International Journal of Clinical and Experimental

Hypnosis

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Evolutionary Approaches to Understanding the

Hypnotic Experience

William J. Ray & Don M. Tucker

To cite this article: William J. Ray & Don M. Tucker (2003) Evolutionary Approaches to
Understanding the Hypnotic Experience, International Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, 51:3, 256-281, DOI: 10.1076/iceh.51.3.256.15520

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1076/iceh.51.3.256.15520

Published online: 09 Aug 2010.

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 The International Journal of Clinical 0020-7144/03/5103-256$16.00
and Experimental Hypnosis # The International Journal of Clinical
2003, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 256–281 and Experimental Hypnosis

EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES
TO UNDERSTANDING
THE HYPNOTIC EXPERIENCE
WILLIAM J. RAY1
Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania, USA

DON M. TUCKER
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, USA

Abstract: Using Tinbergen’s 4 why questions of causation, develop-

ment, evolution, and function, the authors examine hypnosis from a
larger, evolutionary perspective. Reasoning by analogy, they seek to
view hypnosis in terms of an action pattern that represents a self-
contained behavioral program although not as rigid as seen in lower
organisms. In humans, such a program develops within the context of
a long developmental sequence emphasizing social connections, imi-
tation of significant figures, and the use of linguistic symbols to
regulate both internal and external processes and actions. In terms
of a mechanism, the authors speculate on the involvement of the
cingulate cortex in achieving in hypnosis the experience of autono-
mous actions or analgesic sensory processes. Finally, they point to the
fact that hypnotizability is associated with an ability to reduce the
experience of pain, modulate the immune system, and achieve greater
benefits of psychosocial therapies as a functional significance of the
hypnotic experience.

In On the Origin of Species, Darwin wrote ‘‘Psychology will be based on

a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental
power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of
man and his history’’ (p. 488, 1886). Although this was written nearly 150
years ago, we are just now beginning to come to grips with the manner
in which evolutionary thinking can impact and shape our current con-
ceptualizations. One strong force that supported this perspective can be
found in research and theoretical perspectives from cognitive and
affective neuroscience, biology, human ethology, and genetics. In the
current paper, we attempt to articulate some of the concepts necessary
for understanding hypnosis from this perspective. We first suggest
important neurophysiological structures and processes involved and

Manuscript submitted August 15, 2002; final revision received November 15, 2002.
1
Address correspondence to Dr. William J. Ray, Department of Psychology, Penn-
sylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA. E-mail: wjr@psu.edu

256
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 257

then draw from ecology to illustrate one possible manner in which these
mechanisms may come into play in an organized coherent manner.

OUTLINE OF THE HYPOTHESIS

The phenomenon of hypnosis presents important challenges for a

theoretical understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms
of the human mind. We hypothesize that hypnotic suggestion engages
self-regulatory mechanisms (of the hippocampus and posterior cingu-
late cortex) that originally evolved to support orienting to the episodic
environmental context and then were integrated within attachment and
imprinting instincts. Perhaps equally important, hypnosis may require
a suspension of other self-regulatory mechanisms (of the amygdala and
its input into anterior cingulate cortex) that normally serve to disengage
the person from the episodic context.
The fact that volitional control of behavior can be interrupted and
modified by external suggestion suggests that, under appropriate
conditions, social influence may engage mechanisms of voluntary
control at an elementary level. By understanding the process of hyp-
nosis, we may better understand not only this interesting phenomenon
but also the mechanisms of self-regulation themselves.
The evolution of self-regulatory capacity has resulted in mecha-
nisms, such as integrating the ongoing episodic context (posterior
cingulate) versus disengaging from the context to establish internal
control (anterior cingulate) that may not be obvious to psychological
analysis. For both avian and mammalian neural evolution, self-regula-
tion has evolved within a social context, in which development of self-
regulatory skills is at first facilitated through incorporation of parental
regulatory influence. The ontogenetic formation of self-regulatory
capacity is closely dependent on effective coordination with parental
and peer social regulatory influences. By understanding the neural
mechanisms through which both parental influence and internal con-
trol are achieved, we may better characterize the substrate that is
engaged by hypnotic suggestion.

EVOLUTION OF ATTACHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL

One important source that contributed to the evolutionary perspec-

tive in the 20th century was that of ethology and the pioneering work of
Konrad Lorenz (Lorenz, 1970). Ethology, which is derived from the
Greek word ‘‘ethos,’’ refers to character or trait focus of the study of
animals and their behavior (Cartwright, 2000). Within this field, it is
assumed that behavioral processes have been shaped through evolu-
tion to be sensitive to environmental conditions. Environment in this
258 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

context includes not only the physical characteristics of a particular

setting but also the social and cultural environment in which the
organism lives. From this perspective, behavior is always understood
within the context of the larger environment. Given the complexity of
behavior within an environment, the field of ethology has largely
focused on particular patterns of behavior that have evolutionary
significance and the possible mechanisms that produce these behav-
iors. In now classic studies, Lorenz showed that orphaned baby birds
such as geese and ducks would follow Lorenz as if he were their mother
if he came before them during their first two days of life, a process
known as ‘‘imprinting.’’ In normal situations, newly hatched birds
prefer following females of their own species as compared to other
objects, which has a clear evolutionary advantage. Humans have been
shown to have similar emotional bonding processes, which Bowlby
(1982) referred to as attachment.
Most of the early research in ethology was demonstrational in
nature. For example, in the 1930s, Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen experi-
mented with the egg-rolling movement of the greylag goose (Lorenz,
1970). If the goose sees an egg outside of its nest, it will reach past the
egg with its bill and then roll it back with the underside of its bill,
balancing it carefully into the nest. What Lorenz observed was that if
the egg was removed once the rolling behavior had been started, then
the behavior continues as if the egg is still there. However, the
balancing movement is not seen. This suggests that the balancing
movement is sensitive to ongoing stimulation and ceases in its absence,
whereas the egg-rolling movement, once begun, does not require
sensory stimulation to continue.
The egg-rolling movement is what Lorenz referred to as a fixed-action
pattern. A fixed-action pattern is (a) released by a stimulus; (b) has a
constant form, i.e., uses the same physiological process (e.g., muscles)
to achieve the same sequence of actions; (c) requires no learning; (d) is
characteristic of a species; and (e) cannot be unlearned. Once a fixed-
action pattern is released, it will continue in the absence of the releasing
or triggering stimulus.
Humans also show fixed-action patterns, which are clearly seen in
newborn babies in terms of the grasping movements of the feet and
hands if touched or the rooting reflex if the lips or cheeks are touched.
Research has supported the idea that an infant’s facial features, in-
cluding large eyes and forehead, may serve as releasing mechanisms
that bring forth positively valenced, affectionate responses from adults.
Cartoon characters or toys that have similar characteristics are rated as
cute across a variety of cultures.
Following this tradition, we can consider hypnosis from an etholog-
ical perspective and evaluate it as a fixed-action pattern. We first
consider if the five characteristics of a fixed-action pattern are present.
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 259

