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History of Psychology
© 2023 American Psychological Association 2024, Vol. 27, No. 2, 139–158

ISSN: 1093-4510 https://doi.org/10.1037/hop0000245
Reconsidering the “Uznadze Effect” and Psychology of Set

(Gantskoba) From a Systemic Cultural Psychological Perspective
Vladimer Lado Gamsakhurdia

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Ivane Javakhishvili

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Tbilisi State University
This article aims to (re)introduce and further develop Dimitri Uznadze’s theory of psychological
“set” from the perspective of contemporary cultural psychology. His ideas are prominent in
Georgia and other post-Soviet countries; however, they might be totally new for psychologists
from other parts of the world. Uznadze, unlike Vygotksy, still awaits to be rediscovered. I discuss
the main theoretical premises and features of the formation of a psychological “set,” according to
Uznadze, which were based on his interpretations of his rich experimental data. Uznadze con-
ceived the psychological “set” as a holistic phenomenon determining human conduct and strongly
opposed reductionist, vitalist, and behavioristic approaches. Subsequently, a more person-
centered and systemic view of set formation and its relation to human conduct is briefly considered.
Further directions for Uznadze’s experimental data’s theoretical consideration are also identified.
Keywords: Uznadze, set, Gantskoba, semiotic cultural psychology
Dimitri Uznadze (1886–1950) was among the most significant figures in Soviet psychol-
ogy in the first half of the 20th century. However, his name is largely unknown in the West and
still awaits to be rediscovered by the broader world, as it happened to Lev Vygotsky, who was
brought to light in the West only in the 1970s–1980s, long after his death. This article aims to
contribute in this direction. Uznadze was a truly exceptional character with a fascinating biog-
raphy, and his name is part of the contemporary Georgian national scientific mythos. He was
born in the late 19th century in a tiny provincial Georgian village (Sakara, Zestafoni district). In
that period of history, Georgia was occupied by the Russian Empire, which was quite behind in
terms of technological and industrial development, whereas the field of psychology was
unknown in the country. It was a period when Georgian national sentiment was reigniting
against Russian imperial oppression, and at the same time, internationalistic socialist move-
ments were gaining influence.
Despite being a very poor province, Georgia was a lively, developing place where information
about developments and new tendencies on the international scene came very quickly and gave
rise to some very famous and infamous figures. Stalin and many other leading Bolsheviks were
This article was published Online First November 13, 2023.

Vladimer Lado Gamsakhurdia https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5297-4777
The writing of this paper was financially supported by the Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation grant
YS-21-1375.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vladimer Lado Gamsakhurdia, Department of
Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University 11a, Ilia
Chavchavadze Avenue, Building 3, Tbilisi 0179, Georgia. Email: ladogamsakhurdia@gmail.com
139
140 GAMSAKHURDIA
unfortunately among them. Also, a large number of significant new poets and writers were appear-
ing in those times in Georgia who were discussing various intellectual questions. So, Uznadze was
born and raised in a vibrant historical period when political and cultural developments were very
active. Probably inspired by the surrounding intellectual and political frenzy, thanks to being from
a fairly wealthy family, he managed to get the best education that was possible in his time, first in
Georgia and afterward in Germany and Ukraine, and subsequently played an instrumental role in
a developing philosophical and experimental school of psychology in Georgia.
Uznadze was the first academically educated Georgian psychologist who formally
founded the field in Georgia and the South Caucasus. He graduated from Kutaisi secondary
school in 1904 and moved to Germany, where he got a higher education in philosophy from
the University of Leipzig (1905–1909). Notably, in Leipzig, Uznadze got experience work-
ing at the famous psychological laboratory of Wilhelm Wundt. However, Uznadze initially
had very diverse interests in aesthetics, philosophy, and psychology. Remarkably, he was
awarded for his coursework thesis on Leibniz philosophy by the scientific board of the fac-
ulty in Leipzig in 1907. He was strongly influenced by Leibniz’s ideas; namely, Uznadze
was inspired by Leibniz’s “petite perceptions” and subsequently attempted to develop his
own view of unconscious processes.
Soon after getting a diploma from the University of Leipzig (1909), Uznadze moved to
the University of Halle-Wittenberg, where he defended a doctoral dissertation in philosophy.
His doctoral thesis was dedicated to the theory of Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov.
However, this particular work had less influence on his psychological explorations that
evolved later, back in Georgia.
By 1909, after defending a doctoral dissertation at Halle-Wittenberg, Uznadze returned
to Kutaisi, Georgia, and started teaching history at a secondary school (university was non-
existent by that time in the South Caucasus). In parallel, he enrolled at the University of
Kharkiv, which was part of the Russian Empire at the time, and earned a degree in history,
however, without physically attending lectures (a specific arrangement that existed in those
times called “extern”). Uznadze was very interested in teaching history and even published
the first-ever handbooks on “the history of the world” in Georgia in 1917. So, historiography
was also among his main interests at the early stage of his career.
Notably, Uznadze was actively involved in Georgian politics. He was among the leaders
of Georgia’s social-federalist party in the 1910s, which fought for leftist ideas and, at the
same time, promoted the right to autonomy of Georgian culture/society under Russian occu-
pation. Uznadze was elected a member of the Georgian National Council (parliament) in
1917–1919 and was among those who signed the Declaration of Independence of the
Georgian Republic on May 26, 1918. Most importantly, he was among the founders of
the first university (Tbilisi State University) in Georgia (and the Caucasus region) in
1918, where he subsequently established a section on psychology. The psychology section
(now there is a Faculty of Psychology) at Tbilisi State University1 became the basis of psy-
chological education and research in Georgia.
However, after the invasion of the Red Army that led to the occupation of the small
Georgian Republic by the Soviet Union in 2021, his political activities were over. During
the Soviet occupation, Uznadze had to completely concentrate on his academic career, as it
was the only way to ensure his physical survival. It is widely believed that he was under the
observation of Soviet security forces until the end of his life. Soviets regarded him as an exces-
sively subjectivist theoretician who was not loyal enough to their socialist agenda.
1
Now, it is called Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University.
DIMITRI UZNADZE’S THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL “SET” 141
Interestingly, Uznadze, despite having a brilliant education in psychology, started

his psychological explorations only after 1918, when he moved from Kutaisi to Tbilisi,
Georgia. Before that time, his writings mainly concerned philosophy, aesthetics, and
history.
Uznadze is rightfully regarded as one of the founders of the Georgian philosophical school. His
works in this field include monographs in the history of philosophy—works that analyzed
the philosophical systems of V. Soloviev (already written in Germany) and Bergson (1920), as
well as a whole host of original studies of various philosophical problems: Individuality and Its
Genesis (1910), Philosophical Discussions: Death (1911), The Philosophy of War (1914), The
Meaning of Life (1915), and The Meaning of Life and Upbringing (1916). (Imedadze, 2009, p. 4)
He focused on psychological experiments only after the establishment of a psychology

