Law Library, Library of Congress, USA

Foreign and Comparative Law Webinar Series:

“Weaponization of Passports - Tool of War & Diplomacy: Legality,

Methodology, & Impact of Russian ‘Passportization’ Policy Toward Ukraine,
Georgia, & Moldova”

webinar on May 23, 2024

Transcription

Iana Fremer

00:00:00

Good afternoon.

 Thank you for joining our webinar today. My name is Iana Fremer, and I
am a legal research analyst at the Library of Congress.
 My presentation will offer an overview of historic events, spending more
than 2 decades
 focusing on laws and policies concerning Russia's practice to give the
passports to people in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, I will discuss how
Russia's post Cold War, foreign policy was implemented on the
territories of former Soviet Republics. We will compare differences in the
Russia's approach to extraterritorial naturalization in annexed and
occupied territories.
 Extraterritorial naturalization is a well-known phenomena whereas the
rationale of such policies is largely focused on sustaining cultural and
economic ties between the motherland and diaspora. In the globalized
world.
 The basis of such policies is to provide legal mechanisms for the
diaspora to obtain citizenship of the ancestral motherland through
voluntary application.
 When it comes to passportizations, the rationale is fundamentally
different.
 Scholars refer to passportization
 as a massive and expedited extraterritorial materialization of citizens
residing in contested territories of another country.
 While such policies clearly encroach on the serenity of other States, the
aim of prioritization is to effectively undermine and eventually change
national borders.
 Russia does not pursue a uniform strategy for passportation.
 Instead, the Kremlin adapts its foreign policy instruments to specific
circumstances and changing
 objectives.
 In practice, Russia has employed 3 scenarios of postprofitization,
extrateralization in the case of Transnistria.
 presportisation in occupied territories such as Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, in Georgia.
 and passportation in annexed territories of Ukraine, Crimea, and parts of
several regions of Donetsk, Luganskerson, and Zaparosia.
 Notably for each Scenario Russia's state institutions, whether it be the
President's office of or the State
 doom. A Parliament of the Russian Federation provide corresponding
legal justification, despite the non-conformative as international law and
practices.
 The results of passportization have been used by the Russian
Federation, not only as the Kazoos belly to justify military actions
outside of Russian territory, as in South, so South South Ossetia, by also
as a tool for changing demographics, artificially increasing new waters
to strengthen the ruling elite in Russia.
 and for military purposes, to replenish the Russian armed forces.
 To understand the logic comes
 context and concept of the prophetization policy. It is crucial to delve
into the strategies developed by Russia. Following the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
 After the collapse of the Ussr. In December of 90 91,
 Russia began to develop a new foreign policy formula.
 This formula was focused on ethnic and linguistic communities
 with historic and cultural ties to Russia, known as the Compatriots.
 until leadership
 of the Foreign Minister and later the Prime Minister, Ibni Primakov, a
new doctrine of Russian foreign and security policy, emerged in 90 96.
 This doctrine emphasized Russia's role as a great power at the heart of
Eurasia, and reintroduced the concept of spheres of influence which
aimed to limit the political, economic and security choices of states
surrounding the Russian Federation.
 Second patriots were seen as a key instrument for implementing this
doctrine.
 Additionally, Russia justified its action as a part of responsibility to
protect ethnic Russians and compatriots while undermining the
territorial integrity of neighboring countries.
 This policy merely continued Rush's previous attitude to its
neighborhood.
 well described by the celebrated American diplomat, George Kennan in
44, who once said, the jealous and intolerant ire of the Kremlin can
distinguish in the end only vessels and enemies and the neighbors of
Russia, if they don't
 wish to be, one, must reconcile themselves to being the other.
 Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet States
experienced economic turmoil as a transition from the Soviet style
planned economy.
 This period above, he will lead to severing economic ties between the
newly independent States, resulting in economic decline, and in some
cases ethnic tensions that escalated into civil wars.
 Russia supported secessionist and separatist entities in several post-
soviet States, found themselves heavily dependent on the Russia for
support, including for access to the freedom of movement and social
benefits.
 the invalidity of Soviet passwords, and the practical uselessness of
passwords issued by the separatist regions.
 Regimes further pushed individuals in these regions towards seeking
Russian citizenship.
 90 97. Russia's president, Boris Yeltsin, mandated the expiration of old
Soviet passports by December 31, st 2,005.
