The Art of War Translation

The Art of War
By
Antoine Henri de Jomini (Baron de Jomini)
General and Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor of Russia
Originally published in French in 1836
Translated from French by
Capt. g. H. ftendell
Corps of Topographic Engineers
US Army
&
Lieutenant. W. Q. Craighill
Corps of Engineers
US Army USA
1862
This edition by
Arc ftanor, Rockville, ftD

2007
With an introduction and commentary by

Horace E. Cocroft, Jr.
table of Contents
Preface to the 1862 edition
Introduction
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR - DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR
CHAPTER I - THE STATUS IN ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WAR
ARTICLE I - Offensive wars to claim rights
ARTICLE II - Defensive wars from a political point of view and offensive wars from a
military point of view
ARTICLE III - Wars of Expediency
ARTICLE IV - Of wars with or without allies
ARTICLE V - Wars of Intervention
ARTICLE VI – Aggressive Wars for Conquest and Other Reasons
ARTICLE VII - Wars of opinion
ARTICLE VIII – National Wars
ARTICLE IX - Civil wars and religious wars
ARTICLE X: Double wars and the danger of waging two wars at once
CHAPTER II - MILITARY POLITICS
ARTICLE XI - Military statistics and geography
ARTICLE XII - Other causes that influence the success of a war
ARTICLE XIII - Military institutions
ARTICLE XIV - The command of the armies and the main control of operations
ARTICLE XV - The military spirit of nations and the morale of Armies

CHAPTER III - STRATEGY - DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF WAR
ARTICLE XVI - The Operations System
ARTICLE XVII - Theater of Operations
ARTICLE XVIII - Bases of operations
ARTICLE XIX - Strategic lines and points, decisive points of the theater of war and
objective points of operations
ARTICLE XX - Operational fronts, strategic fronts, defense lines and strategic

positions
ARTICLE XXI - Zones and lines of operations
ARTICLE XXII - Strategic lines
ARTICLE XXIII - Means to protect a Line of Operations through temporary Bases or

strategic reserves
ARTICLE XXIV - The old system of positional wars and the modern system of Marches
ARTICLE XXV - Supply depots, and their relationship with Marches
ARTICLE XXVI - The Defense of the Borders by Forts and Intercalated Lines.-Siege
Wars
ARTICLE XXVII - The connection of camps and Tetes de Ponts with Strategy 112
ARTICLE XXVIII - Strategic operations in mountains
ARTICLE XXIX - Great invasions and distant expeditions
CHAPTER IV - GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES
ARTICLE XXX - Defensive positions and battles 132 ARTICLE XXXI - Offensive
battles, and different orders of Battle
ARTICLE XXXII: Turning maneuvers and overextended movement in battles
ARTICLE XXXIII - Unexpected meeting of two armies in March
ARTICLE XXXIV - Surprises of armies
ARTICLE XXXV - Of the attack by the main force of fortified places, camps or lines
ajar. -Coups d'état in general
CHAPTER V OF VARIOUS MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE PARTLY
STRATEGIC AND PARTLY TACTICAL IN NATURE
ARTICLE XXXVI - Detours and large detachments
ARTICLE XXXVII - Passage of rivers and other currents
ARTICLE XXXVIII - Withdrawals and searches
ARTICLE XXXIX - Of cantonments, either in March, or when established in Winter

Quarters
ARTICLE XL - Descents
CHAPTER VI - LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOBILE ARMIES
ARTICLE XLI - Some observations on logistics in general
ARTICLE XLII - Reconnaissance and other means of obtaining correct information

about the enemy's movements
CHAPTER VII - THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE

SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE OF THE THREE WEAPONS
ARTICLE XLIII - Placing troops in line of battle
ARTICLE XLIV – Infantry training and employment
ARTICLE XLV – Cavalry
ARTICLE XLVI - Use of artillery
ARTICLE XLVII - The combined use of the three arms
SUPPLEMENT TO THE SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR
NOTE ON THE MEANS TO ACQUIRE A GOOD OLLO STRATEGIC BOND
SECOND APPENDIX TO THE SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR ON THE TRAINING

OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE
DRAWING OF THE MAIN MARITIME EXPEDITIONS
Comments
Commentary on Chapter I 27
Commentary on Chapter II 48
Commentary on Chapter III 129
Commentary on Chapter IV 161
commentary on Chapter V 187
Commentary on Chapter VI 206
comment on Chapter VII 246
Final comment 288
Editor's note on illustrations and text
We have preserved the original illustrations to maintain the flavor of the original
translation. However, the text has been reformatted and compiled for clarity and ease
of readability.
Preface to the 1862 edition

In the execution of any undertaking, there are extremes on both hands that are similar
to avoid. The rule is observed in a special way when making a translation. There is, on
the one hand, the extreme of too rigid adherence, word for word and line by line, to the
original, and on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. In any case, the
author's meaning may not really be given. It is not always easy to maintain an
adequate average between these extremes. The translators of Jomini's Summary of
the Principles of the Art of War have made an effort to render their author into simple
English, without mutilating or adding to his ideas, trying not to show and not criticize.
For people accustomed to reading for instruction in military matters, it is not necessary
to say a word with reference to Jomini's merits. To those who are not hitherto
accustomed, but who are increasingly interested in such subjects, (and this class must
include the great mass of the American public), it is sufficient to say, and it may be said
with all truth, that General Jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the
most able military critics and historians of this or any other day.
The translation now presented to the people has been made with the sincere hope and
sincere expectation of its usefulness. Since the existence of a large, well-trained
standing army is considered incompatible with our institutions, it becomes more
important that military information be disseminated as widely as possible among the
people. If by the present work the translators discover that they have contributed, even
in an insignificant degree, to this important object, they will be amply reimbursed for the
care and labor expended upon it.
For those for whom the study of the art of war is new, it is recommended to begin in the
article "Strategy", Chapter III., From that point, read to the end of the Second Appendix,
and then return. To the chapters
Jomini j The art of war I. and II.
It should be noted that this topic, to be appreciated, must be studied, have a map in
hand: this observation is especially true in the case of strategy. An acquaintance of the
campaigns of Napoleon I. It is quite important, since Jomini and all other recent writers
on military art constantly refer to them.
US Military Academy USA,
West Point, NY
January 1862.
Introduction
By Horace E. Cocroft, Jr.
In 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf ousted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait using
several specific strategies. Schwarzkopf established a temporary supply base in the
Saudi Arabian desert to form a base of operations for the US Seventh Corps. USA And
then he used coalition allies Marines and Arabs in a pinning operation against Iraqi
troops in Kuwait while the Seventh Corps made a subsequent turning movement
toward the Iraqis. Having captured its limited and geographical objective, the coalition
called to stop the war. Schwarzkopf's strategies came directly from Antoine-Henri
Jomini's The Art of War, which is the foundation of professional military education in the
Western world. Although several military writers preceded Jomini, such as Marshal
Saxe in the 18th century, and some may be better known today, such as Carl Von
Clausewitz, no other military theorist has had as great an impact on professional
military thought, doctrine and vocabulary as Jomini. Swiss-born civil servant Jomini,
whose work remains relevant even today. Jomini (March 6, 1779 – March 4, 1869) was
born in Payerne in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland, where his father was a minor
officer. Jomini's early military life was spent in the armies of the French Revolution and
the Helvetic Republic (the Swiss client state of the French Republic). After the Treaty of
Luneville of 1801 ended hostilities between the Habsburgs, Austria and France, Jomini
moved to Paris, ostensibly to resume the business career interrupted by war and
revolution. More importantly, he wrote his first work on military theory, "Treatise on
Major Military Operations." This early work brought him to the attention of Marshal Ney,
who placed Jomini on his team, as well as the attention of Napoleon himself, who
secured Jomini's promotion to colonel and Brigade General and awarded him the
Legion of Honor. After the 1806-1807 campaigns in Prussia and Poland, Jomini
rejoined Ney as his chief of staff, an arrangement that lasted until 1813.
Jomini j The art of war
After Napoleon's victory over the Russians and Prussians at Bautzen, Jomini fell out
with Napoleon's chief of staff, Louis Alexandre Berthier, and left the French army.
During the armistice that followed Bautzen, Jomini joined the Russian service, where
he received the rank of lieutenant general; Based on the reputation of his writings, he
won the appointment of an aide-de-camp to Tsar Alexander. Jomini's post-war career
was mainly in the Russian army. He was employed in the military education of Prince
Nicholas and played a leading role in the organization of the Russian personnel
college. He retired from active service in 1893 and spent his long retirement writing and
commenting on military affairs. The Art of War comes from the first part of his
retirement.
The Art of War is a book with the purpose of educating. It is not a work of philosophy or
history, although it contains useful military history and interesting comments on the
philosophy of using armed force to achieve national objectives. Its purpose is primarily
focused on educating serving officers in military matters outside of the regimental
routines that were the bread and butter of most 19th century line officers' lives. A
secondary purpose of the book was to provide instruction in military matters to a more
general audience. Jomini managed to produce a book that is practical and easy to
understand. The art of war is based on simple and easy to understand principles or
maxims. By providing commanders with a clear framework for planning operations,
Jomini wanted to help his students eliminate the unpredictable variables that come with
war. Clausewitz, on the other hand, sought to understand the fog of war rather than
eliminate it.
The Art of War opens with a grand perspective and then boils down to the details.
Jomini's point of view narrows progressively through the overall military policy of a state
and the grand strategies used in fighting a war to the deployment of individual
battalions on the line of battle. This progression, from the grand to the minuscule and
from the general to the specific, allows you to address all levels of military policy in a
way that is both comprehensive and detailed.
Military schooling of young officers in the 19th century was an on-the-job education,
generally restricted to regimental-level problems and generally limited to leadership
problems, such as maintaining troop morale and maintaining discipline in the ranks.
Battlefield tactics tended to be left to the experience and imagination of the
commanding general, supplemented by any independent study in military history that
the general might have undertaken. What was needed was a guide to tactics, strategy
and logistics that provided clear, easy-to-understand principles that covered most
eventualities.
Jomini's Art of War offered a simple and practical practical guide to using troops in land
operations in war. His lessons were written in such a way that they can be easily
understood and copied. Considerations that were difficult to quantify, such as troop
morale or the personalities of allied or opposing commanders, were mentioned in
passing but were generally ignored, a fact that has received the bulk of the criticism
directed at Jomini. Jomini is accused of Creating an Instruction Manual for War; Simply
follow the checklist to ensure the campaign thrives. However, an instruction manual for
the strategic and operational levels of warfare was exactly what Europe needed at the
beginning of the 19th century.
In the United States, Jomini is best known for the influence he had on pre-Civil War
military studies at West Point. His ideas were filtered through American military
interpreters such as Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry Halleck. Jomini's reputation
suffered at the hands of early Union war commanders as a result of the
oversimplification of his thinking. Excessively brave generals, such as Halleck and
McClellan, who used Jominian vocabulary to provide excuses for their inactivity, have
been described as Jominian in their reliance on formal principles of war and cautious
maneuvering to gain geographical advantage. The irony is that Jominian warfare was
practiced by generals like Sherman, who carefully employed turning movements to
maneuver Joe Johnston out of position after positioning his successful campaign to
take Atlanta, and Grant, who realized that Petersburg It was the nodal point that held
the key to Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia. Clearly, Jominian principles in
the hands of imaginative generals won the war. The only major commander who could
not be called Jominian was Stonewall Jackson, who, in his independent operations,
apparently ignored his own lines of communication and bases of operations, relying
instead on speed and surprise to create chaos in the Union army. .
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR
DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR
The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches,
namely: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering and Tactics. A sixth essential
branch, hitherto unrecognized, could be called Diplomacy in its relation to War.
Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a
statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it is useless to a
subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general in command of an army: it
enters into all the combinations that may lead to a war, and have a connection with the
various operations that will be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, you should
have a place in a job like this.
To recap, The Art of War consists of six distinct parts:
1. State in its relationship with war. s. Strategy, or the art of properly directing the
masses on the theater of war, whether for defense or invasion.
3. Grand Tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
4. Engineering, -the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor tactics. It is proposed to analyze the main combinations of the first four
branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and the art of engineering.
Familiarity with all of these parts is not essential to being a good infantry, cavalry, or
artillery officer; but for a general or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.
CHAPTER I
THE STATUS IN ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WAR
Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes
whether a war is appropriate, expedient, or indispensable, and determines the various
operations necessary to achieve the object of the war. A government goes to war, -
To claim certain rights or to defend them;
To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, such as commerce,
manufacturing or agriculture;
To maintain neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the security of
the government or the balance of power;
To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances; Propagate political or

