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The Sources of Ethnic Strives and Tensions among the Issa-Somali and Ittu-
Oromo Pastoral Communities of Eastern Ethiopia

Technical Report · August 2013

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The Sources of Ethnic Strives and Tensions among the Issa-Somali and Ittu-
Oromo Pastoral Communities of Eastern Ethiopia.

Abstract1, 2
A number of ethnic-based conflicts were observed in eastern Ethiopia in the past between various ethnic
groups such as between the Afar and the Oromo, between the Oromo and the Somali, between the Somali
and the Afar ethnic/clan groups. This research attempted to identify the conflicts and tensions observed
between the Oromo and Somali ethnic/clan agro-pastoralist and pastoralist groups in the eastern parts of
the country. The results revealed that the new political and administrative arrangements following the
introduction of ethnic based federalism gave the existing conflicts new shapes and paradigms. The
current conflicts in the study area are generally between the Oromo, the Afar and the Somali ethnic/clan
members. The causes of conflicts in the study area are multi-dimensional, complex and dynamic in
nature. It has changed its nature across the different regimes in Ethiopian past history. The research
revealed that social, economic, institutional, resource and environmental factors were found to be the
important factors in explaining the conflicts and tensions observed in the study areas. The competition
over scarce natural resources particularly on water and pasture land was found to be one of the
important causes for most (agro) pastoral conflicts in the study area. Such conflicts become more intense,
severe, frequent, and violent when the competing groups differ in their ethnic groupings and when there
are no clearly defined property rights between the groups (including the absence of clearly defined
regional boundaries). Owing the ethnic-based federal administrative structure, the indigenous institutions
of conflict resolution, were found to be more effective, as compared to modern institutions in managing
intra-ethnic/clan conflicts, and less effective in addressing inter-ethnic conflicts.

Key words: Resource scarcity, competition, property rights, (agro) pastoral community, eastern
Ethiopia, and ethnic conflict.

1. Introduction
This study aims at identify the sources of conflicts and tensions among farmers, agro-pastoralists
and pastoralists of eastern Ethiopia by focusing on socio-economic, institutional and resource
factors and assessing the impacts of conflicts and tensions on the livelihoods of households. The
study focuses on how the institutional, social, and economic and governance factors are inducing
and aggravating the historical, structural and temporal manifestations of competitive ethnics or
clans groups in the study area. It also discusses on the factors that provide the rival and
competitive communities the incentive to instigate conflict

1
Bamlaku Tadesse, Ass. Professor of Social Anthropology, Department of Gender and Development, Haramaya
University, Ethiopia, Email: betayehu@gmail.com
2
Fekadu Gelaw, Ass. Professor of Agricultural Economics, School of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness
Management, Haramaya University, Ethiopia, Email: fekadugelaw1@yahoo.com

1
2. Background

Ethiopia remained a home of diverse ethnic groups for centuries. Unlike many African countries,
Ethiopia was known to have ‘unified’ empire at early age. Partly owing to early formation of
‘state’ and partly socio-economic interactions and resource sharing (through voluntary
agreements and forceful occupation), the various groups are intermingled each other. It is hard to
find a well-defined and recognize boundary between ethnic/clan groups. Many of the various
ethnic/clan groups are mixed and intermingled each other. But, violent conflicts and open wars
between ethnic/clan groups and even between communities of the same ethnic group were
common in the country before the 18th century. However, the incidences of such violent conflicts
and wars have been dramatically declining with the development of strong central state since 18th
century. The ethnic-based boundaries have been disappearing and the customary institutions
have been replaced by modern legal and administrative systems. Though there could have been
suppressed hatreds, hostilities and domination of one group over the other, the various
ethnic/clan groups have co-existed for many centuries. Though some attribute this suppressed
hatred and domination to the emergence of ethnic-based rebels in the 1960s and 1970, the hatred
and hostility among ethnic/clan groups has been diminishing and the country have been moving
towards a peaceful co-existence.

It was under such socio-political structure the Ethiopian Peoples Republic Democratic Front
(EPRDF) has introduced the ethnic based federalism as the best state structure and political-
governance strategy to share power and decentralize political and economic governance in the
country (Keller, 2002). Ethiopia is constitutionally a federal state as of 1995 when the Ethiopian
constitution recognizes the rights of the different ethnic groups in the country to their language
and culture. The constitution divided the country into nine ethnic-based federal states. The
government’s constitution hoped that the political paradigm of multi-ethnic federalism enhances
the prospect for peace, stability, growth and development and redresses socio-political and
governance erroneous committed in the past (Assefa, 2011).

Before the introduction of ethnic-based federalism by the Ethiopian constitution in the early
1990’s, these conflict prone areas were generally governed under Hararghe Province during the
Imperial and the Dergue regimes and with two distinct Awrajas, namely the Adal and Gara

2
Guracha Awraja districts for the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups, and that of the Issa and Gurgura
Awraja for the Issa and Gurgura clans of Somali. During the Derge regime all the three ethnic
groups in the area and their sub-clans were administered with the same province, i.e Hararghe
province and with the administrative sub-province named as Issa, Adal and Gara Guracha
Awraja. However, even during the two previous ruling systems, the areas had experienced series
of devastating conflicts. But the new political and administrative arrangements gave the conflicts
new shapes and paradigms. The conflicts are generally between the Oromo, Afar and Somali
clans, but the areas where the three groups share border are multilingual and multicultural and
where ethnic flexibility is prevalent, thereby serving as a fabric for ethno-political and ethno-
territorial competitions.

The regional boundaries are poorly defined and remained controversial and are rarely enforced.
Most of the violent conflicts that occurred in the past few years were arrested through the
military interventions of the federal government. Though there have been attempts to empower
local institutions to manage and resolve conflicts and tensions, the success remained very
limited.

This research was conducted in areas where various ethnic/clan groups belonging to the different
ethnic groups that belong to their own respective regional states where there are fluid and
contested regional boundaries. This research was done in the pastoral and agro-pastoral conflict
prone areas of eastern Ethiopia particularly in the Meiso-Mullu, Erer and Meiso districts where it
is inhabited by various clan and ethnic groups in a hostile manner.. For example, in Meiso-
Mullu, the primary conflict actors are first the Issa and Hawiya clans, second the Afar, and third
the Ittu, Alla and Nolle clans, each representing the three different ethnic groups, namely the
Somali, the Afar and the Oromo respectively. In general, the conflicts occur in areas where the
Oromia, the Afar and the Somali regional states share porous and controversial regional
boundaries. The study focused on those conflict prone areas that are located along the ‘borders’
dividing two ‘independent’ ethnic-based national states – the Somali People National Regional
State and the Oromo People National Regional State. The regional boundaries are fluid and
contested. For instance a violent conflict between the Somali-Essa and Oromo-Ittu occurred just
one week before the field survey of this study was made.

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The data were collected from 116 male and female household heads randomly drawn from five
Peasant Administrations (PA) of two districts; , community and religious leaders, women and
youth representatives and government officials at different levels. While the data from sample
households was administered through structured questionnaire, key informant interviews and
focus group discussions were used to collect information from other groups. Each group of the
informants was engaged in intensive interviews and focus group discussions that lasted for an
average of two hours.

3. The Causal Factors for Instigating/Aggravating Violent Conflicts

There is no single conceptualization of conflict that can capture the variety of variables
explaining the sources of conflicts. These variables include cultural, historical, political, and
economic motivations of the various parties involved in the conflict. Real world conflict
situations are often further complicated by the actions of secondary conflict parties expressing
their interests through the primary contenders or actors (Adan and Pkalya, 2005).

Identifying and understanding the causes and dynamics of conflicts in the study area is important
for designing effective peace building strategies. Both intra- and inter-ethnic/clan conflicts over
the use and control of natural resources as well as territorial expansionary moves are everyday
business in the dry lands of Ethiopia in general and in the study area in particular. The study area
is one of the most volatile, unstable and a major hot spot in the country. Violent conflicts have
occurred several times in the areas. These conflicts have resulted in high destructions in
livelihoods of the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities and their lives. Furthermore, the
conflict in the area is characterized by multiple interests and causes among the pastoral and agro-
pastoral groups which resulted in massive displacement of people from their original settlement.
A case in point is the Oromo who displaced from Bike of Somali region and settled in Meiso
town, and the Somali who displaced from Bordede and Meiso district of Oromia region and
settled in Mullu district of Somali region in a new settlement site named Hardim. This
displacement and resettlement of people was due to the ethnic conflicts for control of certain
territories and following referendum which took place in 2004 among the contested areas
between Somali and Oromia regional states. The conflict has caused precarious living conditions
in the area and resulted in huge socio-economic disruptions and lose of human lives.

4
The cause of conflicts in the study area is multi dimensional, complex and dynamic in nature
which requires a deep understanding of the conflict situation in all intervention and development
endeavours. The conflict has changed its nature from time to time and the introduction of modern
weaponry in the conflicts arena made the conflicts more devastating than the earlier forms of
traditional confrontations. The introduction of ethnic based federal arrangements in Ethiopia in
1991 gave the conflicts among the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities of eastern Ethiopia a
new shapes and dimensions.. Pastoralism as a livelihood mechanism by its nature requires
mobility as an adaptation to the arid and semi-arid range lands of the region as well as an
alternative strategy to maximize their productivity. When their mobility is restricted, it could be a
cause for conflicts. The conflict between Oromo-Ittu/Alla vs Somali-Issa, Oromo-Ittu/Alla vs
Somali-Hawiya, Somali-Issa vs Afar and Oromo-Ittu/Alla vs Afar pastoral groups are some of
the notable conflicts found in the eastern parts of the country. The conflict between Oromo-
Ittu/Alla vs Somali-Issa, Oromo-Ittu/Alla vs Somali-Hawiya, Somali-Issa vs Afar and Oromo-
Ittu/Alla vs Afar pastoral groups are some of the notable conflicts found in the eastern parts of
the country.

Furthermore, FGD participants of the Meiso Woreda community elders clearly outlined the
major actors of conflict involved and the main sources of conflicts in the study area. The primary
actors involved in the conflict are the Issa clan Vs Hawiya clan of Somali, the Issa clan of
Somali Vs Afar, the Issa clan Vs the different Oromo clans. There are also secondary and tertiary
actors of conflicts like governmental and non-governmental organizations/officers, the
neighbouring states, the Diaspora community, the different liberation fronts/resistant groups or
secessionists in the region, etc. They also added that the primary sources of conflicts in the study
area are the competition on pasture land and water points, cattle raiding, heroism, and among
others.

Respondents were asked to the importance of the possible sources of recent violent conflicts. The
rates were then weighted by the proportion of each possible source and by the total proportion of
each rate. As presented in Table 1, competition over water and pasture land, absence of clearly
defined boundary, theft of properties, destruction of farmers’ crops by pastoralists’ livestock,

5
 were reported to be the sources of conflicts in both study areas. These factors are all related, in
one way or another, to property rights. These property rights related problems are partly the
outcomes of the historical expansionary/contractionary movements of communities and the
current political, legal, economic and institutional environments. The Oromos accused of the Issa
Somalis as agents of the vision of the then Said Barrie regime in creating the so called “Greater
Somalia” by expanding their territory and then incorporating and uniting the scattered Somalis
in many countries of the Horn of Africa. On the contrary, the Issa Somalis also accused of the
different Oromo clans who are predominantly settled agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists for
their encroachment in to the Issa’s grazing areas for new settlement areas and farm lands. These
accusations and counter accusations as well as claims and counter claims over territories/borders,
ownership rights of custom posts, institutions like market centres and other important resources
still continues by both parties.

Table 1: Ranking of possible sources of conflicts by district

Meiso Erer Both Chi-

No. Possible sources of conflicts square
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
test
1 Competition over water and pasture land 12.41 2 6.54 1 18.43 1 3.7
2 Absence of clearly defined boundaries 12.83 1 4.67 5 16.81 2 22.0***
3 Theft of properties 10.91 4 4.95 4 15.26 3 5.5
4 Livestock encroachment by pastoralists 9.58 11 5.48 2 14.41 4 0.1
5 Proliferation of firearms and small weapons 10.70 6 4.38 7 13.51 5 15.8***
6 Introduction of ethnic-based boundaries 11.00 3 3.57 9 12.88 6 32.8***
7 Revenge of past harms 9.45 12 4.38 6 12.40 7 12.5***
9 To demonstrate their superiority 10.87 5 2.69 12 11.99 8 40.8***
10 Sense of ethnic/clan rivals or enmity 10.35 10 3.22 10 11.22 9 26.2***
11 Motivation of political bodies 10.44 9 2.23 14 11.01 10 45.7***
12 Control over custom posts 10.65 7 1.27 15 10.80 11 47.7***
13 Response to past plunder (Banditry) 9.28 13 2.93 11 10.24 12 21.5***
14 Unfair distribution of development activities 10.52 8 0.92 16 10.04 13 67.1***
15 Worsening environmental degradation 6.97 16 3.78 8 9.25 14 12.5***
16 Incitement or hate speech against others 7.49 15 2.79 12 8.76 15 14.1***
17 Dispute on marketing & settlement areas 8.77 14 0.88 17 8.67 16 35.9***
18 Weak customary institutions 6.67 17 2.62 13 7.29 17 11.0**
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level

Competition over resources was reported to be the second and the first important sources of
conflict by respondents of Meiso and Erer districts, respectively. The responses were also found

6
to be statistically not different. In the past, territorial expansion of communities in search of idle
arable land, grazing land and water points was a common response of both the farming and
pastoralist communities to resource scarcity. But in recent times, the interplay of increasing
adverse impacts of Global Climate Change (GCC) with numerous socioeconomic and
institutional factors has caused the existing natural resources to deteriorate. As a result, the
marginal productivities of the already scarce resources have been substantially declining from
time to time. With poor technological progress that improve the productivity of labour and
natural resources and in the absence of structural shift, the amount of natural resources that an
average sized household require to achieve a minimum level of living standards tend to be higher
than the amount a comparable household size required in the past. That means, the amount of
natural resources that are required to maintain the pastoralist and farming communities will grow
from time to time. The demand for resources could be even grow at an exponential rate if
population is also growing at a rapid rate. The situation will put pressure on both farming and
pastoralist communities to look for, individually and/or collectively, for more resources. Unless
society is able to curb this declining individual and common resource bases through
development, communities tend to take expansionary move as a soft and immediate means of
acquiring more resources.

Whether communities and households can succeed to expand their natural resource base or not
depend on the ability of society in defining and enforcing property rights and in limiting
opportunistic expansionary moves. The ability of the society to do so, primarily depend on the
strength or weakness of the institutional environment. In a society where the formal constraints
(rules, laws and constitutions) and informal constraints (norms, conventions and self-imposed
codes of conduct) are weak to define and enforce property rights and limit opportunistic
behaviours. In such weak institutional environments, communities can find expansion beyond
their historical territories as an alternative solution to the resource problems. In an attempt to do
so, communities can enter into conflicts and tensions. Particularly, the situation is likely lead to
conflict if the institutions (formal and informal) are not strong in mitigating and resolving
conflicts.

The current situation in most parts of the countries can be characterized by such institutional
environment where the legal and political institutions are weak to defined and enforce property

7
rights, and to limit opportunistic behaviours. In addition, the administrative structure of the
country is primarily divided based on ethnicity with partial power devolution. Such ethnic-based
administration can help ethnic groups to promote their collective interest, it can also cause
tensions and conflicts if boundaries are poorly defined and institutions are weak to constrain
opportunistic moves of communities and individuals. Rather the political institutions can find the
acts of supporting communities to realize their expansionary interest as a means of gaining
public support. Hence, they can implicitly or explicitly encourage them to expand.

In addition to the property rights related factors, other factors such as proliferation of firearms
and weapons, introduction of ethnic based boundaries, and to revenge past harms were also
reported to be important. While the proliferation of fire arms could be a source of conflict by
providing the capacity to enter into violent conflicts and hence can cause conflicts by providing
the power to confront rivals. The result shows that the proliferation of fire arms and weapon is
being the sixth and seventh important sources of conflicts by respondents of Meiso and Erer
districts, respectively with the response pattern being significantly different at 1% between the
two study areas. The proliferation of fire arms and weapons can contribute to conflicts, the root
causes of conflict should remain resource and socio-cultural factors. The study also revealed that
sample households view the introduction of ethnic-based boundaries as an important sources of
conflicts, third and ninth important factor to Meiso and Erer respondents, respectively with the
pattern of responses being different a 1% significance level. Sample households seem to have
developed this perception due to the fact that the frequency and severity of violent conflicts have
become higher after the introduction of ethnic based boundaries than it was before. The
introduction of ethnic based boundaries can cause conflict in various ways. When, the
boundaries are clearly delineated, one of the rival communities may consider the boundary as
unfair and biased for many reasons. As a result, those communities take conflict instigating
actions such as plunder, raid, and incursion.

When boundaries are loosely defined, one community expect its rival community to attempt to
take some actions around the disputable border that are usually considered as a means of
ensuring ‘legitimate’ ownership rights. Since most parts of the areas around the borders between
pastoralists and others are seemingly unoccupied and historically have been temporarily used by
different groups, their ownership was not formally assigned to a specific group. Before the

8
introduction of ethnic-based administrative system, if conflicts arise in these areas, it usually
occur when two or more less-related groups, in terms of ethnic/clan or other relationship, attempt
to use the areas at a time. When the new ethnic-based regional administrations begin, however,
these areas per se became the source of conflicts.

The problem is that, in such situations one community expect its rival to take some actions to
demonstrate its ownership rights. When one community expect its rival to do so, any actions of
one community around the border will be automatically interpreted by its rival community as an
act of territorial expansion. As a result, communities compete to occupy the place before it is
taken by its rival by taking such actions as constructing administrative offices, (re) settling their
members, implement development infrastructures, put custom posts, and erect their regional
flags and the like. Such actions are then considered as territorial expansions and instigate
conflicts. For instance, the very recent conflicts around Meiso were instigated when the Issa clan
of Somali region occupy a place called Hardim. The temporary occupation was then considered
as an act of expansion when the members begin to erect their regional flag, construct
infrastructures and increase settlers. Following this, the Oromos on the other hand has responded
with a similar action by (re)settling at a place called Obensa kebele (PA) near/adjacent to that of
Somalis Hardim kebele. Such actions taken by both contending conflict parties escalate the
animosities and tensions between the Somali and Oromo ethnics in the area.

In general such boundary disputes could be directly related to resource competition, there are
also other issues behind the observed conflicts. From individuals’ point of view, communities are
largely concerned with issues that directly affect their communities. They rarely attempt to
articulate the interest of the wide ethnic group. Hence, there could be external parties instigating
and backed the community up during the violent conflicts. Though the survey results indicate
that the importance of political bodies as sources of conflicts is ranked 9th in Meiso and 14th in
Errer, the discussion with community members indicates the contrary. In addition, while Meiso
respondents perceive competition over control of custom post as the 7th important source of
conflicts, the Erer respondents ranked it as the 14th important source. On top of this, focus group
discussants in both study districts reported that administrative bodies also play important role, in
many ways, in instigate conflicts and provide implicit and explicit supports when their group
enter into open violent conflicts. In addition, study groups also strongly condemn government

9
bodies for playing very passive or no role in strengthening local institutions that can mitigate and
resolve conflicts. The role of political bodies as a source of conflicts seems to be more important
in Meiso (due to the nature of the conflicts) than Erer district. Yet, all the indications are that
political (government) bodies play important role in instigating conflicts and adding fire once
conflicts erupted.

In addition, they reported that local government bodies is not playing any role in resolving
conflicts and the responsibility seems to be left to the Federal Government. Yet the reality shows
that the Federal Government responds through military interventions only to severe and
extensive violent conflicts. The survey also shows that the Federal Government rarely intervene
to find a solution even when there are clear indications of tensions. The Federal Government has
been providing a fire-brigade service rather than taking long term and sustainable solutions to the
pervasive and frequent conflicts observed in the study and similar areas of the country.

Superiority feeling of the rival group was ranked by Meiso sample respondents as the 5th
important source of conflict. Meiso respondents, who are entirely Oromo people, perceive that
the Somali Issa clan members (the rival group) are instigating conflicts to demonstrate their
superiority. On the other hand, the Erer respondents, who are dominantly Somali Issa clan
members, demonstrate superiority by their rival Oromo people is less important and ranked the
12th sources of conflicts.

The incidences of plunder as a source of conflicts seems to be less important factor in both Erer
and Meiso districts as they ranked it 11th and 13th respectively. Unfair distribution of
development activities seems to be important (ranked 8th) to Meiso but least important (18th) to
Erer respondents. This result is consistent with the nature of conflicts explained in relation to
regional interests expressed in the form of control over custom posts and the role of political
bodies as sources of conflicts.

Other factors such as incitement or hate speech against rivals, weakened capacity of customary
institutions in mitigating and resolving conflicts, dispute on marketing & settlement areas and
worsening environmental degradation/natural disasters were reported to be least important
factors in explaining the observed conflicts. Though the role of these factors could be important
in reality, they may not be observed as important sources of conflicts by the respondents.

10
The result of the survey also support this in that the role of sense of ethnic enmity (if it was not
disguised) and incitement or hate speech against rival were reported to be less important at
aggregate level in that they are ranked 10th in both districts.

In sum, resource competition, as we argued at the beginning seems to be the primary cause of
conflicts. But these competition would have not be sources of conflicts if there was clearly
defined and enforced property rights, and opportunistic actions of individuals and communities
were limited. This requires strong local institutions that enforcing property rights and limit
opportunistic moves. In a closed communities where interaction of one community with others
through markets and other social aspects, they tend to have less incentive to cooperate with other
communities and limit any opportunistic actions of individuals and groups against the interest of
other communities.

Respondents were asked about the possible actions that the community take on them if they fail
to cooperate with their community during violent conflicts. As Table 5 shows, except 24% of the
respondents of Meiso reported that no action will be taken on them. The rest of the respondents
of the district (76%) have reported the presence of social sanction or penalty. On the contrary,
the respondents of Erer, only 50% reported social sanction or penalty in kind or money. The
main reason is likely to be that the study communities of Erer district are multiethnic group
(Somali and Oromo people) while the communities of Meiso district are all Oromo people. The
more a community is mixed; it is likely that member accommodate ethnic differences.

