LIT Articles 08 Geopolitics International Relations5573496

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c o m
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1. Article 01
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Article Name: Forging Ahead to Open a New Chapter of China-Russia Friendship, Cooperation
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and Common Development
2023-03-20 0621
Xi Jinping
President of the People’s Republic of China
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Forging Ahead to Open a New Chapter of China-Russia Friendship, Cooperation and Common Development
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At the invitation of President Vladimir Putin, I will soon pay a state visit to the Russian Federation. Russia was
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the first country I visited after I was elected President ten years ago. Over the past decade, I have made eight
visits to Russia. I came each time with high expectations and returned with fruitful results, opening a new
chapter for China-Russia relations together with President Putin.
China and Russia are each other’s biggest neighbor and comprehensive strategic partner of coordination. We
are both major countries in the world and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Both countries
uphold an independent foreign policy and see our relationship as a high priority in our diplomacy.
There is a clear historical logic and strong internal driving force for the growth of China-Russia relations. Over
the past ten years, we have come a long way in our wide-ranging cooperation and made significant strides into
the new era.
High-level interactions have played a key strategic role in leading China-Russia relations. We have established
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a 5B
tr-5D whole set of
mechanisms for high-level interactions and multi-faceted cooperation which provide important
systemic and institutional safeguards for the growth of the bilateral ties. Over the years, I have maintained a
close working relationship with President Putin. We have met 40 times on bilateral and international occasions.
Together we have drawn the blueprint for the bilateral relations and cooperation in various fields, and have had
timely communication on major international and regional issues of mutual interest, providing firm stewardship
for the sustained, sound and stable growth of China-Russia relations.
Our two sides have cemented political mutual trust and fostered a new model of major-country relations. Guided
by a vision of lasting friendship and win-win cooperation, China and Russia are committed to no-alliance, no-
confrontation and not targeting any third party in developing our ties. We firmly support each other in following a
development path suited to our respective national realities and support each other’s development and
rejuvenation. The bilateral relationship has growntr-more 3U4O9S6U
5Q5R7Smature and resilient. It is brimming with new dynamism
and vitality, setting a fine example for developing a new model of major-country relations featuring mutual
respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.
Head Office: 127, Zone II, MP Nagar, Bhopal |+91-7676564400| https://www.toprankers.com Page 1 of 24
Our two sides have put in place an all-round and multi-tiered cooperation framework. Thanks to the joint efforts
of both sides, China-Russia trade exceeded US$190 billion last year, up by 116 percent from ten years ago.
China has been Russia’s largest trading partner for 13 years running. We have seen steady increase in our two-
way investment. Our cooperation on major projects in such fields as energy, aviation, space and connectivity is
moving forward steadily. Our collaboration in scientific and technological innovation, cross-border e-commerce
and other emerging areas is showing a strong momentum. Our cooperation at the sub-national level is also
booming. All this has brought tangible benefits to both the Chinese and the Russian peoples and provided
unceasing driving force for our respective development and rejuvenation.
Our two sides have acted on the vision of lasting friendship and steadily strengthened our traditional friendship.
On the occasion of commemorating the 20th anniversary of the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness
and Friendly Cooperation, President Putin and I announced the extension of the Treaty and added new
dimensions to it. Our two sides have held eight “theme years” at the national level and continued to write new
chapters for China-Russia friendship and cooperation. Our two peoples have stood by and rooted for each other
in the fight against COVID, which once again proves that “a friend in need is a friend indeed”.
Our two sides have had close coordination on the international stage and fulfilled our responsibilities as major
countries. China and Russia are firmly committed to safeguarding the UN-centered international system, the
international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms of international relations based on the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We have stayed in close communication and coordination in the UN,
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the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the G20 and other multilateral mechanisms, and worked
together for a multi-polar world and greater democracy in international relations. We have been active in
new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind.
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practicing true multilateralism, promoting the common values of humanity, and championing the building of a
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Looking back on the extraordinary journey of China-Russia relations over the past 70 years and more, we feel
strongly that our relationship has not reached easily where it is today, and that our friendship is growing steadily
and must be cherished by us all. China and Russia have found a right path of state-to-state interactions. This is
both history and reality.
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essential for the relationship to stand the test of changing international circumstances, a lesson borne out by
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My upcoming visit to Russia will be a journey of friendship, cooperation and peace. I look forward to working
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with President Putin to jointly adopt a new vision, a new blueprint and new measures for the growth of China-
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Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the years to come.
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To this end, our two sides need to enhance coordination and planning. As we focus on our respective cause of
development and rejuvenation, we 4O9S6Uget creative in our thinking, create new opportunities and inject new
should
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impetus. It is important that we increase mutual trust and bring out the potential of bilateral cooperation to keep
China-Russia relations at a high level.
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Our two sides need to raise both the quality and quantity of investment and economic cooperation and step up
policy coordination to create favorable conditions for the high-quality development of our investment
cooperation. We need to boost two-way trade, foster more convergence of interests and areas of cooperation,
and promote the complementary and synchronized development of traditional trade and emerging areas of
cooperation. We need to make sustained efforts to synergize the Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian
Economic Union, so as to provide more institutional support for bilateral and regional cooperation.
Our two sides need to step up people-to-people and cultural exchanges and ensure the success of China-
Russia Years of Sports Exchange. We should make good use of the sub-national cooperation mechanisms to
facilitate more interactions between sister provincesstates and cities. We should encourage personnel
tr- exchanges
5D 5B7I3C4E9J6Fand push for the resumption of tourism cooperation. We should make available better summer
camps, jointly-run schools and other programs to steadily enhance the mutual understanding and friendship
between our peoples, especially between the youth.
The world today is going through profound changes unseen in a century. The historical trend of peace,
development and win-win cooperation is unstoppable. The prevailing trends of world multi-polarity, economic
globalization and greater democracy in international relations are irreversible. On the other hand, our world is
confronted with complex and intertwined traditional and non-traditional security challenges, damaging acts of
hegemony, domination and bullying, and long and tortuous global economic recovery. Countries around the
world are deeply concerned and eager to find a cooperative way out of the crisis.
In March 2013, when speaking at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, I observed that countries
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are linked with and dependent on one another at tr- a 5Q
level never seen before, and that mankind, living in the same
global village, have increasingly emerged as a community with a shared future in which everyone’s interests are
closely entwined. Since then, I have proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative,
the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative on different occasions. All these have enriched
our vision for a community with a shared future for mankind and provided practical pathways toward it. They are
part of China’s response to the changes of the world, of our times, and of the historic trajectory.
Through these ten years, the common values of humanity -- peace, development, equity, justice, democracy
and freedom -- have taken deeper roots in the heart of the people. An open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world
with lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity has become the shared aspiration of more and
more countries. The international community has recognized that no country is superior to others, no model of
governance is universal, and no single country should dictate the international order. The common interest of all
humankind is in a world that is united and peaceful, rather than divided and volatile.
Since last year, there has been an all-round escalation of the Ukraine crisis. China has all along upheld an
objective and impartial position based on the merits of the issue, and actively promoted peace talks. I have put
forth several proposals, i.e., observing the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, respect of the legitimate
security concerns of all countries, supporting all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis, and
ensuring the stability of global industrial and supply chains. They have become China’s fundamental principles
for addressing the Ukraine crisis.
Not long ago, we released China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, which takes into
account the legitimate concerns of all parties and reflects the broadest common understanding of the
international community on the crisis. It has been constructive in mitigating the spillovers of the crisis and
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facilitating its political settlement. There is no simple solution to a complex issue. We believe that as long as all
parties embrace the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and pursue equal-
crisis as well as a broad path toward a world of lasting peace and common security.
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footed, rational and results-oriented dialogue and consultation, they will find a reasonable way to resolve the
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To run the world’s affairs well, one must first and foremost run its own affairs well. The Chinese people, under
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the leadership of the Communist Party of China, are striving in unity to advance the rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation on all fronts through the Chinese path to modernization. Chinese modernization is characterized by the
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following features it is the modernization of a huge population, the modernization of common prosperity for all,
the modernization of material and cultural-ethical advancement, the modernization of harmony between
humanity and nature, and the modernization of peaceful development. These distinctive Chinese features are
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the crystallization of our practices and explorations over the years, and reflect our profound understanding of
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international experience. Going forward, we will steadfastly advance the cause of Chinese modernization, strive
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to realize high-quality development, and expand high-standard opening up. I believe that this will bring new
development opportunities to Russia and all countries in the world.
Just as every new year starts
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spring,
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4O9S6Uevery success starts with actions. We have every reason to expect
that China and Russia, as fellow travelers on the journey of development and rejuvenation, will make new and
greater contributions to human advancement.
2. Article 02
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Article Name: G7 ‘outreach’ an effort to build consensus on global issues
G7 ‘outreach’ an effort to build consensus on global issues like Ukraine, China, and climate change
HIROSHIMA, Japan (AP) — Leaders of the Group of Seven wealthy democracies have joined their counterparts
from other countries during their summit in Japan to try to expand the G7’s sway and to include voices from the
so-called Global South.
From South America to South Asia, Ukraine to the South Pacific, the guests represent a carefully considered
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of countries including big emerging economies like Australia, Brazil, Indonesia and India and smaller
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ones like the Comoros and Cook Islands.
Critics accuse the G7 of being an “elite club” of countries whose relevance as global leaders is being eclipsed
by up-and-coming powers. By including leaders of big but less wealthy democracies like India and Brazil, Japan
and the other G7 countries aim to amplify their consensus on vital issues like the war in Ukraine, China’s
growing assertiveness, debt and development issues and climate change.
It’s something of an odd assortment, but there’s a method to the mixture.
South Korea is a key ally of the U.S. and Japan, with a huge stake in regional security and stability. The
Comoros, an archipelago off the coast of East Africa, is currently chairing the African Union — a vital connection
to a continent that increasingly is the focus of rivalry between Western democracies in China.
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The Cook Islands is heading the Pacific Islands Forum — another link to a strategically important region.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has said another aim is to highlight the importance of the Global South
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As the only Asian G7 member, Japan has a special role
to play in that regard, said Yuichi Hosoya, a professor of international politics at Tokyo’s Keio University.
In a joint statement issued Saturday, the G7 leaders underscored their commitment to helping countries cope
with debts that have mounted to perilous levels during the pandemic and war in Ukraine. They also reiterated
their aim to pull together up to $600 billion in financing for projects to develop infrastructure such as railways,
clean energy and telecommunications in developing nations.
Kishida convened a session of G7 leaders and guests that included executives from Citigroup and other private
partners to discuss how to get more done — and offer an alternative to financing from China with investments in
a “transparent and fair manner.”
“We’re just getting started. Together we have a lot to do to close the infrastructure gap,” President Joe Biden
told the gathering, pointing to a railway project in West Africa that he said would improve food security and
supply chains.
“Let’s commit to showing that democracies can deliver,” Biden said. “We have to deliver.”
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, said the effort might raise the amount of
investment from “billions to trillions.”
“We want to put a better offer on the table,” she said.
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A key aim of including a broader set of countries in the annual G7 summit is to help build agreement ahead of
the annual summit of the broader Group of 20 major economies in India later this year.
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“Important global issues cannot be solved” without the other countries, Hosoya said. “Without the support
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coming from the countries in the Global South, the G7 cannot, unlike before, effectively respond to the most
pressing issues in the world.”
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Indonesia was host of the G20 last year and Brazil will host the meetings in 2024. All have complicated relations
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with China and Russia and the G7 is seeking support for its efforts to push Russia to end the war. India has
abstained several times from voting on U.N. resolutions against Moscow and has increased its imports of
Russian oil, while calling for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.
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Brazil and India belong to the so-called BRICS group of developing nations, that also includes China, Russia
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and South Africa. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva recently visited China to strengthen ties with its
biggest trade market.
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Vietnam is an increasingly important
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region’s fastest growing economies.
trading
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tr-5Q5R7S3ULike
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9S6U partner for the U.S., Japan and other G7 nations and one of the
Japan, it has territorial disputes with China.
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“At a time when the world is heading toward divisions, one of the most important issues is to figure out how to
steer the world in one direction and regain cooperation and Japan is expected to play an important role as a
bridge between G7 and the so-called Global South countries including the G20,” said Akio Takahara, a
professor at University of Tokyo.
3. Article 03
Article Name: G7
The Group of Seven (G7) is an intergovernmental political forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States; additionally, the European Union (EU) is a non-enumerated
member. It is organized around shared values of pluralism, liberal democracy, and representative government.]
tr- As
5D5Bof 2020,
7I3C 4E9J6FG7 members are large IMF advanced economies and account for over half of global net wealth (at
over $200 trillion), 30 to 43 percent of global gross domestic product,[n 1] and 10 percent of the world's
population (770 million people). Some members are great powers in global affairs and maintain mutually close
political, economic, diplomatic, and military relations.
Originating from an ad hoc gathering of finance ministers in 1973, the G7 has since become a formal, high-
profile venue for discussing and coordinating solutions to major global issues, especially in the areas of trade,
security, economics, and climate change.Each member's head of government or state, along with the EU's
Commission President and Council President, meet annually at the G7 Summit; other high-ranking officials of
the G7 and the EU meet throughout the year. Representatives of other states and international organizations
are often invited as guests, with Russia having been a formal member (as part of the G8) from 1997 to 2014.
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tr-5Q5R secretariat or office. It is organized through a presidency
The G7 is not based on a treaty and has no permanent
that rotates annually among the member states, with the presiding state setting the group's priorities and hosting
the summit; Japan presides for 2023. While lacking a legal or institutional basis, the G7 is widely considered to
wield significant international influence; it has catalyzed or spearheaded several major global initiatives,
including efforts to combat the HIVAIDS pandemic, provide financial aid to developing countries, and address
climate change through the 2015 Paris Agreement. However, the group has been criticized by observers for its
allegedly outdated and limited membership, narrow global representation, and ineffectualness. It is also
opposed by anti-globalization groups, which often protest at summits. It has also been widely criticized as a
Western imperialist summit, as the members of the grouping all have varying ties to historical and modern-day
imperialism.
History Origins
The concept of a forum for the capitalist world's major industrialized countries emerged before the 1973 oil
crisis. On 25 March 1973, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, George Shultz, convened an informal gathering of
finance ministers from West Germany (Helmut Schmidt), France (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing), and the United
Kingdom (Anthony Barber) before an upcoming meeting in Washington, D.C. U.S. President Richard Nixon
offered the White House as a venue, and the meeting was subsequently held in its library on the ground floor;
the original group of four consequently became known as the Library Group. In mid-1973, at the Spring
Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Shultz proposed the addition of Japan, which
all members accepted. The informal gathering of senior financial officials from the U.S., U.K., West Germany,
Japan, and France became known as the Group of Five.
In 1974, all five members endured sudden and often troubled changes in leadership. French President Georges
Pompidou abruptly died, leading to a fresh presidential election that was closely won by Valéry Giscard
d'Estaing. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, American President Richard Nixon, and Japanese Prime
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Minister Kakuei Tanaka all resigned due to scandals. In the United Kingdom, a hung election led to a minority
government whose subsequent instability prompted another election the same year. Consequently, Nixon's
another.
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successor, Gerald Ford, proposed a retreat the following year for the group's new leaders to learn about one
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First summit and expansion
First G6 summit at the Chateau de Rambouillet in November 1975
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At the initiative of Giscard d'Estaing and his German counterpart, Helmut Schmidt, France hosted a three-day
summit in November 1975, inviting the Group of Five plus Italy, forming the Group of Six (G6). Taking place at
the Château de Rambouillet, the meeting focused on several major economic issues, including the oil crisis, the
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collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and the ongoing global recession. The result was the 15-point
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Declaration of Rambouillet, which, among other positions, announced the group's united commitment to
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promoting free trade, multilateralism, cooperation with the developing world, and rapprochement with the
Eastern Bloc.The members also established plans for future gatherings to take place regularly every year.
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tr-5QHarold
In 1976, British Prime Minister
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5R7S3U Wilson, who had participated in the first G6 summit, resigned from office;
Schmidt and Ford believed the group needed an English speaker with more political experience, and advocated
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for inviting Pierre Trudeau, who had been Prime Minister of Canada for eight years – significantly longer than
any G6 leader. Canada was also the next largest advanced economy after the G6 members.The summit in
Dorado, Puerto Rico later that year became the first of the current Group of Seven (G7).
In 1977, the United Kingdom, which hosted that year's summit, invited the European Economic Community to
join all G7 summits; beginning in 1981, it had[clarification needed] gathering through the president of the
European Commission and the leader of the country holding the presidency of the Council of the European
Union. Since 2009, the then-newly established position of the President of the European Council, who serves as
the Union's principal foreign representative, also regularly attends the summits.
Rising profile
Flags of G7 members as seen on University Avenue, Toronto (September 2016)
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Until
tr-5D the 1985 Plaza Accord, meetings between the seven governments' finance ministers were not public
knowledge. The Accord, which involved only the original Group of Five, was announced the day before it was
finalized, with a communiqué issued afterward. The 1980s also marked the G7's expanded concerns beyond
macroeconomic issues, namely with respect to international security and conflict; for example, it sought to
address the ongoing conflicts between Iran and Iraq and between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
Following the 1994 summit in Naples, Russian officials held separate meetings with leaders of the G7. This
informal arrangement was dubbed the Political 8 (P8), colloquially the G7+1. At the invitation of the G7 leaders,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin was invited first as a guest observer, and later as a full participant. After the
1997 meeting, Russia was formally invited to the next meeting and formally joined the group in 1998, resulting in
the Group of Eight (G8). Russia was an outlier in the group, as it lacked the national wealth and financial weight
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of other members, had never been a major advanced tr-5Q5R7S3U4O
economy, and was not yet an established liberal
democracy. Its invitation, made during a difficult transition to a post-communist economy, is believed to have
been motivated by a desire to encourage its political and economic reforms and international engagement.
Russia's membership was suspended in March 2014 in response to its annexation of Crimea.[25][26][27]
Members stopped short of permanently ejecting the country, and in subsequent years expressed an openness
or express desire to reinstate Russian participation. In January 2017, Russia announced it would permanently
leave the G8, which came into effect June 2018. In 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump, backed by Italian Prime
Minister Giuseppe Conte, advocated for Russia's return; all other members rejected the proposal, and Russia
expressed no interest.
Renewed calls for expanded membership

There have been various proposals to expand the G7. The U.S.-based Atlantic Council has held the D-10
Strategy Forum since 2014 with representatives from what it calls leading democracies which support a rules-
based democratic order, consisting of all members of the G7 (including the European Union) plus Australia and
South Korea. Several democratic countries – including India, Indonesia, Poland, and Spain – participate as
observers. Centered around a similar mandate as the G7, the D-10 has been considered by some analysts to
be an alternative to the group;[33] This is also favored by various think tanks and former British leader Boris
Johnson.
In 2019 under Putin, Russia had signaled support for the inclusion of China, India, and Turkey if the G7 had
reinstated Russian membership.
In 2020 under Trump, the U.S. had signaled support for the inclusion of Australia, Brazil, India, and South
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Korea, plus the reincorporation of Russia. The leaders of the other six G7 members unanimously rejected this
proposal, and suggested they'd be more inclined to expel the United States than to reinstate Russia.
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Also in November 2020, Jared Cohen and Richard Fontaine, writing in Foreign Affairs, suggested that the G7
.
might be expanded to a T-12 of Techno Democracies. Earlier, in June of that same year, the Global Partnership
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on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) was announced. Something of a spin-out of the G7, founded by members
Canada and France, GPAI's initial membership was 15, including both the EU and India, as well as Australia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Slovenia, and the Republic of Korea.
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Boris Johnson invited members of Australia and the Republic of Korea to the June 2021 G7 summit.[33] India
was also invited to the 2021 summit, with an aim to deepen the expertise and experience around the table along
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with the other guests, according to a U.K. government statement.
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In 2021, French jurist and consultant Eric Garner de Béville, a member of the Cercle Montesquieu, proposed
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Spain's membership to the G7.[40] American Chargé d'Affaires in Spain, Conrad Tribble, stated that the United
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States enthusiastically supports a greater role of Spanish leadership at the international level.
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In 2022, Germany has confirmed it will be inviting India,[42] against rumours to the contrary.
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In 2023, Japan's prime minister Fumio Kishida invited South Korea, Australia, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Vietnam,
Comoros (representing the African Union), the Cook Islands (representing the Pacific Islands Forum) and
Ukraine to the 49th summit hosted in Hiroshima.
Activities and initiatives
G7 is located in Europe1st1st3rd, 10th, 17th3rd, 10th, 17th4th, 11th4th, 11th6th, 13th6th, 13th 8th 8th 15th 15th
18th 18th 20th 20th 22nd 22nd 24th 24th 25th 25th 27th 27th 29th 29th 31st 31st 32nd 32nd 33rd 33rd 35th
35th 37th 37th 39th 39th 40th 40th 41st 41st 43rd' 43rd' 45th 45th 47th 47th
Host venues of G7 summits in Europe
The G7 was founded primarily to facilitate shared macroeconomic initiatives in response to contemporary
economic problems; the first gathering was centered around the Nixon shock, the 1970s energy crisis, and the
ensuing global
9J6F recession.[51] Since 1975, the group has met annually at summits organized and hosted by
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whichever country occupies the annually-rotating presidency;[52] since 1987, the G7 Finance Ministers have
met at least semi-annually, and up to four times a year at stand-alone meetings.
Beginning in the 1980s, the G7 broadened its areas of concern to include issues of international security,
human rights, and global security; for example, during this period, the G7 concerned itself with the ongoing Iran-
Iraq War and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.[52] In the 1990s, it launched a debt-relief program for the 42
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC);[54] provided $300 million to help build the Shelter Structure over the
damaged reactor at Chernobyl;[55] and established the Financial Stability Forum to help in managing the
international monetary system.[56]
G7 is located in North America 2nd 2nd 7th 7th 9th 9th 14th 14th 16th 16th 21st 21st 23rd 23rd 28th 28th 30th
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30th 36th 36th 38th 38th 44th 44th tr-5Q5R7S3U4O
Host venues of G7 summits in North America
At the turn of the 21st century, the G7 began emphasizing engagement with the developing world. At the 1999
summit, the group helped launch the G20, a similar forum made up of the G7 and the next 13 largest economies
(including the European Union), in order to promote dialogue between major industrial and emerging market
countries;[56] the G20 has been touted by some of its members as a replacement for the G7.Having previously
announced a plan to cancel 90% of bilateral debt for the HIPC, totaling $100 billion, in 2005 the G7 announced
debt reductions of up to 100% to be negotiated on a case by case basis.
Following the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, which was the worst of its kind since the 1970s, the G7 met
twice in Washington, D.C. in 2008 and in Rome, the following February.News media reported that much of the
world was looking to the group for leadership and solutions. G7 finance ministers pledged to take all necessary
steps to stem the crisis, devising an aggressive action plan that included providing publicly funded capital
infusions to banks in danger of failing. Some analysts criticized the group for seemingly advocating that
individual governments develop individual responses to the recession, rather than cohere around a united effort.
In subsequent years, the G7 has faced several geopolitical challenges that have led some international analysts
to question its credibility,or propose its replacement by the G20. On 2 March 2014, the G7 condemned the
Russian Federation for its violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine through its military
intervention. The group also announced its commitment to mobilize rapid technical assistance to support
Ukraine in addressing its macroeconomic, regulatory and anti-corruption challenges, while adding that the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was best suited to stabilizing the country's finances and economy.
G7 is located in Japan5th, 12th, 19th5th, 12th, 19th 26th 26th 34th 34th 42nd 42nd 49th 49th
Host venues of G7 summits in Japan
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In response to Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, on 24 March the G7 convened an emergency
meeting at the official residence of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, the Catshuis in The Hague; this
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location was chosen because all G7 leaders were already present to attend the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit
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hosted by the Netherlands. This was the first G7 meeting neither taking place in a member state nor having the
.
host leader participating in the meeting. The upcoming G8 summit in Sochi, Russia was moved to Brussels,
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where the EU was the host. On 5 June 2014 the G7 condemned Moscow for its continuing violation of Ukraine's
sovereignty and stated they were prepared to impose further sanctions on Russia.[70] This meeting was the first
since Russia was suspended from the G8, and subsequently it has not been involved in any G7 summit.
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The G7 has continued to take a strong stance against Russia's destabilising behaviour and malign activities in
Ukraine and elsewhere around the world, following the joint communique from the June 2021 summit in the U.K.
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The group also called on Russia to address international cybercrime attacks launched from within its borders,
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and to investigate the use of chemical weapons on Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. The June 2021
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summit also saw the G7 commit to helping the world recover from the global COVID-19 pandemic (including
plans to help vaccinate the entire world); encourage further action against climate change and biodiversity loss;
and promote shared values of pluralism and
o
6U
p
democracy.
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9S
In 2022, G7 leaders were invited to attend an extraordinary summit of NATO called in response to the 2022
Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Summit organization
T
The annual G7 summit is attended by each member's head of government.The member country holding the G7
presidency is responsible for organizing and hosting the year's summit. The serial annual summits can be
parsed chronologically in arguably distinct ways, including as the sequence of host countries for the summits
has recurred over time and series. Generally every country hosts the summit once every seven years.
Besides a main meeting in June or July, a number of other meetings may take place throughout the year; in
2021 for example, seven tracks existed for finance (4–5 June 2021), environmental (20 and 21 May 2021),
health (3–4 June 2021), trade (27–28 May 2021), interior (7–9 September 2021) digital and technology (28–29
April 2021), development (3–5 May 2021) and foreign ministers.
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4. Article 04
Article Name: Iran-Saudi deal and its geopolitical connotations
Over the years, a new wave of reconciliation and rapprochement are being witnessed among the archrivals
across the Middle East. The region tormented by more than a decade of violence and chaos involving militias,
proxies, and both internal and external military assaults now seems in search of a new polity after the not-so-
early realization that past geopolitical, diplomatic ad hocism merely exposed the power limitation, political
ineptness and fragility of state systems in the region.
Amid the major geopolitical alterations represented by the Abraham Accord, the end of Qatar’s blockade,
Türkiye’s all-out normalization process, and an imminent 4O9S6U
reinstatement
tr-5Q5R7S3U of Syria in the Arab League, what came
as a startling diplomatic exercise was the signing of the Iran-Saudi Arabia truce to restore diplomatic ties under
the auspices of China on March 10, 2023.
Under this deal, both countries would open missions and consulates in each other's capitals soon and high-level
visits from both sides is likely to follow. Both sides have promised to resume past security pacts and revisit
agreements on trade and technology. This deadlock ended after almost seven years of diplomatic impasse
while both sides had decades of engagement through their proxies and militias in different parts of the region.
Arab commentators view the "Beijing Agreement," as it is called in media parlance, as a gateway to new history
in the region and many have compared it to the Elysee Agreement signed between France and West Germany
in 1963 which ended the worst part of war history in Europe.
The China-mediated agreement has proved that the world is beyond conflicts and grudges, and all conflict later
or sooner leads to peace alone. It is also expected that this deal can usher into a new era of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC)-Iran relationship and other GCC member countries might rush to elevate its own
ties with Iran.
Truce manifests shifting geopolitics
The deal can neither be seen only as an extension of ongoing strategic regional readjustment nor in complete
isolation but certainly, it reflects changing regional and global strategic templates.
The China-mediated peace deal does not represent a growing urge of China to diversify its role in the region
alone but also an explicit sign of diminishing U.S. appetite in the Middle East because of its growing
disillusionment with the emerging new polity and perhaps its own deliberate preference for a shift in its strategic
pivot.
o m
The past efforts by Oman and Iraq in 2021-2022 to make both sides sit across the table are no more a secret
c
but they perhaps failed to offer anything tangible because of their inability, as a small-size power to ensure the
the deal.
rs .
sustenance of the deal or exert pressure in case any of the parties drifts or deviates from the core principals of
e
China is more capable to prevail over both if such a situation arises because of its higher economic and political
leverages. Moreover, China is no more only an economic actor there and in the recent past has diversified its
k
imprints and has sighed mega deals with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
n
This mediation effort by China is likely to deepen and widen its template of engagement in the region and the
a
country already seems in pursuit of a new blueprint, which of course would be devoid of U.S.-like designs or
objectives.
r
p
The U.S. growing perplexity in the region was evident for a long but it became more obvious over the last few
6U
7S3U4O9Sin
years when it started askingtr-the
5Q5Rregimes the Middle East to take care of its own security and demonstrated all
o
apathy toward its core allies when their oil installations and other strategic sites were allegedly targeted by Iran
T
in 2019. What further incensed Iran was the cancellation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
and U.S. President Joe Biden’s aggressive anti-Saudi rhetoric during his election campaign and his early days
in the White House embittered Saudi Arabia.
The prospect of a new security milieu and the growing signs of U.S. disengagement might have impelled Saudi
Arabia to revisit its past policy and work for the creation of a tension-freer region.
From Saudi’s perspective, the deal is a sign of a shift from politics for the sake of focus on economic realms in
accordance with its Vision 2030, which by all means requires a stable region.
For Iran, on the other hand, this deal seems a step further toward strengthening its bond with both Russia and
China, which are posing a new set of challenges to its old foe – the United States – and both are also bent on
changing 9Jthe
6F hitherto U.S.-led global order. Regionally, the deal might deter the prospect of growing proximity
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between Saudi Arabia and Israel whose current Prime Minister Netanyahu imagines Iran as a part of his
personal crusade.
Increased diplomatic efforts between Iran and Saudi Arabia could potentially undermine Israel's motivation to
build an anti-Iran alliance in the region. Success breeds success, and there is a possibility that Saudi Arabia
could even play a role as a mediator in future negotiations between Iran and the U.S.
Bad deal is worse than no deal
While it is important to approach negotiations with honesty, it is equally crucial to recognize that a bad deal is
worse than no deal. Therefore, it would be shortsighted to harbor optimism or enthusiasm at this stage. There is
a long way to go before the objective of the deal is accomplished, even partially, as many of the regional issues
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are directly linked to old Iran-Saudi discord. tr-5Q5R7S3U4O
Instead of content or the scope of the deal, one needs to wait to see if the accord would bring peaceful political
order in war-torn Yemen or if the promised peace would ensure the security and safety of oil and other strategic
installations across the region or halt the rocket attacks across different borders or Iraq and Lebanon would see
the return of a new stable polity.
Until these issues are resolved, this deal would serve no purpose for the war-torn region. The success of the
deal also depends upon Israel and one needs to see if the current hawkish policy of Israel and a deal could
coexist, and if so, for how long, and if not, what would be the fate of the deal. The U.S. has already expressed
its pessimism and stated that it was not sure if the Iranians would honor their commitment. The biggest
challenge is how the deal could be immunized to the obstacle ahead.
There is no reason that the U.S. should not prefer a peaceful region but it would, in no way, like to see an
enhanced role for China in the region. Though China, no doubt, is making inroads in the Middle East rapidly but
imagining China as replacing the U.S. as a security provider or peace guarantor would be a far-fetched
conclusion and a China-mediated deal is not likely to rock the century-old U.S.-Saudi marriage.
Washington has seen the region not only evolving but has been an instrument in shaping the region into what it
is today while China is still a new entrant. Despite all these ifs and buts, the importance of the deal cannot be
undermined when it comes to building trust or paving the way for the next step toward regional integration, and
soon, there would be a mix of continuities and changes in the Saudi-Iran relationship.
5. Article 05
Article Name: Macrons-‘Strategic-Autonomy-An-Interpretation-Drawn-from-Chinese-
International-Theory
Macron’s ‘Strategic Autonomy’: An Interpretation
c o m
Drawn from Chinese International Theory
CHIA-YU LIANG, APR 18 2023
rs .
French President Emmanuel Macron engendered a controversy regarding his comments on Europe’s relations
k e
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US) during his visit to China in April 2023. He
advocated for European sovereignty, which would require European states to reduce their dependency on the
US and not be involved in the Sino-Taiwan conflict, as it is not of Europe’s doing, but an issue of ‘the US
n
agenda and a Chinese overreaction’ (Anderlini and Caulcutt 2023). The idea of European sovereignty is so
a
crucial to Macron’s vision for Europe that he reiterated it in a speech in the Netherlands (Macron 2023) where
r
he characterised his vision for Europe as a dream by invoking George Steiner’s imagery of cafés. This vision, or
p
dream, is for Europe to be a third superpower. This dream deserves further examination because on the one
hand, it clearly breaks away5Qfrom the9Sprospect
6U of a bipolar world order that is often characterised in the
tr- 5R7S3U4O
War II international order.

o
language of a ‘new Cold War’. On the other hand, the fact that a former colonial empire is championing the
establishment of a new superpower provides invaluable insight for reviewing the formulation of the post-World
T
However potentially rich the controversy the philosopher president’s vision provoked may be, the dispute has
neglected one indispensable perspective: the Chinese perspective. The debate effectively centres on whether
France – and Europe – should be ‘America’s follower’ without ‘strategic autonomy’ and framed the issue as the
relations between two agents: Europe and the US. Nevertheless, Macron expressed his view during his visit to
the PRC, which is exactly the other superpower next to the US. For him to advocate for Europe as a third
superpower, the neglect of the second superpower seems curious. Furthermore, the PRC’s potential invasion of
Taiwan is exactly what the US as the first superpower sought to deter, and what Macron sought to dissuade
European states from engaging with. Finally, it is actually possible to examine China’s view on Macron’s vision,
since Chinese academics have produced abundant scholarship on Chinese International Relations Theory (IRT)
tr- that
5B7Iis based
5D 3C4E 9J6F on sources of Chinese Intellectual History and Chinese Philosophy, forming a large scope of
Chinese perspectives on international politics. Without taking the Chinese perspective into consideration, the
debate over Macron’s vision cannot reach a comprehensive assessment of his idea.
This article provides one possible Chinese perspective for assessing Macron’s vision. The perspective is
provided by the interpretation of a Chinese classical text, ‘On Six States’ by Su Xun (1009–1066). Before
engaging with Su’s article, I must first explain why the interpretation of this classical text could constitute a
Chinese perspective.
Chinese International Relations Theory: Themes and Method
To call a perspective ‘Chinese’ does not mean that there is one unified and coherent Chinese viewpoint, but
rather a set of formulated perspectives that distinguish themselves from the hegemonic western ones, whereby
3U4O9S6U
tr-5Q5R7Sthat
such a formulation is based on the intellectual tradition is called Chinese. Similarly, other traditions could
form their perspectives based on the resource of their respective intellectual traditions. The recognition of the
need for these non-Western traditions’ contribution in the renovation of IRT was the drive behind the discussion
of non-Western IRT (see Acharya and Buzan 2007). In this development, Chinese scholars put forth several
versions of Chinese IRT, which are diversified in their themes, but unified in their method of theory-building.
Categorised thematically, there are at least Yan Xuetong’s moral realism, which integrates the concept of
morality into realist IRT (Trigkas 2020), Qin Yaqing’s relational theory, which underscores relationality in
Confucian thought as the ontological foundation of IRT, Zhao Tingyang’s theory of the tianxia system, which
advocates for the supremacy of the traditional Chinese worldview of tianxia (All-under-Heaven) to tackle
problems in a globalised world, and Ren Xiao’s symbiosis theory, which reinterprets traditional China’s
diplomatic practice and political thought as constituting an alternative to the western-dominated international
order (see Grydehøj and Su 2022). These theories differ in their epistemological assumptions and thematic foci,
and their thematic propositions have proved to be useful in explaining the PRC’s rhetoric in her foreign policy.
However, on the methodological front, these theories all apply the same approach of rediscovering ancient
Chinese political thoughts and reinterpreting them for the identification of keywords to be the cornerstone of
their theorybuilding. Moral realism underscores the teaching of the Confucian thinker Xunzi; relational theory
expanded to Confucius and other Confucian thinkers; tianxia theory effectively invoked most influential schools
of thought of preimperial China, including Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism; and symbiosis theory even
more freely incorporated concepts such as yin-yang and ‘the symbiosis/unity of Heaven and Man’.
The similar approach resulted in, first, the common embracement of a series of concepts, including non-
exteriority, allinclusive, co-existence, characterised as core values of Chinese tradition; second, the general
justification of officially proclaimed foreign policy objectives, such as Hu Jintao’s harmonious world and Xi
Jinping’s Community of common destiny (Ibid., 38); and thirdly, certain shared methodological weaknesses that
m
other IR scholars indicated in their criticism of Chinese IRT. For example, William Callahan acutely challenged
Zhao’s interpretation of tianxia as based on a decontextualised misinterpretation of Chinese classics such as
Dao De Jing (Callahan 2008).
.c o
Nevertheless, these theoretical constructs do form a perspective that is distinct from the major IRTs that have
rs
long relied on categories developed in the western tradition, such as state sovereignty, balance of power, and
norm construction. It is therefore possible to argue that the Chinese perspective on international affairs could
continue to be constructed if one follows the method of these Chinese IRT, that is, appropriating from the
k e
intellectual resource of pre-modern China, and extracting from the appropriated source crucial concepts and
rationales that are distinct from those of the western traditions. The question then is: which materials in the
abundant resource of traditional Chinese political thought should be appropriated so that Macron’s vision can be
r n
re-examined, and the examination can be seen as from a Chinese perspective?
a
The Lesson from Chinese Classical Text: Sun Xun’s ‘On the Six States’
To address this question, I propose revisiting the Chinese classical text, ‘On the Six States’ authored by Su Xun,
for three reasons. First, it is an exemplary
Masters of Tang and Song tr-
The text ‘On the
o
Empires,
4O9S6U
5Q5R7S3Uand
p
text, by a representative author. Su Xun is enlisted in the Eight
recognised as a prominent figure in the long history of Chinese literati.
T
Six States’ is one of the two major classical texts that commented on the first unified Chinese empire, Qin
Empire (221 – 207 BCE): Jia Yi (200 – 168 BEC) of Han Empire analysed the fall of Qin Empire in his ‘On the
Faults of Qin’, while Su Xun’s ‘On the Six States’ analysed the rise of Qin, by annihilating the other six major
states. This then leads to the second reason, that is, the contextual correspondence between the context of Su
and of Macron, as well as the thematic correspondence between Su’s text and Macron’s vision. Su analysed the
rise of Qin in 221 BCE for the purpose of criticising Song Empire’s policy towards neighbouring empires such as
the Khitan Liao Empire and Tangut Xia Empire, which entailed paying an annual tribute of wealth and goods to
appease the two non-Chinese empires. Macron’s aspiration is situated in the Sino-US contestation, and has
been criticised for breaking away from the western united front and for appeasing China. Finally, Su’s method in
this text, namely appropriating the past to analyse his present, is in accordance with the method of Chinese IRT,
and the4Eappropriation of Su’s work to analyse our present could therefore be considered a possible argument of
tr-5D 5B7I3C 9J6F
Chinese IRT.
In ‘On the Six States’ (see Cai 2022), Su argued that the founding of the first Chinese empire, Qin, as a result of
Qin’s annihilation of the other six states, was not permitted by the military weakness of the latter, but by the
bribery the six states made to Qin. By bribery, Su meant the cession of territory. Su argued that, on the one
hand, those states ceding lands to Qin in exchange for temporary peace weakened them, and by extension they
also weakened other states that did not cede any territory to Qin. Su based his analysis on the judgment made
by the ‘Chinese Herodotus’ Sima Qian (c. 145 – 86 BCE), who in his work that founded the Chinese
historiographical tradition, Records of the Grand Historian, assessed that ‘appeasing Qin by ceding lands is like
putting out fire with timber – only the total consumption of the last timber could succeed’.
Based on this, Su further examined the three states that did
7S3U 9S6Ucede any land to Qin, namely the states of Qi,
4Onot
tr-5Q5R
Yan, and Zhao. In Su’s view, the three states not agreeing to the cession of territory was the reason why two of
them, Qi and Yan, were the last to be conquered. Zhao fell earlier, but defeated Qin repeatedly before its doom.
More importantly, in Su’s view, the state of Qi, being the last to fall under the might of Qin, could have avoided
this fate if Qi had assisted the other five states. Su, in conclusion, argued that the fate of the six fallen states
could have been avoided, if they had given the land not to the aggressor Qin but to the talents of All-under-
Heaven, if they had paid respect not to Qin but to the advisers on interstate affairs. With this conclusion, Su was
effectively criticising the Song court’s policy of tribute-paying to Khitan Liao and Tangut Xia.
What is the perspective that Su’s text provides for the interpretation of the controversy engendered by Macron’s
comments? First, it provided an understanding of the strategic options for both the rising hegemon (Qin in Su’s
article) and the resisting powers (the six states in Su’s article). The rising hegemon benefits from the concession
and disunity of other states, while the other states’ resistance can only be meaningfully achieved by their unity.
By proposing the Europe as the third superpower, Macron could identify the Europe as the rising hegemon,
which however is different from the US that sees the PRC as the rising hegemon. The avoidance of whether the
PRC is the rising hegemon devalues Macron’s proposal of ‘stopping to follow the US’, because it eschews the
question of ‘following the PRC’. In this sense, the western approach to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is more
in accordance with the advocacy of Su’s text. Furthermore, Macron’s proposition could actually serve to benefit
the PRC, especially as Macron included the avoidance of safeguarding Taiwan’s autonomy in his strategy for
formulating European sovereignty. This means that the interest of the PRC in taking over Taiwan is not a
disinterest for sovereign Europe. In Su’s view, however, this would actually be a weakening of first Taiwan, then
the US, then other western states, as per the domino effect Su described in his analysis. This then leads us to
the final lesson Macron can learn from Su, that is: who is the taker in the international system now? In Su’s
argument, the state of Qin was the taker, which demands cession of territory from other states incessantly. In
Macron’s proposition, there is no clear identification of the taker in the international order, nor the state that
m
takes from France and Europe – between the US and the PRC, which demands concession from Europe? If
o
Su’s teaching serves, Macron would benefit from identifying the taker first, and then propose to ‘stop following
the taker’.
c
Conclusion
rs .
In this article, I reviewed Macron’s proposition for Europe, that is to (1) stop following the US, (2) avoid being
forcefully involved in the Sino-Taiwan conflict, and (3) establish a third superpower to safeguard European
e
sovereignty, by extracting a Chinese perspective from Su Xun’s classical text, ‘On the Six States’. I did so by
following the method of theory-building of Chinese IRT, that is: appropriating sources of traditional Chinese
k
political thought to reinterpret the international order and actions. This is of course not the only perspective that
n
can be extracted from Chinese traditional thought, considering the rich civilisational legacy of China. However,
as the major trends in Chinese IRT avoid an in-depth explanation of military conflicts and the annihilation of
a
states, Su Xun’s text is one example that is worthy of exploration. The perspective that Su provided is similar to
for the enlarged sovereigntr-bloc of3UEuropean

