Syntactic of Law

1.1 SYNTACTIC

Syntactic corresponds to the analysis of the relationship between the

different symbols or signs of the language. Conjugation is the word or words
(called in this case a conjunctive phrase) that unites elements of the same
class (nouns with each other, verbs with each other, etc.) or different
elements, but grammatically equivalent, this conjunction is basically a
coordinating link. .

Interpretations of the synthetic:

The concept of relationship is used generally and, according to theory,

refers to the function, connection or interdependence of two or more
linguistic elements.

Syntactic also has many values but in general it designates the study of the
relationships that words form in a sentence.

Ducrot and Todorov affirm that the relationship between subject and
predicate is a reflection of a function in the broader unit that is the
sentence. This presupposes: * Syntactically, the entire sentence is not a
conglomerate of elements. The elements of the sentence maintain
relationships with each other. * These relationships are the functions: it is
accepted that the phrase, taken globally, has a purpose and each
constituent contributes to the fulfillment of that purpose. * The function of
an element is not determined by its nature, as demonstrated by the fact that
the function of subject can be performed by different elements. * The
inventory of syntactic functions of the language is finite.

TO. SYNTACTIC RELATIONSHIPS: SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

The syntactic criterion allows us to define this term as a function of

connection between two or more linguistic elements, therefore, if we focus
on the largest unit (sentence) we must establish that it is constituted on a
syntactic relationship between the elements Subject and Predicate, which
can be performed by a wide variety of elements. The consideration of this
syntactic relationship depends largely on the definition of the elements
between which it is established, which differ depending on the criterion
applied.

Logical-formal criterion: Traditional grammar. It understands the sentence

as an expression of a logical judgment, which is made through onoma and
rhema (Aristotelian terminology), which are the fundamental classes of
words and that we could equate to the terms of subject and predicate. Every
sentence has, from the semantic point of view provided by the Royal
Academy of the Spanish Language. to the criterion, full meaning, complete
melodic structure and presence of all the necessary syntactic elements.
These requirements are not always met, so the criterion is faced with
doubtful or problematic statements, which it designates as "sentences." A
sentence is any statement made up of related elements and that has
meaning in itself (including sentences whose meaning is complete and its
elements are present in one way or another).

Structuralist criterion: In an attempt to resolve doubtful statements for

traditional grammar, the structuralist criterion considers sentences as the
major phrase (Saussurean conception), so its elements must be structured
and related like any other phrase, through relationships. syntagmatic
elements that distinguish between the governed element and the ruling
element that determines the morphological characteristics of the governed
word. ; However, this conception leaves coordinated sentences outside the
concept of prayer. Regarding the problem of sentences or phrases that do
not present any of their obligatory elements (according to traditional
grammar), structuralism establishes two types of sentences, bimembres and
unimembres, among which would be the impersonal ones because they lack
a subject; From the syntactic point of view these sentences would only be
formed by an SV, however it is strange to recognize the existence of
predication of any subject.

Functionalist criterion: The general approach considers that sentences are

maximum constructions in which relationships are established between
minor units (both syntactic, such as phrases, and morphological, such as
words). If we specify Hockett's approach, we must typify the types of
constructions and among them differentiate the predicative ones, formed by
a topic and a comment (terms corresponding to the traditional subject and
predicate). For this author, the sentence is the construction that is not part
of any other and its nucleus is the verb. , which defines as a sentence word,
being able to constitute a sentence by itself, without the intervention of a
subject.

Generativist criterion: According to Chomsky, the sentence is a basic axiom

(deep structure) and therefore does not require definition, although it makes
up to three different definitions of it. The sentence is generated through a
series of rules and symbols, the basic rule being that which equates
"sentence" with the sum of a noun phrase and a verbal phrase, which would
correspond to the subject-predicate syntactic relationships. In this criterion,
single-membered sentences are explained as realizations of the surface
structure, which have the absent element (subject noun phrase or
copulative verbal phrase, in case of absence of a predicate) in the deep
structure.

Dependency grammar criterion, defended by Tesnière. This criterion

indicates the verb as the sentence nucleus, on which actants (the subject is
one of them) and surroundings depend. In this conception it is easy to
understand the sentence as a predicate that may or may not require a
subject and not the other way around, which allows a satisfactory
explanation of impersonal sentences.

1.2. SYNTACTIC OF LAW

Linking this definition to law, it turns out that the study of the linguistic
properties of the legal system invades its entire existential expression as
discourse. And, even more, the same dogmatic thought considers that
semiology is useful, both in legislative work and in the application of the
abstract norm to the concrete case.