Table 2: Sanctions and penalties that arise from failure to cooperate during violent
conflicts
Meiso Erer Total
Sanctions or penalties
N % N % N %
No action 16 24 24 50 64 29
Social sanctions 28 41 17 35 86 40
Penalty in kind/money 24 35 7 15 66 31
Total 68 100 48 100 216 100

The reason could be that the social cohesion of closed communities is built upon, among others,
on norms, conventions and code of conducts that unnecessarily idealize their members and,
directly or indirectly, denigrate members of other communities. A closed and homogeneous

11
community will have a very high value to their culture and race and a very low value for the
outsiders. Such communities, not only are less accommodative, they may also tempt their
members to consider outsiders as non-human. It is not a remote history that some of the highly
closed and isolated ethnic/clan groups of Ethiopia were regarding wild actions such as killing or
castrations of strangers as a heroic act.

When the norms, conventions and codes of conducts of a community are built upon a polarized
view toward its members and against others i.e. when one group will have an ethnocentric view
over the other, the community tend to be less accommodative and less tolerant to the divers
cultures and views. Moreover, the system of relationship within the community either fail to
penalize members taking unfair opportunistic actions against others or could even reward them if
the actions are expected to be beneficial to their community. Consequently, its transactions with
the rest of the world tend to be limited. This would further cause the community more closed
and, hence, less cooperative with others.

Such rival communities attempt to resolve tensions more with force than with peaceful
negotiation. In such situations, the customary institutions of each community, which are the
expression of the belief and value system, the norms and codes of conducts of the community
tend to appreciating forceful actions and undermine peaceful negotiations. If there are some
members who are willing to transact with the rival communities, for any reasons, their intention
could be regarded as deviant of the social norm and, hence, refrain from expressing it in fear of
social sanctions. Consequently, enforcing rule of law becomes difficult. Particularly, the problem
becomes serious if the conflicting groups belong to different regional (ethnic) administrations. If
there is a rule of law at all, the rules of the game are called ‘never touch our group member’.

It requires, at each tier, strong political commitment to promote peaceful coexistence and
cooperation. But in a condition where the local and regional political bodies lack the necessary
power and are less responsible for the problem, they tend to be less committed for finding long
term solutions. They rather tend to implicitly and explicitly encourage their own people to enter
into violence.

In such situations, any tensions and conflicts between communities/groups cannot be left to local
communities. Rather it requires a third party that promotes peaceful coexistences, monitor

12
conflict triggering actions, intervene when violent conflicts erupt and mediate resolutions. The
third party need to have a clear and inclusive rules that govern inter-community relationships and
that govern its mode of intervention must be set out. Yet such modes of interventions cannot be
long lasting and costly to the society.

The present military intervention of the Federal Government is being carried out without setting
out the ground rules. Such interventions by the military of the Federal Government will not only
be a fire brigade service, it could even grow into an authoritarian divide-and-rule governance
system. It only treats the symptom of conflicts not the root causes of the problem. A long lasting
solution to the problem require holistic and integrated approach towards creating strong
institutions that constrain opportunistic actions, enforce human (individual and collective) and
property rights, promote cooperation and freedom, and that check and balance the powers of
individuals and organizations. Each community must be encouraged and monitored to exercise
rule of law within its community. The system must encourage civil societies and human right
watch groups.

4. Factors that Provide Rival Community an Incentive to Instigate Conflicts

In addition to the perception of respondents on the different possible sources of conflicts, attempt
was also made to identify the conditions where the rival community got an incentive to enter into
violent conflicts. Identifying these factors will help to design policies and programs that build
peace in the areas. Table 3 shows the factor that respondents perceive as to provide rival groups
the incentive to instigate conflicts.

Table 3: Factors providing rival community incentives to trigger violent conflicts

Meiso Erer Both Chi-
Factors square
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
test
Drought incidence 5.97 3 4.11 1 10.79 1 10.8**
Easy access to weapon 6.97 1 2.08 3 9.27 2 24.8***
Presence of territorial delineation 6.02 2 2.05 5 8.30 3 10.8**
Political/social instability 4.99 6 2.15 2 7.35 4 10.2**
Pressure from other rival groups 4.58 7 2.08 4 6.90 5 5.8
Motivation of political bodies 5.50 4 0.92 8 6.31 6 64.9***
Decline in income 4.53 8 1.29 6 5.93 7 24.6***
Weak social cohesion 4.41 9 1.20 7 5.60 8 23.1***

13
Increase in income of rivals 5.24 5 0.466 9 5.568 9 89.8***
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level

Respondents were asked to rate factors that can provide their rival communities the incentive to
trigger violent conflicts as most important, important, less important and not important. The
result of the chi-square test indicates that the responses between the two study sites are
significantly different in all incentive factors except pressure from other groups. This indicates
that the factors that provide the rival groups of the two study sites are different due to their
different socio-economic, political and resource factors. Then index values were calculated to
rank the perceptions by weighting the perception (within and between the study groups) and then
by multiplying it with arbitrary values to each alternative. Accordingly, the factors that are
expected to provide the rival group the incentive to trigger conflicts were ordered according to
their importance.

Incidence of drought in the rival community was ranked third and first by Meiso and Erer
respondents, respectively. This indicates that the main causes of violent conflicts are related to
resource scarcity and hence competition for them. In addition respondents have also reported that
when it is easy for the rival group to access weapon, it provides them the incentive to trigger
conflicts, the first important factor for Meiso respondents and the third for Erer. While drought
forces rival groups to find a way out of the situation by taking/using or by claiming available
resources (since boundaries and ownership rights are poorly defined), easy access to weapon
could provide them the courage to meet their economic and other interests through forceful mean
leading them into triggering conflicts. Whether the presence of easy access to weapon leads to
violent conflicts or not can depend on many other factors such as the presence of strong rule of
law, the accommodativeness of society, the surveillance system, etc. Even in civilized societies
such as United States of America, easy access to weapon becomes a point of public debate.
When it comes to poor, disintegrated and divided society, easy access to weapon becomes the
source of every piece of social, economic and political crisis.

Some argue that a practical way of stopping a bad man with gun is to have a good man with gun.
Setting aside the current Americans debate on gun law, easy access to weapon in agrarian
societies can pose many problems. In socially and culturally closed and less accommodative, and
economically very poor farming, pastoralists and agro-pastoralist communities of Ethiopia, easy

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access to personal weapons can become very problematic. In such communities where the
institutional and technological environment is weak to enforce the rule of law, the political
system is racist and totalitarian, the administrative structure is ethnic-based, the competitions
over deteriorating natural resources are stiff, the property rights are weakly defined and poorly
enforced, and more importantly in a situation where the weapons are easily accessible only to
some groups, force becomes the rule of every game. Respondents of Meiso district, including
administrative bodies, reported that their rival Issa clan have not only the access weapon (due to
their location), every individual Issa clan member has also the legal right to have gun. They
complained that the government is not providing equal access to weapon. Whatever, unequal
access to weapon coupled with these various socio-economic, institutional and political
environments can provide some groups the incentive to take forceful measures over others. In
other words the presence of power asymmetry between rival groups exacerbates the tensions and
conflicts and also has its own repercussions on the resolution and negotiation processes.

The presences of territorial delineation around their borders were reported by the sample
respondents as the most important factors that provide the rival communities the incentive to
trigger conflicts. Since the natural resource such as arable land, grazing land, water points and
forests were relatively abundant in the past; every community was using the resources at
different points in time. As a result, there are multiple claims over such resources. Due to this,
communities keep an eye on any attempts to assign the resources to a community. When they
perceive such acts, one of the community attempts to trigger conflicts over the other. This could
be that border delineation are being carried out before reaching agreement between the claimant
groups the ground rules upon which the delineation will be made and enforced. It could also be
the fact that there is no rule of law governing defiance to the decision.

The result also shows that the prevalence of political/social instability within a community
provide its rivals the incentive to trigger violent conflicts. This is straight forward that political
instabilities provide the stronger groups a better opportunity to revenge past harms, to own
resources, or just to show their power over the weaker groups. Since intervention of the Federal
Government and the administrative bodies on violent conflicts are easier in time of stability, it is
likely that instability especially political one reduce such interventions. While respondents of
Meiso district ranked prevalence of political/social instability as the 6th important factor in

15
providing rivals the incentive to trigger conflicts, respondents of Erer district ranked it as the 2nd
important factor. Although political instability is always welcomed by the stronger group, they
may not be automatically responding to the incidence if the stronger group has no information on
the internal social and political situation of their rival. Since the rivals of the Meiso district are
pastoralists and far from them, their response to the instability could be slow and weak. In
addition, their mobile nature and other related factors may enable them to take conflict triggering
actions anytime irrespective of the extent of political stability in their rival communities. On the
contrary, the rivals of Erer are both settled, have ethnic relationships, and have some transactions
between them. As a result, the response of the rivals to the internal problem could be quick and
stronger. Moreover, it could also indicate that the rule of law is a more important constraining
factor to the conflicting parties of Erer district than Meiso district.

The other factor that forces one community to trigger conflict over the other is the incidence of
pressure from other groups. When one stronger group pressurize the other weaker group, the
weaker group can attempt to transfer the pressure onto another weakest group. The perceived
importances of this factor in providing rivals to trigger conflicts differ between the two study
areas. While the perceived importance of this pressure as a factor for triggering conflict is
stronger among respondents of Erer district, it is weaker among Meiso district.

The study also attempted to assess the role of political bodies in conflicts. The proposition is that
in the prevailing political situation where regions are structured along ethnicity, the matter of
violent conflicts are left to the military of the Federal Government, and in a condition where
territorial borders are loosely defined, local governments could attempt to achieve some strategic
objectives by motivating local people to trigger conflicts. Hence, we hypothesis local/regional
political bodies could play a role in triggering conflicts by implicitly or explicitly encouraging
their communities to trigger conflicts. While respondents of Meiso district perceived as the 4th
important factor, respondents of Erer perceived it as the 8th important factor. The reason is that
the main source of conflict between the communities of Meiso and Mullu districts seems to be
motivated by political bodies in that the reaction of the regional bodies is higher than the local
communities, In addition, the sources of the recent violent conflict (just two days before this
survey was made) seems to be more of political than economic which have little implications on
the local communities.

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Different authors have suggested different hypothetical variables as factors causing pastoral
conflicts. According to Mahmoud (2006), there are wide ranges of factors which trigger
conflicts at local and regional levels. His empirical finding in Southern Ethiopia and Northern
Kenya pinpoint that factors like a policy of ethnic based regionalization, ethnic politics at the
national level; state implemented ethnic based boundaries are major causes of conflicts among
feuding groups in southern and eastern Ethiopia, who have laid claims on crucial range resources
in certain pockets and on disputed boundaries which have a strategic economic/political interests.
Similarly, several ethnic groups in the study area have engaged in at least one or more
ethnic/clan groups’ conflict in relation to land and water disputes, disputes on custom posts,
territorial expansionary moves over the year. This is due to the absence of clearly demarcated
regional, zonal, district and kebele level boundaries among the contested pastoral and agro-
pastoral areas of eastern Ethiopia.

This study revealed that some of the most important variables as most important causing factors
for conflicts in this region are competition over pasture land, water points, boundary disputes,
livestock raiding, heroism, banditry and its sudden killings and the like.

A similar study conducted by Beyen (2007) in Mieso District of Eastern Ethiopia also verify that
factors like customary norms, power asymmetry, resource scarcity and livestock raids are causes
of conflicts in the area. Quoting several sources Mahmoud (2006) outlined some of the major
hypothesis in the anthropological study of conflict management. These are competition for
scarce resources, frequent internal conflict in societies with strong fraternal groups, emphasis
transforming disagreement in to violent action, enemy stereotype, marginalization of a society,
uncontrolled proliferation of weapons are found to be the causes of conflicts in the study
conducted in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya border line.

Some group of scholars are also stressing on livestock raiding as major causal factor to conflicts
in most pastoral areas of Africa. For example, Blench (1996) indicated that in the research that
have been done, inter group conflict between pastoralists has been interpreted as competition for

17
pasture. However, he clearly indicated that chronic insecurity from livestock raiding has the
effect in some areas determining herders from exploiting pasture that are not easily defensible.

Moreover, resource scarcity and the subsequent competition is also a causal factor to conflict is
strongly highlighted and explained by FDG participants in Meiso. The rapid environmental
degradation, an alarming rate of population pressure, unequal distribution of power and the lack
of good governance, and changing consumption pattern which exacerbates resource competition
and in turn exacerbate natural resource scarcity. Homer- Dixon (2007) indicated that
environmental scarcity will contribute to the occurrence of violent conflicts. Drought conditions
can trigger and escalate conflicts over scarce resources. During severe shortage of rainfall in
pastoral areas, the groups residing in the area try to spread over more land, while at the same
time, neighbouring groups increasingly do the same (Stiles, 1992).

According to the empirical research finding done in Sudan it is indicated that when land becomes
more scarcer and under increasing pressure, the various stakeholders will claim over it and
therefore, underpinning a history of conflict in relation to land and access to natural resources.
Despite the huge land size in Sudan, scarcity of the range lands creates for primary production
systems has become increasingly felt and perceived by resource users (Taha, 2007).

Various development projects or interventions are also considered as causes of conflicts in the
study area. However, not all development intervention activities are considered as causes of
conflicts. But those development interventions which are not conflict sensitive might instigate or
trigger the existing or new conflicts in the area. For example, a road from Bordede to Gelemso
town and also another new road that links Serkama and the surrounding kebeles to Dire Dawa
city behind Hurso military camp which are constructed by the Oromia regional state in
collaboration with the local people trigger the already existing conflicts between Somali and
Oromo clans in the region. Another Indian investor in Meiso at Bordede area in Jatroffa plant
was also harassed or threatened by the clan conflicts and finally forced to withdraw from his
investment in the area. Besides, another investor in Bordede who tried to construct Oil Company
was also considered as a threat to the livelihoods of the local pastoralists so that he was
threatened by the local people.

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5. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1. Summary and Conclusion

This research was conducted in areas where various ethnic/clan groups belonging to the different
ethnic groups that belong to their own respective regional states where there are fluid and
contested regional boundaries. This research was done in the pastoral and agro-pastoral conflict
prone areas of eastern Ethiopia particularly in the Meiso-Mullu, Erer and Meiso districts where it
is a home for various clan/ethnic groups. Before the introduction of ethnic-based federalism by
the Ethiopian constitution in the early 1990’s, these conflict prone areas were generally governed
under Hararghe Province during the Imperial and the Dergue regimes and with two distinct
Awrajas, namely the Adal and Gara Guracha Awraja and that of the Issa and Gurgura Awraja.
However, even during the two previous ruling systems, the areas had experienced series of
devastating conflicts. But the new political and administrative arrangements gave the conflicts
new shapes and paradigms. The conflicts are generally between the Oromo, Afar and Somali
clans.

Conflicts between ethnic groups of two regions sharing the same administrative borders were
more recurrent and brutal in the Southern and Eastern parts of Ethiopia than anywhere else. A
number of ethnic-based conflicts were observed in the past between various ethnic groups such
as between Afar and Oromo, between Oromo and Somali, between Somali and Afar, etc. Most of
these ethnic conflicts are usually armed wars and they are more destructive and brutal. Such
conflicts have become frequent and more severe since 1991 following the ethnic-based
decentralization.

Past empirical evidences and theoretical developments indicates that various interacting factors
such as social, economic, institutional, environmental, property rights, and governance are
important underlying factors in explaining conflicts and tensions in developing countries. The
weakness/ loosely structured nature of governance structures and local institutions in resource
allocations, negotiations, and conflict preventions are becoming dominate factors for aggravating
the existing conflicts. With regard to the prevalence and the trends of violent conflicts in the
study areas over the past few years, the survey result shows that there is significant difference in
the frequency of violent conflicts between the two study districts, i.e Erer and Meiso. The survey

19
result shows that while violent conflicts in Erer district and the neighbouring communities of
Oromia region is largely a rare phenomenon, it is much more frequent between the study
communities of Meiso district and the neighbouring communities of Mullu district. Of the total
respondents of Meiso district, 63.5% respondents reported that violent conflicts in the area
occurs at least once in a year and 52% still reported that it occurs more than twice a year. About
36.6% of the respondents reported that it differs from year to year.

A detail inspection of the result at PA level shows that the incidences of conflicts between PA
vary within district. The PA level distribution shows that some communities experience more
frequent conflicts than others. This could be due to the fact that the entire sample PAs of Erer
district are dominantly agro-pastoralist and hence are more or less sedentary. When two
communities are both settled, the likelihood that they enter into conflict is less than those
communities that one of the communities is mobile while the other is sedentary. This is because,
when members of two communities are largely living a sedentary way of life as in the former
case, it is likely that they will at least have a shared understanding on the ownership and use of
common resources.

It is believed that competition over scarce natural resources like water and pasture land is one of
the causes for most (agro) pastoral conflicts, such conflicts become more intense, severe,
frequent, and violent if the two groups of users differ in their ethnic alignments and if there is no
clearly defined property rights. Apart from the historical hatred that can fuel the resource
competition into conflict, differences in ethnicity can make cooperation in the distribution and
management of resources difficult. Such types of inter- ethnic conflicts can better addressed with
the intervention of the modern system than the indigenous institutions which manages conflicts.
Indigenous institutions can better function in managing intra-ethnic/clan conflicts. The
homogeneous nature of ethnic groups could be considered as an incentive for instigating violent
conflicts against the other competing ethnic group over scarce resources. Although the main
causes of conflicts are competition over scarce resource, such ethnic differences and their
respective different administrative structures/units may aggravate the ethnicization and
politicization of the rival communities that reinforce their differences and hostility. However,
the differences in ethnic composition, i.e the heterogeneous nature of the communities in the

20
rival ethnic groups could provide the two groups different incentives for taking cooperative
actions towards resource governance and conflict mitigation and resolution practices. Social
networks among the rival ethnic groups could be considered as an incentive for cooperation,
mutual understanding and trust between them that their total disconnections.

The cause of conflicts in the study area is multi dimensional, complex and dynamic in nature. It
has changed its nature from time to time along with the proliferation of modern automatic
weapons, the property rights related factors, the roles of political bodies, revenge past harms, the
introduction of ethnic based boundaries in Ethiopia in 1991, among others. As a result of the
latter case, the conflict has got new shapes and dimensions particularly among the pastoral and
agro-pastoral communities of eastern Ethiopia. Sample households seem to have developed that
the frequency and severity of violent conflicts have become higher after the introduction of
ethnic based boundaries than it was before. Pastoralism by its nature requires mobility as an
adaptation to the arid and semi-arid range lands of the region as well as an alternative strategy to
maximize their productivity. When their mobility is restricted, it could be a cause for conflicts.

It is clear that competition over water and pasture land, absence of clearly defined boundary,
theft of properties, destruction of farmers’ crops by pastoralists’ livestock, were reported to be
the sources of conflicts in both study areas. These factors are all related to property rights. These
property rights related problems are partly the outcomes of the historical expansionary
movements of both groups and the current political, legal, economic and institutional
environments.

5.2. Recommendations
Based on the research findings, the following are some of the important recommendations
forwarded by the research participants that are drawn from the result and discussions, summary
and conclusions:

Ø There should be a strong political commitment to promote peaceful coexistence and

cooperation at all levels since the local and regional political bodies lack the necessary
power and less responsible for the problem and less committed for finding long term
solutions.

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Ø Interventions by the military of the Federal Government will not only be a fire brigade
service rather there should be a long lasting solution to the problem by the concerned
bodies which require a holistic and integrated approach towards creating strong institutions
that constrain opportunistic actions, enforce human (individual and collective) and property
rights, promote cooperation and freedom, and that check and balance the powers of
individuals and organizations.

Ø The indigenous institutions are becoming weaker to function while the modern system of
resolving conflicts are not yet ready to fully functional. Therefore, there should be a strong
desire to revitalize indigenous institutions at grass root level.

Ø The introduction of ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia restricts easy movement of

pastoralists across regions and even national borders in search of pasture and water. There
should be recognition to the flexibility/mobile nature of pastoral way of life during drought
seasons irrespective of manmade regional boundaries. If not possible, there should be
another alternative solution to the deteriorating environmental conditions which put
pastoralism under pressure as a livelihood strategy.

Ø There should be a livelihood diversification system or transformation of their way of life

i.e. from pure pastoralism to agro-pastoralism or from pastoral production system to agro-
pastoral form of production system since the mobile nature of cattle and camel herders for
long distances create conflicts.

Ø Development of basic infrastructures like water points (water pond development or birka
construction), educational services, health posts, access to road, promotion of irrigation
agriculture, etc are urgently and strongly required.

Ø The absence of clearly defined regional boundaries and that of the property right regimes in
the pastoral areas of eastern Ethiopia is a deep rooted problem and causes for most pastoral
conflicts in the region. Therefore, there is an urgent need to address such problems by
clearly demarcating the contested regional boundaries.

Ø Heroism in most pastoral areas of eastern Ethiopia is encouraged. As a result teenagers as

well as youngsters are usually carrying automatic weapons throughout their life. There

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 should be a wide range of deliberations and discussion forums at grass root /community
level on peace and conflict issues on continuous bases that discourages hatred, bravery and
heroism.

References

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Pastoral and Semi Pastoral Economies in Kenya and Uganda. Closed to Progress, Kenya

Asefa, A., 2001. Indigenous Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict The
Experience of Oromo in Ethiopia. A Report of Ethiopian National Workshop, Addis
Abeba, Ethiopia.

Beyene, F., 2007. The role of customary institytions in managing conflict on grazing land: a
case study from Mieso District Eastern Ethiopia. ICAR Discussion Paper 17/2007

Blench, R., 1996. Aspect of Resource Conflict in Semi-Arid Africa. Overseas Development
Institute, working paper, London.

Homer–Dixon, T., 2007. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,
Part1.Peace and Conflicts Studies Program University of Toronto International
Security,vol.19,No.I (summer 1994), 5-40.

Keller, Edmond, J. (2002). Ethnic federalism, fiscal reform, development and democracy in
Ethiopia. African Journal of Political Science, 7(1), 21-50.

Mahamoud, H.A., 2006. Conflicts and Pastoral Livelihoods in the Kenya-Ethiopia – Somalia
borderlands. Report submitted to DPMF. Eagerton University, Kenya.

Stiles, D., 1992.The Gabera Traditional Siocial Factors in Aspect of Land Use Management.

Taha, M.D. El T., 2007. Land Degradation and Conflict in Sudan. Resource Based Conflict
Network- Sudanese Environment Conservation Society, University of Juba.

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