First, hypnosis is clearly released by a stimulus, which consists of a safe

environment in which a suggestion to enter into the hypnotic state is
made. Second, the form in terms of physiology and experience appears
constant over various hypnotic experiences. Subjectively, hypnosis has
been characterized by deep mental relaxation; mental absorption;
diminished tendency to judge; a suspension of orientation toward
time, location, or sense of self; and the experience of one’s own response
as automatic (Price, 1996). On a physiological level, similar processes
(e.g., EEG theta activity and the involvement of the anterior cingulate)
have been reported in a variety of studies. Third, hypnosis on the part
of high hypnotizable individuals is assumed not to require learning,
although there is some debate as to whether low hypnotizable individ-
uals can be taught the experience. Fourth, hypnosis as it has been
studied scientifically is not a characteristic of all humans. In this sense,
hypnosis might be better considered as process, such as attachment in
which there exist different types or classes of responding to the
invoking stimuli. This would suggest that hypnotic susceptibility is
part of a larger developmental process resulting in a stability of
susceptibility. Fifth, although it’s an unresearched area, there exists
little evidence to suggest that the ability to be hypnotized can be
unlearned.
In terms of an ethological perspective, Tinbergen (1963) suggested
that there were four ‘‘whys’’ to be considered in terms of behavior:
causation, development, evolution, and function. First, what are the
mechanisms that cause the behavior? Cause in this case refers to
physiological mechanisms that are activated by environmental cues.
Second, how does the behavior come to develop in the individual?
Third, how has the behavior evolved? And fourth, what is the function
or survival value of the behavior? Considering hypnosis within the
broader context of these questions allows one to cut across many
dichotomies found in the current debates concerning the most appro-
priate model for understanding hypnosis (e.g., Kihlstrom, 1998; Kirsch
& Lynn, 1998; Woody & Sadler, 1998).

Hypnosis and Mechanisms of the Executive Functions

We begin by considering Tinbergen’s first question as to what
mechanisms are activated by environmental conditions to produce
the hypnotic experience. As shown by the name given to the phenom-
enon, the early studies of hypnosis attempted to understand it in
relation to the mechanisms of sleep. Although this approach remains
highly relevant, largely because we have such a poor understanding of
the alterations in consciousness and mental status in relation to the
neural mechanisms of sleep, a theoretical account of hypnosis must go
beyond the changes in arousal and level of consciousness to consider
260 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

the executive monitoring and control of behavior. Several neurophy-

siological findings present interesting clues in this direction.
In the 1800s, James Braid not only introduced the term hypnosis but
also proposed a physiological basis for the hypnotic process (Braid,
1843/1960; Kravis, 1988). Much of the early work emphasized the
nature of the hypnotic experience, especially its relationship to sleep.
Pavlov (1927), for example, saw both hypnosis and sleep as cortical
inhibitory processes. Later work began to differentiate hypnosis and
sleep. In the late 1940s, Gordon (1949) reported that an EEG recorded
during hypnosis was less like sleep and more similar to being awake.
During the next decade, there was a shift to suggest that hypnosis most
resembles light sleep (cf. Barker & Burgwin, 1949; Franck, 1950). With
the arrival of more sophisticated signal processing techniques, there
was a trend to move toward questions concerning which physiological
markers are associated with hypnotic processes. The classic example
was the examination of EEG activity in the alpha band (8–12 Hz) and its
later interpretation as a reflection of differential hemispheric activity.
However, during the past 50 years, this work has not presented a
consistent picture of the hypnotic process.
The most solid relationship between electrocortical activity, hypno-
sis, and hypnotizability exists in the EEG theta frequency range (cf.
Graffin, Ray, & Lundy, 1995; Isotani et al., 2001; Sabourin, Cutcomb,
Crawford, & Pribram, 1990; see also Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992, for a
review). Galbraith, London, Leibovitz, Cooper, and Hart (1970), using
stepwise regression methods, reported that baseline EEG activity in the
theta range was most predictive of hypnotic susceptibility. This has
been replicated in other studies showing a strong relationship between
theta and hypnotic susceptibility across a wide variety of sites as well
as the presence of theta during a hypnotic induction (cf. Crawford &
Gruzelier, 1992; Galbraith et al., 1970; Sabourin et al., 1990). In our own
lab, we have replicated our previous work showing greater theta
activity by high susceptible individuals within the context of the
hypnotic experience. In a follow-up study, we invited high and low
susceptible individuals to the lab for a startle study outside of a
hypnosis context and did not find EEG theta differences. This suggests
that increased theta activity is not a product of high susceptibility alone
but requires an appropriate context and the hypnotic experience.
Why would we expect to see EEG theta associated with hypnotic
processes? Historically, theta has been associated with a variety of
processes, including hypnagogic imagery, meditation, REM sleep,
problem solving, focused attention, memory processes, and the cessa-
tion of a pleasurable activity (Kahana, Seelig, & Madsen, 2001; Schacter,
1976, 1977; Walter, 1953; see Ray, 1990; Basar-Eroglu, Basar, Demiralp,
& Schürmann, 1992; Basar, Basar-Eroglu, Karakas, & Schürmann, 2001;
Ray, 1990; for a discussion of EEG including theta). In general, theta has
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 261

been associated with continuous concentration of attention (Bruneau,

Sylvie, Guérin, Garreau, & Lelord, 1993; Ishihara & Yoshii, 1972;
Mizuki, Kanaka, Isozaki, Nishijima, & Inanaga, 1980), selective atten-
tion (Basar-Eroglu et al., 1992), and memory retrieval (Klimesch, 1999;
Raghavachari et al., 2001).
Animal research suggests that theta may index the adaptive adjust-
ments required for the ongoing regulation of action. For example, theta
activity is only observed after the animal shows evidence of coherent,
learned behavior, suggesting that the animal had established the
context for action (Pickenhain & Klingberg, 1967). Theta habituates
after repeated presentation of a stimulus (Miller, 1991). In humans, as
task difficulty is increased by inducing time pressures or raising
demands on working memory, frontal midline theta activity also
increases (Gevins, Smith, McEvoy, & Yu, 1997). In our lab, when we
asked individuals to play a video game, we found enhancement of
frontal midline theta on successful trials, and these findings were more
pronounced in a time-pressure condition (Slobounov, Fukada, Simon,
Rearick, & Ray, 2000).

Limbic Theta and Action Regulation

One interpretation of these findings on theta and performance in
humans is that increasing working-memory load increases demands
for monitoring performance outcome, which require entrainment of
multiple regions of the limbic system regulating working memory.
Overall, limbic theta appears to index the adaptive adjustments re-
quired for the executive monitoring and self-regulation of behavior.
These executive functions are often related to a higher-order, homun-
cular director of more elementary cognitive and memory operations.
However, recent theoretical approaches to neural mechanisms of self-
regulation have suggested that executive capacities can arise from
elementary mechanisms of action regulation.
Action regulation can be described as a process that involves learn-
ing which behavior is relevant in a given context, monitoring the
outcome of an action, and switching to a different behavior when
expected outcomes are violated. A primary candidate for imple-
menting this process across cortical, limbic, and diencephalic regions
is the Papez circuit (Papez, 1937), which includes the cingulate cortex,
hippocampus, anterior and medial nuclei of the thalamus, and ma-
millary body. Recent speculation has linked theta activity with these
areas, especially the anterior cingulate (Allman, Hakeem, Erwin,
Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001; Luu & Tucker, in press).
The cingulate cortex was named because it forms a cingulum or collar
around the corpus callosum and forms the dorsal of the limbic lobe
originally described by Broca. In the 1930s, Papez saw it as the area that
262 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

interpreted emotional information coming from the hypothalamic

region (Papez, 1937). From an evolutionary developmental perspective,
Papez saw the cingulate cortex as part of an ancient system. Likewise,
MacLean in his concept of the triune brain suggested that brain
development over the ages evolved in a series of three concentric
structures, with the cingulate being part of the earliest of these
(MacLean, 1990).
Overall, research has suggested that the anterior cingulate (ACC) is
involved in the type of executive function that allows one to drive down
the street and ignore one set of signs while paying attention to another
(Awh & Gehring, 1999). Current research with both EEG and PET
studies suggests that within the ACC the execution and monitoring of a
response can be separated from the monitoring of the context in which
the action is executed (Elliot & Dolan, 1998; Luu & Tucker, in press). For
example, Elliot and Dolan found that the dorsal ACC was active when
subjects generated a hypothesis concerning what would be a correct
response, whereas the ventral ACC was active when a choice was
made. Others have suggested that dorsal ventral differences reflect
cognitive versus emotional processes as well as executive versus
evaluative (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). For example, stimulation of
the central part produces intense fear or pleasure, whereas the dorsal
part produces a sense of anticipation of movement. Studying stroke
patients with lesions of the anterior cingulate, Damasio and Van
Hoesen (1983) described one patient who reported her mind was
empty. This patient had a remarkable recovery and knowledge of
conversations that had taken place among doctors even during the
early stages of her recovery. However, when asked why she did not
reply, she reported that she had nothing to say and felt no will to reply
to the questions. Other lesion studies have reported a similar reduction
in verbal responses and spontaneous behavior (Cohen et al., 1999).
In terms of hypnotic modulation of experience, the ACC consistently
is shown to be involved. In a series of PET studies, Rainville and his
colleagues have shown that neural activity in the brain stem, thalamus,
and ACC contribute to the experience of being hypnotized (Rainville,
Carrier, Hofbauer, Bushnell, & Duncan, 1999; Rainville, Hofbauer,
Bushnell, Duncan, & Price, 2002). In particular, these authors report
absorption related changes in the more rostral regions of the ACC. In an
earlier hypnotic study involving painful stimuli, Rainville and his
colleagues (Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997) found
that activity in the ACC closely paralleled subjective experience and that
it reflected the emotional component (i.e., unpleasantness) but not the
sensory component of the painful stimuli. The right anterior cingulate
has also been implicated in the hallucination but not the imagining of
external stimuli in high hypnotizable individuals (Szechtman, Woody,
Bowers, & Nahmias, 1998). At this point, we can answer Tinbergen’s first
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 263

question and suggest that EEG theta activity and the cingulate cortex are
two important physiological mechanisms that are active during the
hypnotic experience. Although based on a single case study, it is
tempting to speculate and note the similarities between a patient with
a lesion in the cingulate and an individual experiencing hypnosis. In
both cases, the individual reports a lack of desire to initiate activity
although completely aware of events in the external environment. If,
indeed, hypnosis represents a functional inhibition of normal cingulate
functioning, then this would have a variety of implications. First,
hypnosis would represent a simpler and more primitive cognitive/
emotional/motor process than some theories have suggested. Second,
theories that place an emphasis on higher level neocortical cognitive
functioning as an aspect of hypnosis would be inappropriate for under-
standing the basic phenomenon. And third, using tools such as imaging
techniques directed at reflecting cingulate activity or theta activity, it will
now be possible to begin to address many of the questions that have
plagued the field or been considered unanswerable.

Attachment and Internalized Self-Regulation

We now turn to Tinbergen’s second question, related to the devel-
opment and ontogeny of the hypnotic experience. Are there develop-
mental processes that help explain the nature of hypnosis? Our
hypothesis proposes that there are such processes and that they
mediate the child’s sensitivity to social influence. We begin by noting
that motor behaviors, either in terms of performing an action or an
inability to perform, have traditionally played an important role in the
hypnotic process. At an elementary level, there are neural mechanisms
that plan and monitor a variety of actions. These mechanisms form the
neurophysiological basis for what we experience as voluntary control
over behavior. Throughout development, the child’s self-regulatory
mechanisms are closely tuned to social influence. Human infants
instinctually respond to parental communications. Such responses
allow the infants to incorporate parental regulatory influences to
supplement their immature self-regulatory capacities. The incorpora-
tion of parental control is integral to cognitive development, such that
internalized parental dialogs form a foundation for self-regulation
throughout life. The mind’s direction of behavior is best understood
not as a pristine and powerful act of personal volition but as an
amalgam of urges and self-regulatory algorithms, and one critical
algorithm for self-control is private speech. In this section, we approach
Tinbergen’s developmental question by proposing that hypnosis is
achieved through a diversion of the normal self-regulatory algorithm of
internal speech, facilitated in large part because this algorithm devel-
ops through internalization of what was initially an overt parental
dialog.
264 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

Human infants are neotenous. Their development is retarded, al-

lowing an extensive period of social communication, over a decade or
more, to shape their developing brains (Tucker, 1993). In the first year,
the normal human infant is not only highly responsive to social
communication, exhibiting emotions and communications that support
the attachment process, but also fails to exhibit emotions such as
hostility and negativism that may disrupt the parental bond (Mahler,
1968). A similar delay of hostile displays is seen in rhesus monkeys as
described by Harlow, and Suomi suggested that the developmental
progression facilitating attachment may be a generic feature of primate
social development. In the second year of human development, the
maturation of motor control and language acquisition is accompanied
by motivational substrates, including hostility and negativism that
support the child’s individuation and autonomy (Mahler, 1968). For
both these critical developmental stages, the mechanisms of self-reg-
ulation are tightly coordinated with the mechanisms of social influence.
Recent theorists have emphasized that the parent’s control is important
to supplement the infant’s immature self-regulatory capacity (Rothbart
& Posner, 1985). Because self- and social regulation inevitably diverge
as causal influences on behavior, the coordination of dependence and
independence is a key theme for not only early development but also
for psychological organization throughout the life span.
In considering how hypnotic suggestion could become effective in
controlling an individual’s experience and behavior, it may be impor-
tant to consider early psychological orientations, both those that facil-
itate the incorporation of social influences within self-regulatory
systems and those that reject social influences in order to establish
autonomy. Effective hypnosis would seem to require a strong dom-
inance of the incorporation orientation over the rejection orientation.
Although the early, preverbal motivational and cognitive orientation
must be a critical substrate for experience in a social context, the child’s
capacity for verbal representation of thought soon becomes an essential
medium for not only social influence but internal control of behavior.
Developmental theorists have emphasized the self-regulatory func-
tions of the child’s own speech, which is often used overtly to organize
behavioral plans in young children, and then becomes internalized as a
private guide for actions (Vygotsky, 1934/1962).
Although the explicit verbal form of private speech may be impor-
tant as an organization and memory device in the child’s behavior
planning, there also may be more abstract social representational
functions provided by private speech, in which the child guides his
or her actions by representing the viewpoint of the parent or other
significant figure as an observer of the behavior. Freud’s (1940/1953)
formulation of the superego emphasized the importance of incorpo-
rated parental viewpoints and directives as elements of the self. Later
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 265

object-relations theorists came to understand that the early social-

relation patterns, although they may result in parental introjects, are
also fundamental to the development of the ego itself (e.g., Horney,
1945; Mahler, 1968). Recent research on language acquisition (Baldwin,
1993) has converged with these traditional formulations in an inter-
esting way. The young child learns the meaning of words in large part
through careful attention to the perspective and intention of the parent.
Although classic approaches to language have long emphasized the
speaker’s intention in interpreting the utterance, we have only recently
recognized that forming a mental representation of the parent’s inten-
tion is an elementary process that is formative in the development of
verbal thought as early as the second year of life. Research on repre-
sentation of others’ mental states has also emphasized the importance
of the cognitive representation of social perspective and the intention of
others for the development of the self. The normal volitional control of
behavior emerges out of these elementary structures of self-in-social-
context. Although the complexities of social cognition remain poorly
understood, we can expect that hypnotic control must be understood in
relation to the social influences that engage, at a primitive level, the
mental representations that motivate, direct, and monitor behavioral
actions.

The Fragility of the Will and the Strength of Closure

Hypnosis violates our assumptions about the voluntary control of
behavior. A fundamental assumption of human nature in western
culture is that, as a mature personality is created through the course
of child development, an adult comes to exert voluntary choice in each
action. It is therefore surprising and disturbing when hypnotic sugges-
tions appear to subvert voluntary control. Although it is important to
consider the mechanisms of social influence, it may also be useful to
challenge the assumption of voluntary control of behavior. Both psy-
chological analysis and experimental evidence suggest that the com-
mon assumptions about voluntary control of the mind and behavior
may be naı̈ve.
When William James examined his own behavior to look for evi-
dence of willed action, he found that the agentive capacity of the mind,
a capacity that seems to be universally assumed in our culture, was
difficult to support with behavioral evidence. He found clear examples,
such as when intending to get out of a warm bed on a cold morning,
that the will is weak. James could represent the necessary action to
himself with great intentional vigor but remain inert. Yet, a few minutes
later, upon remembering an important appointment, he suddenly
found himself out of bed getting ready for the day, with no recollection
of willful intention intervening in the effective act.
266 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

Given the strong belief in the efficacy of human intentionality,

among philosophers as well as ordinary people, one might be tempted
to question whether James’ introspection should be taken as a lesson on
human nature or a confession of personal inadequacy. A good deal of
modern experimental evidence supports James’ assertion that the
conscious will is overrated (Wegner, 2001). Furthermore, from the
naı̈ve perspective on the mind, we assume that we have conscious
access to the intentional process, and yet social psychological research
has provided many examples of instances in which this assumption is
also invalid (Nisbitt & Wilson, 1977). If the account from social-cogni-
tion research is correct, then behavior is regulated not by a robust and
effective conscious volition but by a loose assemblage of urges, habits,
and contextual constraints. In such a framework, it may be less
surprising that hypnotic instructions could supplant the internal con-
trol of behavior.
Although we may not have effective voluntary control over behav-
ior, we may need to maintain the illusion that we do (Wegner, 2001).
Clinical observation of the self-regulatory deficits of schizophrenics
provides important examples of the disorganization that occurs when
the sense of agency is disrupted. Through mechanisms that are not well
understood, the schizophrenic loses the experience of being in control
of thoughts and actions. This experience is profoundly unsettling and
leads to a search for explanations for this state that often become the
defining features of the syndrome, in relation to paranoid interpreta-
tions or delusions of thought insertion. The social-cognitive framework
of self-regulation is invariably significant, as the schizophrenic at-
tempts to understand the conspiracy or other bizarre mechanisms that
must be responsible for the theft of personal agency.
Fragments of early object relations are often manifested as uncon-
nected external agents with the dissolution of the schizophrenic’s
agentic sense of experience. The hallucinated voices often provide
critical, parent-like monitoring of behavior, and their origin in private
speech is suggested by several forms of evidence. Consistent with the
importance of the ACC to normal self-monitoring (Luu & Tucker, in
press), there are syndromes of defective agency that occur with ex-
tensive lesions of the ACC and associated midline frontal cortex
(Goldberg, 1985). In the ‘‘alien hand sign,’’ the patient’s own actions
are observed but not sensed as willed. In a direct parallel to schizo-
phrenic control delusions, the patient with ACC lesions interprets the
actions as caused by an outside force.
There are many remarkable implications of the normal illusion of
agency and the delusions of control that occur with the loss of the sense
of agency in schizophrenia or in frontolimbic lesions. What may be
most instructive in relation to hypnosis is not only the fragility of
conscious control of behavior but the strong tendency of the mind to
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 267

attempt to maintain a causal coherence of experience. When the

hypnotic induction causes one’s actions to begin to seem under external
control, an apparently strong requirement for closure in causal attribu-
tion seems to lead to a progressive strengthening of hypnotic control.
To draw from a more general instance in which causal coherence
appears to emerge spontaneously in human reasoning, if the will didn’t
exist, it would need to be created.

The Trait of Hypnotic Susceptibility

Although we can examine fundamental mechanisms of social influ-
ence and self-regulation in development that may contribute to the
hypnotic process, there is a problem with a developmental explanation
of hypnosis in relation to those mechanisms. Hypnotic susceptibility
should vary as a function of personality outcomes of early experiences
with attachment, self-regulation, and the establishment of the sense of
personal agency. Yet it has proven remarkably difficult to find personality
differences that are consistently related to hypnotic susceptibility (Glisky,
Tataryn, & Kihlstrom, 1995; Glisky, Tataryn, Tobias, Kihlstrom, &
McConkey, 1991; Hilgard, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1985; Nadon, Hoyt, Register,
& Kihlstrom, 1991; Ray, 2000). One interpretation of this lack of result is, of
course, that hypnotic susceptibility is not a stable trait. However, high test-
retest correlations (r > .70) have been observed for hypnotic susceptibility
measured over 10, 15, and even 25 years (Piccione, Hilgard, & Zimbardo,
1989). Furthermore, there is a substantial correlation (r ¼ .60) of different
hypnotic susceptibility measures (Bowers, 1983). Finally, the heritability
of susceptibility is among the highest of any psychological individual
difference measure identified to date (Morgan, 1973; Morgan, Hilgard, &
Davert, 1970) (see Table 1). One alternative is that hypnotic susceptibility,
like attachment, is an action pattern that is unique and has its own
developmental history and does not overlap with traditional psychologi-
cal measures of individual differences. It is therefore an important
scientific problem that such a stable tendency is not correlated with other
traditional individual-difference measures.

Evolution of Cognitive Control

Although more speculative, it may also be useful to consider the
question of the evolutionary substrate of hypnotic suggestion. In many
ways, this question returns us to the question of physiological mecha-
nism, because the human brain’s cognitive mechanisms are built upon
circuits that cross the hierarchy of vertebrate neural architecture, in-
cluding not only telencephalic (cortex, amygdala, hippocampus, neos-
triatum) but also diencephalic (thalamus, hypothalmus) and
mesencephalic (brain stem reticular system) levels. Examining fossil
 268
WILLIAM J. RAY
Table 1
Heritability of Susceptibility

Morgan, Hilgard & Davert, 1970 Morgan, 1973

AND
Twins (monozygotic) .63 .54 (male) .49 (female)
Twins (dizygotic) .08 (same sex) .04 (different sex) .18 (same sex) .15 (different sex)

DON M. TUCKER
Sibling .22 (same sex) .01 (different sex) .25 (male) .10 (different sex)
.19 (female)
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 269

records along with the brains of a variety of organisms has suggested

that our current brain can be viewed as having the features of three basic
evolutionary formations: that of reptiles, that of early mammals, and that
of recent mammals (MacLean, 1990). MacLean’s formulation, which is
referred to as the triune brain, suggests that through rich interconnec-
tions our brains can process a variety of information in three somewhat
independent although not autonomous manners.
The first level is that of the reptilian brain involving the brain stem
and cerebellum that processes major life requirements such as breath-
ing, temperature regulation, and sleep-wake cycles. The second level is
that of paleomammalian, which is seen to involve the limbic system
and its involvement in emotional processing. MacLean points to three
developments that took place evolutionarily in the transition from
reptiles to mammals. These are (a) nursing in conjunction with ma-
ternal care, (b) audio-vocal communication that maintained maternal-
offspring contact, and (c) play. The third level of the triune brain is
that of neomammalian and is related to the neocortex and thalamic
structures. This level is generally associated with problem solving,
executive control, and an orientation toward the external world with an
emphasis on linguistic functions. Although MacLean’s anatomical
framework is highly schematic and more detailed analysis is required
to understand exactly how mammalian self-regulation achieved the
advances in behavioral flexibility and social coordination, his approach
has been highly influential in emphasizing the integral social basis of
the evolution of higher levels of psychological function. Thinking in
these terms, we would conclude that such processes as a sense of
control as well as conscious self-awareness and consciousness would
come late in evolution.
Considering hypnosis, we propose that our ability to model or
imitate others has evolutionarily preceded a fully developed sense
of willed voluntary action. We would further suggest that hypnosis as a
process finds its evolutionary heritage in the interplay of the cortical
and limbic levels. By considering the multiple levels of corticolimbic
networks, we can understand the process of executive control not only
from the perspective of conscious and linguistic mechanisms that are
the obvious medium of hypnotic suggestion but also from the pre-
conscious formative processes that may be the critical mechanisms
through which social influence operates.

Corticolimbic Architecture
Theoretical advances in cognitive neuroscience may offer new
insight into the process of psychological development. The dual
mechanisms of neural plasticity, indiscriminant synaptogenesis, and
activity-dependent pruning of unused connections appear to articulate
the connectional structure of both the cortex and memory. At the same
270 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

