FOREIGN SERVICE ACADEMY

(MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS)

ISLAMABAD

41ST SPECIALIZED DIPLOMATIC COURSE

Critical Analysis of Pakistan’s Policy on the Russian Invasion of

Ukraine

by

Zohaib Nazir

Supervisor: Muhammad Taimur Fahad Khan (ISSI)

i
 PLAGIARISM UNDERTAKING

A research paper submitted to the Faculty of the Foreign Service Academy,

Islamabad, in fulfillment of the requirements of the 42 nd Specialized Diplomatic Course
(SDC).

I solemnly declared that the paper presented is solely my research work. Small
contribution / help, wherever taken, has been duly acknowledged and referenced and the
complete report has been written by me.

I understand the zero-tolerance policy of the Foreign Service Academy towards

plagiarism and its implications. Therefore, I, as an author of the research paper, declare
that no portion of my research has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is
properly referred / cited. The report reflects my own views and is not necessarily
endorsed by the Academy.

Signature of Probationary Officer: _______

Name of Probationary Officer: Zohaib Nazir

Dated: _______

ii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate, all praise be to
Allah, the Lord of the worlds. First and foremost, I must acknowledge my limitless thanks
to Allah, for His benedictions. I am sure that this work would have never become truth,
without His guidance.

I am grateful to some people, who worked hard with me from the beginning till
the completion of this research report, particularly my supervisor Mr. Muhammad

Taimur Fahad Khan and Director Program (FSA) Dr. Asima Rabbani who have
always been generous during all phases of the research work, and I highly appreciate the
efforts expended by my fellow colleagues for collection of the worthwhile data. I would
also like to express my wholehearted thanks to my family for their generous support they
provided me throughout my entire life. Because of their unconditional love and prayers, I
have the chance to complete this research work.

Lastly, I owe a deep sense of gratitude to Foreign Service Academy for giving me
an opportunity to complete this work.

Zohaib Nazir

iii
 Executive Summary
February 24, 2022, an inauspicious day for the world community, heralded the
unrest and instability for the already somewhat unstable world as Russia announced the
invasion of Ukraine under the pretext of national security. The conflict, which was
initially planned by Russia to be relatively short with massive gains, has transformed
itself into a costly war of attrition for both sides. While the imposition of crippling
sanctions from the United States and Western Europe would take their toll on the Russian
economy, developing countries of the world are likely to suffer the most from disruption
of global supply chains, and, regrettably, Pakistan is not an exemption. Russian-Pakistani
rapprochement, which began with a thaw in the 2000s, has also come under serious
threat, particularly after mounting pressure from the Western quarters on Pakistan to
denounce the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Pakistan has, so far, successfully maintained
its neutrality in the conflict by absenting itself from voting in the United Nations General
Assembly’s resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Pakistan’s principle
stance in the Assembly remained that it is committed to the fundamental principles of the
United Nations (U.N.) Charter, including abstaining from the use or the threat of use of
force and pacific settlement of disputes. At the same time, Pakistan stressed that it
believes in the principle of alike and indivisible security for all − a tacit indication by
Pakistan of the fact that the resolution did not address the legitimate security concerns of
Russia. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s principle stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict stays
largely impartial. To what extent this policy of Pakistan serves the national interest of
Pakistan, what could be the ramifications of such neutrality for Pakistan-United states
ties, and what aftermaths could Pakistan suffer in the domains of its economy, domestic
politics, and foreign policy? These are the few, yet critical, questions that warrant serious
deliberation. This paper analyzes the policy stance of Pakistan on the Russia-Ukraine
conflict in the light of historical ties of Pakistan with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) during the cold war era, and, in doing so, it arrives at the conclusion
that whether this neutral stance of Pakistan furthers its national interests or hampers its
growth by invoking the wrath of the West, particularly the United States, as a punishment
for not siding with it. Lastly, this paper also analyzes the impact of the conflict and
consequently the neutral stance of Pakistan on its domestic politics, economy, and foreign
policy.

iv
 Table of Contents

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................................iv
Section 1........................................................................................................................................................1
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Prologue...............................................................................................................................................
1.2 Background..........................................................................................................................................
1.3 Statement of Problem...........................................................................................................................
1.4 Scope of the Research..........................................................................................................................
1.5 Review of Literature............................................................................................................................
Section 2........................................................................................................................................................7
Narrative Part................................................................................................................................................7
2.1 Tracing the roots of conflict from the historical perspective.........................................................
2.2 Miscalculation of Ukrainian identity on part of Russia.......................................................................
2.3 The Road to war and beyond...............................................................................................................
2.4 Deconstructing Pakistan’s Neutral Stance.........................................................................................
Section 3......................................................................................................................................................12
Analytical Part............................................................................................................................................12
3.1 Pakistan’s Neutrality and Implications for its Economy...................................................................
3.1.1 Pakistan’s Bilateral trade with Russia and Ukraine: Facts and Figures.........................12
3.1.2 Challenge 1: Securing Renewal of Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+).....13
3.1.3 Challenge 2: Securing Future IMF Loans.......................................................................13
3.2 Pakistan’s Neutrality and Implications for Domestic Politics...........................................................
3.2.1 Challenge 1: Nation at odds and Politically Inspired Divisions Abound........................15
3.2.2 Challenge 2: Political Polarization and Lack of Consensus on Important Matters........16
3.3 Pakistan’s Neutrality and Implications for Foreign Policy................................................................
3.3.1 Challange1: The Tricky Business of Balancing...............................................................17
3.3.2 Challenge 2: U.S. Unbridled Support for India: A security Dilemma for Pakistan.........18
Section 4......................................................................................................................................................19
Concluding Remarks................................................................................................................................19
Section 5......................................................................................................................................................20
Recommendations....................................................................................................................................20
Bibliography................................................................................................................................................21

