Consti 1

Atty. Pulido

12 September 2021

I. Introduction

Constitution – Written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which

fundamental powers of the government are established, limited, and defined and by
which those powers are distributed among several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.

A. Nature of the Constitution

Supremacy – fundamental and highest law of the land because it is the only law
enacted by the people directly

Laws made by representatives are deemed inferior to the Constitution

Deemed read into every contract

(Contracts that contradict the Constitution are null and void)
i.e., Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997]

MANILA PRINCE vs. GSIS

“Deemed read in every contract (the Constitution)”

Any law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.

B. Changing the Constitution (Only the people can change it)

 1. Amendment – a change that
adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved
(specific provisions) (Lambino vs
COMELEC) PROPOSAL IS
DIFFERENT FROM AMENDMENT
a) Three (3) ways to propose an amendment
(1) Constituent Assembly – Congress, by a vote of 3/4
of ALL its members
(2) Constitutional Convention – Congress by 2/3 vote
or the electorate (the people) themselves (simple majority
50% plus 1) (Doctrine of Proper Submission)
(3) People’s Initiative – 12% of total voting population
where every congressional district is represented by at
least 3% (COMELEC’s certification of the sufficiency of
the petition) (The system of initiative under Art XVII, Sec
2 is not self-executory)

2. Revision – alters a basic

principle in the Constitution (change)
(several provisions)
a) Two (2) ways to propose
(1) Constituent Assembly (same as above)
(2) Constitutional Convention (same as above)

3. Approval/Ratification –
ratification by a majority of vote of
electorate cast in a plebiscite (60-90
days after approval of amendment or
revision) or after certification of
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the
petition under Section 2 (People’s
Initiative)

II. Interpreting the Constitution

A. Role of the Judiciary as interpreter of laws

Settle laws/Interpret Laws

1. Marbury vs Madison, 5 US
137
solely to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the Executive or
Executive officers perform duties in which they have a discretion

Political question – they are concerned with question of policy and issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure (the SC tries to avoid this)
 2. Angara vs Electoral
Commission (now Electoral Tribunal)
Courts have the power to determine who between the Electoral Commission and
Congress itself can set deadline for election contests (EC decision shall prevail)

3. Araullo vs Aquino (DAP)

Courts have duty to entertain a petition questioning the DAP as it involves a claim
that the executive officials acted beyond jurisdiction and in violation of the
Constitution

4. Gonzales vs OP (Hongkong
Tourist Bus)
Whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable
question – not a political question (how you interpret the constitutionality of the act –
making it a justiciable question)

5. Vinuya vs Exec Sec. (Comfort

women - Japan)
Claims of its nationals against foreign governments is a foreign relations matter, not
the courts but the political branches

B. Rules of interpretation

1. Presumed to be
Self-executory (Presumption until
proved otherwise)

a) CLU vs Exec Sec

contrary interpretation will give the Legislature discretion to determine when and
even if they shall be effective. (Presumption is Self-executory because otherwise will
provide congress its dependency)

b) Gamboa vs Teves
reservation of certain areas under Sec 11, Art 12 is self-executing (Reservation of
investments for certain Filipinos)

c) Tanada vs Angara
Provisions of Art 2 are generally not self-executing (State policies and principles)

d) Oposa vs Factoran (Exception to the general rule)

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health are
self-executory (Even if it is under Art. 2)

2. Presumed to be Mandatory
not directory

3. Prospective rather than

retroactive
 4. Basic rules of interpreting the
words

a) Verba Legis – when possible, words must be given their

ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed

b) Ratio legis et anima – words of the Constitution should be

interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers

c) Ut magis valeat quam pereat – The Constitution must be

interpreted as a whole. One section is not allowed to defeat
another hence, the interpretation that can harmonize two
apparently conflicting provisions must be upheld

d) Every part must be given effect — Court should avoid

construction which renders any provision meaningless or
inoperative and must lean in favor of construction rather than
idle/nugatory

e) Doctrine of Necessary Implication — Whatever is

necessary to render effective a provision whether a grant of
power of right or prohibition or a restriction, must be deemed
implied or intended in the provision itself [Nitafan v. COMELEC,
Gatmaytan].

19 September 2021

Why are there requisites?

Because the main limit to the judiciary’s power is that it has no self-starting
capacity.

“The limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government”

C. Requisites of judicial review

1. Actual Case or Controversy
 - Existing case or controversy must be ripe for resolution and susceptible of
judicial determination

- Involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,

susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute

- Something that had been accomplished or performed before a court may

come into picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate to threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action

a) Mariano v Comelec x
A petition premised on the belief that the incumbent mayor will seek reelection
presents a hypothetical question hence cannot be allowed

b) Montesclaros v Comelec x
To ask the court to rule on a proposed bill is to seek an advisory opinion

c) Belgica vs Ochoa check

The so-called reforms initiated by the President against the PDAF does not render
moot the question of constitutionality of PDAF simply because the Executive branch
of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence

d) Ocampo v Enriquez x
There being no law that prohibits the President from allowing the burial of Marcos in
the LNMB, it is political question and presents no justiciable controversy

e) Imbong vs Ochoa check

The petition questioning the questioning the constitutionality of the RH Law presents
justiciable controversy because the implementing rules have already taken effect
and there is already budget to implement the law. Public health practitioners are now
actually threatened.

2. Facial Challenge
It is a challenge that seeks to invalidate a statute on its face, rather than as applied,
because of its chilling effect on the freedom of expression.

In a legal context, a chilling effect is the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate

exercise of natural and legal rights by the threat of legal sanction.

a) Disini vs Secretary of Justice

All penal laws, like cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect

b) Imbong v Ochoa
Facial challenges can now be mounted against statutes that threaten religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government to redress grievances.

3. Political question
 4. Moot and academic

The issue must not be moot

a) Gonzales v Narvasa
A petition questioning the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform should be deemed moot and academic after the said PCCR was dissolved
by the President

b) Lacson v Perez
A petition questioning the declaration of rebellion is moot and academic after the
said declaration is lifted by the President

c) Defunis vs Odegard 416 US 312 (1974)

A petition questioning the admission policy of Washington State U becomes moot,
after the petitioner is admitted, and has reached his 4th Year and the law school
has already committed not to abrogate his registration

d) David v Arroyo
The lifting of the state of rebellion does not make the case moot. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do
the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly, and of the press.
Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrine of rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and
the bar, and in the present petitions, the military, and the police, on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested
actions are capable of repetition.

e) ISAAAI v Greenpeace
The termination of the field trials of the BT Talong does not make the issue moot
since the next phase of the project shall continue and the issue of human and
environmental effects of introducing genetically modified plant is an issue of
paramount public interest.

f) Belgica v Ochoa
Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents’ proposed
line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the
useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter,
remains legally effective and existing.

g) Salonga v Cruz Pano

The Court has the duty to formulate the guiding principles, precepts, and doctrines. It
has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees.

5. Standing
A person has a standing if he is the one who has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.
“Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question”
Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and
‘calls for more than just a generalized grievance”.

a) KMU v Garcia
Members of the KMU who avail of the use of buses, trains, and jeepneys everyday
are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares
have standing to question the increase in transportation fares allowed by the DOTC.

b) IBP v Zamora
The IBP President has no direct personal interest to be affected by the deployment
of Marines in Metro Manila.

c) Tañada vs Tuvera
When the question is one of public right, and the object of the mandamus is to procure
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the petitioner
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
that he is a citizen and as such, interested in the execution of the laws.

d) Ople v Torres
A Senator asserting that the issuance of Admin Order 308 amounts to usurpation of
legislative power has standing to bring the suit.

e) Ocampo v Enriquez
Citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show
that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

f) Arigo v Swift
The rule on standing is procedural matter which is this Court has relaxed for
non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter if the controversy is of
transcendental importance of overreaching significance to society or of paramount
public interest.

g) Information Tech Foundation v Comelec

The legality of the award of the contract for the automation of the elections by
Comelec is of transcendental importance

Not included - the doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental

importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly
faced with the need for substantial protection.

h) Tatad v Sec of Energy

The constitutionality of An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry is of such
importance that the issue of standing may be brushed aside
 i) Senate v Ermita
Established the parameters of “transcendental importance”
The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
The lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising questions
being raised

The Doctrine of Transcendental Importance serves as an important exception to the

requisites of judicial review. If the Court deems a case to be of paramount importance,
the requisites of actual case or controversy and legal standing or locus standi
may be dispensed with according to the former's discretion.

