Securing g Digital

g Democracyy
Lecture 9 | Using
g Technology
gy Wiselyy

J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
9.1 Criteria Securing Digital Democracy

Criteria
9.1 Criteria Securing Digital Democracy

Transparency
V
Voters can observe
b and
d understand
d t d theh process.

A fully transparent election system supports

accountability as well as public oversight,
comprehension and access to the entire process.

Definitions adopted from Joseph Lorenzo Hall

http://josephhall.org/papers/jhall‐phd.pdf
9.1 Criteria Securing Digital Democracy

Verifiability
Voters have
V h means to convince
i themselves
h l that
h theh
outcome is correct without having to blindly trust
the
h technology
h l or the
h election
l i authorities.
h ii
9.1 Criteria Securing Digital Democracy

Auditability
The system can be
Th b manually ll checked
h k d after
f theh
election to ensure that the votes have been counted
properly.
l
9.1 Criteria Securing Digital Democracy

Software Independence
A voting system is software
software‐independent
independent
if an undetected change or error in its
software cannot cause an undetectable
change or error in an election outcome.

See: Rivest and Wack, “On the Notion of Software Indepdence in Voting Systems”
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/RivestWack‐
OnTheNotionOfSoftwareIndependenceInVotingSystems.pdf
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Post‐Election Auditing
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Manual Recounts Wh t?
What? Wh ?
When? C t?
Cost?

Full slide photo:by Flickr user immortalpoet, http://www.flickr.com/photos/32628580@N07/3048811142/

Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‐ShareAlike 2.0 Generic license
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Redundant Records

AUDIT =?

Slow/expensive
Redundancyto tally failure modesFast/cheap
+ Different to tally
= Greater security
Verified by voter Unverified
But…Redundancy only helps if we use both records!
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Post‐‐Election Audits
Post

Pick some precincts randomly for paper recount.

Iff electronic
l tallies
ll disagree,
d recount everywhere.
h
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

How much to Audit?

Standard practice: Recommended practice:

Fixed Fraction Fixed Level of

of Precincts Confidence
((e.g.,
g , 10%)) ((e.g.,
g , 99
99%))
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Statistical Risk‐
Risk‐Limiting Audits

Establish, with high statistical confidence, that

hand co nting all of the paper records would
hand‐counting o ld
yield the same winner as the electronic tally.
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Audit Example
Alice: 55
55%
Bob: 45% Goal: Reject hypothesis that ≥ 5%
of ballots differ between
electronic and paper

For 95% confidence, hand‐audit 60 precincts

Cost: about $100,000
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

An Alternative Approach

Precinct‐based auditing
(standard practice)

Ballot‐based auditing
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

100 marbles, 10% blue 6300 beads, 10% blue

How large
l a sample
l ddo we need
d to d
detect an error?
Example due to Andrew Appel. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Audit Example
Alice: 55
55%
Bob: 45% Goal: Reject hypothesis that ≥ 5%
of ballots differ between
electronic and paper

ballots
For 95% confidence, hand‐audit 60 precincts
Cost: about $100,000
$1,000
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Why Not Ballot‐

Ballot‐based?
● Alice
○ Bob
325631 Alice 325631
218594 Bob
810581 Alice
○ Alice
● Bob
218594

● Alice
○ Bob
810581

Need to match up electronic with paper ballots.

Difficult without compromising the secret ballot!
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Machine‐‐Assisted Auditing
Machine
○ Alice ○ Alice
● Bob ● Bob
B b
1

1 Bob
B b
Alice: 510 2 Alice
Bob: 419 ...
929 Bob

Step 1. Check electronic

records against paper records =
using a recount machine.
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Machine‐‐Assisted Auditing
Machine
○ Alice ○ Alice
● Bob ● Bob
B b
1

1 Bob
B b
Alice: 510 2 Alice
Bob: 419 ...
929 Bob

=
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Machine‐‐Assisted Auditing
Machine
○ Alice
● Bob
○ Alice 321
● Bob
B b
1
● Alice
○ Bob =
1 Bob
b 716
2 Alice
... 321 Bob
716 Alice
929 Bob

Step 2. Audit the recount

machine by selecting random
ballots for human inspection.
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

Machine‐‐Assisted Auditing
Machine g
○ Alice
● Bob
○ Alice 321
○ Alice
● Bob ● Bob
1 ● Alice
○ Bob =
1 Bob 716
Alice: 510 2 Alice
... 321 Bob
Bob: 419 716 Alice
929 Bob

Machine Recount Manual Audit

We can use a machine without having to trust it!

9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

More Efficient Audits

2006 Virginia
g U.S. Senate race
0.3% margin of victory
We want 99% confidence

Precinct Machine
Based Assisted
# Ballots 1,141,900 2,339
# Precincts 1,252 1,351
See Calandrino, Halderman, and Felten, “Machine‐Assisted Election Auditing.” EVT 2007.
https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/audit‐evt07.pdf
9.2 Post‐Election Auditing Securing Digital Democracy

The Gold‐
Gold‐Medal Standard

Precinct‐Count Optical Scan

+
Mandatory Risk‐Limiting Audits
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting

This segment adapted from Josh Benaloh, with permission.

