Delgado CD1

Deryhl F.
Delgado
R3-PUP Civil Case Digest 1
Doctrines:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the

law of the country where it is stipulated.
Doctrine of Lex loci rei sitae
Doctrine of Processual Presumption Is a presumption which provides

where a foreign law is not pleaded or even if pleaded is not proved the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who “buys the

property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
or before receiving any notice of another person's claim.” One claiming to
be an innocent
Case Title: Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki; GR No. 205487 (J. Brion);
November 12, 2014
Facts:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki

(Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer,
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean
national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186 and Parking Slot No. 42
[covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja
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likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were
clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to
₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as reservation fee. On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang
another check, BPI Check No. 83350, this time for ₱2,700,000.00
representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering
Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession
of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of
the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver

the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite
several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later
on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Issue:
Whether or not the conveyance of real property located in the

Philippines made by Mr. Kang, a Korean national to Mr. Suzuki, a
Japanese national, is null and void?
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Held:
No. The Supreme Court said It is a universal principle that real or

immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state
where it is located (lex loci rei sitae). However, property relations between
spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. Thus,
matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be
governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of
the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven
as a fact. Hence, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof
and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South
Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it
was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play,
i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven,
the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. Under
Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang 'married to' Hyun Sook Jung"
is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import
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from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as
they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook
Jung.
Therefore, we are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have

held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does
not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In
those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or
community properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid
Kang's conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal
consent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack

of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in

its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, the

publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.
Article 8 of the Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting

the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
Case Title: NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.,

vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES, G.R. No. 187587 (CJ. Sereno) June
5, 2013
Deryhl F. Delgado
Facts:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos

P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The
military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)

issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national
shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which
is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services –
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.

2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a

handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"

Deryhl F. Delgado
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-
quoted addendum.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject
lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476
on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not
included in the publication of the said law.
Whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and
effect of law.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court said Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is

indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in
the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, in which we had the occasion to
rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in

its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended.
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No. The Supreme Court said,this Court cannot rely on a handwritten

note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without
publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
Under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the

publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not
President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant
but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.
This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently,
there is none.
We ruled that under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions

applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts
can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it.
To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret
the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities
becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating."
The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but
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another legislation that would amend the law to include petitioners' lots in
the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in
toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in
contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
Article 14 Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall
beobligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject
to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Article. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption under this doctrine, if the foreign

law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Article 26 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy

and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the

following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in
the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
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(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
Case Title:
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, v. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM GR No. 193707 (J. Peralta) December 10,
2014
Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan

Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25,
1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue

of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that
time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner
and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide

monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250)
Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and

remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing
thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business known as
Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Deryhl F. Delgado
Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter

demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-

affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for
violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted
her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent.
Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his

minor child under Philippine law; and Whether or not a foreign national can
be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court said, to determine whether or not a person is

criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists. It is undoubtedly that parents are obligated to
support their children pursuant to Article 195 of the Civil Code regardless
by reason of divorce decree obtained in Holland. The obligation to give
support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Deryhl F. Delgado
While respondent is a foreign citizen It is incumbent upon respondent

to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before,
during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because foreign laws do
not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law

applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In
the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.41
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing

his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same. In view of the respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. Even assuming
arguendo, that the foreign law and been proved and pleaded accordingly.
Such law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or contract or
Deryhl F. Delgado
order shall not be applied. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Yes. Foreign National can be held liable under penal

laws.Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we
find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal
law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant
case, which provides that penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.” On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against the respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his
arrest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19,

2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on
the merits of the case.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.
Article 1700 of the Civil Code provides that the relation between
capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Mode of settling conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining to

substantive content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes
have emerged: (1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of the making;
(2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the place of performance; and (3) lex loci
intentionis or the law intended by the parties
Forum non conveniens literally translates to ‘the forum is

inconvenient. This doctrine applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts
the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the
most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. It
is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and
vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or
dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
Practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even

though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:
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1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere,
either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign
jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice
known as forum shopping merely to secure procedural advantages or to
convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to nonresidents or

aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right
sought to be maintained; and
5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,

clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.
Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational litigation

and dispute resolution in one of or in a combination of four ways: (1)
procedures for settling disputes, e.g., arbitration; (2) forum, i.e., venue; (3)
governing law; and (4) basis for interpretation.
Philippine court may properly assume jurisdiction over a case if it

chooses to do so to the extent: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
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that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision."71
Case Title: SAUDI ARABIAN ARILINES vs. MA. JOPETTE