5Q5R7S 4O9S6U
p r
realist logic, but it could also be a Chinese contribution to the maintenance of an interstate system. Macron, as
the philosopher president of the sovereign state of the Republic of France, could consider a different approach
states, in light of Su’s analysis, the inspiration for which could
6.
o
actually also serve the interpretation and prediction of the PRC’s behaviour, since the PRC is, fundamentally,
China. Su’s article could therefore help Macron develop an interpretative framework and gain insight on how the
T
PRC might evaluate the overall situation in the changing international system, and this insight could be
extremely valuable for France and Europe, if becoming the third superpower is indeed their aspiration.
Article 06
Article Name: Migration and State-making Explaining Xenophobia in South Africa
Migration and State-making Explaining Xenophobia in South Africa
Has it taken a rush of xenophobia to turn the poster-child of George H.W. Bush’s ‘the new world order’, towards
a failed state?
The violent attacks on foreigners which first broke out in the city of Johannesburg in mid-May, resulted in 62
9J6F
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deaths and many more injured and displaced. For the first time since the troubled early days of South Africa’s
transition to democracy a decade and a half ago, the country’s military occupied the streets of its shanty-towns.
Suddenly a city that often chooses to measure itself against the world’s finest, found itself staring into the abyss
of Port-au-Price rather than Manhattan.
What had become of the idea of the Rainbow Nation, the triumphant trope broadcast by the irrepressible Nobel
Laureate, Desmond Tutu, and in which all the country’s people, under the forgiving leadership of Nelson
Mandela, rejoiced?
State-centred Optics
Most commentaries on the xenophobia framed the fortnight of violence within two optics.
The first linked the events to the dire socio-economic 4O9S6U in neighbouring Zimbabwe which had just
situation
tr-5Q5R7S3U
experienced a seemingly pointless election. These conditions, the logic ran, had forced that country’s citizens to
flee southwards, seeking refuge in South Africa. Through this, the idea of Zimbabwe – place, political disaster,
producer of social chaos – became a cipher for South Africa’s mounting social woes.
The second optic positioned this very despair at the centre of the analysis. It argued that the presidency of
Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki had simply failed to deliver sufficient social goods to South Africa’s poor.
Instead, of the deep-seated social and economic transformation promised by the end of apartheid, the new
South Africa had delivered to its people a comprador class.
Few who rushed to speak on the violence seemed interested in the historical sociology of the southern African
within which the xenophobia played out. But understanding the violence is not possible without appreciating the
fluidity, identity and social turmoil which is the very essence of the region.
State-making
For all its state-authored divides, Southern Africa remains a single political entity. Archaeologists and
Anthropologists – whose work remains oblivious in the empty conversations of political punditry – have long
shown intimate linkages between the region’s people. More recently, especially as the climate change debate
has taken hold, environmentalists have argued that the region’s delicate ecology is intertwined. So, floods and
drought touch the lives of the region’s people no matter where they live.
It was of course the late-Eighteen Century discovery of Diamonds, first, and, later, of Gold which sparked a
conversation over the possibility that states other than the British-linked Cape of Good Hope could exist in the
southern African region. Until the allure of the region’s wealth was opened up, the land beyond the borders of
the selfgoverning Cape was considered as unforgiving as the Australian Outback.
m
This particular understanding of southern Africa was oblivious to the intricate social and economic linkages
o
which lay beyond the imperial gaze. Turbulent and increasingly subjected to the impact of modernity –
missionaries, miners and mercenaries – the sub-continent was in deep convulsion.
c
rs .
The mineral discoveries in Kimberley, first, and later on the Witwatersrand, occurred in places which would be
incorporated into the state to be called South Africa. They only added to the social trauma by drawing the
region’s indigenous people into a moneyed economy which, with time, would corrode traditional forms of social
e
intercourse.
k
It was around the wealth promised by these mineral discoveries that the shape of a region took place. Put
differently, the template of the nation-state was super-imposed upon centuries of life and living. What was left
r n
unclear for almost a century however was whether this was to be a single state or a series of states.
a
Much of the dense political conversation over the most suitable form of state – or state system – in the region
was lost by the rush to political independence which characterised the 1960s.
The latter development sealed
tr-5Q5Rthe
o
7S3Uregion’s
p
4O9S6U geopolitical fate: southern Africa would be a clustering of states
around the rich and politically powerful South Africa. White-ruled Southern Rhodesia – the state that would
become (after a number of changes in name and constitutional status) Zimbabwe in the 1980s – opted out of
T
joining the Union of South Africa in 1922 when voters rejected proposals to join their rich neighbour. Others, like
Lesotho (once called Basutoland), Botswana (Bechuanaland) and Swaziland occupied lesser positions within
the region at the whim of Whitehall.
An immediate challenge for researchers – in History, in Comparative Politics and in International Relations – will
be to map and understand the intense conversations over confederalism, federalism and state-formation which
continued between the 1880s and the establishment of the region’s first modern state, Union of South Africa in
1910.This largely unexplored political canvas – with its tension between modern and indigenous social
relationships – forms the backdrop to the intense processes of social inclusion and exclusion in modern South
Africa.
State and
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4E9JMigrant
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At an official level, state-directed surveillance and control operates through the increasingly sophisticated
techniques of border control with its technical devices like passports and visas. At a quotidian level, a
continuous process of toing and fro-ing occurs across national boundaries which were originally drawn on maps
in distant London and, very occasionally, were fenced—off by apartheid’s infamous securocrats.
It was this dilemma – one of the least explored in the study of International Relations but well-developed in
Historical Sociology – that faced the first post-apartheid government.
Openly appreciative of the support the liberation movements received from Africa’s people during the their
struggle, and declaring it desirous of becoming a fully-fledged African state, South Africa’s new government
drew on international experience which was increasingly anti-immigration.
tr-5Q5R7S3U4O
9S6U South Africa’s security-makers drew
on the unsympathetic models offered by Fortress America and Fortress Europe to feed their policy discourse.
But life on the street for would-be immigrants who has came (as migrants famously declared) “for Mandela”,
was often more brutal. Anger at the presence of migrants frequently erupted into violence as this vicious story
from the early post-apartheid years suggests.
“In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a train: one, a Mozambican, was
thrown out while the other two, both Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed on the roof trying to
escape the crowd. This violence was visited by members of a crowd who were returning from a rally in the
country’s administrative capital, Pretoria, who had gathered to protest under the banner of an organisation
called “Unemployed Masses of South Africa” who claimed to represent 32 000 jobless people.
In academia IR Regime Theory and its twin, Regional Integration Theory, are often advanced as the most
propitious pathway to solving the tension between the transnational flows of people and the project of the
national state. But these theories rely on leaky concepts like sovereignty.
In southern Africa the measure of their conceptual limitations are distilled in the regional organisation, SADC –
the Southern African Development Community – which has shown itself to be utterly incapable of pursuing the
interests of the region let alone its impoverished peoples.
As a result interminable debates on security and democracy privilege the state and its institutions over the
deepening human tragedies – like HIV/AIDS – which plays out in the everyday lives of millions.
This claim is not made recklessly, nor is meant to reinforce the anti-statist sympathies which are often thought to
lurk within the academe. In Southern Africa real life examples are everywhere to be seen. Consider just one:
SADC has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy on AIDS – indeed, it has still to develop a single logo to
brand the AIDS pandemic making it comprehensible to all who live in the region and who cross-over its often
porous borders.
o m
Migration to South Africa is possible of course. This is contingent on the battery of conditions which enable
c
migration to the two global Fortress, America and Europe. These conditions are wealth, and skills which are
people of southern Africa.
rs .
needed in the much celebrated “knowledge economy”. Both of these, alas, are held in short supply by the
e
So the gate into the new South Africa is not unlike the one that operated in the old. Discriminating and
discriminatory it includes and excludes along a chain determined by the chance of birth and the privilege of
k
childhood.
the new world order.
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These considerations are often far removed from hopes that attended the ending of apartheid and the birth of
a
They are also distant from the lofty calculations of mainstream International Relations. Caught by the latest
p
policy fashion, the policy eye always falls upon the immediate crisis of the state, or of capital upon which,
9S6U
tragically, state power invariably
tr-5Q5Rturns.
7S3U4OAs a result, the lives of people lie beyond the ken of IR’s procedural and
punditry end.
To
If there are failing states in Africa – and if South Africa is to join them – the burden for this must fall on those
overexuberant declarations of the end of history and the utter failure of those who declared them to
acknowledge that social processes and the everyday lives of people are the long duree of which the Annales
School so eloquently spoke.
7. Article 07
Article Name: Opinion – A Diplomatic Breakthrough on Seas
Opinion – A Diplomatic Breakthrough on Seas
MARTIN DUFFY, APR 12 2023
5B7I 6F
3C4E9JUN
For
tr-5D years member states have engaged in protracted negotiations to secure a UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea. On 4 March 2023 these long-running discussions became a reality in the form of the Internationally
Legally Binding Instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In a confident statement,
attributable to Stéphane Dujarric (the spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General), the UN confirmed the
conclusion and future ratification of this measure on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Quoting Dujarric directly:
The Secretary-General commends delegates for finalizing a text to ensure the conservation and sustainable use
of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. This breakthrough – which covers nearly two-
thirds of the ocean — marks the culmination of nearly two decades of work and builds on the legacy of the
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This action is a victory for multilateralism and for global
efforts to counter the destructive trends facing ocean health, now and for generations to come. It is crucial for
addressing the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. It is also vital for
achieving ocean-related goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the Kunming-
Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.
It was apparent that not only had several all-night discussions yielded a near-unanimous applause for a final
text, but all parties had shown “ambition, flexibility and perseverance”. There was also praise for the “leadership
and dedication” shown by Ambassador Rena Lee (Conference Chair) and for the constructive and enthusiastic
work of non-governmental organizations, civil society, academic institutions and the scientific community.
This is the first international treaty after years of marathon negotiations to protect the high seas, a fragile and
vital treasure constituting approximately the scale of half the planet. The submissions to conference had been
prolonged – sometimes threatening to languish in disputed classification of the diverse minutiae of the
biosphere. But on the late evening of 4 March Ambassador Lee was able to confirm “the ship has reached the
shore” as the conference could then conclude at the UN headquarters. This was approximately 9.30pm New
York time, and the Conference Chair’s final remarks were met by extended applause from delegates.
Activists have unanimously confirmed that the deal represents, “a breakthrough moment for the protection of
biodiversity after more than 15 years of discussions” which also evidences the most important matter that the
conference will have civic society endorsement. The treaty will be paramount to conserving 30% of the world’s
land and ocean by 2030, as had earlier agreed by world governments in a historic accord signed in Montreal in
December. “This is a historic day for conservation and a sign that in a divided world, protecting nature and
people can triumph over geopolitics,” said Greenpeace’s Laura Meller. “There will be no reopening or
discussions of substance” Ambassador Lee told negotiators. The agreement will be formally adopted once
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vetted by lawyers and translated into the United Nations’ six official languages, she announced. UN Secretary-
o
General Antonio Guterres commended the delegates, in achieving, “victory for multilateralism and for global
efforts to counter the destructive trends facing ocean health, now and for generations to come.”
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rs .
The high seas, technically and legally, begin at the border of countries’ exclusive economic zones, which extend
up to 200 nautical miles (370km) from coastlines. They thus fall under the jurisdiction of no country. While the
high seas comprise more than 60% of the world’s oceans and nearly half the planet, previous discussions on
and iconic species.
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their safeguarding had probably attracted disproportionately less focus than (for example) coastal waters or rare
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This is in juxtaposition to the enormous importance of the high seas for our habitat. Ocean ecosystems create
a
half the oxygen we breathe and limit global warming by absorbing much of the carbon dioxide emitted by human
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activities. Perversely, like many other eco-systems that are equally threatened by climate change, pollution and
overfishing (and prior to this landmark deal) only about 1% of the high seas were formally protected. When this
treaty comes into force it will allow 3U
seas marine protected areas
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p
the creation of marine protected areas across all international waters. “High
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can play a critical role in building resilience to the impact of climate change,” said
Liz Karan of The Pew Charitable Trusts, which called the agreement a “momentous achievement”.
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The treaty will also oblige countries to conduct environmental impact assessments of proposed activities on the
high seas. A highly sensitive chapter on the sharing of potential benefits of newly discovered marine resources
was one of the focal points of tensions, causing the conference to over-run a full day, before it was finally
overcome. Developing countries, without the means to afford costly research, had fought not to be excluded
from the expected windfall from the commercialisation of potential substances discovered in international
waters. Eventual profits are likely from the pharmaceutical, chemical or cosmetic use of newly discovered
marine substances that belong to no one.
As in other international forums, notably climate negotiations, the debate crystalized around ensuring equity
between the poorer Global South and richer North, observers noted. In a move seen as an attempt to build trust
between
tr-5D 5B7I3C4Erich
9J6F and poor countries, the European Union pledged €40m in New York to facilitate the ratification of
the treaty and its early implementation. The EU also announced €808m for research, monitoring and
conservation of oceans in 2023 at the Our Ocean conference in Panama that ended Friday. Panama said a total
of €17.8bn was pledged by countries.
It is worth looking back at how we had come to the events of 4 March 2023. In 2017, the UN General Assembly
had adopted a resolution calling on nations to establish a high seas treaty. It originally planned four negotiating
sessions but had to pass two resolutions to ensure two additional sessions. Irish President Michael D Higgins
has welcomed the agreement:
[It is]a gain for the future of humanity…It will seek to safeguard 30% of the high seas by the end of the
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decade….it comes at a time when we are receiving tr-5Qthe
5R7Sdirest warnings as a result of the accelerated melting of
the ice caps and so it is particularly timely…All those interested in the future of the planet will be grateful for
those who have worked over many years to bring us to this point.
Higgins added it is essential that attention now “swiftly moves to formal adoption of the text, to ratification and to
implementation.” Ireland is currently a Security Council member and Irish environmental NGOs enthusiastically
campaigned for this agreement. Meanwhile, Irish Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin said
the agreement provided mechanisms to significantly improve the protection of the marine environment. He said
Ireland was committed to working with the international community to realise its full potential. Mr Martin added
the agreement is “a major step forward for ocean conservation.”
The European Commission also hailed the international treaty. “A historic moment for our ocean… We take a
crucial step forward to preserve the marine life and biodiversity that are essential for us and the generations to
come,” said EU environment commissioner Virginijus Sinkevičius. He added “Today marks the culmination of
more than a decade of preparatory work and international negotiations in which the EU played a key role,” he
added, saying he was “very proud of our outcome…The high seas are a fragile and vital treasure that covers
nearly half the planet, and the treaty is seen as essential to conserving 30% of the world’s land and ocean by
2030”. Jessica Panegyres of Greenpeace welcomed the deal but called for urgent ratification of the treaty.
For the global community as much as for UN member states, this declaration must surely be greeted with
optimism. Finally, the international community has what would appear to be a final resolution of the international
status of our governance of this shared space. As with everything in international affairs, actions are indeed
louder than words, so one must only hope that in the coming months, NGOs such as Greenpeace are not
proven right in their circumspection on implementation. Member-states who have procrastinated over such a
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critical issue for decades have certainly taken a brave step in the dark. One hopes this truly constitutes a
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diplomatic leap to preserve the ocean. The consequences for international affairs are as crucial and multi-
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faceted as almost any previous agreed instrument since the very creation of the UN itself.
8. Article 08
Article Name: Opinion-–-Seventy-Years-of-Solidarity-The-ROK-US-Alliance
rs .
Opinion – Seventy Years of Solidarity: The ROK-US Alliance
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On a state visit to the US, Republic of Korea (ROK) President Yoon Suk-yeol, visited the Korean War Veterans
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Memorial in Washington DC with US President Joe Biden on April 25, 2023. The two heads of state paying
a
respects and laying flowers symbolizes how the two countries are tightly bonded within the long-lasting ROK-US
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alliance. In addition to celebrating the alliance’s 70th anniversary, Yoon and Biden agreed to launch a ‘US-ROK
Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG)’ to provide more enhanced regional security stability in terms of nuclear
deterrence.
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Over the past seven decades, the ROK-US alliance has become one of the world’s most successful
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partnerships in modern history, serving as a linchpin of peace, stability, and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula
and the broader Asia-Pacific region. Since the signing of the Mutual Defence Treaty in 1953, the two countries
have forged a solid and enduring partnership based on shared values, common interests, and a commitment to
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. South Korean and US governments officially announced the
significance of this alliance “as the linchpin for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, our Alliance has grown
far beyond the Korean Peninsula, reflecting the vital role of our two countries as global leaders in advancing
democracy, economic prosperity, security, and technological innovation.”
The history of the ROK-US alliance dates to the aftermath of the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953.
During this war, North Korea, backed by the Soviet Union and China, invaded South Korea to reunify the
Korean Peninsula under the communist regime. The US, along with other members of the United Nations, came
6F
4E9Jof
7I3Caid
to5Bthe
tr-5D South Korea, and after three years of fighting, an armistice was signed in 1953. This armistice
established a demilitarised zone which divided into two Koreas until present, and a ceasefire has been in effect
ever since. Moreover, it marked the end of the war and the beginning of a formal alliance between Seoul and
Washington. Following the war, the US and South Korea signed a Mutual Defence Treaty in 1953, which
established the basis for a long-term security partnership between the two countries.
The treaty committed both countries to defend each other and laid the groundwork for a military alliance.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when South Korea faced internal political instability and a communist
insurgency, Washington provided military and economic assistance to help the South Korean government
overcome these challenges and establish a stable democracy. In the 1980s, Seoul experienced rapid economic
growth and modernization. Behind the economic miracle of Seoul, the US supported this transformation by
tr-5Q5R7S3U4O9S6U
providing financial assistance and technology transfer. The 1990s witnessed the end of the Cold War and the
demise of the Soviet Union. As a result, Washington shifted its focus to other regions, leading some to question
the continued relevance of the ROK-US alliance. Nevertheless, the alliance remained unchanged, and both
countries continued to work together to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
The 21st century has brought new challenges for the ROK-US alliance. North Korea publicly announced that it
had successfully developed nuclear weapons and tested inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which can
directly target the US mainland; undoubtedly this development posed a severe threat to regional and global
security. The alliance has resolutely responded to Pyongyang’s nuclear threats through diplomatic, economic,
and military measures.
Diplomatically, the alliance has engaged in numerous efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the North
Korean nuclear issue. The US, South Korea, and other countries have participated in multilateral talks, including
the Six-Party Talks, to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Economically, the
alliance has pressured North Korea through sanctions and other measures to cut off its access to international
trade and finance. Washington has played a crucial role in imposing strict economic sanctions on North Korea,
which has significantly impacted its economy. South Korea has also restricted trade with North Korea and
stopped most inter-Korean economic cooperation. In terms of the military, the alliance has strengthened its
deterrence posture by deploying advanced military capabilities, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defence System (THAAD). South Korea deployed this missile defence system in 2017 in response to North
Korea’s endless missile and nuclear tests. Moreover, the alliance has also conducted numerous joint military
exercises to enhance readiness and deterrence against North Korean aggression.
As history shows, one of the key strengths of the ROK-US alliance has been its ability to adapt and evolve to
meet changing circumstances and emerging threats. In the early years of the alliance, the primary focus was on
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countering the threat of communist aggression from North Korea and its allies. Seoul and Washington worked
o
together to build up the South Korean military, which gradually became a formidable force. Today, the alliance
faces new and complicated challenges, including the threat of Pyongyang’s nuclear advancement, as well as
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.
the rise of China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
rs
Given the conditions of anarchic international politics, the formation and strengthening of the alliance has been
a way to secure the survival and prosperity of any nation, regardless of the era, and at the same time, the most
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efficient tool. In Northeast Asia, where the interests of China, Japan, Russia, and the US surrounding the
Korean Peninsula are intricately intertwined, 70 years of the ROK-US alliance has proven to have sufficient
capabilities to play a role as a stabilizer in the region.
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On 26 April 2023, Biden stated that “the ROK-US alliance is unbreakable”, to which Yoon immediately replied,
“Korea and the United States are a blood alliance born as a result of the struggle for freedom. The ROK-US
alliance is not a transactional relationship, but a value alliance to protect the value of freedom.” In this regard, it
is noteworthy that two presidents of
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solid ties of friendship, trust,
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the alliance reaffirmed its relationship as ‘ironclad.’ Based on these rock-
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and cooperation, the ROK-US will be a security linchpin of the Korean Peninsula
and the Indo-Pacific region for the coming decades.
9. Article 09
T
Article Name: Sudan’s Armed Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis
Sudan’s Armed Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis

In light of the ongoing conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, Sada publishes
three articles that discuss the humanitarian and political situation, the impact of fighting on the future of the
country, and the possibilities of external interference, namely from countries that have historically played
prominent roles in Sudan, such as Egypt.
tr-5D 4E9J6F
7I3Cfirst
In5Bthe article,
Sudanese journalist Youseif Basher argues that the complete disappearance of the state
since the first day of the fighting exacerbates the human cost of a conflict which is likely to be exhausting and
long, due to the fact that the two fighting sides possess a huge amount of military equipment and seem unwilling
to stop the fighting. Basher predicts that the war will lead to millions of people in urban areas losing their jobs,
and he notes that tens of thousands have already fled to safe cities. Basher says that with the continuation of
fighting, the number of internally displaced persons will increase to a point that is difficult to estimate.
The second article, presented by Sudanese writer Weam Al Sharif, recounts the causes of the current armed
conflict, explaining that despite the involvement of the army and the RSF in the political process, their media
statements indicated the existence of deep differences between them, especially regarding the framework
agreement. Al Sharif highlights that the civilian forces involved in the political process believe that supporters of
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the former regime played a role in fueling these disputes, as handing over power to civilians constitutes a threat
to their activities. She also stresses that now, after the outbreak of fighting on April 15, it has become important
to stop the conflict because of its high costs, and if this does not happen quickly, then further regional and
international intervention is likely to complicate the situation.
In the third article, Giorgio Cafiero argues that despite Egyptian concerns about the conflict in Sudan, this crisis
presents a potential opportunity for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to position himself as an important
leader on the international stage, as Sisi expressed his desire to play a mediator role after the outbreak of the
crisis. Cafiero says that even though Cairo had given the Sudanese army unwavering support and viewed the
RSF as an imminent threat, Egyptian officials reached out to RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” through
a meeting with Sisi held in Cairo. Accordingly, it is likely that Washington, Moscow, and Arab capitals could see
Sisi as a leader capable of playing a constructive role in de-escalating the conflict between the two sides in
Sudan.
HOW COULD THE WAR BETWEEN THE RSF AND THE ARMY IMPACT SUDAN?
THE CURRENT CONFLICT WILL HAVE WIDE-SPREAD EFFECTS ON POLITICS, THE ECONOMY, AND
SECURITY, WITH DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES FOR CIVILIANS.
Youseif Basher
The dangerous effects of the clashes between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
emerged quickly in the state of West Darfur, as the fighting between the two sides morphed into an ethnic
conflict between Arab and African tribes.
The clashes erupted on April 15, against the backdrop of disagreements between military leaders over issues of
command and control and timelines for integrating the RSF into the army. These issues were discussed in the
context of an internationally supported political process that aimed to hand over power to civilians, and to
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implement military reforms that would end with the formation of a professional, regular national army. Yet, these
o
steps towards a political solution were thwarted upon the emergence of deep differences between the two sides
of the current fighting.
c
rs .
The political forces involved in the political process worked to prevent the outbreak of war, but the lack of trust
between the two forces regarding how to manage the process of handing over power, the active opposition of
the forces that helped the army carry out the October 2021 coup, and the rejection of the process by entities
close to the former regime caused the clashes.
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After the outbreak of the war, the commander of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti,” claimed that his
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current fight was launched on behalf of the country’s transition to democracy, a position that contradicts his
a
participation in the 2021 coup (He later regretted his participation, saying that elements of the former regime
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who wanted to seize power again were behind him.) The army, for its part, says it is currently suppressing a
rebellion against the state, while at the same time showing its commitment to the political process.
o p
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tr-5Q the democratic transition and the army’s stated commitment to the democratic
Both Hemedti’s claim to protect
process are false, as the democratic transition needs dialogue, and closing the door to dialogue using military
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force confirms their desire to rule alone. Given that wars usually end with negotiation, it is likely that the two
powers will negotiate, but the focus of the negotiations will be the cessation of hostilities, the exchange of
prisoners, security arrangements, the repositioning of forces, and the sharing of power and influence. In this
context, the subject of negotiations will not be the transfer of power to civilian forces. This means that the
political forces and the peaceful protest movement will remain spectators rather than actors, as they will
gradually lose their strong influence after the militarization of public life.
In this context, the pro-democracy forces have begun to form a new coalition, whose first declaration says that it
is working to stop the war, meet the basic needs of the population, restore mobility, and remove the military from
political and economic life. Yet, this coalition has not explained how to achieve these goals in light of an
increasingly fragile situation that deteriorates by the day, as there is no security at all in Khartoum, looting has
6F
5B7I3C4E9Jand
tr- prevailed,
5D the clashes in the state of West Darfur between the two forces turned into a bloody ethnic
conflict. It is expected that this conflict will move to other areas, especially after the armed movements that
signed the peace agreement deployed fighters to secure the city of El Fasher in the state of North Darfur. In the
event of any friction between rival forces in local communities, the situation will likely get out of control as hate
speech spreads, possibly extending beyond the Darfur region to eastern Sudan and the Blue Nile.
During this time of crisis, the United Nations has suspended its humanitarian activities, which provide aid to 12.5
million people out of a total population of 15.5 million in need, including 8.5 million children. These children are
among the most affected by the war; about 50,000 children suffer from acute malnutrition and are at risk of
death due to interruption of medical treatments. Moreover, frequent cuts to electricity and fuel scarcity can
obstruct vaccination processes, exposing children to fatal diseases.
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It is also likely that the war will lead to millions of people in urban areas losing their jobs, which will increase the
number of people in need of aid. Already, tens of thousands have fled to safe cities, and the number of internally
displaced persons will only increase as fighting rages on. The exact number of IDPs is difficult to estimate now,
but before the war, it was 3.7 million people.
Moreover, due to the concentration of pharmaceutical and food factories and major importing companies in
Khartoum, and their exposure to looting and bombing, the supply of daily necessities has come to a complete
halt, which has raised the prices of food commodities many times over. This will lead to a high rate of inflation
and place millions at the risk of starvation.
Even before the recent conflict, the economy in Sudan was suffering from stagnation and slow growth. After the
war, it will enter a long-term recession given massive disruptions to industry, which contributes to 21 percent of
GDP. Yet, in light of fuel scarcity and the lack of fertilizer, the greatest impact will fall on agriculture, a sector
which a large number of Sudanese depend on, as this sector contributes to 32.7 percent of GDP.
All these effects are exacerbated by the complete absence of the state since the first day of the war—a conflict
which is likely to become a long-term battle of attrition, due to the two sides’ possession of a huge amount of
military equipment and their unwillingness to stop the conflict before it inflicts unbearable losses on one of them.
Youseif Basher is a Sudanese journalist. You can follow him on Twitter: @YouBasher.
STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE IN SUDAN TURNS LETHAL