v
Abbreviations and Key Terms

U.N.: United Nations

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

IMF: International Monetary Fund

FATF: Financial Action Task Force

EU: European Union

INF: Intermediate Nuclear Forces

GSP+: Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus

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vii
Section 1: Introduction

Section 1
Introduction
This section introduces the origins of present conflict between Russia and Ukraine
and touches upon the historical relations of Pakistan with USSR and subsequently relations of
Pakistan with Russia and Ukraine. An effort has been made to deconstruct Pakistan’s neutral
stance from the bitter experience of block politics during cold war era. Finally, this section
provides statement of problem, scope of the research, and concludes with review of the
literature.

1.1 Prologue

As envisioned, Ukraine’s prospects of joining NATO did not go well with Russia, and
February 2022 prognosticated a devastating war that would impact the whole world in
general and developing nations in particular. The war has already manifested its cruel
consequences in form of global food shortages, rising commodities prices, and disturbed
supply chains. Moreover, the war has also obligated the rest of the countries to take sides.
General Assembly’s resolution demanding Russia to immediately stop its military offensive
in Ukraine overwhelmingly captured the support for Ukraine with 141 votes in favor, 35
abstentions, and only 05 against the resolution.

Pakistan, unsurprisingly, in a bid to drift away from its policy of becoming part of any
one block, as it did during the cold war, abstained from voting on the resolution. Apparently,
Pakistan did not censure Russia’s invasion and took the position in General Assembly that it
is committed to the fundamental principles of the UN Charter including territorial integrity
and sovereignty of states. Although Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan’s permanent
representative to the U.N., did not mention Russia in his discourse, he asserted that Pakistan
puts its weight behind the principle of undividable security for all. This statement tacitly
approved the legitimate security concerns of Russia vis-à-vis NATO expansion eastwards.

While few believe that Pakistan’s neutral stance is an attempt to get out of the fold of
American influence, the outlook is not that simpler. Had Pakistan voted against Russia, it
could have secured Western support, and critics submit that the negative fallout of tilting too

1
Section 1: Introduction

much towards Russia and China is likelier given Pakistan’s dependence on international
financial institutions on which the West maintains unrivaled influence. To understand things
in a clear way, deconstructing Pakistan’s historical ties with the USSR, and subsequently
with Russia and Ukraine, and the literal context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are vital.

1.2 Background

On Pakistan’s accession to an independent state, the relations between USSR and

Pakistan got off to an unpromising start as USSR did not even send a customary message of
felicitation1. On the other hand, U.S. showed friendly predisposition towards Pakistan. Most
of the 1950s and 1960s eras were marked by the U.S. military and economic assistance to
Pakistan, and strategic cooperation between the two states manifested itself in the four
alliances (CEATO, SENTO, Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 1954, and Bilateral
Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1959). However, the commitments made in the 1959
agreement did not guide US policy in the Pakistan-India wars of 1965 and 1971. When
Pakistan invoked the provision of Article 1 of the 1959 Bilateral Defence Cooperation
Agreement, U.S. refuses to help claiming that Joint Resolution on the Middle East limited the
US obligation to come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of aggression by a communist
state.2

The cost of alliances was, however, not only limited to the U.S. reneging on its
promises, USSR viewed the tilt of Pakistan towards its ideological rival as an opportunity to
hurt it at every opportunity. First, USSR abused its veto power in Security Council to prevent
adoption of every resolution on Kashmir, and then gave India a cover from Chinese threat in
1971 war against Pakistan by concluding a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with
India. Any further prospects of thaw in relations between USSR and Pakistan was further
marred by Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan Jihad against Soviet forces during 1980s.

On dissolution of USSR in 1991, Pakistan recognized Ukraine's independence.

Diplomatic relations between both countries were established 1992. Lately, Pakistan has
developed close economic and military ties with Ukraine. Ukraine and Pakistan have been
cooperating with each other in educational sectors as well as cultural exchanges. Pakistan and

1
Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s foreign policy (1947-2009), A Concise History, 38-39.
2
Ibid, 47.

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Section 1: Introduction

Ukraine also heavily cooperate with each other in aerospace engineering, aerospace
technologies, bio-medical sciences and science and technology.3

Pakistan-Russia relations, however, did not see the signs of rapprochement till early
2000s. However, when Pakistan announced to join the NATO-led coalition to crackdown on
the jihadist organization and Al-Qaeda, it was welcomed by Russia and relations between
both the countries improved significantly. The recent warm relations between Russia and
Pakistan are product partly of warming ties between India and the United States and partly of
Pakistan’s attempt to wriggle out of the Western influence.

Regarding Russian aggression on Ukraine, it would be erroneous to say that it was

unprovoked. The dominant opinion in the Western circles is that Russia aggression was
uncalled for, which is somewhat a misnomer. Kremlin’s claims of West going back on its
promises made in the 1990s of not expanding the NATO eastwards are contested. 4 However,
sufficient evidence is available from the declassified documents that makes it clear that
NATO indeed made a pledge of not expanding eastwards on the condition that reunified
Germany remains in its fold.5 On 09 February 1990, James Baker, the then U.S. Secretary of
State, in one of its conversations with Mikhail Gorbachev stated: “NATO is mechanism of
securing the U.S. presence in Europe. If NATO is liquidated, there will be no such
mechanism in Europe. We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other
European countries as well it is important to have guarantees if the United States keep its
presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present
military jurisdiction will spread in eastern direction.” 6

However, these assurances were breached when in 1999 Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland joined NATO. Therefore, while current Russian aggression on Ukraine is based
on various grievances, the assertion of Western infidelity with regards to expanding NATO
eastwards has featured significantly in the Moscow’s rhetoric. In light of above stated
actualities, Pakistan’s policy of not taking any side in General Assembly may seem rational

3
Linda Kay, "Ukraine to Upgrade Pakistan Air Force Il-78 Tanker Plane", Defense World, 4 June 2020.
4
Did NATO betray Russia by expanding to the East?
Available from https://www.france24.com/en/russia/20220130
5
Did NATO promise Russia never to expand to the east?
Available from https://www.dw.com/en/top-stories/s-9097
6
Anna Melyakova, “Document No. 119: Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James
Baker”, February 9, 1990, 675-684.

3
Section 1: Introduction

and cogent for two reasons: first the bad experience of becoming part of one bloc in cold war
politics needs not be repeated, and second Pakistan’s stance of indivisible security for all
holds water. Nevertheless, there is one catch: the neutral policy of Pakistan on Russian
aggression on Ukraine may hurt Pakistan’s principled stance on Kashmir. India may cement
its claim on Kashmir and counter Pakistan’s claim by linking it to the Pakistan’s
unwillingness to side with the oppressed i.e., Ukraine in this case. Furthermore, implications
of Pakistan’s policy for its foreign policy, domestics politics and economy start manifesting
themselves in the times to come.

1.3 Statement of Problem

Russian invasion of Ukraine has once again made the countries to confront the
question of siding with the right or wrong depending on the prevailing alliances and national
interests. Pakistan has attempted to break away from the bloc politics by abstaining from vote
on General Assembly’s resolution condemning Russian invasion of Ukraine. This neutral
stance of Pakistan is sure to impact Pakistan in number of ways. In what ways Pakistan’s
policy could be beneficial or detrimental and to what degree such a policy serves its national
interests, particularly economic welfare?

1.4 Scope of the Research

This research work highlights the impact of Pakistan’s policy regarding Russian
invasion of Ukraine on the domestic politics, foreign policy and economy of Pakistan.
Furthermore, this paper also touches upon what would have been the scenario had Pakistan
voted in favor of (or against) the General Assembly’s resolution and adhered to its former
policy of becoming part of the bloc politics.

1.5 Review of Literature

While assessing Pakistan’s neutrality in the Russian-Ukraine conflict, an element of

surprise is likely given that Pakistan-Russia relations improved only after 2014, and Pakistan
shares considerable trade ties with Ukraine, particularly in imports of defense equipment. 7
7
Pakistan imports from Ukraine [2022 Data 2023 Forecast 2009-2021 Historical].
Available from https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports/ukraine

4
Section 1: Introduction

However, many analysts believe that the souring relationship of Pakistan with the
West, especially the United States, underpins Pakistan’s muffled response to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. India’s growing defense capabilities and strategic relationship with the
United States, Pakistan’s declining engagement with the United States in the aftermath of the
superpower’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the indifference of the United States towards
the revocation of Article 370 and 35A by India compelled Pakistan to not put other
relationships in jeopardy by supporting the United States’ stance on the Russian invasion. 8

Particularly, Pakistan’s response to the Western calls was one of the hardest. Ex-
Prime Minister Imran Khan's rejoinder to the European Union (EU) envoys' letter, asking
Islamabad to denounce Russia invasion of Ukraine, was stringent to the point that he not only
countered their demand, but also questioned where the same countries were when New Delhi
violated international law and commandeered the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 9 Whatever the
rationale behind Pakistan’s neutral stance be, experts are suspicious of Pakistan’s eyeballing
the Western bloc. The fears among analysts are that Western diplomatic support to Pakistan
will wither away, and it will then be extremely painstaking job to secure future IMF loans if
the need be. 10

On foreign policy front, scholars are of the view that Pakistan will have to recalibrate
its external policy in a way that its tripartite partnership, including itself Russia and china,
11
does not harm its waned relations with the West to the extent of extinction. While some see
merit in Pakistan’s neutral policy on the Russian invasion, other believe that despite of
changing geo-political realities, amicable relations with the West, particularly with the United
States, are indispensable for Pakistan given the global influence wielded by the United
States.12

The last, but not the least, concern expressed by analysts of Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis
Russian-Ukraine war is domestic politics of Pakistan. Fragmentation and polarization of
unprecedented level simmered in domestic politics of Pakistan as a result of previous
8
Namra Naseer, “Assessing Pakistan’s Neutrality in the Ukraine Crisis”, South Asian Voices, (March 2022).
9
Nafees Takar, “Pakistan Walks Thin Line Between Russia, Ukraine” voanews, (March 2022).
10
Hamza, “Pakistan under Western pressure to condemn Russia’s invasion in Ukraine”, Business Standard, 7
March 2022.
11
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “U.S. Warns Pakistan of Ukraine war Consequences “, DAWN, 05 March, 2002.
12
Ambassador William B. Taylor “United States speaks clearly on Russia’s Ukraine war” United States Institute
of Peace, 03 June 2022.