6. Earliest Opportunity/Doctrine
of hierarchy of courts

a) Umali v Guingona
The constitutionality of the creation of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission cannot
be raised in a motion for reconsideration if it was not raised in his original petition.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy

7. Need to notify solicitor general

8. Symbolic decisions

03 October 2021

D. Effects of declaration of unconstitutionality

Statute or Act is void – as if never existed because the Constitution is Supreme

 1. Operative Fact Doctrine - The
doctrine of operative fact recognizes
the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative
fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the
void law or executive act but sustains
its effects. It provides an exception to
the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no
effect

a) Serrano de Agbayani v PNB (Moratorium Law – During

War)
The effectiveness of a statute subsequently struck down as invalid must be
considered as a fact.

b) Commissioner of Internal Revenue v San Roque Power

Corporation (Practice of the BIR)
A mere administrative practice not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice
because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and
consistently applied (Not a recognized operative fact)

c) Araullo v Aquino (DAP)

To declare the implementation of the Dap as unconstitutional without recognizing
that its prior implementation constituted and operative fact that produced
consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation
is to impractical and unfair.

d) Araullo v Aquino (MR) (same as above)

Court has still presumed their good faith by pointing out that “the doctrine of
operative fact xxx cannot apply to the authors, proponents, and implementors of the
DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative, and other liabilities. (Liability
shall still remain) Unconstitutionality is not an excuse

III. The Philippine as a State

A. Territory

Art 1 – National Territory

- not binding to other states
- included so that we know

Archipelago
- A group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other
natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters,
 and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic, and
political entity or which has been historically regarded as such.

-3 miles because it is the reach of a canon

Archipelagic baseline
- The baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the straight
baseline joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs
of the archipelago. (But not the outer limit of our territorial sea)
Territorial Waters
- 12 miles (old - from the low water mark) (new- under international from the
archipelagic baseline)
Contiguous zone – jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone
- 24 miles
- Enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (Parang atin)
Exclusive Economic Zone – right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Art. 56)
- 200 miles
- Exploit living and non-living resources

a) Magallona v Ermita (Diminished territory)

Questioned R.A. No. 9522, claimed that said law diminished our territorial waters
under UNCLOS III

UNCLOS III – a treaty

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baseline laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under international law
typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession, and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulation of
sea-use rights or enacting statues to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are
outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on international general
law
b) Reagan v CIR (US Base)
It to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise
is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation,
which in the succinct language of Jellinek, “is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction”. A
state then, if it chooses to may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence.

If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien
character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority.
Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear.
 c) People v Gozo (US Naval Base without Permit)
Olongapo has administrative jurisdiction over the Naval Base, the RP-US bases
agreement cannot diminish that.

d) Province of Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel on AD (Peace

Talks)
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion
of the Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of
the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.

Considering MILF as an “associate” gives them a separate t1erritory (surrendering

a portion of territory)

B. Government

Government - is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is
formulated, expressed, and realized.

Philippine Government
Is the corporate government entity through which the functions of the government
are exercised throughout the Philippines, including the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous region, the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay subdivisions or other
forms of local government

a) MIAA v CA (GOCC has Taxes)

MIA is neither a stock nor non-stock corporation,
It is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers, but the grant of
such powers does not make it a corporation. MIAA is government instrumentality
(part of the government) vested with corporate powers.

b) Valmonte v Belmonte (Snap Election) (Soft Loans)

The dichotomy between constituent and ministrant (no more difference) (proprietary
function in this case) cannot justify the non-disclosure of relevant information
involving loans of a public nature.

They provide access to data but not to process it.

C. Philippine Citizenship

1. Who are citizens?

a) Those who are citizens at the time of the adoption of

the 1987 Constitution

- Those who were inhabitants as of April 11, 1899, and their children (Treaty of
Paris)
- Those naturalized before the 1935 Constitution
- Those were citizens under the 1935 Constitution
 • Citizens at the time of adoption
• Born in the Philippines of foreign parents and elected to public office
(Caram rule)
• Fathers are citizens (mother’s if born out of wedlock); mothers are
Filipino, must elect upon reaching age of majority

Natural Born citizens

Those who are citizens without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship

Exception – mothers are Filipino but elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching age of
majority

b) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens (Jus

Sanguinis)

c) Those born before January 1973 of Filipino mothers (with

Alien Father) who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority

d) Those naturalized according to the law

2. Cases

a) Lee v Director of Lands (Aliens can not own land) (Pari

delicto)
The Constitutional proscription on alien ownership of land of the public or private
domain was intended to protect the lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In
this case however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in
the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.

Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be
impugned based on the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of Constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Heirs who are Filipino can now legally own lands.

b) Republic v Chule Lim

Electing citizenship applies only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
case of illegitimate children. By being illegitimate, respondent became Filipino upon
birth. (Filipino mother – because of the principle of Jus Sanguinis – bloodline of the
mother)

(Mother Filipino – Father alien)-illegitimate–no need to elect(only known bloodline M)

(Mother Filipino – Father alien)- Legitimate born before 1973 – you must elect

c) Calilung v Datumanong (Dual Citizenship Law)

R.A. No. 9225 is not unconstitutional. It does not deal with dual allegiance. By
making the last oath of allegiance to the Philippines, it left the problem of dual
allegiance to the other country. (Dual allegiance differs from dual citizenship)
Last Oath in Philippines – no dual allegiance

d) Republic v Sagun
There is no law authorizing a judicial declaration of election of citizenship hence it is
beyond the competence of a court. (because of In re Ching)

e) In re Ching (Law student to take the bar)

14 years after reaching the age of majority is beyond the reasonable time required
by the Constitution to elect citizenship

f) Co v HRET (Natural Born)

Chinese father Filipino mother – should elect citizenship
When he was 9 years old – father petitioned for naturalization (minor pa)
Ong also became Filipino (naturalized)
According to 1935 Constitution, he’s still qualified to become natural born Filipino if
he elects Filipino citizenship upon reaching age of majority – he did not choose.
Ong could not have elected citizenship as he was already a citizen. Hence, his
“informal” election is enough to consider him a natural born citizen. (implied) –
special circumstance where it is allowed – studied the dialogue

g) Bengzon v HRET (Repatriated) (US)

Repatriation – natural born?
A former natural born citizen who lost his citizenship when he joined the US armed
forces regains his natural born status upon repatriation.

h) David v Agbay (Repatriation) (Buying a Land)

R.A. No. 9225 – repatriation
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship, which was lost pursuant to CA 63,
under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.

Under CA 63 – automatic lost Fil

Under RA 9225 – does not automatically lost Fil

Falsification for not being Fil declaring a Fil in an application.

i) Lewis v COMELEC (right to vote of duals)

Duals are exempted from the residency requirement and must be allowed to
exercise their right of suffrage

j) Aznar v COMELEC (disqualification case)

The fact that Lito Osmeña is an American does not lead to the conclusion that he is
not Filipino. You can not assume; you must prove that he is not a Filipino.
 k) Valles v COMELEC (same as above)
The fact that respondent Lopez was born in Australia and that the said jurisdiction
follows the principle of Jus Soli does not make her not Filipino citizen. At worse, she
may have dual citizenship which is not prohibited. You can not assume; you must
prove that he is not a Filipino.

l) Poe v COMELEC
Foundlings are citizens under international law. (It is not clear if she is a natural born
citizen)

D. Sovereignty

Is the supreme power of the state to command and enforce obedience, the power to
which all interests are practically subjected and all will subordinate. It is also
defined as freedom from external control.

a) Macariola v Asuncion (Relatives against heirs of property)

All political laws are deemed abrogated if there is change of sovereignty unless
they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. (Great
Rule)

Judge Asuncion owns a property from previous court ruling. No Judge must engage
in commerce. (Previous laws)

Code Commerce issue but affects the practice of Judges making it a Political law.

b) Harvey v Commissioner
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or for public
interest.

E. The Doctrine of State Immunity (Non-Suability)

Provided for in the Constitution by the Non-Suability clause – the state can not be
sued without its consent

Rationale
Public service would be hindered and public safety endangered if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and
consequently, controlled in its use and disposition of the means wherewithal required
for the proper administration of government.

Basic Rules:
- If sued in their official capacity performing tasks enjoined by law, it is a suit
against the state
- If sued in their capacity, but allegedly acted in grave abuse of discretion, it
is not against the state
- If sued in their personal capacity, it is not a suit against the state
 1. Suit against public officials

a) Phil. Aguila Satellite v Lichauco (Philippine Orbital Slot)

If the act performed was done within the official’s jurisdictional capacity, the suit is
against the state; if in grave abuse of discretion, it is against the person of the
official, not the state.

b) Farolan v CTA (Fishing nets)

The customs commissioner may not be sued for damages caused by the
performance of his duties because ultimate liability will fall on the state.

c) Republic v Sandoval (Mendiola Massacre)

Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging
their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official
the moment they exceeded their authority.

d) Lansang v CA (Blind people in Luneta Park)

When a public official is sued allegedly for having personal motives, it is the
person being sued and not the state (breached of contract due to personal motive)

e) Animos v PVAO
A suit against an official is generally a suit against the government unless the suit is
instituted precisely to compel the official to perform what the statue actually
dictates – not a suit against the state

2. Consent
- Given by the legislature through a law
- If the state gives its consent to be sued, the suit must follow strictly the
requirements or conditions stated in the law that gave consent (Conditional
Consent)

a) Republic v Purisima
Notwithstanding a contractual provision allowing the Rice and Corn Administration to
be sued, RCA cannot be sued because the consent must come from the state
through a duly enacted statute. The counsel of RCA who gave the so-called
consent in this case did not have the authority to grant the said consent. (Consent of
the state not the public official)

b) DA v NLRC (Money claim) (Condition)

The claims of the private respondents, i.e., for the underpayment of wages, holiday
pay, overtime pay, and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service,
clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be
“sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied… Pursuant however to Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1145, the monetary claim must be first brought to the
Commission on Audit. Must follow first the condition.
 c) Sayson v Singson (Overpriced purchases)(Condition)
The consent given by the State allows claims to be made with the General Auditing
Office, but unless the claimant goes through the prescribed procedure in the
grant of express consent, a suit cannot be allowed.

d) DOTC v Sps Avecina (Use of property)

The Department’s entry into and taking possession of the respondents’ property
amounted to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit
(Doctrine of non-suability cannot be used by the state to perpetrate injustice)

e) Amigable v Cuenca (same as above)

The doctrine of non-suability of the state cannot be used to perpetrate injustice.
Thus, it cannot be invoked in the situation where the state failed to abide by the
Constitutional dictate of paying just compensation for property taken.

f) EPG Construction v Vigilar (Contractor build houses for

the government)
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to
defeat petitioners-contractors’ right to be fully compensated for actual work
performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have,
for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the
fruits of petitioners-contractors’ honest toil and labor. – you can sue

g) Torio v Fontanilla (Fiesta – Stage is broken)

Municipal corporations have dual character. In exercising governmental functions,
they are agents of the state. In exercising proprietary functions however, they act
as corporations may thus be sued based on their conduct in holding/celebrating a
fiesta which is a non-governmental function. – you can sue.

3. Suits Against Government

Corporations
- Suable if the charter gives them the power to sue and be sued (Charter
is the rule)

a) PNB v CIR (GOCC) (Charter)

The People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation is a government corporation with
the power to sue and be sued, hence the defense of non-suability does not lie.
-suable under its charter

b) SSS v CA (Charter)
SSS has the power to sue and be sued. On that score, it can be sued. Whatever
function it performs (whether for profit or not) is immaterial… - suable under its
charter

c) Rayo v CIR (Charter)

The NPC has a personality of its own, with power to sue and be sued for tort claim
arising from the opening of the floodgates of Angat dam - suable under its charter.
 d) Republic v Sandiganbayan (Waiver) (Answered)
The state cannot raise immunity against an Answer in Intervention because by filing
a complaint, it waived its immunity. -non-suability was waived when the state
answerd

e) Froilan v Pan Oriental (Barko)(Waive)

When government intervenes In a suit and claims payments being litigated therein, it
waives its immunity to suit.

f) Lim v Brownell (Exception) (Merely DEFENDS, do not

claim)
When the state intervenes merely to resist a claim, it does not, by its
intervention, waive its immunity from suit.

4. Suits Against Other

Sovereigns (Commercial
Contract\Business)
- Max in parem, non habet imperium – all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another

a) Arigo v Swift (War ship damaged Phil. Island)

The suit is deemed against the US itself. The principle of state immunity therefore
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents,
Swift, Rice, and Robling -it can be invoked

b) USA v Ruiz
In conducting a bidding for the construction of wharves for its bases, the US
government does not descend into a business entity and hence not suable

This is not ordinary contract, it is a forming of naval bases

c) Holy See v Judge Rosario (Squatted Land)

Selling the land was not for business purpose but for the purpose of
establishing the residence of the Papal Nuncio, the ambassador of the Holy See
to the country. The Holy See is therefore immune from suit.

d) Minucher v CA (Even not an official qualified from

diplomatic immunity)
An employee of the US Government, performing his job as such, is immune from
suit even if he does not enjoy diplomatic immunity

e) Republic of Indonesia v Vinzons

A provision in a contract choosing the exclusive venue of any action that may arise
from the contract is not a waiver. -agreement on choice of venue is not consent

f) WHO v Aquino
Diplomatic immunity is a political question and courts should not look beyond the
executive determination – because it is an Executive Function
 g) ATCI v Echin (OFW)
A private recruitment agency cannot evade monetary claims of OFWs it deploys
abroad by claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency immune from
suit or that foreign principal’s liability must first be established before it as agent can
be held jointly and solidarily liable.

h) DFA v NLRC (Executive Branch)

DFA, being the department of the executive branch tasked to determine the persons
and institutions that must be granted immunity, has the personality to sue to annul
a judgment against an immune agency.

i) USA v Reyes (Filipino Employee) (Racial Bias)

A suit against an official of a foreign government for tortious conduct is not a suit
against the state of such official (personal act causing damage)

j) Shauf v CA (same as above)

Acts in excess of authority cannot hide behind the cloak of immunity and this rule
applies even to officials of foreign government

5. Suability does not mean

liability
No funds from the treasury of the Government can be get without a law stating it
a) UP v Dizon
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. Hence, the
funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of
execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit
to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution
against UP because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

b) Nessia v Fermin (Remedy is Mandamus)

The remedy of a claimant against a local government who refuses to pay because
there is no allocated fund for the obligation is to file a mandamus case to allocate
funds for the payment of the obligation – because you can not garner public funds

c) Caloocan v Allarde (Exception Case) (Special

Circumstance)
The general rule is that public funds cannot be garnished, and remedy of the
judgment creditor is to file an action for mandamus so that an appropriation can be
made for the payment of the obligation. But when there is already an allocation for
the payment of the obligation, and the government unjustly refuses payment,
garnishment maybe resorted to. -grave abuse of discretion is the only fact that
prevents payment, allocation is already made
09 October 2021

IV. Philippine Constitutional Principles and Policies

A. Principles and Policies

(Article 2 – Principles and Policies) General rule is not self-executing

A provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixated by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

The following have been held to be not self-executing

Section 11 Respect for human rights
Section 12 Sanctity of Family; Protection to unborn child
Section 13 Role of Youth in Nation Building
Section 17 Priority to Education
Section 18 Labor as Primary Socio-Economic Force
Section 6 of Article XIV Use of Filipino

1. Sovereignty
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

a) Villavicencio v Lukban (Mga putang ginawang pusa)

Officials of the City of Manila cannot arbitrarily round up prostitutes and ship them off
to Mindanao without violating the Constitution.

Public officials are mere representatives of the people.

Writ of Habeas Corpus – Writ of Liberty – Effect: Bring detainer to explain in court
the detainment of the detainee

b) Maquiling v COMELEC (Pablo Ocampo vs. HRET

related) (Second Placer in default of the First Placer – Second
Placer is the winner)
Ocampo ruling overruled
Old rule rejecting second placer is an obiter dictum (opinion of the court)

Even when the votes of the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an
ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of the
voice of that voice and must also be respected. -SC declares 2nd placer as winner
 2. Adherence to International
Law

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts

the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with
other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues
a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. (Nuclear Energy is
accepted)

2 components of Section 2
- Adherence to the generally accepted principles of international law (part of the
law of the land)
- Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy

2 policies in accordance with said principles

- Independent foreign policy
- Freedom from nuclear weapons

a) Agustin vs Edu (mandatory early warning device)

Since the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law,
requiring the EWDs is and should be part of the laws of the land (International
Treaty on Road Safety) – even if there is no law, it is in international treaty

b) Ichong v Hernandez
Law that limits retail trade for Filipinos (old law)

Alien control and predominance in the retail trade is sufficient to justify the exercise
of police power to protect the Filipinos – if people vs aliens, it should be the people
first.

c) Deutsche Bank v CIR (Treaty-Tax Exemption)

The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the
performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into
the agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations
under the treaty must be performed by them in good faith. More importantly, treaties
have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.
 d) In re Garcia (Spain Law Degree to take bar in Phl.)
A Filipino who studied law in Spain cannot invoke the Philippine-Spain treaty on the
practice of law to petition to be allowed to take the Bar because he is not a Spanish
citizen.