Theoretically, if linguistic research into legislation and application of law is

fundamental to the study of legal discourse, the study of the different
theories on language that have been presented is no less fundamental.
Notwithstanding this, and without ignoring its importance, for reasons of
thematic orientation, it will not be broken down, specifically resorting to the
postulates that provide greater clarity according to the purpose of this
work: the importance of Saussure for law, leaving for a later occasion the
reference to theories.

It becomes an obligatory topic, because thinking of language as a system of

signs whose articulation and functioning obey multiple rules, its study
cannot be the exclusive privilege of a single theory or school and we
censure the attitude frequently assumed by legal dogmatics, by leaning by
analytical philosophers. To the extent that it is recognized that it is
Saussure's semiological model where a deep analysis of the processes of
language constitution and its application can be found. Of course, this can
only be carried out by particularizing, as Saussure himself mentions, the
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels of it.

On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that the positive law that
exists in a given society has manifestations in translingual forms, which
indicate the mistake of considering it exclusively as language. So, if law is
not exclusively language, it is due, as is understood, to the threat of
coercion, which qualifies legal forms by basing their effectiveness, that is,
that their afflictive phase in relation to the recipients goes beyond a series
of procedures. analogical relative to the language in which normative
statements are written.

Notwithstanding the above, the need to analyze the characteristics of the

law is totally legitimate.

Since being expressed in spoken or written language, the law does not
dissolve or subvert the characteristics of the language in which it is written.
Since the law uses the intelligibility that language can provide to its
prescriptions and subjects its specificities to the rules of oral or written
language that make it understandable.

When the law uses verbal signs, its messages are interpreted primarily as
language. Being a discourse, its interpretation is directed to different
associative fields to which a discourse of another type for another social
subsystem would be referred. When in legal practice one seeks to establish
the meaning of the words of the law, one will go through legal customs, the
definitions established by jurisprudence, the general principles of law, etc.
But if the discourse of the law is given the interpretation of a literary
discourse, the expressions of the text will be associated with the repertoire
of metaphors and linguistic turns known by a certain author, the school to
which he belongs, etc. However, the associative process that runs through
the specific sources results in the establishment of a secondary and typical
meaning in relation to the discourse being examined. The determination of
such secondary meaning occurs through a process in which language
preserves its particular functioning. In this sense, if one seeks to
understand the functioning of legal writing and its interpretation
mechanisms, one must overcome its hermeneutic and traditional
ineffectiveness, referring to the study of the ways in which language
discourses are constituted.

Saussure, intending to investigate the functioning and significance of the

discourses of spoken language, links his linguistics to a broader science
that should study the life of all signs within social life, creating concepts
that allow for explanations about the mechanisms of language and,
simultaneously, a minimal system of semiological character. From this
amphibiological system I highlight the notions of sign, signifier, meaning,
significance, value, syntagmatic relations and associative relations. Without
these extremely valuable categories for the critique of legal dogmatics'
interpretation of the law, it would not be possible to do so.

In Saussure's work the concept of sign appears, when it refers to a

significant relationship that develops between two terms articulated by
language: thought and sound. And based on this, the significant unit
becomes an entity formed by the association of a concept to an acoustic
image, from an idea to a phonetic support. Later, Saussure will specify the
meaning of these two terms in relation, designating them as signifier and
signified; He will call the effects produced by their relationship significance.

Some later authors criticize Saussure because they consider the concepts
of sign, signifier and signified to be insufficient. They point out that the
concept of sign is limited as an association in the sense of the levels of
signifier and signified and, they say, the designation of these levels must be
replaced by the terms expression and content.

In the signifier, or plane of expression, there would simply be a substance of

articulatory expression, this is the phonetic substance, the object of
phonetics. Likewise, a form of expression, phonic or graphic, object of
syntax and paradigmatic.

As for the meaning, or plane of content, there would be a substance of

content that corresponds to the notional or ideological sense of the
meaning, being a form of content referred to the different forms of sign,
symbol, index or signal, being impossible to capture in human language. The
signifier would, therefore, constitute the material element of the sign, that
is, the support or vehicle of the concept. Regarding meaning, translinguistic
semiology tends to innovate the Saussurian formulation, pointing out the
impossibility of an immaterial component that is located in the substance of
the content.

If the reference is made to the law, in terms of what has been said, it is
observed how dogmatic thought, when referring to written norms, considers
the signifier as the graphism that exposes each word of the law, whether we
speak of deontic logic or of legal semiology, for your interest it is indistinct.

Regarding meaning, taking into account the latest contributions, it can be

considered as a concept or as the absence of the perceptible object
converted into a signifier. Therefore, the meaning would only be
"something" that the user of the sign will understand exactly as real. On the
other hand, if it were given a functionalist characterization it would simply
be one of the relata of the sign, the one that did not act as a mediator.

Following Saussure's thought, signification is a process that relates the

signifier and the signified, constituting the sign. In a first analysis, this
notion refers us to the relationship established between two terms: the
concept and the acoustic image. However, this cannot be simplified so
much, since by reflexively investigating the character of language, it
becomes a system of multiple articulated signs where the meaning depends
not on the relationship of a sign with others, but on a double movement: the
internal relationship or sign and the relationship with other signs.

If one focuses on the second relationship, the sign with other signs, this is
established through a process of contrasts and oppositions. It is these
distinctions that a word has in relation to others that explain it, that is, give
it its value. The significance, ultimately, depends on its value. From this it
follows that the concept of value is fundamental in the interpretation of the
sign. It indicates that, undoubtedly, language is a system, a "structure", in
which the meaning of expressions is determined by a complex network of
relationships.

One must ask what relationships are these? To give an answer, we will
resort to locating two different aspects, since each of them produces a
certain order of values. On the one hand, the aspect of syntagmatic
relations and, on the other, that of associative relations. There is a question-
begging to deal with both aspects, which consists of starting from the
definition of a phrase. In this sense, Saussure says that, at the level of
discourse, words are chained in obedience to the linear and irreversible
character of the language, thus excluding the possibility of pronouncing two
elements at the same time, generating a combination that is supported by a
extension. The combinations of elements, words, compound words,
sentence members, entire sentences that, based on the extension of the
language, form significant units, will constitute the phrases. Furthermore,
the relationships between the elements of the phrase, or the relationships
where the value of each sign depends on its opposition to the preceding and
the one that follows, where the terms are articulated in presence, make up
the syntagmatic relationships.

In such syntagmatic relationships there is a relationship that unites the

parts of the phrase and another that articulates their entirety. If we talk, for
example, about the phrase wardrobe: there is a relationship that unites the
parts wardrobe and clothing; and another, which articulates the entire
wardrobe with the part of the phrase guard, and the clothing part. If we turn
to criminal legislation to reproduce the example and take the case "kill
someone", where the value of killing is referred to the sign someone, the
term someone with the sign kill is, finally, the articulated totality, which is
related with each of these terms. In this double articulation the concept of
syntagmatic relationship is specified.

At the same time, the linguistic phenomenon involves another form of

connection that no longer relies on the extension of language and the
articulation of words "in presentia." We refer to the associative
relationships that bring together terms "in absentia", in virtual mnemonic
series. "Associative relations form paradigms or associative fields
determined by the most diverse affinities, they leave the signifiers in order
and are concretized to the meanings, they fix the affinities of sound or
meaning. To illustrate the reference that has been made, think of two
associative series. The first, inspired by an association of signifiers, such as
the constellation health, friendship, kindness; and the second, made up of
an analogy of meanings as in the series teaching, instruction, learning. It is
possible to construct countless series in proportion corresponding to the
relationships that thought engenders. Continuing with the example of
criminal legislation, we can think that the association of signifiers such as
homicide, infanticide, suicide; or meanings such as rape, seduction, etc.,
represent factual references for the interpreter in the act of determining the
meaning of the words of the law.

Locating law primarily as language, its typical significance depends on

reference to systems that are not linguistic or, at least, typically linguistic.
The process of association in the interpretation of the law runs through the
signifiers and, particularly, the legal and meta-legal meanings. Through what
dogmatics calls "means of interpretation", the interpreter's reference to the
meanings established in official repositories of the language is legitimized.
Hence they resort to dictionaries (literal interpretation), historical
documents, preparatory work for legislation, discussion and argumentation
for or against a law (logical interpretation), etc.; the values or ideologies
that, at a certain moment, the norm must ensure, as dogmatics calls it, the
adaptation of the norm to the specific case (teleological interpretation).
Referring the application of the law to the associative fields rooted in what
dogmatic thought establishes as "mediate formal sources", customs and
general principles of law are used, or also, to the "forms of interpretive
procedure", in the case of equity or predominant political ideology, doctrine
and jurisprudence.

However, dogmatics moves away from this, there are intrasystematic

interpretative criteria that function as catalyst elements of associative
processes, such as the legal object, the agent's intention, his personal
conditions, his environmental conditioning, his own ideological framework,
etc Returning to the level of linguistics, syntagmatic and associative
relationships generate solidarity of both types, linking terms and words in
linguistic discourse. It is through the interweaving of the levels of
syntagmatic relations and associative relations or the interweaving of these
solidarities, that the functioning of language is ensured. In other words, the
significance of language lies in the contrast of the expressions present in an
opposition of the terms that are evoked with an absence. In the
interpretation of the law it can be seen that the meaning of the words of the
law depends on the relationships between the present expressions and the
absent terms. Thus, when dogmatics resorts to syntactic or systematic
interpretations or to literal or logical interpretations, it itself is highlighting
(the value) of syntagmatic and associative solidarities, as well as the
intertwining of these solidarities. Finally, I consider it valuable to highlight
in Saussure's linguistics two important semiological principles for
understanding the meanings of the words of the law. The first refers to the
arbitrariness of the sign, and the second, to its immutability and mutability
regardless of the particular will of the user.