5
Section 1: Introduction

governments’ policy of not condemning Russian invasion. The opposition stole the
opportunity and started enumerating instances on which Pakistan needs backing by the West.
The turn of the events leading to the removal of previous government by the vote of no
confidence, and conspiracies surrounding U.S.-led regime change narrative of ex-Prime
Minister Imran Khan, effectively divided the people as well as political elites of the country
into two groups. Policy analysts share the fear that his fragmentation is not only detrimental
for the stability of the country, but it also entails the ample space for manipulation and
exploitation of all the information available over the internet, which, in turn, may worsen
Pakistan’s internal and external vulnerabilities. 13

All in all, putting the available literature in a nutshell, Pakistan’s policy of neutrality
on Russian invasion of Ukraine prognosticates repercussions for Pakistan in the arenas of
domestic politics, foreign policy and in-house economy. Yet it remains to be seen how
Pakistan reacts to the domestic and external challenges and maintains a healthy relationship
with the West despite showing neutrality in the event which concerns the West more than any
other global issue at present time.

13
Salma Shaeen, “Fake News, Escalation, and Polarization: Pakistan’s Disinformation Vulnerabilities, South
Asian Voices, 12 May 2022.

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Section 2: Narrative Part

Section 2
Narrative Part

This section traces the roots of present conflict from the historical lens, particularly Russians’
perspective of Ukrainian identity as being fluid and shared identity between Ukrainians,
Russians and Belarussians. This section further talks about miscalculation on part of Russia
in gauging how Ukrainians view themselves, particular after the collapse of USSR. Finally,
this section deconstructs Pakistan’s neutral stance in the present conflict between Russia and
Ukraine and elucidates that this neutral stance, by no measures, means that Pakistan condone
the atrocities committed by Russia.

2.1 Tracing the roots of conflict from the historical perspective

While the list of grievances as a validation for the special military operation in
Ukraine by Russia is exhaustive, the conflicts surrounding the possible expansion of NATO,
and the shape of the post-Cold war security architecture in Europe feature significantly in
Moscow’s oratory to indicate that the invasion was legitimate. 14 Moreover, on February 21,
2022, the speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin identified more fundamental issues of
the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood. The speech emphasized Putin’s view that
the historical unity among Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians, all of which trace their
origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth, is innate, and thus this unity shall
become the motive for aspiring to a shared political future for the modern states of Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus.

The upshot of this view is that the West is manipulating Ukraine and Belarus to create
their distinctive identities which are not aligned with Russian identity in any way. Putin
tends to portray himself as symbolizing Russia’s imperial tradition when he uses language
similar to his imperial predecessors in describing the Russian-Ukraine relationship. 15 He
blames the European Union and NATO for manipulating Ukrainian national sentiment as part
of their own geopolitical competition with Russia, and, in doing so, pushing Ukraine away
14
Wong, Edward, Jakes, Lara, "NATO Won't Let Ukraine Join Soon. Here's Why". The New York Times, 13
January 2022.
15
Perrigo Billy, "How Putin's Denial of Ukraine's Statehood Rewrites History", Time, 22 February 2022.

7
Section 2: Narrative Part

from its authentic identity alignment with Russia. Thus Putin believes that the West is
following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in exploiting Ukraine and Belarus as
part of an anti-Russia Project.

Indeed, all along Putin’s time in office, Russia has maintained a policy toward
Ukraine and Belarus premised on the assumption that their respective identities are fluid and
therefore artificial. The overwhelming importance that Putin assigns to the notion of Russian-
Ukrainian-Belarusian shared identity helps in deconstructing the origins of the current
conflict, particularly why Moscow was willing to risk an all-encompassing war on its borders
when there was no imminent military threat neither from Ukraine nor from NATO. 16 Putin’s
view of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus from the shared identity lens shows that Moscow’s
ambitions are not only limited to desisting Ukraine from joining NATO, but the overarching
aim of Russia is to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically.

2.2 Miscalculation of Ukrainian identity on part of Russia

In 2008, Putin has reportedly commented that Ukraine is not even a country during
his meeting with then-U.S. president George W. Bush. While announcing the annexation of
Crimea, he also described Ukrainians and Russians as “one people”. 17 Lately, in his pre-
invasion address, Putin asserted that the current Ukrainian state was a creation of the Soviet
Union and should be renamed for its supposed architect, the Bolshevik leader Vladimir
Lenin. This strong conviction of shared identity between Ukrainians and Russians on part of
Russia helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow seemed to assume that Ukrainians,
at least in the eastern part of the country, would be inclined to accept reintegration into the
Russian sphere of influence because of shared linguistic, cultural, and religious ties with
Russia.

However, Russia has caught itself up in a costly war of attrition because this
calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven diametrically wide of the mark. The past
three decades—and especially the years since the 2004-2005 “Orange Revolution” followed
by 2014’s “Revolution of Dignity” and the ensuing Russian annexation of Crimea and
16
Jeffrey Mankoff, “Putin likes to talk about Russians and Ukrainians as ‘one people.’ Here’s the deeper
history.” The Washington Post, 10 February 2022.
17
Jesse Granger, “The Fall of Crimea: One Marine's Story”, Sandboxx, 29 January 2015.

8
Section 2: Narrative Part

intervention in Donbas—have witnessed a significant solidification of Ukrainian civic

identity.18 The current Ukrainian generation has grown up in an independent Ukraine that, for
all its shortcomings, has maintained a vigorous democracy and is becoming increasingly
European in its outlook. Russia’s self-confidence that the war could be won effortlessly and
swiftly—that ordinary Ukrainians would welcome Russian forces as liberators—rested on a
basic failure to grasp not only the deep roots of Ukrainian identity, but also the extent to
which Ukraine itself has transformed in the years since the Soviet collapse. 19 The current war
has further united Ukrainian citizens from all regions and linguistic and religious
backgrounds while reinforcing the divide between Ukrainian and Russian identities.

2.3 The Road to war and beyond

The Crimean annexation of 2014 in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity is a

lynchpin in the wider Russo-Ukraine war. The briskness with which Russia devoured Crimea
(where a majority of the population is ethnically Russian) reinforced Russian convictions
about the weakness and phoniness of the Ukrainian state and encouraged Moscow to
undertake a similar effort across many of the Russian-speaking regions of eastern and
southern Ukraine. However, to Moscow’s utter surprise and frustration, the Crimea strategy
had limited success in other parts of the country. On top of it, the never-ending conflict in
Donbas and mounting economic penalties from the United States and the European Union
strangled the Russian economy.

Moreover, in 2016, NATO reacted to the apprehensions of the member states along
Russian borders by fortifying its military capabilities in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
and Poland and standing by its 2008 pledge that Ukraine and Georgia will eventually become
members.20 Further, to the chagrin of Russia, in 2019, the United States abandoned the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty after convicting Russia of noncompliance, a step
that would allow for nuclear deployments in Central and Eastern Europe as well as around
the Russian boundary in Asia.21 The worsening security environment and the assumption that
18
Anaïs Marin, “The peoples of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are one nation”, Chatham House, 13 May 2021.
19
Ishaan Tharoor, “How Russia’s invasion strengthened Ukrainian identity”, The Washington Post, 24 August
2022.
20
Colin Brown, "EU allies unite against Bush over NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine". The
Independent, 3 April 2017.
21
Theodore A. Postol, "Russia may have violated the INF Treaty. Here's how the United States appears to have
done the same". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 7 February 2019.

9
Section 2: Narrative Part

the West was too engrossed in other affairs to react vehemently pushed Putin to gamble on
full-scale invasion. With almost 200,000 military personnel deployed across the Ukrainian
border when the war began, Russia has not been able to carry out sustained occupation due to
counter insurgency sustained by foreign support.

Now the situation on ground is that crippling sanctions from the European Union and
the United States are taking toll on the Russian economy. With most of its banking sector cut
off from access to the dollar-denominated financial system, Russia is in the middle of a
looming economic crisis. The not-so-impressive performance of the Russian military so far
and the devastating impacts of the sanctions have failed to hinder its ambitions. Russia could
still be victorious on the battlefield—but only with high accompanying costs. The decisive
ending of the conflict will hinge on the West’s response and, principally, on Ukrainians’
alacrity to fight for a nation Putin believes does not and should not exist.

2.4 Deconstructing Pakistan’s Neutral Stance

Pakistan’s position on the conflict is driven by the imperative of safeguarding the

country’s vital interests. The Pakistani government’s decision not to vote in the General
Assembly was in line with its policy of not becoming part of the bloc politics. Pakistan’s
stress over dialogue and diplomacy to bring an end to the dispute highlights that it wants to
become a partner in peace, not in conflict. Western countries are uneasy with Pakistan for the
obvious reason that no clear denunciation of the Russian invasion came from Islamabad.
However, since day one of the conflict Pakistan has been consistently emphasizing the
fundamental principles of the UN Charter, including self-determination of peoples, non-use
or threat of use of force, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, pacific
settlement of disputes, and equal security for all.22

One misnomer that can spur out of Pakistan’s neutral policy on the Russian-Ukraine
war is that by not condemning Russian aggression Pakistan has turned a blind eye toward the
victims of war. However, this is not true. Pakistan has been engaged with both Russia and
Ukraine and European partners and is willing to contribute toward efforts for a diplomatic
solution. Pakistan’s sympathy for the victims of the war is unquestionable. The dispatch of

22
Baqir Sajjad Syed “ Neutrality in Ukraine war to safeguard Pakistan’s interests”, DAWN, 19 March 2022.

10
Section 2: Narrative Part

humanitarian assistance for the people of Ukraine speaks volumes about Pakistan’s concern
for the sufferers. Thus, Pakistan’s neutral stance shall not be construed as being
commensurate to an act of callousness. The neutral stance in no way means that Pakistan
does not have sympathy for the Ukrainians.

In essence, Pakistan’s neutral stance can be understood in terms of preserving

relations with both Ukraine and Russia. Pakistan has significant economic partnerships with
both countries, including the sizeable imports of wheat grain, combustible engines, and
defense equipment from Ukraine and cereals, edible vegetables, and mineral oils from
Russia.23 Thus jeopardizing relations with any one country and creating a diplomatic crisis by
voting in favor of or against any one country was simply not aligned with the national
interests of Pakistan. Last but not least, the increasing level of understanding and cooperation
between Russia and China simply ruled out Pakistan’s vote against Russia. Thus, though the
West is angered and has shown frustration over Pakistan for not condemning the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, Pakistan had its own imperatives for maintaining a neutral position in
the Russo-Ukraine war.

23
Pakistan imports from Russia [2022 Data 2023 Forecast 2009-2021 Historical].
Available from https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports/russia

11
Section 3: Analytical Part

Section 3
Analytical Part
In this section analysis has been presented as to what are the short-term and long-term
implications and ramifications for Pakistan for not giving any voice in the UNGA to the
resolutions put forward for condemning Russian aggression. Three specific areas namely
economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy have been particularly focused in this section
and challenges for each along with some workable solutions have been identified.

