YEAR 9 • Nº 188 AUGUST 10th, 2023

JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS AND OCEANPOLITICS

BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
ISSN 2446-7014

Rising sea levels, sinking Pacific Islands

and a further 12 articles in this edition

BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
No 188 • august 10th, 2023
Boletim Geocorrente is a biweekly publication from EDITORIAL BOARD
the Conjuncture Assessment Group (NAC), which is
connected to the Department of Research and Post BRAZILIAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE'S
Graduation (SPP) at the Naval War College (EGN). DIRECTOR
Rear Admiral Gustavo Calero Garriga Pires
The NAC monitors the International Conjunction
under the theoretical lens of Geopolitics and Ocean SUPERINTENDENT OF RESEARCH AND
politics in order to provide an alternative for the global POST-GRADUATION AT THE BRAZIL-
demand for information, making it accessible and IAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
integrating society to the topics of defense and national Rear Admiral (Retd) Marcio Magno de Farias Franco e
security. Moreover, the Boletim allows for the spread Silva
of knowledge on crises and international conflict while EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
aiming to meet the demands of the Naval Staff. Captain (Retd) Leonardo F. de Mattos (EGN)
The publication has the purpose of publishing small SCIENTIFIC EDITOR
articles regarding current issues from 10 different Captain (Retd) Francisco E. Alves de Almeida (EGN)
macro-regions: South America; North and Central
America; Sub-Saharan Africa; Middle East and North ASSISTANT EDITORS
Jéssica Germano de Lima Silva (EGN)
Africa; Europe; Russia and former USSR; South Asia; Noele de Freitas Peigo (Facamp)
East Asia; Southeast Asia and Oceania; Arctic and Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (UFF)
Antarctica. Furthermore, one can find the “Special Victor Eduardo Kalil Gaspar Filho (EGN)
Topics” section, regarding some latent issues in
International Relations. GRAPHIC DESIGN
Guilherme de Oliveira Carneiro (UFRJ)
The research group responsible for the Boletim is TRANSLATION AND REVIEW
composed of members from multiple areas of expertise, Lucas Salles (UFRJ)
whose multitude of backgrounds and experiences
provide a wide analysis of international conjuncture
and current issues. Thus, it seeks to identify the major
themes, motivational factors and main actors regarding
the escalation of conflicts and ongoing crises as well as
their outcomes.

PUBLICATIONS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

For publishing in the Boletim, the author is required to be a researcher at NAC's "Geopolítica Corrente” (Current
Geopolitics) group and submit their article containing a maximum of 400 words to the peer review evaluation
process.

The texts in this Boletim are of sole responsibility of their authors, not reflecting any official opinion
from the EGN or the Brazilian Navy.

The full publishing of any article from this Boletim is only allowed with a full citation of the author and source,
as well as a redirect link to the original article.

Cover: Funafuti, capital de Tuvalu

By: Wikimedia
Source: Wikimedia

CORRESPONDENCE
Brazilian Naval War College – Research and Post-Graduation
Superintendency.
Av. Pasteur, 480 - Praia Vermelha – Urca - Postal Code: 22290-255 - Rio de Janeiro/
RJ -
Brazil
PHONE.: +55 (21) 2546-9394 | E-mail address: geocorrentenac@gmail.com
This and other editions of BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE, in Portuguese and English, can be
found at the Brazilian Naval War College Webpage and in our Google Drive Folder.

2
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 RESEARCHERS OF THE
CONJUNCTURE ASSESSMENT GROUP

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
..
Carolina Vasconcelos de Oliveira Silva (PUC-Rio)
Franco Napoleão A. de Alencastro Guimarães (PUC-Rio)
Isadora Jacques de Jesus (UFRJ)
João Victor Marques Cardoso (UNIRIO)
Luísa Barbosa Azevedo (UFRJ)
Nicole Eduarte Silva Chifunga (UFF)
Vanessa Passos Bandeira de Sousa (ESG)
SOUTH AMERICA
Bruna da Silveira Eloy (UFRJ)
Fernanda Carvalho Calado Coutinho (UFF)
Gabriel Augusto Almeida da Silva (UFRJ)
Luciano Veneu Terra (UFF)
Matheus Ribeiro de Paula (UERJ)
Pedro Emiliano Kilson Ferreira (Univ. de Santiago)
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Isabela Süssekind Rocha Torres (PUC-Rio)
Taynah Pires Ferreira (UFRJ)
Victor Cabral Ribeiro (PUC-Rio)
Victor Eduardo Kalil Gaspar Filho (EGN)
ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
Gabriela Paulucci da Hora Viana (UFRJ)
Gabriele Marina Molina Hernandez (UFF)
Jayanne Balbino Soares (UFF)
EUROPE
Guilherme Francisco Pagliares de Carvalho (UFF)
Gustavo da Hora Azevedo Osuna Bittencourt (UFRJ)
Lohanna Rodrigues Reis (USP)
Maria Victoria R. Scarlatelli de Menezes (PUC-Rio)
Marina Autran Caldas Bonny (UFRJ)
Millene Sousa dos Santos (UFRJ)
Rafaela Caporazzo de Faria (UFRJ)
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Amanda Neves Leal Marini (ECEME)
João Gabriel Fischer Morais Rego (ECEME)
Melissa Rossi (Suffolk University)
Vitória de França Fernandes (UFRJ)
RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
José Gabriel de Melo Pires (UFRJ)
Luiza Gomes Guitarrari (UFRJ)
Pedro Mendes Martins (ECEME)
Pérsio Glória de Paula (Saint Petersburg University)
Rafael Esteves Gomes (UFRJ)
SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
Guilherme de Oliveira Carneiro (UFRJ)
Maria Gabriela Veloso Camelo (PUC-Rio)
Matheus Bruno Ferreira Alves Pereira (UFRJ)
Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (UFF)
SOUTH ASIA
Eduardo Araújo Mangueira (UFRJ)
Gabriela Siqueira Duarte dos Santos (UFRJ)
Lucas Mitidieri (UFRJ)
Maria Fernanda Császár Lima Ferreira (UFRJ)
Rebeca Vitória Alves Leite (EGN)
Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira (PUC-Rio)
SPECIAL TOPICS
Raquel Torrecilha Spiri (UNESP)
Victor Magalhães Longo de Carvalho Motta (UFRJ)

EAST ASIA
João Pedro Ribeiro Grilo Cuquejo (Kobe University)
Luís Filipe de Souza Porto (UFABC)
Marcelle Torres Alves Okuno (EGN)
Maria Eduarda Araújo Castanho Parracho (UERJ)
Philipe Alexandre Junqueira (UERJ)
Rodrigo Abreu de Barcellos Ribeiro (UFF)
Thomas Dias Placido (UFSC)

3
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 INDEX
SOUTH AMERICA EAST ASIA

Mercosur: Brazilian presidency, EU-Mercosur agreement and Uruguayan claims ����5 10 years of China’s initiative for global projection.................................................13

NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA SOUTH ASIA

US submarine pays unwanted visit to Cuba............................................................6 Indo-Sinhalese cooperation and Indian Maritime Strategy....................................14
Colombia and Nicaragua: recent implications on the dispute for maritime............
SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
borders....................................................................................................................7
The new Impeccable submarine and Singapore’s maritime routes.......................14
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Rising sea levels, sinking Pacific Islands..............................................................15
Between the crescent and the sword: Mali and the end of MINUSMA....................8
SPECIAL TOPICS
EUROPE Offshore mining could be avoided through a moratorium......................................16
Beyond the 2%: opportunities and challenges for NATO........................................9

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

EUNAVFOR MED Irini carries out large-scale exercise in the Central....................
Mediterranean.......................................................................................................10
RUSSIA & FORMER USSR Selected Articles & Defense News........................... 17
Geocorrente Calendar.............................................. 17
Navigating through Arctic waters: Novatek advances in Arctic LNG 2 project....... 11
Second Russia-Africa Summit: Cooperation and Interests in the Contemporary...... References............................................................... 18
World.....................................................................................................................12 Risk Map.................................................................. 19

RISK MAP
By: Luísa Barbosa

For more information on the criteria used, see page 19.

4
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 SOUTH AMERICA
Mercosur: Brazilian presidency, EU-Mercosur agreement and Uruguayan claims
T he Southern Common Market (Mercosur) was
instituted in 1991, with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay as its founders. In 2023, Brazil assumed
temporary presidency of the group and faced some
challenges, such as the ratification of the EU-Mercosur
agreement and the Uruguayan ambition of no longer
jointly negotiating with other countries alongside all
members of the bloc. Thus, one shall question: what will
be the challenges faced by Brazil in the next six months
of integration, and what are Uruguayan claims?
Brazil assumed the Presidency Pro Tempore of
Mercosur in July 2023, during the 62nd Summit of the
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and Associated
Countries in Puerto Iguazú, Argentina. The country
declared itself concerned with the EU-Mercosur
agreement, which will be a priority in the next few
months, and political calculations and protectionism are
two elements that hinder consensus between the parties
For the EU, ratification of the agreement would lead
to a diversification of supply chains after the Russia-
Ukraine conflict. For Mercosur, in turn, it would allow
more easily for the export of its agricultural goods to the
European market.
Source: Self-made
5
Fernanda Calado
Another obstacle is the issue with Uruguay, which did
not sign the final declaration of the Mercosur meeting
due to its disagreement in relation to the clauses that
make it mandatory for countries to negotiate in a joint
manner. Montevideo advocates for each State’s capacity
to negotiate its own international agreements without
the interference of other players. Indeed, for that reason,
it has already extrapolated Mercosur regulations by
pursuing direct bilateral negotiation with China (Boletim
177). Furthermore, President Lacalle Pou was a notorious
critic of the ambitions of modifying the EU-Mercosur
agreement, which was negotiated in 2019.
After over 30 years in effect, Mercosur is in one
of the most sensitive moments in its existence. One of
the challenges of the bloc is the modernization of its
legislation regarding negotiation as a bloc, the precise
aspect disputed by Uruguay. If, on one hand, this type
of negotiation allows for the reduction of tariff barriers,
on the other hand, it presents setbacks to relations with
countries outside the bloc. And this shall be, after the
EU-Mercosur agreement, one of the most sensitive topics
faced by Brazil during its temporary presidency in 2023.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n187.p05.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
US submarine pays unwanted visit to Cuba
B etween July 5th and 8th 2023, US Los Angeles-class
attack submarine USS Pasadena (SSN-752) docked
in the Guantanamo Bay Naval base, a facility installed in
Cuba since 1903, in the context of the Spanish-American
War. The vessel is nuclear-propelled and equipped with
torpedoes as well as nuclear cruise missiles, making it
also an instrument for dissuasion. The event led to distaste
from Havana, which deemed it a provocation and a threat
to the interests and sovereignty of the Latin American
and Caribbean peoples. Therefore, one shall question the
underlying motivations of the USS Pasadena’s visit to
Guantanamo Bay.
According to information from Washington, the USS
Pasadena performed a planned logistic stop as a result
of the UNITAS Naval Exercise. This is an annual event
organized by the United States (US), in cooperation
with naval forces of other South and Central American
countries, in a tradition that dates back to the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty).
However, the event took place after a supposed leak
of information regarding negotiation between Havana
and Beijing for the construction of a joint military
training facility on the island, according to reports from
the Wall Street Journal. In addition, US Secretary of State
Antony Blinken had already expressed US concerns over
6
Jéssica Germano de Lima Silva
Chinese military and intelligence activities in Cuba. The
possibility of expansion in the Asian power’s influence in
the Caribbean is a sensitive influence, one that certainly
is monitored by US intelligence agencies, especially
considering the Island’s geographical proximity of about
150 km to US territory.
On July 11th, Russian training ship Perekop did a
stopover at the Havana Port, making clear the influence
of another major power over the island. This presence is
part of a long-established strategic partnership between
Russia and Cuba, dating back to the Soviet Union
(USSR). The visit aimed to strengthen bilateral ties, as it
also involved an exchange of humanitarian aid supplies
and cultural activities between the countries, which are
both under US sanctions.
Finally, one can observe that Cuba is indeed
involved in the competitive geopolitical escalation
between countries exogenous to the Caribbean. Thus,
the presence of USS Pasadena in Guantanamo Bay does
symbolize US geopolitical influence in the region. In
the medium and long term, actions by these powers can
shape the economic and political course of the island,
besides having significant effects on the geopolitics in
the Caribbean and international relations in general.
Source: Al Jazeera
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p06.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
Colombia and Nicaragua: recent implications on the dispute for maritime borders
D ispute for maritime sovereignty between Nicaragua
and Colombia has been the subject of controversy
and friction since 1928. In 2007, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) declared Colombian sovereignty over the
Caribbean islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa
Catalina, without establishing a maritime border between
the countries. In 2012, an ICJ decision granted Nicaragua
the right to expand through approximately 75,000 km² on
the Caribbean Sea (Boletim 131).
In a new decision, made public on July 13th, the
ICJ rejected three requests by Nicaragua regarding the
extension of its continental shelf. The decision was taken
based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as customary international
law and the principles of equity and respect to a State’s
sovereignty over its maritime area. According to the Court,
a State cannot extend its continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles from its baselines if, in doing so, it starts to
expand into the 200 miles from another State’s baselines.
With that in mind, the ICJ dismissed Nicaraguan claims
of extending its continental shelf beyond the 200 miles
Source: El País
Mapa da área disputada com detalhes das reivindicações da Colômbia e da Nicarágua
7
Bruna da Silveira Eloy
of its baselines, as there would be an overlap with the
Colombian shelf.
Furthermore, in the midst of this dispute lied the
fishing, oil and gas exploration potential in the region,
as those are natural resources of great economic and
strategic value, thus fueling Nicaragua to aspire for
maritime sovereignty and the guarantee of exploration
in the region. That is because the Caribbean has been
the target of investment in hydrocarbon exploration, and
possession of the reserves can strengthen one’s economic
and political position in the international arena.
In summary, the dispute between Colombia and
Nicaragua presents complexities in the realms of
economy, sea and sovereignty. The decision by the ICJ
results in implications over future development of the
area and highlights the importance of cooperation and
the use of international law for solving border disputes.
Finally, despite only spanning over the parties involved,
it is possible that this decision by the ICJ, which reaffirms
international customary law, gets to discourage future
claims of a similar nature to that of Nicaragua.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p07.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Between the crescent and the sword: Mali and the end of MINUSMA
T he United Nations (UN) peace operation in Mali,
named United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), was ended
on June 30, 2023 after ten years in the country. With the
end of activities, the mission’s effective is expected to
leave Mali until the end of this year. The decision was
taken by the Security Council (UNSC) after a statement
by the Mali government on June 17th, which demanded
the “immediate retreat” of MINUSMA. Far from being
protocol, this case is an additional indicator of the crisis
in relations between Mali and the West, thus allowing for
an understanding of how this dissent can be expressed by
other African countries in a similar situation.
Estabelecida em 2013, the peace operation had (as
the name indicates) the objective of stabilizing Mali’s
security framework following conflict between the
government, Tuareg groups and the Ansar Dine extremist
group, nowadays linked to al-Qaeda. MINUSMA was
not the only initiative with that goal: France also kept a
