Constitutional Law Outline

Reed v. Town of Gilbert (content based)

Issue: Does a sign code that differentiates political, ideological and sign for events,
affect the First Amendment?

Facts: The town of Gilbert, Arizona (or Town), has adopted a comprehensive code
governing the manner in which people may display outdoor signs. The Sign Code
identifies various categories of signs based on the type of information they convey,
then subjects each category to different restrictions. One of the categories is
“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event,” loosely defined as
signs directing the public to a meeting of a nonprofit group. The Code imposes more
stringent restrictions on these signs than it does on signs conveying other messages.

Procedural Posture: petitioners filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona, arguing that the Sign Code abridged their freedom of
speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The District Court denied the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Sign Code’s
provision regulating temporary directional signs did not regulate speech on the basis
of content [and] holding that the Code’s sign categories were content neutral.

Holding: Yes. They are facially content based and are neither justified by traditional
safety concerns nor narrowly tailored.

Reasoning (s):

 The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth

Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws “abridging the freedom of
speech.” Under that Clause, a government, including a municipal government
vested with state authority, “has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
 Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative
content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
 government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests. Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed.
 Are subject of strict scrutiny.
 A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless
of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of
“animus toward the ideas contained” in the regulated speech.
 A speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even
if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter. The
Town’s Sign Code likewise singles out specific subject matter for differential
treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints within that subject matter.
 Because the Town’s Sign Code imposes content-based restrictions on speech,
those provisions can stand only if they survive strict scrutiny, “`which
requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The Town cannot do
so. It has offered only two governmental interests in support of the
distinctions the Sign Code draws: preserving the Town’s aesthetic appeal and
traffic safety. Assuming for the sake of argument that those are compelling
governmental interests, the Code’s distinctions fail as hopelessly
underinclusive.

First of all, the obvious similarity between Town of Gilbert and Sorrell, is that both cases
issue is content-based law. In Town of Gilbert, petitioners filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the Sign Code
abridged their freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The District Court denied the motion, and then, Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Sign Code’s provision regulating
temporary directional signs did not regulate speech on the basis of content and
holding that the Code’s sign categories were content neutral, because there where
no viewpoints. The Court decided this matter stating that The Town’s Sign Code
singles out specific subject matter for differential treatment, even if it does not
target viewpoints within that subject matter. Therefore it is a content based law
which an strict scrutiny examination is imposed, this is, requires the Government to
prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. The Court held that The Town did not do so. It has offered
only two governmental interests in support of the distinctions the Sign Code draws:
preserving the Town’s aesthetic appeal and traffic safety.
West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette (coercion)

Issue: Does a rule that compels the salute to the American flag violates the First
Amendment?

Facts: The Board of Education on January 9, 1942, adopted a resolution ordering

that the salute to the flag become “a regular part of the program of activities in the
public schools,” that all teachers and pupils “shall be required to participate in the
salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal
to salute the Flag be regarded as an Act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with
accordingly.”
Children of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been expelled from school and are threatened
with exclusion for no other cause. Officials threaten to send them to reformatories
maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. Parents of such children have been
prosecuted and are threatened with prosecutions for causing delinquency.

Procedural Posture: This case occurred three years after the Court’s decision in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). There, the Supreme
Court ruled that public schools could compel students—in that case, too, Jehovah’s
Witnesses—to salute the American Flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance despite
the students’ religious objections to these practices. The ruling was 8-1, with Justice
Frankfurter writing for the Court. Appellees, citizens of the United States and of
West Virginia, brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and
others similarly situated asking its injunction to restrain enforcement of these laws
and regulations against Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Holding: Yes. the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.

Personally, I think that human freedom is based on freedom of thought. When I

speak of freedom of thought, I mean that there is nothing that influences its
development, but that the human being himself is in charge of deciding where he
wants to take his beliefs. I think this is why the cases where coercion is eliminated
and addressed by the protection of the first amendment have been very important.
A case that generated a lot of appreciation for me was that of Brunetti, because
beyond the fact that it touches the bottom of the heart of the Americans that
someone resists to salute the flag, the Supreme Court made it clear that it does not
want beings humans who perform forced acts and who do not really feel in their
hearts what they are doing. I think that from cases like the one mentioned, the
enormous importance of freedom of expression underlies: you can do whatever
you want, after you don't affect others. You can believe in whatever religion you
want, you can follow whatever ideology you want, after you don't affect other
people. I sincerely believe that of all the amendments enshrined in the Constitution
of the United States, I believe that the Clause of Free Expression is the most
important: it is where the human being makes sense, it is from where people can
develop. I believe that the essence of the human being is freedom of expression
without any coercion.

Reasoning (s):

 To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of
Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open
to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.
 The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
 If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us. We think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control.

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum

Issue: Does the refusal violate 1A free speech rights when the park already contains
a monument from a different religious group?
Procedural Posture: In 2005, respondent filed this action against the City and various
local officials (petitioners), asserting, among other claims, that petitioners had
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by accepting the Ten
Commandments monument but rejecting the proposed Seven Aphorisms monument.
Respondent sought a preliminary injunction directing the City to permit Summum to
erect its monument in Pioneer Park. After the District Court denied Summum’s
preliminary injunction request, respondent appealed, pressing solely its free speech
claim.
A panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed. … concluding that the exclusion of
respondent’s monument was unlikely to survive [] strict scrutiny, and the panel
therefore held that the City was required to erect Summum’s monument
immediately.

Facts: Summum is a religious organization founded in 1975 and headquartered in

Salt Lake City, Utah. On two separate occasions in 2003, Summum’s president
wrote a letter to the City’s mayor requesting permission to erect a “stone
monument,” which would contain “the Seven Aphorisms of SUMMUM” and be
similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument. The City denied
the requests and explained that its practice was to limit monuments in the Park to
those that “either (1) directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were
donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.” The
following year, the City passed a resolution putting this policy into writing. The
resolution also mentioned other criteria, such as safety and esthetics. In May 2005,
respondent’s president again wrote to the mayor asking to erect a monument, but the
letter did not describe the monument, its historical significance, or Summum’s
connection to the community. The city council rejected this request.

Holding: the City’s decision to accept certain privately donated monuments while
rejecting respondent’s is best viewed as a form of government speech. As a result,
the City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech Clause

Reasoning (s)
 A government entity has the right to “speak for itself.” It is entitled to say
what it wishes, and to select the views that it wants to express. it is not easy
to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom.
 A government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views
when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering
a government-controlled message.
 While government speech is not restricted by the Free Speech Clause, the
government does not have a free hand to regulate private speech on
government property. In order to preserve this freedom, government entities
are strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech in such
“traditional public fora.” Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are
allowed, but any restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy
strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest, and restrictions based on viewpoint are
prohibited.
 Government restrictions on speech in a designated public forum are subject to
the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum. The Court
has also held that a government entity may create a forum that is limited to
use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.
In such a forum, a government entity may impose restrictions on speech that
are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.
 Permanent monuments displayed on public property typically represent
government speech. A monument, by definition, is a structure that is designed
as a means of expression. When a government entity arranges for the
construction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to convey some
thought or instill some feeling in those who see the structure.
 Just as government-commissioned and government-financed monuments
speak for the government, so do privately financed and donated monuments
that the government accepts and displays to the public on government land.
 Government decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what they
view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account such
content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture. The monuments
that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect of
conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government
speech.
 By accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property, a
city engages in expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived
 significance of that conduct may not coincide with the thinking of the
monument’s donor or creator. By accepting such a monument, a government
entity does not necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular
donor sees in the monument.
 Respondent and the Court of Appeals analogize the installation of permanent
monuments in a public park to the delivery of speeches and the holding of
marches and demonstrations, and they thus invoke the rule that a public park
is a traditional public forum for these activities. However, public parks can
accommodate only a limited number of permanent monuments. They
monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere permanently
with other uses of public space. [I]t is hard to imagine how a public park
could be opened up for the installation of permanent monuments by every
person or group wishing to engage in that form of expression.

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n

Facts: Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent
video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in
a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed
restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games"
to minors.

Reasoning (s)

 And whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing

technology, “the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the
First Amendment’s command, do not vary” when a new and different
medium for communication appears.
 “‘From 1791 to the present,’ … the First Amendment has ‘permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,’ and has never
‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.’ ” United

 States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584, 176 L.Ed.2d
435 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–383 (1992)).
These limited areas—such as obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
 483 (1957), incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–449 (1969)
(per curiam), and fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)—represent “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem,”
 As in Stevens, California has tried to make violent-speech regulation look
like obscenity regulation by appending a saving clause required for the latter.
That does not suffice. Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception
to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking,
but only depictions of “sexual conduct.
 No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm,
but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which
children may be exposed. “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor
subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable for them.”
 Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is
invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that
is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly
drawn to serve that interest. “It is rare that a regulation restricting speech
because of its content will ever be permissible.”
 Underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in
fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular
speaker or viewpoint. Here, California has singled out the purveyors of video
games for disfavored treatment—at least when compared to booksellers,
cartoonists, and movie producers—and has given no persuasive reason why.

Justice Alito Opinion

 In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new

and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We
should make every effort to understand the new technology.
 In the view of the Court, all those concerned about the effects of violent
video games—federal and state legislators, educators, social scientists, and
parents—are unduly fearful, for violent video games really present no serious
problem. Spending hour upon hour controlling the actions of a character who
 guns down scores of innocent victims is not different in “kind” from reading
a description of violence in a work of literature.
The Court is sure of this; I am not. There are reasons to suspect that the
experience of playing violent video games just might be very different from
reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie or a television
show.

Snyder v. Phelps

Issue: whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability
for their speech in this case.

Procedural Posture: A jury held members of the Westboro Baptist Church liable for
millions of dollars in damages for picketing near a soldier’s funeral service. The
picket signs reflected the church’s view that the United States is overly tolerant of
sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment.

Facts: Phelps became aware of Matthew Snyder’s funeral and decided to travel to
Maryland with six other Westboro Baptist parishioners (two of his daughters and
four of his grandchildren) to picket. On the day of the memorial service, the
Westboro congregation members picketed on public land adjacent to public streets
near the Maryland State House, the United States Naval Academy, and Matthew
Snyder’s funeral.

Holding: Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public
concern, that speech is entitled to “special protection” under the First Amendment.

Reasoning (s)

 The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest

to society at large, rather than matters of “purely private concern.” While
Westboro’s messages may fall short of refined social or political
commentary, the issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the
United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the
military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public
 import. The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on those issues, in a
manner designed to reach as broad a public audience as possible.
 Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a
public place adjacent to a public street. Such space occupies a “special
position in terms of First Amendment protection.” [Case omitted]. “[W]e
have repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of a traditional
public forum,” noting that “‘[t]ime out of mind’ public streets and sidewalks
have been used for public assembly and debate.”
 Simply put, the church members had the right to be where they were.
Westboro alerted local authorities to its funeral protest and fully complied
with police guidance on where the picketing could be staged. The picketing
was conducted under police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church, out
of the sight of those at the church. The protest was not unruly; there was no
shouting, profanity, or violence.
 The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing
turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any
interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the
very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said “God Bless
America” and “God Loves You,” would not have been subjected to liability.
 As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That
choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in
this case.

United States v. O’Brien

Facts: On the morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O’Brien and three
companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of
the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event. Immediately after the burning,
members of the crowd began attacking O’Brien and his companions. An FBI agent
ushered O’Brien to safety inside the courthouse. After he was advised of his right to
counsel and to silence, O’Brien [stated] to FBI agents that he had burned his
registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal
law.
Procedural Posture: O’Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He did not contest the
fact that he had burned the certificate. He stated in argument to the jury that he
burned the certificate publicly to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs, as he
put it, “so that other people would reevaluate their positions with Selective Service,
with the armed forces, and reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully
consider my position.”

The indictment upon which he was tried charged that he “willfully and knowingly
did [mutilate], destroy, and change by burning * * * (his) Registration Certificate
(Selective Service System Form No. 2); in violation of Title 50, App., United States
Code, Section 462(b).”

Holding: We find that the 1965 Amendment to s 12(b)(3) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements (see requirements in
reasoning), and consequently that O’Brien can be constitutionally convicted for
violating it.

Reasoning (s):

 We note at the outset that the 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free
speech on its face, and we do not understand O’Brien to argue otherwise.
Amended s 12(b)(3) on its face deals with conduct having no connection with
speech.
 This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
 To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear,
the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling;
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision
inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
  The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make
all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping. [Cases
omitted] *.*.* Pursuant to this power, Congress may establish a system of
registration for individuals liable for training and service, and may require
such individuals within reason to cooperate in the registration system. The
issuance of certificates indicating the registration and eligibility classification
of individuals is a legitimate and substantial administrative aid in the
functioning of this system. And legislation to insure the continuing
availability of issued certificates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose
in the system’s administration.
 We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital interest in having a
system for raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency and is
capable of easily and quickly responding to continually changing
circumstances. For these reasons, the Government has a substantial interest in
assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates.
 Both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment are
limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct. The
governmental interest and the scope of the 1965 Amendment are limited to
preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective
Service System.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.

Facts: Vermont law restricts the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that
reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors. Subject to certain exceptions,
the information may not be sold, disclosed by pharmacies for marketing purposes, or
used for marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers. Vermont argues that its
prohibitions safeguard medical privacy and diminish the likelihood that marketing
will lead to prescription decisions not in the best interests of patients or the State.

Reasoning (s)
  Both on its face and in its practical operation, Vermont’s law imposes a
burden based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker. While
the burdened speech results from an economic motive, so too does a great
deal of vital expression. Vermont’s law does not simply have an effect on
speech, but is directed at certain content and is aimed at particular speakers.
 beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance
human knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong
argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First
Amendment purposes.
 Under a commercial speech inquiry, it is the State’s burden to justify its
content-based law as consistent with the First Amendment. To sustain the
targeted, content-based burden §4631(d) imposes on protected expression, the
State must show at least that the statute directly advances a substantial
governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.
There must be a “fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends.” As in other contexts, these standards ensure not only
that the State’s interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed on
speech but also that the law does not seek to suppress a disfavored message.
 First, the State contends that its law is necessary to protect medical privacy,
including physician confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the
integrity p. 1431of the doctor-patient relationship. Second, the State argues
that §4631(d) is integral to the achievement of policy objectives—namely,
improved public health and reduced healthcare costs. Neither justification
withstands scrutiny.

Morse v. Frederick

Issue: whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.

Facts: At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, a high school principal

saw some of her students unfurl a large banner conveying a message she reasonably
regarded as promoting illegal drug use. Consistent with established school policy
prohibiting such messages at school events, the principal directed the students to
take down the banner. One student—among those who had brought the banner to the
event—refused to do so. The principal confiscated the banner and later suspended
the student.

Holding: The First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at school events
student expression that contributes to those dangers.

Reasoning (s)

 First, Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of students

in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings.” Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum
outside the school context, it would have been protected. In school, however,
Fraser’s First Amendment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.”
 schools may regulate some speech “even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.
 The “special characteristics of the school environment,” Tinker, 393 U.S., at
506, 89 S.Ct. 733, and the governmental interest in stopping student drug
abuse—reflected in the policies of Congress and myriad school boards,
including JDHS—allow schools to restrict student expression that they
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use. Tinker warned that schools
may not prohibit student speech because of “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance” or “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Id., at 508,
509, 89 S.Ct. 733. The danger here is far more serious and palpable. The
particular concern to prevent student drug abuse at issue here, embodied in
established school policy, extends well beyond an abstract desire to avoid
controversy.

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

Issue: whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of
Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general
criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such
religiously inspired use.

Facts: Alfred Smith and Galen Black (hereinafter respondents) were fired from their
jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both
are members. When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division
(hereinafter petitioner) for unemployment compensation, they were determined to be
ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related
“misconduct.”

Reasoning (s)

Holding

 The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First
Amendment obviously excludes all “governmental regulation of religious
beliefs as such.”
 We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is
free to regulate.
 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press. The present case does not present such a
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any
communicative activity or parental right.
 Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
 The “compelling government interest” requirement seems benign, because it
is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met
before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race,
see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984), or before the
government may regulate the content of speech, see, e.g., Sable
 Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), is not remotely
comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in
those other fields-equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of
contending speech-are constitutional norms; what it would produce here-a
private right to ignore generally applicable laws-is a constitutional anomaly.
 If the “compelling interest” test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied
across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded.
Moreover, if “compelling interest” really means what it says (and watering it
down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied),
many laws will not meet the test.
 Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference,” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S., at
606, and precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an
interest of the highest order.
 The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind. *.*.* The First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty
does not require this.