Sudan has been plunged into a dire humanitarian crisis as a result of an armed conflict between rival forces and
deep disagreements regarding security arrangements.
DISAGREEMENTS REGARDING COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE RSF INTO
THE ARMY AWAKENED DEEP CONFLICTS THAT MILITARY LEADERS HAD LONG SOUGHT TO
c o m
.
SUPPRESS.
rs
Weam Al Sharif
The first signs of disagreement between the Sudanese Army and leaders of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
appeared when the latter’s commander, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti,” left the capital, Khartoum, for Darfur in
k e
June 2022, under the pretext of concluding reconciliations with the warring tribes. Yet, he returned from this
journey after the army commander, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, announced the approval of the draft
transitional constitution that was to be the basis for the transfer of power to civilians.
r an
The leaders of the army and the RSF engaged in a political process facilitated regionally and internationally,
which resulted in the signing of a framework agreement. This agreement talked about handing over power to the
civilian forces after agreeing on thorny issues, including security and military reform. The parties succeeded in
agreeing on all of these issues in workshops,
reform. Such a success tr- 5Q5R7S3U4O
o
made
government by the April 11 deadline.
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p
with the exception of three items related to security and military
them optimistic about signing a final agreement and forming a civilian
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Before disagreements erupted in the security and military reform workshop, the commanders of the army and
RSF signed a vision to reform this sector, which included setting gradual mechanisms for command and control
to eventually achieve a unified and professional military. This process was to begin with the unification of
leadership, followed by the unification of the staff ranks, then the command of regions and divisions, over a
period not exceeding ten years.
Yet, army leaders were absent from the closing session of the reform workshop, in protest of what they
perceived to be a choice to ignore the proposals they had advanced. These proposals included stopping
recruitment operations and amending the legal status of the RSF by reinstating the article confirming its
affiliation with the army, an article that General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan removed shortly after he took control of
tr- the
5D 3C4E9J6FThis made the paramilitary force largely independent of the military.
country.
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This independent position strengthened Hemedti’s ambition to monopolize power without announcing it.
However, this goal was clear in his closeness to the influential forces in Sudanese society, whether they were
civil society groups or political forces calling for democracy. This type of ambition, shared by some army
leaders, led to the attempted coup against the transitional government on September 21, 2019, and despite the
thwarting of their military move, coup leaders defended their plans desperately in court sessions.
Despite the involvement of the army and the RSF in the political process, their media statements indicated the
existence of deep differences between them, especially regarding their respective positions on the framework
agreement, which was highlighted in the reinforcement of their forces in Khartoum recently.
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While the army leaders were hinting at retreating from the framework agreement, Hemedti remained a strong
advocate of it, expressing in his speech that his disagreement was not with the army, but rather with those
clinging to power. Despite this defense, anyone who follows Hemedti's military and political career points to his
willingness to ally with anyone in order to lock in his ambitions and make them reality. Thus, although he had
continued to defend the isolated President Omar Al-Bashir, he quickly changed his allegiance to cautiously
welcome the protest movement, eventually joining the generals who overthrew Al-Bashir. These generals then
formed a military council led by Al-Burhan, who made Hemedti his deputy, and the two continued in the same
positions as president and deputy of the Transitional Sovereignty Council after agreeing to share power with
civilians (before overthrowing them in the October 25, 2021, coup to reach the framework agreement stage).
The differences between the army and the RSF cannot be reduced to their positions on the framework
agreement, issues of command and control, and the time period for the merger of forces. Rather, differences
extend to the general influence of the leaders of the two forces, in addition to the expansion of the RSF in terms
of recruitment and arms, its rapidly developing commercial activity, and its establishment of separate foreign
relations.
All this has made Hemedti the biggest threat to not only the army, but also to the state itself. In addition, the civil
forces involved in the political process believe that supporters of the former regime played a role in fueling these
disputes, as handing over power to civilians constitutes a threat to their activities, which resumed after the
October coup.
In light of all this, it was expected that the two sides would enter into a fight due to the escalating conflict of
interests. After the outbreak of this conflict on April 15, it became important to stop the fighting due to the high
cost of the war. Continued fighting could prompt further regional and international intervention, which could
complicate the conflict and may prolong it.
Weam Al Sharif is a Sudanese doctor and writer interested in issues related to conflict.
c o m
EGYPT’S HIGH STAKES IN SUDAN’S CRISIS
rs .
Sudan has been plunged into a dire humanitarian crisis as a result of an armed conflict between rival forces and
deep disagreements regarding security arrangements.
OFFICIALS IN CAIRO ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF INSTABILITY IN

SUDAN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EGYPT’S GEOPOLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY
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INTERESTS.
Giorgio Cafiero
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As Egypt grapples with high inflation, rising food prices, a debt crisis, currency devaluation, and other major
challenges, the country of 109 million is now vulnerable to the threat of Sudan’s turmoil spilling into Egypt.
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tr-5Qno country has taken in as many Sudanese refugees as Egypt. Of the roughly
Amid Sudan’s ongoing crisis,
150,000 Sudanese who have been displaced to neighboring countries since last month, roughly 50,000 have
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come to Egypt. Continuation of Sudan’s conflict could easily add new layers of severity to Egypt’s already dire
domestic problems.
Historically, Sudan has been a country under much Egyptian influence with Cairo viewing it as Egypt’s
“backyard.” The two Arab states’ armies have maintained close relations. Just as Egypt’s leadership sees its
national army as the guarantor of stability at home, Cairo’s perception is that the Sudanese national army is the
country’s main institution similarly capable of ensuring security and order in Egypt’s neighbor.
In 2019, President Omar al-Bashir, whom Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi saw as too tolerant of political
Islam and too close to Turkey and Qatar, lost power amid a popular revolt against his 30-year dictatorship.
Bashir’s ouster gave Egypt, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, an opportunity to gain
tr- greater clout
5D 5B7I3C4E 9J6F in Khartoum at Ankara and Doha’s expense.
In March 2021, Egypt and Sudan’s armies bolstered their cooperation through a training and border security
agreement. Subsequently, the two militaries have carried out joint exercises. Seven months later, Lieutenant
General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the coup against the civilian wing of Sudan’s transitional government.
Consequently, Cairo-Khartoum relations further deepened.
Since the ongoing Sudanese conflict erupted last month, Egypt has established itself as the dominant outside
actor supporting Burhan in his struggle against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan
Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti). In conflicts across Arab countries, Egypt believes national armies—not mercenary
groups, militias, or other non-state actors—should receive backing from other Arab states. This thinking largely
5R7S3U4O9S 6U
explains Sisi’s support for the Ba’athist regime intr-5Q
Damascus and the Syrian Arab Army throughout the Syrian
crisis. In Sudan, Egypt’s stance is that Burhan, unlike Hemedti, has legitimacy. Cairo will probably continue to
see Hemedti as a threat and remain committed to backing the Sudanese national army.
The unpredictable nature of Sudan’s internal conflict raises important questions about the future of Egypt’s
water and food security. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue is of immense importance to
Cairo with Egypt’s government considering access to waters from the Nile River a lifeline for its citizens. Against
the backdrop of Russia’s overt invasion of Ukraine last year, the Egyptians have been needing more water while
attempting to grow their agricultural sector as part of an effort to compensate for their lost wheat imports from
Ukraine.
Over the years, Egypt and Sudan have sided with each other against Ethiopia in the GERD dispute. Khartoum’s
alignment with Cairo on this issue has been extremely important to Egypt. Yet, the Sudanese crisis stands to
weaken Egypt’s position. In Cairo there are fears that Egypt may lose Sudan as a partner vis-à-vis the GERD,
which would decrease Cairo’s leverage.
For all Cairo’s concerns about the conflict in Sudan, this crisis also provides a potential opportunity for Sisi to
position himself as an important leader on the international stage. Egypt’s head of state has expressed his
desire to play this mediation role shortly after the crisis erupted. Although Cairo has firmly supported Burhan
and seen the RSF as a threat, Egyptian officials have engaged Hemedti with Sisi himself meeting the
paramilitary leader in Cairo. Most likely, Washington, Moscow, and various Arab capitals will look to Sisi as a
leader who can play a constructive role in terms of deescalating this conflict between Sudan’s two warlords,
ultimately bolstering Cairo’s leverage internationally. On May 10, Egypt’s Deputy Foreign Minister for African
Affairs, Hamdi Sanad Loza, met with the British special envoy to Sudan, Robert Fairweather, and London’s
swiftly implement an effective and lasting ceasefire in order to protect civilians.
c o m
ambassador to Cairo, Gareth Bayley, to discuss the Sudanese crisis. Their discussions focused on efforts to
.
However, there are potential scenarios in which Egypt’s diplomatic energy fails to produce positive results and
rs
Cairo concludes that direct military intervention is Egypt’s only viable option for safeguarding its interests. If this
conflict rages on and Hemedti proves increasingly triumphant over Burhan, Egypt might come under pressure to
wage unilateral military action to shore up the Sudanese national army. Naturally, any such intervention would
moves.
k e
come with enormous risk that Egyptian policymakers must seriously consider before making any such bold
10. Article 10
r an
Article Name: The Latest @ USIP The Evolution of the Quad
The Quad’s uneasy place in Southeast

tr-5Q5R7S3U4O
o
Asia
The Latest @ USIP The Evolution of the Quad
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p
The “Quad,” made up of the United States, Australia, India and Japan, began as an informal grouping for
T
sharing strategic assessments of the Indo-Pacific region. But over time, the Quad has grown to include leader-
level summits and a coordinated policy agenda for the region covering everything from COVID vaccine
distribution to telecommunications regulations and climate change. Arzan Tarapore, a research scholar at
Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center, discusses how the Quad has evolved, how non-Quad
members in the region — such as ASEAN states — have reacted, and China’s concerns about what the Quad’s
strategic vision means for its own approach to the region.
The Quad’s uneasy place in Southeast Asia

Last month, the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – the United States, Japan, India and Australia –
met for the first time. Promising to strive for a region that is “free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by
democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion”, the Quad countries launched a vaccine partnership and
6F
5B7I3C4E9Jto
promised
tr-5D deliver 1 billion Covid-19 vaccines to countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Among other things, the
summit also discussed climate change, critical technologies, cyber space, counter-terrorism, maritime security
and humanitarian assistance.
But the significance was also the message that the summit sent about the nature of the grouping. Against the
backdrop of worry about China, this summit clearly sought to address one of the biggest concerns from
Southeast Asian countries about the Quad concept itself: that it focuses too much on security rather than
cooperation on more practical, immediate concerns. Given that the Quad’s main concern revolves around
China, there were worries that the Quad would securitise the region by becoming an “Asian NATO”.
Southeast Asia’s response to the Quad has been muted. With China the largest trade partner of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, the member countries tr-5Q
are 7S3U4O9S6U
5Rcautious, for fear of pushback from China, which remains
wary of the new grouping. The Quad’s language about upholding the rule-based order and democratic values
might also not sit well with some governments in the region, even if they pay lip service to it.
All four Quad countries have had deep footprints in Southeast Asia and good ties with many Southeast Asian
countries.
By focusing on more practical cooperation, the Quad has gone some way to allow Southeast Asia a good entry
point for cooperation. Increasingly, a “twin chessboard scenario” is being formed in the region, where great
powers are competing at two levels – the strategic and resources level. For the latter, we can see a race to
compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in the likes of Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,
Australia’s Partnership for Infrastructure (P4I) and the US-led Blue Dot Network.
Logically, having more options for Southeast Asia is no bad thing. Cooperation on technology, climate change
and vaccines is much needed by Southeast Asian countries, and working with more than one partner can
reduce over-reliance and encourage better quality investment.
Yet the attention of great powers can be a blessing or a curse. Southeast Asia has been careful in not choosing
sides, insisting on ASEAN centrality in any regional cooperation. But mere refusal not to choose side might not
be an option for long as great power competition intensifies, meaning that ASEAN’s strategic calculation must
adapt. As it stands, ASEAN has published the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, giving the the Quad’s favoured
lexicon an affirmative nod while offering its own iteration of the concept.
Having said that, it is not always helpful to see the world in such binary terms. All four Quad countries have had
m
deep footprints in Southeast Asia and good ties with many Southeast Asian countries. Even if Southeast Asian
o
countries are not ready to openly endorse the Quad as a whole, it should not hinder strengthening cooperation
with Quad countries. A good example is Malaysia’s approach in the South China Sea issues. While choosing
c
.
quiet diplomacy by not regularly clashing with China, Malaysia has also taken less publicised steps to
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strengthen its maritime security with other partners, including under the Maritime Security Initiative with the US,
as well as the submission of the continental shelf delineation to the UN in December 2019.
k e
Many non-Quad countries are also increasingly adopting the “Indo-Pacific” concept in their strategic documents.
This includes the United Kingdom, whose recent integrated strategic review signalled an Indo-Pacific “tilt”, as
well as France, Germany and the Netherlands. These countries have expressed concerns over regional security
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in the Indo-Pacific while also holding a more nuanced view about working with China.
a
Southeast Asian countries will need more assurance to assuage a deep-seated fear of upsetting China, a
country which by dint of geographical fact will forever be a big neighbour. How ASEAN countries perceive the
“China threat” will also be a key factor
judge the Quad on its promise
o
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in driving them closer or further away from the Quad. Southeast Asia will
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more regular engagement and realisation of the initial commitments. The
courting of so-called “Quad-plus” countries has already begun, and ASEAN members will need nimble
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diplomacy in response to navigate these new dynamics and emerge with a positive outcome.
On 19 March, the leaders of four important democracies of the Indo-Pacific region – the United States, Japan,
Australia and India – held (virtually) their first-ever “Quad Summit.” This meeting at the leaders’ level of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was significant on two counts.
It showed, for one, that the extent of frustration with Chinese behaviour has reached a pitch where all four
countries have overcome past reservations to deliver a potent message of solidarity. Following border clashes
between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Himalayas and export sanctions meted out as punishment by China
to Australia, the new Biden administration’s determination to rally this grouping as a show of strength in the
region was more easily realised than it otherwise might have been.
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Perhaps more importantly, though, the Quad was finally able to show the substantive utility of the grouping in its
collaborative effort to provide a badly needed global public good: more vaccines. Provided that the deal hatched
for the summit is realised, the world will now be up another billion Covid-19 vaccines, based on Indian
production and financial, technical and logistical assistance from the other three players.
This development probably would not have happened without this Quad summit as an “action-forcing event”, but
now provides a template for possible future projects. This promising start has boosted enthusiasm on both sides
of the Pacific about the Quad’s finally coming together; Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison hailed the
meeting as ushering in a “new dawn”.
9S6U
It seems clear that the Quad is destined to continue as
tr-5Q5R a 4O
7S3U dialogue for now, and will not take on a permanent
secretariat beyond the ad hoc working groups that were established at the summit.
Before we invest in Quad challenge coins, however, it’s worth probing some of the seams of this grouping to
make a realistic judgment about its future direction and sustainability. Many in the US have cheered the Quad’s
powerful symbolism as a grouping of important democracies in the region. This attribute is seen as particularly
important in the current moment, when the performance of democracies is being compared with perceived
efficiencies or advantages of authoritarian governments, such as China, for example, in combatting Covid-19 or
industrial policy. But so far, the topics discussed in the Quad grouping have little to do with governance, human
rights, or strengthening democracy or the rules-based system, and few believe that like-mindedness on these
issues was the decisive factor in pushing India forward at long last.
It is also not clear how, in forming an entente aimed at major-power contestation in the Indo-Pacific region, this
grouping will strengthen international institutions and rules so much as go around them. It’s great, of course,
that this collective spurred the production of more vaccines for the Indo-Pacific, but the international mechanism
for fair vaccine distribution is the World Health Organisation’s COVAX facility and should be based on science,
not geopolitical competition. Rampant vaccine nationalism and major-power fixation on milking vaccine
distribution for “soft power” purposes can only erode faith in international institutions and are indicators of the
continued weakening of that system, which will redound negatively to the world’s democracies, in particular.
The behind-the-scenes main impetus for the Quad, of course, is shared security concerns about China, and
security cooperation seems now to be durably established. India already has bilateral or trilateral arrangements
with each of the Quad countries in the military sphere, which open the way for continued training, intelligence
sharing and capacity enhancement. Last year’s inclusion of Australia in the Malabar naval exercise should now
provide the Quad’s security leg with a solid, annual platform.
o m
Looking ahead from this promising kick-off, there are many factors that will determine the Quad’s future
c
sustainability and success. It seems clear that the Quad is destined to continue as a dialogue for now, and will
.
not take on a permanent secretariat beyond the ad hoc working groups that were established at the summit.
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This is to the good, as it keeps expectations modest, allows for flexibility in taking in new partners and does not
compete with important regional architectures such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the Indian
Ocean Rim Association.
k e
Two key factors, though, are likely to determine the Quad’s staying power above others. The first is the degree
to which the Quad can forge a reputation for producing positive-sum outcomes. Without an alternate rationale
n
for what this particular four-country grouping can do, its salient identity will be as a nakedly anti-China bloc.
a
India in particular will be uncomfortable with this, as was demonstrated by Indian Prime Minister Narendra
r
Modi’s insistence that that group “stand for something and not just against something”, and by the non-mention
of China in the summit’s joint statement.
o p
5R7S3U4O9S6U
tr-5Qis provision of public goods and mobilising synergies on global issues, not only do
But if the Quad’s raison d’être
member countries stand to benefit, but Chinese objections will fall flat. The initial “deliverable” of a pooled
T
investment in Indian vaccine production capacity is right on target, but following this with further outcomes on
climate change and technology cooperation will likely be more difficult. If, however, the Quad can push in the
laudable direction of raising India’s global engagement while expanding its marketplace and support network,
the Quad brand will remain resilient in the face of future potential pressures.
Which brings us to the final point: if China continues to show its teeth and bully others, the Quad is more likely
to be sustained. If, on the other hand, China demonstrates restraint, it will be harder to keep it going.
11. Article 11
Article Name: Why Existential Risks Matter in International Relations
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Why Existential Risks Matter in International Relations
An existential risk can be defined as a “risk that threatens the destruction of humanity’s long-term potential”. To
put it bluntly, it is a risk that can credibly lead to human extinction, with irreversible damage to the ability of
human civilisation to repair itself. The ‘terminal impacts’ to existential risks – e.g. their challenges to our
existence – need not manifest in the short-term; and this is why they are oft-neglected. Existing communities of
researchers focusing on existential risks (x-risks), remain divided over the exact boundaries and constituents of
the set of x-risks – though most agree that the following count as ‘core’ examples: a global nuclear winter
(arising from the deployment of nuclear weapons or other sources of fallout), a (engineered) pandemic that
infects the entire Earth’s population, or Artificial Intelligence (AI) that destroys humanity. Much as these risks are
often dubbed to be excessively speculative or exaggerated in nature, they deserve our concern not necessarily
tr-5Q 5R7S3U4O9S6U
because of the probabilities with which they occur, but the absolute scale and intensity of devastation that they
would wreak upon humanity.
Many could well spell the end to humanity. Despite so, most discussions on x-risks tend to remain within the
domains of moral and applied philosophy – more notably, the Effective Altruism and Long-termism Movements
have been instrumental in spearheading the popularisation of the concept. Yet it remains the case that not
enough attention is paid to the subject in the international relations (IR) community, with a notable exception
being the joint research project by Jordan Schneider and Pradyumna Prasad, which pointed to the risks arising
from potential war between the US and China, two sizeable nuclear powers with precipitously tense relations.
Indeed, long-termism/x-risk and international relations communities have remained, by far and large,
fundamentally disjointed. The following seeks to sketch out a few conceptually rooted arguments concerning
why the field of IR and IR scholars must take seriously the possibility of existential risks, to grapple fully with the
stakes and challenges confronting us today.
Picture this: a series of explosions storm the world in quick succession, incinerating vast swathes of the Earth’s
population, and killing many more through the smoke emissions and environmental damages that immediately
follow. The radioactive traces of the detonations and bombings permeate the thickest walls of overground
buildings, affecting the billions left behind. The gargantuan volume of particles emitted by the detonations fill the
skies with fog and smoke so dense that it would take years, if not decades, before the skies clear. Darkness
prevails.
The above picture is one of a global nuclear winter. As Coupe et al. note in a 2019 paper, a potential nuclear
winter following on from a hot war between the US and Russia could give rise to a “10°C reduction in global
mean surface temperatures and extreme changes in precipitation”. At first glance, there exist sufficient fail-safe
mechanisms to render this worst-case scenario improbable: military commanders that are cognizant of the risks
destruction imposing sufficient deterrence upon key decision-makers.
c o m
of escalation; the existence of bunkers in which individuals can seek refuge; the fact of the mutually assured
.
Yet, this possibility cannot be so simply dismissed. It has been over two hundred days since the Russian army
rs
invaded Ukraine. Recent setbacks on the battlefield and growing dissatisfaction amongst the Russian
population have precipitously heightened the likelihood that Putin would contemplate deploying a tactical
nuclear weapon on the battlefield. Without wading into specific quantitative estimates (though examples of these
k e
can be found here), the underlying explanations are relatively straightforward: in seeking an increasingly unlikely
victory over nominally Russia-claimed territories in Ukraine, preserve his domestic credibility and political
standing, and to force the hands of NATO and Ukraine to come to the negotiation table, Putin might feel that he
is running out of viable options.
r an
The nuclear option is most certainly undesirable even to Putin given the potential repercussions, but could be
seen as preferable to perceived capitulation and the eventuation of overthrow by actual opposition – for which
there is currently relatively limited3Uchance
tr-5Q5R7S
between any two nuclear powers
o p
4O9S6U of success. Indeed, categorically, the full-blown military conflicts
– Russia, China, or the US; Pakistan and India – could escalate, through the
security dilemma – into inadvertently precipitating a nuclear confrontation between such powers.
T
Nuclear winters are by no means the only x-risks. Take the much-touted AI ‘arms race’ for instance – as AI
progresses precipitously towards greater speeds, greater accuracy, and cultivates a deeper capacity to adjust
and course-correct through self-driven calibration and imitation, it is apparent that it, too, could equip countries
with substantially greater capacities to do harm. Whilst the research and development itself would generate
relatively innocuous outputs – such as programmes capable of tracking and monitoring individuals’ behaviors
and speech patterns, or AIs guiding lethal autonomous weapons in choosing their targets, it is the yearning for
competition and victory that poses a fundamental threat to global safety.
We have seen leading powers such as China and the US seek to out-maneuver one another through punitive
and preemptive measures pertaining to chips and semiconductors. Correspondingly, the level of coordination
tr- and
5D 4E9J6F
communication
5B7I3C across sensitive issues – such as AI and deployment of drones – has declined
considerably, reflective of the broader attitudes of mistrust and skepticism that underpin the bilateral
relationship. In the dearth of clearly agreed-upon frameworks for regulation and expectation alignment, it would
be of no surprise if the AI race between the two largest economies in the world culminated at a vicious race to a
particular bottom: a bottom in human welfare as AI is wielded by antagonistic powers to achieve geopolitical
objectives, and, in the process of so doing, causes substantial disruptions and irrevocable destruction to our
digital and data infrastructure.
Setting aside the prospective dangers of clashing world powers, there exists a further, positive case for genuine
international cooperation. Existential risks require coordination in resources, strategies, and broader governance
frameworks in order to be properly addressed. The risks arising from a non-aligned, strong artificial intelligence
9S6U
– that is, a self-conscious, improving, and truly autonomous
tr-5Q5R7S3U4O
AI whose preferences diverge from those of human
(interests), could well culminate at human extinction. Such risks require careful management and installation of
both guardrails and responsive programmes that could mitigate against prospective non-alignment, and/or the
premature arrival of strong AI. In theory, countries that lead technology and innovation should be allocating
substantial resources to devising a shared and transparent framework of AI regulation, as well as foresight-
driven research aimed at planning for various scenarios and possible trajectories adopted by AI. In practice,
governmental cynicism and strategic importance attached to accelerating domestic-national developments in AI
have rendered such long-term-oriented initiatives incredibly difficult. Even European legislation on AI – arguably
the most advanced amongst its counterparts – remains vulnerable to internal discrepancies and nonalignment.
More interlocution between continents and geopolitical alliances is thus vital in enabling the devising of
regulations, laws, and decision-making principles that can tell for what to do in face of AI risks.
An alternative concern looms, concerning the stability of food supply in the face of extreme weather and other
geopolitical disruptions. Consider the ongoing global food crisis, which has arisen from a combination of the
ongoing war in Ukraine and regional droughts and floods resulting from a prolonged La Niña (attributed by some
to climate change). A key to resolution of such crises requires both targeted and comprehensive agreements
over production and distribution of food, as well as a fundamental structural push for more rapid green
transition. Short of global coordination, much of this would be hugely difficult – food supply chains cannot be
optimised if trade barriers and border skirmishes continually disrupt cross-border flows. Attempts to curb carbon
emissions and advance a shift away from non-renewables, would require countries to see value in their
committing and adhering to stringent yet much needed pledges concerning shrinking their carbon footprints.
Short of genuine distribution of labour and collaboration – over the production of solar panels and renewable
energy, for one – we would be trending dangerously down a path of no return.
There are those who argue that climate change is not, in fact, an existential risk; that its effects are unevenly
m
distributed throughout the world and could be overcome through adaptive technologies. Yet this underestimates
o
the extent to which disruptions to food production and supply can cause or exacerbate preexisting geopolitical
c
and cultural tensions, thereby precipitating conflicts that could eventually escalate into total or nuclear war. The
.
probability may be objectively low, but the harms are sufficiently weighty as to merit serious attention.
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The academic community would thus benefit from taking seriously the quantum of impacts that international
conflict and collaboration possesses in relation to existential challenges to mankind. There remains much to be
k e
explored in the intersection of long-termism and IR – quantification and mechanisation of causal processes, the
devising and evaluation of prospective solutions. Fundamentally, it is imperative that IR theory can account for
not just the probabilistically likely and proximate – but also structural threats that could undermine the continuity
and survival of the human species.
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LANGUAGE IMPROVEMENT TOOLKIT (LIT) QUIZ-08

both history and reality.

First G6 summit at the Chateau de Rambouillet in November 1975

Renewed calls for expanded membership

War II international order.

for the enlarged sovereigntr-bloc of3UEuropean

people of southern Africa.

the new world order.

and iconic species.

Sudan’s Armed Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis

STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE IN SUDAN TURNS LETHAL

OFFICIALS IN CAIRO ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF INSTABILITY IN

swiftly implement an effective and lasting ceasefire in order to protect civilians.

The Quad’s uneasy place in Southeast

The Quad’s uneasy place in Southeast Asia

destruction imposing sufficient deterrence upon key decision-makers.

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