3.1 Pakistan’s Neutrality and Implications for its Economy

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a point of flux in world affairs, similar to the US-
China rapprochement in the early 1970s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As the
situation is unfolding, there are many enigmas including how it will impact Russia itself and
other vulnerable countries. Its consequential character is apparent but the direction is not
clear. Pakistan should be concerned about what evolving situation heralds for its economic
future.

3.1.1 Pakistan’s Bilateral trade with Russia and Ukraine: Facts and Figures

In today’s world of economic integration and dependency, taking or not taking any
one side comes at a cost. Similar is the case with Pakistan’s middle-of-the-road stance on the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. Historically, Pakistan has sustained decent bilateral economic
ties with Russia and Ukraine. In the last 24 years, Pakistan’s exports to Russia have improved
at an annualized rate of 13.6% from USD 13.1M in 1996 to USD 279M in 2020, while
Russia’s exports to Pakistan have amplified at an annualized rate of 10.2% from USD 67.6M
in 1996 to USD 699M in 2020.24

Similarly, in the last 24 years, Pakistan’s exports to Ukraine saw an annualized

growth of 15.5% from USD 18.1M in 1996 to USD 573M in 2020, while Ukraine’s exports
24
Pakistan/Russia page of the Observatory of Economic Complexity website accessible
at https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/pak/partner/rus#historical-data

12
Section 3: Analytical Part

to Pakistan have augmented at an annualized rate of 14.8% from USD 2.98M to USD 82.1M
in 2020.25 In 2021, Pakistan’s trade value with Russia was USD 711M including USD 537M
in imports.26 With Ukraine, the trade value touched USD 800M including USD 739M in
imports.27 Thus far, Pakistan enjoys friendly, though modest, trade relations with Ukraine, a
large component of which is the agriculture sector, particularly wheat. Moreover, lately,
Pakistan and Russia have agreed to promote bilateral cooperation in all sectors including
defense, trade, economy, and energy. However, the conflict has the potential to dislocate
Pakistan’s new strategic fulcrum of geo-economics.

3.1.2 Challenge 1: Securing Renewal of Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+)

To begin with, the European Union is Pakistan’s largest export destination, and
Pakistan was granted Generalized System of Preferences + (GSP+) status in 2014, which
permits the removal of tariffs on most EU tariff lines. This status is set to expire on 31 st
December 2023, and Pakistan will have to apply for the renewal of the status and commit to
the specific conventions to upkeep the GSP+ status. Russia has increased its economic
involvement in Pakistan over the years, as typified by signing an agreement in 2021 to
construct a national gas pipeline in Pakistan worth $2.5B, which the former Pakistani
government claimed was going ahead, even after the invasion. This is in contrast to the EU,
which aims to cut its gas imports from Russia by two-thirds in one year. Therefore, the
dilemma for Pakistan will be to choose between Russia and the West for economic
imperatives.

3.1.3 Challenge 2: Securing Future IMF Loans

Secondly, it is also a matter of concern whether Pakistan will be able to secure future
IMF loans when IMF itself has made its support for Ukraine vividly clear through an
emergency funding of $1.4B. Decision-making within the IMF echoes the relative positions
of its member countries in the global economy. Countries that have strongly supported

25
Pakistan/Russia page of the Observatory of Economic Complexity website accessible
at https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/pak/partner/rus#historical-data
26
Pakistan/Russia page of the Observatory of Economic Complexity website accessible
at https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/pak/partner/rus#historical-data
27
Ukraine/Pakistan page of the Observatory of Economic Complexity website accessible
at https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ukr/partner/pak

13
Section 3: Analytical Part

Ukraine, such as the US and the UK, have a greater share of IMF votes than Russia and
Pakistan. Therefore, based on the stance of the IMF itself and the share of votes, Pakistan
might find itself in a precarious situation to secure loans from the lender of the last resort
without taking a tougher stance on Russia – a stance that is in line with the wishes of the
West – and thereby jeopardizing its relations with one of the major energy and grain suppliers
of the world.

Lastly, the costs of the conflict are massive for countries like Pakistan which are oil
importers. The conflict will also adversely affect Pakistan’s wheat import from Ukraine,
which accounted for 39% of the total imported wheat in the previous fiscal year. 28 The
potential snowball effects of this conflict are massive, with a surge in electricity rates, raising
of interest rates by the central bank, wage-increase demand to meet increased living costs,
increase in prices by businesses to compensate for higher wages, and workforce cuts leading
to unemployment.

To Conclude, with ongoing geopolitical tensions rising amid the Russia-Ukraine

situation, there is no doubt that the economic aftermath will impact Pakistan. With the
country’s economy already in shambles, Pakistan could face a deterioration of current
account and fiscal balances and torpor of economic development. Pakistan needs to prudently
assess its strategic position in the global and regional context and make informed but
opportune decisions that are essential for its survival. So far, despite the reaction by Western
powers, Pakistan has done well in maintaining its nonaligned posture, and its response to the
invasion of Ukraine shall not necessarily be surprising when looking at the situation through
a geo-economics lens. Nonetheless, the invasion will undoubtedly have a significant bearing
on Pakistan, which will have to navigate muddy waters to maintain its economic partnerships
with Russia and the West concurrently in the face of Western pressures and sanctions.

3.2 Pakistan’s Neutrality and Implications for Domestic Politics

Pakistan is facing a principally challenging time when it comes to political stability.

Pakistan’s impartial policy vis-à-vis the Russian-Ukraine war has a significant bearing on the
domestic politics of Pakistan. Fragmentation and polarization of unprecedented level
28
Abdul Kamal, “Impending economic repercussions of Russia-Ukraine conflict on
Pakistan.” Pakistan Today, 6 March 2022.
14
Section 3: Analytical Part

simmered in domestic politics of Pakistan as a result of previous governments’ policy of not

condemning the Russian invasion. The opposition stole the opportunity and started
enumerating instances in which Pakistan needs backing from the West, particularly the USA.
The turn of events leading to the removal of the previous government by the vote of no
confidence, and conspiracies surrounding the U.S.-led regime change narrative of ex-Prime
Minister Imran Khan, effectively divided the people as well as political elites of the country
into two groups. Ex-Prime Minister’s followers seem ready to believe their leader when he
tells them, misleadingly, that Pakistan would benefit from a close relationship with Russia
and that Pakistan’s sovereignty is endangered by an alliance among Israel, India, and the
United States. This type of fragmentation is detrimental to the stability of the country, which,
in turn, may worsen Pakistan’s internal and external vulnerabilities.

3.2.1 Challenge 1: Nation at odds and Politically Inspired Divisions Abound

Now the current situation is such that the nation is divided—between Khan’s
followers and supporters of Pakistan’s traditional political parties, between Islamists and
supporters of Western democracy, and between protagonists of the military and its
faultfinders. Imran Khan’s opponents identify him as a dangerous populist refusing to follow
democratic norms; his supporters see him as an anti-corruption messiah who has been
removed from office through a U.S.-backed conspiracy. The hatred and resentment among
the supporters of the two major parties of the country spiraled to such an extent that current
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who was elected by parliament in April 2022 after Khan’s
removal from office, was heckled by PTI supporters while on a religious pilgrimage to
Islam’s holiest places in Saudi Arabia. Since former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran
Khan lost a parliamentary vote of no confidence, the cricketer-turned-politician has been
threatening continued street protests by his supporters to demand early elections; however,
parliamentary elections are not due until next year, and Sharif can stay in office until October
2023 as long as he retains the support of the majority in parliament. But the specter of
political conflict, together with an economic meltdown, continues to pester the government.

15
Section 3: Analytical Part

3.2.2 Challenge 2: Political Polarization and Lack of Consensus on Important Matters

The ongoing battle of “Us vs Them” and “bad vs good politicians” have radically
shaped Pakistani society. Such irretrievable changes due to lack of political accord have
damaged the very tolerant feature of Pakistani society. This changing nature of politics will
undoubtedly shake the edifice of national unity and integration as it brings with it multiple
undesirable fundamentals which become poisonous to societal development. On account of
recent political discords, the non-existence of political unity, and the emergence of obnoxious
political culture, Pakistan has already started moving towards political polarization. The main
causes of divisive politics are manifold; however, one of the most prominent ones is the lack
of political consensus. There have always been grave differences between treasury benches
and opposition on concerns of national importance, but the difference of opinion on taking
sides − with a relatively new relationship with Russia over the West − has dented the politics
of the country. Hence, the prominent role of lack of political consensus on matters of
important concern as the origin of political polarization cannot be rubbed under the carpet.

To exterminate the menace of such divisive politics, it is sine-qua-non to sign a new

charter of democracy that ensures the peaceful transition of power among parties without any
political wrangling. All the ideological differences between parties must be sorted out,
particularly the issue of taking sides with countries or maintaining a balance in relationships
with all countries. The basic ideology of every political party should be national interest
rather than holding grudges against opponents. Routing disenchanted youth towards, hatred,
violence, and against the national institutions for sheer political gains is simply demoralizing.
It is high time for politicians, policymakers, and others to wriggle out of the deep political
battles to help Pakistan sail out of the muddy waters. Ego, personal liking, and political
imperatives should cede to societal harmony, political stability, and national interests. In that,
the broader political rapprochement among major political parties of the country is a must to
save society from further alienation, necessitating measures that are direly needed for healing
the torn social structure and preserving the youth for a progressive Pakistan, rather than using
them as political fodder.

16
Section 3: Analytical Part

3.3 Pakistan’s Neutrality and Implications for Foreign Policy

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has gesticulated a shift in the global order. Countries
around the world are facing the repercussions not only in terms of economic fallout of the
invasion but also vis-à-vis difficult diplomatic choices that they are required to make. For a
country like Pakistan, which aspires to develop its ties with Russia without endangering its
relationship with the Western block, the situation is everything but welcoming. The most
preponderant challenge for Pakistan now is to pursue a balanced foreign policy. The
Pakistan’s neutral stance in the UNGA as an attempt to avoid siding with any camp indicates
that it is caught between a rock and hard place. At the same time, however, it would be wrong
to say that this policy of neutrality in the conflict is a response solely to the Ukrainian crisis.
Pakistan has already been trying to balance its relation with the United States and China, and
Russia and EU are just new weights in this balancing act.

3.3.1 Challange1: The Tricky Business of Balancing

Although Shifting geopolitics of the region and Pakistan’s national interests may have
warranted policy of neutrality, the country’s leadership and policymakers ought to
acknowledge that balancing requires perpetual to-and-fro motion. From the Ex-Prime
Minister’s decision to keep his planned visit to Russia amid rising escalation—which
included being present in Moscow on the day of the invasion and holding a
long meeting with Putin soon after he declared Russia’s “special military operation” in
Ukraine—to abstaining from the UNGA resolution to call for withdrawal of Russian forces,
most of Pakistan’s actions show a tilt towards Moscow rather than a neutral stance.

Besides, a few occasional statements in support of Ukrainian sovereignty and advising

Putin to resolve the matter through diplomatic channels are not enough for the balancing act.
Amidst already not-so-well relations with the United States, Pakistan needs a robust plan to
improve its relationship with the Western powers if it truly seeks a neutral position. There is
need of realization that Pakistan’s action and oratory is pushing it towards the Sino-Russian
camp. Unlike Pakistan’s perception that a stance which is in harmony with the western stance
would enslave it to the Western policies, condemning the invasion on the grounds of its
support to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political independence can help elevate its

17
Section 3: Analytical Part

diplomatic position in the world and would fetch it back a balanced position from which its
recent action has tilted it away.

3.3.2 Challenge 2: U.S. Unbridled Support for India: A security Dilemma for Pakistan

To put things in perspective, with India balancing its ties with the United States and
Russia and Russia moving towards a more balanced relationship with India and Pakistan,
Pakistan faces a twin foreign policy challenges of improving its relationship with Moscow
without cutting ties with Washington. Thus the preeminent foreign policy challenge for
Pakistan is to improve its relationship with Russia, maintain its ties with China, and not
alienate itself from the United States. It goes without saying that building stronger ties with
Moscow is also of strategic interest to Pakistan, as U.S. support to India’s military and
nuclear energy program creates a security dilemma for Pakistan, driving it further towards
China and now, Russia.

It is understandable that Pakistan’s current aim to maintain positive ties with all
global powers is predominately based on its Cold War experience where its decision to join
the U.S. camp alienated it from USSR. Moreover, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has
historically been laden with mutual frustration and highs and lows, but ultimately, for
Pakistan the experience represents the mistake of putting all eggs in Western basket during
the cold war period, and the country now ought to tread more watchfully to ensure a well-
adjusted foreign policy.

18
Section 4: Concluding Remarks

Section 4
Concluding Remarks
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has global repercussions for a globalized world.
Particularly, developing states like Pakistan are suffering from economic turmoil and rising
global food and oil prices. Moreover, the diplomatic burden of taking sides in such type of
conflict adds to the woes of security states like Pakistan. Pakistan, despite the overwhelming
pressure from the Western quarters, has maintained neutrality in the conflict by managing to
abstain from voting on resolution in the UNGA regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has ostensibly acted to secure its periphery. It has done so like a great power
which accords primacy to its perceived interests rather than show sensitivity to the principles
of inter-state relations set out in the UN Charter. Whereas Pakistan has stressed the respect
for principles of the UN charter, it also laid stress on principle of indivisible security for all,
which is a tacit indication towards the fact that UNGA resolutions did not address the
Eastwards expansion of NATO despite promises by the West to the contrary.

Nonetheless, neutrality comes at a price. While the popular belief is that Pakistan’s
neutral stance is an attempt to get out of the fold of American influence, the outlook is not
that simpler. Had Pakistan voted against Russia, it could have secured the Western support,
and, without a doubt, the negative fallouts of tilting too much towards Russia and China are
in the offing for Pakistan, as the implications of Pakistan’s neutrality for its foreign policy,
domestics politics and economy are numerous.

For Pakistan’s geo-economics interests, neither China nor Russia can replace the
United States and the European Union. Moreover, Russian military adventure in Ukraine has
reduced its economic and security appeal. Hence, the best strategy for Pakistan is to remain in
good books of Western powers to keep its economy afloat in these precarious times. On the
foreign policy front, Pakistan will have to recalibrate its external policy in a way that its
tripartite partnership, including itself Russia and china, does not harm its waned relations
with the West to the extent of extinction. Regardless of its future actions, Pakistan’s
response to the Ukraine crisis is a stark reminder of how states, especially smaller powers
like Pakistan must make difficult choices amid evolving crises and global competition.
Perhaps, neutrality comes at a price.

19
Section 5: Policy Recommendations

Section 5
Recommendations
Desperate times require desperate measures. We can see this maxim playing out
perfectly in case of Pakistan vis-à-vis Russia-Ukraine Conflict. First of all, to tackle the issue
of economic crisis and fragmentation in domestic politics, there is an imminent and dire
need for the Charter of Economy. The ruling coalition and the opposition need to shed their
hard core stances in the bigger interest of Pakistan. Parochial political rhetoric shall be put
on the back burner against national interests. Concrete economic policy encompassing the
broader issues of trade and fiscal policy, issue of taxation and revenue generation and strict
austerity and fiscal discipline along with stringent enforcement shall be ensured to restore
economic glory of Pakistan. Secondly, on the Foreign Policy front, Pakistan must maintain a
nonaligned posture in its foreign policy and it must protect and prioritize its national
interest. There is dire need to balance our relations between our Eastern friends and USA.
For this a clear and loud message shall be disseminated to both the West and the East
through our respective missions that Pakistan wants friendly and amicable relations with all
nations on equal footings and does not want to be dictated to change position on the invasion
of Ukraine only because it is in the interest of the West. We have our own interests with
Russia and China and we need to conduct our foreign policy accordingly. Regardless of its
future actions, Pakistan’s response to the Ukraine crisis is a stark reminder of how states,
especially smaller powers like Pakistan must make difficult choices amid evolving crises and
global competition. Perhaps, neutrality comes at a price.

20
Section 6: References

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