religious theories, crush them or defend them;
To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory;
To defend the threatened independence of the state;
To avenge the insulted honor; either,
Of a mania for conquest.
It can be seen that these different types of war influence to some extent the nature and
scope of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed purpose. The party that
provoked the war can be reduced to the defensive, and the assaulted party can take
the offensive; and there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and
conduct of a war, since,
1. A state can simply wage war against another state.
s. A state can wage war against several states in alliance with each other.
3. A state in alliance with another can wage war on a single enemy.
4. A state can be the main part or an auxiliary.
4. In the latter case, a state can join the fight at the beginning or after it has started.
6. The theater of war can be on the enemy's soil, on that of an ally, or on one's own.
7. If the war is one of invasion, it may occur in adjacent or distant territory: it may be
prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous.
8. It can be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy.
9. War can be a civil or religious war.
War will always be carried on according to the great principles of art; Great discretion
must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be carried out, which will depend
on the circumstances of the case.
For example: two hundred thousand Frenchmen who wished to subjugate the people of
bread, united with one man against them, would not maneuver as the number one of
the French in a march on Vienna, or any other title, to force peace; nor would a French
army fight Mina's guerrillas as they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a
French army venture to march on Vienna without considering what might be the tone
and temper of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the inn, or
between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in much the same
way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events.
To these different combinations, which more or less belong to statesmanship, others

can be added that relate solely to the management of armies. The military policy ame
is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but
remain of the greatest importance in the plans of a statesman and a general.
ARTICLE I
Offensive wars to claim rights
When one state has claims over another, it may not always be best to enforce by arms.
The public interest must be consulted before action.
The most just war is one that is based on undoubted rights and that, in addition,
promises state advantages commensurate with the sacrifices required and the risks
incurred. Unfortunately, in our times there are so many doubtful and disputed rights
that most wars, although apparently based on bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
reality wars of convenience. The question of the succession to the Spanish crown
under Louis XIV. It was very clear, since it was resolved by a solemn will, and was
supported by family ties and by the general consent of the Spanish nation; However, it
was harshly contested throughout Europe and produced a general coalition against the
legitimate legatee.
Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, advanced an old objective, entered
Silesia in force, and seized this province, thus doubling the power of Prussia. This was
a stroke of genius; and, even if it had failed, it could not have been much censured; for
the greatness and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, so far as
such attempts can be justified.
In wars of this nature no rules can be established. Looking at and taking advantage of
circumstances covers all that can be said. Offensive moves should be appropriate for
the goal to be achieved. The most natural step would be to occupy the disputed
territory: then offensive operations can be carried out according to the circumstances
and with the respective strength of the parties, with the object of securing the cession
of the territory by the enemy, and the means to threaten him in the heart of his own
country. Everything depends on the alliances that the parties can achieve with other
states and their military resources. In an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be
taken not to arouse the jealousy of any other state that may come to the aid of the
enemy. It is part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this possibility and obviate it by
making adequate explanations and giving adequate guarantees to other states.
ARTICLE II
Of politically defensive wars and military offensive ones
A state attacked by another that renews an old claim rarely gives it up without a war: it
prefers to defend its territory, as is always more honorable. But it may be
advantageous to take the offensive, rather than wait for the attack on the borders.
There are often advantages to an invasion war: there are also advantages to waiting
for the enemy on one's own soil. A power without internal dissension, and without the
apprehension of an attack from a third party, will always consider it advantageous to
carry the war into hostile terrain. This course will save your territory from devastation,
continue the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of your soldiers, and
depress the spirits of the adversary. However, in a purely military sense, it is true that
an army operating on its own territory, on a theater of which all the natural and artificial
features are well known, where all movements are aided by knowledge of the country,
by the favor of the citizens, and the help of the constituted authorities, has great
advantages.
These simple truths have their application in all descriptions of war; But, if the
principles of strategy are always the same, it is different with the political part of the
war, which is modified by the tone of the communities, by localities, and by the
characters of the men at the head of the states and armies. The fact of these
modifications has been used to demonstrate that war knows no rules. Military science
is based on principles that can never be safely violated in the presence of an active
and skilled enemy, while the moral and political side of war presents these variations.
Plans of operations are made as circumstances require: to execute these plans, the
great principles of war must be observed. For example, the plan of a war against
France, Austria, or Russia would be amply defended by one against the brave but
undisciplined bands of Turks, who cannot keep themselves in order, are not able to
maneuver well, and possess no dexterity under misfortune .
ARTICLE III
Wars of convenience
Frederick II's invasion of Silesia and the War of the Spanish Succession were wars of
convenience.
There are two kinds of wars of convenience: first, where a powerful state undertakes
the task of acquiring natural limits to trade and policy; secondly, to reduce the risk of a
dangerous rival or to prevent its aggrandizement. The latter are wars of intervention; for
a state will rarely attack a dangerous rival alone: it will endeavor to form a coalition for
that purpose.
These views pertain more to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.

ARTICLE IV
Of wars with or without allies
Of course, in a war an ally is desirable, other things being equal. Although a large state
is more likely to succeed than two weaker states in alliance against it, the alliance is
stronger than either of the two alone. The ally not only provides a contingent of troops,
but also greatly annoys the enemy by threatening otherwise secure parts of its border.
All history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and neglected by
any power, however formidable.
Chapter I. State in its relationship with war
ARTICLE V
Wars of Intervention
Interfering in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a state than war
under any other circumstance; And the reason is clear. The interfering power throws all
its weight and influence to one side of the scale; It interferes at the most opportune
moment, when it can make decisive use of its resources.
There are two types of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring
states; s. Intervention in external relations. Whatever may be said about the moral
character of interventions of the first kind, instances are frequent. The Romans gained
power with these references, and the empire of the English India Company was made
in the same way. These interventions are not always successful. While Russia has
increased its power by interfering with Poland, Austria, on the other hand, was almost
ruined by its attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution.
Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate and perhaps more
advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the ability to interfere in the
internal affairs of other people; but it certainly has the right to oppose when it spreads
disorder that can reach neighboring states.
There are three reasons for intervention in foreign wars abroad, namely: 1, by force of
a treaty compelling aid; s, to maintain political balance; 3, or to avoid certain evil
consequences of war already begun, or to secure certain advantages of war which
would not otherwise be obtained.
History is full of examples of powers that have fallen due to neglect of these principles.
"A state begins to decline when it allows the excessive aggrandizement of a rival, and a
secondary power can become the arbiter of nations if it throws its weight into the
balance at the appropriate moment."
From a military point of view, it seems clear that the sudden appearance of a fresh new
army as a third party in a well-contested war must be decisive. Much will depend on
your geographical position in reference to the armies already in the field. For example,
in the winter of 1807, Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of
Koenigsberg, leaving Austria in his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had
launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia over the Oder, it is
probable that Napoleon's power would have been ended; There is every reason to
think that his army could not have recaptured the Rhine. Austria preferred to wait until it
could gather four hundred thousand men. Two years later, with this force she took the
field, and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well spent at the appropriate
time would have decided the fate of Europe.

There are several types of warfare as a result of these two different nterven ions –
1. When the intervention is merely auxiliary and with a force specified by previous
treaties.
s. Where intervention is to keep a weak neighbor defending its territory, changing the
scene of war to another soil.
3. A state interferes as the main party when it is close to the theater of war, which is the
case of a coalition of several powers against one.
4. A state interferes in a fight already in progress or interferes before the declaration of

war.
When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to the provisions of
the treaty, it is simply an accessory, and has little say in the main questions; but when it
intervenes as a principal part, and with an imposing orce, the case is quite different.
The military possibilities in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the Years' War
was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and, at the same time, was a main party in the
North until its occupation of Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff led the
army to Brandenburg, they acted exclusively in the interests of Austria: the fate of
these troops, far from their base, depended on the good or bad maneuver of their
allies.
Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate operations. The
campaigns of 1799 and 1804 furnish sad illustrations of this, to which we shall refer
again in Article XXIX, when discussing the military character of these expeditions.
It follows, then, that the security of the army can be endangered by these permanent
interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own territory cannot be easily
invaded, since the scene of hostilities is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune to
the general may be, in some measure, an advantage to the state.
In wars of this type, the essential thing is to secure a general who is both a statesman
and a soldier; have clear stipulations with allies as to the art each should take in major
operations; finally, agree on an objective point that is in harmony with common
interests. By neglecting these precautions, the greatest number of coalitions have
failed or have maintained a difficult struggle with a power more united but weaker than
the allies.
The third type of intervention, which consists of interfering with the entire state and
near its borders, is more promising than the others. Ustria had the opportunity for this
character in 1807, but could not take advantage of it: he had the opportunity again in
1813. Napoleon had just gathered his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking its front of
operations in reverse, launched into the fight with two hundred thousand men, with
almost perfect
Certainty of success She recovered in two months the Italian empire and its influence
in Germany, which had been lost due to fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention,
Austria not only had political but also military opportunities in its favor, a double result,
combining the greatest advantages.
Her success was made more certain by the fact that while the theater was close to her
borders to permit the greatest possible show of force, she was at the same time
interfering in an ongoing contest, which she entered with all her resources. and at the
most opportune moment for her.
This double advantage is so decisive that it allows not only powerful monarchies, but
even small states, to exert a controlling influence when they know how to take
advantage of it.
Two examples can establish this. In the 144s, the elector Maurice of Saxony formerly
declared war against Charles V., who was the master of Spain, Italy and the German
empire and had defeated Francis I and had France within his grasp. This movement
brought the war to Tyrol and arrested the great conqueror in his career.
In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile to Louis
catastrophe that immortalized Prince Eugene.
Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these timely
interactions: further illustrations could be given, but they could not be conveyed to the
reader's conviction.
ARTICLE VI
Aggressive wars for conquest and other reasons
There are two very different types of invasion: one attacks a contiguous state; the other
attacks a distant point, over a large intermediate territory whose inhabitants may be
neutral, doubtful or hostile.
Wars of conquest, unfortunately, are often prosperous, as Alexander, Caesar, and

Napoleon fully demonstrated during part of their careers. However, there are natural
limits to these wars, which cannot be passed without incurring great disasters.
Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus and the Emperor Julian among the
Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia, furnish bloody proofs of these truths. However,
love of conquest was not Napoleon's only motive: his personal position, and his
competition with England, urged him into enterprises whose objective was to make him
supreme. It is true that he loved war and its possibilities; but he was also a victim of the
need to succeed in his endeavors or yield to England. You could say that he was sent
to this world to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. Your victories
omini j The art of war
To teach what can be achieved by activity, boldness and skill; their disasters, which
could have been avoided by prudence.
A war of invasion without good reason, like Genghis Khan's, is an attack on humanity;
but it may be excused, if not approved, when great interests are induced, or when it is
done with good motives.
The invasions of Spain of 1808 and 1893 differed equally in object and results: the
former was a cunning and wanton attack, which threatened the existence of the
Spanish nation and was fatal to its author; the second, while combating dangerous
principles, advanced the general interests of the country, and was easier to bring to
successful completion because its object met with the approval of the majority of the
people whose territory had been invaded.
These illustrations show that the invasions are not necessarily all of the same
character. The former contributed greatly to Napoleon's downfall; the second included
the relationship between Spain and Spain, which should never have changed.
Let's hope invasions are rare. Still, it is better to attack than invade; and let us
remember that the surest way to control the spirit of investigation and usurpation is to
oppose it by intervention at the appropriate time.
An invasion, to be successful, must be proportionate in magnitude to the goal to be
achieved and the obstacles that must be overcome.
An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and probably to be
helped by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous undertaking, as the war in Spain (1808)
and the wars of the Revolution in 179s, 1793 and 1794 demonstrated. In these last
wars, although France was better prepared than Spain, it did not have a powerful ally
and was attacked throughout Europe both on land and at sea.
Although the circumstances were different, the Russian invasion of Turkey developed,
in some respects, the same symptoms of national resistance. The religious hatred of
the Ottoman powerfully incited him to arms; but the same motive was impotent among
the Greeks, who were twice as numerous as the Turks. If the interests of the Greeks
and Turks had been harmonized, as those of Alsace were with France, the united
people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element of religious
fanaticism. The war of 1880 showed that Turkey was formidable only on the borders,
where its bravest troops were located, while everything inside was weakness.
When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the inhabitants, the
principles of strategy determine its course. Popular sentiment brought about the
invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so early (these military points are dealt with in
Article XXIX). But when the invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its
success will depend more on diplomacy than strategy. The first step to ensure success
will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a state adjacent to the enemy,
which will allow
Troop reinforcements and, even more importantly, provide a safe base of operations,
supply depots and a safe haven in the event of a disaster. The ally must have the same
interest in success as the invaders, for all this to be possible.
Diplomacy, although almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not powerless against

adjacent invasions; because here a hostile intervention can arrest the brightest
successes. Austria's invitations in 1804 and 1809 might have ended differently if
Prussia had interfered. The invasion of northern Germany in 07 was, so to speak,
permitted by Austria. That of Rumelia in 1899 could have ended in disaster, if the
negotiation had not been wise, it would have avoided any possibility of intervention.
ARTICLE VII
Wars of opinion
Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes confused, they
are different enough to require separate notification.
Wars of opinion can be intestinal, both intestinal and foreign, and, finally, which,
however, is rare,) they can be foreign or external without being intestinal or civil.
Wars of opinion between two states also belong to the class of intervention wars;
because they result from the doctrines that one party wishes to dress among its
neighbors, or from the dogmas it wishes to crush, in both cases leading to intervention.
Although they originate in religious or political dogmas, these wars are very deplorable;
because, like national wars, they recruit the worst passions and become vengeful, cruel
and terrible.
The wars of Islam, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of the League,
present almost the same characteristics. Religion is often the pretext for gaining
political power, and war is not really one of dogma. Muhammad's successors were
more concerned with extending their empire than with preaching the Koran, and Philip
II, intolerant as he was, did not support the League in France for the purpose of
advancing the Roman Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX, when he made
a crusade in Egypt, thought more about the trade of the Indies than about taking
possession of the Holy Sepulchre.
Dogma is sometimes not just a pretext, but is a powerful ally; because this excites the
ardor of people and also creates a pair and. For example, the Swedes in the Thirty
Years' War and Philip II. in France, they had allies in the country more powerful than
their armies. However, it may happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islam, that
the dogma by which the war is fought, instead of friends, finds such bitter enemies in
the invaded country; and then the competition becomes fearful.
The possibilities of support and resistance in wars of political opinions refer to quality. It
may be remembered how 179 associations of fanatics believed it possible to propagate
throughout Europe the famous declaration of the rights of man, and how the
governments were rightly alarmed and rushed to arms, probably with the intention only
of forcing the lava from this volcano to return to its crater and extinguish it there. The
media was not fortunate; because war and aggression are inappropriate measures to
arrest an evil that lies in human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of shorter
duration since it is the most violent. Time is the true remedy for all evil passions and for
all anarchic doctrines. A civilized nation can endure the yoke of a factious and
uncontrolled multitude for a short interval; but these storms soon pass away, and
reason resumes its dominion. Trying to stop such a crowd by a foreign force is trying to
contain a mine explosion when the dust has already ignited: it is much better to wait for
the explosion and then fill the crater than to try to prevent it. perish in the attempt.
After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the Girondists and the
National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign armaments, they would never
have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands on the weak but venerable head of Louis
XVI. The Girondists would never have been crushed by the mountain, but by
Dumouriez's setbacks and threats of invasion. And if they had been allowed to clash
and fight with each other to their hearts' content, it is probable that, instead of giving
rise to the terrible Convention, the Assembly would have slowly returned to the
restoration of good, temperate, and monarchical doctrines, according to with the needs
and immemorial traditions of the French.
From a military point of view, these wars are fearful, since the invading force is not only
supported by the enemy's armies, but is exposed to attacks by an exasperated people.
It can be said that the violence of one part will necessarily create support for the
invaders through the formation of another and opposite; But, if the exasperated party
possesses all the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it has the
support of a great majority of the people, of what use is the support of the faction that
does not possess such means? What service did one hundred thousand Vendeans
and one hundred thousand Federalists do for the Coalition in 1793?
History contains only one example of a struggle like that of the Revolution; It seems to
clearly demonstrate the danger of attacking an intensely harassed nation. However, the
mismanagement of military operations was one of the causes of the unexpected result,
and before deducing certain maxims from this war, we should determine what the
result would have been if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of destroying and
capturing fortresses , the allies had informed the commanders of those fortresses that
they did not regard France, its forts or its brave armies, and they had marched to Paris
with two hundred thousand men. They could have restored the monarchy; and, again,
they may never have returned, at least without the protection.
Of an equal force in their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to decide this, since the
experiment was never done, and as everything would have depended on the course of
the French nation and the army. The problem thus presents two equally serious
solutions. The campaign of 1793 yielded one; whether the other could have been
obtained, it is difficult to say. Experiment alone could have determined it.
The military precepts for such wars are almost the same as for national ars, but they
differ, however, in one vital point. In national wars, the country should occupy and
subjugate fortified places besieged and reduced, and armies destroyed; where in wars
of opinion it is of utmost importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts must
be made to obtain the end quickly, without delaying the details, care is constantly taken
to avoid any act that may alarm the nation for its independence or the integrity of its
territory.
The war in Spain in 1893 is an example that can be cited in favor of this as opposed to
that of the Revolution. It is true that the conditions were slightly different; because the
French army of 179 was composed of more solid elements than that of the radicals of
the Island of León. The war of the Revolution was at the same time a war of opinion, a
national war and a civil war, while if the first war in Spain in 1808 was completely a
national war, that of 1839 was a partial fight of opinions without the element Nationality;
and hence the enormous difference in the results.
Furthermore, the Duke of Angoulême's expedition was well carried out. Instead of
attacking fortresses, he acted in accordance with the aforementioned precepts.
Advancing rapidly towards the Ebro, he divided his forces there, to seize, at their
sources, all the elements of his enemies' force, which they could do with safety, since
they were supported by the majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the Ministry's
instructions, to proceed methodically to the conquest of the country and the reduction
of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in order to provide a base of
operations, perhaps he would have failed in his mission, or at least he did. that the war
was long and bloody, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country
similar to that of 1807.
Emboldened by the cordial welcome of the people, he understood that it was a political
rather than a military operation, and that he had to consummate it quickly. Their
conduct, so different from that of the allies of 1793, deserves the careful attention of all
those charged with similar missions. In other months, the army was under the walls of
Cádiz.
If the events now occurring on the Peninsula prove that political skill cannot take
advantage of success to find an adequate and solid order for things, the fault was
neither in the army nor in its commanders, but in the government. Spanish, who,
yielding to the advice of the violent reactionaries, could not ascend to the height of his
mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Fernando blindly threw himself
into the arms of the party
That he professed a deep veneration for the throne, but that he intended to use royal
authority to further his own ends, regardless of the consequences. The nation
remained divided into two hostile camps, which would not have been impossible to
calm and reconcile in time. These fields collided again, as I predicted in Verona in
1839, a surprising lesson, by which no one is willing to make profits in that beautiful
and unhappy land, although history does not cease to be an example to demonstrate
that violent reactions, More than revolutions, they are not elements with which to build
and consolidate. May God grant that from this dreadful conflict there may arise a strong
and respected monarchy, equally separated from all factions, and based on a
disciplined army as well as on the general interests of the country, a monarchy capable
of uniting this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which , with merits no less
extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those in the best position to
know it.
ARTICLE VIII
National Wars
National wars, which we have referred to when talking about invasions, are the most
formidable of all. This name can only be applied to those who wage war against a
united people, or the great majority of them, filled with noble ardor and determined to
maintain their independence: every step is disputed, the army has only its camp, its
supplies only They can be obtained at the sword point, and their convoys are
everywhere threatened or captured.
The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, although there
is something great and noble here that deserves our admiration, the consequences are
so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we must hope never to see it. This uprising
should not be confused with a national defense in accordance with state institutions
and directed by the government.
This uprising can be produced by the most opposite causes. The servants can see in a
body the call of the government, and their masters, affected by the noble love of their
sovereign and country, can give them the example and set command over them; and,
in a similar way, a fana population can arm itself under the attraction of its priests; or a
people enthusiastic in their political opinions, or animated by the sacred love of their
institutions, may hasten to meet the enemy in defense of all that is most dear to them.
Control of the sea is of great importance in the results of a national invasion. If people
own a long stretch of coast, and are owners of the sea or in alliance with a power that
controls it, their power of resistance increases fivefold, not only because of the ease of
fueling insurrection and alarming the enemy. in all the points he can occupy, but even
more for him.
Difficulties that will be thrown in the way of your provision of supplies by sea.
The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the ease of national defense.
In mountainous countries, people are always the most important next to these
countries covered with extensive forests.
The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and the Duke of Burgundy, that of the Catalans
in 171 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the Russians in the subjugation of
the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally, the repeated efforts of the Tyrolean, clearly
demonstrate that the inhabitants of the mountainous regions have always resisted
longer than those of the plains, which is due as much to the difference in character and
customs as to the difference in the natural characteristics of the countries.
Gorges and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this type of defense; The
Bocage of La Vendée, so justly celebrated, shows that any country, even if it is only
crossed by large hedges and ditches or canals, supports an unbeatable defense.
The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinion, as well as in non-national

wars, are very great and make the mission of the generalist very difficult. The events
just mentioned, the contest of the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans
with the English, furnishes evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary
struggle of the Vendée with the victorious Republic, those of Spain, Portugal and Tyrol
against Napoleon, and, lastly, those of the Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre
against the armies of Queen Christina, are still more striking illustrations.
The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by a considerable
core of disciplined troops. The nvader only has one army: his adversaries have an
army and a people totally or almost totally armed, and they constitute means of
resistance against everything, each individual conspires against the common enemy;
Even non-combatants have an interest in their ruin and accelerate it by all means at
their disposal. He has hardly any land except that on which he camps; Outside the
limits of his camp, everything is hostile and multiplies the difficulties he encounters a
thousand times at every step.
These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is difficult. Each
armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their connections; everywhere he finds
a relative or friend who helps him; The commanders also now the country, and,
immediately learning the slightest movement in the art of the invader, can adopt the
best measures to defeat their projects; while the latter, without information of his
movements, and not in a position to send detachments to obtain it, having no resource
except in his bayonets, and with a certain security only in the concentration of his
columns, is like a blind man: his combinations are failures; and when, after the most
carefully concerted movements and the most rapid and tiring marches, he thinks he is
on the point of achieving his objective and deals a terrible blow, he finds no signs of the
enemy.
But his bonfires: so while, like Don Quixote, he is attacking windmills, his adversary is
on his line of communications, destroys the detachments left to protect him, surprises
his convoys, his warehouses, and carries out a war. so disastrous for the invader that
he must inevitably give way after a time.
In Spain I witnessed two terrible examples of this type. When Ney's orps replaced Soult
in La Coruña, I had camped the artillery-rain companies between Betanzos and La
Coruña, in the middle of four brigades distant from the camp by two to three leagues,
and no Spanish forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago de
Compostela, the Maurice-Mathieu division was in Ferrol and Lugo, Marchand in La
Coruña and Betanzos: however, one fine night the wagon and horse companies
disappeared, and we were never able to discover what became of them: a solitary
wounded corporal escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests,
had taken them with them. Four months later, Ney with a single division marched to
conquer Asturias, descending through the Navia valley, while Kellermann left León on
the road to Oviedo. A part of the La Romana corps that guarded the Asturias marched
behind the same heights that border the Navia valley, at most a league from our
columns, without the marshal knowing a single word: when it entered Gijón, the army of
La Romana attacked the center of the regiments of the Marchand division, which,
dispersed to protect Galicia, barely escaped, and that only due to the marshal's prompt
return to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as this one. All the
gold in Mexico could not have obtained reliable information for the French; What they
were given was a decoy to make them fall more easily into traps.
No army, however disciplined, can successfully compete against such a system

applied to a large nation, unless it is strong enough to hold all the essential points of
the country, cover its communications and at the same time provide an active force
sufficient to win. the enemy wherever he appears. If this enemy has a regular army of
respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what force will be
sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to guarantee the security of the long lines of
communication against numerous bodies?
The War of Independence must be carefully studied to know all the obstacles that a
general and his brave soldiers may encounter in the occupation or investigation of a
country whose people are in arms. What efforts of patience, exhaustion and resignation
did it not cost the troops of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney and Suchet to sustain
themselves for six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and
Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, Blake, La
Romana, Cuesta, Castanos, Reding and Ballasteros!
If success is possible in such a war, the following general course will be very useful in
securing it, namely: to make a display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles
and resistance that may be encountered, to calm the popular passions .
In every possible way, exhaust them with time and patience, show common courtesy,
gentleness and severity, and, particularly, deal fairly. The examples of Henry IV. In the
wars of the League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and
Valencia, of Hoche in La Vendée, there are models of their kind, which can be used
according to the circumstances with the same success. The admirable order and
discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the late war were also models,
and were not a little conducive to the success of their enterprises.
The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars have led some
speculative people to hope that there will never be another ind, for then wars would
become rarer, and, as conquest would also be more difficult, it would be less of a
temptation to ambitious. leaders. This reasoning is more plausible than sound;
because, to admit all its consequences, it would always be necessary to be able to
induce the people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be
convinced that in the future there would be no wars other than those of conquest, and
that all legitimate, although secondary, wars , which are only to maintain political
balance or defend public interests, should never occur again: otherwise, how could one
know when and how to excite the people to a national war? For example, if one
hundred thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally with the
intention of preventing France's conquest of Belgium, and without any other ambitious
project, it would be a case where the entire population - men, women and children of
Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne and Burgundy, should they rush to arms? make a
Zaragoza of each walled city, to provoke, as retaliation, murders, looting and arson
attacks throughout the country? If all this is not done, and the Germans, as a
consequence of some success, must occupy these provinces, who is to say that after
that they will not seek to appropriate a part of them, although at first they never
contemplated it? The difficulty of answering these two questions seems to argue in
favor of national wars. But is there no way to repel such an invasion without provoking
an uprising of the entire population and a war of extermination? Is there nothing wrong
between these contests between people and the old regular method of war between
standing armies? Will it not be enough, for the efficient defense of the country, to
organize a militia or patrol unit that, uniformed and called into service by their
governments, regulates the part that people should take in the war and sets limits to
their atrocities?
I answer affirmatively; and, applying this mixed system to the cases mentioned above, I
will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French troops, raised by the National Guards
of the East, would get the best of this German army that had crossed the Vosges; for,
reduced to fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon approaching the Meuse or
arriving at Argonne he would have one hundred thousand men in his hands. To
achieve this meaning, we have established it as a necessity for good national reserves
to be prepared for the army; which will be less costly in peace and will ensure the
defense of the
Country at war. This system was used by France in 179, imitated by Austria in 1809,
and throughout Germany in 1813.
I summarize this discussion by stating that, without being a utopian anthropologist or

condottier, a person can wish that wars of extermination could be banished from the
code of nations, and that the defenses of nations by disciplined militias, with the help of
good political alliances , may be enough to ensure its independence.
Asasoldier, preferring loyal and massive war to organize assassination, a choice needs
to be made. I admit that my prejudices refer to the good old days when French and
English guards politely called each other to shoot first, as at Fontenoy, preferring the
gruesome time when priests, women and children throughout Spain plotted the murder
of isolated soldiers .
ARTICLE IX
Civil wars and religious wars
Internecine wars, when not related to a foreign dispute, are generally the result of a
conflict of opinions, political or religious sectarianism. In the Middle Ages, collisions of
feudal parties were more frequent. Religious wars are above all the most deplorable.
We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force to obtain its
own subjects in order to crush factions that would weaken the authority of the throne
and national strength; but that he should murder his citizens to compel them to say
their prayers in French or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is
difficult to conceive. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis XIV, who
persecuted a million industrious Protestants, who had put their own Protestant ancestor
on the throne. Wars of fanaticism are horrible when they are mixed with foreign wars,
and they are also horrible when they are family disputes. The history of France in the
times of the League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is difficult to
believe that such a noble and chivalrous people in the time of Francis I. In twenty years
it has fallen into such a deplorable state of brutality.
Giving maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon which thinking
men will agree: that is, to unite the two parties or sects to expel the foreigners from the
soil, and then to reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. In fact, the
intervention of a third power in an eligible dispute can only be with ambitious views.
Governments can intervene in good faith to prevent the spread of a political disease
whose principles threaten social order; and, although the ears are generally
exaggerated and often mere pretexts, it is possible that a state could believe that its
own institutions are threatened. But in religious disputes this

It is never the case; and Philip II. He could have had no other object in interfering in the
affairs of the League than to subject France to his influence or to dismember it.
ARTICLE
Double war and the danger of starting two wars at the same time
The famous maxim of the Romans, not to wage two great wars at the same time, is so
well known and appreciated that it does not have to demonstrate its wisdom.
A government perhaps forced to maintain a war against two neighboring states; but it
will be extremely unfortunate if he does not find an ally to help him, with a view to his
own safety and the maintenance of political balance. It will rarely be the case that the
nations allied against it have the same interest in the war and will enter it with all their
resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it will be an ordinary war.
Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, Emperor Alexander and Napoleon, used gigantic
struggles against united Europe. When such contests arise from voluntary aggressions,
they are proof of a capital error on the part of him who invites them; but if they arise
from compelling and unavoidable circumstances, they must be found seeking alliances
or opposing means of resistance that establish something like equality between the
strength of the parties.
The great coalition against Louis XIV., which nominally arose from his designs in
Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions that had alarmed his neighbors. To
the combined forces of Europe, he could only oppose the faithful alliance of the Elector
of Bavaria, and the more equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who, in fact, was soon
increasing the number of his enemies. Frederick, aided only by subsidies from
England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different states, waged war against the
three most powerful monarchies in Europe: the division and madness of his opponents
were his best friends.
Both wars, as well as the one waged by Alexander in 181, were almost impossible to
avoid.
France had all of Europe in its hands in 1793, as a result of the extravagant
provocations of the Jacobs, and the ideas of the Girondins, who boasted that with the
support of the English fleets they would challenge all the kings of the region. World.
The result of these absurd calculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which
France miraculously escaped. Napoleon is, to some extent, the only modern sovereign
who, at the same time, has had two and even three formidable ones at the same time.

Wars, with Spain, with England and with Russia; but in the latter case he hoped for the
help of Austria and Prussia, not to mention that of Turkey and Sweden, on which he
counted too surely; so that the enterprise was not so adventurous on its part as has
generally been supposed.
It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war waged against a
single state which is aided by a third party acting as auxiliary, and two wars waged at
the same time against two powerful nations in opposite quarters, who employ all their
forces and resources. . For example, Napoleon's double engagement in 1809 against
Austria and Spain aided by England was a very different affair from a contest with
Austria assisted by an auxiliary force from a given fortress. These last conflicts belong
to ordinary wars.
It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if possible, and, if the
cause of the war is given by two states, it is more prudent to conceal or neglect the
injustices suffered by one of them, until a suitable opportunity. They will come to repair
them. The rule, however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the localities,
the possibility of finding allies to restore, to a certain extent, the equality of forces
between the parties, are circumstances that will influence a government so threatened.
We have now accomplished our task, in pointing out both the danger and the means of
remedying it.
Commentary on Chapter I
Chapter 1 defines wars and the relationship of diplomacy and statecraft in the conduct
of military operations, probably due in large part to Clausewitz. There is no hint of this
breadth of thought in Jomini's early career "Treatise of Major Military Operations." His
concession that different types of wars must be fought in different fashions is an echo
of Clausewitz's famous writings in On War on the impact of the political sphere on the
military. The categorization of different types of war is somewhat arbitrary, but the
advice in each article is of importance to both the soldier and the statesman. In this
chapter, Jomini issues warnings about paying due attention to the overall diplomatic
situation and international opinion; public opinion is not ignored. Knowledge of national
opinion is important for leaders to understand the level of sacrifice their people will be
willing to accept. According to Jomini, an accurate assessment of popular opinion in
enemy states is vital to assessing the level of opposition that can be expected during
war. These warnings provide useful reminders that wars are not fought in a vacuum.
Jomini gives concrete examples of how different political situations affect military
operations. In Article VI, he contrasts Napoleon's futile attempt to conquer Spain in
1808 with the successful French intervention in Spain's internal affairs in 18s3 to show
how Spain's different internal political climate required different military strategies and
produced different results. Politicians and statesmen cannot simply hand over the
conduct of a war to the generals without warning them of the general diplomatic and
political situation and warning them of any restrictions on military operations that they
The situation demands it .
CHAPTER TWO MILITARY POLITICS
We have already explained what we mean by this title. It covers the moral
combinations related to the operations of armies. If the political considerations that we
have just discussed are also moral, there are others that influence, to a certain degree,
the conduct of a war, which do not belong to diplomacy, strategy or tactics. We include
these under the heading of military policy.
Military policy may be said to embrace all combinations of any projected war, except
those connected with diplomatic art and strategy; and, as their number is considerable,
a separate article cannot be assigned to each one without expanding too much the
limits of this work, and without deviating from my intention, which is, not to give a
treatise on these subjects, but to point out their relations with military operations.
In fact, in this class we can put the passions of the nation that is fighting, its military
system, its immediate means and its reserves, its financial resources, the link it has
with its government or its institutions, the character of the executive, the characters and
military skills of the commanders of their armies, the influence of the cabinet councils or
war councils in the capital on their operations, the system of warfare favored by their
personnel, the established strength of the state and its weaponry, the military
geography and the statistics of the state to be invaded and, finally, the resources and
obstacles of all kinds that can be encountered, all of which are not included in either
diplomacy or strategy.
There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that nothing should be neglected by
the government in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and that it is indispensable
to take them into account in the organization of all plans. We propose to outline the
main points that should guide this type of combinations.
Chapter Two. Military policy
ARTICLE XI
Military statistics and geography
In the first of these sciences we understand the most complete knowledge possible of
the elements of the power and military resources of the enemy with whom we are
called to fight; The second consists of the topographical and strategic description of the
theater of war, with all the obstacles, natural or artificial, that can be found, and the
examination of the permanent decisive points that may occur along the entire length of
the border or throughout the territory. extension of the country. In addition to the
minister of war, the commander general and his chief of staff should receive this
information, under penalty of cruel miscalculations in their plans, as frequently happens
in our days, despite the great advances that civilized nations have made. taken in
statistical, diplomatic, geographical and topographical sciences. I will cite two examples
of which I was aware. In 1796, Moreau's army, upon entering the Black Forest,
expected to find terrible mountains, gorges and forests, and was greatly surprised to
discover, after climbing the slopes of the plateau descending towards the Rhine, that
these, with their spurs, the only mountains, and that the country, from the sources of
the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.
The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his entire army supposed that the
interior of Bohemia was very mountainous, as there is no district in Europe more level,
after the belt of mountains surrounding it has been crossed, which can be done in a
single March.
All European officers had the same erroneous opinions regarding the Alkan and the
Turkish force in the interior. It seemed to have been given in Constantinople that this
province was an almost impregnable barrier and the palladium of the empire, a mistake
which I, having lived in the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, no less deep-
rooted, have led to the belief that a people whose individuals are constantly armed
would constitute a formidable militia and would defend themselves to the last extreme.
Experience has shown that ancient regulations placing the elite Janissaries in the
Danube border towns made the population of those towns more bellicose than the
inhabitants of the interior. In fact, Sultan Mahmoud's reform projects required the
overthrow of the old system, and there was no time to replace it with the new: so the
empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly shown that a mere crowd of brave
men armed to the teeth constitutes neither a good army nor a national defense.
Let's return to the need to know military geography and the characteristics of an empire
well. These sciences are not established in treaties, and must be developed. Lloyd,
who wrote an essay about them, describing the roentiers of the great states of Europe,
was not as fortunate as his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; He
represents the Austrian border as impregnable at the inn, between Tyrol and Passau,
where Napoleon.
And Moreau maneuvered and triumphed with armies of one hundred and fifty
thousand men in 1800, 1804 and 1809.
But, if these sciences are not taught publicly, the archives of the European aff must
necessarily possess many valuable documents for instruction in hem, at least for the
school of specialized personnel. Waiting for the moment when some scholarly officer,
taking advantage of these published and unpublished documents, presents to Europe a
good military and strategic geography, we can, thanks to the immense progress in
topography of recent years, partially make up for the lack of it by the excellent graphics
published in all European countries in the last twenty years. At the beginning of the
French Revolution, topography was in its infancy: except for Cassini's semi-topographic
map, Bakenberg's works were only worthy of the name. The Austrian and Prussian
staff schools, however, were good and have since borne fruit. Tables recently
published in Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart and Paris, as well as those from Herder's
institute in Freiburg, promise future generals immense resources unknown to their
predecessors.
Military statistics are not much better known than geography. We have vague and
superficial statements, from which the outbreak of armies and navies is conjectured,
and also the income that a state is supposed to possess, which is far from being the
knowledge necessary to plan operations. Our goal here is not to discuss these
important topics in depth, but rather to point them out, how to facilitate success in
military endeavors.
ARTICLE XII
Other causes that influence the success of a war
As the excited passions of a people are in themselves a powerful enemy, both the
general and his government should do everything possible to dissipate them. We have
nothing to add to what has been said on this point under the direction of national wars.
On the other hand, the general should do everything to electrify his own elders, and to
impart to them the same enthusiasm that he tries to express in his adversaries. All
armies are equally susceptible to this spirit: the springs of action and the means, alone,
vary with the national character. Military eloquence is a means, and has been the
subject of many treatises. The proclamations of Napoleon and Paskevitch, the
addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and those of Suwaroff to men of still greater
simplicity, are models of their different types. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas and
the miracles of the Virgen del Pilar led to the same results by very different means. In
general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires confidence by previous
success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and leading.
To victory. Some dispute the advantages of this enthusiasm and prefer imperturbable
coolness in battle. Both have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm
drives the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in maintaining it constantly;
and, when discouragement succeeds, disorder easily results.
The greater or lesser activity and audacity of the commanders of the armies are
elements of success or failure, which cannot be subject to the rules. A cabinet and
commander must consider the intrinsic value of their troops and the resulting cap of
their organization compared to that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the
most solidly organized troops in Europe, need not fear undertaking anything against
undisciplined and disorganized troops in an open country, no matter how brave his
individuals may be. [I] Concert in action strengthens; order produces this concert, and
discipline ensures order; and without discipline and order there is no possible success.
The Russian general would not be so brave before the European troops have the same
instructions and almost the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general can attempt
with a Mack as his antagonist what it would be foolish to do with a Napoleon.
The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of the armies influences the age of its
operations. A general whose temper and hands are tied by one council
Aulic five hundred miles away cannot be a match for someone who has freedom of
action, all things being equal.
As for superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain promises of victory, all things
being equal. It is true that great generals have often been defeated by superior ones;
but an exception does not make a rule. A misunderstood order, a chance event, can
throw into the hands of the enemy all the chances of success that a skillful general had
prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks that cannot be foreseen or
avoided. Would it be fair for that reason to deny the influence of science and principles
in ordinary affairs? This risk even proves the triumph of the principles, because they
happen to be accidentally applied by the army against which they were intended to be
applied, and are the cause of their success. But, by admitting this truth, it can be said
that it is an argument against science; This objection is not well founded, since the
science of a general consists in providing his side with all possible possibilities of being
foreseen, and of course cannot be extended to the whims of fate. Even if the number of
battles won by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to an accident, it
would not invalidate my statement.
If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it will easily be seen that
the judicious selection of generals is one of the most delicate points of the science of
government and one of the most essential parts of the military policy of A state.
Unfortunately, this choice is influenced by so many small passions, that opportunity,
rank, age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will
I Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops can be of great value in destroying
convoys, intercepting communications, &c., and may - as in the case of the French in
181 - make a very disastrous retreat.
They have as much to do with it as public interest and justice. This topic is so important
that we will dedicate a separate article to it.
ARTICLE XIII
Military institutions
One of the most important points of a state's military policy is the nature of its military
institutions. A good army commanded by a general of ordinary ability can accomplish
great feats; a bad army with a good general can do equally well; but an army will
certainly do much more if its own superiority and that of the general are combined.
Twelve essential conditions come together to make a perfect army:
1. Have a good recruitment system;

