 2024. Access on: jan. 18 2024
• The role of the Namibian Navy in the South Atlantic
INS Sumedha mission deployed at Walvis Bay, Namibia. Maritimafrica, nov.
13 2023. Access on: nov. 14 2023.
Major Oil Discovery Unveiled Offshore Namibia. Xinhua, jan. 10 2024.
Access on: jan. 19 2024.
• Instability in Serbia and the complex geopolitical arena
of the Balkans
FRIEDMAN, George. Europe Comes to Boil: the Balkans, Hungary and
Russia. Geopolitical Features, jan. 12 2024. Access on: jan. 18 2024.
BARBER, Tony. Why is the EU soft on Serbia?. Financial Times, jan. 13
2024. Access on: jan. 19 2024.
• Under the sea: Chinese interests on the ocean floor
China unveils results of basic geological survey of South China Sea. CGTN,
jan. 24 2024. Access on: jan. 31 2024
SABELLON,Vince Andre C. Look Into China's Race to the Seabed:
Understanding China's Future in the Deep Sea and its Potential Threat to the
Philippines. National Defense College of the Philippines, dec. 14 2023.
Access on: jan. 31 2024
• Bangladesh’s election results: the tumultuous journey
of Bengali politics and the Awami League
ANBARASAN, Ethirajan & NG, Kelly. Bangladesh election: PM Sheikh
Hasina wins fourth term in controversial vote. BBC News, jan. 08 2024.
Access on: jan. 19 2024
BOSE, Sohini. Polls, politics, and foreign policy: Bangladesh in perspective.
Observer Research Foundation, jan. 12 2024. Access on: jan. 19 2024
• The new Indian Antarctic station: a new range for
national technological capabilities
CHATURVEDI, Sanjay. India and Antarctica: Towards post-colonial en-
gagement? In Brady, Anne-Marie (Organizadora): The Emerging Politics of
Antarctica. Nova Zelândia, 2013, pp 92-126
SEQUEIRA. Newton. Goa-based centre to build India’s new Antarctica sta-
tion. Times of India, dec. 25 2023. Access on: jan .16 2024
The initial map on page 04 of this Boletim was made in MapChart and follows the
guidelines by Creative Commons.

• A new moment in the Middle East: “return” of the

Islamic State after a period of contention
Why the Islamic State threat to Iran is growing? The New Arab, jan. 17 2024.
Access on: jan. 29 2024.
US to send 1,500 troops to Syria and Iraq. Middle East Monitor, jan. 15
2024. Access on: jan. 29 2024.

• Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Russian capabilities in the

Black Sea
Russia Commutes U.S. Investor Calvey’s Fraud Sentence After Guilty Plea.
The Moscow Times, feb. 01 2024. Access on: feb. 01 2024.
BORSHCHEVSKAYA, Anna. Understanding Russia’s War on Ukraine Starts
with Understanding Russia’s Black Sea Politics. The Washington Institute,
sep. 20 2023. Access on: feb. 01 2024.

• A geopolitical analysis of the Taiwanese elections

KLEINTOP Jeffrey. The Global Impact of Taiwan’s Election. Charles Schwab,
jan. 16 2024. Access on: jan. 20 2024.
BLOOMBERG. If China invades Taiwan, it would cost world economy $10
trillion. The Times of India, jan. 09 2024. Access on: jan. 20 2024.

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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 196 • February | 2024
 RISK MAP

T he map titled “Main Global Risks”, showcased

on page 04 of this Boletim, was elaborated by
members of the Conjuncture Assessment Group
(NAC, in Portuguese) from the Brazilian Naval War
College. The criteria used for analyzing international
phenomena and determining which should be on
the Map is based on the relevance of said topics for
Brazil, being: the presence of Brazilian residents in
the region, its influence over the Brazilian economy
and its impact on Brazil’s Strategic Environment.
The parameters for risk categorization follow the
interests of the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council, the relevance of involved
players, international repercussions, regional impact
and the possibility for conflict escalation. After the
► HIGH RISK:
• HAITI - Domestic conflicts: UN warns of spike in killings and kidnappings across Haiti as deployment of armed force stalls.
AP News, feb. 01 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.
selection of the phenomena, those can be categorized
into high risk (red) — when great social, political,
military or economic instability can be observed —
and moderate risk (orange) —for situations of main
observed risk aggravation. The countries represented
in gray present monitored conflicts; in the case of risk
aggravation, they can turn orange or red.
The analyses are reformulated in every new
edition of the Boletim, with the aim of re-evaluating
and updating the highlighted regions, as well as
the color used in each of them. This way, the main
phenomena are always observed and sorted between
high and moderate risk. Below, there are links about
the risks indicated in the map:
By: Kaike Mota

• ISRAEL - Regional conflicts: Overnight Israeli airstrikes kill scores in Gaza as fears grow of push into Rafah | Israel-Gaza
war. The Guardian, feb. 04 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• LEBANON - Structural crisis: Israel says ‘time running out’ for diplomatic solution in south Lebanon. Al Arabiya, feb. 05
2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• MYANMAR - Regional crisis: 520 killed in 6-month violent attacks in Myanmar. The Business Standard, feb. 01 2024.
Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• RED SEA - Attacks on vessels: Red Sea maritime situation worsens. Defence Web, feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• RUSSIA AND UKRAINE - Military conflict: Dozens killed in strike on Russia-held Ukraine city. BBC, feb. 05 2024. Access
on: feb. 05 2024.

• SOMALIA - Structural crisis: Somalia Says It Has Blocked Websites Used by Al-Shabab. Voa News, feb. 01. 2024. Access
on: feb. 05 2024.

• SUDAN - Domestic conflicts: Sudan Conflict Fuels World’s Largest Internal Displacement. Human Rights Watch, jan. 31
2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• YEMEN - Structure and regional crisis: US, Britain strike Yemen's Houthis in a new wave, retaliating for attacks by Iran-
backed militants. Associated Press, feb. 04 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

► MEDIUM RISK:
• ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN - Regional crisis: Azerbaijan says ‘de facto peace’ with Armenia needs treaty for finalization.
Daily Sabah, feb. 02 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• BELARUS - Regional crisis: Belarus Bolsters Border Security Amid Rising Tensions with Ukraine and NATO. APA.AZ, feb.
05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•BURKINA FASO - Sociopolitical crisis: 'No Soldiers, No Logistics, No Compassion': Burkina's Traore on Reasons for
ECOWAS Withdrawal. Sputnik, jan. 31 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO - Regional crisis: SAAF Oryx riddled by small arms fire in the DRC; two crew
injured. Defense Web, feb. 02 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• ECUADOR - Sociopolitical crisis: Russia condemns Ecuador over decision to hand Russian military hardware to US for
Ukraine - RIA . Reuters, feb. 02 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• GABON - Political crisis: Appel de la Jeunesse Gabonaise pour la Transparence dans l’utilisation des 500.000.000 de sa ligne
Budgétaire. Gabon News, feb. 03 2024. Access on: feb. 06 2024.

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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 196 • February | 2024
 •IRAN - Regional instability: Iran says it ‘will not hesitate’ to respond to US attack on its territory. Al Arabiya, feb. 05 2024.
Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•IRAQ- Regional crisis: Iraq says 16 people, including civilians, killed in ‘new US aggression’. Al Jazeera, feb. 03 2024.
Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•MALI - Sociopolitical crisis: UN rights chief decries death of 50 people in Mali attacks. Al Jazeera, feb. 01 2024. Access on:
feb. 05 2024.

•NIGER - Sociopolitical crisis: Four ways Niger exit from ECOWAS fit affect its relationship with Nigeria. BBC Pidgin, feb.
02 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•PAKISTAN - Sociopolitical instability: Pakistan's economic crisis looms over last days of election campaign. Nikkei Asia,
feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•SENEGAL - Political crisis - NEW ON THE MAP: Senegalese Lawmakers to Meet on Monday to Consider Extending
President's Mandate, Report Says. Sputnik, feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•SYRIA - Regional crisis: Syria drone attack: At least 6 Kurdish fighters killed on base housing US troops. Associated Press,
feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•VENEZUELA - Structural crisis: Venezuela: 4 possíveis cenários para oposição após veto à principal adversária de Maduro.
BBC, feb. 04 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

► UNDER MONITORING:

• AFGHANISTAN - Sociopolitical instability: US Exploring Consular Return to Afghanistan Without Recognizing Taliban
Rule. VOA News, feb. 02 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - Sociopolitical instability: Central African Republic: $367.7 million needed to reinforce
strictly humanitarian response in 2024. Zawya, feb. 02 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• DARIEN GAP - Migration crisis: ‘Deeply alarming’: sevenfold increase in sexual attacks at Darién Gap, says Médecins Sans
Frontières. The Guardian, feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• EL SALVADOR - Sociopolitical instability: El Salvador election: Bukele heads towards landslide victory in reelection bid.
AP News, feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• ETHIOPIA - Domestic crisis: Horn of Africa: Ethiopia-Somaliland deal unsettles an already embattled region. The Africa
Report, feb. 01 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• GUYANA-VENEZUELA - Regional disputes: Brazil's military reinforces border with Venezuela and Guyana due to Esequibo.
Reuters, feb. 03 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

•INDIA - Social instability: Manipur Chief Minister meets Amit Shah amid renewed violence in State. The Hindu, feb. 03
2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• LIBYA - Sociopolitical instability: Libyan parliament declares Zliten "devastated city" over groundwater crisis. Libya
Update, feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• MOZAMBIQUE - Instability between government and insurgent forces: Mozambique: Forced return of IDPs to conflict
zones raises alarm. Fair Planet, feb. 01 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• NICARAGUA - Sociopolitical instability: Nicaragua: Priests need gov't approval of daily schedule. Aleteia, feb. 02 2024.
Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• NIGERIA - Domestic crisis: At Least Four Policemen Killed in Nigeria While Defending Station From Armed Attackers:
Police. Sputnik, feb. 04 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• NORTH KOREA - Regional crisis: N. Korea slams Seoul defense chief's anti-Pyongyang warning as 'catalyst' for clash. The
Korean Herald, feb. 05 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• PERU - Sociopolitical instability: 'Former Peruvian intelligence chief gets 19 years in prison for 1992 massacre of farmer. AP
News, jan. 31 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• SERBIA AND KOSOVO - Regional instability: Kosovo's block on the Serbian currency raises alarm in the EU and US.
Associated Press, feb. 04 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• SOUTH CHINA SEA - Regional disputes: ‘Gutter-level’ talk: China-Philippines discord deepens over Taiwan. Financial
Times, feb. 01 2024. Access on: feb. 05 2024.

• TAIWAN - Regional disputes: NATO chief warns 'Taiwan could be tomorrow' at Trump bastion. Nikkei Asia, feb. 01 2024.
Access on: feb. 05 2024.
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