Doctrines:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the

law of the country where it is stipulated.
Doctrine of Lexloci rei sitae
Doctrine of Processual Presumption Is a presumption which provides
where a foreign law is not pleaded or even if pleaded is not proved the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who “buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
or before receiving any notice of another person's claim.” One claiming to
be an innocent

Case Title: ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SUZUKI, GR NO. 205487;

November 12, 2014

Facts:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki
(Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer,
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean
national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186 and Parking Slot No. 42
[covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja
likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were
clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to
₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as reservation fee. On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang
another check, BPI Check No. 83350, this time for ₱2,700,000.00
representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering
Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession
of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of
the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver
the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite
several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later
on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Issues:
Whether or not the conveyance of real property located in the
Philippines made by Mr. Kang, a Korean national to Mr. Suzuki, a
Japanese national, is null and void?
Held:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located
(lex loci rei sitae). However, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses. Thus, matters
concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property
shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
Hence, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it
was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play,
i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven,
the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. Under
Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang 'married to' Hyun Sook Jung"
is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import
from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as
they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook
Jung.

Therefore, we are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate
the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases,
however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name
of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang's conveyance in
favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
Doctrines:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.
Article 8 of the Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.

Case Title:
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES, G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

Facts:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos
P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The
military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national
shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which
is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services –
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-
quoted addendum.
Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject
lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476
on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not
included in the publication of the said law.
Whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the
force and effect of law.
Held:

Supreme Court said Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides

that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in
the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, in which we had the occasion to
rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended.
This Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never
had any legal force and effect. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents
are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and
give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber
that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
Under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not
President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant
but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.
This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently,
there is none.
We ruled that under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts
can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it.
To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret
the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities
becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating."
The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but
another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in
the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in
toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in
contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
Doctrines:

Article 14 Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to
the
principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Article. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Article 26 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in
the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.

Case Title:
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES, G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

Facts:
 Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25,
1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a

Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time,
their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her
son came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly

support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in

Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.
Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter

demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-

affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for
violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted
her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent.

Issues:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his

minor child under Philippine law; and Whether or not a foreign national can
be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.
Held:

The Supreme Court said, to determine whether or not a person is

criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists. It is undoubtedly that parents are obligated to
support their children pursuant to Article 195 of the Civil Code regardless
by reason of divorce decree obtained in Holland. The obligation to give
support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
While respondent is a foreign citizen It is incumbent upon respondent
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before,
during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because foreign laws do
not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In
the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.41
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. Even assuming
arguendo, that the foreign law and been proved and pleaded accordingly.
Such law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or contract or
order shall not be applied. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we
find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal
law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant
case, which provides that penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.” On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his
arrest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February
19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court
of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on
the merits of the case.
 ORION SAVINGS BANK v. SUZUKI G.R. No. 205487, November 12,
2014 Facts: First week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki
(Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer,
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean
national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. After the
meeting and brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price from 3
million to P2,800,000.00. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking
Slot No. 42. Issue: The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki
is null and void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property
should be made with the consent of both spouses. Ruling: It is a universal
principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws
of the country or state where it is located (lex loci rei sitae). The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property its immobility. Immovables
are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over
them have their natural center of gravity there. This principle even governs
the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property,
no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to
transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the
place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
However, property relations between spouses are governed principally by
the national law of the spouses. Thus, matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues
pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South
Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact. Hence, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The
foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or the law of the forum. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the present case, Orion,
unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the
seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Accordingly,
the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law. Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang
'married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is
the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. Therefore, we are not unmindful that
in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the
name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal or community property. In those cases, however, there was proof
that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were
indeed either conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, we see no
reason to declare as invalid Kang's conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the
supposed lack of spousal consent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-

of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that
the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision.46 All these requisites are present here.