department at the newly founded Tbilisi State University in 1918. Uznadze’s main experi-
ments on the psychology of the set were conducted in the 1920s–1940s.
Furthermore, in 1941, he initiated the foundation of the first independent psycho-
logical scientific establishment, which subsequently transformed into the Institute of
Psychology in 1943 and became part of the Georgian Academy of Science, which was
the main administrative body governing science in the country during the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Besides, from 1933 to 1942, Uznadze also held the position
of head of the psychology department at the Institute of Pedagogy in Kutaisi (which is
now called the University of Kutaisi). So, his organizational talent was remarkable, as
his extensive contribution to founding formal academic and scientific psychological insti-
tutions in Georgia is undeniable.
Uznadze’s name was very much praised and even gradually mythologized in Georgia
after his death; however, his figure remains largely unknown beyond the post-Soviet area.
Uznadze’s works were known and scarcely mentioned by some of his contemporaries in
the West. For example, Piaget and Lambercier (1944) referred to his works and labeled
the results of his experiment—perceptive illusions—as the “Uznadze effect.” However,
Piaget’s reference is rather an exception, as Uznadze’s name remained mostly shadowed
beyond the dark curtain of the Soviet Union.
This article explores his legacy and aims to conduct an imaginary dialogue with
Uznadze’s main ideas from a contemporary cultural psychologist’s perspective and dis-
cuss their relevance to contemporary psychology. However, the framework and volume
of this article are limited and allow only the consideration of the general/fundamental
features of Uznadze’s theory, as it is impossible to fully comprehensively elaborate
on all the subtleties of Uznadze’s legacy in the frame of one manuscript. This article
neither aims to provide a comprehensive report on the history of Georgian psychology
nor does it require the volume of a book. The latter decision is also justified by the
fact that Uznadze’s theory has never been significantly revised by other scholars but
rather has been further commented on and nuanced by his followers. Hence, my
main goal is to (re)introduce, particularly Uznadze’s main ideas and experiments, to
the Western reader and hopefully spark further discussions on the topic through its crit-
ical reconsideration.
Notably, Uznadze mainly published his ideas in German and Georgian. Some important
papers among his first publications were printed in Germany by the Journal of Berlin Gestal
Psychology Society (Psychologische Forschung) and reveal his strong connection to Gestalt
theory; however, during my overview, I will mainly concentrate on his later two monographs
published in Georgia(n), which provide a complete account of all his main experiments
(including those data and viewpoints, which had been reported earlier in his German
142 GAMSAKHURDIA
publications), ideas, and Uznadze’s views on his psychology of set and also its comparison
to other relevant psychological theories.
Roots of Uznadze’s Theory of Set

Uznadze was very well aware of theoretical developments in the psychology of his
time and was actively referring to Lewin, Kulpe, Krueger, Fechner, Marbe, Wundt,
Stern, Radoslavlevich, Freud, Bartlett, behaviorism, and many more of his contemporary
European psychologists in his writings. He was theoretically rooted, particularly in
Wurzburg school psychology of conscious processes and the Gestalt-psychological
approach, attempting to elaborate holistic biopsychological theory. He was well aware of

