Professional Documents
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Lecture 6 - E-Voting Around The World
Lecture 6 - E-Voting Around The World
Lecture 6 - E-Voting Around The World
g Democracyy
Lecture 6 | E‐Voting
g Around the World
J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
6.1 Case Studies Securing Digital Democracy
Case Studies
6.1 Case Studies Securing Digital Democracy
The Netherlands
6.1 Case Studies Securing Digital Democracy
Brazil
South Africa
I di
India
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
India’ss EVMs
India
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
US/Europe
S India
di
C
Complex
l machines
hi Si l machines
Simple hi
PC like design
PC‐like Embedded system
Research shows Also vulnerable,
vulnerable
vulnerable but in different ways
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
CLEAR
CLOSE BALLOT
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
Officials’
Officials Claims
Claims…
“tamperproof”
tamperproof
“perfect”
“infallible”
“no need for
technical improvement”
improvement
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
E‐book available at
http://www.indianevm.com/book.php
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.2 India’s EVMs Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
Tamperproof ?
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
Secret Software
ECI doesn
doesn’tt own source code
ECI has never seen the source code
Only “3‐4 guys” at the companies
“know what’s in the code”
Even ECI cannot verify the chips
contain original
g code
6.3 Tamperproof? Securing Digital Democracy
India’ss Response
India
6.4 India’s Response Securing Digital Democracy
6.4 India’s Response Securing Digital Democracy
6.4 India’s Response Securing Digital Democracy
6.4 India’s Response Securing Digital Democracy
6.4 India’s Response Securing Digital Democracy
6.4 India’s Response Securing Digital Democracy
6.4 India’s Response Securing Digital Democracy
J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan