FRANZ BRENTANO'S ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

FRANZ BRENTANO'S
ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

by

JAN SRZEDNICKI
University of Melbourne

•
MARTINUS NIJHOFF I THE HAGUE I 1965
ISBN-lg: 978-90-247-0148-3 e-ISBN-lg: 978-94-010-3535-4
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-3535-4

Copyright I965 by Martinus Nijhoft, The Hague, Netherlands

All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
To the memory 01 my Father who gave me an interest
and early training in philosophy.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book contains a large number of translated quotations. Thanks

are due to Professor ]. C. M. Brentano, and to the Brentano trust, for
the special permission to translate and include these. This permission
was explicitly given for the inclusion of these quotations in this book
only, and in the case of quotations from Wahrheit und Evidenz and
Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, and also in the case of
unpublished MSS., without prejudice to the rights of other translators
and editors of the text and the rights of any future editor or translator.
This book could not have been written without the help of many
people. Thanks are due to Professor A. Boyce Gibson for his patient
and helpful comments, further thanks are due to Professor D. A. T.
Gasking and Dr. A. C. ] ackson, who helped with suggestions and
discussion and to Dr. W. D. ]oske, who read and corrected the manu-
script with great patience and thoroughness. From among people
outside Melbourne, I am most heavily indebted to Professor ]. C. M.
Brentano, son and literary heir of the philosopher. He has made
available a number of microfilms of F. Brentano's unpublished works.
These microfilms have now been donated by Professor Brentano to
the Baillieu Library of the Melbourne University. Besides the very
considerable expense and effort involved in this, Professor Brentano
has helped freely with suggestions and commentaries which, despite
his protestations of lack of philosophical competence, were no less
and possibly even more helpful than those of other people. Professor
Roderick M. Chisholm, of the Brown University, U.S.A., helped by
reading and commenting upon the translations from Wahrheit und
Evidenz. I received further kind help and suggestions from Professor
F. Mayer-Hillebrand of the University of Innsbruck, Professor S.
Korner of Bristol University, Professor L. Bodi of Monash University,
and Dr. Felix Meiner of the Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. Thanks are also
due to Professor Gilbert Ryle and Professor A. ]. Ayer for their
VIII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

encouragement, without which I might not have undertaken this

work. I wish to express my sincere gratitude for the help I have re-
ceived from all these people. I would also like to take this opportunity
to thank Miss Alexandra Thomas, who typed and re-typed the manu-
script, and read the proof.
 ABBREVIATIONS

Aristotelian Society Proceedings ASP

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research PPR
Analysis Anal.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy AJP
Logic Semantics Metamathematics (Tarski) LSM
Wahrheit und Evidenz (Brentano-Kraus) W&E
Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt (Brentano- Psych.
Kraus)
Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil (Brentano-Mayer- LRU
Hillebrand)
Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos (Kastil) Kas.
Die Ethik Franz Brentanos (0. Most) Most
Notes by O. Kraus in his editions of Brentano OK (1)
The Symposium on Truth (Austin, Strawson, Cousins) ASP Sym.
ASP, supp. vol. XXIV
Versuch tiber die Erkenntnis (Brentano-Kastil) VUE
Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis (Brentano-Kraus) USE
 RE TRANSLATIONS

All translations included in this book are my own unless otherwise

specified. The translations are reasonably free, but care was taken
to make them faithful as well as readable. Many of the notes translated
were not meant for pUblication and are therefore difficult to follow and
translate. Sometimes I had to supplement them. Whenever the English
text required words or phrases not used in the original, they were
placed in parentheses (like this). Sometimes Brentano himself used
parentheses, but it should be clear from the text when this is the case.
In some cases I have indicated this explicitly. Points missing from the
translated text are supplied either in the commentary or in footnotes.
Both the books which provided most of the translated quotations,
namely Wahrheit und Evidenz and Psychologie vom Empirischen Stand-
punkt (Second Edition), were edited by Oscar Kraus, and comprise
both early and later material. When quotations appear, it will be clear
from the context or covering remarks whether the quoted text is early
or late. Both these books are now being prepared in English translation.
I used double inverted commas" ... " to indicate quotations,
whether translated or not, and single inverted commas to form
inverted comma names like 'red'.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements VII
A bbreviations IX
Translations XI
Introduction xv

I. Introduction to Franz Brentano's Philosophy I

1. Problems of Interpretation I
2. General 10

II. The Early Position 18

1. About the concept of truth. Early criticism of the corre- 18
spondence theory
2. Arguments for the Existence of entia rationis 29
III. The Transition 36
1. Analysis of Linguistic Function 36
2. Arguments against the Existence of entia rationis 42
IV. The Transition and Background So
1. Mental Acts So
2. Judgements S8
3. An attempt to retain the correspondence theory with-
out entia rationis 67
V. Late position (critical part) 74
1. Criticism of the correspondence formula res 74
2. Criticism of the correspondence formula intellectus and
adequatio 81
VI. Late position (positive part) 87
1. Truth 87
2. Evidence 93
XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS

VII. Ramifications of the analysis of truth 99

I. Self-evident judgements, 'a priori' and' a posteriori' 99
2. The relation between self-evident and demonstrable 105
knowledge
Concluding Remarks 110

Appendices
A. The German text and the translation of Sprechen und Denken rr6
(EL. 66).
B. The German text and the translation of Wahrheit ist eine Art
von Ubereinstimmung (EL. 67) 122

C. The German text and the translation of Uber den Sinn und die
Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satzes "Veritas est adequatio
rei et intellectus" (EL. 28) 128

D. The German text and the translation of Kurzer Abriss einer

allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie, (Chapter IV) (EL. 96) 132

Bibliography 137
Index 148
 INTRODUCTION

Franz Brentano 1 was an important philosopher, but for a long time

his importance was under-estimated. At least in the English speaking
countries, he came to be remembered best as the initiator of a philoso-
phical position which he in fact abandoned for good and sufficient
reasons. 2 His ultimate and most important contributions passed almost
unnoticed. Even such a well-informed and well-prepared book as
Passmore's IOO Years of Philosophy (Duckworth, I957), is open to the
same comment; Passmore concentrated his attention on the early
Brentano, because he regarded his influence on the British philo-
sophical scene as being confined to Brentano's early work. Brentano's
pupils, e.g., Husserl, Meinong, Marty and Twardowski, were often
influential and, often enough, they departed from the strict common-
sense and advisedly cautious attitude of their great teacher. Thus
even on the continent, the public image of Brentano tended to be
incomplete (and sometimes distorted), outside the narrower circle
of pupils, followers, and people with special interest. This, or very
nearly this, was still the case in I955, when my contacts with the
followers of Twardowski made me turn towards the study of Brentano.
Since then there has been a gratifying revival of interest in his
work. His early book on Aristotle was reprinted in German and
two of his main positions, Psychologie and Wahrheit und Evidenz, are
appearing in English translations. Translations into other languages,
e.g., Spanish, have also appeared and the interest in his philosophy
seems to be growing.
The pre-revival situation was partly created by Brentano's own
working and publishing habits, partly by external circumstances, such
as his blindness in later years, and the War, which interrupted the
work of his literary heirs and editors.
1 Born January 16, 1838, in Marienberg, near Boppard, Germany; died in 1917.
2 The theory of entia rationis, abandoned in a later period.
XVI INTRODUCTION

Brentano was a systematic philosopher, in the sense that he pre-

sented his views in an orderly manner and considered it important to
work out the significant regularities, where the significance was to be
seen in relation to the whole of the problem considered at the moment,
and ultimately, in relation to the entire field in which the problem
arose. He was not a system-builder, in that he did not seek to produce
an all-embracing philosophical answer. He was concerned with truth
rather than with elegance, and he distrusted philosophical flights of
fancy. According to him, philosophy ought to be built up by collective,
carefully considered and checked labours of a number of researchers.
In an age when philosophy was largely characterised by imaginative
systems of poetic appeal and based on bold armchair theorising, he
was concerned with making it scientific and dependable. He considered
it quite unlikely that anyone man could produce a satisfactory
general theory by reflecting, however ably and skillfully, upon a large
area of discourse. The big problem is made up of a number of particular
problems; it is true that we must look for general regularities in order
to make sense of it, but these regUlarities occur among particular cases.
One can investigate the overall issue properly only when one pays
proper attention to these cases. When we achieve a more generalised
theory, it is only as solid as our grasp of the particulars. 3 Thus it would
be quite improper to pay the most attention to general features of our
problems and to guess at details. The opposite would be better, but
Brentano does not go to extremes in this direction. His method was to
investigate theories propounded by others and then to form a con-
ception of the whole, based on an informed guess. Subsequently,
he would test this estimate by investigation of significant particular
cases; in this way the proper balance between the general and the
particular would be preserved. If the 'hypothesis' did not fit the facts
it would be amended; if it could not be adjusted it would be abandoned.
Gradually a more generalised and better established theory would
appear. Brentano has attempted, at least once, an almost complete
re-assessment of his well-established position, i.e., he abandoned the
view that entia rationis exist. This is in keeping with his methods. The
entire development represents a systematic and persistent attempt at
a thorough investigation of some key philosophical issues - the theory
of mental acts, the theory of truth, jUdgement, etc. Even when
Brentano introduced radical and far-reaching changes, this was in
3 It should be remembered that, according to Brentano, all judgements are general in
character; they amount to "seeing something as something".
 INTRODUCTION XVII

keeping with his conception of the nature of the subject and his
views concerning the proper method of philosophical investigation.
These attitudes profoundly affected Brentano's working and publish-
ing habits. He often returned to problems previously considered, or
took a part of an earlier discussion and developed it in more detail. 4
He never believed that his investigations were complete and was
always willing to start a new line of inquiry when an important issue
presented itself.5 As the result of this, he did not complete his main
published work in a final and complete way, even though his present-
ation of what was done was systematic enough. He left a large number
of manuscripts, many of them unpublished. In these fragments and
papers, the same problem is often taken up several times, frequently
from different points of view. Some papers supersede others and there
is a fair amount of reduplication. In later years, when Brentano became
blind, he became less systematic in presentation, and sometimes even
the clarity of his statement suffered, possibly due to dictating diffi-
culties. Generally speaking, at his death in 1917, Brentano left a
number of published works and articles, systematic in presentation
but not forming a philosophic system and not correlated to each other
as parts of a system. These were fairly unrepresentative of his latest and
most important findings. He also left a large amount of unpublished
material dating from all periods of his development and including his
latest papers.
Oscar Kraus and Alfred Kastil undertook the difficult task of
editing this heritage, and in doing so, of making Brentano's ultimate
philosophical position known. Partly the old volumes, e.g. Psychologie,
were re-edited, with the addition of some significant late papers. Partly
new volumes were prepared. At least one, namely Wahrheit und
Evidenz, presented the whole development of Brentano's view in a
particular area, in this case, the problem of truth. This type of edition
seems to me to do most justice to all aspects of Brentano's philosophy.
Other volumes, e.g. Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil (Edited by F.
Mayer-Hillebrand), were designed to present primarily the ultimate
philosophical position. These, though extremely valuable, do not
present all facets of Brentano as a philosopher, and this might be a
10ss.6 The work of editing Brentano's papers was carried out with
great devotion and extreme care; it produced a number of important

4 See the development of Psychology, especially the third volume of it.

S See the discussion of evidence in Chapter VI, Section 2.
6 See Chapter I, Section 1.
XVIII INTRODUCTION

publications and was making the later philosophy of Brentano known,

when it was interrupted by the war, After the war and the death of
Oscar Kraus, Alfred Kastil carried on the work, and after his death it
was taken over by F, Mayer-Hillebrand, who edited the last volumes of
the now practically complete edition of Brentano's works. A new
publisher had to be found, since the house of Felix Meiner of Leipzig
could not carryon, even though Dr. Meiner re-opened his firm in
Hamburg. Accordingly, post-war volumes are published by A. Francke
of Berne, Switzerland. A great deal of published material is thus
available in German, and it makes the study of Brentano not merely
easier, but possible. Nevertheless, there remains a number of unpublish-
ed or partly published manuscripts; probably there are not enough left
to form a new volume satisfactorily, unless it was a volume of Bren-
tano's criticism of other philosophers, but they still contain some
significant material, and they contain it in the form in which Brentano
left them. Some of the published volumes are adjusted to present
Brentano's 'final' position, and of necessity embody a fair amount of
editorial interpretation. However good such interpretation is, it is
always possible to disagree with it, be it only on the point of emphasis.
This book represents to some extent such disagreement. Possibly my
interpretation is wrong where it differs from the traditional view,
possibly both the interpretations are insufficient. In any case, it would
seem worthwhile to present and argue such differences of opinion.
This, then, is partly my intention in this book - to re-interpret and
re-emphasise some aspects of Brentano's philosophy. However much
I might disagree with the editors and interpreters of Brentano, e.g.
Kastil or Mayer-Hillebrand, I am nevertheless vividly conscious of my
indebtedness to them, both in the field of presentation and in the
field of interpretation of the Brentano heritage. 7
Another of my purposes is to provide a contemporary introduction
to Brentano for the English-speaking reader. The third, and perhaps
the most important, is to present, to analyse and to learn something
from Brentano's analysis of truth.

7 See here Kas.

 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO FRANZ BRENTANO'S

PHILOSOPHY

1. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION 1

1. Most of the editors of F. Brentano's works and his commentators

have a tendency to attempt to arrest his thought at a given moment,
and then to try to work out, in a systematic way, his views concerning
most problems. So, for instance, Alfred Kastil (in Die Philosophie
Franz Brentano's, Salzburg, I95I) " ... attempted to represent Bren-
tano's teaching in its final form ... " 2 The same tendency is clearly
evident in, e.g., F. Mayer-Hillebrand's edition of Die Lehre vom Richti-
gen Urteil, (Bern, I956). In order to attain this objective, the editor
used Brentano's own writings, together with some writings of Hille-
brand, and produced a systematic whole by skilful arrangement,
subtle changes and additions. The effect is to present Brentano's
views in the form of a detailed and systematic theory.

2. One can understand and sympathise with this craving for com-
pleteness. What is more, it appears to receive some support from
Brentano's own requests that his work should be continued rather
than reverently edited. A. Kastil quotes 3 from a letter that Brentano
wrote to O. Kraus, expressing the view that a treatment similar to
that accorded by E. Dumont to Bentham's Theory ot Legislation
would be preferable to a straight edition of his manuscripts. 4 He

1 This section appeared first as an article: Remarks concerning the interpretation of the works
of Franz Brentano in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, March, 1962, vol. XXII,
NO.3. Thanks are due to the editors of this journal for their kind permission to reprint it
here.
2 Comment of the editor F. Mayer-Hillebrand; p. 6. (My translation).
3 Ibid., p. 9. There is also a tradition by word of mouth strengthening and reasserting
these requests.
4 Dumont took a number of Bentham's paper written separately at different times and
edited them by placing them together in an order, deleting parts of them, etc. This resulted
in a systematic statement of the theory of legislation, such as Bentham himself never
produced.
2 INTRODUCTION

expresses further the opinion that it is not of the utmost importance

to have his work edited in final form. In other places, and by word of
mouth, Brentano also advised his followers to carry on his work in
preference to undertaking a painstaking edition of his manuscripts.
It is noticeable that the tendency to make a tidy theory out of Bren-
tano's later writings is stronger with Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrand
than it was with Kraus.

3. Despite a certain sympathy with this attitude, and some respect

for the justification produced, I am of the opinion that the treatment
does not suit Brentano's philosophy really well; that it is not likely to
bring out the best in his work; and finally that it rests, to some extent,
on a misunderstanding of his advice. Perhaps I ought to add that I
am certain that Brentano was serious in advising an edition like Dum-
ont's. What I am not certain of is whether he thought it the best way
of representing his work, even if he thought it good enough. I am con-
vinced that it is not the best way, even though I do not wish to say thatit is
useless - the position represented in those editions is in itself of inter-
est. The loss lies in omitting much that is of value in Brentano's
method, and his subtlety of approach as well; therefore I would prefer
the job of completion and explanation to be done through commentary
of the text rather than by adjusting and completing the text itself.
In saying this, I am not trying to indicate that Brentano was a piece-
meal philosopher who was interested in detail for detail's sake. When-
ever he worked on a point of detail, he always kept in mind the ramifi-
cations and the more general background of this investigation, and
he took care to be certain of the relevance and importance of his
particular enquiries. He was, as it were, on the look-out for significant
regularities, not just on the look-out for some regUlarities. He did
concern himself with some more general problems, and with the theo-
retical considerations which enabled him to form opinions concerning
the significance of detail. All this is well brought out in his criticism of
the early descriptive psychology.5 I wish, however, to assert that for
Brentano, his particular insights were of far greater importance than
any general hypothesis. They were much more reliable and the theories
would have to be modified to account for the particular elements which
were thus established. Theorising may be important, but it always
follows on, and must have the utmost respect for, the detailed investi-
gations.
5 See Psychologie.
 INTRODUCTION 3
4. Brentano never thought himself in possession of the final and
complete theoretical view. It is noticeable that he was always willing
to re-investigate his assumptions and to recast his thinking. Among
his latest writings one finds fresh attempts to work out views, which
otherwise one would have had reason to regard as long since discarded
and disproved to Brentano's complete satisfaction. (Wahrheit ist eine
Art von Ubereinstimmung, EL, 67, 1907). It is in the continuous re-
thinking in a deeper way of the basic, and therefore most important,
tenets, in the refusal to close any issue once and for all, in the refusal
to sacrifice thoroughness and understanding for spectacular and neat,
theoretical results, and above all, in the rich and subtle presentation
of the difficulties and intellectual puzzles connected with his problems,
that one finds Brentano's greatest and most lasting contribution to
philosophy. It is also in this way that Brentano would have liked to be,
and in fact was, most influential - this influence however is hard to
trace.

5. This approach to problems is what Brentano regarded as the

essence of real science. His advocacy of scientific method in philosophy
was partly, I think, methodological,6 but at least partly, and I think
mainly, it was advocacy of a cautious, thorough and honest approach
to philosophical study. It implied criticism of the methods which he
described as a "dance with ideas", and it reflects Brentano's conception
of philosophical study - it puts it as far as possible from literature and
as close as possible to science. I could perhaps conceive of Brentano
changing his method of arguing, and abandoning his theory, but I
could not conceive of him adopting the Hegelian frame of mind. At the
back of Brentano's mind, there could have operated a super-ego of
theory-completion, but he certainly never attempted seriously to
achieve such aims. He always found it more interesting and more
important to check on some of the results already propounded and to
deepen his understanding of these problems, than to complete the
picture. His publishing policy and the manuscripts that he left are
witness to this. It should also be remembered that in his time, a strong
academic pressure would have existed towards publishing a complete
theory, a pressure much stronger than anything one might experience
today. In view of this, Brentano's actual methods seem even more
significant.

6 It must be remembered that F. B. thought of XIX century science.

4 INTRODUCTION

6. All this would point to the fact that rounding-off a philosophical

system is not carrying on Brentano's work in his own spirit. I doubt
whether Brentano ever had all his views concerning all the problems that
interested him brought up to the same level, in any explicit manner. I
doubt whether he could have done it, and, as the practice of Mayer-
Hillebrand in Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil shows, he did not even
try to work out in detail all of the issues necessary for the reasonable
completion of a system. One should remember that the mainstay of
this book consists in lecture notes where the demands of lecturing
alone would have necessitated a fair amount of theory-completion, and
yet it was necessary to use Hillebrand's notes in order to round it off.
Admittedly Brentano would consider it important that a certain view
A would not fit with a certain other B. He was thus concerned with
the implications of new discoveries. In this way he was systematic,
but he was not a system builder. System-building was both alien and
repugnant to him. If I am right, then a rounded-off theory not only
misrepresents Brentano and is not really a continuation of his work,
but it is also a way of presenting his philosophy which, to a large
extent, conceals what is most valuable in it. My main argument lies in
this - that the nature of philosophical problems makes system-building
inappropriate. The approach to such problems must be much more
detailed, painstaking and careful. Ingenuity and logic combined with
a facility for systematisation must lead one inevitably astray. It is my
point that F. Brentano was aware of this. It can be argued that
he was not aware of this in quite as detailed or explicit a way
as some contemporary thinkers, particularly L. Wittgenstein. But
his statements and, even more so, his practice, show that he was
aware of them. His statements may have been general, but his practice
was very significantly subtle. I am not claiming that Brentano's
methods are significant from the methodological point of view only -
they are, but this I note only in the margin. What is really important
is the fact that his approach and his argument, seen in its development
from the earlier to the latest, picture his insight into the nature of the
problems discussed in particular, and into the nature of philosophical
problems in general. Looking at Brentano's method of doing it, and
watching his development, one learns a lot more about philosophy
than one is likely to learn from a mere survey of his latest views and
his argument for them. From such a study one learns inter alia some
things about philosophy of which Brentano was aware, but not suf-
ficiently so in order to state them explicitly.
 INTRODUCTION 5
7. Having expressed such strong views about a commonly adopted
approach to F. Brentano's philosophy, I feel now that I should try to
justify my stand by some more detailed arguments.
I. The strongest justification for the criticised method lies in F.
Brentano's favourable view of Dumont's edition of Jeremy Bentham's
Theory of Legislation, (I829, trans. R. Hildreth, London, I864, and
Kegan Paul, London, I93I, with notes and introduction by C. K.
Ogden).7 If one could find no justification for duplicating Dumont's
approach in editing Brentano's work, then it would be easier to criti-
cise Kastil's and Mayer-Hillebrand's methods.
(a) First of all I would wish to point out that although Brentano
says that a treatment not unlike Dumont's is preferable to the pain-
staking edition contemplated by O. Kraus, he does not say that it is
absolutely desirable and even quotes, without comment, J. S. Mill's
refusal to treat Dumont's edition on a par with other (posthumously
edited) works of Bentham. The approval then, though existent, is
neither whole-hearted nor unconditional. Brentano's objections against
the Kraus-proposal are mainly supported by the suggestion that this
would involve an amount of labour not worthy of the result. Should,
some of his work" ... be lost, it would be a mad overestimation of
one's own worth, to conclude that this would constitute an irreparable
damage." (trans. mine.) It appears then that Brentano objected be-
cause he thought that it would be better for his followers to do more
creative work than to spend their efforts at the mere edition of his
manuscripts; it is more important that the research should go on. He
might have thought that the Dumont-style edition was preferable
just for this reason. He does not appear to me to maintain that such
an edition would represent his views better, indeed it seems that he
was willing to accept the loss of some elements of his writings "
that would be of some benefit to my fellow-men".8
7 Here is the text of the letter as quoted by Kastil on p. 9 of Die Philosophie Franz Bren-
lano's: " ... Sie deuten an, welche Aufgabe Sie sich in Bezug auf von mir hinterlassene
Manuskripte gestellt haben. lch weiss nicht, inwieweit ich solche Publikationen iiberhaupt
fiir wiinschenswert halten kann. Besser ware es jedenfalls, wenn etwas geschahe ahnlich
dem, was Etienne Dumont gegen-iiber Benthams Manuskripten getan. Marty hat mich in
meiner Enthaltung von Veroffentlichungen und endgiiltiger Redaktion gar manchmal mit
Bentham verglichen. Aber was nach dem Tode Benthams herausgegeben worden ist, wollte
J. St. Mill schon darum Dumonts Schrift nicht gleichwertig erachten. Die Vorsehung, die
immer weise ist, hat vieles anders gefiigt, als wir es ratsam befunden hatten. Aristoteles'
Metaphysik is nich t zur Ausfiihrung gekommen und keine der uns iiberlieferten Schriften
zur endgiiltigen Redaktion. Bei mir scheinen aussere Umstande neben vielem anderen, was
meine Arbeit erschwert, es ahnlich dahin kommen zu lassen, dass gar manches, was ich
meinen Mitbriidern Gutes hatte geben konnen, verloren geht. Es ware eine t6richte Selbst-
iiberschatzung zu glauben, dass dies einen unersetzlichen Verlust bedeute."
8 It would appear from the letter (from 13.1.61) that Brentano was in earnest, concerning
6 INTRODUCTION

8. Furthermore, one need not agree with Brentano that a Dumont-

style edition would meet his objections to any extent. One could
reasonably hold that it would be better either to edit his manuscripts
well and faithfully, or else to engage in some altogether original work,
and that the proposed solution achieves neither end, while making no
special contribution of its own. If anything, then, an edition, with a
running commentary on the model of some of Cornford' translations
of Platonic texts would be preferable for this purpose.
(b) There are some significant similarities between the editions
of Theory ot Legislation and Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil, (which I
shall take as an example), but there are also some significant differences.
Among the similarities, one could count the fact that both editors
had to select between manuscripts of different dates and had to fill
in the gaps and elaborate the work to look like a finished whole. Here
the close similarities end. On the other hand, one should observe that
where Dumont filled in gaps on the basis of Bentham's own notes,
Mayer-Hillebrand often used Hillebrand's notes; where Dumont had
to excise more than he added, Mayer-Hillebrand had to add; where
Dumont used a number of unfinished papers all directed to the same
purpose, Mayer-Hillebrand used a set of lecture notes, writings of a
Brentano pupil, and some quite independent papers of F. Brentano's; 9
lastly Bentham had, and Brentano had not, the opportunity to
comment upon the edition, offer suggestions and finally to read the
proofs. These points, though worth mentioning, should perhaps not
assume, on their own, overmuch importance.
(c) What is important, and to my mind of paramount importance,
is the fact that the treatment suitable to Bentham's work seems to
me unsuitable to the works of F. Brentano. It might be true that, as A.

this way of editing his work, and I am certain that he thought this best in the circumstances,
i.e. taking into account the state of his manuscripts, and the attitude of his followers. I would
be incredulous however if it was maintained that he was in earnest thinking that this would
represent his achievements most faithfully. His arguments are significant here:
Argument I - Perhaps it is not really important to edit my works at all.
Argument 2 - Even if something is lost from my achievements, "Es wiire eine tiirichte
Selbstiiberschiitzung, zu glauben, dass dies einen unersetzlichen Verlust bedeute."
Argument 3 - It would be better to do something like Dumont - even if J. S. Mill would
not allow this to be rated equal with careful posthumous editions of Bentham's work;
but it has some other value as well.
All this points to the fact that Brentano thought that this may be the best way of carrying
on his tradition, but not to the fact that he thought this the best way of representing his
writings. He would have thought that to carryon the work and the tradition is much more
important than to prepare a detailed and scholarly faithful edition of his writings.
9 See also (c).
 INTRODUCTION 7
Marty remarked, there 10 was some similarity between Bentham's and
Brentano's working habits; but the similarity was, I think, superficial,
and its underlying causes different in the two cases. Whereas Bentham
could be described as an untidy system-builder, Brentano was system-
atic, but certainly not a system-builder. If we take Dumont seriously,
Bentham's attitude to his work was that: "He considered it not as
composed of detailed works, but as forming a single work." 11 He was,
then, aiming at a complete theory, as neat and simple as possible. He
was honest enough to take his difficulties seriously, and untidy enough
never to return to a work, once interrupted. When faced with difficul-
ties, he undertook at least once to rewrite a whole section of the theory.
His attitude seems to have been that in the face of difficulties, the theory
had to be recast to fit the facts more closely. Even if he never wrote out
a complete statement of his theory, he did write out elements of a
system, seen by him as such. Furthermore, at least according to Du-
mont, he had a very good idea of the whole of the system and its
divisions while doing this. It would therefore be entirely fair to present
his system to the public as a complete theory. The only problems and
difticulties would be technical, and would concern the quality of this
presentation, specially the accuracy with which Bentham's thoughts
were represented.

9. As I see it, Brentano's attitude was quite different. For him,

the theory was indeed necessary in order to see the particular pieces
in their proper perspective. But he always thought of the particular
insights and of the particular regularities as more important, and
perhaps more illuminating, than the theoretical framework in which
they were presented - he developed and recast his theory in so far as
it was necessary in order to understand properly his particular dis-
coveries, but he was primarily active in the field of detailed analysis.
If one wishes to understand F. Brentano's philosophy, it is therefore
much more important to become acquainted with his particular
investigations than with his overall theory - the particular overall
framework which he evolved was, to some extent expendable; the
methods of enquiry, the subtle and thorough thinking-out of detail,
and the relative evaluation of 'fact finding' and theory construction
were not. It is not least instructive to see Brentano at work, to see
him reach one and then another, subtler view. It is not only important
10 See the letter quoted, footnote 6.
11 Theory of Legislation, quoted in the Introduction by Ogden, p. xiix.
8 INTRODUCTION

to be given his reasons for accepting any given position, but also to see
why he had adopted a different position at an earlier stage, and what led
him to become dissatisfied with it. To investigate his latest position,
and the main arguments for it, is unsatisfactory. It makes it very
hard to realise the subtlety and depth of Brentano's approach to, and
his understanding of, philosophical problems. The recommendation
to his followers, quoted by them in support of their way of editing F.
Brentano's works, was due, I think on the one hand, to the nature and
the 'unity' of the Brentano-Schule; and on the other hand to Brentano's
views concerning the proper way of carrying on his traditions.

10. I think that the unity of the Brentano-Schule consisted in a

closely-knit relationship of a group of researchers who were willing to help
each other, with Brentano as the senior statesman of the group.
Brentano himself had no reverence for his papers, even if he took them
seriously. This was due both to his modesty and to his earnest attitude
to the problem of finding the philosophical truth - always willing
to recast his thinking when confronted with a serious objection,
he would be willing to delegate this right to his followers and fellow
researchers. I have some doubts whether what was actually done
would satisfy Brentano, simply because the development of research
was practically arrested at his death. At any rate, from the point of
view of discovering F. Brentano as he was - seeking, as it were, the
man himself, rather than his' school', I find that the method adopted
makes it rather difficult, as:
(i) The work as presented was unlikely to have been presented in this
form by Brentano himself. In these matters, a man's practice is usu-
ally a better guide than his avowals - and Brentano never pro-
duced a systematic and full work of this kind, or dimensions, in 54
years of active professional life.
(ii) I find Brentano's philosophical practice and development as
illuminating as his results - and his results unintelligible in the absence
of the earlier work and appraisal of his practice. Some of his results
may be outdated now, but his practice and his attitude are signs of
his awareness of some important features of philosophical issues, that
have only recently been seen explicitly. My conviction that it is a loss
to miss out on Brentano's development of a philosophical issue on the
one hand, and on the other hand, my view that the understanding of
his method, approach and development is a conditio sine qua non
for proper and thorough understanding of his final results, leads me
 INTRODUCTION 9
to believe that editions like "Wahrheit und Evidenz" are preferable
even if they mean limiting the field covered by publications. This point
is perhaps hardest to see for the author himself and his editors - they
have of necessity all the background needed for a thorough under-
standing of the end-position. For clarity, an edition with a running
commentary of the type used by Cornford in translations of Platonic
Dialogues would seem to be the one best suited. It would combine the
merits of continuous and clear exposition, allowing for 'filling in
the gaps' if necessary, with a faithful representation of the text, un-
hampered by a system-building aura, it would also permit clear and in-
stantaneous recognition of earlier and later, and of Brentano and non-
Brentano texts. I might, in some cases, be inclined to agree that it
would be illuminating to include in such a selection some papers by
Brentano's pupils. In this type of edition they could appear under the
names of their authors, with a suitable commentary.

II. It will be seen from the above that my criticism is directed prima-
rily at the works of A. Kastil and F. Mayer-Hillebrand. Despite those
criticisms, I do not wish to affirm that their work was useless or even
that it was misleading to the point of being harmful. Once the reser-
vations have been made, and are kept in mind, Kastil's book,12 as
well as his and Mayer-Hillebrand's editions, can be used to advantage,
especially as they are quite well annotated. My objection to these
works consists in:
(a) That these reservations have to be made.
(b) That if I am right, this type of work can be grossly misleading.
(c) That it is not as clear as other types of editions could be, and
finally.
(d) That even when useful, it is not as useful, and in a significant
way considerably more limited, than the type of edition advo-
cated by me.

12. In this book I intend to follow my own advice as far as possible.

This is not an edition of Brentano's work, but an account of his views.
The main stress will be on presenting the important points made by
Brentano in connection with the problem of truth. I shall endeavour
to avoid completing and systematising his views beyond the point
that he himself reached, and I shall try to show the subtlety and
sensitivity of his discussion. When his views are related to each other,
12 Die Philosophie Franz Brentano's.
IO INTRODUCTION

I shall try to show this. If he is trying out suggestions rather than

systematising or working out details, this should be indicated explicitly.
I shall attempt to indicate when and why I consider it important to
notice that he failed or refused to say something. In this way I hope
to do something towards rendering the real flavour of Brentano's
philosophy - the sensitive probing, careful argument, the attention
to difficulties, however small, respect for particular points, and on the
whole, the realistic, down to earth attitude, and willingness to
accept any conclusion demanded by argument. In the course of this
presentation I hope to demonstrate that Brentano's philosophy is
both worthwhile in itself and of contemporary importance. If a few
of its readers are tempted to read Brentano's original work, this
book will have fulfilled its purpose.

2. GENERAL

I. Brentano was early impressed by the philosophy of Aristotle and

accepted a great deal of it. Subsequently he reconsidered many of his
ideas and gradually worked out a view which, though reasonably
akin in spirit to the Aristotelian position, was nevertheless very differ-
ent from it. This is clearly indicated by Brentano himself in a letter
to o. Kraus. 1
"In these times of woeful downfall of philosophy I could find none better than
the old Aristotle. Aquinas had to serve as a guide to the understanding of a
text that wasn't always easy to follow; It was there that I let myself be led
into believing that 'is' has the same function both in the phrase 'a tree is ... '
and in the phrase ,that a tree is ... '."

The earliest of the important papers of Brentano are those in which

he produces arguments against Aristotle and attempts an improved
version of the correspondence theory of truth. An excellent selection
of papers from this period forms the first part of Wahrheit und Evidenz,
and these, with some additions, can be regarded as the main Brentano
text to which I am referring in discussing the early position. The
largest and fullest article in this group is the one reprinted under
the title: tJber den Begritt der Wahrheit. In this early period Brentano
attempts to modify the Aristotelian definition of truth merely in order
to escape difficulties inherent in its original formulation. By consider-
1 See O. Kraus, Franz Brentano, p. 32. I reproduce only part of what is quoted by Kraus
(translation mine).
 INTRODUCTION II

ing this, I hope to start building up a picture of the problem of truth

which will not conceal its complexity and ramifications. In the course
of this exposition I shall also offer some arguments concerning the
points raised. These will perform the dual role of indicating my assess-
ment of Brentano's views as well as providing some support for my
claim of the genuine contemporary importance of his work.

2. At the outset, Brentano accepts Aristotle's view that 'true' in its

original or main sense applies properly to jUdgements only. This
particular view was not reconsidered later, which is not really
surprising since even Ramsey still used the jUdgement-language. 2 This
view is supported by the following argument: When 'true' is applied
to something other than a jUdgement, then the use of the term is
secondary or dependent, because every such use refers back to true
judgements. We say that X is true either because it makes a true
judgement known, or because it causes a true judgement to be made;
sometimes because it amounts to a true judgement, or when one that
would believe X, would judge truly, and so on. Generally it would be
said that, e.g., statements, assertions or judgements are true in the
primary sense; Gems, love, friendship, affection, etc. are sometimes
said to be true too, but then 'true' is obviously used in a dependent
sense. Brentano claimed that only jUdgements can be said to be true or
false without qualification. Let us have a look at the argument as
presented by Brentano himself (W&E, p. 5 ff.):
"We call some perceptions either true or false as e.g. we call hallucinations
false; we call ideas true or false; we call fudgements true or false; we call guesses,
hopes and troubles true and false (un esprit faux); we call outside objects true
or false; we call statements true and false ... The multiplicity of the meanings
of the word 'true' is brought to our notice by this manifold usage. But one can
equally easily observe the relation to the one (meaning) that is the stan-
dard for all the others. And what is the one (meaning)? Where do we find
truth in the strict sense? ARISTOTLE says that it is to be found in judge-
ments. The name 'true' is applied in all cases with reference to the truth or
falsity in judgements. Sometimes because a true or false judgement is made
known, as in a false statement, a false utterance; sometimes because it causes a
true or false judgement as, e.g., with: hallucinations, a mis-said or miswritten
word, a metal which is believed to be gold because or similarity in colour.
Sometimes because it is intended to create a true of false judgement, as, e.g.,
a true feeling, a false manner, sometimes because if we think it is true we judge
truly or falsely, as, e.g., a true God, or a true stone, in contradistinction to a
painted one. Some concepts are called true or false in respect of something that
agrees with them contextually, because we would judge truly or falsely if we
2 He says, for instance, (Foundations 0/ Mathematics, p. 142): " ... the problem is not as to
the nature of truth or falsehood, but as to the nature of judgement or assertion ... "
12 INTRODUCTION

believed this, e.g., when we say that 'a four-cornered figure' is not the true con-
cept of a square and so on.
And so truth and falsity in the strict sense is to be found in judgements. Indeed
each judgement is either true or false."

The second paragraph contains a remark well worth our attention.

Brentano thinks of the meaning of a word like 'true' as varied and
yet as united. This is an interesting and attractive view in face of
the sometimes fashionable tendency to multiply meanings of words
endlessly.3 This latter attitude does not seem plausible, but the diffi-
culty for those who wish to preserve the unity of meaning lies in
explaining the multiplicity of uses of such words. Brentano seems to
think of one of the meanings as central, as it were, a master of cere-
monies - "the standard for all the others". But how could such a
standard work? We do not compare our use of, e.g., 'true love' with
our use of 'true judgement' before deciding that it is correct. In fact
nothing is to be gained by such comparisons. I think that a correct,
or at least plausible, explanation of the special position of the
central meaning can be gained by reflecting on how such a word could
come to assume its complex form. It appears likely that this would
be most easily achieved if it started as a word having a single and simple
meaning and use and then developed by acquiring special, extraordinary
and ad hoc uses. If some of these uses became standardised in their own
right, then they might be quite different from the original meaning
and yet they would be best understood by reference to it. The very
features of the main usage that made the original ad hoc application
of the word intelligible would provide the explicatory element. Clearly
each of the new usages could develop off-spring of its own, the limits
being purely practical. I believe that Brentano's suggestion, developed
in this way is very important. It presents a reasonably clear and
workable picture of our language as an intellectual tool; and it might
also be thought of as suggesting a satisfactory type of solution to the
problem of truth. We can attempt to elucidate the central meaning
and usage. The dependent usages will then have to be explained with
reference to it.

3. Even though Brentano's analysis of the relations of the various

senses of 'true' tends to be oversimplified, it can be successfully
implemented by the introduction of the above indicated step into his

3 For this attitude with respect to the concept of true 'sentence' and 'true', see Alfred
Tarski, LSM, p. ISS ff.
 INTRODUCTION

analysis of language. And so the argument is valid as far as it goes,

but it has to be observed that it can be equally well used with respect
to say, propositions or assertions. One could even argue that a judge-
ment is said to be true because it amounts to being at least prepared
to assert something true. This is a plausible suggestion and, quite
obviously, the above argument cannot be used to show that it is
false. When other arguments are used it would, I think, seem prefer-
able to say that only e.g., assertions are true in the primary, non-
dependent sense. One could argue here that a judgement is a mental
event similar in kind even if dissimilar in character to anger, dislike,
apprehension and so on. It can be further maintained that it would be
a category mistake to say that a mental event is either true or false.
It would therefore be better to say: "I judge truly" than to say:
"The judgement is true". All this is based on the view that a judge-
ment is the act of judging. However if it is not the act of judging but,
for instance, what is being achieved by it, e.g., the assertion that can
be said to be either true or false,4 then clearly one could distinguish
between the act, the object, and the judgement (assertion) itself, which
in this case would be regarded as what is being achieved by the act
of judging with respect to its object. 5 The judgement then becomes an
event even if not necessarily a mental act. This view encounters
another difficulty: What can be achieved by one act of judging can be
achieved by another. Therefore it cannot consist in the event of achiev-
ing it. It would simply be ridiculous to say: "My judgement that
2 + 2 = 4 is true; so is yours; so was mine yesterday," etc., etc.
In accordance with this observation, let us say that it is neither
necessary to know who asserted 2 + 2 = 4, or when, in order to be
able to say that it is true; nor is it obligatory to specify a particular
judgement or utterance, (mental act, event or linguistic episode),
when saying that an assertion is true. Presumably it is what one said
or judged that is true, not the judging or saying of it. In this light it
would appear obvious that what is true is the same in all the cases
quoted, that is, the assertion that 2 + 2 = 4. This would seem suffi-
cient to show that to say: "'true' applies primarily to jUdgements
only," is misleading.

4 Compare here the first part of Austin's contribution to the symposium in A.S.P., Supp.
Vol., 195I.
5 Compare here Brentano's discussion of judgement in L.R.U. and Psych. Vol II, Ch. 7,
(3), also Anhang. If the whole subtlety of Brentano's final position is taken into account,
his view appears plausible, but I still feel that the terminology is at best misleading.
 INTRODUCTION

5. This is connected with Brentano's whole conception of psychology

and the psychical. He thinks of psychology as one of the central
sciences and as basic for philosophy and logic. Some of his arguments
in this respect are reminiscent of the misconception that led logicians
to formulate laws at thought. I do not think that Brentano was ever
completely clear on this point and as a result his distinction between
psychological and logical points were muddled and unsatisfactory. I
say this in the face of Brentano's denials that he commits, as charged
by Husserl, the psychological fallacy (Psychologismus). But Husserl
claimed that Brentano had commited the fallacy of psychological
subjectivism, and of this, I agree that Brentano was innocent,6 at
least in the later stage. Some further discussion of this point is
needed, since it tends to affect Brentano's handling of the truth
problem as a whole. However, I would like to argue, before taking
this point up, that, even on Brentano's own view of the nature of
judgement, it is implausible to say that jUdgements are true or false
in the strict sense.

6. According to Brentano, mental acts are characterised by this -

that they have an intentional relation to their object. The problem of
'psychical relation' is discussed in Psych. Vol. II, Anhang; (see also
Kas, Part 2; Psych. Vol. I, Book II, Ch. I (O.K.) etc., see also Ch.
IV, sects. I and 2). The psychical act is, according to him, distinguished
from others in that it stands in relation to something as its subject.
This relation is different from other types of relations, in that in other
relations, all terms are objectively real, whereas in a psychical relation
only one term must be an objectively real term. It is therefore a one
term relation. By this Brentano means, for instance, that if someone
thinks about something, it does imply that the thinker exists, but it
does not imply that what is thought about exists. On the other hand,
the similarity between this and the other relations lies, according to
Brentano, in this - that in both cases one is concerned with two objects,
one referred to directly and the other indirectly. When one says that
Mary thinks about John, one refers to Mary in oratio recta, to John in
oratio obliqua. Similarly, if one says that John is bigger than Mary,
one refers to one of them directly and the other indirectly. This is true
about every relation and about every mental phenomenon as well.
Brentano would express it by saying that even though mental pheno-
mena are not relations, they are relativistic in character. More pre-
6 See here Psych. II, p. 179 ff.
 INTRODUCTION 15
cisely, one can say that between the person thinking, feeling, etc. and
the object of his thought, feeling, etc. there obtains a dependence of
relativistic character. Types of psychical phenomena are then dis-
tinguished by reference to the exact nature of the particular relation
and so, for instance, judgements are characterised by this - that he
who judges, either accepts or rejects the object of his judgements. It
will be agreed that it is not the mental episode of passing a judgement
that could be true or false, nor yet this judgement having a given
content or object. What can be true or false is what is done by the
person who judges, i.e., either the acknowledgement or rejection of
given object. Even if the judgement consists in the acknowledgement
or rejection of the 'object', it would seem unnatural to say that it is
acknowledgement or rejection of it 7 (i.e., the judgement itself) -
after all, the 'object' is an aspect of the judgement as much as the
'acknowledging relation' is an aspect of it. The acknowledgement or
rejection of the same object can be accomplished however, as was
remarked above, by different jUdgements passed by different people at
different times; hence the above objections apply to saying (without
qualification), that judgements are true or false. If 'judgement' is
used, as after all it could be used, to denote only what was accomplished
in passing the judgement, then the view advocated by Brentano would
be rendered correct. However, even then it would be less misleading
to replace the word by, say, the word 'assertion', which is more
neutral and therefore less likely to lead to misunderstandings.

7. Now, to anticipate a point raised in Chapter III, sec. 2 - Brentano's

conception of the role of psychology with respect to other disciplines.
This is important because he was never really clear about it and this
might easily be the most significant single shortcoming of his philoso-
phy. The view that psychology is basic for philosophy and logic is,
to say the least, misleading, and serious acceptance of it imposes a
limit on one's insight into at least some logical and philosophical
problems. I think that the problem of truth is one of them. Brentano
says, USE, p. 12:
"The laws of logic are obviously the valid laws of judging, i.e. one has to obey
them because judging following those rules is reliable, and judging at variance
with them is subject to error. One is therefore concerned with the natural
superiority of the orderly train of thought over the disorderly one." 8
7 Anerkennen und Verwerfen - love and hate characterise value judgements.
8 'Regelmassig' and Regelwidrig' are stronger than 'orderly' and disorderly - there is
the suggestion of obeying or defying the proper order of things.
16 INTRODUCTION

and again, W&E, p. 92:

"According to me, all that is indicated in those cases is a linguistic usage.
This usage inclines us to posit fictitious new entities and creates a misunder-
standing about our psychical functions because it leads us to regard instances of
denial as instances of affirmative jUdgement."

These quotations make it quite clear that Brentano has not dis-
tinguished properly between logical and psychological points. And
for this reason he conceives the psychological as the basis of the logical.
The distinctions that need to be stressed in this connection are the
distinctions between laws of nature, normative laws and laws of
logic. The implications of this confusion are taken quite far and
affect Brentano's conception of the nature, and of mutual relations
between, humanistic disciplines. This is put briefly by Kastil.l 0 He
says: "Only through the psychological analysis of the immediately
perceptually 11 given can we obtain an impartial judgement about the
limits of our knowledge." Brentano himself says, Psych. I, p. 30:
"I indicate only very fleetingly how psychology contains the roots of aesthe-
tics which (in turn) will certainly, when it is more developed, clear the eyes of
the artist and make sure of his progress. I will also touch in only a word (the
fact) that logic, (a discipline such) that one achievement 12 in it results in a
thousand achievements in the sciences, quite similarly finds its nourishment in
psychology. "

Despite the metaphorical language, his meaning is clear - psychology

somehow or other forms the basis of philosophy and logic. However,
Brentano's acute sense of reality saves him from the worst consequences
of his own view. It prevents him from distorting particular points,
and when a distortion happens it is usually on a marginal issue.
However it might prevent Brentano from being explicitly aware of
certain features of the problem of truth and in this way it would
appear to put a limit on the development of his ideas. This will, I hope,
come out in the discussion of his later papers. The psychological
fallacy is serious in that it makes itself felt throughout his work. This
can be seen when we think what he could have said, quite naturally if
he had abandoned this view. The following two quotations will illustrate
the point. The first is from a letter to Anton Marty (W&E, p. 94):

9 Indicated, that is, by the expressions that we apply and by the way in which we apply
them.
10 Kas., p. 28. Translation mine.
11 Anschaulich.
12 Fortschritt.
 INTRODUCTION I7
"There is no doubt that a judgement correct at one time, may later become
incorrect owing to a real happening, which changes the (concrete) reality."

It is clear that here Brentano treats the judgement which is either

true or false as a mental event and the psychological idiom thus causes
him to overlook the obvious possibility that the truth of, for instance,
the assertion "A is", as asserted at the time t1, could be non-temporal.
The second quotation forms paragraph 3 of the unpublished MS, EL.
96 (Appendix D) :
"It is impossible to give an analytic definition of truth, this because the
difference between a true and a false judgement is something elementary that
must be experienced to be understood."

Clearly Brentano implies here that judgement is a mental event, and

that this mental event is either true or false, and equally clearly, the
whole confusion is due to the psychological fallacy.

8. The psychological fallacy might have ruined completely Bren-

tano's analysis of truth, but it does not. It seldom leads him into direct
error where an important matter is concerned. It is most evident in his
terminology and sometimes in the reasons he gives for a particular
view, which in itself might be correct. This seems to be borne out by the
last quotation. The argument is suspect but the view seems right; we
cannot produce an analytic definition of truth, only an account of it
can be given. Brentano's healthy respect for particular philosophical
points and his honesty in facing up to all difficulties are very important
in this respect. Still, I think that most important of all was his feeling
for the concrete philosophical point. Feeling is not perhaps the best
word; it would appear that at each stage of his development Brentano,
besides being explicit about some features of his problem, was already
working towards further insight. He seemed to be sufficiently aware
of this not to ride roughshod over the subtle tell-tale points. One is
tempted to say that in this rather indirect way, Brentano had some
awareness of most of the important philosophical points in the field in
which he was working, even if he was not explicitly aware of them. I
feel that this explains Brentano's working and publishing habits as
well as the general character of his philosophy. In this kind of con-
jecture however, one can never really be sure, and even if one guesses,
one ought to do so cautiously.
 CHAPTER II

THE EARLY POSITION

I. ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH. EARLY CRITICISM

OF THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY

1. Let us now turn directly to the problem of the analysis of truth.

We shall be concerned firstly with Brentano's early position, i.e.,
the position he attained after his first independent criticism of Aris-
totle. Brentano represents Aristotle in the following manner: On p.
7, W&E, he quotes from Metaphysica IX. 10. 1051 b. 3:
" ... so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined
to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to
that of the objects is in error." (Translation: W. D. Ross.)

Brentano took this quotation as indicating that Aristotle thought that

truth was the correspondence between the judgement and the real
objects. Later on, (on p. 18), he claims that in De Interpretatione
Aristotle represents judgement as consisting in entwining of thought
which in turn consists in this - that when one judges, one takes some-
thing real to be connected with something else, also real (or the op-
posite). Then if what is in fact connected is taken for connected, (or
the opposite), one judges truly, otherwise falsely.!

2. This Aristotelian view was, according to Brentano, almost uni-

versally adopted up to his day. There were some criticisms of it but,
in the main, it was unquestionably accepted by philosophers of all

1 Without entering the field or Aristotelian scholarship, I would like to remark in passing
that, should one pay attention to the 7 lines preceeding the given quotation, and further
to the passage (Met. IO. II. b. 27): "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not, that
it is, is false. While to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so
that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what
is false;" (Trans. Ross.) One might be inclined to consider again Brentano's interpretation
particularly for proof that 'x exists' is a combination of ideas or rather that Aristotle conceives
of it as such. This point is in fact taken up by Brentano elsewhere, and Met. 10. II. b. 27
is quoted further on in this very paper (Sect. 51, p. 24, W&E.).
 EARLY POSITION I9

views. Yet the view is not free from difficulties. At the outset, Bren-
tano remarks, W&E, p. I9:
"Here is something that must make us hesitate. First of all it is true about the
statement that the separation, the apart-being of (those) things that correspond
to the subject and predicate in judgement are responsible both for the truth of the
negative and the falsity of the affirmative jUdgement. When I say about a
dog that it is a cat then it is true, of course, that the subject (dog) and the pre-
dicate (cat) are apart here: and also that if I take this dog and this cat for one I
judge falsely. But it is not true that my judgement is false because this dog and
this cat exist as separate entities. If there was no (such thing as a) cat, neither
conjoined with the dog, nor apart from it, my judgement would be just as false
... And so the definition of truth would now have to appear as: A judgement is
true (either) when it ascribes to an object what is in reality given as one with it,
or if it denies an object something that is not (in fact) given as one with it."

Brentano then goes on to present a series of difficulties which still

appertain to the view as amended by him. In the light of future de-
velopments, the above passage is also interesting in itself in that it
does not suggest entia rationis, despite the fact that this would seem to
be the obvious solution.

3. Let us now consider the main objections to the traditional theory

presented by Brentano at this stage: The first difficulty discussed is
one which, Brentano maintains, was first formulated by Gorgias. I
shall refer to it as the Gorgias difficulty. It is claimed that the relation
of correspondence must amount to identity if it is to serve the purpose.
After all, there can be some correspondence between Paul and Peter. If
the judgement recognising Peter as Peter did not correspond with him
to any greater extent than it corresponds with Paul it would be useless
- as Brentano says - it could not be true of Peter. To make sure, the
correspondence must be full. However, full correspondence amounts
to identity. But Peter is outside any judgement - a material object -
and judgement cannot be identical with this sort of object. On the other
hand, if identity is replaced by similarity then unprecision is the result. 2
Therefore the correspondence theory is unsatisfactory whichever way
we look at it. Brentano argues that the Gorgias objection is not valid
because there is no contradiction in the same object being present
outside me standing to me in a formal relation, and on the other hand,
the very same individual being present intentionally in me, i.e.,

2 Compare here Brentano's late position on objects of mental acts (see W&E, p. 87 ff.).
Some interesting complications will arise if the problem of identity of indiscernibles is intro-
duced at this point. I think, however, that they are only of marginal interst and need not be
discussed.
20 EARLY POSITION

standing in intentional relation to my judgement (as its object 3).

This is the same distinction as drawn by Descartes between formal
and objective reality.4 Having noted it, I shall not discuss this argu-
ment here because it seems to me that the force of the Gorgias objection
lies in another direction, and is due to what it implies and/or draws
attention to. If the difficulty is viewed in this light, Brentano's
argument against it is beside the point.

4- According to Brentano, it is the judgement which should corre-

spond with real objects. The question must arise then whether such
correspondence is really possible? 5 This problem is the gist of the
Gorgias difficulty. There seem to exist different kinds of correspond-
ence. Sometimes it is the formal or conventional correspondence:
In this sense we often talk of the cash and the accounts corresponding.
This sort of correspondence cannot, even by the wildest stretch of
imagination, lead to identity. In a well conducted business, the corre-
spondence between accounts and effects is usually complete. The
accounts, however, do not consist of stock, cash and equipment, even
if stock, cash and equipment are what the accounts are about. The
relation between a mental act and its object is not conventional.
The object is given in the mental act,6 not connected with it by custom,
e.g., if the mental act is the act of being aware of a horse, then the
horse is the object of it. But then it is, as it were, essentially given
in it and certainly its connection with the act of being aware at a horse
cannot be represented with any plausibility as conventional or due to
custom. This type of correspondence then, does not look very promising.
On the other hand, we speak often of an image, or a picture corre-
sponding with the original. It can correspond in appearance, size,
character, etc. If the correspondence obtains at many and different
points, the image may become a copy of the original. It is obvious that
in some cases at least, a copy could be made so well that it could not be
distinguished from the original. A number of real objects standing in a
given relation to one another are not a judgement - if a mental act
was identical with this 'situation' it would not be a judgement or even
a mental act; it would be another concrete situation. 7 If we accept
3 The nature of this relation and the possible object of judgement occupied Brentano
very often - for the latter position, see W &E, p. 87 ff.
4 This is what Brentano claims.
5 Compare here Austin in ASP Supp., 1951.
6 This is part of the force of saying that the object is immanent and the relation between
the object and the act is intentional.
7 Compare this and what Brentano says of the Gorgias difficulty.
 EARL Y PO SITION 2I

Brentano's argument, we will admit that this situation can be intent-

ionally present in me, but even so, it is still a situation not a judgement.
The judgement consists in either acknowledging or rej ecting it - unless
we at least envisage acknowledgment or rejection, the problem of
truth and falsehood cannot arise. On the other hand, neither ac-
knowledgement nor rejection can be present in the concrete objects.
A judgement then cannot correspond with a concrete situation. s If
one says that there is a sense in which, e.g., a fable can correspond
with reality, one does not fare much better. A story might correspond
with reality but it does not contain a jUdgement, it expresses no
opinion as to whether the story represents what is the case. Of course a
judgement could take place; one could have the opinion that the story
corresponds with what really happened; but then this opinion is
precisely not something that either corresponds or fails to correspond
with it. When I judge that this page is printed - this judgement could
be said to correspond with the tact that this page is printed, but not
with the printed page, or to judge that x is identical with accepting x for
a fact. Hence it would be unplausible to offer the correspondence
between judgement and fact as the solution of the problem of
truth.

5. A judgement can correspond with another judgement; to say that

it does is to say that it makes the same point, i.e., my judgement that
this is a printed page corresponds with your judgement that this is a
printed page; 9 both assert the same fact. Quite naturally, when such
a situation arises I would be prepared to say, without further ado, that
your judgement is true,l0 But this is not the point of the Aristotelian
theory; for it, the correspondence must be between the judgement and
what is judged. How such correspondence can be established at all is
hard to see. Situations can correspond with situations, jUdgements
with jUdgements, copies with originals, facts with facts. It is difficult
to imagine cross-correspondence between them. Facts could correspond
with judgements, but then, how are they different from each other?l1
The gap is either too big or too narrow. The only hope lies in the con-
ventional correspondence, but this cannot obtain between jUdgements

8 Compare here W&E, p. 132, sect. 5; also W&E, pp. 138-9.

9 This is actually the type of correspondence relevant to the judgement - "This judgement
(assertion) is true".
10 Compare W &E, p. 87 ff. Brentano makes this point in letter 3. I would argue that this
is the basic fact about the use of 'true'. See also W&E, p. 133.
11 I mean different as facts from judgements not as one judgement from another.
22 EARLY POSITION

and objects unless jUdgements are no more than sentences. Even

treating judgements as assertions or propositions will not help.

6. Brentano then introduces some, according to him, more serious

difficulties, some of which,h e says, are due to the faulty concept of
judgement 12 which Aristotle conceived either as a combination or
separation of ideas. In Psych. II, p. 44, Brentano represents this
conception of judgement as follows:
"In fact a very ordinary conception asserts that judgement consists in combi-
nation or separation that takes place in our imagination,13 Therefore the affirm-
ative, and in slightly modified form also the negative judgement is quite simply
distinguished from mere representation as compound or also as referring thought-
activity.14 Conceived of in this way the difference between pure imagination
and judging would in reality come to nothing more than a difference between
the content of judgements and the content of purely representative thoughts.
If a specific type of relation or connection of two signs were to be thought then
the thought would be a judgement, while any thought that failed to exhibit such
relation to the content would have to be called a mere representation.
This view however is also indefensible."

Brentano says that it obviously can, and often does happen, that a
thought which is nothing more than a mere representation involves us
in combining exactly the same ideas in exactly the same way in which
it happens when we pass a jUdgement. If we compare the judgement
that there is a white horse on the green lawn with the mere repre-
sentation of such a horse, as for example, in day-dreaming, we see that
he must be right. He believed that James Mill and Herbert Spencer
agreed with him on this point,15 but comments that they went wrong
when they tried to complete the analysis by reference to results or
dispositions. Against Aristotle, Brentano has some further arguments.
The Aristotelian correspondence theory 16 consists in saying that a
judgement is true when it takes two concrete things as connected
when they are in fact connected and takes them as separated when
they are in fact separated. If the opposite is the case, a judgement is
false,17 It was objected to this, (see section 2 above), that the same
concrete situation can prove equally well the falsehood of an affirma-
tive judgement, for example, "This dog is a cat", as the truth of the

12 See O. Most: Die Ethik Franz Brentanos, pp. 15-20.

13 The German reads: in dem Bereiche unseres Vorstellens.
14 'Denken'.
15 Psych. II, Chap. 7 (3), p. 45.
16 This is Brentano's interpretation of the theory.
17 I use 'concrete' to render 'das Reale' which is not perfect but, I think, suitable.
 EARLY POSITION 23
negative judgement "This dog is not a cat" .18 It is not only obvious
that both the judgements correspond with the same situation, but also
that if the affirmative is false, it is not because dog is separate from
being a cat on the ground that "This dog is a unicorn" is also false, but
because there are no unicorns, dog and unicorn cannot be separate.
The position is even more serious however, because it can be shown
that even the truth of a positive judgement is not always based on a
connection between two concrete terms. While this conception might
seem sufficient when we contemplate the judgement "This object is
round", it appears implausible when we look at the judgement "This
exists" or "This is something or another", taking these jUdgements as
merely affirming our belief in the existence of an object. If such a
judgement be represented as a combination of ideas, it must be repre-
sented as combining' something' with 'exists'. This cannot be accepted
as existence is not a possible predicate. 19 Hence, while we may still
think that negative jUdgements are thus complex, at least some affirma-
tive judgements must be simple. The resultant corrected statement of
the traditional view appears then as follows: W&E, p. 21:
"The truth of a judgement consists in that it ascribes something concrete 20
to an object while this is given as one with this object; or it denies of an object
something concrete that is not given as one with this object. In the case of the
simplest judgement however, it consists in that it affirms that there is something
concrete,20 when there is, or that it is not, when it is not. In this consists the
correspondence of a true judgement and concrete things."