Wurzburg school experiments, which emphasized the role of the directedness of conscious
(thinking) processes and showed that it is possible to study higher mental processes exper-
imentally. Uznadze’s psychology of the set was specifically inspired by German psycholog-
ical experiments on illusions (e.g., Muller’s).
I assume that particularly relevant for the understanding of Uznadze’s ideas should be
his predecessor, Wurzburg school representative Narziss Ach’s concepts of mental aware-
ness and determining tendencies (Ach, 1951). Asch as well as other representatives of the
Wurzburg school rejected the idea of mechanic associationism and assumed that “will”
drives human activity. Ach was studying processes of will through experimental self-
observation and revealed that people are aware of the importance or nonimportance of an
object, so in contemporary terms, they have a certain form of representation of it. People
are aware of and evaluate concrete situations and objects. And they also have conscious
or unconscious determining tendencies that drive their conduct in a particular direction.
Determining tendencies are oriented toward a certain result and imply the conscious willing-
ness to perform a particular task or realize a particular intended result (Teo, 2000). So,
humans are represented as future-oriented.
Uznadze’s ideas were noticeably formed under the implicit and explicit dialogue
with various branches of holistic and reductionistic psychological approaches formed
in Germany and the United States of his time. It would be appropriate to consider
Uznadze’s approach as opposed to reductionistic behavioristic and vitalist positions,
which were dominant in his time. His approach represented the particular expansion of
holistic psychological theories that were born through international collaboration/discus-
sion by the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, mostly in
various German universities. Uznadze was specifically interested in the organization of
conscious and subconscious processes in an attempt to explain the foundation of human
conduct.
Uznadze, in his own way, followed the idea of holistic and systemic organization of the psy-
che, which was a popular viewpoint in his time in major circles in Germany (Lewin’s topology;
Gestalt psychology). However, despite actively referring to and publishing his papers in the
main outlets of the Berlin Society of Gestalt Psychology, he was never adept at Gestalt theory.
Uznadze criticized Gestalt psychology due to the diminishing subject’s role and overemphasiz-
ing the role of Gestalt patterns. For Uznadze, Gestalt theory is also not reflective of dynamics/
changes and is rather static due to its structuralism. Following Uznadze, Imedadze (2009) stated
that Gestalt psychology “reduces the phenomenon of holism in perception to patterns of
Gestaltization.” Those patterns are conceived as static structures. Uznadze attempted to go fur-
ther beyond structuralist Gestalt theory in terms of studying the underlying subjective mecha-
nism of human behavior and eventually conceptualized a relational phenomenon that,
according to him, drives human action and thinking.
In pursuit of a more subject-centered and dynamic holistic theory, he invented a special con-
cept/word in the Georgian language, “Gantskoba,”2 which signifies a relational mediational
driving mental phenomenon that involves cognitive and emotional layers and approximately
translates in English as “set.” The latter signifies the holistic and agentic tendency of the
whole mental system and body to perform a particular action in the immediate situation.
According to Uznadze, “Gantskoba” comes as a result of the combined workings of external
stimulation and internal needs and directs human mental processes and behavior.
Considering Specific Forms of the Psychological Set—Uznadze’s Experiments
Dimitri Uznadze was an imaginative scholar who carried out fascinating experiments
revealing universal tendencies of mental systems. They are telling us not only about a par-
ticular phenomenon, like the psychological set, but also about the systemic interrelatedness
of different psychological processes. His experimental studies represented a significant
development of studies on conscious processes and human conduct initiated in the
Wurzburg school and various Gestaltist directions and contributed to a better understanding
of the holistic nature of the human’s mental system, making it obvious that reductionist
(atomistic, vitalist, or mechanistic) approaches lack validity. He also attempted to explain
intersituational differences in human conduct.
Uznadze’s main goal was to check if the psychological set influences human conduct.
Under human behavior, he implied not only externally observable actions but also internal
mental activities. So, “behavior” is not meant in a behavioristic sense but rather as a human
activity or conduct.3 To answer his question, he designed an experimental situation where he
provoked the formation of a particular set and then checked if it made an impact on the out-
come, which is behavior. According to his model, the coincidence of internal need/drive and
situation serves as the independent variable that is mediated by the psychological set and
results in the behavior that comes to be an independent variable.4 So, he was creating a
need accompanied by a situation that would allow the formation of a psychological set
and was checking the outcome in the form of the research subjects’ responses.
The most classic form of Uznadze’s experiment involved the following procedure5: A per-
son was temporarily “blinded” in order not to see the real size of the balls s/he was given for
evaluation. At the preparatory stage, the research subject was repeatedly given a very heavy
ball in the right hand, whereas a very light ball was given in the left hand. Research subjects
were asked each time if any of the balls were heavier or if they were equal. Following
Uznadze’s scheme, this repetitive procedure (giving heavy and light balls in right and left
hands, respectively) could be operationalized as an independent variable in contemporary
terms that was expected to induce a particular psychological set (mediation variable) into
the research subjects that would influence their perception (dependent variable).
At the experimental stage, Uznadze was handing balls having an equal weight in both
hands to the research subjects and was asking the same question if those balls were different
(if one of them was heavier or lighter) or similar in their weight/volume. If research subjects
would have been free from experimentally induced psychological “set,” then they would
2
Gantskoba in the Georgian language signifies a hyper-generalized cognitive–emotional state involving willing-
ness, desire, anticipation, and a tendency to take a particular action in a particular situation. It involves cognitive and
affective components, which were considered indissoluble by Uznadze.
3
In the Georgian language, there is one word signifying both conduct and behavior.
4
I am using modern terminology to make Uznadze’s data and ideas more understandable; however, he never
explicitly used concepts like “independent or dependent variables.”
5
The style of reporting of data from experiments was less thorough by the 1920–1930s, and so I am able to pro-
vide only main results and deductions; however, will not consider statistical numbers standing behind them.
144 GAMSAKHURDIA
have measured stimuli properly and would have answered that the balls have the same
weight/volume. However, if the repetitive experience of getting significantly different
weighted balls in different hands conditioned a specific psychological “set” then research
subjects’ evaluation of similar balls would be distorted. Experiment results confirmed
Uznadze’s hypothesis and showed that most subjects were indeed under the influence of a
psychological set induced by repetitive preparatory stimulation and answered that the ball
in their right hand was significantly lighter than the one they got in the other hand, whereas,
in fact, both balls were exactly the same. Thus, Uznadze deduced that the psychological “set”
leads to a haptic illusion. He also conducted experiments with a similar scheme for all other
modalities of sensation (haptic, visual, and audio) and also about various characteristics like
volume, pressure, light, and perception of quantitative relations. All of his experiments pro-
vided similar results, consolidating his general deductions about the mediational power of
the psychological set.
I assume Uznadze’s set could remind us of the phenomenon of apperception; however,
the former is considered by his author to be a much broader and more general psychological
process than the latter. The psychological set that involves apperception, however, is not lim-
ited only by perceptive processes or by one modality of sensation. The set is conceived as a
holistic phenomenon that encompasses, drives, and directs the whole body and mind in their
totality. It irradiates, spreads, and generalizes from one modality of mental processes to oth-
ers simultaneously, revealing the systemic interconnectedness of the whole multilayered
psyche. Uznadze checked and proved that the psychological set induced by one modality
would influence perception in another modality. For example, if the preparatory stage was
conducted by showing research subjects two different balls repetitively and afterward, asking
them to shut their eyes and evaluate given balls of equal size and weight in their hands, then
their perception of weight and size would also be illusionary in the same manner as it hap-
pens when the whole experiment is conducted in one modality (e.g., haptic). The psycholog-
ical set reveals itself in human conduct, whereas apperception is largely a perceptive process.
Considering the Meaning of Uznadze’s Experiments