s. A good organization;
8. A well-organized system of national reserves;
4. Good instruction of officers and men in exercises and internal tasks, as well as
those of a campaign;
4. Strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality,
based on conviction rather than the formalities of service;
6. A well-digested reward system, suitable to excite emulation;
7. Engineering and artillery special arms must be well trained;
8. A superior weapon, if possible, to that of the enemy, both in defensive and offensive
weapons;
9. A general team capable of applying these elements, and having an organization

calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of its officers;
10. A good system for the police station, hospitals and general administration;
11. A good system of assigning command and directing the main operations of the war;
1s. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people
To these conditions a good system of clothing and equipment could be added; r, if this
has a less direct importance on the battlefield, it is nevertheless related to the
preservation of troops; and it is always a great object to conomize the lives and health
of veterans.
None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without great convenience. An
excellent army, well trained and disciplined, but without national servitude, and
ruthlessly directed, suffered the fall of Prussia in fifteen days under him.
Napoleon attacks. On the other hand, it has often been seen how advantageous it is for
a state to have a good army. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming
and instructing their phalanxes and facilitating their movement, and capable of the
quickest maneuvers, that enabled the Macedonians to subdue India and Persia with a
handful of choice troops. It was his father's excessive love for soldiers that provided
Frederick the Great with an army capable of executing his great undertakings.
A government that neglects its army under any pretext is unspeakable in the eyes of
posterity, since it sets humiliation for its standards and its country, instead of a different
course preparing it for success. We are saying that a government should sacrifice
everything to the army, because this would be absurd; but he must make the army the
object of his constant care; and if the prince does not have a military education, it will
be very difficult for him to fulfill his duty in this regard. In this case, which is
unfortunately all too frequent, the defect must be provided for by wise institutions, at
the head of which will be placed a good general personnel system, a good recruitment
system and a good system. of national reserves.
There are, in fact, forms of government that do not always allow the executive the
power to adopt the best systems. I the armies of the Roman and French republics, and
those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of Prussia, prove that a good military system and a
skilful direction of operations can be applied in governments, the very opposite, in
principle, it cannot be doubted that, in the current state of the world, the form of
government exercises a great influence on the development of a nation's military
strength and the valor of its troops.
When the control of public funds is in the hands of those affected by qualified interests
or party spirit, they may be so scrupulous and painstaking as to seize all the power to
carry on war from the executive, which many people he seems to consider him as a
public enemy and not as a boss dedicated to all national interests.
The abuse of misunderstood public freedoms can also contribute to their deplorable
esult. It will then be impossible or the mystical farsighted administration to prepare in
advance for a great war, whether demanded by the most important interests of the
country at some future time, or whether it is immediate and necessary to resist sudden
aggressions. .
In the vain hope of becoming popular, they cannot members an elective legislature, the
majority of whom cannot be Richelieus, Pitts or ouvois, in an ill-conceived economic
spirit, allow institutions to be necessary or a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army
to fall into decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of exaggerated philanthropy, do
they not end up convincing themselves and their constituents that the pleasures of
peace are always preferable to the more statistical preparations for war?
I am far from advising that states always keep their hand on the word and always set
themselves up on a war footing: such a condition of things
It would be a scourge for the human race, and it would not be possible, except under
conditions that do not exist in all countries. I simply mean that civilized governments
must always be prepared to carry on war at short notice, that they must never be found
unprepared. And the wisdom of its institutions can do as much in this preparatory work
as the foresight in its administration and the perfection of its system of military policy.
If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms, governments subject to all
the changes of an elective legislature are less adequate than others for the creation or
preparation of a formidable military power, yet in great crises these deliberative bodies
They have sometimes achieved very different results, and have contributed to
developing national strength to its full extent. However, the small number of such cases
in history makes rather a list of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent
assembly, placed under the need to conquer or perish, has benefited from the
extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save to the country and to themselves. at the
same time resorting to the most terrible measures and calling to his aid an unlimited
dictatorial power, which overthrew freedom and law under the pretext of defending
them. Here it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of power,
rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the real cause of the display
of energy. What happened in the Convention after the fall of Robespierre and the
terrible Committee of Public Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1814. Now,
if dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank of security in
major crises, it seems natural to reach the conclusion that countries controlled by
elective assemblies must be politically and militarily weaker than the pure monarchies,
although in other aspects they present decided advantages.
It is particularly necessary to ensure the preservation of armies in the context of a

prolonged peace, because then they are more likely to degenerate. It is important to
foster the military spirit in the armies and to exercise large maneuvers which, although
hardly resembling those of civil war, are still a decisive advantage in preparing them for
war. It is no less important to prevent them from becoming effeminate, which can be
done by employing them in useful tasks for the defense of the country.
Isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst possible systems, and
the system of Russian and Prussian divisions and the standing army corps seems to
be much preferable. Generally speaking, the Russian army can now be presented as a
model in many respects; and if in many points its customs would be useless and
impracticable in other places, it must be admitted that many good institutions could be
copied from it.
When it comes to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service while
also opening a path for merit. Three-quarters of the promotions in each grade must be
made according to the list, and the remaining quarter reserved for those distinguished
for merit and zeal. On the contrary, in times of war, the regular order of promotion
should be suspended, or at least reduced.
One third for promotions, leaving the other two thirds for brilliant conduct and marked
services.
Superior weaponry can increase the chances of success in war: it does not by itself
win battles, but it is a great element of success. Everyone remembered how almost
fatal for the French at Bylau and Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may
also refer to the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the
cuirass, which they had so long neglected. Everyone knows the great advantage of the
spear. Sure, as skirmish lancers they would be no more effective than hussars, but
when loaded online it's a very different matter. How many brave cavalrymen have been
victims of the prejudice they endured against the lance because it was a little more
difficult to carry than a saber!
The armament of armies is still susceptible to great improvements; The state that will
take the initiative in making them will guarantee great advantages. There is little left to
be desired in artillery; but the offensive and defensive weapons of cavalry and cavalry
deserve the attention of a provident government.
The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great volume in the
organization of the army, weaponry and tactics. Strategy alone will remain unchanged,
with its principles equal to those of the Scipios and the Caesars, Rederick and
Napoleon, since they are independent of the nature of the weapons and the
organization of the troops.
The means of destruction approach perfection with frightening rapidity. [I] The
Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which the Austrians are now said to be
able to regulate, - the shrapnel shells, which throw a canister stream up to a bullet's
range - the Perkins steam guns, which vomit out so many bullets like a battalion, it will
multiply the possibilities of destruction, as if the hecatombs of Eylau, Borodino, Leipzig
and Waterloo were not enough to decimate the European races.
If the governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe the destruction of these

inventions, there will be no choice but to make half an army of cavalry with troops, in
order to capture these achines with great speed; and the infantry, even, will be obliged
to resume their armor of the Middle Ages, without which a battalion will be destroyed
before engaging the enemy.
Then we will be able to see the famous men-at-arms covered in armor again, and the
treasures will also require the same protection.
While there are doubts about the understanding of these fears, it is true that artillery
and pyrotechnics have made advances that should lead to I
It will be remembered that the author wrote this many years ago, since then the
inventive genius of the age has been attentively directed to the improvement of
firearms. Artillery, which he considered almost perfect, has certainly undergone
important improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less marked,
while we now hear nothing of Perkins' steam guns; and as yet no civilized army has
been organized on the plan which the author suggests to deprive these destructive
machines of their effectiveness.-TRADLATORS.
We are thinking about modifying the deep formation so abused by Napoleon. We will
return to this in the chapter on Tactics.
We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the military economy
which should be adopted by a wise government.
1. The prince must receive both a political and a military education. You will probably
find men of administrative ability in your councils who are good witnesses or soldiers;
and therefore he should be both of the latter himself.
s. If the prince himself does not lead his armies, it will be his first duty and closest
interest to have his place well supplied. He must entrust the glory of his reign and the
security of his states to the general most capable of leading his armies.
3. The standing army must not only always be on a respectable basis, but must be
capable of being doubled, if necessary, by reserves, which must always be prepared.
Their instruction and discipline should be of a high character, as well as their
organization; Their weaponry should be at least as good as that of their neighbors, and
superior if possible.
4. War material should also have the best balance and be abundant. Reserves must be
stored in warehouses and arsenals. National jealousy must not be allowed to prevent
the adoption of all improvements in this material manufactured in other countries.
4. It is necessary that the study of military sciences be encouraged and rewarded, as
well as courage and zeal. The scientific military corps must be esteemed and honored:
this is the only way to secure for the army men of merit and genius.
6. General personnel in peacetime must be employed in preparatory work for all

possible war contingencies. Its archives must be provided with numerous historical
details of the past and with all statistical, geographical, opographical and strategic
treaties and documents for the present and the future. It is therefore essential that the
head of this corps, with several of his officers, remain permanently stationed in the
capital in time of peace, and that the military service be simply that of the general staff,
except that there should be a secret department for that these documents be hidden
from the subordinates of the body.
7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography and military

statistics of other states, in order to know their material and moral capacity for attack
and defense, as well as the strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished
officers should be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when
they acquit themselves with marked skill.
8. When a war is decided, it becomes necessary to prepare, not a whole series of

operations, which is always impossible, but a system of operations with reference to a
prescribed objective; to provide a foundation as well as all the material means
necessary to ensure the success of the company.
9. The system of operations should be determined by the object of the war, the type of
enemy forces, the nature and resources of the country, the characters of the nations
and their leaders, whether of the army or the army. State. In short, it must be based on
the moral and material means of attack or defense that the enemy can put into action;
and must take into consideration the probable alliances which may be obtained for or
against either party during the war.
10. The financial condition of a nation must be weighed against the possibilities of war.
However, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute to this condition the importance
that Frederick the Great attributes to it in the history of his month. He was probably in
his time, when armies were recruited chiefly for voluntary enlistment, when the last
crown brought the last soldier; But when national taxes are well organized, money will
no longer have the same influence, at least for one or two campaigns. If England has
shown that money will get soldiers and auxiliaries, France has shown that love of
country and honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war can be
waged to support war. France, in fact, in the fertility of its land and the enthusiasm of its
leaders, possessed sources of temporal power which cannot be adopted as a general
basis of a system; but the results of his efforts were nonetheless surprising. Every year
the numerous reports of the London cabinet, and in particular of M. d'Yvernois,
announced that France was about to collapse for lack of money, while Napoleon had
s00,000,000 francs [I] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all while meeting the government's
expenses, including the pay of his armies.
A power can be invading with gold and still defend itself very poorly. History, in fact,
proves that the richest nation is not the strongest or the happiest. Iron weighs at least
as much as gold in the scale of military force. Still, we must admit that a happy
combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of well-regulated finances, of
internal wealth and public credit, imparts to a nation the greatest strength and renders it
most capable of sustaining a long war.
A volume would be necessary to analyze all the circumstances under which a nation
can develop more or less strength, whether for its gold or iron, and to determine the
cases in which war can be expected to support war. This result can only be obtained by
leading the army into the enemy's territory; and all countries are not equally capable of
providing resources to an attacker.
We do not need to extend further the investigation of these topics that are directly
related to the art of war. It is sufficient for our purpose to find its relations to a projected
war; and it will be up to the statesman to develop the modifications that circumstances
and localities can make in these relationships.
I There was a deficit in France's finances at the fall of Napoleon. It was the result of his
disasters, and of the stupendous efforts he was forced to make. There was no deficit in
1811.
ARTICLE XIV
The command of armies and the main control of operations
Is it an advantage to a state that its armies are commanded in person by the monarch?
Whatever the decision on this point, it is certain that if the prince possesses the genius
of Frederick, Peter the Great, or Napoleon, he will be very far from leaving to his
generals the honor of performing great actions that he himself could perform; because
in this he would not be faithful to his own glory and the well-being of the country. As it is
not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more fortunate or a nation to have
a warlike or peace-loving prince (which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our
subject), we will only affirm on this point that With equal merit and possibilities in In
other respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who is not
the head of a state.
Leaving behind the question that he is responsible only for his daring undertakings, he
can do much with the certainty that he can command all public resources to achieve his
goal. He also has the powerful accessory of his favor, of rewards and punishments; all
will be dedicated to the execution of your orders, and to assure your enterprises the
greatest success; no zeal will interfere with the execution of their projects, or at least
their display will be rare and in secondary operations. These are, no doubt, sufficient
reasons to induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possesses military ability and the
competence is of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he does not have military capacity,
if his character is weak and he is easily influenced, his presence in the army, instead of
producing good results, will open the way to all kinds of intrigues. Each one will present
their projects to you; and, as he will not have the necessary experience to estimate
them according to their merits, he will submit his judgment to that of his intimates. Your
general, interfered with and opposed in all your undertakings, will not be able to
achieve success, even if you have the required ability. It can be said that a sovereign
can accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the contrary, help
him with the full weight of his influence. In this case, their presence can be productive
of good results, but it can also lead to great embarrassment. If the army turned and cut
itself off from its communications, and was forced to free itself, with sword in hand,
what sad results might not result from the presence of the sovereign at the
headquarters!
When a prince feels the need to take the field at the head of his armies, and lacks the
confidence necessary to assume the supreme direction of affairs, the best course will
be that adopted by the Prussian government under Bluecher. ; he should be
accompanied by two generals of the best ability, one of them a man of executive ability,
the other a well-trained state officer. If this trinity is harmonious, it can give excellent
results, as in the case of the Silesian army in 1813.
The same system could be applied in the case where the sovereign deems it
appropriate or entrusts the command to a prince of his house, as has frequently
happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often happened that the prince possessed
only the titular command, and that an advisor, who actually ordered him, imposed
himself on him. This was the case with the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous
battle of Turin, then with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendome at the Battle of
Audenarde, and, I believe, also at Ulm with Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This
system is deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known that at
the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity than Marsin, and it
became necessary for the latter to show the king's secret authority before the prince
would pass his judgment and allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm, the archduke
showed more skill and courage than Mack, who would be his mentor.
If the prince possesses the genius and experience of Archduke Charles, he should be
invested with free command, and allowed the full choice of his instruments. If he has
not yet acquired the same titles to command, he may be provided with an educated
general of the staff and another general distinguished for his talent in execution; but in
no case will it be wise to invite any of these counselors with more authority than a voice
in consultation.
We have already said that if the prince does not lead his armies in person, the most
important duty will be to have the commander's position well filled, which,
unfortunately, is not always done. Without going back to antiquity, it will be enough to
remember the most modern examples of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince
Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this brought him (the most capable
commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After the death of Louvois, Tallard,
Marsin and Villeroi filled the places of Turenne, Conde and Luxembourg, and
subsequently Soubise and Clermont succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashion
selections made in the Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's
preference for mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide
enough to permit the less intelligent means of government to make rational
nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exert an influence in one form or
another, and artifice will often take the prize of a modest or timid merit, which awaits a
call to its services. But, leaving all these influences out of consideration, it will be
profitable to ask in what respects this choice of a commander will be difficult, even
when the executive is most anxious to make it judicious. First of all, to choose a skilled
general, it is necessary that the person making the selection be a military man, capable
of forming an intelligent opinion, or be guided by the opinions of others, which opens
the way to improper influence of cliques. The shame is certainly less when there is a
general already illustrious by many victories; but, apart from the fact that every general
is not a great leader because he has won a battle (for example, Jourdan, Scherer and
many others), it is not always the case that a victorious general is in the
Government provision. It is quite possible that after a long period of peace, there will
not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. In this case, it will be
difficult to decide if one general is better than another. Those who have served long in
peace will be at the head of their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate to
this position; But will they always be the most capable of filling it? Furthermore, the
sexual relations of government heads with their subordinates are generally so rare and
transitory that it is not surprising that they have difficulty assigning men to their
appropriate positions. The prince's judgment, deceived by appearances, may err, and,
with the purest intentions, he may well be deceived in his choices.
One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would be to interpret the beautiful
fiction of Fenelon in Telemachus, finding a fabulous, nére and generous Philokles,
who, standing between the prince and all the spirants for the command, would be able,
for through its most direct relations to the public, to include the mona ch in reference to
the selections of people best recommended for their character and abilities. But will this
faithful friend never give in to personal affections? Will it always be free of prejudice?
Suwaroff was rejected by Potemkin because of his appearance, and it required all of
Catherine's art to secure a regiment for the man who later shed so much brilliance on
Russian arms.
Public opinion has been thought to be the best guide; but nothing could be more
dangerous. He voted for Dumouriez as a Caesar, when he was ignorant of the great
operations of the war. Would he have placed Bonaparte at the head of Italy's army,
when he was only known to two directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible,
public sentiment should not be despised, particularly if it survives major crises and the
experience of events.
The most essential qualities for a general will always be the following: First, moral
courage, capable of great resolutions. Second, physical courage that disregards
danger. Your scientific or mythical acquisitions are secondary to the aforementioned
characteristics, although if they are large they will be valuable auxiliaries. It is not
necessary that he be a man of great erudition. Their knowledge may be limited, but it
must be exhaustive, and it must be perfectly grounded in the principles at the core of
the art of war. Next in importance come the qualities of your personal character. A
gallant, just, firm, upright man, capable of estimating merit in others instead of being
jealous of it, and skilled in making this merit lead to his own glory, will always be a good
general, and may even pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do
justice to merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are always
jealous, and are inclined to surround themselves with people of little ability, fearing the
reputation of being led away, and not realizing that the The nominal commander of an
army always receives almost all the glory for his success, even when he has the least
right to it.
The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to assign a general
with long experience in service with troops or an officer to the command.
Of the personnel, generally having little experience in managing troops. It is beyond

doubt that war is a science distinct from itself, and that it is quite possible to combine
operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment against an enemy. Peter the
Great, Count, Frederick and Napoleon are examples of this. Therefore, it cannot be
denied that one staff officer and another prove to be a great general, but it will not be
because he has become gray in the duties of a quartermaster that he will be capable of
being the supreme command, but because he has a genius natural for war and
possesses the required characteristics. Then, too, a general from the ranks of the
infantry or cavalry may be just as capable of conducting a campaign as the deepest
tactician. So this question does not admit a definitive answer, neither affirmative nor
negative, since almost all of them will depend on the personal qualities of the
individuals; but the following observations will be helpful in reaching a rational
conclusion:
1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers or artillery, who has
commanded an army division or corps, will, with the same opportunities, have more
capacity than one who is familiar with the service of an arm or special. Body.
s. A general of the line, who has made a study of the science of war, will also be
prepared for command.
3. That the character of the man is above all other requirements in a commander-in-
chief.
Finally, he will be a good general in whom the required personal characteristics are
combined with a deep knowledge of the principles of the art of war.
The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the formation of a good
general team, which by being close to the general can advise him and therefore exert a
beneficial influence on operations. A well-trained general taff is one of the most useful
organizations; but care must be taken to avoid the introduction of false principles, as in
this case it could be fatal.
Frederick, when he established the Potsdam military school, never thought that it would
lead to General Ruchel's "right shoulder forward," [I] and to the teaching that oblique
order is the infallible rule for winning all battles. How true it is that there is only one step
from the sublime to the ridiculous!
Furthermore, there should be perfect harmony between the general and his talented
staff; and, if it is true that the latter must be a man of recognized ability, it is also
appropriate to give the general the choice of men who will be his advisors. To impose a
chief of staff on a general would be to create anarchy and disharmony; while allowing
you to select a cipher for that position would be even more dangerous; because if he
himself is a man of little.
General Ruchel thought at the Battle of Jena that he could save the army by giving the order to advance the right
shoulder to form an oblique line.
Skill, beholden to the favor or fortune of your station, selection will be of vital
importance. The best means of avoiding these dangers is to give the general the
choice of several appointed officers, all of undoubted ability.
It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent wa officers,
assisting the commander with their advice, give more weight and effect to the direction
of military operations. No doubt, if the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a
Mack, he might well find in a court-martial opinions more valuable than his own; most
of the opinions given could be preferable to yours; But what success can be expected
from operations carried out by others than those who have originated and organized
them? What should be the result of an operation that is partially understood by the
commander, since it is not his own conception?
I have had a miserable experience as a prompter at headquarters, and one has a

better appreciation of the value of such services than I do; And it is particularly in a
court-martial that such a part is absurd. The greater their number and the higher the
rank of the military officers who make up the council, the more difficult it will be to
achieve the triumph of truth and reason, no matter how small the amount of dissent.
What would have been the action of a war council to which Napoleon would have
launched the Arcola movement, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the Ulm maneuver
or that of Gera and Jena? The timid would have considered them reckless, even crazy,
others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution, and all would have agreed
in rejecting them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been
executed by someone other than Napoleon, would they not certainly have
demonstrated failures?
In my opinion, courts-martial are a deplorable resource, and can be useful when they
concur in opinion with the commander, in which case they can have more confidence in
their own judgment and, furthermore, can assure him that his lieutenants, being of his
opinion , they will use all means to ensure the success of the movement. This is the
only advantage of a court-martial, which, furthermore, should be merely advisory and
have no further authority; but if, instead of this harmony, there must be a difference of
opinion, it can only produce unfortunate results.
Consequently, I think it is safe to conclude that the best way to organize the command
of an army in the absence of a general approved by experience is:
1st. To give the order to a man of proven bravery, bold in fight and firmness in danger.
South Dakota. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of great ability, of an open and
faithful character, between whom and the commander there can be perfect harmony.
The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some for the friend who has
contributed to his success. In this way, Bluecher, aided by Gneisenau and Muffling,
achieved glory that he probably could not have achieved on his own. It is true that this
double command is more objectionable than a
Undivided when a state has a Napoleon, a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when
there is no great general to lead the armies, it is undoubtedly the preferable system.
Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of influencing
military operations—namely, that of a council or war in the place where the post is
located—deserves notice. Louvois for a long time dictated in Paris the armies of Louis
XIV., And with success. Carnot, too, of Pa, addresses the armies of the Republic: in
1793 he did well, and saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but
he later repaired his faults by chance; in 1796 he was completely guilty. It should be
noted, however, that both Louvois and Carnot individually controlled the armies, and
that there was no council of war. The council of Aulic, sitting in Vienna, was often
entrusted with the duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never
been more than one opinion in Europe of its fatal influence. Whether this opinion is
right or wrong, only the Austrian generals can decide. My own opinion is that the
functions of such a body should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of
operations. By this I do not mean a plan that must trace the campaign in detail, restrict
the generals and force them to fight regardless of the circumstances, but a plan that
must determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether
offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to these companies first, then
to reserves, and finally to levies that may be necessary if the country is invaded. These
points, it is true, should be discussed in a council of generals and ministers, and on
these points the control of the council should be limited; for if he not only ordered the
commanding general to march to Vienna or Paris, but also had the presumption to
indicate the manner in which he should maneuver to achieve this objective, the
unfortunate general would be defeated, and the entire responsibility for his reverses
would fall upon him. the shoulders of those who, hundreds of kilometers away,
assumed the duty of leading the army, a duty so difficult for anyone, even in the field of
operations.
ARTICLE XV
The military spirit of nations and the morale of armies

The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army would be in vain if
the government did not at the same time cultivate the military spirit in its citizens. It may
well be the case in London, situated on an island and protected from the invasion of its
immense fleets, that the title of wealthy banker should be preferred to a military
decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and customs of the
merchants of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner or later become the prey of
its neighbors. It was the union of civic virtues and the military spirit fostered by its
institutions that the
The Romans were indebted for his greatness; and when they lost these virtues, and
when, ceasing to consider military service as an honor and a duty, they gave it up to
Gothic and Gaul mercenaries, the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is
undoubtedly true that whatever increases the prosperity of the country should not be
neglected or despised; It is also necessary to honor the branches of industry that are
the first instruments of this prosperity; but they must always be secondary to the great
institutions that constitute the strength of the States to encourage the cultivation of virile
and heroic virtues. Politics and justice agree on this point; Well, whatever Boileau says,
it is certainly more glorious to face death in the footsteps of the Caesars than to gain
weight against public miseries by betting on the vicissitudes of national credit.
Misfortune will certainly befall the land where the wealth of the tax collector or the
greedy stock gambler ranks, in public opinion, above the uniform of the brave man who
sacrifices his life, health, or fortune in defense of his country.
The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army with all possible
social and public considerations. The second means is to give preference to those who
have served the state, to fill vacancies in administrative departments of the
government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a qualification for
certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military institutions of Rome with those of
Russia and Prussia, is a subject worthy of serious attention; and it would also be
interesting to contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare against
the employment of army officers in other public functions, and who want nothing more
than rhetoricians in important administrative positions. [I] It is true that many public jobs
require a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the abundant leisure of
peace, prepare himself for the career he would prefer after having fulfilled his debt to
his country in the profession of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred
upon retired officers of the army in a rank not lower than that of captain, would it not be
stimulating to the officers to attain that rank, and would it not lead them, when in
garrisons, to find their recreations? anywhere other than in public theaters and clubs?
It is possible that this ease of transfer from military to civil service is rather detrimental
than favorable to a high military spirit, and to encourage this spirit it would be advisable
to place the profession of soldier above all others. This was the early practice of the
Mamluks and Janissaries. His soldiers were bought at the age of seven, and were
raised to believe that they would die according to his standards. Even the English, so
jealous of their rights, contracted to enlist as soldiers, the obligation for life, and the
Russian, to enlist for twenty-five years, do what is almost equivalent.
In such armies, and in
For example, in France, instead of excluding all officers from the privilege of the
elective franchise, it should be granted to all colonels; and generals should be eligible
for the legislature. The most venal deputies will not be those from military life.
Those recruited by voluntary enlistments would perhaps not be wise to tolerate this
fusion of military and civil offices; but where military service is a temporary duty
imposed on the people, the case is different, and the ancient Roman laws which
required a previous military service of ten years in any aspirant for public employments,
seem better calculated to preserve the military power spirit. , especially in this era,
when the achievement of material comfort and prosperity seems to be the dominant
passion of the people.
However, this may still be, in my opinion, under all forms of government, it will be a
wise part to honor the military profession, in order to encourage the love of glory and all
the warlike virtues, under penalty of receiving the approaches of posterity and suffering
insult and dependence.
It is not enough to encourage the military spirit among the people, but, more than that,
it is necessary to encourage it in the army. What good would it be if the uniform were
honored on earth and it was considered a duty to serve in the army, while military
virtues were deficient? The forces would be numerous but worthless.
The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two very different things, and
should not be confused, although they produce the same effects. The first is the effect
of passions more or less of a temporary nature, for example, of a political or religious
nature, or of a great love for the country; while the second, depending on the skill of the
commander and resulting from military institutions, is more permanent and less
dependent on circumstances, and must be the object of the attention of all visionary
governments. [I] Courage must be rewarded and honored, different degrees of rank
respected, and discipline must exist in feelings and convictions rather than only in
external forms.
Officers must feel the conviction that resignation, courage, and full attention to duty are
accomplished without any glory being possible, no adversary being respectable, and
that firmness in setbacks is more honorable than enthusiasm in success. since courage
is only necessary to assault a position, while it requires heroism to make a difficult
retreat in the face of a victorious and enterprising enemy, always opposed by a firm
and unbroken front. A good withdrawal should meet a reward equal to that given for a
big win.
By subjecting armies to toil and fatigue, by keeping them away from the garrison of
stagnation in times of peace, by instilling in them their superiority over their enemies,
without disparaging too much the latter, by inspiring a quest for prowess, in a word, by
xci their enthusiasm by all means in harmony with his tone of voice, honoring courage,
repressing weakness, and dishonoring cowardice, we may hope to maintain a high
military spirit.
Effemination was the main cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: the inevitable, those
who had worn the helmet, the shield and the cuirass in the
I It is particularly important that this spirit permeates officers and non-commissioned

Officers: if they are capable, and the nation brave, there is no need to fear men.
The times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, they found them too
burdensome in the cold climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was lost.
I have remarked that it is not good to create too great contempt for the enemy, lest the
soldier's morale be shaken if he encounters obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena,
addressing Lannes' troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would
contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians.
Officers and troops must be warned against the sudden panics which finally overtake
the bravest armies when they are not well controlled by discipline, and therefore when
they do not recognize that order is the surest hope of faith. It was not for lack of
courage that a hundred thousand Turks were defeated at Peterwardein by Prince
Eugene, and at Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once rejected in their disorderly
charges, each yielded to his personal feelings, and because they fought individually,
but not in masses and in order. An army besieged by panic is also in a state of
demoralization; for when disorder occurs once, all concerted action on the part of
individuals becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no
maneuver can be executed to resume the battle, and there is no recourse but an
ignominious flight .
Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly prone to panic; and less than strong
institutions and skillful leaders can remedy it. Even the Frenchman, whose military
virtues, when well led, have never been questioned, has often made some quick
moves of this kind that were very ridiculous. We can refer to the undue panic that
permeated Marshal Villars' infantry after having won the battle of Friedlingen in 1704.
The same thing happened to Napoleon's infantry after the victory at Wagram and when
the enemy was in total retreat. An even more extraordinary case was the flight of the
97th semi-brigade, fifteen hundred men strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon
of cavalry. Two days later, these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
vigorous attacks mentioned in modern history. Still, it would seem easy to convince
brave men that death comes more quickly and surely to those who fly in disarray than
to those who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
punctually when their lines have been broken. the broken moment.
In this regard, the rest of the Russian army can be taken as a model. The firmness
which he has shown in all retreats is due in equal degrees to the national character, the
natural instincts of the soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. In fact, the
liveliness of the imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder: the
lack of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of caution on the part of generals
to maintain this order contributes to it. I have often been surprised by the indifference of
most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the slightest precaution
to give proper direction to small detachments or scattered men, and they did not adopt
any signal to facilitate the assembly in each division of the.
Fractions that may disperse in a momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the

enemy, but were offended that anyone should think of proposing such precautions.
Still, the most undoubted courage and the severest discipline will often be powerless to
remedy a great disorder, which might be largely obviated by the use of muster signals
for the different divisions. It is true that cases in which all human resources are
insufficient to maintain order, as when the physical sufferings of the soldiers have been
so great as to make them deaf to all appeals, and when their officers find it impossible
to do anything to organize them, which was the case in the withdrawal of 181. To get
out of these exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
gathering and good discipline will often succeed, if not in preventing the disorder, at
least in its prompt solution.
Now is the time to abandon this branch, of which I have only desired to draw an outline,
and pass on to the examination of subjects which are purely military.
Commentary on Chapter II
The chapter on military police emphasizes the importance of good intelligence or, as
Jomini puts it, military statistics. Precise knowledge of an opponent's geography,
demographics, and military strength are obviously necessary to successfully prosecute
war, but such information has often been ignored by generals and policymakers.
Napoleon III had no idea of Prussia's military strength in 1870; more recently, Mussolini
ignored the effect that the rugged Greek terrain would have on Italian operations in
1940. Other articles in chapter s begin to reduce the emphasis of the book to more
purely military topics. Jomini discusses the form that national military institutions should
take, the relationship between the head of state and the senior military commander,
and the organization of the military headquarters. Article XV is Jomini's nod to morality
in this book, a topic he generally ignores in chapters focusing more directly on military
operations.
CHAPTER III STRATEGY DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF WAR The art of war, regardless of its political and moral relations,
consists of five main parts, namely: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the
different arms and the Engineer's Art. We will deal with the first three branches and
begin by defining them. To do this, we will follow a general's order of procedure when
first declaring war, which begins with the most important points, such as a campaign
plan, and then descends to the necessary details. Tactics, on the other hand, begin
with the details and ascend to the combinations and generalizations necessary for the
formation and management of a large army. We will assume that an army is in the field:
the first care of its commander must be to agree with the head of state on the character
of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war and select the most suitable
base of operations, taking into account the borders of the state and those of its allies.
The selection of this base and the proposed objective will determine the area of
operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will select the line of
operations leading to this point, either as a temporary or permanent line, giving it the
most advantageous direction; that is, that which promises the greatest number of
favorable opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of
operations will have an operational front and a strategic front. The temporary positions
that the army corps will occupy on this front of operations or on the defense line will be
strategic positions. When close to its first objective point, and when it begins to
encounter resistance, the army will attack the enemy or maneuver to force it to retreat;
and for this purpose it will adopt one or two strategic lines of maneuvers, which,

Being temporary, it may deviate to some degree from the general line of operations, with which they
should not be confused.
To connect the strategic front with the base as you advance, upply lines, warehouses, &c. will be
established.
If the line of operations is long, and if there are hostile troops in bothersome proximity to it, these bodies
may be attacked and dispersed or simply saved, or operations against the enemy may be carried on
without any drift occurring. If the second of these courses can be demanded, the result will be a double
strategic strategy and large detachments.
Since the army is almost within reach of the first objective point, if the enemy threatens it, there will be a
battle; if he is indecisive, the fight will be resumed; If the RMY wins the victory, he will secure his
objective point or advance to reach the second. If the first objective point is the possession of an
important fort, the siege will begin. If the army is not strong enough to continue its march, after detaching
a force sufficient to hold the siege, it will have a strategic position to cover it, as the army of Italy did in
1796, which, less than fifty thousand men strong , might not pass Mantua to enter Austria, leaving
twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty thousand more ahead in the double line of
Tyrol and Frioul.
If the army is strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if it has to wage a siege, it will operate
toward a second and more important objective.
If this point is distant, it will be necessary to establish an intermediate support point. One or more safe
cities already occupied will form an eventual se: when this cannot be done, a small strategic reserve can
be established, which will protect the rear and thus the depots by temporary fortifications.
When the army crosses large streams, it will build tetes de pont; and, if the bridges are within walled
cities, earthworks will be erected to increase the means of defense and to guarantee the security of the
eventual base or strategic reserve that may occupy these positions.
If the battle is lost, the army will retreat towards its base, to reinforce it by detachments of troops or, in
other words, strengthen itself by occupying fortified posts and camps, which will make it impossible for
the enemy to divide the forces. .
As winter approaches, armies will enter quarters or the army will hold the field that has
achieved decisive success and is eager to make the most of its superiority. These
winter campaigns are trying to attract both armies, but in others they do not differ from
ordinary ones. campaigns, unless it requires greater activity and energy to achieve
immediate success. Such is the normal course of a war, and as such we will consider
it, while listening to combinations resulting from these operations.
Chapter III. Strategy: definition of strategy and fundamental principle of war Strategy
covers the following points, namely: 1. The selection of the theater of war, and the
discussion of the different combinations of which it admits. s. Determining the decisive
points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations. 3. The
selection and establishment of the fixed base and the area of operations. 4. The
selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive. 4. Strategic fronts,
defense lines and operations fronts. 6. The choice of lines of operations that lead to the
objective point or strategic front. 7. For a given operation, the best strategic line and the
different maneuvers necessary to cover all possible cases. 8. The eventual bases of
operations and strategic reserves. 9. The marches of the armies, considered as
maneuvers. 10. The relationship between the position of the depots and the marches of
the army. 11. Fortresses considered as strategic means, as a refuge for an army, as an
obstacle to its progress: sieges that must be made and covered. 1s. Points for
entrenched camps, tetes de pont, &c. 13. The deviations that will be made and the
large detachments necessary. These points are mainly important in determining the
first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as
stream passages, retreats, surprises, landings, convoys, winter quarters, the execution
of which belongs to tactics, conception and arrangement to strategy. The maneuver of
an army on the battlefield and the different formations of troops for the attack constitute
the Great Tactics. Logistics is the art of moving armies. It includes the order and details
of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; In a word, it is the
execution of strategic and tactical undertakings.
Repeat. Strategy is the art of waging war on the map, and includes the entire theater of
operations. Grand Tactics is the art of placing troops on the battlefield according to the
features of the terrain, of putting them into action, and the art of fighting on the ground,
as opposed to planning a map. Its operations may extend over a field ten or twelve
miles in extent. Logistics includes the means and arrangements that resolve the
strategy and tactical plans. The strategy decides where to act; logistics get the troops
to this point; Grand tactics decide the form of execution and the use of troops.
It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic moves, and in fact have been a succession of
them; but this only occurs in the case of a dispersed army: for the general case of pitched battles, the
definition of bove is valid.
Grand Tactics, in addition to local execution acts, is related to the following projects:
1. The choice of defensive battle positions and lines.
s. The offense in a defensive battle.
3. The different orders of battle, or the great maneuvers for attacking the enemy's line.
4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.
4. Surprises of armies in the open field.
6. Arrangements for bringing troops into battle.
7. The attack of entrenched positions and fields.
8. Coups de main.
All other operations, such as engaging with convoys, foraging parties, outpost or forward guard
skirmishes, the attack of small posts, and anything carried out by a detachment or a single division, may
be regarded as details of war, and not included in the big operations.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR

It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all the operations of war, a principle
which must be followed in all good combinations. It is accepted in the following maxims:
1. Throw, by strategic movements, the mass of an army, successively, on the decisive points of a theater
of war, and also on the enemy's communications as much as possible without compromising one's own.
s. Maneuver to attack hostile army factions with the bulk of one's forces
3. On the field of battle, throw the mass of forces upon the decisive point, or upon that
part of the hostile line which it is of first importance to overthrow. 4. Arrange so that
these masses are not only thrown on the decisive point, but are involved at the
appropriate times and with energy.
Chapter III. Strategy: definition of strategy and fundamental principle of war

This principle is too simple to escape criticism: one objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the
mass of forces at the decisive points, but that the difficulty is in recognizing those points.
This truth is evident; and it would be nothing short of ridiculous to state a general principle with the
collaboration of its necessary balances for its application in the field. In Article XIX. These decisive
points will be described, and in the articles of the XVIII. to XXII. Their relationships with the different
combinations will be discussed. Those students who, having carefully considered what is said there, still
regard the determination of these points as a problem without a solution, may despair of a strategy that
they will ever understand.
The general theater of operations rarely contains more than three zones: the right, the left and the center;
and each zone, front of operations, strategic position and defense line, as well as each battle line, has the
same subdivisions, two extremities and the center. A direction on one of these three will always be
adequate for achieving the desired goal. An address on one of the remaining two will be less
advantageous; while the third direction will be completely inapplicable. When considering the proposed
object in connection with the enemy's positions and the geography of the country, it will appear that in
every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the question for decision will always be, whether to
maneuver to the right, to the left, or directly in front. . The selection of one of these three simple
alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of giving proper direction to the masses is
certainly the basis of strategy, although it is not the entire art of war. Executive talent, skill, energy, and a
quick apprehension of events are necessary to carry out any previously arranged combination.
We will apply this great principle to different cases of strategy and tactics, and then
show, from the history of twenty celebrated campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the
most brilliant successes and the greatest reverses were due to the adherence to this
principle in the one case, and from carelessness in the other. OF STRATEGIC
COMBINATIONS ARTICLE XVI Of the system of operations Once the war has been
determined, the first point that will be decided is whether it will be offensive or
defensive; and first we will explain what is meant by these terms. There are several
phases of the offensive: if against a large state, all or a large part of its territory is
attacked, it is an invasion; yes a province.
Jomini j The art of war alone, or a line of defense of moderate extent, being attacked, is
the ordinary offensive; Finally, if the offensive is nothing more than an attack on the
enemy's position, and is limited to a single operation, it is called taking the initiative.
From a moral and political point of view, the offensive is almost always advantageous:
it takes the war to foreign lands, saves the raider's country from devastation, increases
its resources and decreases those of its enemy, raises the morale of its army, and
generally depresses the opponent. It sometimes happens that invasion excites the
ardor and energy of the adversary, especially when he feels that the independence of
his country is threatened. From a military point of view, the offensive has its good side
and its bad side. In theory, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, which are
always dangerous in a hostile country. All obstacles in the enemy's country, the
mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are favorable for defense, while the inhabitants
and authorities of the country, far from being the instruments of the invading army, are
generally hostile. However, if success is achieved, the enemy is hit at a vital point: he is
deprived of his resources and forced to seek a quick termination of the contest. For a
single operation, which we have called taking the initiative, the defensive is almost
always advantageous, particularly in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war is to throw the
dots at the decisive points, doing your part will require taking the initiative. The
attacking party knows what it is doing and what it wants to do; He directs his masses to
the point where he wants to attack. He who expects the attack anticipates himself
everywhere: the enemy falls with great force on fractions of his force: he neither knows
where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what way to repel him. Tactically,
the offensive also has advantages, but they are less positive, since the operations are
carried out in a limited field, the party that takes the initiative does not hide them from
the enemy, who can detect its designs and by identifying good reserves. causes them
to fail.
The attacking party strains under the disadvantages arising from the obstacles that
must be overcome before reaching the enemy's line; in which the advantages and
disadvantages of tactical offensive are equally balanced. Whatever the political or
strategic advantages of his offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
during the war; for an offensive campaign at the beginning can turn defensive before it
ends. A defensive war is not without advantages, when carried out wisely. He can be
passive or active, taking the offensive at times. Passive defense is always harmful; the
asset can achieve great successes. The object of a defensive war is to protect, as long
as possible, the country threatened by the enemy, all operations must be designed to
retard his progress, to disturb him in his enterprises by multiplying obstacles and
difficulties, without compromising one's security. own army. He who invades does so
for the reason of.
Chapter III. Strategy: definition of strategy and fundamental principle of war

some superiority; then it will try to solve the problem as soon as possible: the
defense, on the contrary, wants to delay until its adversary is weakened by
sending detachments, marches and hardships and fatigue that affect its
progress. An army is reduced to the defensive only by setbacks or positive
inferiority. Then he seeks the support of the strong, and in natural or artificial
barriers, the means to restore equality by multiplying obstacles in the path of
the enemy. This plan, when not carried to the extreme, promises many
chances of success, but only when the general has the good sense not to
make the defense passive: he must not remain in his positions to receive the
blows that his adversary may deliver; On the contrary, it must redouble its
activity and be constantly alert to improve all opportunities to attack the
enemy's weak points. This war plan can be called defensive-offensive, and
can have both strategic and tactical advantages. Combines the advantages of
both systems; for he who awaits his adversary on a prepared field, with all his
resources in hand, surrounded by all the advantages of being on his own
ground, can with the hope of success take the initiative, and is able to judge
when and where Strike. During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years'
War, Frederick was the attacker; In the remaining four his conduct was a
perfect model of defensive offense. He was, however, wonderfully aided in
this by his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
opportunities of successfully taking the offensive. Wellington's course was
basically the same in Portugal, Spain and Belgium, and was the most suitable
in their circumstances. It seems clear that one of the greatest talents of a
general is knowing how to use (may be alternatively) these two systems, and
particularly being able to take the initiative during the progress of a defensive
war.

The Art of War Translation

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Art of War Translation

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Art of War

Antoine Henri de Jomini (Baron de Jomini)

General and Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor of Russia

Originally published in French in 1836

Translated from French by

Corps of Topographic Engineers

Arc ftanor, Rockville, ftD

With an introduction and commentary by

Preface to the 1862 edition

SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR - DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR

CHAPTER I - THE STATUS IN ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WAR

ARTICLE I - Offensive wars to claim rights

ARTICLE III - Wars of Expediency

ARTICLE IV - Of wars with or without allies

ARTICLE V - Wars of Intervention

ARTICLE VI – Aggressive Wars for Conquest and Other Reasons

ARTICLE VII - Wars of opinion

ARTICLE VIII – National Wars

ARTICLE IX - Civil wars and religious wars

CHAPTER II - MILITARY POLITICS

ARTICLE XI - Military statistics and geography

ARTICLE XII - Other causes that influence the success of a war

ARTICLE XIII - Military institutions

ARTICLE XV - The military spirit of nations and the morale of Armies

ARTICLE XVI - The Operations System

ARTICLE XVII - Theater of Operations

ARTICLE XVIII - Bases of operations

ARTICLE XX - Operational fronts, strategic fronts, defense lines and strategic

ARTICLE XXI - Zones and lines of operations

ARTICLE XXII - Strategic lines

ARTICLE XXIII - Means to protect a Line of Operations through temporary Bases or

ARTICLE XXV - Supply depots, and their relationship with Marches

ARTICLE XXIX - Great invasions and distant expeditions

CHAPTER IV - GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES

ARTICLE XXXII: Turning maneuvers and overextended movement in battles

ARTICLE XXXIII - Unexpected meeting of two armies in March

ARTICLE XXXIV - Surprises of armies

ARTICLE XXXVI - Detours and large detachments

ARTICLE XXXVII - Passage of rivers and other currents

ARTICLE XXXVIII - Withdrawals and searches

ARTICLE XXXIX - Of cantonments, either in March, or when established in Winter

CHAPTER VI - LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOBILE ARMIES

ARTICLE XLI - Some observations on logistics in general

ARTICLE XLII - Reconnaissance and other means of obtaining correct information

CHAPTER VII - THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE

ARTICLE XLIII - Placing troops in line of battle

ARTICLE XLIV – Infantry training and employment

ARTICLE XLV – Cavalry

ARTICLE XLVI - Use of artillery

ARTICLE XLVII - The combined use of the three arms

SUPPLEMENT TO THE SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR

NOTE ON THE MEANS TO ACQUIRE A GOOD OLLO STRATEGIC BOND

SECOND APPENDIX TO THE SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR ON THE TRAINING

DRAWING OF THE MAIN MARITIME EXPEDITIONS

Commentary on Chapter III 129

Commentary on Chapter IV 161

commentary on Chapter V 187

Commentary on Chapter VI 206

comment on Chapter VII 246

Final comment 288

Editor's note on illustrations and text

Preface to the 1862 edition

US Military Academy USA,