REBESENCIO ET. AL.. GR No. 198587 (J. Leonen); January 14, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation

established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. It has a Philippine office located at 4/F, Metro House Building, Sen.
Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City. In its Petition filed with this court.
Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited

and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation
and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.5 After
undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration for deployment overseas, as well as training modules
offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight attendant/training course and transition
training), and after working as Temporary Flight Attendants, respondents
became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin
Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette)
on May 16, 1990; Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen
Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993; and Loraine Schneider-
Cruz (Loraine) on August 27, 1995.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were

separated from service on various dates in 2006.
Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was

illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely because they
were pregnant.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and

demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for
Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract).
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed based on the grounds

of forum non conveniens.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court said, on the matter of pleading forum non
conveniens, we state the rule, thus: forum non conveniens may not only be
clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the
earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
Furthermore, forum non conveniens finds no application and does not
operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the
application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to
supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that
require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
In addition, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more
conveniently tried elsewhere because Saudia is doing business in the
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Philippines and all four respondents are Filipino citizens, thus Saudia may
be tried under the jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.
The considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine

tribunals as outlined in Bank of America, NT&SA have been satisfied. First,
all the parties are based in the Philippines and all the material incidents
transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus, the parties may conveniently seek relief
from Philippine tribunals. Second, Philippine tribunals are in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. Third, Philippine
tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions. There is no compelling
basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the
immense public policy considerations attendant to this case behoove
Philippine tribunals to not shy away from their duty to rule on the case
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda

J. Betia is not solidarity liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and
second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and
exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
Art. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:(1) Full name of the contracting party;(2) Place of birth; (3)
Age and date of birth; (4) Civil status;(5) If previously married, how,
when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; (6)
Present residence and citizenship; (7) Degree of relationship of the
contracting parties;(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the
father; (9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and
(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person
having charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor
mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.
Article. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been

previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the
birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute
divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or
her previous marriage.
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are

citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a
marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or
consular officials.
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Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the

certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the
circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a
Article. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637
and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Article 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the

marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and
the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same
shall not affect their persons.
Case Title:
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO v. REDERICK A.

RECIO G.R. No. 138322.( J. Panganiban) October 2, 2001
Deryhl F. Delgado
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as

shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian
government. Petitioner — a Filipina — and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately

without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy —
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had

revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
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On July 7, 1998 — or about five years after the couples’ wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending — respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.
Issues:
Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was

proven, and Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner.
Held:
1. No.The divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was not

properly proven in the court of competent jurisdiction. Before a
foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country. Although divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence
must be demonstrated. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.The power of judicial notice must be exercised
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with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
2. No. The Supreme Court said, the legal capacity to contract marriage
is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our

jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial

justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void
on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
As a general rule, law declared as unconstitutional produces no effect

whatsoever and confers no right on any person. It matters not whether the
person is a party to the original case, because not only the parties but all
persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means
that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to
apply it in subsequent case.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such,it must be

applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied
on the invalid law,61 but it can never be invoked to validate as
constitutional an unconstitutional act.
The Doctrine of Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium

faciunt means matters which are adjudged as between certain persons
effect no prejudice as to others; matters determined in a case do not
prejudice those not parties thereto.
Article. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for
in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
Article. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Article 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any
natural or industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part of the
expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion
to the time of the possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two

possessors.
The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the possessor
in good faith the right to finish the cultivation and gathering of the growing
fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the expenses of cultivation and the net
proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason whatever should
refuse to accept this concession, shall lose the right to be indemnified in
any other manner.
Case Title:
MORETO MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, GR No. 194538,

(CJ. Sereno) November 27, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a

Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio
Makatipo, Caloocan City.
As a consequence of Tuason, respondent made several oral

demands on petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail. A written
demand letter which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded.
Deryhl F. Delgado
On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer

before the MeTC. After due hearing on 9 November 2007, the trial court
rendered a Decision
Petitioner alleges that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, because respondent had filed the Complaint beyond the one-year
prescriptive period for ejectment cases
In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been unduly

burdened by reliance on an invalid law.
Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit

allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing
petitioner to occupy the same. However, this Affidavit was executed only
sometime in 1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case
was promulgated. At the time petitioner built the structures on the
premises, he ought to have been aware of the binding effects of the
Tuason case and the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 293. These
circumstances necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operative fact
doctrine.
Issue:
Whether the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. 293 should affect