 Under this legislation the former Soviet citizens, who were permanent
residents in Russia on February 6, 90, 92 automatically became Russian
nationals unless they explicitly rejected Russian citizenship. By
February 6, 90 93.
 As a former Soviet citizens could acquire Russian citizenship through
registration. If they migrated to Russia before December 31, st 2,000, or
before February 6, 90 95. If they were residents in the former Soviet
republics, and had not become citizens in the States where they resided
 2 years later, in 1,999, the Russian Federation implemented the State
policy concerning competes abroad.
 defining compatriots as individuals who shared language, history, and
cultural heritage with Russia, including Russian citizens residing outside
of the country
 in 90 99, the Federal law on State policy concerning competitors abroad
was adopted.
 Salo defined Russia as a legal continuation of all State formations that
previously existed on the Russian territory.
 It is worth mentioning that the prioritization policy of the Russian
Federation towards Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, intensified
 after significant political events that have challenged
 Russia's dominance in the neighboring countries.
 instances such as the 2,003 rose revolution in Georgia, and 2, and the
2,004 Orange and 2,000
 14 dignitary revolutions in Ukraine have triggered new waves of
prosperization and subsequent military actions with full scale, military
interventions. In Georgia, in 2,008 Ukraine, and
 in 2,014
 and Ukraine again, most recently, in 2,022
 distribution of Russian passports formally
 formally commenced in 2,002. When Russia adopted the Federal law on
citizenship.
 The provisions of this law enabled people who have had Usssa
citizenship, and having resided and residing in the States that have
formed part of the Ussr have not become citizens of these States.
 and as a result remain stateless persons to obtain Russian citizenship
through a simplified procedure.
 Primary targets for such policy became the Georgian separatist
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
 Over time. Russia has utilized prophetization policies as an instrument
to exert pressure on States like Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova through
distribution of Russian passports amongst the population of their
respective separatist regions, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
Georgia, so Donetsk people Republic, Dpr. And Luhansk people.
Republic, Lpr. In Ukraine as well as Transistria and Gaga in Moldova.
 In order to understand the diverse mechanisms of the prosperization
policies, let's review the separate cases of Georgia and Ukraine.
 The practice of using domestic id documents or passports in Russian
terminology as foreign policy instruments originated in Georgia.
 the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, currently under
Russian control, were targeted by the Russian Federation for
passportation and later for an invasion with a pretext to defend its own
citizens.
 Both regions fought wars of secession from Georgia during the early 90
S. With covert Russian support, and in both regions peacekeeping
operations, including Russian troops were deployed
 between 90, 91, and 90 99, Russia actively distributed passports to non-
russian citizens visited the territories of South Sussey. And
 in 2,002, the Congress of Russian communities of Abkhazia, a Russian
government controlled Ngo, started collecting old Soviet passports from
residents and issuing some new documents confirming their Russian
citizenship
 by 2,002, 150,000 new residents of Abkhazia had acquired Russian
citizenship, in addition
 to the 50,000 who already possessed it.
 Following the 2,003 rose revolution in Georgia, the acquisition of
Russian citizenship in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was simplified
further.
 and the residents could apply for Russian passports without even
leaving their homes.
 Despite the peace plans proposed by Georgian authorities. In November
2,006,
 a Russia-packed referendum was held in South Ossetia to reaffirm its
independence from Georgia.
 99% of voters supported this referendum.
 In response. The Russian authorities actively started granting Russian
citizenship to Southwest and issuing them Russian passports.
 This act de facto
 recognize the independence of South Ossetia from Georgia, and was
used by the South. Susan's authorities, mostly represented by so-called
officials parachuted in from Russia.
 ask permission to initiate the expulsion of ethnic Georgians from the
territory of South Ossetia
 reportedly up to 90% of South Sussey's population of under 100,000. To
use this opportunity to acquire Russian citizenship, and a special series
of Russian tribal passports was designated for insurance in South
Sussey.
 Relocation to the Russian territory was not required to obtain Russian
citizenship
 by 2,006. 90% of the population in Abkhazia and south. Ossetia held the
Russian passports with both regions, allowing dual citizenship with
Russia.
 Thus prosperization provided the basis for Russia's justification for the
use of military action against Georgia to protect Russian citizens.
 As a result, local secessionist authorities claim sovereignty over the
territory.
 A five-day Russe, Georgian war in August of 2,008 resulted in full control
of South Ossetia by Russian forces and an ethnic cleansing of Georgians
from the region.
 Russia justified its military integration by
 by its legal obligation to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia from
Georgian military aggression.
 Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valerie Zorgan, in his
interview
 August 13th 2,008 stated that the Russia has a legal right to use military
force to protect its citizens. Living abroad in such situations.
 He further referred to the Federal law on the State policy of the Russian
Federation towards compatri compatriots abroad.
 stating that the Peace enforcement operation conducted by the Russian
military in South Ossetia was in accordance with Article 14, paragraph
5, which provides that if a foreign state, while it's recognized norms of
international law and human rights in regard to Russian expatriates, the
Russian Federation shall undertake efforts authorized by international
law to defend their interests.
 Sorkin concluded that by invading Georgia, Russia fulfilled its obligation
to fellow citizens.
 Russia continued its passportization policies after the Rusa Georgian
war of 2,008, and officially recognized Abkhazia and South society as
independent States.
 Now I would like to discuss Georgia's legal framework and Georgian
responses to Russian purpose, passportization
 for Georgia. The residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are considered
citizens of Georgia and therefore can travel to other parts of the country
with the travel documents issued by the local authorities.
 The law of Georgia on occupied territories adopted in 2,010, provides for
a special legal regime in these territories. Under this law the residents
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia can acquire Georgian citizenship and
travel passport or the status neutral Id. Card and travel document.
 In July of 2,011 the Georgian Government introduced touches, neutral
passports to facilitate travel for people living in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
 The status neutral travel document is issued to persons legitimately
residing in Abkhazia and the Timbali region.
 which is the former autonomous district of South Ossetia.
 On July 17th
 the Us. Department of State began accepting Georgian status. Neutral
travel documents Smt from any resident of Russian, occupied Abkhazia
and South society. Who chooses to use them for travel or education in
the United States.
 Now let's go. Our passportation in Transnistri as an example of extra
territory, of policy, of the distribution of passwords.
 The transistorian, predmistroven Moldovan Republic, commonly known
as Transnistria is yet another area where Russia applies its
passportization policies.
 Transistor is populated by about
 half 1 million people. Each population is multiethnic, made up of
Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, and others.
 According to Transnistrian authorities, currently 300
 40,000 residents has already possessed Russian citizenship.
 At the same time, local experts claim that in parallel most residents of
Transnistria keep their Moldovan citizenship, in addition to Romanian
one.
 Starting last December, the Kremlin increasingly signaled its views that
there are Russian citizens
 and compatriots abroad in Transnistria who Moscow must protect
 Russian state media intensified efforts to set information conditions
aimed at destabilizing Moldova by framing Russia as a protector of
allegedly threatened Russian language and speakers.
 Russian language speakers in Moldova.
 On January 1020, 24, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated
 that it summons the Moldovan Ambassador to Russia to protest
Moldova's unfriendly actions, including the politically motivated
persecution of Russian and Russian language, media and cases of
discrimination against Russian citizens. Entering Moldova.
 Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov. Announced on february 14, th
2024, that Russia is concerned for its citizens in in Transnistria, and
then Moscow will not allow the West to victimize
 200,000 Russian citizens living in transit
 before we move to the prioritization in Crimea. I would like to make
some remarks concerning Russia's policy instruments in Ukraine.
 So revolution of dignity in Ukraine and its subsequent short lived power
of vacuum were utilized by Russia to advance its policies in Ukraine,
particularly in Crimea.
 On March 1st
 2,014 Russian President Vladimir Putin received authorization from the
Russian Parliament to use force in Crimea.
 This approval led to a rapid escalation of Russia's efforts to integrate
the region ultimately resulting in its annexation.
 On March 11, 2,014, following the Russian military occupation of Crimea,
the regional Parliament declared the territory independent from Ukraine.
 Seat. Declaration paved is a way for the Crimean status referendum. The
referendum took place on March 16 2,014, under close Russian
supervision in which the Crimean population voted on. Whether the
Crimea should join the Russian Federation.
 despite being deemed illegal by the organization for security and
cooperation in Europe, Osc. Approximately 96% of waters indicated this
support for unification with Russia, as reported by Cbc.
 On the same day Russia acknowledged the Republic of Crimea as an
independent State.
 The following day authorities of Independent Crimea and President Putin
signed an agreement for
 for Crimea to become part of the Russian Federation
 is a context of changing State borders, as specified in Article 17 of the
Russian Citizenship law. Individuals residing in territories affected by
border changes due to international agreements have the right to
choose their citizenship within the framework established by the
relevant international treaty.
 This provision allows individuals in such territories to opt for Russian
citizenship.
 while Russia and the Crimean Parliament argues that the referendum
was lawful, invoking the UN recognized right to self-determination, and
referring to the advisory opinion on Kosovo, in which the International
Court of Justice stated that international law does not prohibit
Declaration of Independence.
 Legal experts have
 contested the validity of the Crimean referendum on integration with
Russia, because it was in violation of the constitution of Ukraine.
 According to the 2,014 State statistic service of Ukraine, estimates the
total population of the Peninsula was 2.3 million.
 based on information available online. After next in Crimea, Russia
forced citizenship on over 2 million people on the peninsula through
automatic passportization.
 a practice that grants citizenship on mass to residents
 occupied territories without the content
 or input
 and in some cases even in their absence.
 In 2,014 Ukrainian human rights activists recorded instances in which
Ukrainian passwords were seized from officials such as judges, police
officers, and prosecutors in Crimea.
 they were forced to write applications for renunciation of Ukrainian
citizenship, and since their passports were taken away.
 passportization of the dumbass region of Ukraine is a separate case
study.
 The Kremlin expanded its passportization policy to annex parts
 of Ukraine's Eastern Lukasan Donetsk provinces controlled by Russia
since 2,014, and shifted it
 tactics to coerce Ukrainians to accept Russian citizenship.
 The Minister of Internal Affairs of the Dpr. Began issuing their own
Donbas passports in 2,016 aiming to gain internal legitimacy, and
deepens the Aline of Donbass residents from Ukraine.
 Since 2,016, over 415,000 individuals has received Dpr. Passports.
 In February 2,017, the decree number 74 of the Russian President
recognized identity documents, education, doors, marriage and name,
change certificates and vehicle registration documents issued by the
Dpr. And Lpr.
 This recognition applied to Ukrainian citizens and stateless person
permanently residing in the territories controlled by the Separatists and
allowed them to acquire Russian nationality.
 A special office of the Russian Interior Ministry was set up in the
neighboring Russian Rostov region to process fast tracking applications
 while passport applications could be submitted. In the so-called people's
republics.
 Passwords were issued exclusively in the roast of region. Local
governments
 have put in place log long distance bus lines to make it easier for people
to collect the new password.
 Those who travel to pick up the newly printed Russian passports pay
this substantial fee, and took the oath of allegiance to the Russian
Federation.
 In April 2,019, Russia decided to allow residents of Lpr. And Dpr. To
become Russian citizens via a simplified procedure.
 2 presidential decrease facilitated this process.
 According to Russian government, close to
 200,000 Donetsk and Lukansk residents obtained Russian citizenship in
2,019,
 160,000 of them received their passports in Rostov alone.
 Russian President Vladimir Putin cited humanitarian reasons for this
decision, addressing the growing crisis in the Donbas region.
 He also discussed the possibility of simplifying Russian citizenship
acquisition for all Ukrainians residents the fast track citizenship scheme
originally created for residents of the Separatist territories was
extended to residents of the donbas areas controlled by the Ukrainian
Government, and later it was expanded to all Ukrainian citizens,
regardless of their location.
 Ukrainian authorities view viewed this decrease
 as an act of aggression against Ukraine. The government in Kiev
declared the Russian passport issued to residents of the republics
invalid, and urged
 other countries to break out these fake documents.
 However, Donbas residents who obtained Russian passports revealed
that they would prefer to keep all 3 available passports, Russian,
Ukraine, and as the republics to maximize travel and social benefits
 reportedly by mid
 August 2,021 approximately 500
 30,000 newly passportized Donbas residents emerged in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions
 following the military aggression against Ukraine and occupation of
other regions.
 Independence referendums were held in her son and Zaparogia
provinces.
 Russian military, civilian administrations of her son and Zaparosia
proclaimed independence as an intermediate step for Russian
annexation. On September 32,000
 22 President Vladimir Putin signed a session treaties with self-
proclaimed and Russia appointed leaders of the 4 Occupian regions.
 It is estimated that by 2,022 1.6 million Ukrainians received Russian
passport.
 This number seems to have increased substantially after 4 Ukrainian
territories were formally included in the Russian Federation
 after the war started in February 2022, more than 5 million Ukrainian
refugees moved to Russia. It is not clear how many of them preserved
their Ukrainian passports.
 Russian law requires them to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship,
restricting employment of people with a second citizenship
 so newly passed, law specifically addressing the legal status of
Ukrainians in the Russian Federation prohibits them from using the
Ukrainian passports, or any other actions related to the rights given to
them by being Ukrainian citizens
 to enforce the ban on possession of Ukrainian citizenship by Ukrainians
admitted to Russian citizenship.
 Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree
 on select issues related to Specifics of the legal status of Russian
Federation citizens who have Ukrainian citizenship. In June 2023,
 also writing the Minister of Internal Affairs, together with other law
enforcement institutions to conduct a continuous review of such
individuals and prevent the use of Ukrainian citizenship.
 even though since since 2020, those who apply for naturalization in
Russia are no longer required to renounce the original foreign
citizenship. This rule does not apply to Ukrainians
 because they cannot provide proof of terminating the Ukrainian
citizenship due to lack of consular relations between Russia and
Ukraine.
 In June 2023, the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs adopted a
procedure under which any Ukrainian older than 14 years of age
 can submit a statement renouncing Ukrainian citizenship at a local
Russian police station, or electronically through the web portal for
Russian State public services.
 the Ukrainian passport of the applicants must be submitted to Russian
authorities.
 According to the Ministry's order, individuals are no longer considered to
be considered to be Ukrainian citizens from the moment they submits
their Ukrainian passport and signs the statement
 regarding Zoos living in occupied Ukrainian territories.
 Russia has promulgated a series of legal regulations that accelerated
the acceptance of Russian citizenship and increasingly penalized those
who have not applied
 to use it.
 Interest in obtaining Russian citizenship among people in the occupied
territories has been minimal. Russia has applied pressure, such as tying
the receipt of humanitarian aid or keeping a job in the health and
Education sectors, or to having a Russian passport.
 Researchers at Yale University had found that the residents of the
Luftwaffe, Donetsk Person and Zaparoja regions were being targeted by
a systematic effort to strip them of Ukrainian identity.
 Nathaniel Raymond, the executive director of the Yale Humanitarian
Research lab, said that Rush's actions were classic war crimes in the
sense that they are restricting or limiting people's ability to access
critical services and resources, such as a healthcare and humanitarian
systems.
 For example, in September
 2023. The National Resistance Center of Ukraine reported this as people
who do not have a Russian passport were denied medical care because
they did not have Russian health insurance, which could only be
obtained with a Russian password.
 It was reported that in the South Ukrainian city of Khovka the occupiers
made door-to-door and house-to-house. Visits.
 they conducted a population census and exerted psychological
pressure, forcing residents to obtain passports.
 They also threatened Ukrainian citizens who refused to obtain a Russian
passport with forced eviction from their homes and power cuts.
 Moreover, during as the massive flood flooding is her son Obelis.
 Following the breach of the Kahovka them, Russia allowed evacuation
only to Russian passport holders, as reported by the General staff of
Ukraine's armed forces.
 reportedly residents of the temporally occupied territories, are deprived
of their jobs for refusing to obtain Russian passports.
 The Russian is told, administrations have told public sector employees
that they must all obtain a Russian passport, otherwise they will not be
able to continue working.
 In addition, Russian employees
 do not allow Ukrainians to enter employment centers unless they have a
Russian passport.
 Another example of pressuring people to accept Russian citizenship is
that
 this past January
 occupation authorities in the Hirson Province decided to distribute
 gives cylinders to people without central gas supply. Only if they had a
Russian passport.
 Now I will speak about reaction to Russian postpartization policy in
Ukraine.
 According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the illegal
introduction of Russian passports in Kherson and Zaparosia, as well as
in Crimea, and the temporarily occupied part of Donetsk and Luansk
Oblast is a gross violation of Ukraine's serenity and territorial integrity,
and the Norse norms and principles of international humanitarian law.
 The Russian President's decree is legally null and void, and will not
 no legal consequences.
 So Ukrainian authorities emphasize that anyone who was forced to
receive a passport from the Russian Federation is still considered as
citizens of Ukraine and archite citizens to keep the Ukrainian passport
as document confirming Ukrainian citizenship
 in a response to Russian actions, Ukraine has adopted a number of legal
acts and amended the existing ones.
 On September 16, th 2022, the Cabinet of ministers of Ukraine approved
a draft laws that makes Ukrainian civil servants and representatives of
local authorities
 criminally liable for passportation. Forceful issuance of Russian
passports to civilians in Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by
the Russian aggressor State.
 According to Ukrainian authorities the law is aimed at punishing the
organizers of hostile postpartisation, and they accomplishes particular
results. Russian citizens who are engaged in illegal prosperization in the
territory of Ukraine
 under this law, private individuals, state officials, and local government
authorities, such as city council members, and governors, are criminally
liable for requiring Russian citizenship or obtaining a Russian passport
and for restricting the rights of people who have not received Russian
citizenship or a Russian passport.
 The citizenship status of people residing on Ukrainian territories
occupied or annexed by Russia appears to be unclear.
 Why is the law and government statements emphasize that obtaining a
Russian passport has no effect on the legal status of Ukrainian nations
located on temporarily occupied territories.
 Several recently several recently introduced legislated proposals
provide for termination of Ukrainian citizenship in case of voluntary
acceptance of
 and usage of Russian passports.
 Ukrainian law does not allow dual citizenship
 according to the law on citizenship of Ukraine, foreign citizenship
acquired by Ukrainian
 nationals is not recognized and does not create any legal consequences.
In the view of Ukrainian authorities.
 Preservation of Ukrainian citizenship by those who live in the territories
annexed or occupied by Russia is regulated by the
 14 law on ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens, and the legal
regime on the temporally occupied territory of Ukraine.
 Numerous amendments have been made to the law, to this law to reflect
the Russian annexation of Crimea and ongoing military aggression.
 According to this law, Ukrainian
 Ukraine recognizes all the rights of its citizens who live on temporarily
occupied Territories. Article 5. Paragraph 6 of this law states that
compulsory automatic acceptance of Russian citizenship by Ukrainian
nations who reside in temporarily occupied territories is not recognized
by Ukraine, and cannot be a ground for loss of Ukrainian citizenship.
 The law provides for the unrestricted movement of Ukrainian citizens
between temporarily occupied and unoccupied territories of Ukraine.
 In addition, under the citizenship laws, the restoration of Ukrainian
citizenship might be another pathway to Reinstate Ukrainian citizenship,
lost by coerced or voluntary acquisition of Russian citizenship because
of moving to Russia or residing on Russian occupied territories.
 Currently the law on citizenship has no provisions that would restrict the
restoration of Ukrainian citizenship by those who required citizenship in
the Russian Federation.
 Formerly any person who previously had a Ukrainian passport, and was a
citizen of Ukraine.
 but is now a stateless, stateless person, or has a newly acquired
citizenship in another country.
 can apply for the restoration of Ukrainian citizenship. According to the
law, such persons should be reintegrated, regardless of their place of
residence at that time.
 Now I would like to address
 so very sensitive issue for displacement of Ukrainian children
 under
 Russian law, having a passport is
 mandatory for every national, older than 14 years of age.
 A passport serves as a major document confirming the Russian
citizenship of its bear.
 International organizations, accuse Russia of forceful deportation or
displacement of Ukrainian children
 in order to impose Russian citizenship on those younger than 14.
 On May 30, 2022 Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decree number
3, 0, amending 2 existing presidential decrease.
 This amendment simplified the procedure for obtaining Russian
citizenship by Ukrainian orphans and children left without parental care,
particularly in the temporarily occupied territories.
 A year later.
 in July 2023, Vladimir Putin announced to the Medias that Russia had
taken in
 7
 144,000 children from Ukraine since 2,014,
 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has expressed strong
reservations
 save you Russia's move as an attempt to legalize the illegal movement
of children from the occupied Territories.
 The Minister contents. This
 de facto legalization of children. Abduction violates the Geneva
Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war
 to accelerate the process of adoption of Ukrainian children in the
Russian Federation. Further on January 4, 2024, Vladimir Putin issued
decree number 10 on the categories of foreign nationals and State. Latin
individuals entitled to apply for Russian citizenship
 under this decree orphaned Ukrainian children, or those deprived of
parental guardianship, can be fast tracked to Russian citizenship. Via
Presidential discretion, or following a request from the institution
holding them.
 a citizenship application can be submitted either by the child's legal
guardian
 or the head of a Russian organization responsible for the children
 for the child.
 In response to the introduction of the decrease, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine released a statement saying.
 such actions violate. The norms of international humanitarian law
 are null and void, and do not create any legal consequences. All
children, citizens of Ukraine, who were forcibly relocated to the territory
of the Russian Federation. Under the trumped up
 pretext of the so-called humanitarian protection, remain citizens of
Ukraine.
 It appears that legal and factual components of Russian. But
passportization
 policy constitutes constitutes violation of established international
humanitarian law principles.
 The regulation annexed to the head convention of 19 0 7 respecting the
laws and customs of war on land, and its annex regulations concerning
the laws and customs of war on land explicitly forbid compelling
inhabitants of occupied territory to sway allegiance to the hostile power,
as the acquisition of citizenship requires.
 Article 45 of the force head conventions stipulates that the occupying
power shall not Comp. Compels inhabitants of the occupied territory to
swear allegiance to the hostile power.
 Article 69. Of the additional protocol. One also provides that the
occupying power shall ensure the provision of closing bedding, means of
shelter, and other supplies essential to the survival of civilians of the
Occupied Territories.
 International human rights treaties such as the International Convention
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights also provide
 for the recognition of legal national identity and the associated rights of
a national identity.
 These rights include access to social services, freedom of movement,
education and work opportunities.
 while States have broad discretion under international law. When it
comes to granting nationality, it is important to note that customer
international law explicitly prohibits the imposition of citizenship
without consent or underrs.
 Public international law
 unequivocally, unequivocally prohibits the forced and coercing position
of citizenship.
 The 2,017 report by the UN. High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
passportization campaign in Crimea highlighted that imposing
citizenship in occupied territories, could be viewed as compelling
residents
 to pledge
 alleg allegiance to a State.
 To a State they perceive as hostile a violation of the 1st Geneva
Convention.
 As we approach the end of the presentation, I would like to make a few
brief conclusions
 as discussed. Postpartization serves as a tool of Rush's foreign and
security policy, aimed
 at interfering with neighboring States, undermining their sovereignty and
compromising their territorial integrity
 international observers say that the use of passportization in the
preparation of military operations shows a distorted interpretation of
preemptory norms of international law consciously twisted to justify the
use of force beyond the reason violating the UN principles and Norse
 according to legal scholars. Russia's implementation of prosperization
policies not only breaches principles of international law, but also
results in severe human rights, violations in various forms and
manifestations.
 Now a few words about resources.
 For more information on the laws and regulations in the Russian
Federation.
 Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Please refer to our
 guide to law, online and review articles published in the global legal
monitors, the law libraries, online publication
 covering legal news and developments worldwide.
 If you have any questions, please submit them through the ask a
librarian system on our website, and we will be happy to provide the
response.
 it's all for now. Thank you for your attention. And
 let me please
 look
 into the Q and D
 section.
 So 1st question is, what measures
 can these countries take to counteract the effects of Russian
transportation on their territories?
 Thank you for your question.
 case studies from countries I discussed during my presentation revealed
that.
 say a rap.
 I would say 3 major
 components, elements to for the counter measures. First, st it's
 legalistic meanings that
 adoption of relevant and corresponding legislative acts, resolutions
related to illegal passportization, occupation, and annexation.
 The second, I would say, it's a diplomatic way
 to counteract.
 Let's continue
 policy
 to ensure the non-recogn
 actually, conduct continue conducting non-recognition policies by the
international community and among the Member States
 regarding Zell next and occupied the regions and condemn forced
postpartisation, and
 even seeking punitive actions, sanctions.
 And the 3rd element,
 is more, I think, is more human-centric.
 offering a viable alternative so to population affected by the
postpartization.
 and offers them more incentives like status. Neutral travel. Documents
like Georgia did in I mentioned during my presentation.
 and the eligibility for
 of social benefits.
 As this is true, that
 And it should be mentioned that
 this occupied, and the next territories I completely are completely
isolated from the rest part
 of Ukraine.
 and it's impossible to penetrate or even cross the checkpoint.
 But what I am trying to say, and mentions all those 3 components.
 When time comes
 for us to be prepared to
 take a
 moves and to take measures in order to enforce
 of these legal acts and the resolutions, and the
 to work with population in order to integrate, reintegrate them in the
society.
 I hope
 I answer your questions, please.
 let me see, this is the next question here.
 What lessons can be learned from these case studies regarding the
effectiveness and consequences of prosperization?
 Thank you. It's a very interesting question.
 There are plenty of legal mechanisms in place
 of the current international legal system
 that can be
 effective in cases of extra territorial passportization.
 If they are, I would say, applied in a timely and forceful manner.
 And of course it's better applied. All this. Apply also this mechanism
before such
 situation situation as a preventive measures before such situation
occurs.
 Now, when parties are at war.
 It is essential.
 again, based on the research and all the materials I was reading. While I
was preparing this presentation.
 It is essential to have trusted
 verification mechanisms in place
 which, can be civil society, representative of international organizations
 to
 and or monitoring missions to provide
 accurate information from the ground.
 and also
 economic and social benefits. I think, play a significant role. If the
passportization
 is conducted in a voluntary in a voluntary manner.
 The next question
 here is a
 could she go back to the conclusion slide.
 Of course I can.
 Yes, please.
 Has Russia also tried the same passportization policy in other form or
Soviet States, such as in the Baltics
 or in the Central Asia. Great Webinar.
 Thank you. I am humbled. Thank you for your kind words
 up.
 Russia.
 it's not not definitely not in the Baltic States. 1st of all, Baltic States
became members of the European Union of the European Union, and
joined Euro Atlantic institutions back in 90, if I'm not mistaken in 90
 in 2,000,
 or if I am not mistaken.
 And so
 not definitely, not in the Baltic States, and regarding the Central Asia.
 those Central Asian countries, most of them are the
 part of the Eurasian Union and the custom Union visa rush. So.
 Theories! I think that's
 there is no need to
 to, for
 To implement such policies on Central Asian region
 are the enforcement mechanism to reverse the legal or Russian policies
 I think I mentioned. It's a similar question, I I answered earlier just a few
minutes ago.
 Yes, they're not
 plenty of
 enforcement mechanism.
 But
 source. Mechanism can be
 instrumental
 as a preventive measure before situation, or
 in the
 cases of U in the cases of Ukraine.
 When time comes
 again, I would like to underlines that series.
 No access in the occupied
 and the
 annexed territories.
 Moreover, Russia imposed
 their governance there. And basically, those regions live under the
Russian jurisdictions.
 so there is no access to population.
 And so, and respectively, you cannot enforce anything on this stage, at
least.
 Why has Russia targeted this particular State for postpartisation.
 Thank you for your question.
 This particular States, as I mentioned
 during cause, the webinar
 say,
 Targeted
 countries who has since contested
 disputed
 territories
 and the
 taken advantage of the
 vulnerability
 and interro
 and the
 intervention. It's so inter. Actually, they started their interventionist
policy early 90 s.
 I started with Georgia because
 Georgia had already had the South Ossetian conflict
 and the
 oh, then, in 90 91
 in Abkhazia. The same can be said
 in Moldova, but it's a different example in terms.
 Office. As they did not occupy territory of Transistrian Gagausia.
 Have they tried pushing prescriptivization on Serbia.
 Hungary. I hung it.
 I know these 2 are
 close allies with Russia.
 Nothing
 comes to my mind. Last thing I say. No, thank you for your question.
 Ukrainian, Latvian, Armenian, Polish, Eastern European countries,
citizens before 90 90 are until now, or can have a Russian
 solve it or passport
 former Soviet regions by
 use and worse, or the need to renounce to this right, to this passport, or
 it is there in Alabama wide?
 Know it?
 also. So, citizens of Ukraine. It's all independent countries.
 And technically
 I went with so independent legislation and
 us
 nothing. I I know. No, it's not according to the citizenship law, for
example, of Ukraine.
 it is impossible to acquire
 on voluntary basis.
 and the
 and they become all independent after collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991.
 So some of them, of course, can apply, and I described during the my
presentation because Russia simplified procedure of obtaining of the
citizenship, and, by the way.
 Russia adopted
 new law on citizenship in effect, since October 26, th 2,000
 24, and it provides for
 actually, for if
 former. So if of or if citizens of former Soviet Union apply.
 they are eligible to to obtain Russian passports.
 Are.
 are any United States members of Congress or their staff registered for
this webinar.
 I think this is a question to Barbara.
 Yeah, I don't know.
 I don't know. Thank you for your question.
 And one more question.
 That's postization impact domestic relations with the Russian
Federation, such as
 in the North Caucasus.
 no!
 According again, according to as as far as I know.
 and according to my knowledge.
 let's
 Sarah
 a lot of issues there, but not something you mentioned here again,
according to my knowledge.
 Thank you
 very much for your time
 attentions. Thank you for your questions.
 and we are done. Have a great day. Thank you.