considerable military presence in the African country as
part of Operation Barkhane.
However, this foreign presence was not capable
of containing deterioration in the country’s security
8
Franco Alencastro
framework. The security crisis was followed by a political
one, with two coups d’État, in 2020 and 2021. In that
sense, the new administration had to deal with criticism
from France due to a supposed lack of compromise with
democracy; the weakening of relations between the two
countries culminated in the termination of Operation
Barkhane. Amid this vacuum, one can notice growing
Russian influence through the presence of men from the
Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization also
present in Burkina Faso (Boletim 173).
The difference between the end of French involvement
and the end of MINUSMA are where they came from: the
former, from France itself; the latter, from Mali. According
to Mali Minister of Foreign Relations Abdoulaye Diop,
MINUSMA “became part of the problem”, contributing
to the conflict instead of ending it. Indeed, there are signs
that the country regards Russian military activities and
the presence of the UN as incompatible: in February,
Bamako demanded the removal of Guillaume Andali,
director of the operation’s human rights division, after
his criticism of the Wagner Group’s actions. With that,
the end of MINUSMA may result in a strengthening of
ties between Russia and Mali.
Source: Arab News
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p08.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 EUROPE
Beyond the 2%: opportunities and challenges for NATO
T he North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the
main military alliance in the planet, currently with
31 member countries. Aiming to establish a compromise
for investment in the sector, since the 2014 summit its
members have taken on the objective of destinating 2% of
their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to the development
of collective security guidelines. In that sense, one must
question the opportunities and challenges that arise from
an increase in spending in the field.
At first, one can perceive that the allocation of a
significant part of the GDP to security is a reflection
of growing concerns regarding new threats to global
stability. Uncertainties in international politics, persisting
regional conflict, the rise of new military powers and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
have forced countries to prioritize preparation and
qualification of their Armed forces for protecting their
interests and consolidating their territorial integrity.
Opportunities that arise from that investment are
broad-ranging: modernization and acquisition of state-
of-the-art equipment, alongside research in advanced
technology — including cybernetic and Artificial
Intelligence systems — represent an increase in NATO’s
potential for improving operational effectiveness and
dissuasion strategies. Furthermore, collaboration in
joint operations as well as investment in anti-ballistic
9
Millene Santos
missile (ABM) systems and counter-terrorism defense
capacities represent fields of opportunity for the
Alliance’s continuous development. For instance, one
can recall recent arms agreements, such as the missile
defense system established in Poland and the acquisition
of Boeing CH-47 aircraft by Germany.
However, NATO faces significant challenges for
the 2% goal. According to studies by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), only 10 countries
managed to reach
it, while other 21 nations still haven’t adopted it — a
number still to increase, after Sweden’s incorporation to
the Alliance. In addition, the challenge also lies upon the
decision of how to, at the same time, invest in support
for Ukraine, maintain resources for guaranteeing defense
in Europe and improve combat capacities, including
armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) and air and
missile defense systems, given that many European
armed forces still face difficulties in their Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) Sectors
One concludes, therefore, that continuous allocation
of financial resources by countries to the security of the
bloc makes clear NATO’s commitment to consolidating
a regionalized concept of defense. At the same time, they
seek strategies to establish rapid and efficient investment
aiming to guarantee regional stability.
Source: OTAN
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p09.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
EUNAVFOR MED Irini carries out large-scale exercise in the Central Mediterranean
F rom 8th to 10th June 2023, the EUNAVFOR MED
Irini naval mission, also known as Operation
Irini, carried out its 7th Focused Operation (FOCOP)
in the Central Mediterranean. This endeavor covers
the maritime routes that lead to the Libyan regions of
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which are often used by arms
dealers, a situation which contributes to instability in the
country.
The operation saw the participation of naval and air
assets from six countries of the European Union (EU),
with Italian frigate ITS Libeccio as its flagship. The
Council of the European Union voted to renew Irini
in March, as it is the only naval mission that currently
imposes the United Nations (UN) arms embargo in Libya.
In June, the UN Security Council (UNSC) further voted
to renew the Libyan arms embargo, which was originally
established by Resolution 2292 in 2016. What is the
importance of this exercise in relation to past training?
Firstly, it is important to remember that the joint
action of several European vessels and air assets in
international waters off the coast of Libya help to project
the mission´s power and increase the interoperability of
the Armed Forces of EU countries. In particular, the 7th
FOCOP had a great impact on the maritime traffic within
Source: European Union
10
Melissa Rossi
its Area of Operations (AOO), intercepting and later
clearing more than 80 vessels in only 2 days. This level
of coordination is unprecedented, and its main goal was
to concentrate all assets in the abovementioned routes,
promoting actions of maritime interdiction and increasing
the situational awareness in its AOO in order to signal
to the international community the growing presence of
European naval forces as a stabilizing element for Libya.
Moreover, it is important to highlight that Irini´s
renewal is a clear indicator of its effectiveness, since it
needs the unanimous vote of the 27 EU Member States
in order to be approved. According to Rear Admiral
Stefano Turchetto, Irini´s Operation Commander, “the
EU is therefore strengthening its engagement in securing
the maritime domain and stepping up activities at sea” by
increasing the interoperability of European forces and,
thus, continuously contributing to the deterrence of arms
trafficking in its AOO.
Despite the many challenges connected to Libya´s
stabilization, the ongoing presence of Operation Irini in
the waters of the Central Mediterranean has strengthened
the mission´s power of deterrence vis-à-vis arms
trafficking in Libya.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p10.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Navigating through Arctic waters: Novatek advances in Arctic LNG 2 project
L iquified natural gas (LNG) is a strategic energy source
in the global energy market. The resource, which
comes from the liquefaction of natural gas, has reached
worldwide as its transportation and marketing are carried
out by sea, occupying a volume almost 600 times smaller
than that of natural gas. Among the LNG’s advantages are
its supply, storage, transport and regasification by FSRU
(Floating Storage Regasification Unit) ships, capable of
anchoring at LNG terminals and thus connecting some
of the world’s main energy markets. Regarding the
LNG expansion by sea, how can the Arctic region be an
energetic hub to Russia?
On July 20, the first module of the Arctic LNG 2 project
was inaugurated at the Gydan Peninsula, in the Kara Sea.
With the capacity to hold 6.5 million tons of LNG per year
and an estimated value of USD 21 billion, the project can
produce 19.8 Mton/year from three production modules
linked to the Utrenneye field, which holds 590 bcm (billion
m3) of gas in reserves (Bulletin 168). Despite current
sanctions to Russia and the exit of Western enterprises —
such as the French companies Total Energies and Technip
— from Russian territory, the Arctic project accomplished
its schedule by turning operational its first LNG module,
Source: High North News
11
Luiza G. Guitarrari
estimated to launch its second and third modules between
2024 and 2025, respectively. Beyond that, Novatek, the
project’s major shareholder, expects the new volumes to
contribute to price stability and boost competitiveness on
the international market.
Another cornerstone of the project are the ships and
LNG terminals. By partnering with Asian shipyards,
Russia will build two new FSRU, capable of storing
360.000 m3 to be deployed in the Arctic Ocean. Currently,
Arctic LNG 2 holds a fleet of 15 Arc-7-class oil tanker
and icebreaker ships, and hopes to increase this number in
the coming years.
The possible imposition of European sanctions on
Russian LNG also encourages diversification towards
partners in the Asian market, including with Atlantic
countries. In summary, the redirection of exports can
stimulate Russian navigation to the East, reducing the
route from 30 days through the Baltic to 15 days through
the Arctic project.
In this sense, the Arctic LNG 2 project appears as a bet
by Novatek to expand the Russian presence in the Arctic
and, from infrastructure assets, contribute to the export of
LNG through the Northern Route.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p11.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
Second Russia-Africa Summit: Cooperation and Interests in the Contemporary World
R ussia's relations with African countries are an
important axis of Russian international action. In
addition to the historical component of these relations in
current tensions with the West, they are also relevant for
Moscow to avoid possible international isolation, which
could affect its position as a polar power. Thus, the Second
Russia-Africa Summit points to a significant expansion of
trade ties and strategic partnerships compared to the first
edition, held in 2019 (Boletim 107). In this sense, how
does this meeting showcase the aspirations and interests
of the parties involved, given the current international
scenario?
The Second Russia-Africa Summit, held in St.
Petersburg on July 27-28, 2023, produced a joint
declaration, containing more than 70 topics, which also
highlighted points of mutual interest between Russia
and the 49 participating African countries. In addition to
strengthening historical ties and dialogue mechanisms,
the summit addressed current issues, such as the climate
emergency, and spearheaded the establishment of trade,
technological, cultural and educational partnerships.
There is also a project for greater multilateral coordination,
with the promotion of the BRICS-Africa partnership and
greater articulation with Eurasian initiatives, such as the
Assistência militar russa no continente africano
12
José Gabriel Pires e Pérsio Glória de Paula
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The Ukraine conflict was also addressed, underlining
a clear interest from African countries in a diplomatic
resolution and the immediate implementation of
a ceasefire, as they have been suffering from the
international spillover effects of the conflict. Moreover,
given the suspension of the grain deal (Boletim 187)
between Russia and Ukraine, food security was also
central. Moscow announced donations and committed to
maintain food supplies to countries in the region. Security-
related issues such as arms exports and cooperation in
military-technical programs also underscore the high
level of Russian-African relations. In this area, the work
of Wagner Group was also highlighted, which, despite
the recent mutiny, is still relevant in the provision of
security and defense services in Africa.
Russia demonstrates that it is able to position itself
as a strategic partner in Africa, which strengthens its
aspirations directed at global power status. The scope
and amount of partnerships and agreements signed also
reveal that the West's strategy of isolating Moscow due to
the Ukrainian conflict has not had the expected support
from the Global South, especially from African countries.
Source: RAND
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p12.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 EAST ASIA
10 years of China’s initiative for global projection
T he year 2023 marks the 10th anniversary of
China’s notorious project for construction and
interconnection of transcontinental infrastructure, the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The magnitude of its
scope and the goals that shape its geopolitical scenario,
however, are worthy of highlight in and of themselves.
In 2013, when Chinese president Xi Jinping launched
the initiative, Chinese foreign relations were tumultuous:
militarily, conflict in the South China Sea and the East
China Sea was latent; economically, Beijing faced
growing economic dispute with the United States (US)
after the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Beside that
foreign pressure, environmental pollution and the excess
of industrial capacity affected Chinese development.
In that sense, the BRI’s implementation aimed to
solve those issues, as the China Goes West strategy would
reduce maritime conflict by intensifying trans-Eurasia
connectivity and allowing for State-run agencies and
Chinese companies to access foreign markets. Starting in
2021, China signed Memoranda of Understanding with
140 countries and 32 international organizations located
in Africa, North America, Latin America, Asia, Europe,
and the Pacific. In total, USD 962 billion were invested
in the BRI.
Since then, the initiative consolidated three general
objectives: promoting growth through the share of
Chinese development experience and articulation with
other economies; “re-globalizing” — with changes in
global interconnectivity — through land-sea connections
and “de-westernization” of the currently US and
13
Philipe Alexandre
European-centered world order; and, lastly, establishing a
new regionalism, with economic corridors and belts.
Ten years after its launch, BRI’s integration with
domestic and foreign Chinese priorities has become
more systematic. Chinese companies are expanding their
investments and international operations regarding the
green economy, digital infrastructure and the construction
industry. The regions which received the most investment
from the project are: East Asia (26%), West Asia (21%),
Sub-Saharan Africa (20%), the Middle East (15%) and
Latin America (10%). The main recipients of Chinese
investment were Hungary (USD 7,6 billion), Saudi Arabia
(USD 5,6 billion) and Singapore (USD 2,5 billion).
Still, capital, multilateral institutions and investors
coming from the US and Europe have more strength,
prestige and preference in relation to the Chinese.
Furthermore, the US and its allies hold technological
strength, competitive economies, sustainable infrastructure
and a more desired sociocultural system. In that sense,
the establishment of the BRI may have fueled Chinese-
American strategic competition even more, increased
environmental impacts and made some economies more
and more vulnerable.
Therefore, after ten years, the great Chinese initiative
has indeed not eliminated the domestic and international
challenges faced by Beijing. But, it is undeniable that the
country was an integral part of global political economy
in the last decade, and that it shall remain like so in the
future.
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p13.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 SOUTH ASIA
Indo-Sinhalese cooperation and Indian Maritime Strategy
O n July 29, Indian Khukri-class corvette Khanjar
docked at the port of Trincomalee in Sri Lanka.
The visit, which lasted for three days, was aimed at
strengthening cooperation between the two countries
in the maritime domain, with the realization of a joint
exercise between their navies and engagement with local
population, allowing for a friendly image of the Indian
navy. This visit takes place amid a context of growing
cooperation, with the visit of Sinhalese president Ranil
Wickremasinghe resulting in a commitment to boost
commercial relations and build infrastructure to further
deepen connectivity between the two countries, such
as power and oil lines and a bridge crossing the Palk
strait. What could be the reason for such rapprochement
between the two countries, considering Indian maritime
strategy?
India is a traditional ally of Sri Lanka, ranking among
its top commercial partners, in addition to the fact that its
recent support, in the form of around USD 4 billion, has
been crucial to the country, which recovers from severe
financial crisis (Boletim 171). Positioned between the
straits of Malacca and Ormuz, in a strategic region amid
SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
The new Impeccable submarine and Singapore’s maritime routes
I mpeccable, the first of four diesel-electric attack
submarines built in Germany and ordered by Singapore,
arrived at the Asian country’s naval base by the end of
June 2023. The acquisition of modern submarines is
part of a wide strategy to modernize the country’s armed
forces.
Singapore aims to replace its old submarines with the
new ones, as the former were acquired secondhand from
Sweden and customized for operation in its surrounding
waters. The new submarine belongs to the class Invincible
(Type 218 SG) and was projected for operating in the
country’s shallow and busy waters, being crucial for
its maritime security — especially given its strategic
location in the Malacca strait and the South China Sea,
two of the busiest trade routes in the world. Thus, control
and security of navigable waterways around Singapore
is fundamental for both its own economy and regional
stability.
German Invincible-class submarines do possess
comparative advantages, such as high level of automation,
14
Eduardo A. Mangueira
commercial routes of the Indian Ocean, the country has
recently been in the midst of a dispute between China
and India: the growing presence of Beijing in the Indian
Ocean is competitive for New Delhi, which seeks to
project itself as a main supplier of security in the region
(Boletim 169).
In addition to the counterbalancing of Chinese
presence, one can observe the establishment of a
particular field of action in the Indian Ocean through
the straightening of ties and regional integration. This
Neighbourhood First Policy manifests in the maritime
domain through the doctrine of Security and Growth for
All in the Region, which aims at strengthening security
cooperation in the Indian Ocean and reaffirming India as
a regional leader.
In that sense, India seeks to not only approach Sri
Lanka, but also invest in its maritime capacities and
port infrastructure. The importance of Colombo to the
establishment of an area of influence cannot be ignored,
especially considering the manner in which Sinhalese
fragility facilitates Indian cooperation and consequently
contributes to New Delhi’s ambitions in the region.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n187.p14.
Gabriela Veloso
significant useful load capacity, resilience and endurance
in operation and optimized ergonomics for Asian physical
features. An improvement of these capacities allows for
the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) to operate with
larger efficacy in its unique and challenging maritime
environment. The Impeccable will go through a series
of local tests at sea in order to reach full operational
capability (FOC), while Singaporean submariners will
be trained at the class’ flagship, Invincible, in Germany.
Continuous modernization of the Singapore Armed
Forces (SAF) is seen as a strategic priority vis-à-vis
the growing security threats in the Indo-Pacific and the
country’s need for an effective response capability in
scenarios of emergency or conflict. Alongside the new
submarines, the RSN has invested in warships, artificial
Intelligence and communication systems as well as other
capabilities for facing security challenges and engaging
in joint military exercises and exchange programs with
other countries in the region, including ASEAN member
States.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 The modernization of defense equipment and activities
is seen as an important measure for improving efficacy
and operational readiness of the RSN. The update and
acquisition of state-of-the-art equipment allows for the
Rising sea levels, sinking Pacific Islands
T he Pacific Islands share many geographical aspects,
among which an elevation of around three meters
above sea level at their highest points. With such a low
elevation, the peoples of the island countries face constant
peril due to the impacts of climate change, especially
rising sea levels, which put their own existence at risk.
For overcoming the problem, countries such as Tuvalu are
implementing national adaptation programs which cover
both local needs and the control over climate variability.
Therefore, how can Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Plan
(NAP) be perceived as the first step towards preservation
of the Pacific Islands?
According to the 2023 Special Report on the Ocean
and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC) by the
United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), rising sea levels will continue until
after the year 2100 and, in the best-case scenario, sea
levels will be one meter higher until 2300, which would
flood over 40% of urban areas of countries such as Fiji,
the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Tuvalu. Although
permanent submersion of territories isn’t an immediate
risk, rising sea levels bring gradual consequences
to the subsistence of these island countries, such as
15
SAF to face a multitude of security scenarios — including
the protection of vital maritime routes — as a response to
regional and global security challenges.
Source: CNA
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p14-15.
Guilherme Carneiro
more frequent floods, erosion of coastal areas, loss of
ecosystems, harm to the fishing sector, and salinization
of the soil, groundwater and surface water. In addition to
these aspects, Reuters reports that the effects of climate
change in the area cause overflowing to surrounding
countries, which is seen through an increase in cases of
climate refugees.
For overcoming this scenario, in May of this year
the Tuvalu government promoted a series of events,
alongside NGOs, civilians and the private sector, for
the development of the NAP, a medium and long term
project to be implemented across three years and that
will serve as leverage for additional financing in order to
establish more immediate action of adaptation to climate
change. The more important sectors for the country
will be prioritized: water, agriculture, disaster response,
coastal management and health care.
The small low-elevation island countries of the Pacific
will continue to be those most affected by greenhouse
gas emissions, which lead to the melting of ice caps
and subsequent rises in sea levels. For that reason,
plans of action in the medium and long term aiming at
rapid forms of adaptation are the first step towards the
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
preservation of ecosystems and territory. However, only
long term collective efforts involving the Pacific Islands
SPECIAL TOPICS
Offshore mining could be avoided through a moratorium
I nternational Seabed Authority (ISA) Council
Negotiations took place between July 10 and 28
2023 in Kingston, Jamaica. The deadline requested
to close the draft of the Authority's Mining Code or
provisionally consider plans for deep sea mining in light
of the current regulation, which ended on July 9th. This
happened due to the request made by the Republic of
Nauru, through Nauru Ocean Resources Incorporated
(NORI), a subsidiary of Canadian The Metals Company
(TMC, in English) (Boletim 173). The request, based
on a provision of the Annex to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), started a
two-years-period. However, during the elapsed time, the
Authority was unsuccessful, facing difficulties imposed
by the COVID-19 pandemic which limited in-person
gatherings.
While some companies justify the speculative move
to obtain such resources as being essential for equipment
production chains of renewable energy generators, Academia
and a growing group of governments are opposed, clarifying
that this activity has A devastating potential for the ocean.
Currently, 20 governments, including Brazil, Canada,
Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, have already spoken out
in favor of implementing a moratorium of at least ten years
16
as a whole, with the help of foreign players, will bring
permanent preservation of these island countries.
Source:IPCC
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n187.p15-16.
Victor Gaspar Filho
on deep sea mining, until there is enough knowledge about
environmental aspects. Canada's presence also stands out, as
it is the TMC's home country. Some companies have joined
the movement, such as BMW, Volvo, and Renault. In favor
of the activity there are countries like China, South Korea
and Russia, which have a consolidated mining industry and
a large infrastructure installed for refining. The search for
ocean minerals could lead to supply chain production of
resources such as cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel,
although with a high environmental cost.
In research recently carried out in the ClarionClipperton
Zone (the Pacific region where NORI proposes to exercise
its activities), 5,578 species were discovered in the habitat,
of which more than 5,000 still had not been documented.
Indeed, the recognition of a scarcity in available data on the
impacts of mining to the marine environment is fundamental
for it to shape decision-making. The ocean floor beyond
the Exclusive Economic Zones, known as “the Area”,
covers 54% of the oceans and is recognized as a common
world heritage. It is argued that the anticipated activity on a
commercial scale clashes with the very principle of Common
Heritage of Humanity, written in the body of UNCLOS,
which created the ISA.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n188.p16.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 SELECTED ARTICLES & DEFENSE NEWS
By: Captain (Retd) Leonardo F. de Mattos
► The First Polycrisis
PROJECT SYNDICATE, Harold James
► Planning defence projects for a new submarine era
THE STRATEGIST, Raelene Lockhorst
► Five Eyes in Our Time
GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES, George Friedman
► Looking South: A Conversation with GEN Laura Richardson on Security Challenges in Latin
America
CSIS
► America Needs A True Maritime Strategy
1945, James Holmes