The explanation of illusions by psychological “set” seems confusing, as the question
remains why people have such a specific and universal illusion after the sequence of partic-
ular stimuli. I assume that the statement that illusion is conditioned by a “set” sounds self-
explanatory unless defined as what is exactly implied under the mechanism of the formation
of a particular “set.” For further elaboration, it would be useful to consider mental dynamics
evolving throughout Uznadze’s experiment in detail and contemplate our own thought
experiment to track the foundation of the psychological “set.”
If we interpret the results of Uznadze’s experiments from a different angle, then we can
assume that after repetitively getting a heavier ball in the right hand, the new ball was per-
ceived as lighter than it actually was because it did not meet expectations. Whereas after
repetitively getting a lighter ball in the left hand, the new ball was perceived as heavier
than it actually was in that hand because it exceeded expectations. However, as we know,
in fact, the balls given in both hands were similar and had the same weight. According to
Müller-Freienfels (1923), the experience of getting balls of a particular weight in a particular
hand created specific expectations and arousal of a certain level of mental and muscle tension
to be able to take a ball of particular characteristics (weight). A research subject, if s/he repet-
itively gets the very heavy ball in the right hand, expects that the next ball that will be given
will also be very heavy and prepares herself accordingly, physically. So, the frustration of
those expectations leads to certain distortions and exaggerative evaluations toward perceiv-
ing an object as lighter than it actually is if a person expected a heavy ball. The opposite sort
of distortion happens if a person gets a bit heavier than expected—then it gets perceived as
even heavier than it actually is.
Uznadze rejected Muller’s theory of muscular/motor tensional dynamics by showing
that illusions induced by set appear not only when muscles need to be physically tense
due to previous stimulation but even when they are not involved at all—for example, in
audio or visual modalities. Also, he conducted experiments on mixed illusions—weight
and volume—and showed that research subjects falsely regard lighter balls as bigger in vol-
ume than more heavy balls that could not be explained by “the levels of motor tension.”
Moreover, according to Uznadze, Muller’s theory could not explain the intermodal general-
ization of illusions (Uznadze, 1947).
However, maybe human perception and conduct are defined not so much by “motor ten-
sion” but mainly by “mental tension,” which is formed based on past experiences and,
respectively, future expectations. Human perception and emotional reactions are caused
by the fulfillment of expectations or frustrations. Probably when a subject expects a heavy
ball, mental tension is fueled by relevant expectations, and muscles in his hand might be
tenser, and when it gets the frustratingly lighter ball, it gets perceived as even lighter than
it would have been perceived if muscles based on mental expectations would have been rel-
atively more relaxed. In the opposite case, when a research subject expects a lighter ball, his
muscles are relaxed, and when the ball appears to be heavier than expected, it causes addi-
tional psychological and physical stress that leads to a distorted perception (the ball gets per-
ceived as heavier than it actually is). Besides, when these two processes are going in parallel
in different hands, they are interrelated and compared in the mind, consolidating the above-
discussed dynamics of expectation ,. frustration. As a result, the research subject makes
“mistakes” and assumes that one ball is heavier than another, whereas they are analogous.
Uznadze rejected the significance of expectations, stating that people form illusionary per-
ceptions even after posthypnotic amnesia when the set is induced unconsciously. While reject-
ing the role of expectations, he regarded them as purely conscious phenomena, and in that, I
cannot agree with him assuming that people might have particular expectations and intentions
that are not always accessible consciously (see Pier Janet’s famous studies on hypnotic sug-
gestion). Uzndaze’s downplaying of expectations due to regarding them as (only) conscious
processes is confusing. If we ignore expectations, it is not clear at all what is set based on
them. Does not “need,” which Uznadze regarded as indispensable for any kind of human con-
duct, lead to the formation of expectations (of pleasure or/and ceasing displeasure) and inten-
tions unconsciously?
Types of Illusions and the Role of Expectations
Uznadze’s another argument against the role of expectations concerns different types of
illusions. He distinguished contrast and assimilative illusions that appear at the experimental
stage of the set experiment. Contrast illusion implies that research subjects perceive the ball
in the right hand as larger than in the left hand, whereas assimilative illusion implies that it
is perceived as lighter or smaller than the one that is given in the left hand. However, in
fact, they are of equal size and volume (at the experimental stage) in both cases. Uznadze states
that expectations cannot explain why some people get contrast illusions while others have
assimilative illusions. I must admit that a complete answer to that could not be given in this
article based on laboratory data provided by Uznadze and his associates, as further additional
experimentation is needed. However, I would note that Uznadze ignored the real-
lifeexperiences of his research subjects that were obtained before their entrance into the labo-
ratory, which could be the reason for such differences. Moreover, it would be interesting to ask
research subjects about their interpretations and explanations of their illusions, which would
146 GAMSAKHURDIA
have given a key to this question (Uznadze did not provide data on that). Therefore, I assume
that research subjects’ personal experiences, intentions, and expectations and their perception
of the laboratory context might have played a role in forming either contrast or assimilative
illusions; however, for a final answer, additional studies are needed.
Furthermore, Uznadze assumes that the research subject, after repetitively getting a
ball of a certain volume or weight in his hands, constructs a certain need to get a similar
size of the ball (and, therefore, set) that seems vague. It is unclear to me why he defined
expectation as a need. I assume that the only need that is seen in his imaginative experi-
ments is people’s aspiration to know and predict upcoming developments—to reduce
uncertainty and master or control the situation. Research subjects try to anticipate the
size, weight, and volume of the ball to prepare for its appearance and to be able to control
it. So, the perception of the actual characteristics of the ball is dependent on the intuitive
prediction that people make as the actual sensation (sensory material) gets compared to it
before it gets perceived. I assume that the subjectivity of human perception and thinking/
judgment gets formed and is “dependent” exactly on the continuous and largely precon-
scious comparison of intuitive expectations, desires/needs, and actual sensory materials
that they obtain.
Interestingly, the significance of “expectations” for meaning-making has been com-
mon knowledge for a long time in marketing research and management (Kotler et al.,
2021). It has been known that the higher the expectations, the higher the probability of get-
ting frustrated concerning the business product and being overwhelmed by negative emo-
tions, whereas when expectations are low, even very little advancement may make a person
happy.
Furthermore, people not only have “set” or expectations of doing something (or not
doing) but also anticipate the possible consequences of their (possible) activities that set
standards in relation (and comparison) to which their emotional reaction is being constructed
upon acting (or not acting) on something. So, expectations and predictions play a significant
role in the process of sense-making for any experience, be it a physical sensation or a mean-
ingful act like getting married or buying a particular object brand.
Thus, the psychological “set” should not be considered as a separate mediational
variable, but rather the systematically organized dynamic process that is being con-
structed continuously. It is based not only on actual needs and the current situational
environment but also on an individual’s past experiences, anticipated developments,
and goals related to the features of the relevant object (and its context) that are per-
ceived and mediated.
Distinct Higher Mental Form of the Set—Objectification
Notably, Uznadze (1940) recognized that a psychological set might not always be auto-
matically realized due to external constraints. However, in such cases, people do not always
get stuck but rather attempt to identify an issue and think of ways to overcome obstacles.
Uznadze assumed that in such nonstandard situations, the reflective, higher mental process
of theoretical thinking gets initiated, which he signified as objectification (Uznadze, 1947).
Objectification gets activated when environmental conditions change and people need to
reflect on it (Prangishvili, 1968). The latter comes to be perceived as a higher-level form
of “set”6 while the lower-level set is represented as an impulsive automatic mechanism lead-
ing to spontaneous human conduct. However, the relationship between these two levels of
mental functioning was left without proper elaboration.
6
In some texts, objectification is represented as a separate phenomenon distinct from “set.”
Objectification was considered as a mechanism allowing human “will” based on reflec-

tion and was regarded as a purely human phenomenon unavailable to other animals.
Subsequently, Nadirashvili (2014) distinguished three levels of human activity: impulsive,
theoretical, and will-based. The latter two are related to objectification. However, as
Imedadze stated (2009), objectification remained a very vague and unclear concept, the
meaning of which is quite controversial. It could involve processes of reflection and identi-
fication and distancing from the point of reference (an object in a situation and an obstacle on
the way to it) in the concrete situation in an attempt to find ways of realizing the set.
I assume Uznadze’s objectification due to its emphasis on theoretical thinking is similar
to Vygotsky’s mediation; however, the fact that Uznadze’s conception does not imply the
possibility of imagination, innovation, and invention of new objects and meanings beyond
existing needs makes it confusing and even reductionistic. I assume that the concept of
objectification (and, so, the idea of a higher level of set) could be relevant for contemporary
psychology only if it links it to the idea of culturally coordinated intentional higher mental
dynamics. Besides, if objectification arises only when there are constraints, then creative
innovations and insights should have been nonexistent that does not seem to be true. Or if
we look at the latter matter from a broader perspective, there is no situation or context that
could be free of any constraints, and in that case, all actions should require objectification,
which is neither true nor false. It seems obvious that Uznadze’s understanding of objectifi-
cation requires further elaboration in a broader theoretical context than just his set theory. I
will consider the possibility of a more developmental and systemic representation of the
“set” later in this article.
Fixed “Set” and Its Implications
Uznadze found that once a “set” is constructed, it persists for a certain time. Fixed sets
lead to similar perceptions and conduct in similar situations (if a person has a certain need) in
the presence of a similar stimulus. A certain “set” gets formed after experimentation repet-
itively provides the same stimulus on average 10–15 times. The repetition of a particular
experimental scenario or situation is necessary for the “set’s” maintenance after its forma-
tion; otherwise, illusions associated with the “set” gradually disappear if the scenario or sit-
uation that caused its formation is not repeated anymore (occasionally and repetitively).
Consequently, in the frame of Uznadze’s experiments, if at the experimental or critical
stage balls having equal weight or volume are provided several times, then the illusion that
makes people perceive them as different gradually fades and research subjects begin to per-
ceive those balls as similar (as they are in fact). So, eventually, after providing similar-
weighed balls several times, research subjects realize that those balls have similar weights
as the illusionary set gradually disappears. So, illusionary perception induced by the “set”
persists only in case of repetition of the situational (“misleading”) stimuli—by tediously pro-
viding a significantly bigger ball in one hand while a smaller one in another.
Uznadze does not clearly distinguish the meanings of “need” and “expectations.” He
bases all his “functionalist” arguments on the assumption that people are simply driven
by their needs and did not elaborate much on “expectations.” So, Uznadze assumes that
after getting a heavier ball in the right hand and a lighter in the left one, people construct
the need and so the “set” to get a heavier ball in the right hand and a lighter in the left
one again and again. The latter assumption seems illogical, as it is incomprehensible why
people need to get the same set of balls repeatedly. On the contrary, it could be expected
that repetitive routines might get them bored, which would have led to the appearance of
a need and even expectation (if higher mental functions are involved) for novelty (different
sets of balls).
148 GAMSAKHURDIA
Furthermore, needs do not exist separately from other mental phenomena. It would be
more accurate to assume that expectations are formed based on past experiences and present
needs and that people prepare themselves for anticipated (a particular set of balls) and desired
developments accordingly to adapt. One of the fundamental driving necessities underlying
other needs is to orient oneself through time and space by understanding and making sense
of experiences and ongoing developments.
Cultural Institutions as a Fixed Set

Additionally, I assume we can draw parallels between fixed psychological “set” and cul-
tural institutions (i.e., religion, various traditions) that maintain or induce loyalty and beliefs
among their followers by regularly involving them in various practices and providing partic-
ular social suggestions. Many people follow certain sociocultural “sets” without conscious
reflection on them, as long as they are repetitively stimulated by participation in certain rit-
ualistic practices. Change in irrational or rational “sets” requires the breaking of the repetitive
pattern.
“Set” Is a Holistic and Unconscious Process