The arbitrariness of the sign is explained by the conventional nature of

language, which originally supposes an unmotivated association between a
signifier and a signified. This thesis, that is, the claim that the relationship
established between graphics and a concept has been established,
disqualifies the realistic concepts that can be given about language, for this
reason, they have great validity in dogmatic thought.

Regarding the rule of immutability and mutability of the sign, however, it

does not take into account the will of the user, the evidence in the social or
ideological institutional character of the language. And it will seek to keep
the language irreducible to the particular purpose of the individual without
modifying it. Despite this, the will of the subject will not be able to stop the
gradual and historical modification of linguistic meanings.

The application of these two principles that we have discussed emphasizes

the ideological nature of the production of meanings in the field of language.
If the meanings are determined historically and evaluatively, this leads us to
interpretive modification, changing from an equivocal meaning to a
changing one.

Already in the interpretation of the law, located at the level of language, it

turns out that the senses are conditioned by multiple factors, ambiguous,
mutable and ideologically modalized.
We find such modalization in the field of ideology of the concept of deontic
modalization, which is used by legal logic to refer to the logical operation
that places a deontic operator (mandatory, prohibited, permitted) before an
action described in the norm. In this sense, in the same way that every norm
is modalized by a deontic operator, it is also, on the pragmatic level,
ideologically modalized.

The last phase of the analysis of legal language would be its organization,
which necessarily implies a logical mathematical strategy, specifically an
algebra of sets, that allows the jurist to integrate, in a reasoned and correct
way, the classification of law with respect to its various aspects. regulatory
areas.

Hence the importance of knowing the only reasonable instrument through

which human beings can communicate with each other, which is language
itself, whether spoken or written. The need for it to be purified, integrated
and ordered, which will lead us, in the development of the research, to use a
logical method that allows the simplification of legal language into an
artificial language, which allows us to better understand the central object
of our studio.

The language of law can be located as a directive function, consisting of

giving orders, prohibiting, allowing, commanding, acting, authorizing,
sanctioning.

When analyzing and studying legal language, itself, the fulfillment of three
functions stands out, which are: * Formulate and transmit knowledge and
information (descriptive language) * Direct and influence human behavior
(prescriptive language) * Arouse emotions or moods ( expressive or literary
language)

On the other hand, legal language can be of two kinds; a language whose
object of study is the legal norms issued by the legislator, also called
language of norms; and another language that is the one used by jurists,
also known as "metalanguage."

The language of regulations is prescriptive, while the language of jurists is

descriptive. The difference between the language of norms and the
language of jurists (or legal metalanguage) lies in that difference that Hans
Kelsen made in his work Pure Theory of Law, between Law and Legal
Science, the language of legal norms or norms. It is the one used in Law;
while the metalanguage, also known as the language of jurists ("legal
statements" as Kelsen says), is the one used in the science of law.

The author, Antonio Hernández Gil, explains this difference between both
legal languages, between the normative language of law and the scientific
language of law; "The normative language, as a whole, is prescriptive, while
the language of the legal scientist, although it deals with prescriptions, is
descriptive."
The law, through the legal language of norms, is capable of self-creation. On
the other hand, the language of jurists, he studied the language of norms.
The discourse of norms is prescriptive, "orders", while the discourse of
jurists describes, what the norms prescribe.

1.3. SYNTACTIC PROPERTIES OF THE LANGUAGE OF LAW

The syntactic properties of the language of law serve to study the

relationships between the different expressions of law. This study is very
useful for the analysis of the interpretation and application of the law.

TO. THE PROPOSITIONS

There are imperative propositions that designate an imperative relationship

that links the subject of the action with the action, signifying an order.
Examples in law:

Legal norms and truth values, whose most important function is to guide
human behavior or actions.

The open texture in the language of law

The bilingual brain from a neuropsychological perspective

Another type of propositions are normative propositions, which are the usual
linguistic sign of a norm (a directive that indicates what can be done and
(or) not done). This type of propositions have as propositional functor one of
the following verbs: "must do", "have the right to do", "have the right not to
do". Estimative propositions mean estimates, that is, value judgments,
which are judgments that prove that an action is, in one sense or another,
good, indifferent or bad.

Syntactic analysis
Any linguistic expression can be precise or diffuse, since any, even if it is
well formed syntactically, depends for the determination of its meaning on
the context of use and on the non-grammatical rules that determine its
adaptation to changing circumstances, which well-constructed statements
can be an expression of diverse meanings. Strictly speaking, law is the
purified version of inconsistency, ambiguities and vagueness that jurists
prepare from the linguistic material produced by legislators. Making law:
dictating laws, resolving conflicts, agreeing on legal acts, is a linguistic
activity: the message transmitted in the speech is the law itself.

The idea of the analogy between law and language is a product of the
consciousness of society: in its theoretical elaboration, legal science would
resemble the grammars developed by linguists to explain the languages
developed spontaneously by popular consciousness; Language and positive
law are produced by human conventions from certain ritual functions of
language similar to the legal uses of language to constitute specific legal
phenomena.

Law is a set of rules; The unit of analysis is the norm, whether in its
grammatical aspects or in some formalization suitable for some logical
calculation. The norm, from a grammatical point of view, are modal or
imperative sentences. Example: a modal verb is duty, which alters
traditional grammar and originates the "modality" of the statement; Another
example is the adverbial expression "it is obligatory that" allows us to
obtain norms from morally neutral sentences.

Indeed, semantic properties cannot be attributed to norms, in terms of

norms or expression of the will of a legislator, due to classical bivalent
propositional logic; Consequently, law is better represented as a model and
not simply as a set of normative statements, since it is a sequence of
illocutionary acts (order, rule, promulgate, regulate, etc.), that is, it is an
imperative or normative discourse. (understanding that the discourse is not
identified with a set of well-formed grammatical sentences, nor with a set of
ideal and logical propositions), which are neither true nor false, but it does
have the qualities of validity and effectiveness, since the legal norm It has
the validity conferred by being syntactically well constructed and
semantically well thought out: the legislator does not aspire to be
understood, but rather to be respected and obeyed; This act constituting the
real relationship between the behavior of the sender and the behavior of the
receiver of the message. Indeed, law is more than a type of specialized
language, law cannot be represented as a purely linguistic model, since the
structure of law is not isomorphic with that of any available language, in
addition to the fact that standard normative logic does not responds to the
concepts supported by jurists.

Law is not, therefore, language, if by such is understood a set of

grammatically well-formed sentences in accordance with the phonetic,
lexical, syntactic and semantic rules corresponding to any natural language.
For the jurist it makes no sense:

that phonetic aspects are determined by the rules of formation and

transformation of natural language and no grammar can omit to take into
account this superficial aspect of language;

that the syntactic rules of natural languages do not correspond to some

logical formalizations intended for their own analysis;

that the internal and external negation of the deontic modal operators
cannot be adequately expressed in some natural languages, except through
periphrasis.

that trivial logical theorems in normative logics do not correspond to the

corresponding expressions in natural language.
This lack of meaning is based on the need for language that the legislator
has, on the need for language that legal science has and the need for
language that the theory of law has; since the analysis of legislative
language has no place in the analysis of the theory of law, since this theory
is not about law but about legal science; For example, the function and
character of the different types of norms are foreign to the theory of law.
Therefore, at this level, language analysis consists of substance, that is, the
meaning of linguistic expressions (statements, phrases, terms), such as
information, stipulation or clarification.

Legal language constitutes in itself a complicated system of meanings

strongly tinged with emotion. Society is accustomed to assuming that law is
just and crime is bad, and we then tend to give thoughtless approval to what
is presented in the form of the law and to disapprove of what is shown to us
as outside the law. Knowing this, when a terrorist organization kills
someone, it does not say that it murdered him, but that it executed him;
When he appropriates someone else's property, he does not proclaim that he
stole, but rather that he expropriated. The thing is that execution and
expropriation are legal forms of killing and seizing someone else's property,
so the use of these words suggests a more favorable image to whoever
hears them. In the same way, the authors of a coup d'état do not say that
they have usurped power, nor that they have committed the crime of
rebellion: they broadcast that they have assumed the government of the
State; In other words, that they have appropriated the legal language and
that from now on the way to understand each other will be to call what they
do laws and subvert the opposition that those who yesterday were the
government may make.

In summary, the intention to make language fulfill a certain function is not

exhibited except sometimes through the grammatical form used. Generally,
to interpret what that intention is, we will have to resort to the context and
circumstances surrounding the emission of the message in question. But the
complications don't end there. It also happens that - whatever the form used
- the different functions of language are rarely shown to us in pure form. An
order aims to obtain a behavior from us, but at the same time it provides us
with certain information about the preferences of the person issuing it, and
it is also easy to find in it the expression of a certain emotional attitude: the
desire of the issuer for what he prescribes, or his rejection for what it
prohibits.

In conclusion, the Law, as it regulates, and therefore, conditions, the life

and interests of individuals, must use clear and concrete language, perfectly
understandable for the vast majority of members of society. The reality,
however, is usually very different. It would be said that one of the
requirements of legal certainty would have to be the concomitance between
the language of the Law and that used by the society in which it is applied,
but this is not the case. And the function entrusted to the Law of regulating
social relations leads it to flee from the inaccuracies manifested by
countless words of colloquial language and to specify, delimit and even
artificially change their meaning. The endless process of specifying terms -
or technical words - is more of a goal than a triumph: The legal system is, in
its transmission and reception mode, a set of linguistic propositions and this
is the only mode of transition of law.

In law, the importance of languages is very different from what it may have
in other disciplines. Language for law is not only a way of externalizing
oneself, it is a way of being. The law imposes a severe discipline on
language and this is obvious because the justice of the expression is not
foreign to the justice of the resolution.

Semantics of Law
3.1. SEMANTICS OF LANGUAGE

Linguistic semantics is a subfield of general semantics and linguistics that

studies the encoding of meaning within linguistic expressions.
Etymologically the term comes from the Greek semantikos, which meant
'relevant meaning', derived from sema, which meant 'sign'. Semantics
studies the meaning of words, it can be approached from a semasiological
perspective, in which we start from the meaning to reach the form, or from
an onomasiological perspective, which starts from the form (signifier) to
reach the study of the meaning. .

The word is a linguistic unit made up of one or more meaningful phrases

(monemes). Flor, sub-mar-inista-s. It is also explained as each part of text or
speech that is between pauses or blank spaces. Words are organized to
form statements or sentences. They can perform several functions, which is
why they are classified into different classes, or categories, depending on
the work they do. Some are autonomous or independent because they can
fulfill a certain function on their own. They are called lexical words. Others
can only appear in a statement supported by the first, exercising nexus and
link functions. They are the dependents. They are known as grammatical
words. Grammatical categories are the classes in which all the words in the
language are classified and grouped. Traditional grammar usually considers
the following types of words: Noun, adjective, verb, pronoun, determiner,
verb, adverb, preposition, conjunction and sometimes interjection. However,
other classifications are taken into account based on different criteria
(point of view used to discriminate the elements). These criteria are:

Semantic. Pay attention to what they mean

Morphologic. It looks at the monemes and morphemes that make them up.

Syntactic. Depending on whether they accompany and complement or not

Functional. It takes into account the work you do in the prayer or message.
On many occasions these criteria are usually combined to define each type
of word. This is the case, for example, when the noun is defined as a
"variable word, morphological criterion, which performs the functions of
subject and direct object, functional criterion, can be accompanied by
determiners and adjectives, syntactic criterion, and serves to name things
or people, criterion semantic".

Terms related to semantics:

Hyperonymy: It is the relationship that exists between a word (hyperonym)

whose more general meaning is totally included in the meanings of other
more specific words (hyponyms): "tree" is a hypernym of "willow, elm,... ",
because the meaning of the latter includes all the features of "tree".

Hyponymy: It is the inverse relationship to hyperonymy, in which the

meaning of a more specific word (the hyponym) contains all the meaning
features of the more general term (hyperonym); Thus, "elm" and "willow" are
hyponyms of "tree", because in their meaning they include the features of
the latter, which is their hypernym.

Cohyponymy: It is the relationship established between hyponyms of the

same hypernym, so that "willow" and "elm" are cohyponyms, since both
have the same hypernym, "tree."

Holonymy: It is the relationship established between one word (holonym)

and another or others (meronyms) that designate parts of what is denoted
by the first. Unlike hyponymy/hyperonymy, here it is not a matter of one
meaning being contained in another, but rather that what is named by the
metonym is, in extralinguistic reality, one of the parts that make up what is
named by the holonym. Thus, "tree" is a holonym of "leaves", "branches",
"trunk" and "roots", which are its meronyms.

Meronymy: This is the inverse relationship to the previous one, so that a

meronym designates a part of reality named by a holonym. If hyponyms
designate "classes" of hypernyms, meronyms designate "parts" of holonyms.

Monosemic: Monosemic words are those that have a single meaning or

meaning.

Polysemy: A single word has several meanings, acquired by expansion or

restriction of its original meaning, so that all of them are semantically
related.

Homonymy: It belongs to the same type of relationship as polysemy; several

meanings associated with a single form, but this does not originate from the
divergence of meanings, but from the confluence of forms between several
words that were different in origin, so that their different meanings are not
related to each other. There are two types of homonymy: * Homophony or
partial homonymy: The words have the same pronunciation, but either do
not have the same spelling or do not belong to the same syntactic category.
Example: Baya (fruit) / voy (verb to go), basto (rough) / vasto (large), mate
(grass) / mate (verb to kill). * Homography or absolute homonymy, in which
there is no difference in form and the words also belong to the same
syntactic category. Example: carp (fish)/ carp (cover).

Paronymy: It is the relationship between two similar terms, although not

identical in form and with different meanings. Example: Absorb/absolve,
reja/regia.

Synonymy: It is the relationship between two terms with similar and

interchangeable meanings in discourse because they belong to the same
syntactic category. Example: broad/extensive, hair/hair,
estimate/appreciate.

Antonimia: It is the relationship maintained by two words whose meanings

are opposed, either due to incompatibility (alive/dead), or with a gradation
that allows the existence of intermediate terms (cold/hot/temperate), or in a
relationship of reciprocity (give /receive).

Cryptolexemia: Cryptolexemes are signifiers whose meaning is unknown to

the speaker and which, especially in the literary field, awaken aesthetic
pleasure in him.

3.2. SEMANTICS OF LAW

The semantics of natural language applied to law (based on the fact that
semantics is the coding of meaning within linguistic expressions), finds
three definitions of the (purely) referential occurrence of a term in a
statement: it can be said that the occurrence of a term singular (ts) in a
statement (E) is referential (or purely referential), a) if (ts) is used in this
occurrence to specify or identify its object (its denotatum) in such a way
that the rest of the statement asserts something about him; b) if, in this
occurrence, (ts) can be replaced by any other codenotative term (that is,
with the same denotation) without the truth value of the statement being
altered; and c) if (E) is of the form "(ts) has property P" and the passage from
statement (E) to statement "there is an object that has property P" is a valid
inference. That gives rise, in turn, to three concepts of reverently opaque
context. A context is reverently opaque if the insertion of an utterance (E)
into it can render irreferential (not purely referential) the occurrence of a
singular term that was referential in (E). There are some authors who call
opaque contexts indirect, but others use the criterion of failure of
substitutivity of codenotative terms to identify them.

3.3. SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF THE LANGUAGE OF LAW.

When talking about the semantic properties of the language of law, it must
be taken into account that there is a general classification of propositions.
There are imperative propositions that designate an imperative relationship
that links the subject of the action with the action, signifying an order.
Pragmatics of Law
4.1. LANGUAGE PRAGMATICS

Pragmatics, the discipline that studies the relationship between such signs
and the contexts or circumstances in which users use such signs. A
pragmatic definition is one obtained from practice or experience and not
from theory. It always indicates an awareness of things as they really are,
that is, it is always objective. It sticks to the facts and leaves no room for
speculation.

An example is the definition of social capital, theoretically it is the set of

common values and expectations of a given community. Social capital is a
precondition for cooperation and organization of human activities, including
business. Social capital can be transformed, consumed or replaced, just like
financial capital. Pragmatically, social capital is the value of labor,
materials and financial support that individuals are willing to give for the
good of a social cause, what is the difference?, which in the first definition
is barely talked about. expectations, of the previous condition, in
pragmatics we talk about the action already done, in practice.

Pragmatics supposes a dynamic approach to the study of the literary sign,

since it takes into account the variants of use that are present in the
concrete communication processes, thus surpassing both extrinsic methods
and immanentist methods of research into literary discourse.

Pragmatics deals with the circumstances in which the process of

expression, communication and interpretation of signs occurs, in a given
time, space and culture, transcending, in this way, the text itself, unlike
syntax and to a lesser extent semantics, which are aspects fundamentally
immanent to the text. The significant change introduced by pragmatic
research lies in the shift of attention from the systematic aspects that
structure a corpus, previously delimited for its accommodation to the study
method, towards the different variants of use present in specific
communication processes. The pragmatic approach proposes studying the
sign with all the circumstances that arise in its use. Rather we could say
that pragmatics has definitively clarified that the proper object of semiotics
is not the sign, but the sign in situation, that is, not the product objectified
in a form, but the entire production process that creates it and in the one
that integrates to acquire meaning:

The signs in situation.

The relationship of signs with their own presuppositions.

The relationships of signs with the subjects participating in the semiotic

process.
The relationship of signs with the semiological situation in which they are
used.

The relationship of signs with the social, cultural and ideological situation in
which they are used.

The relationships of signs with their own values as speech acts.

The relationship of signs with their own forms.

4.2. PRAGMATICS OF LAW

The language of law is that in which the legislator enunciates the legal rule.
Like any language, it can be subjected to linguistic studies.

The language of law has pragmatic, syntactic and semantic properties like
any other particular language. With this, it is possible to determine the
properties of the language of law that are manifested through the
relationships that exist between the expressions of law and those who state
them (pragmatic properties); It is possible to specify the relationships that
unite the expressions of the law with each other (syntactic properties) and,
in addition, it is possible to capture the relationships established between
the expressions of the law and the meaning thoughts (semantic properties).

4.3. PRAGMATIC PROPERTIES OF THE LANGUAGE OF LAW.

The pragmatic properties of the language of law concern the question of the
sources of law and its enactment. This study can be extended to the
relationships that exist between the expressions of this language and those
to whom they are directed, with which it would be possible to say whether
or not the law exercises effective influence on the behavior of people and
society.

Currently, pragmatics studies are fundamentally oriented in three directions:

the productive direction (poiesis), which focuses on the circumstances of
production of the legislator; the communicative (katharsis), which has
speech acts as its theoretical basis and deals with laws and norms as a
communicative process, following the semiotic theory of communication;
and, finally, the receptive (aisthesis), which attends to the act of exercising
the right, seeking its usefulness and effectiveness located in the criterion of
truth. The meaning of the norm is established from its consequences.

For the authors of the discursive theory of law and politics, Kelsen's
statement becomes increasingly valid, according to which whoever only
relies on an earthly truth... cannot justify the inevitable coercion to the
realization of social purposes, if it does not convey at least the approval of
the majority of those who must take advantage of the coercive order. The
democratic procedure is then constitutive of the legitimization of the
sociopolitical order. On the other hand, communicative reason does not
accept the "skeptical" interpellation of democracy, which visualizes in it a
simple search, guided by rules, for a compromise between discordant
interests and visions of the world. Supporters of this position are therefore
subjected to strong criticism. In particular, the instrumental conception of
democratic rules would not have the capacity to explain the binding nature
of their respect by the interested parties; This would rather justify the
attitude of the so-called free rider, who, while showing acceptance of the
rules, implicitly reserves the right to violate them if this ensures the
achievement of a higher individual interest. It is possible to escape from this
dead end only by once again attributing a normative value to democratic
rules; that is, from the perspective of discursive theory, anchoring them to
the value of the truth of social communicative processes: democratic rules
are nothing more than the formalization of what happens in social
communication in any way. As long as they function, those who do not
respect them are placed in a normatively wrong and socially marginal
position: in this way, reestablishing the violated norm is no longer an
abstract Sollen, but the product itself of social dynamics.

Once the reason for the foundation of the socio-political order in the social
processes in which the rulers are involved has been clarified, we return to
the problem of how this foundation is founded, from the modalities of the
passage of communicative reason that permeate society to the
crystallization of formal rules. On this point, discursive theory is divided into
two tendencies, one markedly normativist, and another that directly refers
to the concretion of vital worlds.

The idea of the rule of law can be developed on the set of principles
according to which a legitimate right is produced from the power of
communication and this, in turn, is translated through the right legitimately
erected into administrative power. That is, the democratic principle refers
to the level of external institutionalization, effective in the plan of action,
from equal participation to a discursive formation of opinion and will, which
is fulfilled in communicative forms that are in turn legally guaranteed. . In
other words, the democratic rule of law has the task of translating the
product of social communication into binding legal norms; In this way, on
the one hand the legal medium has the function of a transformer and
expander of the weak impulses towards the social integration of a
communicatively structured vital world; On the other hand, administrative
power can be redirected to that communicative power that constitutes the
only source of legitimation.

4.4. PRAGMATIC RATIONALITY.

A norm is created to regulate the conduct of individuals who are within the
scope of spatial validity of the law of a State, its immediate purpose is to be
accepted and fulfilled by its recipients, which is why pragmatic rationality is
presupposed for the feasibility of the norm in its practical application, not
only positivized and as a theoretical part of the legal system. It is defined as
the claim that the conduct of the recipients conforms to what is prescribed
by law. It is the degree of acceptance and compliance with the standard by
the recipient or addressee of the standard. The importance of this
rationality is manifested in the fact that it would make no sense to have a
perfectly well-structured body of regulations, prepared in accordance with
the established training processes, if its degree of incidence and
compliance is not being achieved, because there is no parameter between
the editor and the receiver. or link that intertwines them.

So the question is, if the effectiveness of a law depends on its acceptance

and compliance by the recipients, by society, or a sector of it, how to
achieve the empathy of society towards a law?, so that with its voluntary
acceptance , its implementation is easier, and its impact on society is
positive. Certainly, legislative production cannot be at the expense of what
society wants to be done, because adding to this the democratic system
that governs us, fosters very diverse points of view and perspectives of the
same fact, and the social demands that, as inputs ask the legislative power
to solve them through a law, they can be infinite; The question lies in
analyzing and identifying what society needs to be done, and in a general
way having a social overview of what is considered pertinent, of the
appropriate direction, both for the State as a government apparatus, and for
society.

NORBERTO BOBBIO says: "The language of the legislator... is

incomplete. ...this lack of completeness is precisely addressed by the
grammatical analysis of the language. ... What is important to establish is: a)
that the language of the legislator is, ... lacks completeness, incomplete;
b) ...like any language that becomes increasingly more rigorous, it can be
completed. It is precisely this interpretation of the language of the legislator
that constitutes... legal research."