the rights of other persons not party to the case.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court said, As a general rule, a law declared as

unconstitutional produces no effect whatsoever and confers no right on any
Deryhl F. Delgado
person. It matters not whether the person is a party to the original case,
because not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor
may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other
words, a total nullity. Likewise, invocation of the doctrine of res inter alios
judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt cannot be countenanced. We
have categorically stated that the doctrine does not apply when the party
concerned is a successor in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem, the
judgment in which is binding against him. While petitioner may not have
been a party to Tuason, still,the judgment is binding on him because the
declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of the nature of an in rem
proceeding.Neither may petitioner avail himself of the operative fact
doctrine, which recognizes the interim effects of a law prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of
equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that
an unconstitutional law produces no effects.The doctrine is applicable when
a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law, but it can never be invoked to validate
as constitutional an unconstitutional act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals sin CA-G.R.
SP No. 105190 are AFFIRMED.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrine:
The presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of

controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that
public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of
controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-
compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local
government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the
oppositor’s cause of action. The presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence
of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in their enactment.
Case Title: RAMONITO O. ACAAC vs. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, Jr.

GR No. 187378, (J.Perlas-Bernabe) September 30, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.
(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner
Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and conservation of
ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. In line
with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous
materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as
a seminar cottage in 2001 which it rented out to the public and became the
source of livelihood of its beneficiaries, among whom are petitioners Hector
Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor

Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for

its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its
buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as
the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal
building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with
the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final
Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July
8, 2002, but still the same remained unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez

Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002 (subject
ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; and (b) the
construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises,
except if authorized by the local government. On July 12, 2002, Azcuna
approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn,
conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at
the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of Municipal Ordinance is valid despite the

absence of publication in a newspaper of general circulation, public
hearings and posting requirements.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Held:
The Supreme Court said, While it is true that he likewise failed to

submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or
legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that
the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment.
Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which
they, however, failed to do.
The Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein

despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local
government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the
oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local
government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact
that the local government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation
essential to the oppositor’s cause of action.The presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in
the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was
not observed in their enactment.
The lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to

petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Since petitioner failed to
rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinance and to
discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted
prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their
constitutionality or legality.
Deryhl F. Delgado
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30,

2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
Net profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and
not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice,
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
Article. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved

and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of
Article 43;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent
spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
Deryhl F. Delgado
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of
the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be
revoked by operation of law.
Article. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded
to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall
not apply.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage,

an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered
to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall
be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution.
Deryhl F. Delgado
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the

husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92
of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And
when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass
is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of

the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal

debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive
funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive
property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out
of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
Deryhl F. Delgado
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article

121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall

thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss
or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to
either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse
from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute
the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife,
unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of
such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered

upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case
there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children.
Deryhl F. Delgado
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
On the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article

102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of
defining "net profit." As earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community
regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63,
No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
A regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the

Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of
their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage." From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her
own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or
merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.
The following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the
spouses: (a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate
properties.(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of
the conjugal partnership;and if the community is enriched at the expense of
the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made.(c) Subsequently, the
couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
Deryhl F. Delgado
partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be
paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal
partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses
with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.(d) Now, what
remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the
wife shall be returned to each of them.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of
the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and
industry.
Case Title: BRIGIDO QUIAO vs. RITA QUIAO, G.R. No 176556

(J. Reyes) July 4, 2012
Facts:
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a
complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido).Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 10,
2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment

is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao
and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from

each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor
children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall
remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already

foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao,

Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila

de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao,

Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner]

subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal

partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
Deryhl F. Delgado
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of

[₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [₱]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal
Separation.
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution

which the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby

granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of
the Judgment. Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ
of Execution which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner]

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-
quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the service of this
Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy

this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands
and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the
manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9,
Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Deryhl F. Delgado
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings

immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in
consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner
paying the respondents the amount of ₱46,870.00, representing the
following payments:
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses.
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the

promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion
for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an

Order dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT
EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts."
The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The dispositive portion of the Order states:
Deryhl F. Delgado
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends

to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the
debts for only separate properties of the defendant-respondent shall be
delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the

Decision.
Issues:
What law governs the property relations between the husband and
wife who got married in 1977?
Can the Family Code of the Philippines be given retroactive effect for
purposes of determining the net profits subject of forfeiture as a result of
the decree of legal separation without impairing vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code?
What is the meaning of the net profits earned by the conjugal

partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article
63 of the Family Code?
Is the dissolution and the consequent liquidation of the common

properties of the husband and wife by virtue of the decree of legal
separation governed by Article 125 of the Family Code?
What properties shall be included in the forfeiture of the share of the

guilty spouse in the net conjugal partnership as a result of the issuance of
the decree of legal separation?
Deryhl F. Delgado
Held:
The Supreme Court said, First, we can deduce that the petitioner and
the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time
of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of
the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
It is clear that what governs the property relations of the petitioner

and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this
property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry.The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains.
Second, Yes. Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and
the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code,
the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Deryhl F. Delgado
Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of

the Family Code this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other law.
Third, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the

property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the
definition of net profits.As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code
applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the
computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits,"
we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In
this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.Thus, without
any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the
absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the
Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference
lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used
under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129
of the Family Code.
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that
we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the
Deryhl F. Delgado
community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the
properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the
properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market
value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net
profits.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal

partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, "the husband and
the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Fourth, No. it is governed by Article 129 since at the time of the

dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative
law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and
the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code this Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.
Fifth, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's

"vested right" is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code,
but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129
Deryhl F. Delgado
of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the
conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his
or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to
the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall
not apply.In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be
entitled to all the net profits.
Since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest
we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because
there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty
party's favor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality

rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between
the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident
of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the

status,condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages –

void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or
at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law.
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements

agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
Deryhl F. Delgado
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the

husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of

various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code,
viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

Deryhl F. Delgado
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage

settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
Case Title: SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, (

J. Bersamin)GR No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Facts:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the
prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano
Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church
ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12,
1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7)
children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria
L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda
L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of
marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from
each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which
end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
Deryhl F. Delgado
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12,

1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his

marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the
First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the
same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit
including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were
taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established
his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
Issues:
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna

(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage and
Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and
the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Held:
No. The Supreme Court said, the law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality
rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.
Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if

voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12,
1997. The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially
among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon
a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
Deryhl F. Delgado
On the second issue, No. due to the second marriage between Atty.
Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous,
the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by
the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code,
viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden

of proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore,
it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
relief in her favor. Likewise, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship
is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on

November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Doctrines:
The judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive

phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction

considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the
choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do
not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony"
or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed." It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly. Under the "state of the most significant relationship
rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of
Deryhl F. Delgado
the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates
them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue to be resolved.
Case Title: KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA vs.MINORU KITAMURA, Gr

No.149177, (J. Nachura) November 23, 2007
Facts:
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co.,
Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments,
entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent
Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the
Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent was to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999. Nippon
then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the
company's consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of

Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of
Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time for the detailed engineering and
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project. Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's
Appendix 3.1
Deryhl F. Delgado
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's

general manager for its International Division, informed respondent that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the
ICA's expiry.
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his

lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be
assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract
was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for
the renewal of the ICA.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Lipa City has jurisdiction for contracts
executed by and between two foreign nationals in foreign country wholly
written in a foreign language?
Deryhl F. Delgado
Held:
Yes.The Supreme Court said,It should be noted that when a conflicts

case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or
refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over
the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction
over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States.The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from
the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of
foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of
treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign sovereigns. In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be
used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a
proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit
should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. Third, the propriety of dismissing a
case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this
conflict principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Deryhl F. Delgado
Since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear
the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to
assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate,the trial and appellate courts
correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on

certiorari is DENIED.

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Deryhl F.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the

Doctrine of Lex loci rei sitae

Doctrine of Processual Presumption Is a presumption which provides

An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who “buys the

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver

Whether or not the conveyance of real property located in the

No. The Supreme Court said It is a universal principle that real or

Therefore, we are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in

Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, the

Article 8 of the Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting

Case Title: NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.,

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in

No. The Supreme Court said,this Court cannot rely on a handwritten

Under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the

We ruled that under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are

Doctrine of Processual Presumption under this doctrine, if the foreign

Article 26 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy

Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his

Yes. The Supreme Court said, to determine whether or not a person is

While respondent is a foreign citizen It is incumbent upon respondent

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law

While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing

Yes. Foreign National can be held liable under penal

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19,

Mode of settling conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining to

Forum non conveniens literally translates to ‘the forum is

Practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to nonresidents or

5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.

Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,

Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational litigation

Philippine court may properly assume jurisdiction over a case if it

Case Title: SAUDI ARABIAN ARILINES vs. MA. JOPETTE

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation

Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were

Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and

Whether or not the case should be dismissed based on the grounds

The considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda