1. SECUYA vs. VDA. DE SELMA GR No. 136021.

February 22, 2000

This case is about an action to quiet title. That in an action to quiet title, the
plaintiffs or complainants must demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or
an interest in, the subject real property. Likewise, they must show that the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their
title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy. If the title is not valid on its face, an action for quieting of
title cannot be given due course.

Under Art. 476, in an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or

complainants must demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or an
interest in, the subject real property. Likewise, they must show that the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on
their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.

Here, the HEIRS OF SECUYA insisted that they had been occupying the
disputed property for 47 years before they filed their Complaint for quieting of
title. However, there was no proof that they had exercised their rights and
duties as owners of the same. They argue that they had been gathering the
fruits of such property; yet, it would seem that they had been remiss in their
duty to pay land taxes. If petitioners really believed that they owned the
property, they should have been more vigilant in protecting their rights
thereto. As noted earlier, they did nothing to enforce whatever proprietary rights
they had over the disputed parcel of land.

The HEIRS OF SECUYA relied their ownership on the Agreement of

Partition executed by Maxima Caballero and Paciencia Sabellona and the Deed
of Confirmation of Sale executed by Ramon Sabellona.

The Agreement of Partition was a mere Express Trust was because there
was no property to partition and the parties were not co-owners. Being that there
was a repudiation of the express trust when the heirs of Maxima Caballero failed
to deliver or transfer the property to Paciencia Sabellona, and instead sold the
same to a third person not privy to the Agreement., all, the subsequent sales
transactions involving the land in dispute and the titles covering it must be
upheld, in the absence of proof that the said transactions were fraudulent and
irregular.

Although there was a Deed of Confirmation of Sale executed by Ramona

Sabellona, there was an absence of the Deed of Sale itself. Moreover, the lot,
 including the disputed portion, had been the subject of several sales
transactions. The title thereto had been transferred several times, without any
protestation or complaint from the HEIRS OF SECUYA.

In any case, VDA. DE SECUYA’s title was amply supported by clear

evidence, while SECUYA's claim was barren of proof.

2. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ALEJO GR No. 141970 .

September 10, 2001
This case is about filling an action for quieting of title as a remedy.
What was asked by Metrobank was for relief from the peremptory
declaration of nullity of the TCT covering the mortgaged land, which had been
issued without first giving METROPOLITAN BANK an opportunity to be heard.
Filing an action for quieting of title will not remedy what it perceived as a
disregard of due process; it is therefore not an appropriate remedy.

An action for quieting of title was not an appropriate remedy.

It should be stressed that this case was instituted to ask for relief from the
peremptory declaration of nullity of the TCT covering the mortgaged land, which had
been issued without first giving METROPOLITAN BANK an opportunity to be
heard. METROPOLITAN BANK focused on the judgment in the civil case between
Respondent SY TAN SE against Spouses Acampado which adversely affected it, and
which it therefore sought to annul. Filing an action for quieting of title will not remedy
what it perceived as a disregard of due process; it is therefore not an appropriate
remedy.
Equally important, an action for quieting of title is filed only when there is a
cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. As defined, a "cloud on title
is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded." In this case, the subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud
on petitioner’s title or interest over the real property covered by said TCT, which
does not even have a semblance of being a title .
It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would
warrant the filing of an action for quieting of title, because to do so would require the
court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment or order of another co-
equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no
power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the
administration of justice. Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate
remedy in this case.

3. SAPTO vs. FABIANA GR No. L-11285. May 16, 1958

This case involves an action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title. And the
prescriptibility or imprescriptibility of the actions to quiet title.
The court will treat an action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible. But if he is not in possession thereof, the right may as well prescribe
and barred by acquisitive prescription.

No enforcement of the contract was in fact needed, since the delivery of

possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the
purchaser, registration of the contract not being indispensable as between the parties.
Actually, the action for reconveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the
cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to
recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when
appellants initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954.
Here, the sale entered into was valid and binding upon the vendors, one of
whom was Samuel Sapto and is equally binding and effective against his heirs, DORA
BAGOBA and LAUREANA and VICENTE SAPTO. To hold otherwise would make of the
martens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs, who
would then be able to reconvey the same property to other persons.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible. Art. 480 of the Civil Code, states that “the principles of the general
law on the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict
with this Code”. The general law referred to is American jurisprudence. Under
American jurisprudence, actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the
plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land
quieted is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual
possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof. But the rule that the statute
of limitations is not available as a defense to in action to remove a cloud from title can
only be invoked by a complaint when he is in possession. If the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property, the action to quite title may also prescribe.