9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Photo by Flickr user Dina Regine, http://www.flickr.com/photos/divadivadina/3954028726/in/photostream/

Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‐ShareAlike 2.0 Generic license.
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

End‐‐to
End to‐‐End (E2E) Voter
Voter‐‐Verifiability
As a voter, I can be sure that:
• My vote is cast as I intended.
• My vote is counted as cast.
• All votes are counted as cast.
cast Alice Johnson,
Ali J h 123 M
Main
i . . YES
Bob Ramirez, 79 Oak . . . . . NO
Carol Wilson, 821 Market . NO
Not a secret ballot!
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

End‐‐to
End to‐‐End Voter
Voter‐‐Verifiability
As a voter, I can be sure that:
• My vote is cast as I intended.
• My vote is counted as cast.
• All votes are counted as cast.
cast
• No voter can demonstrate how
h or she
he h voted d to a third
h d party.
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

A Verifiable Receipt
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Alice Johnson, 123 Main . . . YES

Bob Ramirez, 79 Oak . . . . . . NO

Carol Wilson,
Wilson 821 Market . . NO
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Checking the Result

Alice Johnson,
Johnson 123 Main . . . YES
No: 2
Bob Ramirez,, 79 Oak . . . . . . NO
Y
Yes: 1
Carol Wilson, 821 Market . . NO
Mathematical
Proof
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

End‐‐to
End to‐‐End Verifiable Elections
Anyone who cares to do so can:
Alice Johnson, 123 Main .
No: 2
Bob Ramirez, 79 Oak . . . . Yes: 1
Carol Wilson, 821 Market Mathematical
Proof

Check that their own Check that other Check the mathematical
encrypted votes are voters are legitimate. proof of the correctness
correctly
tl listed.
li t d off the
th tally.
t ll
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

The Voter
Voter’ss Perspective
Voters can …
• Use their receipts to check that their results are properly recorded.
p in the trash.
• Throw their receipts

• Verify the accuracy of the election with apps they wrote themselves.
• D
Download
l d apps from
f sources off th
their
i choice
h i tto verify
if th
the election.
l ti
• Believe verifications done by their political parties.
• Accept the results without question.
question
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Lots of Details to Get Right!

How do voters know that their

p matches their choices?
receipt

How are voters convinced that

the published encrypted votes
correspond to the announced tally?
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Voter‐‐Initiated Auditing
Voter

19837984723

Encrypted Vote

Voter’ss choice:
Voter Cast or Challenge
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Voter‐‐Initiated Auditing
Voter

Cast
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Voter‐‐Initiated Auditing
Voter

Challenge Vote for Alice

19837984723
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Scantegrity

Optical Scan + E2E

http://www.scantegrity.org/
9.3 End‐to‐End Verifiable Voting Securing Digital Democracy

Helios

E2E Internet
Voting
http://heliosvoting.org/
9.4 Verifying an E2E Result Securing Digital Democracy

Verifying an E2E Result

9.4 Verifying an E2E Result Securing Digital Democracy

Scantegrity

See: Chaum, et al., “Scantegrity II: End‐to‐End Verifiability for Optical Scan
Election Systems using Invisible Ink Confirmation Codes”. EVT 2008.
http://static.usenix.org/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/chaum/chaum.pdf
9.4 Verifying an E2E Result Securing Digital Democracy

Verifiable Tallying
Confirmation Code Table p
Correspondence Table Voted Choice Table

Ballot A B VOTE? Result YES NO

B1 7LC WTX B3:A R2:YES R1
B2 J31 TC0 B1:B R3:NO R2
B3 KWA H7L B2:A R1:YES R3
B1:A R2:NO
B2:B R1:NO
B3 B
B3:B R3 YES
R3:YES
9.4 Verifying an E2E Result Securing Digital Democracy

Verifiable Tallying
Confirmation Code Table p
Correspondence Table Voted Choice Table

Ballot A B VOTE? Result YES NO

Yes B1 7LC WTX B3:A R2:YES R1 
No B2 J31 TC0 B1:B R3:NO R2 
No B3 KWA H7L B2:A R1:YES R3 
B1:A X R2:NO
B2:B X R1:NO
B3 B
B3:B X R3 YES
R3:YES
9.4 Verifying an E2E Result Securing Digital Democracy

Verifiable Tallying
Confirmation Code Table p
Correspondence Table Voted Choice Table

Ballot A B VOTE? Result YES NO

B1 7LC WTX B3:A R2:YES R1 
B2 J31 TC0 B1:B R3:NO R2 
B3 KWA H7L B2:A R1:YES R3 
B1:A X R2:NO
No: 2
B2:B X R1:NO
Yes: 1
B3 B
B3:B X R3 YES
R3:YES
9.4 Verifying an E2E Result Securing Digital Democracy

Verifiable Tallying
Confirmation Code Table p
Correspondence Table Voted Choice Table

Ballot A B VOTE? Result YES NO

B1 7LC WTX B3:A R2:YES R1 
B2 J31 TC0 B1:B R3:NO R2 
B3 KWA H7L B2:A R1:YES R3 
B1:A X R2:NO
B2:B X R1:NO

Check that revealed codes

B3 B
B3:B X R3 YES
R3:YES
Check that voted choices are
are marked with an X marked with an X
9.4 Verifying an E2E Result Securing Digital Democracy

Questions for E2E?

Complexity? Usability?

Comprehensibility? Security?
Securing g Digital
g Democracyy
Lecture 9 | Using
g Technology
gy Wiselyy

J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan