Wesleyan University

Understanding Narrative Theory

Author(s): L. B. Cebik
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 25, No. 4, Beiheft 25: Knowing and Telling History: The
Anglo-Saxon Debate (Dec., 1986), pp. 58-81
Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505132
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 UNDERSTANDINGNARRATIVETHEORY

L. B. CEBIK

Does the Eagle know what is in the pit?

Or wilt thou go ask the Mole?
William Blake

Narrativetheoriesemergefrominquiriesjust as surelyas do historicalinvestiga-

tions. Therefore,understandinga particulartheory requiresthat we attendto
the questionsit puts to narrative.Expressedanotherway,we cannot fully ap-
preciatethe termsof a narrativetheory unless we also appreciateits purpose.
Hempel'scovering-lawmodelsprovidedhistorywitha singularfunction:to serve
as explanations(or explanationsketches)of crucialevents.HaydenWhite'spiv-
otal studiesof historicalnarrativeas a literaryentity supportthe values (and
dangers)of history'screativefunctions.Ricoeur'smimeticdialecticdevelopsnar-
rative'sfunction to configuretime in human experience.
However,all of these (and other) theories are incomplete- in some cases,
justifiablyso. Forexample,in the interestsof literarycriticism,Whitewouldleave
to epistemologists"thequestionof the veracityof a givenkindof discourse,with
respectto the 'object-world'of whichit speaks."'Likewise,in their concentra-
tion uponhistory'sexplanatoryfunction,Hempelianslargelyignoredeverything
in historicalnarrativethat they could not translatewith ease or by force into
causalstatements.Wehavemadesomerecentinroadsinto the connectingground
betweenthese seeminglypolar perspectives.Nonetheless,we must also record
two majordifficultiesthat remain:the denigrationof epistemologyand its in-
terestsandthe failureto developa comprehensiveviewof whata theoryof nar-
rativeshould contain in its finishedstate.
AlthoughWhite'sremarkon epistemology'stask seemsinnocentenough, it
reflectsa moregeneralview that epistemologydeserveslittle place withincon-
temporarynarrativetheory.Ricoeurechoesthis idea,despitehis appreciative cri-
tique of Anglo-Americananalysesof narrative.In characterizingsuch workas
the epistemologyof the historicalsciences,he absorbswhathe callsWhite'sfirst
presupposition,the settingasideof methodsin whichobjectivityand proof de-
terminethe criteriafor classifyingmodes of discourse. Whiteand Ricoeurfall
into this sharedviewby equatingquestionsof objectivityand proof with ques-

1. H. White, "Comment on Robert Anchor 'Narrativeand the Transformation of Historical Con-

sciousness,"' 2, presented at the History and Theory conference on narrative, August, 1985, Bad
Homburg.
2. P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative (Chicago, 1984), I, 161.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 59
tions on the methodsof science,but also- and morefundamentally- by virtue
of an uncriticalreferentialviewof historicalstatements,if not of historicalnar-
rativeitself. WhereasWhitecan set asidesuchquestions,Ricoeurmustembrace
themin his triplemimesesof prefigured,configured,and refiguredtime and in
his analogicalsolution to the question of historicalreality.
In short, currentnarrativisttheory and phenomenologicalanalysismiscon-
strueepistemology'srelationshipto narrativetheoryby focusingupon one sort
of epistemictheory.In rejectingcovering-lawepistemology(and most counter-
covering-law versions),theyignoreepistemology's moregeneralconcernsin which
science,explanation,objectivity,proof, and referencebeginas problemata,not
as presuppositions.In addition,they fail to notice epistemology'sfunction to
formulatewhattheoriesmayand mustcontain.If we ignorehistory'sregulative
commitmentto tellingthetruth(howeverweanalyzetheterm)andto beingbound
withinthe limits of reliableevidence,then of coursehistorybecomesno more
than a variantof literatureratherthan being a disciplinedinvestigation.If the
relationshipof historicalconstructionsandcolligationsto determinableevidence
and publicdebateis not to disappearinto shadow,such theoreticalideas must
equallyilluminethe creativeresultsand the justifiedfoundationsof histories.
And narrativecreationitself musteitherfold backupon basicconceptualstruc-
turesor be left floatingamid merelyaestheticclouds. If fictionand art at their
bestcanpersuadeus to alterthe waysin whichweperceiveandconceivethe world
aroundus, they have epistemicdimensions.
Everytheoryhasepistemicdimensionsandremainsincompleteuntilit grapples
with them. Wehaveperhapsfailedto appreciatefully this fact in payingatten-
tion only to particulardevelopmentsin partialtheories.Thus,amidthe seeming
crisisoccasionedby the rapidspreadof narrativismat the expenseof otherap-
proachesto narrative,the time may be ripe for some metatheoretica-l--rumina-
tions. For more is at stake than a debatebetweennarrativehistory'scognitive
respectabilityand its rhetoricalforceand persuasivetechniques.At stakeis an
understanding of philosophicaltheorizationitself. However,beinga secondstep
awayfromthe doingand writingof historyitself, metatheorywill inevitablyput
off practicingand teachinghistorians,even though it should not do so. Such
workmay also offendcertaintheoristswho havealreadytraveledtoo far to re-
traceeasilyanyof theirsteps.Yet,the risksof a metatheoreticalforaypalebeside
the cost to our understandingof narrativetheory if we continueto refusethe
venture.
Letus examineseverallevelsof theoryto see whattheorizingitself mightde-
mand of any narrativetheory.The resultswill be instructiveto the extentthat
theyrevealthe incompletenessof most extanttheories.Indeed,any comprehen-
sivetheorymustaccommodateboth thejustificationalandthe creativeelements
of narrative,the activitiesleadingto narrative,and reflectionupon the finished
narrative.In distinguishinglevelsof narrative,we maytakeas a guidingprinciple
our abilityto pose questionsat a lowerleveland to reframethem at a moread-
vancedlevelwithoutthe reversebeingthe case.Thus,we maypose the question
of truth(in some properform)at all levelsfrom the languageof narrativesup-
60 L. B. CEBIK

ward.In contrast,to ask the consequencesof narrativeshavinga centralsubject

makessensein termsof narrativeobjects,but not necessarilybelow that level.
Weshallinvestigatefour levelsof theory:1. narrativediscourseand temporal
language,2. narrativeand historicalconstructions,3. narrativeobjects or sto-
ries,and 4. narrativefunctionsand purposes.Withina contextof justification,
each successivelevelpresupposesthe preceding.Froma creative,active,or crit-
icalperspective,however,we wouldnecessarilystartat the highestlevelandsearch
the lowerfor tools, techniques,andlimitations.Theboundarieswedrawbetween
levelsarelargelyheuristic,servingto focus our attentionratherthanto separate
theory.This fact will become emi-
absolutelythe facets of historical-narrative
nently clear when we take up narrativeconstructions.

I. NARRATIVE AND TEMPORAL DISCOURSE

SinceHempelbroachedthe questionof narrative'sexplanatoryfunction,most

theorieshavebeguntheirstudiesat the level of narrativeobjects,that is, histo-
ries,novels,journalisticreports,and the like. Regardlessof theoreticalcommit-
ments,the typicalaccountproceedsfromthe objectin two directions.Onedirec-
tion leadstowardthe structuralpartsof the object. The other leads towardthe
object'sfunction.Together,theseelementsconstitutea theoreticalaccountthat
must be consistentwith the genus into which the theoristplaces the object.
If we subsumehistoricalnarrativeunderthe genus "explanation,"then our
theoriestake a particularform. In exploringhistory'sfunctionto explainor to
be a formof explanation(as for Louchor Danto), we must highlightjust those
featuresof narrativethat enablethe function.3Wemight (withMortonWhite)
emphasizethe causalstatementsin historicalnarrative,findingthereinwhatdis-
tinguisheshistoriesfromchronicles.4Or (withStover),we maydenyto narrative
an inherent"fundamentalschemeof intelligibility"of its own and consignnar-
rativeto the class of forms that expressdeterminingconditions.5By contrast,
if we categorizehistoricalnarrativeas principallya form of literature,then a
differentmosaicemerges.Withall greatliterature,history(so saysHaydenWhite)
imbueseventswith meaningor significance,emplottingmereeventsinto trage-
dies, farces,et al. Structuralto this functionarethe elementsof storytelling,the
eventsandcharactersof storybooksandthe tropesof storytellinglanguageitself.6
Tobeginwithnarrativeobjects- thefinishedstoriesthatmarkthehighestrefine-
ment of our narrativecompetence- holds danger.It can lead to an academic
elitism,as it does for Ricoeur,who relegatesto mereprefiguredtimethe narrative-
linguisticabilitieswe all shareapartfromanytalentfor creatingor perceptively

3. A. R. Louch, "History as Narrative,"History and Theory 8 (1969), 58; A. C. Danto, Analytical

Philosophy of History (Cambridge, Eng., 1965), 142.
4. M. White, The Foundations of Historical Knowledge (New York, 1965), 222-223.
5. R. C. Stover, The Nature of Historical Thinking (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), 70.
6. See H. White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," in The Writing of History, ed. R.
H. Canary and H. Kozicki (Madison, Wisc., 1978), 51ff. Cf. White's Metahistory and the essays in
Tropics of Discourse.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 61
followingsophisticatedhistories,novels,or epics that properlyconfiguretime
for us andinfluenceits refiguringin us.7 Tobeginwithobjectsandthe associated
activitiesof production(whichseemeverto dominatethe activitiesof following
or using the object-a Romantichangover)without some vestedinterestmay
not be possible.HaydenWhiteandhis narrativistfollowersseemunableto theo-
rize at all withoutsome few wordsin behalf of the humanitiesas distinctfrom
the sciencesor someotherwordsof worryaboutthe deploymentof power.Some-
times they are the same words.8
Althoughmost narrativetheoriesbeginwith narrativeobjects,narrativelogi-
callyoriginateswithinthe possibilitiesof languageitself. (Wherenarrativeorigi-
natedhistorically,we cannotsaywithanyassurance,sinceeventhe most ancient
recordedsourcesgive us all levels of narrative.)Danto demonstratedlong ago
the originativepotentialwithinlanguagein his analysisof past-referringterms
andtensedsentences.His most strikingdemonstrationinvolvedthe classof nar-
rativesentenceswhich"referto at least two time separatedevents,and describe
the earlierevent,"thus allowingsubsequentspeakersto asserttrulywhat some
historicalactorscould not themselvesassert.Sincewe may use any such possi-
bilitywithinconversationalcontextsfarremovedfromthe formalitiesof stories,
histories,or similarobjects,we cannot plausiblyclaim them as structuresthat
occur only within those objects.9
Dray,Fain, and others have shown some of the possibilitiesfor narrative-
organizationalstructureswithinlanguage.Doing A leadsto B, whichcausesC,
and C - along with D, E, and F - amount to G.... 10Stringing these possibilities
together,with attentionto both temporaland contentlinkages,showshow one
mightbuild a narrative(or narrativistic)accountwithoutnecessaryrecourseto
formalstory structures(for example,to beginningsand endings,characteriza-
tion, or evenfactualplausibility).Yet,withoutsuchelements,formalstoriesand
historicalnarrativeswould not be possible.
Wemayalso usethesepossibilitiesin whollynonnarrativeways.In this regard,
we shouldnot confusecontextsof theiruse with contextsof theirjustification.
To say, "Motheris preparingdinner"(a projectverb in Danto'sterms)entails
no narrative."However,some formsof justificationfor such a statement,such
as a step-by-stepreportof her actions,mightyield a narrativeof sorts. Equally
justifyingthe assertionwouldbe a glanceinto the kitchenby eventhe most ordi-
nary membersof this sort of society.Moreover,we need not use the sentence
in questionfor anyof the purposesrecognizedas belongingto narrativeobjects.
The statementmight functionas an answerto a questionsuch as "Whatis she
doing?"or a remindernot to disturbher or a suggestionfor one to set the table

7. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 54-64.

8. See, e.g., R. Anchor, "Narrativity and the Transformation of Historical Consciousness,"
3-5, presented at the 1985 History and Theory conference on narrative.
9. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 72-75, 156-165.
10. See my Concepts, Events, and History (Washington, D.C., 1978), 175 and associated notes.
11. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 164-166.
62 L. B. CEBIK

or the occasionfor one to ask"What'sfor dinner?"All of thesehumanactivities

call for narrativediscourse,but not for formal narrativeobjects.
Narrativediscoursedoes not standalone withoutregardfor and relationship
to nonnarrativediscourse.In context, everynarrative-organizational structure
presupposes or assertsnonnarrative
statements."Leesurrendered at Appomattox"
presupposes(in part)that surrenderingwas somethingpossible for Lee to do,
that Lee was a person-one capableof surrendering,that Appomattoxwas a
place-and one possiblefor Lee'ssurrender.Thusdo the presuppositionsrange
overbothfactualandconceptualmatters.Additionally,in eventhe leastextended
contextof narrativediscourse,narrativestructuresmustbe consistentwith non-
narrative assertionsandwithothernarrative-organizationalstructurescomprising
the context. 12
Narrativediscourseor languageis at once a set of necessaryconditionsfor
narrativeobjectsand also a set of independentpossibilitiesfor framingnarra-
tivelyorganizedassertionsin a myriadof othercontexts.At just this leveloccur
manyof the phenomenatheoristshavenotedwithinthe formaldisciplineof his-
tory.Goldstein'spast constitutions,Walsh'scolligations,and Ankersmit'snar-
rativeproposals,along withthe rationaldisputabilityof almostanygivenorga-
nization,can all occur at the conceptual-sentential levelsof languagewithout
regardto a specificallynarrativecontext. Thus, theory requiresby one means
or anotherthe abilityto distinguishbetweenwhat demarcatescertainuses of
languageand what demarcatescertainuses of things built from language.
Onceit was popularto claimthat all languageis metaphor,withthe possible
qualificationthat some metaphorsarealive,othersdead. Morerecently,we find
narrativisttheory opting to treat all event reportsas "alreadyinterpreted"(as
for Becker).13 Withoutregardto the truthor falsityof such a claim, it certainly
makessense,at least withina theoreticalcontextthatbeginswitha recognizable
narrativetext. However,we must use carenot to importsuch theory-ladenno-
tions to the everydayworldwhereinwe speakeverso sensiblyof literal(as op-
posed to figurative)statementsand of data or fact priorto interpretation.De-
nied these distinctions,many ordinaryactivities-for example,law or police
work-would eithercease or reinventthe distinctionsin other words.In these
mundanecontexts,such distinctionsare-as Watersnoted of anothermatter-
unless pragmatic,then surelyPickwickian.14
Theoriesbased upon certainfeaturesof narrativeobjects cannot wholly set
asidethe questionof whetherindividualstatementsaretrueor false,evenif pri-
maryinterestrestsupon patternsof meaningfulnessa writercreates.At the level
of narrativediscourse,establishingthe truthor falsityof variousstatementsre-

12. Oddly, some theorists (e.g., Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 149-150) leap over such matters in
their attempt to get from narrativesentences to emplotment, following stories, and formal narrative
texts. Perhaps it is only Ricoeur's preoccupation with time that leads him to overlook the significance
of content relationships in and among narrative statements.
13. C. L. Becker, "What are Historical Facts?" in The Philosophy of History in Our Time, ed.
H. Meyerhoff (New York, 1959), 120-137.
14. B. Waters, "Historical Narrative," Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1967), 214.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 63
vealssome interestingfeatures.If the claimin questionis "Motheris preparing
dinner,"we may establishthe claim as true by watchingMom in the kitchen,
askingherwhat she is doing, or just smellingthe householdair.Wemay estab-
lish the claim'sfalsenessin equallynumerousways,as by learningthat she has
finished,by discoveringthat Dad is doing the work, or by hearingher answer
our questionwith a "No."The desideratafor truthand for falsityarenot coter-
minalevenin so simplean everydaysituationas dinnerpreparation.Sometimes
we cannotwith assuranceestablisheithertruthor falsity.The indecisivenessof
the situationmay stem eitherfrom insufficientfacts (we saw pots on the stove,
but not Mom) or from doubts overthe scope of the key term of our question
(everythinglooked ready,but Mom stayedin the kitchenmakingno move to
set out the food).
Questionsof truth and falsity arise within contextsof justification.In such
contexts,we call for the evidencesupportingour statements.Danto has distin-
guished between factual and conceptual evidence, the former seeming self-
explanatory, the latterrestinguponlogicalconnections,conceptualimplications,
andwhatis typical."5Forexample,a diaryentrymightread,"Itis 6 P.M.Mother
is preparingdinner."Askedfor a justification,sincethe writeris far fromhome,
the diaristmaynote that Motheralwayspreparesdinnerat that hour,or he/she
mightreporton a 6 p.m. telephonecall. History,Danto notes, uses a combina-
tion of factualandconceptualevidence,whereasfiction"requiressolelyconcep-
tual evidence."16Notably,both bodies of evidenceconsist of true statements.
At the levelof narrativediscourse,we maybetterspeakof fact or fictionthan
of historyor fiction.Nonetheless,at whateverlevel,the distinctiondoes not or-
dinarilylabel what level of justificationa segmentof narrativediscoursehas
passed. Instead,it indicateswhat sort of justificationwe shall demandof the
discourse,if the demandbecomesrelevantand appropriate. Withformalobjects,
such as novels and histories,the producersoften tell us how to treat them.17
Everydaysentencesarelessself-certifying,andwe oftenmakethe wrongdemands
upon them.
Theseeverydaysituationsfindtheirwayintohistoricalnarratives, andwe should
not overlookPassmore'simportantsuggestionsabout the relationshipsamong
science,history,and everydaylife, even if he originallyconfinedhis remarksto
explanations. 18 Undergirding everynarrativetheory(or explanationtheory)must
be, in Gorman'sterms,a rationalstandardfor the acceptabilityof truthandrele-
vanceclaims,consistingof a theoryof meaning,of grammar,and of organiza-
tion of "theworld,"or- more succinctly- a theory of language.19 At present,

15. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 122-128. See my Fictional Narrative and Truth
(Washington, D.C., 1984), Chapter 7, for an analysis of the typical.
16.. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 123.
17. See Fictional Narrative and Truth, Chapter 3.
18. J. Passmore, "Explanation in Everyday Life, in Science, and in History,"in Studies in the Phi-
losophy of History, ed. G. Nadel (New York, 1965), 16-34.
19. J. L. Gorman, The Expression of Historical Knowledge (Edinburgh, 1982), 105. Whether we
require a metaphysical conception as well we here leave moot.
64 L. B. CEBIK

perhapsonly three main lines of languagetheory inform currenttheories of

narrative.
By the weightof two millenniaof tradition,Aristotelianviewsof language-
severelymodernized- still predominate.Restingupon the relationshipof terms
to their referents,such theoriesgive rise to correspondenceand semanticthe-
ories of truth and consequentproblemswith past reference.Secondarilyarise
questionsof history'srelationshipto science.Whetheror not this body of theory
can long sustainitself in the face of popularnew ideas concerninghumanlan-
guage activityis uncertain.However,as McCullaghhas shown, such a view of
languagedoes not necessarilycommitus to positivisticconsequenceswhen we
analyze historicaldescriptions.20
A second theory discardsnamingand referenceas primitivesfor a criterial
accountof languagelooselybaseduponthe workof Wittgenstein.Findingcriteria
of warrantedassertionespeciallyaptto eventlanguage,this viewneitherimports
objects necessarilyinto assertionsthat eventsoccurrednor reifieseventsthem-
selves.Withinsuch a theory,the truthof statementstakeson pragmaticdimen-
sionsinherentin Kuhnianparadigmsandin ordinarydiscourse.It thusimmunizes
manyformulations,suchas colligation,fromonslaughtsof traditionalepistemic
distinctions among knowing, believing, and the truth of event assertions.21
Nonetheless,the criterialtheoryhas yet to gain wide acceptanceand use in nar-
rativetheory,eventhough such a view of languagewould obviatethe problem
of historicalreferenceto whichWhiteand Ricoeurhavemade the most recent
contributionsin a vain effortto set it aside.
Mostrecentlyon English-speaking soil hasarisena commitmentby narrativists
to versionsof linguisticstraceableto Saussureand Jakobson.Relatingsignifiers
to signifiedsin a pool of languagewhosereferentialsourcewe can postulatebut
neverdetermine,the theoryallowsus to eschewtruthas correspondencefor ed-
dies of meaning.The only truthrelevantto narrativelies in coherence,although
the scopeandimportanceof thatnotionremainunderanalysis.Narrativistshave
yetto formulatethetheoryin anysignificantdetailin relationship to the epistemics
of narratives.Instead,like HaydenWhite,they use the theoryto justify giving
principalattentionto the literary,meaning-giving dimensionsof narrative.22Thus,
the narrativistsattendto the rhetoricof historicalnarrativeratherthan to its
epistemicfoundations.As a result,one cannot say with certaintywhat drives
such termsas metaphor,emplotment,argument,or ideologicalimplicationin
White'stheory:discourseitself or the functionalobjects we createout of lan-
guage,suchas stories,poems,reports,andhistories.Onemustwonder,however,
to whatdegreesuchuncertaintiesstemfromsimpleincompletenessandto what
degreethey restupon a willful refusalto deal with both the contextof creation
and the context of justification.

20. See C. B. McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions (Cambridge, Eng., 1984), especially
Chapters 3 through 5.
21. See J. W. Meiland, Scepticism and Historical Knowledge (New York, 1965), 41ff.
22. See, for example, H. White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," in
On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago, 1981), 3f., 15ff.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 65
II. NARRATIVE AND HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS

Out of the possibilitiesof discourse- narrativeand nonnarrative - and of evi-

dence,historiansconstruct.Theoriesof narrativeconstructionhaverangedfrom
the mostly nonnarrativeestablishmentof historicalidentificationsto narratios
(to use a termfromAnkersmit).At leastpartof Walsh'sformulationof colliga-
tion, Dray's"explaining'what,"'and Mink'ssynopticjudgmentsbelongto this
aspectof narrativetheory.Morerecently,McCullaghhas defended"arguments
from criteria"as one of severalmodes of justifyingsingularhistoricaldescrip-
tions. In the faceof all thesedevelopments,criticspersistin refusingto historical
narrativesits constructions.
Constructivismin any form in historyhas traditionallyattachedto a certain
metaphysicalthesis, namely,that historydoes not recordthe past, referto it,
representit, or recaptureit. Rather,historycreatesthe past by constructingit.
Whateverthe meritsof this position,its generalrejectionhas stigmatizedalmost
all attemptsto findsomeplaceforhistoricalandnarrativeconstructions,whatever
the claimedrelianceupon evidence.Only now has sufficientwork emergedto
begin understandingthe places of constructionin historywithoutthreatening
the discipline'sjustificationalfoundation.
At perhapsthe most rudimentarylevelarewhatMcCullaghtermsarguments
fromcriteria.Statementshistoriansmakethat characterizeor assertactionsre-
quireno argumentsto the best explanation,but only justificationin termsof
the behavioralcriteriathat warranttheir assertion.Historians,of course,need
cite suchjustifyingmaterialonly wherethey needto argueor wheresuch mate-
rial may serveother functions as well. Essentialto the assertionare the rules
of language,the linguisticconventionsby which any such assertion,presentor
past, achieveswarrant.The evidencefor the truthof such assertionsis just the
evidencefor the factualnessof the criterialelements.Thus,we requireno special
formulaefor assertionsof intentions,consequences,or evenemotionalstates.23
Criterialanalysismakeseachassertiona constructwhenviewedfromthe per-
spectiveof its justification.Indeed,if one takesa broaderviewof eventand ac-
tion languageas criterially(ratherthan referentially)based, then virtuallyall
discourse has a constructivecharacter.Discourse does not lose its truth-
functionalness,since one may set truthconditionsat the propositionallevelin
termsof satisfyingsome criteriaset relevantto the eventor action. Ordinarily
we discourse;only occasionallymust we justify our assertions.However,just
suchcasesattractthe mostattention,especiallythosein whichwe encountercon-
testingcriteriasets(suchas Gallie'sessentiallycontestedconcepts)or an original
conceptualproposalfor a moreaptcriteriaset.Theconstructive'nature of criterial
justificationcomes to light in such situations,especiallyto the degreethat the
termsof disputemay concerna proposal'sconsequencesor utility ratherthan
its correctnessin terms of preexistingconventions.24

23. McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, 78-85.

24. For a more complete account, see Concepts, Events, and History, Chapters I through III.
66 L. B. CEBIK

Relatedto thesenotions,but moredistinctlyhistoricalfroma methodological

pointof view,areGoldstein'sconstructions,whichhe calls the "constitutedhis-
toricalpast."Rejectingperceptionas the paradigmaticactivityfor establishing
true historical assertions, he examines "those intellectual . . . activities in terms
of whichhistorianscometo havesomeideaof whatwemayhavereasonto believe
oncetranspired."However,historicalconstitutionis not for Goldsteinthe gener-
ation of narrativeproducts,but ratherresidesin those partsof historythat re-
veal historical thinking about historical evidence leading to historical
conclusions.25
Goldstein'slogic of historicalconstitutionbeginswith the body of historical
evidencethat presentsthe historianwith a questionof what it is reasonableto
believehappened.Withinthe limitsof availableevidenceandthe prevailingcon-
ceptionof plausibility,the historianby trial and errorproposesan orderingof
the evidencethatis persuasiveof whatoccurred.As Collingwoodhas remarked,
"thegameis won not by the playerwho can reconstitutewhat reallyhappened,
but by the playerwho can showthat his viewof whathappenedis the one which
the evidenceaccessibleto all players,whencriticizedup to the hilt, supports."26
Collingwoodhimself once began with a puzzlingtombstonein Silchesterand
reasonedto the existenceof an Irishcolony in the locale. Indeed,Collingwood
wasmoreexplicitthanGoldsteinin hisownformulationsof constitutivereasoning,
distinguishingrelicsfrom evidence,interrelatingevidencewith the questionat
hand, and rejectingboth fixeddata and fixedprinciplesof evidence.The prag-
maticnatureof historicalinquirypotentiallycallsuponthe entirerangeof human
knowledge,but activatesonly those partsof it that contributeto the question
posed,whichmustin turnrelateto and emergefrompreviousthoughtand have
good reasonfor beingposed.27Whenwelldone,the activityprovidesan answer
to the questionposed,a statementof whathappened.As Goldsteinintentionally
overstatesthe matter,Collingwoodhad no interestin the Irishcolony "untilhe
had virtuallyto call it into existence"to account for the tombstone.28
The resemblanceof historicalconstitutionto criterialargumentsis clear to
the extentthatbothmayassertevents,actions,or humanproductions.However,
thereare at least two majordifferencesbetweenthe two types of construction.
First,criterialargumentsgenerallypresumeaccessto the materialwhichsatisfies
any demandfor justification,that is, instantiationof a relevantcriteriaset. By
contrast,constitutivereasoningmay involvecomplexcases that do not satisfy
any modelsof straightforward justification.Subtlemeanderingsof interpreta-

25. L. J. Goldstein, "Towarda Logic of Historical Constitution," in Epistemology, Methodology,

and the Social Sciences, ed. R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky (Amsterdam, 1983), 19, 21, 29.
26. Quoted in Goldstein, "Towarda Logic of Historical Constitution," 47-48; see also Goldstein's
"Collingwoodon the Constitution of the HistoricalPast,"in CriticalEssays on the Philosophy of R. G.
Collingwood, ed. M. Krausz (Oxford, 1972), 257-266, and Historical Knowing (Austin, 1976), espe-
cially Section V of Chapter 3, 82-91. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, "The Limits of Historical Knowledge,"
in Essays in the Philosophy of History, ed. W. Debbins (New York, 1965), 90-103.
27. See "Collingwood:Action, Re-enactment,and Evidence,"Philosophical Forum 2 (1970), 68-90.
28. Goldstein, "Collingwood and the Constitution of the Historical Past," 265.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 67

tion mayeludethe untrainedreader,and the resultmay lack firmwarrant,but

haveonly the greatestplausibility.Second, criterialargumentsare largelylin-
guisticor conventional,whereasconstitutivereasoningis distinctivelyhistorical:
disciplinedandmethodologicallybased.Thesedistinctionshold, of course,only
if we assumefixedand firmlinguisticconventionsand equallyfixed historical
methods.The dubiousnessof the assumptionsuggeststhat at some borderbe-
tweencriterialargumentsand constitutivereasoning,the two may meld into a
largerpatternof historicalconstructions.
Moreencompassingis the notion of "colligationunderappropriateconcep-
tions,"derivedfromWhewell,but firstemployedin distinctlyhistoricalcontexts
by Walsh.Supplementedby Dray,Levich,and McCullagh,the ideashowsmuch
promiseas an accountof certainformsof historicalinterpretationand even (in
Mink'sview)as a mode of historicalunderstandingin whichthe historian'scon-
clusionsanddetailsremaininseparable.29 The orderof conceptsWalshproposes
and upon whichmost writersfix includessuchthingsas "anewrenaissance,the
emergenceof a freshsocialhierarchy, a widespreadshiftof allegiance,"andsimilar
complexparticularshavingtemporalandspatial"spread." Walshnotesthatevery
act of colligationmustdo justiceto the evidenceandilluminatethe pastor make
it intelligible.30
Colligationis not solely an act of classification,althoughWalsh'sexamples
lendthemselvesto suchan interpretation.As Draynotes,the historian'sdiscern-
mentof a certainunityin his materialoften eludescaptureby the currentsocial
vocabulary,thus forcingnewand sometimesmetaphoriccoinages.Moreshown
than defined,the criteriafor a coinage-perhaps "renaissance" in the handsof
Michelet- establishthe possibilityof furtheruse for cases sufficientlylike the
original.Both Drayand Walshagreethat colligatoryconceptsmaybe distinctly
historical,constitutingentitiesthat makepast actionsand eventsintelligibleto
us by showingthe generalnatureof the changesbroughtaboutwithoutreference
to the motivesand aimsof the agents.31McCullaghdistinguishesthese"formal"
colligatoryconceptsfrom "dispositional"conceptswhichdesignatewholes de-
pendentupon the sharedideas of agents.32
It is no accidentthat colligationunderappropriateconceptionsbearsstrong
resemblance to bothcriterialargumentsandto historicalconstructions.Onemight
well arguethat colligation under ordinaryor acceptedconcepts corresponds
directlyto an ordinaryeventassertion,whereasthe coinage that Drayempha-

29. See W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History (London, 1958), 60-62, and "Col-
ligatory Concepts in History,"in The Philosophy of History, ed. P. Gardiner(London, 1974), 127-144;
W. H. Dray, "Explaining 'What' in History," in Theories of History, ed. P. Gardiner (New York,
1959), 403-408, and "Colligation Under Appropriate Conceptions," in Substance and Form in His-
tory, ed. L. Pompa and W. Dray (Edinburgh, 1981), 156-170; M. Levich, review of Philosophy and
History, ed. S. Hook, History and Theory 4 (1965), 328-349; and L. 0. Mink, "The Autonomy of
Historical Understanding," in Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. W. Dray (New York, 1966),
180-181.
30. Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History," 139-142.
31. Dray, "Colligation Under Appropriate Conceptions," 165, 167-168.
32. McCullagh,JustifyingHistoricalDescriptions,272ff.
68 L. B. CEBIK

sizesrepresentsa conceptualproposal.Moreover,Walsh'sinsistencethat all col-

ligationsrestupon evidencereflectsthe methodologicalelementscrucialto his-
toricalconstructions.Wherethe accountsdifferlies chieflyin the scope of the
formulations.McCullaghappliescriterialargumentsto humanactions,whereas
proponentsof colligationfocusupon largerscalesocialchangesor movements.
Thissamefocusdifferentiates colligationsfromthe rangeof identificationsGold-
stein takes to be the subjectof constitutingthe past. Whetherthese represent
differencesof degreeor of kindhas yet to be established,sincea comprehensive
theory of historical-narrative constructionremainsa futuretask.
The similaritiesamongthe threeconstructivenotionsgivethem equalfitting-
nessto Mink'snotionof "synopticjudgment,"the act of "seeingthingstogether."
Minkattemptsto showthatthe uniquenessof doinghistorylies not in its subject
matteror method, but in a kind of judgmentthat is not, however,limitedto
understandingpast events.Rather,synopticjudgmentcharacterizesmany en-
deavors,suchas literarycriticism,clinicalpsychology,andgroupleadership.Nor
is temporalorderthe"essence" of suchjudgments,sincejudgmentorganizesrather
thanselectsevents.Finally,synopticjudgmentis no substitutefor methodology;
that is, the historiancannotneglectthe need that everyassertionbe justifiable
accordingto evidenceof the appropriatesort.33
All of the constructionswe havenoted so far may occur outsidethe context
of an identifiablenarrativeobject, such as a volumeof historyor a novel. To
the degreethattheoristshaveinsisted- withoutregardto level- upon methodo-
logicaljustificationof the construction,thenno activeconstructioncouldoccur
withina fictionalnarrative,althougha novelistmightuse an alreadyextantcon-
struction.Moreover,the threelevelsof constructionmightwelloccurwithinan
historicalnarrative,but as only part of the narrative.To representthe "histori-
ographicalnarrativerepresentationof the past"achievedby an entirenarrative,
Ankersmithas proposedthe term"narratio," whichconsistsof the sentencesof
the narrativebut is neitheridenticalto themnor identicalto theirconjunction.34
Thesentences,besidesfunctioningnormallyas confirmablestatements,also con-
stitutethe propertiesof a narrativesubstance,a complexstructurewith its com-
ponents of historicalresearchand its view of the past. What a given narratio
is often defiesprecisearticulation.35Mink has noted that articulatedhistorical
conclusionsat bestremindus of the topographyof the eventsto whichthe narra-
tive has givenorder,a positionDrayaffirmedby suggestingthat a narrativehis-
tory mayconstitutewithoutlabelor summarya justifiableorderingof events.36
Using Ankersmit'sfigures,like binocularlenses, narratiosfocus and guide our
viewof events,creating"apointof viewfromwhichweareinvitedto see reality."37
As things,narratiosareneithertruenor false.Rather,theyareproposals.They

33. Mink, "The Autonomy of Historical Understanding," 186-191.

34. F. R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic (The Hague, 1983), 19, 59.
35. Ibid., 101-103.
36. Mink, "The Autonomy of Historical Understanding," 181; Dray, "The Nature and Role of
Narrative in Historiography,"History and Theory 10 (1971), 169-170.
37. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 139.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 69
functionmuchlikethe proposalfacetsof the otherconstructionswe haveexam-
ined. Theyaresubjectto acceptanceor rejection,but not withouta basis in ra-
tionaldisputation.AlthoughAnkersmitselectsas his unitof studythe historical
narrative,nothingin principlepreventsapplicationof the keyideasto otherforms
of factualor evidentiallybased forms of narrative.Indeed,court proceedings
againstjournalistsfor defamationof characteroften treat a newsreport(or a
collectionof them)as a whole,ratherthanexaminingcertainlinesalone,as might
be the casein a libelsuit. The narratiodefames,not its individualsentences(ex-
cept in rare,simplisticinstances).Likewise,we may discovernarratiosin lesser
units of narrativewithin largerworks.Thus, the idea of a narratiomay have
widerapplicationsthan Ankersmitoriginallyenvisionedfor it.
All the formsof narrativeconstructionwe haveexaminedwill normallyoccur
withinnarrativeobjects of recognizedsorts. However,they logicallyneed not.
Consequently, wecannotsubjectnarrativeconstructionsto rulesthatobtainonly
on the levelof narrativeobjects.If storiesmusthaveopeningsand closings,nar-
rativeformsof historicalconstructionsneed not, eventhoughall constructions
willhavelimits.Thelimitsof constructionsarenot necessarilytemporal,whether
we speak chronologicallyor narratively.In fact, the key figureswe encounter
in theoriesof constructionsspeak of perspectives,topography,and seeing, all
nontemporalmetaphors.
Interestingly,narrativeconstructionsneednot be intentional,evenif most are.
If a reader-more especially,if an influentialreaderor a consensusof readers-
can see overarchingpatternsin a pieceof narrativeandjustify that claimon tex-
tualgrounds(supplementedby anyextratextualmaterialappropriateto the type
of justification),then the reader'scase for a constructionis complete(although
not indisputable).Whatwe writerstry to do and what we accomplishareoften
verydifferent.The veryintensityof our trialsmay blindus to accomplishments
(or faults)that othersmay see clearly.A narratorloses exclusivecontrolof that
narrativejust as soon as it occurs.Perhapswe may even see patternsnot open
to the writerto eitherintendor discover.Hypothetically,we mightsuggestthat
Herodotusanticipatedsocioculturalcausalexplanationpatternsthat we see and
regularlyuse today,but which werenot part of his conceptualframeworkbe-
yond some prototypicalstage.
In orderto developthe similaritiesamong narrativeconstructions,we have
passedoverwithonly slightmentionmanyfeaturespeculiarto each sort. Those
differencesmightmakea greatdifferenceto a fully developedtheory.It remains
the case that narrativeconstructions-from the perspectiveof justification-
presupposethe possibilitiesof narrativediscoursewithoutpresupposingnarra-
tiveobjects,eventhoughwemayfindmanyof the constructionsin those objects.
Moreover,only some of the possibilitiesfor constructionbelong distinctly,not
to mentionexclusively,to history.It is not clearwhetherAnkersmitcan confine
the narratiowithinhistory.He restshis distinctionbetweenhistoryand the his-
toricalnovelon opposingrelationshipsbetweenthe pointof viewandthe specific
statement:for history,a pointof viewis a conclusion;for the novelit is a start.38
38. Ibid., 19-27.
70 L. B. CEBIK
This distinctionholds promise,but requiresconsiderablymore attention to
modeof justificationto whichall too fewtheoristshavegiven
fictionalnarrative's
attention.
Additionally,we must more fully developthe relationshipbetweennarrative
discourseand narrativeconstruction.Forexample,Meiland's"perceptiveevalu-
ationof Oakeshott's'constructivism"' thatAnkersmitcitesmaintainsits percep-
tivenessonly on the suppositionof a reference-basedtheory of languagethat
can sustainsharpdistinctionsbetweenour knowledgeof an event and the evi-
dencefor an event.39As we earliernoted,suchcritiquesfail underothertheories
of languagein whichreferenceholds a differentplace.Likewise,we can see that
Ricoeur'sleap from narrativesentencesto followinga story soars over a wide
plaincontaininginterestingand significantformsof narrativelife.40The lureof
realstoriessorelytriesour analyticalpatience.At the sametime,historicalcon-
structions,to the degreetheyconstituteproposals,containelementsof the crea-
tive capableultimatelyof determiningjust how we shall view our world,past,
present,and future.Thus, we needto developfurthernot only the logic of con-
structions,but as wellthe meansbywhichconstructionsachieveor failto achieve
a place within our conceptualand perceptualframeworks.

III. NARRATIVE OBJECTS

Althoughmosttheoriesof narrativebeginwithnarrativeobjects,wecansayonly
a limitedamountabout themper se. For the objects to which we must attend
in narrativetheory exist as culturalachievementswithin social frameworksof
relationsand activities.41Withinthese frameworks,objects serveas functional
entitiesratherthan as naturalphenomena.Social recognitionof objectstends
to freezetogetherobjectsand functionswithina systemof rulesthat a. defines
the functionalobject, b. guidesevaluationsof successand failurein function,
c. determineswhatbenefitor detrimentflowsfromthe object'sfunctioning,and
d. enablesthe processof teachingnew generationshow to producesuccessful
objects.
Withinthe fieldof narrativeobjects,wecan identifya largenumberof distinct
entitieson the basis of theiruse of narrativediscourse.Oraland writtennarra-
tiveobjectsinclude(farfromexhaustively)jokes;anecdotes;news,weather,and
sportsreports;police records;courtrecords;extendedjournalisticaccounts;di-
ariesand memoirs;autobiographiesand biographies;some chroniclesand even
someannals;histories;long andshortstories;novellasandnovels(andevencycles
of novels);somewrittendramaandscripts;someminutesof meetings;sometech-
nicalreports(especiallyof accidents,catastrophes,or failures);depositions;parts
of insuranceclaims;some personalletters;travelogues;epics and sagas;some

39. Ibid., 8; see Meiland, Scepticism and Historical Knowledge, 41ff., for the referencedargument.
40. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 149. I twice note Ricoeur on this point because he is generally
a carefulscholar.Many theoristswho make similarleaps soar on the uncertainwings of hasty erudition.
41. Here we loosely follow M. Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge (Baltimore,
1977), 11-23.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 71

song lyrics;fairytales, folk stories,and fables;mythologicaland religiouscos-

moldgicalaccounts;excuses;partsof medical,socialservice,andwelfarereports;
somecomedymonologues;elementsof psychoanalytic andpsychologicalrecords
and case studies;some fancyrestaurantmenu-itemdescriptions;corporatean-
nual reports;grant and contractfinal reports;parts of equipmentrepairre-
ports.... As importantas wemightlikehistoriesandliteratureto be, theycom-
priseonly a minorityof our narrativeobjects, whetherreckonedcategorically
or by the sum of instances.Theirseemingimportancearisesfromthe fact that
theyinhabitwell-definedsocialinstitutions(separatebut relatedones), the rules
for whichincludea. the formalpreservationand evaluationof the objectsand
b. ruminationupon the foundationsof the activity.This fact, however,cannot
relegateother narrativeobjects to derivativestatus unworthyof theoretical
analysis.
As objectsalone,narrativesshowlittleby wayof commonstructuralelements
otherthantheiruse of narrativediscourseand constructions.Finishedproducts
generallyhaveopeningsand closures,althoughsome may haveonly beginnings
and endings.Perhapswe may find for all or most them centralsubjects-or at
leastcentralsubjectmatter-around or aboutwhicheachtells a story.But what
verydifferentkindsof storiestheytell. Indeed,it is not clearwhetheror not the
verynotion of a storymakessensewithoutreferenceto the functionsof narra-
tive objects.If not, we havefurtherreasonfor not exportingthe idea of a story
(withany or all its ramifications)to the levelsof narrativeconstructionand dis-
course.Moreover,if we cannotintroducethe idea of storyhere,we maynot even
be able to speak of centralsubjects,but only of subjectmatter.
Anothercommonlyposited constantof all narrativeobjectsis change.This
notion grewpopularin narrativetheoriesdevotedto historicalexplanation:the
narrativeprovideseitherfully or sketchilythe explanationfor the changethat
formsthe narrative'ssubject.Draydemonstratedthe nonuniversality of this idea
by callingattentionto "descriptive history,"whichseekssome"unity"in the period
and place studied.42Shorterspans of narrativemay seek only to show the way
somethingis (or was)as an historicalconstruction.Hence,eventhis traditional
essenceof historyturnsout to apply,if at all, to narrativeobjectsas functional
entitieswithin social institutions.
Up to this point, we havebeen examiningthe formalrequirementsof histor-
ical narrative.The logic of languageand certainhistoriographicconcernshave
naturallydominatedin discussionsof linguisticconventions,rules of evidence,
and narrativeconnections.To the degreethat narrativecommunicationis pos-
sibleby thesemeans,we mayfindcertainrulesand techniques,largelymastered
duringthe acquisitionof languageand disciplinaryskills.Any suchruleswemay
be ableto formulateat these levelswouldapplyto the broadestspectrumof so-
cial activities,as distinguishedfromthe narrowercontextsof producingcultural
artifactswithinspecificinstitutionsof society.Whilethesebroadrulesmightun-
derliethemorespecificinstitutionalactivities,the reversedoesnot hold.Wecannot

42. W. H. Dray, Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), 29-35.

72 L. B. CEBIK

uncriticallytransfer rules- whether epistemic,heuristic,or aesthetic- from

specificinstitutionsto the overallframeworkwithinwhich we discoursenarra-
tively and within which we may generatenarrativeconstructions.
What may constitutean illicit movewithinthe constructionof any narrative
theory may nonethelesshint at a naturalprocess.Althoughinstitution-specific
rules(generallythosehavinga bearingupon evaluatingthe adequacy,merit,and
utilityof narrativeobjects)andtechniques(forgeneratingobjectsthat meetsuch
standards)obtain within an institution,such as doing history,they leak back
into societyin variousways.Journalismand report-writing did not reinventnar-
rativeas social institutionsarosethat requiredthose activities.However,as ac-
tivitieswithintheseinstitutions,they arenot beholdento theirsourcesfor rules
of formationand success.At a conceptuallevel, Marxiancategories(or those
of the Frenchsocialists)haveenteredour generallanguage,offeringus waysof
characterizing social groups,waysthat werenot accessibleto JeremyBentham,
despitehis deepconcernfor socialjustice.Tolook at a differentsort of example,
amateurhistoriansaccepttheir role and relationshipto professionals,thereby
generalizingin societya distinctionthat did not exista centuryago. In suchways
the technicalrequirements and creativeeffortsof institutionsaltereverydaypos-
sibilities,evento the levelof whatit is possiblefor us to perceive.Thereis some-
thingveryrightin phenomenologicalexplicationsof humanactivityand in aes-
thetic claims for the powersof our poetic creations(and everycreationis -as
Heideggersaid- initiallypoetic).43However,the detailedprocessesby whichcul-
tural creationsinfluence- not individualpsychology,but the very conceptual
frameworkof languageand activity- still await detailedanalysis.

IV. NARRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Althoughthe earlieraccountof narrativeconstructionsproceedsfrom a strict

epistemicapproach,we may sensein the descriptionssomethingof a technique
that mayserveone or morepurposes.Wemightlearnto formulatenarrativeand
historicalconstructionsin orderto provethesesor to educatereaders.Thesequite
reasonablethoughtsabout historicalnarrativedemarcatea changeof perspec-
tive to a heuristicapproachto the theory of narrative,an approachthat seeks
to analyzethe functionsof narrativesand the meansby whichwe achievetheir
successfulperformance.Indeed,mosttheoriesof historicalnarrativehavestarted
with and been drivenby a heuristicor functionalperspectiveon the subject.
A heuristicapproachbeginswitha narrativeobjectof a socialinstitutionwithin
whichit functions.Sinceinstitutionsarecomplex,a singleobjectmay function
diverselyto educateor edify; to inform,correct,revise,or update;to entertain;
to inspireactionsor attitudes;to imbuewith value(eitherpossessionsor-with
Nietzsche- life and actionthemselves);to explain;to provea thesisor establish
a theme;to persuadeor convince,for example,of the correctnessof what hap-

43. See Fictional Narrative and Truth, Part 5, for one account of Heidegger's "The Origin of
the Work of Art" and its applications.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 73
pened or how to view what happened;to reformor revolutionize;to teach by
example how students and colleagues may do the things of history.... Just as
the types of narrativeobjectsmay seemillimitable,so too will appeartheirpos-
siblefunctions,withouthowevera necessaryone-to-onecorrelationbetweenob-
jects and functions.Institutionsprovidethe frameworkfor fabricating,using,
andevaluatingnarrativeobjectsand forteachingmembersof the institutionhow
to performthese tasks. Giventhis (overlygeneral)descriptionof institutions,
a heuristictheoryof historicalnarrativeswillformulatestandardsandtechniques
relatingtechniquesto ends,ideallyin sucha waythat wemayboth teachanother
howto do andwritehistoryandto assessandevaluatefinishedhistoricalnarratives.
Withfictionalnarratives,we can often divorcefunctionalor heuristictheori-
zationfromepistemicor justificationaltheorization.Behindthis separationlies
an importantdistinctionbetweenparadigmaticfiction and history.In the case
of the former,the epistemicdimensionsof the institutionalactivitylie mostly
in the regionof presupposition,comingto the foregroundonly in the contem-
plationof fictionalizedhistory(forexample,I, Claudius)or historicalfiction(such
as Warand Peace). With history,no such separationis possible.If it is at all
correctto saythathistoryis chargedwithwritingfactuallyjustifiedor justifiable
texts,narrativeor nonnarrative, whichrelateor portraywhathas happened,than
a full heuristictheorymustencompassboth the distinctlyjustificationalandthe
distinctlynarrativeaspectsof whathistorydoes or can do. Perhapsthe only ac-
ceptableexcusefor writingheuristicallyupon one or the other alone wouldbe
for pedagogicalpurposesin muchthe mannerof teachingprotodoctorshow to
administermedicinesand how to performsurgeryin separatelessons.
Despitethe currentpopularityof theoriesthatignorethejustificationaldimen-
sions of historicalpractice,a considerablehistoriographicliteratureexiststhat
heuristicallyapproachesjust this dimension.Fischerbeganhis studyof fallacies
with threepremisesavowingthe existenceof a logic of historicalthought, the
abilityto be awareas an historianof that logic, and the purposefulapplication
of that logic in doing history."4Fischer'sworkis for historiansand showsthem
how, in their works,to be justifiedand to avoid being unjustified.Unlike an
epistemictheoryof history,whichwould formulatethe structureand limits of
historicaljustification,this heuristicstudy tries to show historianshow to use
andhownot to usemodesof justificationby presentingcasesof use and(mostly)
abuse.
Giventhe differentialgoals of epistemicand heuristicstudies,we may antici-
pateandfindextensivecategoricalandterminologicaldifferencesbetweenthem,
just as we do in basiclogictextsbetweencoveragesof formaland informalfalla-
cies. As notedby Hexter,who has treatedhistoriographyas the craftof writing
history,a heuristiccodificationof history'srules"wouldresemblea manualof
militarystrategymore than a handbookof physics,"consistingof "a number
of maximsgenerallyapplicableto the solutionof recurrentproblemsin writing

44. D. H. Fischer, Historian's Fallacies (New York, 1970), xv.

74 L. B. CEBIK

history. . ."I' These statements remain true even if we were to treat only the con-
structionalor justificationalaspects of historicalactivity.
What teachesus to do historycan also teach us to evaluatehistories.(The
reverseis trueas well.)In the areaof historicaldisputeand debate,we havegiven
most attentionto the reasoningprocessesused to reachconclusionsof the con-
structivetypeexplicatedby CollingwoodandGoldstein.McCullagh'silluminating
surveyof commoninferencesin historyoutlinesnumerouscase studiesof the
progressionof historicalreasoningandjustificationthroughdebateandalterna-
tive assessmentsof and searchesfor evidence.46He therebybroadensour view
of historicalreasoninganddescription.However,wemustturnto HaydenWhite
and the narrativistsin orderto acquirea frameworkpermittingan evaluation
of narrativeas a modeof presentationindependentof thepresenterandof formal
historicalargumentation, wherethe latterstillremainsundertheterminological-
if not the conceptual- graspof explanation.Tobe ableto saythatwhatwe know
is as much a function of what we formulateand how we formulateas it is of
the appropriateapplicationof methods of investigationis an insight that-
howeverlong knownsince Kantor beyond-only has permeatedhistoryunder
narrativistpressure.EvenHexter'simmediatelyprenarrativist notionof the craft
of writingcould not escapethe split betweenknowingand communicatingen-
genderedby explanationtheory.47
Explanationtheorybeganwith a limitingcommitmentto at least quasiposi-
tivisticcanons of epistemology,but ended in an appreciationof the diversity
of verbalacts that, in one or anotherway,answeredthe questionsthat posed
andrevealedourpuzzlements.(A phenomenologistmightdo worsethanexplore
the notionof posinga question.48) So-calledcovering-lawtheoristsrigidlyframed
the heuristicdimensionof explanationtheoryby settingout narrativeas a form
of explanation,completeor incompleteaccordingto individualformulations.
Otherfunctionsof narrativereceivedeitherno or unappreciative treatment.This
narrowview of historicalnarrativepersistedfor nearlythreedecadesin some
quarters,occasioninglatertheoriststo despairof everescapinga perceivedcon-
strictionof history'spurposes.49
Wehaveyet to appreciatefully the theoreticalconsequencesof analysesthat
broadenedour view of explanationsas a (not the) functionof historicalnarra-
tive.Ledby Dray,who personallycataloguednumerousexplanatoryformswith
noncovering-law logics, the effortto understandexplanationgraduallymerged
with the effortto understandthe colligatoryfunctionsof narrativeon broader,
if less precise,functionaland justificationalgrounds.50Withinthis movement

45. J. H. Hexter, "The Rhetoric of History," in Doing History (Bloomington, 1971), 66.
46. McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, Chapter 4, 91-128.
47. Hexter, "The Rhetoric of History," 68.
48. To pose a question is, in part, to put it forth, to posit and position it, to frame it: all leading
figures worth exploring.
49. With a bit of arbitrariness, from Hempel's 1942 "The Function of General Laws in History"
to (perhaps) Hexter's 1971 History Primer and Doing History.
50. See Dray's Philosophy of History, Chapter 2, for a summary of his work to 1964. See also
his "Colligation Under Appropriate Conceptions" for seemingly slight but significant shifts, for ex-
ample, in accepting the idea of "saying what" for the earlier "explaining what."
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 75

emergedan awarenessof the everydaydiversityof functionsof both narrative

andexplanation.Theend result,yetto be summarizedin a strictlyheuristiccon-
text (for explanationtheorystill clingsto its illusoryepistemicapproachto the
subject),is a complexweb of techniques(or rulesof procedure)for generating
an arrayof justifiedaccounts(in contrastto Fischer'sfallacies)within formal
objects.Thearraywouldalsoprovidea setof standardsagainst
historical-narrative
whichwe mightmeasurethe successof historicalnarratives,teach studentsthe
methodsof achievingjustifiedhistoricalconclusions,andappreciatethe insight-
fulnessof variedstylesof historicalreasoning.Sucha set of standardsalso would
permitus to recognizenovel methodologies.
Wehavenotedthatin anycomplexinstitution,we mustallowfor partialfunc-
tional accountsof the activities.Explanationtheory,for all of its initialclaims,
presentsthe heuristicsof one significantfacet of doing history.Mandelbaum
took some furtherstepsin understandingthe multifunctionalnatureof histor-
ical narrativewhen he formulatedhistory'ssequential,explanatory,and inter-
pretative"forms."Sequentialhistorychoosesa subjectthat has a "degreeof con-
tinuity"and tracesthe "strandsof eventsmakingup that history."Explanatory
historyseeksto answera definitequestion:"Grantedthat this eventdid occur,
what factorswereresponsiblefor its occurrence?"Interpretativehistoryexists
for the sake of depictinga "stateof affairsitself.""5Althoughthese threefunc-
tions fall shortof adequatelyrepresentingall of history'slegitimateand impor-
tantfunctions,theydo permitMandelbaumto treattheirinteractionwithinsingle
histories,despitethe usual predominanceof one of the forms or functionsin
a givenhistory.Moreover,he is also ableto explorethe relationshipof somecru-
cial epistemicfactors,suchas causation,laws,and objectivity,in the contextof
intertwiningfunctions.The resultis perhapsa schematicmodelfor a full theory
that interrelatesmore completelydifferingapproachesto the full spectrumof
historicalobjects and functions.
With respectto Mandelbaumand to virtuallyall the partialtheorieswithin
the quest for an account of historicalexplanationwe must recognizeanother
significantfact:all writefromthe perspectiveof the historian.This perspective
seemsmostnatural,giventheintensiveandindividualnatureof doingandwriting
history.However,nothingin the natureof historyitselflogicallynecessitatesthat
wetakethisperspective. AlthoughwemaytreatHaydenWhiteandthenarrativists
from this perspective,we may find it more profitablein placingtheir work to
see them as criticalreadersexaminingnot the activityof history,but only the
finishedobjectsthey receivefromhistorians.In literature,as one of our promi-
nentsocialinstitutions,we havea specificmultifacetedrolefor the critic-analyst-
collegeteacherwho is chargedto conveywhatliteratureis, how it is made,what
we can- as readers- get out of it, and how we can appreciateit properly.Some
historicalworks,such as Plutarch'sLives or Gibbon'sDecline and Fall of the
Roman Empire, havetraditionalplacesamongthe collectionof literaryobjects
(justas havesomephilosophicalworks,such as Plato'sdialogues).WhatWhite

51. Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge, 25-29.

76 L. B. CEBIK

and his followershaveintroducedis the generaltreatmentof all historicalworks

as literaryproductions.
Reader-oriented criticismintroducesinto historicalheuristictheoryseemingly
novelelements.Perhapsmost shockingto practicinghistorians,it createsa place
for nonhistoriansto assess systematicallyhistoricalworks.To this assessment,
criticaltheorybringsits ownvocabularyandcategories.Often,especiallyin literary
circlesthat ally themselvesto the arts and its criticism,the operativecategories
mix structural,functional,and aestheticcategories.The reader-critic-analyst-
teacherrolerequirespreciselythe sortof categoriesWhiteadaptsto his purposes.
FromFrye,we discoverin historicalnarrativeromance,tragedy,comedy,and
satire as modes of emplotment.From Pepper,we uncoverformist, organist,
mechanistic,and contextualisttypes of argument.Mannheimsuppliesthe all-
importantideological typology that includes anarchism,conservatism,radi-
calism, and liberalism.White notes that "a historiographicalstyle represents
a particularcombinationof modes of emplotment,argument,and ideological
implication."52 AlthoughWhitegivesfoundationalstatusto the linguistictropes
of metaphor,metonymy,synecdoche,and irony,in the end ideologyformsand
focusesthe purposeof his theory.Ultimately,he wouldhavehistorians"recog-
nize the fictiveelementin their narratives"to free each one from becoming"a
captiveof ideologicalpreconceptions"and "to movethe teachingof historiog-
raphyonto a higherlevelof self-consciousnessthanit currentlyoccupies."53 This
combinationof evaluativecritiqueand teachingprinciplescomprisesprecisely
the benchmarkgoals of heuristictheory,and in termsof them we must under-
stand White'sefforts.
Thetraditionsof literarycriticismrundeepin White'stheorization.In viewing
historicalaccountsas verbalstructuresthatmodel"paststructuresandprocesses,"
Whitecan claimto penetrateto a preanalyticallevel of consciousnessthat con-
stitutesexperience.Just at such a levelwe areto understandthat each historian
necessarilyemplots"thewholeset of storiesmakingup his narrativein one com-
prehensiveor archetypalstory form."54 This maneuverpermitsus to formulate
the historian'sconstitutionof historyin andthroughhisnarrative in manydifferent
ways,withoutcontendingwiththe needfor evidenceof consciousintentor artic-
ulatedpurpose.White'spreanalyticalconsciousnessis thus nobody'sconscious-
ness at all. Rather,in a traditionstemmingat least fromColeridge'spostulation
of a facultyof imagination,we can erectfor heuristicpurposesa quasigenetic
theoryof literaturethat allowsa connectionbetweenperceivedstructureswithin
literatureand techniquesfor any individualto createthem. The resultremains,
however,a heuristicof achievementand not of purpose.
Nonetheless,the essentialposition of the criticis that of a readerRomanti-
cally focusedupon the writer.If Whitereceivesfrom textsthe nasalperception
of ideality,he writesthatto narrativizeis to moralize,to "giveto realitythe odor

52. H. White, Metahistory (Baltimore, 1973), through 34, especially 29.

53. White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," 61.
54. White, Metahistory, 2, 8, 30, 33.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 77
of the ideal."55 In an equallymixedassertion,he notesthat to perceivethe "class
or type"of a storyis to have"theeventsexplainedto him,"presumablyby the
story-teller.56However,perceiving a classor typepreciselydependsupontheclasses
or types that a readerbringsand can applyeffectivelyto the story.The creative
critic-analyst-teacher enablesthe readerto accomplishthis feat at ever deeper
levelsof significancebythe inventionof productivecategorieswithoutanyneces-
sary regardfor the intentionsor conceptualframeworkof writers.For a brief
time, readersfound it profitableto psychoanalyzeHamlet, a task that only a
readercould perform.
Although experiencedliterarycritics and analystscan easily read through
White'sgeneticpostureto the heuristiccore,mostphilosophictheoristshavefoun-
deredon peripheralthesesand concerns.Whitewishesto awakenand enlighten
historiansand studentsto history'slack of ideologicalinnocence,regardlessof
the politicaldirectionof its source.57Whiteearlierdescribedideologyas "a set
of prescriptionsfor takinga position in the presentworldof social praxisand
actingupon it,... attendedby argumentsthat claim the authorityof 'science'
or 'realism."'Herein,perhaps,lies the theoreticalbattlegroundmost separable
fromand superfluousto the creativeheuristics.ForWhitebelievesthat "history
is not a science,or is at best a protosciencewith specificallydeterminablenon-
scientificelementsin its constitution."58 By science,he means a vaguelyHem-
pelianpositivisticconceptionof structureandactivitythatwouldallowhistorians
to explainthe "real,"while leavingnoveliststo deal with "imaginedevents."59
Withinthe ideology of historyas positivisticscience,White sees "a reluctance
to considerhistoricalnarrativesas whattheymostmanifestlyare- verbalfictions
. . ."60 ThusdoesWhiteradically respondto a positionmanytheoristshadviewed
in the early 1970sas dead at least half a decade.
At firstglance,Whiteseemsembarkedupon an epistemicargumentconcerning
the limitsof history.However,two factorsmitigateagainstthe appearance.First,
to classify any narrativeas fiction is to decide what modes of justificationwe
shalldemandof it and not to discoverwhatmodesof justificationin fact apply
to it. The modesof justificationapt to fictionalnarrativeforma subsetof those
we applyto historicalnarrative(exceptperhapsfor someaestheticcategoriesthat
we only sometimesapplyto history).At a heuristiclevel,we can decideto apply
only the subsetwithout therebynecessarilylimitinghistoryor historiography.
By contrast,at theepistemiclevel,onlyif wecanvoidthe methodological justifica-

55. White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," 23, 20, emphasis mine.
56. White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," 49.
57. H. White, "The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-Sublimation," Crit-
ical Inquiry 9 (1982), 137.
58. White, Metahistory, 21-22. Involved in White's definition of ideologies is a more subtle move:
the incorporation of "science" into ideology itself. Thus, every swipe against ideologically biased
history includes a sideswipe against history as it really is. Only in this old formula can we conflate
positivistic science and the real so glibly. Outside this antique, science and the real are often very
different things, as in the case of mystic, mythic, and religious bases for ideologies.
59. White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," 60.
60. Ibid., 42.
78 L. B. CEBIK

tion of historicalconstructscan we sustaina claim that historyis none other

than fiction. This second factor leads us to considerthe natureof historical
methods,whichneithercorrespondto White'snotion of the sciences(derived
fromearlyexplanationtheorists)nor dependupontraditionalviewsof reference
andostension.Relianceuponlinguisticmodelsthat seeminglyrefutesuchirrele-
vant views without speakingto the pragmaticdimensionsof historicaland
everydayjustificationthus leavesthe apparentepistemicpretensionsof narrati-
vism eitherillusoryor unfounded.Whethersuch models can speak directlyto
epistemicquestionsremainspart of narrativism'sunfinishedwork.
Perhapsacademichistory'sseeminglack of everydayfunctionengendersthe
perceptionthat it has no differentimpactupon our worldthan fictionalnarra-
tive.The abstracttermsof our list of historicalfunctionsalmostdefiestransla-
tion into practicalterms.Yeteverydaynarrativeconstructionsshow both their
eminentutilityandtheirpragmaticgroundingin factualevidenceas a necessary
conditionof utility.As I write,a governmentalcommissionis investigatingthe
launchexplosionof an Americanspaceshuttle.Its effortswill yield a narrative
reportof humanactions and physicalprocesses,a narrativethat hopes to ac-
complishat leasttwo explicitgoals:the redesignof launchpersonnelcommuni-
cationsnetworksand the redesignof certainrocketryelements.In the process,
if presentnewsreportsare reliable,the investigatorswill discover(havediscov-
ered)new data to be acquiredand preservedin the future(for example,solid
rocketboosterprelaunchtemperatures). As a consequence,futurenarrativesof
suchincidentswill necessarilytakea (slightly)differentconstructiveform.How-
ever,partof the avowedaim of the presentnarrativeis to precludethe need for
a similarfuturenarrative.Thus occursthe everydaypragmaticgrowthof useful
narrative-constructivemethods.Somedayacademichistoriansmayalsolearnhow
to usetelemetrydata.Nonetheless,all thesenotesreflectmodesof narrativecon-
structionand use that must everelude the creatorsof fictionalnarratives(even
such narrativesas Cook's Brain and Mindbend).
Totheseconsiderations of the everydaynarrativereportwemightaddnumerous
practicalthingsa readermight learnfrom history,mattersthat a literarycriti-
cism focusedupon ideology might miss. FromstudyingBrinton'sand Hoffer's
workon revolutionsand massmovements,one mightlearnhowto organizeand
runan effectiverebellion(or at least howto surviveone). Frommilitaryhistories
of the battleof Cowpens,one mightlearnto conducta doubleenvelopmentwith
due considerationfor the qualityof one's own troops as well as the qualityof
the enemy's.Fromhistoriesof eighteenth-century scientificresearch,one might
learnas from no contemporaryscientificpaperhow to trackwrongdirections
of researchin orderto benefitworkin the rightdirection.Everylessonthatyields
successtendsto confirmits narrativesources.However,everyfailureyieldsa tree
of questions:Werethe narrativesread aright?If so, what needs correctionin
the narratives:theiroverallnarratiosor the collectionof informationwhichin-
formedthem (as viewedfrom a justificationalperspective)?At the level of the
everyday,the heuristicsof historicalnarrativemust makeroom for contextsof
justificationthat go beyondrhetoric,if the theory is to be complete.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 79

Thejustificationof a literaryreader-critic-teacher heuristicsof historicalnar-

rativerests,however,simplyuponthe fact that historyshareswithfictionalliter-
ature (and with journalismand other everydaynarrativeactivities)a set of
justificationalmodes,eventhoughit necessarilyhas othersnot sharedwithliter-
ature.Thedevelopmentof literarycriticalcategories,as withanyset of heuristic
categoriesof analysis,requiresno groundingotherthanin theirproductivityand
utility for the criticalenterprise.White'sown categoriesadmittedlyrest upon
neitherlogicnorepistemology,but ratheruponan adaptationof the Aristotelian
idea of rhetoric.Thus, it is perhapsunfortunatefor the literarycritiqueof his-
torythatWhite'sanalyseshavebecomealmostinextricablymeshedwithperiph-
eralthesesregardinghistoricalreality,power,andidealityas politicalphenomena,
and the perennialgloomy economicand class statusof the humanities.6" Until
narrativismunderstandsits placein theorizationand becomesveryexplicitand
directlyargumentativeabout preciselywhat theses it wishesto sustain,we can
only deconstructits edificeone opaque brick at a time.
The aim hereis not to explainin detailnarrativistcategoriesof criticism,but
to placethe overalltheoryamongothers.The rhetoricalfocus of Whiteand his
followershas revealed,perhapseven admirably,that historicalreasoningand
writingforma continuumthatincludesthe creationof narrativestructureswhich
convinceas wellas communicateandtherebymayalterthe verywaysweperceive
andconceivehistory'sdata. If we learnno otherlessonfrom suchcriticalwork,
we must acknowledgethat Sartre'sidea of literatureinvitingus to participate
as readersin the reformationof our worldis no passiveor neutralaffair.62To
inviteis to make inviting,to set a scene that luresus to participatein just the
waypresentedby the text. Suchis the powerof the narratiounderthe categories
of criticalanalysisso forcefullyand rhetoricallyurgedby White.
If criticalheuristicsteachesanything,it is that much of what we learn from
historymaynot be historical.Ricoeur'srecentwork,currentlyinfluentialamong
narrativetheorists,fully illustratesthe adage.Often mistakenfor a narrativist,
Ricoeuronlycapitalizesuponnarrativist heuristicsin pursuitof othergoals.These
effortsgo well beyondthe level of ordinaryliteraryheuristicsto seek out what
narrativein generalmay do to and for the temporalmode of humanexistence.
As Ricoeurputsit, "timebecomeshumanto theextentthatit is articulated through
a narrativemode,andnarrativeattainsits full meaningwhenit becomesa condi-

61. Out of such materials we make philosophical fads and, as fads fade into disinterest, we lose
the benefits that lie at their core. White has perhaps encouraged such treatment of his work, not
only in the arguments he presents, but as well with his own rhetorical methods, which run the gamut
of erudite persuasive techniques with or without logical foundation. To cite just one example, he
footnotes a piece of the etymology of "narrative"without explicitly arguing its place in his overall
case for his views. He leaves the conclusions about narrativeand knowing to readers who likely have
not explored the question of whether etymology can determine, given such linguistic phenomena
as meaning division and reversal, in any way whatsoever the current meaning and use of a word.
See "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," 1. This and other articles teem with
rhetorical techniques not easily absorbed by even White's categories.
62. Sartre also saw before White that at the heart of an aesthetic imperative lies a moral one;
see What Is Literature? (New York, 1966), 38-45.
80 L. B. CEBIK

tion of temporalexistence."63 Interestin the heuristicor epistemicdimensions

of narrativetheoryseeminglyinfluencesmany commentatorsto stop short of
Ricoeur'sexistentialrenderingof timeandfate.Instead,theyfocusuponRicoeur's
appreciativeanalysesof White,Danto,Gallie,and othersfromwhom he draws
salientpoints.YetRicoeurconcludeshis analysisof thesetheorieswith"theques-
tion of historicaltime"ratherthanthe questionof historicalnarrative.64
He seeks
to explicatelevelsof temporalitywhich hold "historicality" betweena surface
"within-time-ness" (alreadydifferentfromlineartime)and, at the deepestlevel,
the "plural unity of future, past, and present . . . rooted in . . . care reflecting
upon itself as mortal."65
Ricoeurborrowsfrom Heidegger'sanalysisof time for his goals and engages
in phenomenologicaldialecticsto developthe threemodesof mimesisthat com-
prisehis contributionto the mediationbetweentime and narrative.In the "dy-
namicof emplotment,"our practicalunderstandingof narrativeprovidesdis-
cursiverulesof compositionthat governthe "diachronicorder"of a story.Upon
thisprenarrative structureof experienceareconstructedtextual-literary
mimetics.
To this level of prefiguredtime, we add configuredtime or plot as a mediation
betweeneventsand the storyas a whole.The intersectionof "theworldof text"
and "theworldof the heareror reader"marksthe point of refiguringthe time
of experienceand the beginningof a "radicalcircularity." The finalexegesisof
Dasein in thesetermsRicoeurleavesto anothervolume.66 He pointsout the direc-
tion of his workby findingin both historicaland fictionalnarrative"repetition,"
action in the figureof the memorable,in and as accountsof how one (person,
thing,or society)becomeswhatit is:herein destinyliesthe keyto narrativechange
that we tell in and througha story'sevents.67
Ricoeur'sheuristicsof time is a metaphysicalendeavorthat raisesquestions
about its relevanceto epistemicand methodologicalconcerns.From this per-
spective,we mayevenquestionthe relationshipof his effortsto White'ssupraso-
cial heuristicsto which Ricoeurclaims some affinities.Ricoeuroperatesfrom
a cleartraditiondatingto Plato, who also wrestledwith the place of literature
in not just the idealsociety,but in the fundamentalschemeof things.Withup-
datedmethods,however,Ricoeurseeksnot to bestowon narrativea meaningful-
ness derivedfrom basic forms, but to understandthe ultimatemeaningfulness
of a significanthumanactivityin termsof its relationshipto humantemporality.
The legitimacyof this type of theorizationrestsupon commitmentsthat go be-
yondrecognizingsocialinstitutionsalone;it restsupon our commitmentsto the
metaphysicalenterprise.If commentatorsfail to follow Ricoeurthis far, how-
ever,they risk misinterpretinghis analysesof specificaspectsof narrativeand
narrativetheory,no matterhow appealingthose analysesmay seemfrom other
perspectives.

63. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 52.

64. Ibid., 1, 206.
65. P. Ricoeur, "Narrative Time," in On Narrative, ed. Mitchell, 166-167.
66. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 59, 64, 71, 86-87.
67. Ricoeur, "Narrative Time," 176-178.
 UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 81
LikeWhite,however,Ricoeurremainsweddedto a formulationof the prob-
lems of historicalnarrativethat restsupon traditionalreferentialviews of lan-
guage.Hence,his dialecticalsolutionto the so-calledproblemof historicalreality
underthe signsof the same,the other,andthe analoguemighthavebeenunnec-
essaryhad he attendedto the extensiveworkdone so far on the justificationof
historicalconstructions.68 Moreover,althoughliterary-critical heuristicscantreat
historicalnarrativesas a collectionof culturalachievements,the dialecticof time
cannot, for it is not in itself of a cultureor society.69In metaphysics,but not
history,the entirespanof narrativeobjects- and eventhe possibilityof the self-
refiguringof time withinordinaryactivities-must becomethe focus of study.
Culturalachievementssuch as storytellingmight be a key for understanding
humantemporalityin Greco-Romantimes(althoughthis is to be doubted),but
the myriadof narrativeobjectstoday run their tentaclesfrom everydaynessto
the highestachievementswithoutlacuna.Thus, a heuristicof historicalnarra-
tive need not expressan elitism for White'shistorical-literary criticism,but it
almost necessarilydoes so for Ricoeur.
Ricoeurdoes provideus with an intriguingintroductoryaccountof how our
highestnarrativecreationsreturninto the presuppositionsof everydaylife. The
mimeticcircledemonstrates theneedforanytheoryto finishthecourseof thought.
Indeed,anypropertheoryof historicalnarrativemustattendin full circleto all
levelsof the enterprise,providingcompleteand compatibleaccountsof each.
We remainfar from this goal. Metatheoryitself cannot resolvethe mountain
of outstandingquestions,eitherthosewe havealreadyposedor thoseyetto come.
However,metatheorycango somedistancein permittingus to positionconfidently
the contributionsmade so far and to glimpsethe next few steps beyondthem.
By properlyplacingtheoriesand partialtheorieswithina metatheoretical frame-
work, we can see more clearlytheir nature,ramifications,and limits, thereby
differentiatingbetweenthe contributionsand the philosophicalfads. Much of
whatwe needin orderto improveournarrativetheoriesalreadyexistsin the body
of extantthoughtfulanalyses.The task is to use these contributionswisely in
pursuitof a comprehensiveand adequatetheory of historicalnarrative.

The University of Tennessee

68. P. Ricoeur, The Reality of the Historical Past (Milwaukee, 1984), 5, 14, 25. See Time and
Narrative, Vol. 2, for more on these questions, as well as his analysis of fictional narrative and the
completion of the dialectic of temporal existence.
69. See Ricoeur's Time and Narrative, I, 195-200.