4. BUCTON vs. GABAR GR No. L-36359. January 31, 1974

The court will treat an action for specific performance as an action to quiet
title provided that it has all the requisites of the latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible. But if he is not in possession thereof, the right may as well
prescribe and barred by acquisitive prescription.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted is
not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land,
claiming to be owners thereof. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not
available as a defense to in action to remove a cloud from title can only be
invoked by a complaint when he is in possession. If the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property, the action to quite title may also prescribe.

5. CORONEL vs. IAC GR No. L-70191. October 29, 1987

The court will treat an action for recovery of possession of land as an

action to quiet title provided that it has all the requisites of the latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible and are not barred by laches. But if he is not in possession
thereof, the right may as well prescribe and barred by acquisitive prescription
and laches as well.
The claim was not barred by prescription. As lawful possessors and owners of
the lot in question, PRIVATE REPSPODNENT’s cause of action fell within the settled
jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession over a period of more than 25 years gave
them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and the effect of his own title. If at all, the PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' right to quiet title accrued only in 1975 when they were made aware
of a claim adverse to their own, it was only at that time that the statutory period of
prescription may be said to have commenced to run against them.
 The claim was not also barred by laches. Laches has been defined as the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The facts of the
case show that the private respondents have always been in peaceful possession of the
1/3 portion of the subject lot, exercising ownership thereto for more than 25 years
disrupted only in 1975, when the petitioner tried to remove them by virtue of his title. It
was only at this point that private respondents knew about the supposed sale of their
1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate and they immediately resisted.

6. FERNANDEZ vs. CA GR 83141. September 21, 1990

The court will treat an action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title
provided that it has all the requisites of the latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible. But if he is not in possession thereof, the right may as well
prescribe and barred by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, which is, in effect
an action to quiet title against the plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land in
question. As lawful possessor and owner of the disputed portion, her cause of action for
reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible.
While the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the
adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior
equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense of an action to remove a cloud from title can
only be invoked by a complainant when he is in possession.

7. MAMADSUAL vs. MOSON GR No. 92557. September 27, 1990

Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible. But if he is not in possession thereof, the right may as well prescribe
and barred by acquisitive prescription.
It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered
owner of the property in question because the law embraces both legal and equitable
owners.
 8. PINGOL vs. CA GR No. 102909. September 6, 1993

The court will treat an action for specific performance as an action to quiet title provided
that it has all the requisites of the latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible. But if
he is not in possession thereof, the right may as well prescribe and barred by acquisitive
prescription.

9. HEIRS OF OLVIGA vs. CA GR No. 104813. October 21, 1993

The court will treat an action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title provided that it
has all the requisites of the latter.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible. But if
he is not in possession thereof, the right may as well prescribe and barred by acquisitive
prescription.

CO-OWNERSHIP

10. SPOUSES SI vs. CA GR No. 122047. October 12, 2000

After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother
was no longer available.
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice.
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no
co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically
described.
Here, the lot in question had already been partitioned extrajudicially when their
parents executed 3 deeds of sale in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo. The
disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. The portion sold to SPOUSES SI
by Crisostomo and Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and
identifiable.
A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have
actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the
limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale
at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to
them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary.

11. MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR GR No. 122047. October 12, 2000

A man and a woman who are capacitated to marry but are living together
under a marriage declared as void ab initio by the court for the husband’s
psychological incapacity, shall be governed by co-ownership as to the properties
they acquired during the cohabitation. As regards the settlement of the common
properties, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply.
Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article
147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but without the benefit of marriage, or
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-
ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on
installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent
were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of
petitioner and respondent.
The property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law
on coownership. As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. Under Art. 484, in
default of contracts or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the
provisions of Title III of the Civil Code.

12. JIMENEZ vs. FERNANDEZ GR No. L-46364. April 6, 1990

A property held in common, upon the death of a co-owner who died without
any issue or heir shall be owned by the other co-owner. The portions belonging to
each are presumed to be equal.
SULPICIA JIMENEZ's title over her 1/2 undivided property remained good and
continued to be good when she segregated it into a new title. She should be entitled for
the relief of recovery of the disputed property and be declared as its sole and absolute
owner with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died
in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his
niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died
without any issue or other heirs.
 13. PUNSALAN vs. BOON LIAT GR No. 18009. January 10, 1923
Co-owners may file an action for recover not only against strangers but
also against a co-owner, when the latter performs with respect to the thing held in
common, acts for their exclusive benefit, or of exclusive ownership, or which are
prejudicial to, and in violation of, the right of the community.
Here, the selling of the ambergris by the respondent AHAMAD as his exclusive
property and his attitude in representing himself to be the sole owner thereof placed him
in the same position as the stranger who violated any right of the community. Hence, he
was not sued as a co-owner for the cause of action is predicated upon the fact that he
has acted not as a co-owner but as an exclusive owner of the ambergris sold by him.
There was an agreement between the co-owners not to sell this ambergris
without the consent of all. Both sales having been made without the consent of
all the owners, the same have no effect, except as to the portion pertaining to
those who made them.

14. DE GUIA vs. CA GR No. 120864. October 8, 2003 Rabuya

Art. 487 covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. A co-
owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who
takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only
effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership.
Before partition, co-owners have joint right of dominion over property.
A co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who
takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect
of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with
the actual partitioning of the co-owned property.
Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of
the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper
forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND.
However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition of co-
ownership, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the
entire FISHPOND. Hence, ABEJO and DE GUIA had become owners of the whole and
over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they were at the same
time individual owners of a ½ portion, which is truly abstract because until there
is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners,
ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire
FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their
respective portions.
To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without paying rent
would prejudice ABEJO’s right to receive rent, which would have accrued to his ½ share
in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others.
Since ABEJO acquired his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22
November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession
and use of ABEJO’s portion beginning from that date.

15. ADILLE vs. CA GR No. 44546. January 29, 1988

When a co-owner has repurchased a property held in common with his own
funds alone, it did not terminate the co-ownership. The expenses he incurred
shall be subject to reimbursement from the remaining co-owners.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his
share alone. While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its
entirety, shouldering the expenses therefore, that did not make him the owner of
all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Necessary expenses then may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right
to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners under Art. 488.
The redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not
vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his
name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the
entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the
parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers and
sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in
redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in
common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership.

16. SUNSET VIEW vs. CAMPOS GR Nos. 52361 & 52524. April 27, 1981
Ownership over a condominium unit is acquired by the buyer only after he
had paid the purchase price. The ownership of the unit is what makes the buyer a
shareholder in the condominium.
 Under The Condominium Act, ownership of a unit is a condition sine qua non to
being a shareholder in the Condominium Corporation. It follows that a purchaser of a
unit who is not yet the owner thereof for not having fully paid the full purchase price, is
not a shareholder. By necessary implication, the "separate interest" in a condominium,
which entities the holder to become automatically a shareholder in the Condominium
Corporation, as provided in Sec. 2 of the Condominium Act, can be no other than
ownership of a unit. This is so because nobody can be a shareholder unless he is the
owner of a unit and when he ceases to be the owner, he also ceases automatically to be
a shareholder.
The private respondents, therefore, who have not fully paid the purchase price of
their units and are consequently not owners of their units are not members or
shareholders of the petitioner Condominium Corporation. Being that they were not
shareholders in the Condominium Corporation, the Securities and Exchange
Commission did not have jurisdiction over the case.

17. JAVIER vs. JAVIER GR No. 2812. October 18, 1906

The ownership of a house by one person, and of the land on which it
stands by another, does not create a community of property.
If a co-owner has constructed an improvement on the land without the
consent of the other co-owners, he shall have no right of reimbursement.

18. MERCADO vs. LIWANAG GR No. L-14429. June 30, 1962

What a co-owner may dispose of under Article 493 is only his undivided
aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to divide the property
into parts and then convey one part by metes and bounds.
In the deed of sale, MERCADO transferred and conveyed to LIWANAG his title
and interests on half of the portion of said property in metes ad bounds. Nevertheless,
upon registration of the sale, the new TCT did not reproduce the description in the
instrument but carried the names of PIO D. LIWANAG and BASILIA MERCADO as co-
owners pro-indiviso.
As far as Basilia Mercado is concerned she retained in all their integrity her rights
as co-owner which she had before the sale, and consequently she had no cause to
complain. Much less has Ramon Mercado, for it was he who was responsible for
whatever indicia there may be in the deed of sale that a determinate portion of the
property was being sold.
 The title is the final and conclusive repository of the rights of the new co-owners.
The question of whether or not the Deed of Sale should be annulled must be
considered in conjunction with the title issued pursuant thereto. Since, according
to the title, what LIWANAG acquired by virtue of the sale is only an undivided half-
share of the property, which under the law the vendor RAMON MERCADO had the
absolute right to dispose of, the trial court committed no error in dismissing the
action. The end-result of the transaction is in accordance with Article 493 of the Civil
Code.

19. ACEBEDO vs. ABESAMIS GR No. 102380. January 18, 1993

It is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication.
An heir can sell his ideal share including the rights, interests, or
participation he may have in the property held in common under administration.
The position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is null and
void for lack of prior court approval was erroneous. The sale precisely was made
conditional, the condition being that the same should first be approved by the
probate court. This is a matter, which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right.
Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other
words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging
his ideal share in the property held in common.

20. BAILON vs. CA GR No. L-18178. April 15,1988

Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-ownerseller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where
their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale
merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for partition.
Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant
buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common
property claimed.

21. SPOUSES CRUZ vs. LEIS GR No. 125233. March 9, 2000

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his
share alone. Although Gertrudes redeemed the property in its entirety,
shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make her the owner of all of it.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his
share alone. Although Gertrudes redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the
expenses therefor, that did not make her the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not
put to end the existing state of co-ownership. Under Art. 493, a co-owner such as
Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common.
However, being that neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners, LEIS ET AL. were able
to redeem the same within the one-year period stipulated in the Kasunduan, ownership
then remained with the SPOUSE CRUZ. The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that
title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro,
subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the
stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition
vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the
property sold.

22. SPOUSES DEL CAMPO vs. CA GR No. 108228. February 1, 2001

A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share in the property held in
common. However, a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-
ownership.
If a co-owner had an undisturbed possession for a considerable number of
years, it had the effect of a partial partition of the co-owned property, which
entitled the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies.

23. SANCHEZ vs. CA GR No. 152766. June 20, 2003

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes
and bounds of LILIAN’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to
the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her
right to 1/6 of the property must be respected.
 Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner
can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the
property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may
validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.
But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the
thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or
ideal portion without any physical adjudication.

24. HEIRS OF SPOUSES BALITE vs. LIM GR No. 152168. December 10, 2004
When a co-owner sold a concrete portion of an undivided property held in
common, it did not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with
respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner.
Art. 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property
the right to freely sell and dispose of such interest. The co-owner, however, has no right
to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because
such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any
physical division. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a
concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with
respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to
the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.

25. FABIAN vs. FABIAN GR No. L-20449. January 29, 1968

General Rule & Exception. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition
among coheirs does not prescribe. As an exception, this is true only as long as the
respondents do not hold the property in question under an adverse title.
REQUISITES FOR A CO-OWNER TO ACQUIRE A PROPERTY OWNED IN
COMMON BY PRESCRIPTION:
(1) Co-owner has made known to the other coowners that he has:
repudiated the co-ownership and claimed complete ownership over it.
SILBINA, one of the co-owners had repudiated the co-ownership by executing
the Affidavit with TEODORA, which bore that they were the sole heirs of the
late Pablo Fabian. SILBINA claimed complete ownership over it by securing
title in her name to the exclusion of the other 3 sisters.
(2) There is evidence of repudiation and knowledge on the part of other co-
owners. The evidence of the repudiation was the Affidavit, which excluded all
the other co-owners as to ownership over the property. Upon the registration
 of the Affidavit and the issuance of the title, already served as a constructive
notice to the whole world.
(3) There is an open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious
possession of the property. RESPONDENT SPOUSES occupied the
property in the concept of owners since 1929 since they took physical
possession of the land up to 1960. They had cultivated it, harvested and
appropriated the fruits for themselves. Such acts logically meant the adverse
character of the possession they exercised.
(4) Possession of the Property has started from the time of repudiation
until the filing of the action in court should be at least 10 years. It was in
1928 when SILBINA executed the Affidavit which made possible the issuance
of title in her favor. The action for reconveyance was only made in 1960 or 32
big years later after. Said 32 years is even beyond the 10-year requirement
under the law.
Hence, acquisitive prescription of ownership acquired by one of the co-
owners, co-heirs, and administrator, depositary, or lessee by means of an
adverse possession under claim of title and after the lapse of the time fixed by
law can completely extinguish the right of the other coowners, co-heirs, or
owners of the property in the possession of the one claiming ownership by
prescription.

26. CENIZA vs. CA GR No. 46345. January 30, 1990

In a case where the co-owners had agreed that the title to the property be
named after only one of them, there existed a trust relation. Thus, prescription
could not run in favor of the co-owner in whose name the title was registered to
except from the time that he repudiated the co-ownership and made the
repudiation known to the former.

27. BICARME vs. CA GR No. 51914. June 6, 1990

The right of a co-owner for partition against another co-owner, who holds a
common property in trust may be barred by prescription provided that it is being
held in trust. In the case at bar, MARIA had not proved her adverse claim over the
property against her co-owner CRISTINA that the existence of the co-ownership
was sustained.

28. DE LIMA vs. CA GR No. 46296 September 24, 1991

A co-owner had registered a property held in common only in his name and
possessed it in the concept of an owner. After the lapse of 10 years, without
action from the other co-owners, he could then acquire it through acquisitive
prescription.

29. TRINIDAD vs. CA GR No. 118904. April 20, 1998

A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-

owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the
other co-owners.
FELIX and LOURDES TRINIDAD did not acquire ownership of the property in
question by acquisitive prescription. Under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, in a co-ownership,
the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-
ownership. Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or
her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the
coownership. A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners.

30. TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE vs. CA

An action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by

prescription.
The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for
the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but
for division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC.'s
defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to
Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Such coowner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned." In Budlong vs. Bondoc (1977), the
Supreme Court had interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition
is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription.

31. SANTOS vs. SANTOS GR No. 139524. October 12, 2000

 A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the
other co-owners.
Exclusive possession of a co-owner of a property owned in common by
mere tolerance of the other co-owner did not amount to a repudiation. It must be
understood that by culture, Filipino family ties are close and well-knit and that the
tolerance was natural.

32. AGUILAR vs. CA GR No. 76351. October 29, 1993 RABUYA

Art. 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who
shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed.
Rental for the exclusive use and enjoyment of a co- owner which is not
necessarily prejudicial to the interests of the other coowners should only be
ordered after partition because prior to partition, the former has the right to use
and enjoy the entire property as a co-owner.
Here, the right to partition of the property was invoked by VIRGILIO but SENEN
refused to vacate it. The only recourse then is to sell the property and the proceeds of
the sale be distributed to the both of them in equal shares.
SENEN was a co-owner. Hence, under Article 486 of the Civil Code, he had the
right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to VIRGILIO, as he may
use the property owned in common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.
However, since VIRGILIO had decided to effect partition of the house and lot in
court. After the trial court granted the petition for partition and ordered the ejectment of
SENEN, the coownership was deemed terminated and the right to use and enjoy the
possession jointly ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of SENEN and his family in
the house was prejudicial to the interest of VIRGILIO as the property should have been
sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on
respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

33. REYES vs. CONCEPTION GR No. 56650. October 1, 1990 RABUYA

A co-owner has no preemptive right to purchase the pro indiviso share
being offered for sale by another co-owner. What he has is the right of
redemption which must be exercised for a span of period after the sale to a 3rd
person by the other co-owner involving the latter’s share was made.
Under Art. 498, the sale of the property held in common referred to in the
above article is resorted to when: (1) the right to partition the property among the
co-owners is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the property, it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-
owners and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall
be allotted or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of
the other coown