The fundamental contribution made by Uznadze’s experiment is the provision of
experimental proof that mental processes of different modalities are systematically
related. His interest in unconscious mental processes was inspired by Leibniz’s idea of
petite perceptions, and along with Janet’s (and other French scholars studying hypnosis)
and Freud’s materials, Uznadze’s experiments provide significant information on un-
conscious processes. He showed that the “set” created in one modality reveals itself in
other modalities too, without people’s ability to reflect on it. For example, if a research
subject is repetitively given balls with different volumes in the right and left hands that
are followed by the formation of an illusionary “set” (as discussed above), then it will
spread to other modalities of sensation or perception as well (e.g., vision). At the critical
stage of the experiment, instead of giving research subjects similar balls in their hands,
the experimenter was asking them to look at and evaluate or compare the volume of those
balls. They were still susceptible to the illusionary psychological set and perceived them
as different in a similar way as it was happening when getting balls in their hands. So,
haptic illusion gets generalized over optical perception and any other modalities. As
well as optical illusion, it spreads over haptic and other modalities. The irradiation7
(Adamashvili, 1940) of illusion happens unconsciously without conscious control or
elaboration.
Moreover, Uznadze successfully induced a psychological set even when research sub-
jects were in a hypnotic state and were not able to remember the process of experimental con-
ditioning. Namely, Uznadze put research subjects into a hypnotic stage and gave them balls
of different volumes in their hands several times in a procedure similar to what was described
above. He instructed them to forget the procedure after waking up. Uznadze gave them balls
of equal size when they were awake again and consciously unaware of the experimental pro-
cedure that they went through when they were in the hypnotic stage. Uznadze reports that
psychological set and illusionary perception were formed even during the unconscious hyp-
notic stage and persisted after waking up (Uznadze, 1966). Subconsciously fixed psycholog-
ical set led to perceptive illusions that showed that it is fundamentally beyond conscious
control.
7
Irradiation is the concept used by Uznadze himself.
Interestingly, unlike Freud, Uznadze8 signified mental layers beyond consciousness as

subconscious instead of “signifying is as un” or “nonconsciousness” to avoid its negativistic
definition. Contrasting Freud, Uznadze assumed that the subconscious is not a separate com-
ponent with its own ontology and processuallity, but rather a dynamic part of an indivisible
holistic mental system. He highlighted that the subconscious cannot exist without conscious-
ness and disagreed with Freud, who regarded consciousness as a secondary phenomenon
and unconscious drives and instinctual drives as the primary base of mental energy
(Imedadze, 2019; Uznadze, 2004).
Thus, Uznadze highlights that the psychological “set” works subconsciously, yet it is not
localized in conscious or unconscious areas but instead is a holistic phenomenon that
involves and influences the whole (conscious and subconscious) biological and mental sys-
tem of the subject. According to Prangishvili (1968), the end goal of the action is given in the
subconscious psychological set; however, it is not conscious. Moreover, mental processes
formed in one modality are qualitatively connected to all other mental and relevant physio-
logical processes unconsciously. That connection is systemic, not directly causal.
Interestingly, Imedadze (2013) indicates that Uznadze’s unconscious is oriented toward
adaptation to the environment and survival, whereas Freud’s unconscious (mainly, ID is
implied in this case) is oriented toward pleasure. However, that argument seems really doubt-
ful, as survival eventually leads to pleasure, and people might also conduct self-destructive
actions.
The only clear agreement Freud and Uznadze had on the understanding of the indirect
representation of suppressed desires. Uznadze, similarly to Freud, thought that day-dreams
or might-dreams were both the result of the nonrealized psychological set (Uznadze, 2004).
However, if we do not distinguish different aspects of mental dynamics, like expecta-
tions, personal or subjective sense of experience, and intentionality, “set” remains an exces-
sively general, abstract, and unclear concept. We will consider the latter challenge later in
this article through my attempt to further elaborate on the psychological set.
Differential Aspects of “Set”

Uznadze elaborated on the typology of human characters based on their susceptibility to
set formation and the dynamics of its maintenance. He showed that people differ in how eas-
ily they are predisposed to the formation of the psychological “set.” According to his exper-
iments, for some research subjects, just a few (2–3) repetitive expositions of a particular set
of balls are enough for the formation of the illusionary psychological “set,” whereas for
some other subjects, even 10–15 repetitions are not enough for the same purpose as they
are much less susceptible to external conditioning.
Besides, Uznadze indicated that certain illusions are static and so last for a longer time,
whereas some other “sets” are dynamic and disappear easily.
8
Differences between Uznadze’s and Freud’s conceptions of unconsciousness are at the core of the psycholog-
ical set theory and remain in focus even after the death of Uznadze. The huge international scientific conference on
“unconsciousness” was held in 1979 in Tbilisi, Georgia, and probably remains one of the grandest events in the
history of unconscious psychology. As a result of that conference, there were three volumes (the fourth volume
was also published later) and many articles commenting on the discussions held there. The complete and compre-
hensive consideration of the conference, which covered topics from neurophysiology to philosophy of the uncon-
scious, goes beyond the goals and scope of this article, as we are mainly concentrated on Uznadze’s works, not the
history of Georgian psychology or unconsciousness in its many forms. The comprehensive analysis of that confer-
ence would require a book-size publication. So, I concisely provide the main lines of this discussion and provide
relevant references to our discussion when appropriate.
150 GAMSAKHURDIA
However, his account is descriptive and does not explain why such different sorts of set-
formation dispositions exist among different people and what conditions them. It is required
to conduct further experiments to answer these questions. Yet, coming from a cultural psy-
chological stance, I assume that the meaning and personal sense of a particular stimulus
(experience or object), as well as the expectations and intentions of a particular subject
and his/her interpretation of the experimental setting, might be playing catalytic roles in
the formation and maintenance (or disappearance) of particular psychological “sets.”
Considering Uznadze’s “Set” in Relation to the Concept of Intentionality

Uznadze’s views are essentially functionalist, as he assumes that any action serves the
fulfillment of a particular need, and so people act intentionally. Uznadze assumes that
healthy mental activity is always rational. According to Uznadze, the rational psychological
“set” (“Gantskoba” in Georgian) is what drives human actions.9 If there is not a set caused by
needs and appropriate situations, then there will not be any activity by humans. Set aims and
leads to the fulfillment of a particular goal; it is always about and oriented toward something.
I assume Uznadze’s model resonates well with Brentano’s classic representation of inten-
tionality and the more contemporary version—“intentional stance”—of Daniel Dennet.
These approaches have a similar focus but also have certain conceptual differences that
need to be addressed.
Dennet has in common with Uznadze the representation of humans as very rational enti-
ties, yet the former offers a more sophisticated view of intentionality coming from a cogni-
tivist perspective. Daniel Dennet’s differentiation of levels of abstraction of cognitive
functions could be reconciled with Uznadze’s two levels of the psychological set.
Namely, Dennet’s structural (biological) and design stances imply lower-level abstraction
oriented on the prediction of biological or simpler automatic actions that could be regarded
as a similar process as a lower psychological set of Uznadze, which do not need a higher
level of (self)reflection. Uznadze’s objectification involves higher mental abstraction and
reflection and has a meaning or function similar to Dennet’s intentional stance (Dennet,
1987).
According to Dennet, inspired by Brentano, human behavior is always about something
and is driven by an “intentional stance,” which includes beliefs, desires, and intentions. The
main difference between Uznadze’s and Dennet’s approaches is that the former considers
situational affordances and constraints yet ignores the significance of beliefs, whereas the
latter downplays situational factors. Besides, Uznadze’s set is more holistic and implies
the involvement of affection in the psychological set, whereas Dennet’s intentional stance
is completely rational and free of feelings. A psychological set based on objectification is
subjective, whereas Dennet’s intentional stance is structurally patterned and lacks the reflec-
tion of subjectivity.
Intentional stance relies on the ascription of beliefs, desires, intentions and, more broadly, mental
states to a system, in order to explain and predict its behavior…. (Dennet, 1987, p. 17)
I assume that both of those authors’ main issue is that they consider people to be exces-
sively rational actors. Uznadze uses the concept of “functionality” instead of rationality,
but it has largely the same meaning—human conduct is always goal-oriented and is
about something (fulfilling a particular need in a particular situation). Human behavior
9
Uznadze separately distinguished reflexive reactions, which might appear without the mediation of the set. Such
reflexive reactions might be particular actions and also emotions (pleasure–displeasure).
always has a motivational foundation; however, it is not always straightforward.

Rationality is relative, as there could be various choices that could be seen as rational
simultaneously from different perspectives. For example, imagine Jana D’arque, who
had to make a choice to sacrifice herself for her country in the war or to choose to escape
or surrender and survive—both choices would be rational depending on from which per-
spective we look at them. Various options of behavior compete in people’s minds occa-
sionally. And, from that, optional behaviors will be chosen, the set of which will be
constructed and which will be imbued with stronger emotion.
Toward a Systemic Theory of Set (Gantskoba)

Uznadze’s biopsychological theory of “set” attempts to explain human behavior in a

holistic way, taking into consideration external and internal factors. He considers the
human psyche as an open system. The set theory went against its contemporary reduction-
istic theoretical approaches in the first half of the 20th century. Uznadze (1940) criticized the
behavioristic spirit and excessive vitalism/mentalism, which were dominant in his time, as he
aimed at the elaboration of holistic theory. According to the set theory, the human organism,
including body and soul, acts as a unified holistic entity influenced but not defined by situa-
tional factors.10 Gantskoba for a particular action appears only if situational influence and
internal need match each other. For example, Gantskoba (set) to eat an apple appears only
if a person is hungry and an apple is available in the surrounding situation.
Notably, the set is not the same as an attitude, as the latter is narrower in meaning and
implies only emotional relation, whereas the former signifies organisms’ holistic and inten-
tional tendency toward action to fulfill a certain goal in a particular situation. Attitude is an
individual’s emotional relation to the object; a person either has a positive or negative stance
toward something. However, a psychological set is not only a positive or negative evaluation
of the object/situation but implies striving to fulfill a particular task and serves as a media-
tional factor/variable between external and internal factors. Attitude shows that “I like (or
dislike) something” or “it would be nice to do something” whereas the psychological set
in Uznadze’s sense would imply a sense of “I am willing, have the desire, and strive to fulfill
a particular task.” Gantskoba also involves a particular cognitive anticipation of what is to be
done. A psychological “set” drives people toward a particular action (Uznadze, 1940).
Most importantly, according to Uznadze (1940), the psychological set influences and
involves not only externally observable behavior but all mental functions, including higher
and lower-level processes. He was particularly interested in identifying the influence the set
has on people’s perceptions and conducting imaginative experiments. Uznadze’s experi-
mental studies were chiefly concentrated on the exploration of the set’s influence on sensa-
tion and various types of illusions.
However, the psychological set is neither purely internal nor externally induced, but
rather appears at the intersection of both factors. Uznadze highlighted the significance of
internal needs, which he considered a basic requirement and basis for any action to happen.
When people act, they are always oriented toward the satisfaction of their particular needs.
He distinguishes between biological (food, water, mating) and social needs, which are both
regarded as significant. He also specifically distinguished the human sense of morality that
also becomes a need in human society, distinguishing it from other creatures or groups who
10
Dimitri Uznadze’s theory is somehow similar to his contemporary prominent scholar Fredrik Bartlet’s organ-
ismic approach, which also emphasized the systemic unity of individuals and their environment. Uznadze was aware
of Bartlet’s work on remembering and cited him; however, Bartlet seemingly had no information on Uznadze’s
works.
152 GAMSAKHURDIA
are free from normativity. Among people, biological needs might be overdriven by moral
needs. For example, even a very hungry man might restrain himself from stealing food
because of moral principles. However, internal or internalized bio-socio-cultural needs are
not sufficient for the formation of the psychological set as it requires additional conditions
to be present (Uznadze, 1966).
Uznadze highlights the significance of the situational context. He assumes that the psy-
chological set appears only in cases where the situation allows the fulfillment of the need.
For example, if a person is hungry, the urge to eat will only appear if there is food available
for him/her in the immediate context. If the situation does not allow the fulfillment of the
need, then the appropriate psychological set will not be formed (Uznadze, 1966). For exam-
ple, if a person is in a desert without any realistic prospect of getting food, he will not have
food to eat, even if s/he is very hungry. So, the psychological set should not be confused with
“needs,” as its appearance is dependent on the affordances of the surrounding environment.
Consequently, according to Uznadze’s theory, psychological “set” for a particular action
appears if a person has a particular need only when the situation allows them to fulfill it. The
psychological “set” seems to be a very happy occurrence. However, such an assumption
seems narrow and reductionistic, and instead of offering a systemic view, it neglects various
capabilities that humans possess. Firstly, it denies human agency that might allow them to
change their environment, which does not allow them to fulfill their needs in a way that
will/would let them satisfy their needs. Once upon a time, people did not know how to har-
vest crops or wine; however, they managed to do so by learning how to transform their
environment.
The whole evolutionary history of the cultivation of various cultures is an example that
demonstrates that people do not always accept their environments as they are. Humans act
not only when their environment is convenient for the fulfillment of their needs but also some-
times behave against all odds to overcome obstacles and fulfill their aspirations. People can
construct their situations. So, situational constraints could be considered significant factors par-
ticipating in the formation of the psychological set; however, they cannot block it.
Interestingly, as humans act on and modify their environments, it influences their self-
structures and may lead to the formation of new sorts of needs. The development of horti-
culture influenced the forms of subsistence and social structure and led to the formation
of sedentary forms of social organization, making bread one of the main foods. Even though
the latter was not the most healthy and rational choice (Harari, 2015). Agentivity of humans
allows them to transform their environment and sometimes leads to unplanned results that, in
return, modify individuals’ self-structures.
Furthermore, a situation might provoke the appearance of a particular desire, even if a
person does not have a great need for it at a certain moment. For example, it would be obvi-
ous to expect that even if a person is or feels full, they still might get psychologically set to eat
something more or something else if they see a tasty dish. People sometimes cannot stop
themselves while eating desserts (cakes, tarts, chocolate, ice cream, etc.), even when it
becomes dangerous for their health and they do not have an internal (rational) need to eat.
Probably we should distinguish need as a biological necessity from desire, which is a
“wish” for more things that are not necessary but still bring pleasure. Besides, people are
constantly having a plurality of competing needs and desires, and in such cases, it is unclear
whether need could become the basis for Gantskoba. Besides, it is not always the rational
choice that is followeds as it was discussed above.
Moreover, it is the distinctive feature of human beings, who unlike other animals, might not
stop doing something even when their needs are satisfied. As Baldwin indicated, people tend to
“try, try and try even more” even without reinforcement (Baldwin, 2011; Gamsakhurdia, 2022;
Valsiner, 2009). The constant striving for meaning-making and pleasure is what has been driv-
ing human evolution against much stronger creatures.
Therefore, Uznadze, while seeking the construction of a systemic theoretical approach,
actually disregarded the power of humans’ agentic operant and constructive higher mental
activity on the one hand, and on the other, he downplayed the role of social suggestions
and situational influence. As a result, the psychological set (Gantskoba) comes to be con-
structed through the process of the mechanical equation of the coincidence of external
and internal factors that conceptually disregards qualitative and phenomenological subtleties
of each particular situation and the complexity of human needs. I assume it is not always
obvious if the situation allows the fulfillment of particular needs, as it all depends on how
people interpret the situation. Situations as well as human interpretations are often ambigu-
ous. So, humans’ own feelings concerning their surrounding context might be equivocal, as
well as their psychological set. I assume that the “strength” of the set (Gantskoba) could be
different based on humans’ needs and their affective relation to a particular social situation
that is characterized by certain sociocultural aspects.
Different Levels of the Set (Gantskoba) and the Hierarchy of Needs
Uznadze distinguished two levels of the psychological set—the first lower level of the set
appears when a person sees in the situation the opportunity to satisfy his own needs, and this
process gets consciously represented. Animals always act on the set constructed based on the
actual situation—if a lion is hungry and sees a huntable prey, then it will not have any doubts;
it will have a straightforward psychological set to capture its target and will behave accord-
ingly. However, people do not always act in the same manner as other animals, as they have
not only biological but also “sociocultural needs.” Humans, unlike lions, might have differ-
ent and even contradictory needs at the same time. If fulfilling a certain need in a particular
situation contradicts another need, they compete with each other, and a person should decide
which of them to follow. It is not always easy to define which need may prevail in a particular
situation, as it depends on biological necessity and sociocultural regulation, which some-
times might get into conflict.
Notably, it has been long known that there is a general need that underlies all human
actions oriented toward pleasure and avoidance of displeasure. All other needs eventually
lead to pleasure and displeasure. However, even that basic need is not a universal motiva-
tor. People sometimes behave in a way that brings displeasure and even biological or psy-
chological pain. Self-sacrifice in the name of religion, homeland, or to rescue one’s own
family may be painful and even fatal. Heroic behavior is rare; however, sometimes people
deliberately self-sacrifice even when they know that they will suffer a lot. For example,
some hostages or prisoners refuse to give up secrets to their enemies, even when they
undergo torture. So, there is something beyond individual functionalist rationality that
has regulatory power over personal needs. Cultural guidance plays a significant role in
the process of building a psychological set for various groups of people. People represent-
ing different cultures might have different psychological sets in the same situation, even
when they have similar needs.
So, Uznadze (1940) assumes that moral needs may overrule those psychological sets that
are oriented toward the fulfillment of certain needs. For example, people would not steal food
because it is immoral. He assumes that people imagine that they steal food, and that will be
enough to satisfy the psychological set. So he equates imaginative and symbolic experiences
with real phenomenological phenomena. However, he did not explain (at least explicitly)
why certain needs become more important and morally proper than others. I assume that
the significance of a particular need gets defined based on past experiences and future
154 GAMSAKHURDIA
expectations in relation to the fact that each person defines their own priorities in each par-
ticular situation, catalytically influenced by sociocultural context.
Coming from the perspective of cultural psychology of semiotic dynamics, I assume
that it is the meaning/valuation of the situation and the needs that play a decisive role in
the construction of the psychological set. Each situation and possible action represent
signs that have a particular meaning. The process of meaning-making of those signs is con-
structed under the guidance of cultural values that are hierarchically organized throughout
historical development. Therefore, the psychological set is culturally guided, encouraged,
or suppressed based on its valuation.
To illustrate this view, Valsiner (2014) modified Maslow’s famous Piramide to indicate
that the hierarchy of different needs and desires is not fixed as they continuously “compete”
with each other. In a particular situation, any of the needs can suppress another and obtain a
dominant position if inspired/suggested by cultural or internal factors (by the force of its
meaning). The power of a particular need is defined by the socioculturally guided meaning
that is assigned to its fulfillment and the actions that are necessary for its fulfillment. Based
on the emotionally charged meaning of a possibility of action, it creates Ganstkoba (set) to
realize or not to realize it. Thus, of utmost importance, I assume that Gantskoba (set) might
be a driver of not only a particular action but also of nonaction (so, to suppress it).
Cultural regulation and the significance of meaning-making for the construction of
“action” or “nonaction” are most vividly revealed in nonrational actions that people take
despite taking the risk for their own physical survival. For example, some people who
were captured as war hostages deny sharing confidences about their compatriots despite tor-
ture and threats to their lives because they see value in preserving their natives’ safety and
have Gantkoba not reveal their secrets, going against their instinct for survival while serving
the higher cultural goal of loyalty to their symbolic groupness (homeland, friendship, etc.).
Thus, it is possible to distinguish the second level of needs that are historically con-
structed and socioculturally nurtured (Uznadze, 1940). These needs are related to morality
and define social constraints on immoral activities even if they may fulfill biological
needs—a la Freudian super-ego. However, for Uznadze, negotiations of various needs
occur consciously and deliberately. Uznadze assumes that when a person has a psycholog-
ical set based on an actual situation, he may not fulfill it if another suppressing set appears
based on sociocultural suggestions. According to the theory of psychological set, the sup-
pression of the biological-need-related set turns out to be possible as the act of its fulfillment
gets contemplated imaginatively, bringing a sense of its realization.
Certain needs are opposed to each other… The satisfaction of one might be aimed at the detriment
of the other…. For example, next to the normal biological needs of a person, s/he also has moral
or aesthetic needs. It is often the case that these Needs conflict with each other. For example,
maybe one biological impulse of need might attract us to such behavior, that goes against
moral imperatives—say, a hungry person easily would satisfy his need if he allowed himself
to steal forcefully appropriate his comrade’s bounty. But let’s say that this behavior is completely
incompatible with his morals. What will be the result of such a situation? Of course, a hungry
person would not obey the impulse to grab someone else’s portion and, thus, he will abandon
Gantkoba to obtain other people’s property. (Uznadze, 1940, p. 74)
Or imagine another example: even a very hungry person from Western Europe would not
have a set to eat the flesh of a dog, as it is prohibited by most European cultures—they
might even feel disgusted even after the verbal mention of such an idea. Whereas some
Korean or Chinese people might have a joyful “set” to eat the meat of the dog if they see
it when they are hungry.
Furthermore, cultural regulation might lead to the encouragement of actions that a par-
ticular person does not have set to carry out. For example, a specific person who does not
need to kill somebody might still form set to kill somebody if the sociocultural system sug-
gests doing so. Throughout history, people eagerly sacrificed animals and others without a
clear need for that, just because they imagined that need—so imaginary needs are as impor-
tant as real necessities. Even a pacifist might form a set for murder during the war in light of
the emotional propaganda from political elites or due to the instinct of survival. I assume a
psychological set for action appears not only when there is a preexistent biological or psy-
chological need, but also when that need is induced by external cultural agents.
Therefore, an idiosyncratic “set” is part of a broader sociocultural process and is depen-
dent on the negotiation of the meaning of particular objects (symbols; experiences) that is
culturally coordinated and framed.
Subjectivity Versus Normative Sociocultural Schemes

Furthermore, each situation is unique, as is the person acting in that environment.
Therefore, despite being culturally guided, meaning-making and so, the process of the con-
struction of the psychological set is idiosyncratic. Each person in each particular situation
acts based on the interpretation of the value of the fulfillment of a particular need in the par-
ticular situation, anticipating how it will be perceived by others who are present there and
also other absentee significant people (including the general public and particular powerful
voices). The psychological set is constructed by the subject who has their own experience
and intentions in relation to the particular situation. It is created through continuous negoti-
ations with various voices/positions that are vocalized in his dialogical self-structure. The
latter process evolves unconsciously (Parjanadze, 2015).
So, the systemic nature of mental systems is revealed through culturally guided idiosyn-
cratic forms of meaning-making built through the bilateral relation of the self and his/her
environment; however, eventually, people are driven by subjective intentions and expecta-
tions that are culturally nurtured and coordinated (Brentano, 2005; Valsiner, 2014).
Considering the Role of Imagination

Interestingly, Uznadze assumes that the psychological set involves the reason and the
goal of the action simultaneously. The goal is defined by the need. A person aims to behave
in a way that will satisfy her needs. Following Kurt Levin, Uznadze states that a human is the
“subject of the need” (literal translation from Uznadze’s Georgian wording) who evaluates
the possibility of the fulfillment of own necessities in a particular situation (Lewin, 1926).
Lewin (1926) assumes that when a person has a particular need, objects that can fulfill
that need to obtain specific power may direct or determine human action. Uznadze agrees
with Lewin partially, recognizing that when a person has a particular need, appropriate exter-
nal objects that may help in the fulfillment of that need are influencing the formation of
human conduct, but not directly. Uznadze (1940) reiteratively highlights that external or
internal stimuli cannot determine human conduct unless they are mediated by the middle
factor—Gantskoba. The latter is a holistic phenomenon that gets formed through the inter-
action of external and internal stimuli.
The psychological set implies anticipation of the behavior and satisfaction of the need
until it is actually performed. A person might achieve the satisfaction of the fulfillment of
the need by imagining the act of fulfillment as if it were real. So, the psychological set grants
enormous importance to the imaginary processes that are conceived as “real” and equal to
phenomenological experiences in their meaning and significance.
156 GAMSAKHURDIA
However, if imagination is so powerful, how does it come that a person remains limited by
actual situational restrictions? It would make sense to assume that people can imaginatively
transform their situations based on their needs if they want to. Moreover, if it were easy to alle-
viate tension related to the satisfaction of needs by simply imagining the gratification of a cer-
tain need in a particular manner, then people’s lives would be much more convenient, and
there would probably be fewer conflicts all over the world. So, according to Uznadze, the psy-
chological set is constructed not in the subconscious but through rational reasoning.
Conclusions
This article considers Dimitri Uznadze’s figure and theory of psychological “set” from a
contemporary cultural psychological perspective. Uznadze is regarded as the founding father

of psychological science in Georgia, as he built the first psychological laboratory in the
South Caucasus and developed the original theory of psychological set. This article intro-
duces his ideas, which are broadly known in Georgia, Russia, and other post-Soviet coun-
tries, to other parts of the world where Uznadze’s theory is largely unknown. I attempt to
contribute to the reconsideration of the main features of the psychology of “set” in light
of contemporary developments in cultural psychology.
The theory of psychological “set” could be considered as a further elaboration and devel-
opment of Lewin’s topology and the Wurzburg school’s studies on holism of the human psy-
che, human consciousness, determining tendencies, and goal-orientedness, as it offers a more
systemic view proofed by experimental data. A psychological “set” is defined as a general psy-
chological process that holistically drives the whole body, mind, and behavior (Uznadze, 1940).
According to Uznadze, “set” is being constructed when a person has a particular need and the
situation allows them to fulfill it. It is constructed unconsciously; however, it reveals itself and is
felt consciously, inducing particular behavior in a particular situation. He highlights the signifi-
cance of emotions and the goal-orientedness of human behavior, defining them as the basis of
human conduct. “Need is emotional,” as Uznadze states (Imedadze, 2009).
Uznadze indicates the indissoluble connection of biological, cognitive, and emotional
processes that result in a particular behavior. The merit of Uznadze’s experiment on humans’
perceptive illusions is obvious as it reveals the systematically holistic nature of the human
mental system; however, the concept of “set” remains too general and requires further oper-
ationalization. The results of Uznadze’s experiments are reconsidered, and alternative inter-
pretations are elaborated on in this article.
Uznadze’s automatic mechanism of the “set” can explain mostly lower-level mental dynam-
ics that are culturally regulated but presubjective. A higher-level process of objectification that
gets initiated when a lower-level “set” cannot be realized remains reductionistic in Uznadze’s
representation, as he did not elaborate on the innovative/imaginary capabilities of the human
mind that can transform the surrounding environment. For further development of set theory,
it is suggested to consider the significance of not only the factor of cultural guidance but also
the decisive significance of subjective agentivity of people who are to creatively change their
environment even when the situation does not afford the fulfillment of a particular need.
Notably, the intention for a particular action can appear even without a preexisting need,
only as a result of external inducement. Also, needs might be induced by cultural encourage-
ment through meta-narratives or hypergeneralized signs, even when the situation is not
appropriate or even confronting. People are not always rational and may be driven by emo-
tionally charged cultural symbols and orienteers, even when they are harmful to them. I
argue that people are culturally guided but idiosyncratically agentic. External social sugges-
tions may provoke the appearance of new needs and a psychological “set” to fulfill them.
Besides, I argue that the role of expectations and intentions is instrumental in the forma-
tion of the psychological “set.” Certain psychological “set” could also appear for particular
action when people’s need is not satisfied. Frustration might be a strong catalytical factor for
the appearance of a “set” for aggressive action. A particular “set” is always part of the rela-
tional structure of experiences and expectations.
Thus, further thorough and more comprehensive theoretical and experimental studies
are needed for the advanced systemic conceptualization of the cultural foundations of the
idiosyncratic and subjective aspects of higher mental forms of objectification and psycho-
logical “set.”
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Received February 1, 2023

Revision received July 20, 2023
Accepted August 21, 2023 ▪
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History of Psychology

© 2023 American Psychological Association 2024, Vol. 27, No. 2, 139–158

Reconsidering the “Uznadze Effect” and Psychology of Set

Vladimer Lado Gamsakhurdia

Department of Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Ivane Javakhishvili

Tbilisi State University

Keywords: Uznadze, set, Gantskoba, semiotic cultural psychology

This article was published Online First November 13, 2023.

Interestingly, Uznadze, despite having a brilliant education in psychology, started

He focused on psychological experiments only after the establishment of a psychology

Roots of Uznadze’s Theory of Set

approach, attempting to elaborate holistic biopsychological theory. He was well aware of

Objectiﬁcation was considered as a mechanism allowing human “will” based on reﬂec-

Cultural Institutions as a Fixed Set

“Set” Is a Holistic and Unconscious Process

Interestingly, unlike Freud, Uznadze8 signiﬁed mental layers beyond consciousness as

Differential Aspects of “Set”

Considering Uznadze’s “Set” in Relation to the Concept of Intentionality

always has a motivational foundation; however, it is not always straightforward.

Toward a Systemic Theory of Set (Gantskoba)

Uznadze’s biopsychological theory of “set” attempts to explain human behavior in a

culturally coordinated and framed.

Subjectivity Versus Normative Sociocultural Schemes

Considering the Role of Imagination

contemporary cultural psychological perspective. Uznadze is regarded as the founding father

Uznadze, D. (2004). Sleep and dream. Favoriti (in Georgian).

Received February 1, 2023

E-Mail Notiﬁcation of Your Latest Issue Online!

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