time, general principles of function in massive parallel networks are

being suggested by computational models. The theoretical power of
these advances is considerable. A major reformulation of neuropsy-
chological development may soon be possible in which a common set of
principles is able to describe both neurophysiological and psycholog-
ical differentiation across the life span.
Because researchers in neuropsychology adopted the cognitive para-
digm from psychology, the research has considered memory to be a
specific, isolated mental operation. Therefore, the literature on limbic
system contributions to motivation, emotion, and psychopathology has
had little influence on the literature on limbic contributions to memory.
Thus, we need to be speculative as we consider memory-related aspects of
hypnosis such as amnesia. The importance of a more integrated biological
approach to neuropsychology has become obvious as anatomical studies
have illuminated the general architecture of mammalian cortex. The
limbic cortices are the first to have evolved, and they form a core from
which the neocortical networks have expanded (Pandya, Seltzer, &
Barbas, 1988). The critical role of the limbic areas in both motivational
and mnemonic processes shows that even the massive cortex of humans is
organized developmentally, with the extensive neocortical representa-
tional capacity remaining dependent on the adaptive control of consoli-
dation provided by the limbic core (Tucker, 1993). With their close
connectivity with the hypothalamus and brain-stem circuits, the limbic
cortices are closely modulated by internal need states (Mesulum, 1985).
Retracing the progressive differentiation of neocortex from primitive
limbic cortices in phylogenesis, the primate neocortex has been found
to comprise multiple representational networks emanating from
paralimbic (allocortical and periallocortical) areas through traditional
‘‘associational’’ areas to the finely differentiated isocortex of ‘‘primary’’
sensory and motor areas (Pandya et al., 1988). The general organization of
the cortex therefore begins with a limbic core representing the internal
milieu and progresses toward an isocortical interface with the external
environment (Mesulam). The general picture of the connectivity is one in
which the evolution of each more differentiated network of isocortex
created an onion architecture, in which each new superficial network
interposed itself between the thalamic input/output connections (the
environmental interface) and the paralimbic core (Tucker, 1993).
In this architecture, the paralimbic core provides the essential
adaptive control that regulates memory consolidation according to
the significance of events in relation to past history and current needs
(Tucker, 1993). The connectivity is such that integrated brain function is
achieved primarily at the core. The sensory and motor isocortices are
isolated ‘‘islands’’ with limited connectivity. If connectivity indicates
functional integration, we should expect limbic networks to be essential
for abstract semantic function. This is what has been observed, in fact,
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 271

in aphasia. Lesions that produce semantic deficits are consistently

found to encroach on limbic cortices (Brown, 1989).
The key theoretical challenge for understanding this general archi-
tecture of the brain may be to interpret how representations are
transformed across the multiple linked networks from sensory and
motor cortices to the paralimbic core. Processing is more ‘‘abstract’’ at
the paralimbic level, but it is also ‘‘bound’’ within a syncretic matrix of
multimodal constructs, motivational constraints, and incipient action
dispositions. The functional integration of the brain cannot be attrib-
uted to any network level but must be framed as a task for synchroniz-
ing multiple networks in concert.
In the sensory systems, the reentrant traffic across these networks
serves to consolidate an integrated perception through combining the
mnemonic representations of past experience with the new sensory
data. The corticolimbic consolidation is very likely energized by limbic
excitement. At the neurophysiological level, electrical stimulation of
any area of cortex results in kindling or recruitment of increased
electrical excitement in limbic areas (Doane & Livingston, 1986). As-
suming a simple isomorphism of physiology and function, we can
speculate that corticolimbic consolidation of memory proceeds simi-
larly, with the vigor of reentrant consolidation tuned by the adaptive
resonance within limbic tissue.

The Visceral Basis of Action Regulation

We propose that an analysis of corticolimbic network architecture
points to self-regulatory mechanisms that integrate not only the
sensorimotor interface with the environment mediated by neocortical
networks but also the visceral interface with the internal bodily milli-
eux mediated by limbic networks (Tucker, 2001). Within the cingulate
gyrus, the most primitive limbic networks are specialized for viscer-
omotor functions (Neafsey, Terreberry, Hurley, Ruit, & Frysztak, 1993).
Within the insula and associated ventral limbic networks, the most
primitive networks are specialized for viscerosensory functions
(Neafsey et al.). To find the executive functions, through which specific
cognitive processes are selected, prioritized, and regulated, it may be
time to give up the search for a higher-order ‘‘supervisor’’ of cognition,
in the sense of a homuncular administrative agency of the brain.
Instead, the executive functions may be found to emerge from the
complex forms of human elaboration of elementary neural systems for
action regulation, systems responsible not only for control of motor
activity but motivated learning and memory as well (Luu & Tucker, in
press). Key questions are how these elementary systems operate at the
neurophysiological level and how they can be understood at the
experiential level.
272 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

Consciousness and Social Influence

One interesting possibility suggested by a literal interpretation of
corticolimbic architecture is that consciousness requires extensive
representation in neocortical sensorimotor modules, whereas the most
generic, distributed representations of deep semantics may be inher-
ently preconscious. Articulation into acts, including words and/or
images, is generally required before thought is fully conscious. In
contrast, representations in the most integrative and holistic networks
of the cortex, the paralimbic networks (cortices next to the limbic
circuits centering on the amygdala, septal nuclei, and hippocampus)
are incipient, diffuse, and may be largely unconscious. Of course, there
are degrees of awareness of more ‘‘premotor’’ or ‘‘preperceptual’’
representations, certainly in hunches and certainly in more abstract
forms of cognition that may be either preverbal or nonverbal. But
articulation is integral to conscious intentionality. We speculate that
hypnotic influence must engage not only at the conscious articulated
level of experience, at which subjects can provide some degree of
veridical introspection, but also at the preconscious (paralimbic) level
of the motivational and intentional substrate of actions.
What are the key mechanisms of behavior control within limbic
circuits? Several lines of evidence suggest that the mammalian learning
system is not the passive associator assumed by behaviorists but
comprises circuits that apply strategic biases to processes of attention
and memory consolidation. These circuits integrate not only sensory
gating and attentional controls in the thalamus but also elementary
arousal and autonomic responses regulated by the hypothalamus. The
systems that comprise linked diencephalic (thalamic, hypothalamic)
and limbic (hippocampal, cingulate) circuits have long been recognized
as essential for both memory and emotion (Papez, 1937). Together, the
multiple limbic-thalamic-hypothalamic circuits achieve memory con-
solidation that is continually regulated by adaptive needs in strategic
fashion.
A key circuit is centered on the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC),
integrating control input from the hippocampus and providing output
to the anterior thalamic nuclei to modulate ongoing learning (Gabriel,
Sparenborg, & Kubota, 1989). On the basis of learning studies in the
rabbit, Gabriel and associates have proposed that this circuit appears to
operate through gradual modification of the internal representation in
response to environmental events that are generally consistent with the
representation. In many ways, this circuit would be a good candidate to
represent the process of ‘‘context updating’’ described in cognitive
psychophysiology (Donchin & Coles, 1988).
In contrast, when gradual shaping of the internal representation
of the context is not adequate to adapt to abrupt changes in the
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 273

environmental contingencies, the ACC is required to achieve more

rapid, radical shifts in behavior than can be accomplished by the
gradual PCC context-appropriate learning mechanism. Gabriel pro-
posed that, in this way, the ACC is capable of ‘‘salience compensation’’
for normally weak or nonsalient stimuli, when these stimuli are
recognized to be critical for disengaging from the existing context
and establishing a new predictive model.
Gabriel’s model has become highly explanatory for understanding
recent evidence on contributions of the cingulate gyrus to human
motivation and attention (Luu & Tucker, in press). Although developed
to account for simple conditioned learning in rabbits, Gabriel’s model
explains a number of findings on the activity of the ACC in human
executive processes, including effortful attention, monitoring of errors,
detecting conflict, and evaluating significant events (Luu & Tucker).
The importance of both social and emotional responses to the control of
actions by the ACC is shown by a number of findings, including those
on response to pain, chronic anxiety, emotional vocalization, and the
preferential sensitivity of cingulate cortex to opiates (Bush et al., 2000).
In relation to volitional control of actions, the ACC is well-situated to
mediate between limbic motivational influences and the adjacent
sensory motor areas that regulates premotor organization of behavior.
Consistent with this anatomy, lesions of the ACC and associated medial
frontal regions produce akinetic syndromes, in which patients do not
engage in actions even though they are capable of doing so when
pressed. With impaired influence from the ACC, they appear to lack the
motivation to act (Bush et al., 2000). Consistent with these findings are
the affective changes with ACC lesions. Psychosurgery has often
targeted the ACC to alleviate chronic pain or decrease the symptoms
of anxiety. Although ineffective in improving the cognitive disorgani-
zation of psychiatric disorders, ACC lesions, whether intentional or
accidental, invariably decrease the patient’s concern over life problems.
The picture emerging from neurophysiological studies of the cingulate
gyrus and its relation to human behavior suggests that the self-regula-
tion of action integrates two poles, the somatomotor cortices in the
neocortex and the visceromotor cortices in the limbic regions. Closely
associated with visceromotor functions, the anterior cingulate gyrus
appears to have evolved as an essential substrate for motivational
control, contributing to emotional evaluation and significance as well
as to the initiation of action. Notably, the evidence on emotional
vocalization and the action of opiates suggests that the cingulate gyrus
is critical to social motivations specifically (Bush et al., 2000).
If we look to limbic circuits for the motivational, preconscious base
of self-regulation of actions, where hypnosis may achieve its effects,
it may be useful to consider Gabriel’s evidence on the differing
roles of ACC and PCC. Hypnosis may operate through the gradual
274 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

context-updating operations of the PCC, as the hypnotist carefully and

gradually adapts the subject’s contextual model of the world. In this
manner, hypnotic induction and suggestion may achieve a gradual
manipulation of context representation similar to other forms of social
influence, including seduction.
In contrast, the context-disrupting function of the ACC may work
against the hypnotic process and may need to be disengaged in order to
allow the context-altering seduction to occur. In this respect, it is
interesting that certain forms of hypnotic induction rely on paradoxical
intentions, in which the subject’s intentionality is challenged by a
suggestion, such as holding out one’s arm and feeling it get heavy
that makes the subject’s intention ineffective in relation to the hypno-
tist’s suggestion. When manipulations such as this are applied, they
may allow the external source of instructions to achieve effective causal
closure while at the same time demonstrating the inadequacy of the
internal will. In neurophysiological terms, such a manipulation may
allow the context-updating of the PCC to continue uninterrupted by the
ACC, therefore allowing the hypnotist to establish an information
context that dominates the subject’s episodic reality.

Evolutionary Advantage of Hypnosis

We now approach Tinbergen’s fourth question and ask what is the
function and survival value of being able to enter into the hypnotic
experience? That is, we ask the question: Is there any survival value to
those individuals who are able to enter a hypnotic experience as
compared to those who are not? We first must consider the possibility
that there is no value to the hypnotic experience and that it remains an
epiphenomenon that may have served a purpose in the past but does
not any longer. For example, human infants at birth will close their
fingers and toes around an object such as a rope tightly enough to allow
them to hold their own weight. Clearly this is not a task that human
infants are required to do in their environment. However, given that
one of the best stimuli for eliciting the response is a clump of hair, it
may be that the response is related to the nonhuman primate infant
grasping his mother as she moves through the trees, which does have
great survival value. Thus, what has functional significance for nonhu-
man primates may have little for human infants. However, the grasp-
ing reflex still exists in humans.
The alternative to considering hypnosis as a vestigial response is to
examine areas in which there is functional value. If we examine the data
in terms of the current functional value of hypnosis, we are drawn to
such areas as pain management (Holroyd, 1996), modulation of the
immune system (Kiecolt-Glaser, Marucha, Atkinson, & Glaser, 2001),
and its ability to enhance treatment effectiveness (Kirsch, Montgomery,
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 275

& Sapirstein, 1995). A variety of studies including a special issue of the

International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis (April 2000)
have reviewed these areas and shown that hypnotic procedures en-
hance cognitive-behavioral treatments for a variety of problems. Given
that one meta-analysis (Kirsch, Montgomery, & Sapirstein) suggested
that there are few procedural differences between hypnotic and non-
hypnotic treatments, one might conclude that the positive benefits of
hypnotic procedures lie with the individual and his or her suscep-
tibility to hypnotic procedures. Whether this susceptibility level can in
turn result in a greater level of adaptability or ability to produce
offspring as would be suggested by evolutionary fitness is an open
question. However, the fact that hypnotizability is associated with an
ability to reduce the experience of pain, modulate the immune system,
and achieve greater benefits of psychosocial therapies is, of course, of
great functional significance. Another approach to the question of
functional significance of the hypnotic experience is the examination
of animal models. The obvious question is what characteristics of the
human hypnotic experience would one seek in animal models? In 1646,
an Austrian monk published a detailed account describing how he had
hypnotized a chicken by holding its head on the ground and forcing the
animal to fixate on a line drawn away from its beak (Völgyesi, 1966).
From that time to the present, there have been a variety of stories of
how alligators, rabbits, chickens, and other animals could be im-
mobilized, generally by rubbing or stroking the animal, although
eye-fatigue through fixation has also been used. Pavlov (1927) describes
the manner in which inducing hypnosis in animals and humans
utilizes similar mechanisms and its relation to cortical inhibition. In
the second half of the 20th century, a variety of studies examined the
concept of animal hypnosis (Gallup, 1974) with some suggesting
its value for understanding the hypnotic experience in humans (Draper
& Klemm, 1967). A variety of animal hypnosis studies suggest that
in this condition the animals show an analgesia-like response to
needle pricks and electric shock. Draper and Klemm, using a condi-
tioning procedure in rabbits, suggest that the dominant feature of
animal hypnosis is a disconnection of overt motor functions with-
out conspicuous inhibition of sensory functions. Not unlike human
hypnosis, immobilization in chickens has been characterized in
three stages: (a) vocalizations and continuously open eyes; (b) sup-
pressed vocal behavior and eye flutters; and (c) eyes closed, occasional
body twitches, and lack of vocalizations (Rovee & Luciano, 1973).
Research has shown that once tonic immobility is induced, it remains
for anywhere from 10 minutes in chickens to more than 8 hours in
lizards.
The nature of the immobilization response in animals is consistent
with an action pattern described by ethologists. The survival value of
276 WILLIAM J. RAY AND DON M. TUCKER

the immobilization response is typically seen in the context of pre-

dator/prey responses in that predators tend to be sensitive to move-
ment and without it they lose interest and become distracted allowing
the prey to escape. This connection is also supported by the finding that
placing a stuffed hawk in the chicken’s presence increased the period of
tonic immobility by a factor of 5 or 6. Follow-up studies suggested it
was the hawk’s eyes that served as the eliciting stimuli and similar
results were also seen with lizards. Interestingly, human eye contact, as
well as an artificial eye alone, could also prolong the immobilization
response in chickens (see Gallup, 1974, for a review of this literature).
Overall, immobilization is both protective and related to dominance.
Whether the human hypnotic experience is related to or grew out of this
evolutionarily significant event is, of course, an open question.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Using Tinbergen’s four why questions, that of causation, develop-

ment, evolution, and function, we examined hypnosis from a larger
evolutionary perspective. Reasoning by analogy, we sought to view
hypnosis in terms of an action pattern that represents a self-contained
behavioral program although not as rigid as seen in lower organisms.
In humans, such a program develops within the context of a long
development sequence emphasizing social connections, imitation of
significant figures, and the use of linguistic symbols to regulate both
internal and external processes and actions. In terms of a mechanism,
we speculated on the involvement of the cingulate cortex in achieving
in hypnosis the experience of autonomous actions or analgesic sensory
processes. Finally, we point to the fact that hypnotizability is associated
with an ability to reduce the experience of pain, modulate the immune
system, and achieve greater benefits of psychosocial therapies as a
functional significance of the hypnotic experience.

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Ein evolutionärer Zugang zum Verständnis des hypnotischen Erlebens

William J. Ray und Don M. Tucker

Zusammenfassung: Unter Verwendung von Tinbergens ,,4-Warum’’-Fragen
der Verursachung, Entwicklung, Evolution und Funktion, untersuchen die
Autoren die Hypnose aus einer globaleren, evolutionären Perspektive heraus.
Indem sie analog schlussfolgern, versuchen sie Hypnose als ein Han-
dlungsmuster zu sehen, das ein eigenständiges Verhaltensprogramm dar-
stellt, wenngleich nicht so rigide wie man es bei niedrigeren Organismen
findet. Beim Menschen entwickelt sich ein solches Programm innerhalb des
Kontextes einer lange andauernden Entwicklungsfolge, die die sozialen
Verbindungen, die Nachahmung bedeutsamer Anderer, und die Verwen-
dung sprachlicher Symbole zur Regulation von internalen und externalen
Prozessen sowie Handlungen betont. Hinsichtlich des Mechanismus speku-
lieren die Autoren über die Beteiligung des cortex cinguli bei der Erfahrung
autonomer Reaktionen oder analgetischer Wahrnehmungsprozesse in Hyp-
nose. Schließlich weisen sie darauf hin, dass Hypnotisierbarkeit mit einer
Fähigkeit verbunden ist, die Erfahrung von Schmerz zu vermindern, das
Immunsystem zu regulieren und einen größeren Nutzen aus einer psycho-
sozialen Therapie als Ergebnis der hypnotischen Erfahrung zu ziehen.
RALF SCHMAELZLE
University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

Les approches évolutionistes permettant de comprendre

l’expérience hypnotique

William J. Ray et Don M. Tucker

Résumé: En utilisant les 4 <<pourquoi?>> de Tinbergen sur la causalité, le
développement, l’évolution et le fonctionnement, les auteurs examinent
 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS 281

l’hypnose sous une plus grande perspective évolutionniste. Raisonnant par

analogie, ils cherchent à percevoir l’hypnose en termes de modèle d’action
représentant un programme comportemental d’un seul bloc, mais moins
rigide, comme cela s’observe dans les organisations inférieures. Chez
l’homme, un tel programme se développe dans le contexte d’une longue
séquence de développement soulignant les connexions sociales, l’imitation
des figures significatives, et l’utilisation des symboles linguistiques pour
régler les processus internes, externes et les actions. En termes de mécanisme,
les auteurs spéculent sur la participation du cortex cingulaire en réalisant
dans l’expérience hypnotiques des actions autonomes ou des processus
sensoriels analgésiques. En conclusion, ils indiquent que l’hypnotisabilité
est associée à une capacité de réduction de l’expérience de la douleur, de
modulation du système immunitaire et, comme signification fonctionnelle
de l’expérience hypnotique, l’obtention de plus grands avantages dans les
thérapies psychosociales.
VICTOR SIMON
Psychosomatic Medicine & Clinical Hypnosis
Institute, Lille, France

Enfoques evolutivos para comprender la experiencia hipnótica

William J. Ray y Don M. Tucker

Resumen: Los autores usan las cuatro preguntas de tinbergen sobre causa-
lidad, desarrollo, evolución, y función, para examinar a la hypnosis desde
una perspectiva evolutiva. Razonando analógicamente, ven a la hypnosis
desde el punto de vista de un modelo de acción que representa un programa
conductual interno, aunque no tan rı́gido como el de organismos más
inferiores. En los humanos, tal programa se desarrolla dentro del contexto
de una larga secuencia de desarrollo que enfatiza conexiones sociales,
imitación de figuras importantes, y el uso de sı́mbolos lingüı́sticos para
regular procesos y acciones tanto internos como externos. Con respecto al
mecanismo, los autores proponen la involucración de la corteza cingulada
para lograr en la hipnosis la experiencia de acciones autónomas o procesos
sensoriales analgésicos. Finalmente, indican que la hipnotizabilidad está
asociada con la capacidad para reducir la experiencia de dolor, modular el
sistema inmunológico, y lograr beneficios mayores en las terapias psicoso-
ciales, como una funcional importante de la experiencia hipnótica.
ETZEL CARDEÑA
University of Texas, Pan American, Edinburg,
Texas, USA