GEOCORRENTE CALENDAR
Click on the boxes to acess the references: By: Maria Fernanda Császár and Taynah Pires

AUGUST
August Main events on August 11 - 24

11-12 13 18
30-05 20
30

AUSTRALIA ARGENTINA USA EQUADOR

MALABAR JOINT MILITARY PRIMARY - GENERAL MEETING OF US, SOUTH
GENERAL ELECTIONS
EXERCISE ELECTIONS KOREA AND JAPAN LEADERS

20 22-24 11-21
22-26 23

GUATEMALA SOUTH AFRICA CANADA ZIMBABWE

2nd TERM - GENERAL
BRICS SUMMIT 7th ASSEMBLY OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS
ELECTIONS
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY

17
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 REFERENCES

• Mercosur: Brazilian presidency, EU-Mercosur • 10 years of China’s initiative for global projection
agreement and Uruguayan claims EBEL, Pippa. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Ten years on – Council on
Presidente do Uruguai não assina documento final de encontro de líderes do Geostrategy. Council on Geostrategy, May 11 2023. Access on: Jun. 23
Mercosul. G1, Jul. 04 2023. Access on: Jul. 19 2023. 2023.
The Obstacles Facing an EU-Mercosur Trade Deal. Stratfor, Jul. 27 2023. YE, Min. Ten Years of the Belt and Road: Reflections and Recent Trends
Access on: Aug. 01 2023. | Global Development Policy Center. Global Development Policy Center,
Sep. 6 2022. Access on: Jun. 23 2023.
• US submarine pays unwanted visit to Cuba
China negotiating new military training facility in Cuba: Report. Al Jazeera,
• Indo-Sinhalese cooperation and Indian Maritime
Jun 20 2023. Access on: Aug 01 2023.
SEYLER, Matt; KAUFMAN, Ellie; STUKALOVA, Tanya. Cuban government Strategy
ARYAL, S.K., BHARTI, S.S. Evolution of ‘India’s Neighbourhood First Policy’
calls US nuclear submarine stop a 'provocative escalation'. ABC NEWS, Jul.
12 2023. Access on: Aug. 01 2023. Since Independence. Society, v. 60, p. 224-232, Apr. 06 2023. Access on:
Aug. 04 2023.
• Colombia and Nicaragua: recent implications on the PTI. Indigenously-built Indian naval ship to visit Sri Lanka. Economic Times,
dispute for maritime borders Jul. 29 2023. Access on: Aug. 03 2023.
La CIJ falla en contra de Nicaragua en disputa marítima con Colombia. CNN
Español, Jul. 13 2023. Access on: Jul. 19 2023. •
The new Impeccable submarine and Singapore’s
STEFANELLI, Justine. ICJ Issues Decision in Maritime Boundary Dispute maritime routes
between Nicaragua and Colombia. American Society of International Law, YEO, Myke. Singapore’s Navy receives first of four new German-built subma-
Jul. 19 2023. Access on: Jul. 21 2023. rines. Defense News, Jul. 21 2023. Access on: Jul. 31 2023.
HAMZAH, Aqil. First of 4 Invincible-class submarines arrives in Singapore |
• Between the crescent and the sword: Mali and the end The Straits Times. Strait Times, Jul. 20 2023. Access on: Aug. 01 2023.
of MINUSMA
OBERMEIER, A; RUSTAD, S. Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946-
• Rising sea levels, sinking Pacific Islands
2022. Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Jun. 7 2023. Access on: Jul. 19
2023. Sea level rise threatens the existence of the Marshall Islands | Pacific
OCHIENG, B. Lavrov in Africa: Have Wagner mercenaries helped Mali's fight Environment. SPREP, Jul. 11 2023. Access on: Jul. 18 2023.
against jihadists? BBC, Feb. 7 2023. Access on: Jul. 19 2023. Tuvalu fights back against climate change impacts with national adaptation
plan. Pasifika Environews, May 05 2023. Access on: Jul. 18 2023.
• Beyond the 2%: opportunities and challenges for NATO
WEISGERBER, Marcus. Defense Business Brief: NATO’s 2% scorecard; • Offshore mining could be avoided through a
Exports boom; LHX mulls divestiture; and a little more. Defense One, Jul. 10 moratorium
2023. Access on: Jul. 20 2023. ALBERTS, Elizabeth Claire. Calls grow to put the brakes on deep-sea mining
NATO defence spending is rising, but not fast enough. The Economist, Jul. as countries discuss rules. Mongabay, Jul. 12 2023. Access on: Jul. 19 2023.
12 2023. Access on: Jul. 20 2023. STANDING, Guy. The biggest gold rush in history is about to start in the deep
sea – leaving devastation in its wake. The Guardian, Jul. 07 2023. Acesso
• EUNAVFOR MED Irini carries out large-scale exercise em: Jul. 19 2023.
in the Central Mediterranean
Operation IRINI led the 7th Focused Operation in Mediterranean Sea.
Operation Irini, Jun. 15 2023. Access on: Jun. 19 2023. O mapa inicial (pág 04) do Boletim foi produzido pelo MapChart e segue as
ROSSI, Melissa. Operation Irini´s Ongoing Role in Enforcing the UN Arms diretrizes da Creative Commons.
Embargo in Libya. Euro-Gulf Information Centre, Jun. 26 2022. Access
on: Jul. 20 2023.

• Navigating through Arctic waters: Novatek advances

in Arctic LNG 2 project
HUMPERT, Malte. Two Asian Shipyards Continue to Build LNG Tankers for
New Russian Arctic Gas Project. High North News, Jun. 08 2023. Access
on: Aug. 03 2023.
STAALESEN, Atle. Russia's expansive Arctic industry make big advance as
first floating LNG platform sets out from Belokamenka towards Gydan. The
Barents Observer, Jul. 23 2023. Access on: Aug. 03 2023.

• Second Russia-Africa Summit: Cooperation and

Interests in the Contemporary World
SAUER, Pjotr. Putin promises free grain to six African nations after collapse of
Black Sea deal. The Guardian, Jul. 27 2023. Access on: Jul. 28 2023.
FEDERAÇÃO RUSSA. Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit.
Presidência da Federação Russa, Jul. 28 2023. Access on: Jul. 28 2023.

18
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 MAPA DE RISCO

O mapa intitulado “Principais Riscos Globais”,

exposto na página 04 deste Boletim, foi
elaborado pelos integrantes do Núcleo de Avaliação
da Conjuntura da Escola de Guerra Naval. Os
critérios utilizados para analisar os fenômenos
internacionais e determinar quais devem constar no
mapa se baseiam na relevância destes para o Brasil,
sendo eles: presença de brasileiros residentes na
região, influência na economia brasileira e o impacto
no Entorno Estratégico brasileiro. Os parâmetros para
categorização dos riscos seguem os interesses dos
membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança
das Nações Unidas, relevância dos atores envolvidos,
repercussão internacional, impacto regional e a
possibilidade da escalada de tensões. Após a seleção
► ALTO RISCO:
dos fenômenos, estes podem ser categorizados em
alto risco (vermelho), quando avalia-se grande
instabilidade social, política, militar ou econômica;
e também, em médio risco (laranja), para principais
situações de agravamento de riscos observados.
Os países em cinza representam conflitos
monitorados; caso tenha agravamento do risco, este
passa a ser vermelho ou laranja.
As análises são refeitas a cada edição do Boletim,
com o objetivo de reavaliar e atualizar as regiões
demarcadas, bem como a cor utilizada em cada um.
Desta forma, são sempre observados os principais
fenômenos, distribuídos em alto e médio risco.
Abaixo, encontram-se links sobre os riscos apontados
no mapa:
Por: Luísa Barbosa

• •ARMÊNIA E AZERBAIJÃO - Conflito em Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan slams Armenia for stalling peace efforts in
Karabakh. Daily Sabah, 04 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• BURKINA FASO - Conflitos internos: France suspends development and budget aid to Burkina Faso. France24, 07 ago.
2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• EQUADOR - Crise sociopolítica: Elecciones anticipadas no se suspenden y se declara estado de excepción en el país, tras
asesinato de Fernando Villavicencio. El Universo, 10 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 10 ago. 2023.

• HAITI - Conflitos internos: Kenya’s offer to send police to Haiti sparks human rights concerns. The Guardian, 05 ago. 2023.
Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• IÊMEN - Crise estrutural e regional: Two fighters affiliated with Yemen's separatist Southern Transitional Council killed in
suspected Al-Qaeda blast. The New Arab, 06 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• LÍBANO - Crise estrutural: Israeli-Lebanese border tensions raise fears of the unthinkable. Arab News, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso
em: 07 ago. 2023.

• MALI - Conflitos internos: Mali: soldiers killed in a jihadist ambush near Niger. Africanews, 04 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07
ago. 2023.

• MIANMAR - Conflitos internos: Myanmar Junta Grants Partial Pardon To Detained Leaders Amid Continuing Crisis and
Resistance. The News Lens , 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• NÍGER - Golpe de Estado: Mali, Burkina to send delegation to coup-hit Niger. Africanews, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07
ago. 2023.

• RÚSSIA E UCRÂNIA - Conflito militar: Russia unleashes missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, retaliating for an attack
on a tanker. Associated Press, 06 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• SÍRIA - Crise regional: Syria reports soldier deaths in Israeli strike near Damascus. DW, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago.
2023.

• SOMÁLIA - Crise estrutural: African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), frontline States agree to Enhance
Collaboration on Security. African Business, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• SUDÃO - Conflito interno: Malik Agar reveals government-proposed roadmap to end Sudan’s war. Sudan Tribune, 06 ago.
2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

► MÉDIO RISCO:
• BELARUS - Crise regional: Poland rushes troops to border, Belarus denies helicopter violation. Reuters, 01 ago. 2023.
Acesso: 07 ago. 2023.

• ETIÓPIA - Crises internas: Ethiopia accuses Amhara militia of seeking to overthrow government. Al Jazeera, 07 ago. 2023.
Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.
19
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023
 • ISRAEL - Crise regional: Israeli forces kill three Palestinian militants in West Bank. BBC News, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em:
07 ago. 2023.

• PERU - Crise sociopolítica: Peru: Government modifies and extends state of emergency in Puno Department through at least
Sept. 3. Crisis 24, 05 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DO CONGO - Crise regional: Families face starvation over insecurity in DRC-Uganda
border. The East African, 04 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• VENEZUELA - Crise estrutural: Nicolás Maduro interviene la Cruz Roja en Venezuela. El País, 05 ago. 2023. Acesso em:
07 ago. 2023.

► EM MONITORAMENTO:
• COREIA DO NORTE - Crise regional: Kim Jong Un tells North Korea arms factories to boost capacity. Reuters, 06 ago.
2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• EL SALVADOR - Instabilidade sociopolítica: Latin America urgently needs an alternative to Bukele’s security plans. El País,
07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• GUATEMALA - Instabilidade política: Avanzan preparativos para segunda vuelta electoral en Guatemala. Telesur, 05 ago.
2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• ÍNDIA - Instabilidade social: Three people killed, houses set ablaze in fresh violence in India's Manipur state. Reuters, 05
ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2024.

• IRÃ - Instabilidade regional: Thousands of US troops arrive in Red Sea amid ratcheting Iran tensions. Al Jazeera, 07 ago.
2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• LÍBIA - Instabilidade sociopolítica: Libya’s High State Council elects new leader as political gridlock deepens. Al Jazeera,
06 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• MAR DO SUL DA CHINA - Disputas regionais: Philippines summons Chinese ambassador over water cannon incident in
disputed South China Sea. AP News, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• MOÇAMBIQUE - Instabilidade entre governo e forças insurgentes: Secretário de Defesa americano discute com Nyusi
segurança em Cabo Delgado. VOA News, 02 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• NICARÁGUA - Crise política: La válvula de escape de Ortega. El País, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• NIGÉRIA - Crises internas: Navy lied about ship intercepted with suspected stolen oil, says Tompolo’s security firm. The
Guardian Nigeria, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• PAQUISTÃO - Crise sociopolítica: The arrest of Imran Khan has just deepened Pakistan’s political crisis. Arab News, 07
ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023

• REPÚBLICA CENTRO-AFRICANA - Instabilidade social: UN ease sanctions on Central African Republic. Military Africa,
02 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• SELVA DE DARIÉN - Crise migratória: Panamá acusa a Colombia de no colaborar en el manejo de la crisis migrante en el
Darién. France 24, 05 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

• TAIWAN - Tensões China-EUA: China releases TV documentary showcasing army's ability to attack Taiwan. Associated
Press, 07 ago. 2023. Acesso em: 07 ago. 2023.

20
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 188 • August | 2023