3. Supremacy of Civilian
Authority

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

(Military is to defend not to govern – special role)

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. X x x (Article
VII)

Related Provisions

(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the
military, and respect for people’s rights in the performance of their duty. (Article XVI
Section 5)

(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government
including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
(Article XVI Section 5)

4. Government as Protector;
Citizens as defenders

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal military or civil service.

a) People v Lagman and Zosa (Religion and Family excuse

not allowed)
Service to the country is a duty and the citizens may be compelled to render such
service – it is a bond duty of every Citizen

5. Separation of Church and

State
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
(Religion has absolutes)
(Democratic government – there must interplay of ideas) – which religion becomes
an obstacle.
Article III Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

(Religion - realm of belief; realm of action) – free from any belief, free from control
(Your right ends when someone else’s right begins) HOWEVER WHEN IT IS
ACTIONED – IT MAY SUBJECT TO STATE REGULATION (Your right ends when
another right begins)

a) Estrada v Escritor (Court employee-cohabitating with

another man not his husband) (exception) (special
circumstance)
-Carved out an exemption, violating religious freedom

-The Compelling State interest test

First, “(H)as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise
of religion?”
(It is making her choose, so it imposed a burden)

Second, the court asks: “(I)s there a sufficient compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty?”

Has the State in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringe any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state?

(Earlier cases, same case did not swear allegiance, did not salute the flag; Gerona –
expelled; Ebralinag – many ways to impart nationalism without intruding to religious
belief)

*(she is a moral and good standing person in her religion) because the action
infringes her religious freedom, the court finds it as an exemption, she remained a
court employee

• The Compelling Interest Test: The compelling state interest test involves a three-step process.
• First: “[H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of
religion?" The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring
into the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth
as held in Ballard and Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimant’s belief is ascertained to avoid the
mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a mandatory regulation.
• Second, the court asks: "[I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this
infringement of religious liberty?" In this step, the government has to establish that its
purposes are legitimate for the state and that they are compelling. Government must do more
than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how andto what
extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted.
• Third, the court asks: "[H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
 achieve the legitimate goal of the state?" The analysis requires the state to show that the
means in which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it
has chosen a way to achieve its legitime testate end that imposes as little as possible on
religious liberties.

6. Family as the Basic Social

Institution

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

a) Imbong v Ochoa (RH Bill)

From the deliberations above quoted, it is apparent that the framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also
apparent that the framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it to determine when life begins.

The life begins from conception as defined in the Constitution. Protect rights of
the unborn.

However, RH Bill is not violative of constitution. Which promotes family

planning and responsible parenthood.

b) Republic v Manalo (Foreign sps, Fil spouse filed divorce)

However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or
teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
total isolation but must be harmonized with other Constitutional provisions (equal
protection). Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is
equally mandated to actively promote its total development.

The Fil. Spouse can re-marry.

c) Republic v Albios (Paid American to marry her so she can

go to America)

No less than the Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.
This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just easily nullified when no longer
needed.
The ground of the issue is not valid.

17 October 2021

V. The Exercise of Government Power

A. Basic Framework

People – Sovereign Power (Art. 2)

Legislative – Legislative Power

Executive – Executive Power
Judiciary – Judicial Power – Supreme Court

Checks and Balances – the people did not want Dictatorship, or single branch power
3 coequal and independent branches
Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely – evident from history
All dictatorship around the world has failed.

B. Separation of Powers

The three departments of government, the executive, legislative, and judicial, are not
only coordinate, they are coequal and coimportant. While interdependent, in the
sense that each is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the
other, they are, nevertheless, in the most important sense independent of each
other; that is to say, one department may not control or even interfere with another in
the exercise of its special functions. The quality of government consists in their
remaining thus independent.
- Justice Moreland

a) Mamiscal v Abdullah
Clerk of court is also civil registrar in Sharia law

Her job was to record not decide.

Although the Constitution vests the Court with the power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, this power must be taken with due
regard to other prevailing laws. -separation of powers

You can not look for another branch of the government to review the decision
of the SC. The task being complaint of is not related to Court function.

b) In re Laureta and Maravilla

To look for another forum to review the Supreme Court’s decision is to violate the
separation of powers. When it comes to adjudication of cases, the Supreme Court
is supreme, and no other branch of government may review its decisions.
 c) Mantruste System v CA (Asset Privatization Program)
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the
system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts
over other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the
determination of “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by
them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” X x x Courts may not substitute
their judgment to that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its
functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition,
sale, or disposition of assets transferred to it.

Judicial power can not be used to interfere with the functions of the Legislative

d) INS v Chadha (Delegation of powers)

A provision in the law allowing a one-house veto of an executive act is
unconstitutional as it violates the very principle of separation of powers

Overlapping power because of the law created (Unconstitutional)

e) Arnault v Balagtas (Contempt)(400K)(Separation of

Powers)
Courts have no right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what
is known as the legislative process.

“Grave abuse of discretion” – extended powers of the Judiciary

f) Arnault v Nazareno (Arnault lied)

So we are of the opinion that where there is alleged immateriality of the information
sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction,
the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative
body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial
intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.

Legislative powers are given contempt powers for you not to lie.

“Grave abuse of discretion”

g) Belgica v Ochoa (Pork Barrel Scam)

Third time pork barrel is brought to the Supreme Court

Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily
comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role of implementing the national
budget begins. So as not to blur the Constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive.

Release and Implementation – Execute Branch

Budget Execution – the phase of budget execution covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting and accordingly includes the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities the regulation and release of funds as well as all other
related activities that comprise the budget execution cycle. (Congress can not
intrude this process)

h) Mendoza v People (Clemency)

Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the courts are bound to apply the law as
it is and impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same
provision, however, gives the Court discretion to recommend to the President
actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty
imposed as excessive.
i) NPC Drivers and Mechanics v NAPOCOR (Privatization
of Power Board) (Delegated Powers)
Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of NPB,
much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is their
personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.
Resolution is not valid.

j) La Bugal Blaan v Ramos (Alien Participation – Mining)

The choice or prioritizing mining over other economic activity is a political question
which the court cannot pass upon.

Mining is a policy question. Executive Power.

k) Pobre v Defensor Santiago (MDS called SC as idiots)

Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of
the assembly (the senate) and the voters (the people), not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.

l) Makalintal v COMELEC (Absentee voting – Right to vote)

By vesting itself with the power to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the Constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no
option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.

COMELEC is part of the executive.

m) Abakada v Purisima (Overseing power is not allowed for

Congress)
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their
legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto
itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
 C. Delegation of Power

In determining whether or not statute constitutes an undue delegation of power, the

Court has adopted two tests: The Completeness Test and the Sufficient Standard
Test

- Delegation of legislative power >> delegation of rule making power

(subordinate power) (Atty. Pulido)
- Legislature cannot delegate legislative power because they are voted by the
people
- General rule - the delegate cannot delegate delegated power
- Constitution allows subordinate legislation or delegation of subordinate power
- Delegate legislative power >> Congress abdicates and pass it on

In whether or not Congress is abdicating or validly delegating rule making power can
be determined by two tests

1. Completeness Test – the law

must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it

2. Sufficient Standards Test –

adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy, and identify the
conditions under which it is being
implemented.

a) Garcia v Exec Sec (Taxes Duties)

There is thus explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President “subject” to such limitation and restrictions [Congress] may impose” to fix
“within specific limits” “tariff rates… and other duties or imposts… “

It may delegate with complete and sufficient standards.

b) US v Tang Ho (Rice price control)

Undue delegation of legislative power.
A law that allows the Governor-General unlimited discretion to determine when the
price of rice should be fixed, and to make a violation of the price so fixed a crime
provides no standard and hence is an invalid delegation of legislative power.

c) COTESCUP v Sec of Educ (K to12)

The K to 12 Law adequately provide the legislative policy that it seeks to implement
Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to guide the
DepEd, CHED, and TESDA in carrying out the provisions of the law, from the
development of the K to 12 BEC, to the hiring and training of teaching personnel and
to the formulation of appropriate strategies in order to address the changes during
the transition period.

What is passed on is filling in the details not the legislative powers.

d) Conference v POEA
Valid delegation of Rule-making Power.
The formulation of the rules and regulations of the POEA is authorized by a valid
delegation of legislative power.
Policy and standard are sufficient and complete - Rules and regulations are in line
with law.

e) Disini v Sec of Justice (Traffic data)(Invalid Delegation)

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and
lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities
or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law
enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity
of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily
expose the citizenry to leaked information or worse to extortion from certain bad
elements in these agencies.

Standards is an illusion but not complete and sufficient.

f) People v Judge Dacuycuy (Penalty)(Discretion of the

Court)
A law that leaves the penalty of imprisonment to the discretion of the court is void.
The court can not have the discretion, it must be stated by law.

g) Pelaez v Auditor General

The creation/incorporation of municipalities is a legislative function and the
delegation thereof to the executive should not be allowed

h) Sema v COMELEC (BARM) (BANGSAMORO)

The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers
through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or
local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be
created, only through National Law passed by Congress.
24 October 2021

VI. Structure and Powers of the Government

A. The Legislative Branch

1. Composition (Bicameral)

Senate

Composition of Senate

24 Senators elected at large

Senate continuing body 12 every election

Qualifications
- Natural born citizens
- 35 years old on the day of election
- Able to read and write
- Registered voter
- Two years residence

- Terms of Office- Six years and shall commence unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election
- Term Limit - No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms

House of the Representatives

Party list Representatives

District Representatives

Districts
Apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio.
Within 3 years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section

Qualifications
- Natural born
- 25 years old on the day of the election
- Able to read and write
- Resident of the district for 1 year

Party list
Constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list

Qualifications
- Natural born
- 25 years old on the day of the election
- Able to read and write

2. Jurisprudence on Composition

HRET – sole judge on the issues on qualifications or election of the members of the
House or
SET - for members of Senate

a) Reyes v COMELEC (COC – nationality and residence)

The Courtas invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

3 things needed to become Member of the House of Representatives:

Proclamation – null and void by the Supreme Court
Oath Taking – should be public oath taking not public
Taking Office – not yet taken office

COMELEC still has jurisdiction

b) Velasco v Belmonte (related as above)

To compel Belmonte to admit Velasco into the House of Representatives

In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate
of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC
No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming
Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque – it cannot be claimed that the present petition
is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.

The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives. BB is not a bona fide member of the
House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation.

c) Ty Delgado v HRET (Libel) (Moral Turpitude – Libel)

Pichay misrepresented this eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he knew
that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was eligible for elective public office
constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the
office.

d) Powell v McCormack (US Case – Ethics Committee)

Congress cannot exclude a member of the Congress without expelling him in
the manner and with the vote required by the Constitution. The Constitutional
qualifications having been met, nothing short of an expulsion can remove him from
office
“To remove a Representative is to deprive that part of the country he represents of a
duly elected representative”

e) Aquino III v COMELEC (District in Bicol

Creation)(Population Requirement)
Gerrymandering – create a district so one can make a congressman.

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to
a district on one hand, and the entitlement of province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mention about
population, a city must meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
f) Aldaba v COMELEC (Estimate is not allowed)
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only
in the “immediately following election”. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000
population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have
a district representative.

g) Naval v COMELEC (Same district – it was just renamed)

In Naval’s case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second
District is to be created but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est
recedendum. The term used in a legal provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers mean what they say.

h) Bagabuyo v COMELEC (Plebiscite is not required)

Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and
be requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

Does not requires plebiscite

Allocation – allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population;
the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power
among the districts.

Reapportionment – realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.

Requires plebiscite
Division of LGs – The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary
of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are
covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X).

i) Tan v COMELEC (LGU) (Plebiscite must be from the old

and the new District)
The Province of Negros del Norte cannot be created unless the ratification involved
all affected areas, the parent and the newly created province or district.
Plebiscite must be held in the New and Old LGU.

j) Banat v COMELEC (Party List)

More important is to fill up Constitutional mandate of 20% than the 2% threshold
Previous formula is mathematically impossible to fill the 20% allocation (VFP)

How to determine winning party list Candidates

1. Determine no. of seats

2. Seats for Party list = (Total number of district representatives / (0.80) (0.20)
3. Seats for Party list = (Total number of district representatives) (0.20) /0.80

- First guaranteed seat (at least 2% of total votes cast for party list election)

Percent garnered by party list org = votes of party list org / Total votes cast for all
party list election
If percentage is >= 0.02, they gained their first guaranteed seat

Filling up remaining seats

Additional seats = (Allocated seats for party list – Total awarded in the first round)
(percent of votes garnered by the party list organization [votes of the party list
group/total votes for the party list election)

No. of votes/total number of partylist votes multiplied by the number of remaining

seats.

If product is 1 = 1 seat
If product is 2 and above = 2 seats
Maximum of 3 seats (guaranteed sa una 1)
 k) Ang Ladlad v COMELEC (Ground of LGBT community
is not immoral)
The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the
inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act.

l) Walden Bello v COMELEC (Case against Mikee A. –

Security Guard and Tricycle Driver)
A party list congressman is the same as a district representative and therefore only
the HRET can determine his qualification to remain as a member of the House.

m) Atong Paglaum v COMELEC

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system (1) national
parties or organizations (2) regional parties or organizations and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations

2. National and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along

sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector

3. Political parties can participate in party list elections provided they register
under the party list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections.

A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative

district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral
wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent and sectoral party, is linked to a political party
through a coalition.

Sectoral Parties
May either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.

A majority of members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to
the sector they represent.

The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized

and underrepresented” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political
constituencies” either must belong to their respective sectors or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees for national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or
organizations.
 n) Coalition for Associations of Senior Citizens v COMELEC
(Made the party-list system a business – term sharing)
If the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party list organization, had been unfairly and
arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. X x x Clearly then, the
disqualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and
accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.

COMELEC revoked recognition – term sharing is illegal

o) Lico v COMELEC (Jurisdiction)(Term sharing)

Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of
petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating Kop is integral to the issue of his qualifications
to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction
correctible by a writ of certiorari; the COMELEC should not have encroached into
the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.

p) Abang Lingkod v COMELEC (Advocacy)

Contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as Abang
Lingkod, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their tra ck record, i.e.,
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.

If at all, evidence showing track record in representing the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not
factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.

Proof of track record is required if the nominee is not a member of the sector.

Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the partylist system are
not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to
their verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.”

q) Aquino v COMELEC (Domicile)(Nagtipid sa Abogado)

Residence = Domicile
For purposes of elections, residence (1 year requirement) refers to domicile.
Aquino must therefore prove that the district he intends to represent is his domicile of
choice. You can only have one domicile. You must show intent to abandon former
domicile.

r) Abayon v HRET (HRET Explained)

The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Thus, the HRET, as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and disqualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its
determination, fraud, terrorism, or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the
annulment.
Abayon vs. Comelec

In annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among the
candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast (Who won). The
COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of elections with the objective of
holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were suspended, or if
there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of
elections, special elections will have to be conducted.

If HRET, counting of shall continue, if COMELEC, special election.

3. Elections

Section 8
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the
members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of
May

Section 9
In case of vacancy in the Senate or the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but he
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term.

-Usually hinde ginagagawa kasi magastos

4. Officers

Section 16(1)
The Senate shall elect its President and
the House of the Representatives, its Speaker,
by a majority votes of all its respective Members.

a) Santiago v Guingona
When there are no Constitutional provision, law or rule that prescribes the manner by
which the Senate shall elect their minority leader, the Courts cannot dictate upon
the said co-equal body and the manner of electing the said officers is entirely within
its discretion

5. Manner of Doing
Business/Discipline

Section 16(2)
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide

Both Houses are Collegial body – powers are exercised by the collective
Can only do business with a quorum

“a smaller number may adjourn from day to day” – provision that foresee the tyranny
of the majority – depriving them a quorum

Ex. The majority knows the people do not want martial law, they will not vote in favor
of martial law because it is unpopular, but they don’t want to hinder the approval of
martial law, so they will simply not attend resulting to no quorum. They did not
become unpopular by voting for the martial law, but still martial law passed. Minority
couldn’t do business. Incapacitating Congress by depriving it of quorum.

Section 16(3)
Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for
disorderly behavior and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members,
suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension when imposed, shall not
exceed 60 days.

Senator can only be disciplined by Senate, Member of the House, the House.

a) Avelino v Cuenco (Senate Presidency)

The Court has no Jurisdiction to rule upon the validity of the election of a new
Senate President. Election of its officers are entirely within the prerogative of the
Members of the Senate.

b) Alejandrino v Quezon (Discipline of its members)

The court cannot compel the Senate to take a specific action, specially when it
comes to the discipline of its members.

c) De Venecia v Sandiganbayan (2/3 votes)

Preventive Suspension – prevents from tampering with evidence and influencing
potential witnesses is allowed no need for 2/3 vote.

d) Pobre v Defensor Santiago (MDS called SC idiots)

Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. It is only the
Senate can discipline its senator (Separation of Powers).
21 November 2021

B. The Legislative Department (Part 2)

1. Salaries

Article VI, Section 10

The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be

determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.

a) Philconsa v Mathay (Increase of Salaries)

The Constitution provides that it can only take effect after the expiration of the full
term of Senators and Members of the House who approved it. The intention was to
treat the “term” as a single unit without distinction between them. Hence, it can only
take effect after the expiration of the of the full term of the Senators.

b) Ligot v. Mathay (Passed a law for Retirement Gratuity)

The law that gives congressmen a retirement gratuity based on the increased pay
that they cannot receive cannot be allowed as it allows them to achieve the
prohibited result by doing what is prohibited indirectly.

2. Freedom from Arrest/Speech

Article VI, Section 11 (Free them from fear of pressure)

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses

punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

- Why? Freely think and debate >> Freedom from fear

 - Can only be held liable for speeches made in Senate/Congress by
Senate/Congress through their disciplinary process -- cannot be held liable in
any other place

a) Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (Called Justices as idiots)

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity x x x. A old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.

b) People v. Jalosjos
Allowing accused-appelant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with
all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appelants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purpose of the correction system.

3. Prohibitions

- Incompatible Offices
- Forbidden Offices
- Personally appearing as counsel
- Being financially interested in any contract, franchise of special privilege
- Intervening in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit (i.e., business permits)
- Intervening in any matter where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office

Shell corporation – walang laman na corporation

Article VI, Section 13 (Incompatible Office)

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.

a) Adaza v. Pacana (Forfeited his seat)

Being a member of Parliament and Governor were incompatible. When Adaza
assume his post as Member of Parliament, he forfeited his seat.
 b) Liban v. Gordon
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, as neutral and
independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental
Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that
implements government policy, x x x. It is imperative that the PNRC must be
autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State.

c) Adaza v. Pacana
Being a member of Parliament and Governor were incompatible. When Adaza
assume his post as Member of Parliament, he forfeited his seat.

Article VI, Section 14

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as

counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. X x x

Why? – undue advantage (has control over the budget of the judiciary) (signing
included)

d) Puyat v. De Guzman (Stockholder Lawyering)

To uphold the appearance of and intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez
supposedly because of his newly acquired 10 shares would make the constitutional
provision ineffective. Hence, it should not be allowed.

Obligation to disclose

Article XI, Section 17

SECTION 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law. (SALN is required to disclose)

4. Investigations in aid of legislation

Article VI, Section 21

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.

Fake News is not protected by free speech when it does not contribute to society.
(May niloloko ka)
 - Not to determine guilt or innocence

a) Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon Committee (Mentioned that they

are finding out guilt)
When an inquiry is not to aid legislation, it may be prohibited.

b) Arnault v. Nazareno (450 thousand)

We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show
that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

- may remain in jail indefinitely >> Senate is continuing body

- Supreme Court can not come in to say what is relevant or irrelevant

c) Balag v. Senate
The court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt
by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked.

- When the investigation is over, may be released

d) Philcomsat v. Senate
The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in
this case the respondents Senate Committee, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

e) Senate v. Ermita (GMA, hello Garci)

If under Question Hour, Cabinet members may refuse, because. The Constitution
grants Congress only the right to request. But under investigations in aid of
legislation, Department heads cannot impair the legislature’s power to investigate in
aid of legislation.

Executive Privilege – may be exercised with explanation

f) Neri v. Senate (In connection with above)

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic and as well as economic relations
with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this
information was conveyed to the President he cannot provide the Committee any
further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege
is designed to protect.

g) Arnault v. Balagtas (450 thousand)

The legislature’s authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should
be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and
a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.
Arnault can not gateway by giving a fictious name.

5. Powers of Congress

The power of Congress is plenary, subject only to the limitations imposed by:
- Bill of Rights
o Biggest limitation on government power
- Rule on Title
- Special rules on appropriations
- Limitation on tax laws
- Rules on increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
o Can legislate on jurisdiction of courts
o Cannot increase the appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court without its
advice or concurrence
- Prohibition against irrepealable laws
o Impair the plenary power of Congress in the future

Constitutional Rule on Titles of Bills

Article VI, Section 26(1)

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof

Rationale:
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of the law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act.”

a) Tio v VRB (law creating a VRB)

The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill should be not so be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation

b) Imbong v. Ochoa
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

Rules on Appropriations

Article VI, Section 29 (1)

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.

Article VI, Section 24

All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills
of local application and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Article VI, Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in
the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill

unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.

- Allows augmenting your department

o If there are savings (accomplished the purpose and there are extra)
o Can augment only those items that are in your appropriation.
- Reasons why DAP is unconstitutional
o Redefined saving – unspent budget (purpose specified for said budget
is not yet accomplished)
o Augmented items that are not stipulated in the appropriations (usurping
the power of Congress)
o Cross border transfer (Transfer of budget across departments)

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law
for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force
and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended and
shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer,
or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.

- Expenses not included in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)

- Two conditions
o Must be supported by funds that exists
o Must provide for revenue measure if no existing funds

Note: The Appropriation Process was not discussed even in the succeeding classes
5 December 2021

C. The Executive Department

1. Qualifications

- Natural born Filipino

- Able to read and write
- Registered Voter
- At least 40 on the day of the election
- Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the
elections

2. Election

- Elected by direct vote of the people

- Elections shall be held on the second Monday of May
- Determining the winner
o Returns shall be canvased by Congress not later than (30) thirty days
after the day of the election, in joint session
 Role of Congress is to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the Certificates of canvass in the manner provided
by law.
o Person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected
o In case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes,
one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all
Members of both Houses of the Congress voting separately. (Never
happened)
o The Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
 President and Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose
- Term
o Term of the President and VP shall be six (6) years beginning noon of
June 30 following the day of the election and ending six (6) years
thereafter.
o No re-election for President. Any person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall not be
qualified for reelection to the same office at any time.
o Vice President may serve up to 2 terms only.

3. Privileges and Salary

- Official residence (Malacañang Palace)
- Salary
o Shall be determine by law and shall not be decreased during their
tenure
o No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was
approved.
o They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source (remember)
o Income should only come from public office (emoluments)

a) Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Marcos Case – Income

questionable)
Considering that a President cannot receive any emolument from the Government of
any other source, then the $350M is grossly disproportionate to their income
(Marcoses)

4. Succession

- At the beginning of the term (no extension of term for the sitting President)

Rules on Succession

o To prevent the extension of term of the Previous President

o If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act
as President until the President-elect shall have qualified
o If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect
shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified
o If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall
have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice
President-elect shall become President
o Where no president and Vice-President shall have been chosen or
shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
 End of the term – noon 30th of June following the elections
- During the term
o Causes
 Death
 Permanent Disability
 Removal from office
 Resignation
o Order of succession
 If both President and Vice-President, Senate President, or in
case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall act as President until the President and
Vice-President have been elected and qualified (no provision
after the Speaker, Congress is yet to pass a law regarding that)

Section 11: Disability of the President

- Voluntary
o He will write to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House to
inform them of his disability (President should declare state of health)
o Thereafter and until he makes another written declaration, the VP acts
as President. (He can return until he/she is well)
- Involuntary
o Written declaration by majority of the Cabinet, VP immediately
assumes (because they see the President regularly)
o If contested by the President with a written declaration of his own, he
will immediately re assume office (He can contest that)
o If within 5 days, majority of the Cabinet again contests his inability,
Congress will decide. Of not in session, must convene within 48 hours
to decide without the need of call
o Congress must decide and by a vote of 2/3, voting separately, within
12 days after it is required to assemble (total of 14 days or two weeks)
can declare the President to be unable to perform his duties

Article XI, Section 2

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment.

Quo Warranto – not substantive, it is procedural law

 a) Estrada v. Arroyo (no clear resignation by Estrada but SC
finds otherwise) (bad law)
There is no form of resignation required. As long as there is an intent to resign and
acts of relinquishment, the resignation should be given effect.

Constructive resignation – did not actually resigned but deemed constructively

resigned
- Based on labor law (deemed resigned by abandoning one’s work)

5. Prohibitions

Applies to the President, VP, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and
assistants:

Shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.

Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities.

They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office

Prohibitions on Spouses and Relatives

Shall not during his tenure, be appointed as members of the Constitutional

Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries

Prohibitions vs other officials

Article IX(B) SECTION 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or

designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

- IX (B) Applies to all other public officials

- Unless Allowed by law
- Or by primary functions of his office
- For officials lower than assistant secretaries

Exception to Prohibition vs Other Positions

Article VII, Section 3, Paragraph 2

The Vice-President. May be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such
Appointment requires no confirmation.

Only duty of the VP is to stay alive.

Article VIII, Section 8, (1) (Exception)

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

Jurisprudence

a) CLU v. Exec Secretary (Ex-officio position)

“The principle against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to
posts occupied by Executive Officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-Officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do not
compromise ‘any other office’ within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. X x x.

Ex-officio position – held as part of his current position/by virtue of his office, implies
that no other compensation will be given

b) Cruz v. COA
“The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position.

c) NAC v. COA (Agents included)

Representatives cannot receive what their principals are prohibited from receiving.

d) Funa v. Ermita (Marina Case - Undersecretary)

Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of the DOTC, she
was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, Paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law of the primary functions of
the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union. (dalawa lang exception)
 e) Funa v Agra (DOJ na, SolGen pa)
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants. (Executive)(Applies until Assistant Secretary)

D. Powers of the Executive

1. Executive Power

It would not be accurate however, to state that “executive power” is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of State as well as head of government
and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g.,
his power over the country’s foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power”. Corollarily,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated. (Biraogo v. PTC)

a) Laurel v Garcia (Japan given properties)

The President does not have the power to dispose of properties that form part of the
public dominion.

- Needs law to reclassify before it can be alienable.

b) Marcos v. Manglapus (Residual Power)

Contrary to petitioners’ view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom the
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power, and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution.

- Not legislative or judicial must be executive

 c) Biraogo v. PTC (Philippine Truth Commission) (GMA
anomalies)
The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed is well-recognized. It flows from the faithful execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the
President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive department. (Struct down on a
different ground – equal..)

2. Foreign Relations Power

- Chief Architect of Foreign Policy

- Initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states and
governments
- Negotiates and enters into international agreements
- Promotes trade, investments, tourism, and other economic relations
- And settles international disputes with other states
- Defense (Commander-in-Chief)

Pangalinan vs. Cayetano (2021 Case) – President decided to pull out in ICC.
The logic is concurrence is needed in entering treaty same should be done
when getting out of it. SC answers moot and academic.

a) Saguisag v. Ochoa (EDCA)

The VFA is the treaty that allowed entry of (foreign i.e., US troops) military troops.
EDCA is an executive agreement that simply provide for the implementing details of
the VFA, there is thus no need for Senate concurrence. EDCA fill in the details of
VFA.

Executive Agreements defined – merely involves arrangements on the

implementation of existing policies, laws, rules, or agreements. They are concluded:
- To adjust the details of a treaty
- Pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature or
- In the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
- The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or
legislative authorizations.

3. Power over Officials

Article VII, Section 17

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

- Supervision over Local Government and Autonomous Regions

Article X, Section 4
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the
acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.

- Frequent Exam/BAR question – difference between power of control vs

power of supervision

“The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." / This is distinguished
from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter."”

Qualified Political Agency

The heads of executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an
advisory capacity, and in the language of Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the
President’s bosom confidence” (7 writings, Ford ed., 498), and in the language of
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), “are subject to the
direction of the President.” Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of the President.
Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by the Chief Justice Taft of the
Supreme Court of the United States, “each head of a department is, and must be,
the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.”

- All heads of departments are political agents of the President

- Qualified because not all powers of the president can be exercised through
the agents (there are powers that only the Chief Executive can exercise)

Limit

There are certain Presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances,
and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least
call for the supersede of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal
branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands
the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. This list
is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in
question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import (Constantino v Cuisia)
 a) Kulayan v. Tan (Governor cannot call Martial law)
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the
notion that there are certain acts which, by their nature, may only be performed by
the President as Head of State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers to which the “calling-out” powers constitute a portion.
The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the
legislative act of Congress.

Power of Control vs. Power of Supervision – PC you find something wrong, you do it.
SC you find something wrong, you can only call it out.

b) De Leon v. Carpio (NBI Agents)

The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of
the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional
vesture of this power is the President is self-executing and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature.

c) Blaquera v. Alcala (Definition of Control)

Control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.” It has been held that “the President can,
by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter, or nullify any action, or
decision, of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under
him. He can exercise this power motu propio without the need of any appeal from
any party.”

d) Hutchison Ports v. SBMA (SBMA bidding)

The President’s power of control authorizes him to modify or disregard the results of
the bidding conducted by SBMA. Thus, the original bidding having been set aside,
Hutchison has no clear right that can be protected by an injunctive writ.

e) Pimentel v. Aguirre (Definition of Control & Supervision)

In Qutoing Mondano v Silvosa, the Court reiterated that” …In administrative law,
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to perform them,
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”

f) Hontiveros-Baraquiel v. TRB
There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President,
unless repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC
Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President.
 g) Resident Mammals v. Reyes (DENR – President Power)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President
himself be the signatory of service agreements involving the exploration,
development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This
power cannot be taken lightly.

4. Power of Appointment

Article VII, Section 16

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until the disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress. (ad-interim appointments)

a) Soriano v. Lista (Appointment of General – Coast Guard)

“The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause “officers of the Armed
Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain” refers to military officers alone.
SC says Coast Guard is a civilian organization, not military.

b) Manalo v Sistosa
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group
require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson,
Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
 c) Pimentel v Ermita (GMA unpopular appointment)
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may
be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

Regular / Ad interim / Acting

d) Funa v. Ermita
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was
thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of
the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

e) Funa V Agra
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and
assistants.

Midnight Appointments

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

f) De Castro v. JBC (Retirement of CJ)

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we
have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to
extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment
of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured
that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
 g) Velicaria-Garafil v. OP (Requirements of a valid
appointment)

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority
to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time
of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during
the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur
and operate as a single process.

12 December 2021

(Memorize Article VII, Section 18 for possible 20 pts Bonus)

5. Powers as Commander-in-Chief
Article VII, Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need
of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

*Section 18 came from the lessons that we had from the Dictatorship of Marcos.
Writ of Habeas Corpus – Great Writ of Liberty, process to bring detainee by the
detainer and explain and show legal basis of detention

a) Gudani v. Senga (General knows GMA cheating)

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President
that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives
and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline
and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a
military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the
Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
 b) Ampatuan v. Puno (Ampatuan Massacre)
The declaration of emergency in 3 areas is not a declaration of a state of national
emergency. It is the exercise of the calling out power that the Chief Executive may
exercise.

c) Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults
in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the
Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one
in the hands of the Court.

- can only go to court after Congress acted (abdicated??)

d) Lagman v. Medialdea

History of the role of courts

1951 Montenegro v. Castañeda: President’s decision on Martial Law and habeas

corpus is final and conclusive upon the courts.

1971 case of Lansang: the factual basis of the declaration of Martial Law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question and
is within the ambit of judicial review.

1983 Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile: abandoned the ruling in Lansang and rev merted to
Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the Constitutional power of the
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to
judicial inquiry.

1987 Constitution constitutionalized and reverted to Lansang doctrine.

Role of Co-equal Branches

Congress Supreme Court

On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President
On the other hand, Congress may take
into consideration not only the data
The Supreme Court may strike down
the Presidential Proclamation in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient
factual basis
In reviewing the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or
 available prior to, but likewise events
supervening the declaration. Unlike the
Court which does not look into the
absolute correctness of the factual basis
as will be discussed below, Congress
could probe deeper and further; it can
delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.
On the other hand, Congress’ review
mechanism is automatic in the sense
that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation
or suspension was made.
- Automatic
suspension, the Court considers only
the information and data available to the
President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to
“undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleading”
- Why? Nature of Judicial power;
can only resolve if there is a case
of actual controversy; can only
look at what is brought before
them
In addition, the Court’s review power is
passive; it is only initiated by the
filing of a petition “in an appropriate
proceeding” by a citizen.

Abandoned Fortun Ruling

By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own
power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its
bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting
and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a
stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this proceeding.

Standing Rule
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of
review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress.
Corollary, any perceived inaction, or default on the part of Congress does not
deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

Limits on Court Power

The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a
given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President.

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into
the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that
solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

6. Power to Forgive

Article VII, Section 19

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.

- Two possibilities
o Pardon – (reprieves, commutation, forfeiting of fines) can only be done
after final conviction; involves individual
o Amnesty – given to a class of supposed violators; not been charged
much less convicted (ex., tax amnesty)

a) Echegaray v. Sec of Justice (Death Penalty)

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life. Retroact the law because it is in the benefit of the accused

b) Monsanto v. Factoran (Graft and Corruption)

Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we
are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto
restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by
reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.

c) Risos Vidal v. Comelec (Mayor of Manila – Pardoned)

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules, and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any
act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of
the President.

- Congress cannot pass a law to limit the pardoning power of the President

7. Power to Contract and Guarantee Foreign Loans

Article VII, Section 20

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty
days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress
a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations
which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.

a) Constantino v. Cusia (Entering to Bonds)

Issuance of bonds and buybacks are within the power of the President to contract
and guarantee loans.
 8. Other Powers

- Power to enter into treaties with the concurrence of the 2/3 of the Senate
- Power to influence Legislative Agenda
o SONA (what I need from you)
o Certify Bills as urgent

E. Judiciary

1. Qualifications
- Natural Born Filipino
- Forty Years of age (40)
- Must be a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law for at least
15 years
- (3) a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence

2. Judicial and Bar Council

Article VII, Section 8

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.

Names 3 recommendations. May be all rejected for new set of 3. All members of the
Judiciary (RTC, MTC Judges, Justices)

a) Chavez v. JBC (2012) (Congress Representative)

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one
whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the
JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of
the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land.

- No collegial body with even number of members (no tie breaker)

 b) Chavez v. JBC (2013)
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is
entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of
splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not
only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly
against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done
indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a
constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly
put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it
is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.

- Now Congress Rep to the JBC is only one (1)

c) Jardeleza v. Sereno (Claim no due of process)

The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders
illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, tits adherence to
the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion.
When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded
the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the
situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. Carpio and Sereno is not happy with
Jarde.

d) Villanueva v. JBC (MTC to RTC Judge)

On the supervisory role of the SC over JBC

It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity
are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order
the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe
their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter
except to see to it that the rules are followed.

On the nature of JBC

As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and
selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC
has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate.
Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines
to be observed in the evaluation of applicants and formulates rules and guidelines in
order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its
discretion is freed from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention to ensure that
the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence.
 3. Independent Fiscal Autonomy

a) In Re Appraised value of properties

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence,
the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court
officials, and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power;
they determine the terms, conditions, and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

COA cannot intervene.

b) In Re Request for Guidance/Clarification (Civil)

The Court rules that the subject provisions – which requires retiring government
employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative
case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of
the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s
constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel.

Clearance for Criminal Case

It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance
requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate
government agency i.e. the Office of the Ombudsman.

c) In the matter to save judicial independence (JDM)

A proposed bill produces no legal effect until it is passed into law. Under the
Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the
constitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere
speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.

d) In Re petition for exemption (We are government excuse)

Clearly, therefor, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is
an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its Rule-making
power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of
legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.

e) Pimentel v. Medialdea (PHILSAT)

The Court exercises Judicial power only and supervision over education has always
been considered as executive power. PHILSAT declared unconstitutional but LEB
can supervise. SC will regulate pleading and practice in Courts.
9 January 2022

F. Constitutional Commissions

1. Qualifications
Common Qualifications of Members:

- Natural Born Filipinos

- At least 35 years old at the time of appointment
- Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment (Article IX – B, C, D, Section (1)
- Must not be a spouse or relative of the President

Additional Qualifications

Civil Service Commission

- Must have proven capacity for public administration (Article IX-8, Section (1)

COMELEC
- Must be a holder of college degree
- Majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
(Article IX-C, Section 1(1).

Commission on Audit
- Must be certified public accountants with at least 10 years of auditing
experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years.
- At no time shall all members of the Commission belong to the same
profession (Article IX-C, Section 1(1).
- Combination of lawyers and CPAs

a) Cayetano v. Monsod (Practice of law)

His past work experiences include working in the law office of his father for a few
years. During his stint in the World Bank, he worked as operations officer for about
two years and was involved getting acquainted with the laws of the members of the
World Bank, negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic, and project work.
Upon his return to the Philippines, he rendered service to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As a former officer of
National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) respondent become
involved in work that involved that required knowledge of election law. As a member
of the Davide Commission and the Constitutional Commission, respondent made
use of his legal knowledge. Petitioner’s work as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (Application of law, is practice of law)

2. Appointment and Term

The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, for a term of seven (7) years without
reappointment. (Article IX-B, C, and D)

Rotational Scheme
First appointees were for different terms of 7, 5, and 3 years so that the expiration of
term will not leave the commissions without a quorum to act

Commission on Audit (3 Commissioners)

- Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven (7) years,
one Commissioner for five (5) years, and the other Commissioner for three (3)
years without reappointment (Article IX-D, Section 1(2).

Commission on Elections (7 Commissioners)

- Of those first appointed three (3) members shall hold office for seven (7)
years, two (2) members for five (5) years, and the last member for three (3)
years, without reappointment (Article IX-C, Section 1(2).

Civil Service Commission (3 Commissioners)

- Of the first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven (7) years, a
Commissioner for five (5) years, and another Commissioner for three (3)
years without reappointment (Article IX-B, Section 1(2).

a) Gaminde v. COA (3-5-7-7…. is fixed) (Appointed after

vacancy)
In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires
two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first
three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy
due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be
filled only for the unexpired balance of the term." Consequently, the terms of the first
Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates
of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of
the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of
the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.

Vacancy

Appointment to any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor (Article IX-8, C, D, Section 1(2).

In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting

capacity. (Article IX-B, C, D, Section 2).
 b) Brillantes v. Yorac (Comelec) (Acting Chairman is not
allowed)
Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its
own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings
are subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution
in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the
regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised
for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The Constitution
provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections,
foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members.

Removal

“X x x the members of the Constitutional Commissions may be removed from office,

on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violations of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”
(Article IX, Section 2)

3. Disqualifications

a) Hold any other office or employment

b) Engage in the practice of any profession
c) Engage in the active management or control of any business, which in any
way may be affected by the functions of his office
d) Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. (Article IX-A, Section 2)

4. Fiscal Autonomy

The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released. (Article IX-A, Section 5)

a) CSC v. DBM
Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution provides: Sec 5. The Commission shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy. The "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to
petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should
thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this
Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a "no report, no release" policy
against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the
Constitution.

5. Decisions
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or
matter brought before it, within 60 days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution.

A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself (Article IX-A, Section)

6. Jurisdiction

The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article IX-C,
Section 2(2))

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two (2) divisions. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Article
IX-C, Section 3)

a) Sarmiento v COMELEC
All cases must be first heard and decided by a division of the Commission on
Elections. The Commission on Elections sitting en banc has no authority to hear and
decide cases at the first instance. -Division first before en banc

7. Appeals

Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or

ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on petition for
review on certiorari, by the aggrieved party, within 30 days from the receipt of a copy
thereof. (Article IX-A, Section 7)

Civil Service Commission

Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission was provided for in
Republic Act No. 7902, approved on February 23, 1995, which expand the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

Commission on Elections

In the case of the Commission on Elections, any decision of a case over which it
exercises original jurisdiction may be appealed to the Supreme Court on petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 30 days. Any decision of a case which over
which it exercise appellate jurisdiction is reviewable by the Supreme Court on
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The rulings of the Comelec that may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari are those that relate to its exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.
Rule 45 – ordinary appeal – questions of law – judgment of the lower deciding body
Rule 65 – questions of jurisdiction – question the jurisdiction

a) Ambil v COMELEC (SC can only review judgement by En

Banc)
The power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec involves final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” This decision must be a final decision or
resolution of the Comelec in bank, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. The
pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.

Interlocutory orders – issues that do not dispose of the case, merely dispose of
incidents of the case

personal notes, other sources etc.,