This is a slight modification compared with the previously quoted

modified version, and even here it is obviously still the Aristotelian
correspondence theory re-thought in the light of some special difficulties.
It might be objected that while this is not open to the objections
discussed above, it is obviously a job patched up ad hoc, and as such,
suspect. Brentano, however, sees some difficulties appertaining
18 Later, Brentano was inclined to argue that two such judgements are logically identical
and differ only grammatically.
19 Bren tano says: This is unacceptable because existence is the most general reference to
something, hence something exists is equivalent to something is something. However, Brentano
believed, later on, that 'something' is not wholly indeterminate. Compare here F. Brentano:
Von der mannigtachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, Freiburg, 1862, Psych. II,
Chap. 7 (3); Hillebrand: Die neuen Theorien der Kategorischen Schlusse. Wien, 1891; also
O.K. remarks in W&E. Here is the argument in the form in which it appears in W&E, p 20:
"But how does it look when I ... simply believe in the existence of an object in that I judge
that a given object exists? Some (people) really mean (to say) that here exists a connection
because we ascribe existence to objects. And when one asks them what they understand
under 'existence' they reply that 'existend' means the same as an object thought of in a
completely general and unspecific way. In this way it would come to saying that "An object
exists" means the same as "Some object is an object".
20 Etwas Reales.
24 EARLY POSITION

directly to this modified version of the theory, and it is to these diffi-

culties that we must turn our attention next.

8. Brentano claims that one can see that the modified theory
won't do when one contemplates cases of simple negation, for example,
"There is no dragon" or "This man is not black". There are no dragons
in the one case, and in the other lack of blackness is not a concrete
thing 21 to which anything can correspond. Brentano offers the
following examples which produce similar difficulties: JUdgements
sometimes concern collections, parts of objects, boundaries, past or
future objects, absences of objects, impossibilities or logical necessities,
etc. 22 He concludes: W&E, p. 22:
" . .. That this relation of correspondence between judgement and concrete
reality, which supposedly obtains for each true judgement is not to be found (in
these cases)."

In reply to this criticism, one might be tempted to say that what our
true, or mutatis mutandis false, jUdgements correspond with, is facts,
states of affairs, situations or what is the case. However plausible this
sounds, let us remember that we do not have here any concrete realities 23
to which our judgements could correspond. After all, a fact is no more
of a concrete reality than an impossibility is. Brentano's objection
stands, therefore, despite this counter-objection. On the other hand,
this reply is not necessary to defend the possibility of correspondence
explanation of truth because he is not, at this stage, abandoning it.
Later, when Brentano in fact abandoned the attempt to adjust this
theory in favour of a different type of explanation, he did it on the
ground that only real objects can be objects of judgement; and if this
is correct then judgements cannot refer to facts or states of affairs
either, unless these are concrete things. But at this stage he still accepts
the correspondence theory, even though he says: W&E, p. 22-3:
"We find that the affirmative judgement often does stand in relation to
objects; but also often - I shall soon make it clear on examples - it bears a
relation to things that can in no sense be regarded as objects."

This passage can be regarded as, in effect, introducing fictional entities

- those things that are not concrete and yet, at least in cases of affirm a-

21 A quality would be a concrete thing in this usage.

22 These examples as treated at this stage led Brentano to contemplate the introduction
of unreal objects of judgement (entia ,ationis). His opinion on this point changed radically
at al ater stage as evidenced by W&E, p. 87 ff. (See O.K. remarks in W&E).
23 Compare this with Strawson's reply to Austin, part 2, ASP Symposium.
 EARLY POSITION 25
tive judgement, correspond with the judgement in question. This is the
most obvious move to make at this stage. Judgements correspond to
special entities, viz., judgement contents, existences, inexistences,
facts, etc. But perhaps it is not the only interpretation possible.
Perhaps when we say "There are no unicorns", we say something
corresponding to the fact that there are no unicorns, and it is perhaps
true that facts are not entities. Perhaps to talk about facts is to talk
about concrete realities in a special sort of way. If so, no fictional
entities are posited. What Brentano says here is actually neutral
between the two interpretations. We know on other grounds that the
first one is what he takes up, but both of them are taken up in due
course. Still at the present stage it is the obvious move to posit entia
rationis. Yet Brentano, with characteristic restraint and a significant
unwillingness to adopt a solution contrary to common sense, avoids
indicating it explicitly. He leaves the door open for a different view, a
view nearer to common sense. So at this stage, his final re-formulation
of the correspondence theory is significant in that it does not mention
entia rationis by name, nor does it refer to them directly. He says
simply that some jUdgements are related to concrete reality, but
indirectly (W&E, p. 26). He has indicated an explanation by reference
to fictional entities, but his formulation leaves open the possibility
of alternative explanations; the reference to entia rationis would not
seem to be an essential part of the analysis of truth. It might even be
said that notice is thereby given that the entia rationis solution is
adopted in lieu of a better explanation of the relation between some
complex linguistic forms and reality. The latest, intepretation however,
comes pretty close to reading the later Brentano into the earlier, yet
perhaps it isn't wholly inappropriate.

9. The final re-formulation reached in tJber den Begritt der Wahrheit

is as follows: He observes that all the difficulties arise through an
over-literal interpretation of the word 'corresponds'. He maintains
that, in fact, W&E, p. 25:
"To correspond does not signify 'the same' or 'similar'. It signifies something
fitting, something harmonising or correct, something which is adequate and
so on." 24
This interpretation opens the possibility of several re-formulations,25
for instance, to say that judgements, if true, correspond with facts, if
24 This quotation is translated rather freely. It is difficult to render all the adjectives
precisely, but the sense remains. cf. here the Gorgias difficulty.
25 Compare Austin, ASP Symposium.
26 EARLY POSITION

false, fail to correspond with facts. In fact, Brentano's own expla-

nation is less simple and significantly closely related to his particular
findings. He says that some judgements are true because they correspond
with something concrete. They are those where the idea with which they
are concerned has a concrete content. This can be seen when we con-
template cases where, while the judgement remains the same but the
concrete changes, the judgement's truth-value changes also. For
example, the judgement "It is raining now" is rendered false when it
ceases to rain. 26 Also, with other judgements there are two possi-
bilities: (i) Their truth is completely independent of concrete reality,
e.g., analytic, logically impossible, etc. and (ii) they are related to
concrete reality but indirectly, e.g., a judgement is true as the result of
reality being so and so, as in the case of affirmation of empty space.

10. This then represents Brentano's early position. 27 It has several

interesting features. Firstly, Brentano has avoided over-simplification.
This is an important feature of his whole philosophy; if there are no
reasons to believe that a given problem admits of a simple solution,
then there is no reason to impose, or to seek to impose, simplicity on
it. What one should do is to look for significant regularities and hope
for better understanding. If simplicity results, well and good, if it
does not, it does not. An account of a problem should be as simple as
possible - method and manageability demand it; what is more, when
there is no reason to suspect complications then there is no good reason
to suspect them. But such discussions must provide for every feature
of the problem. If this necessitates complexity then the account
should be complex. This attitude is deliberately cautious. Brentano
had no faith in grandiose flights of fancy - he called them a mad dance
with ideas. His own method is designed to make certain that no insight
is lost and that no feature of the problem, which might prove sig-
nificant, is obliterated. His judicious cautiousness carries him in
another direction also. He avoids revolutionary changes unless, as
usual, he has good, sufficient and compelling reasons for them. This
is also visible in his re-formulations of the Aristotelian theory. Sig-

26 The argument is quite obviously implausible because the judgement has a time-
reference such that as the time changes, the reference changes. It is hot now, said an hour ago,
is not the same assertion as when it is said now. One can be true, the other false; the one an
an hour ago, if it was true, will be properly described as true at any future time. See L.
Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, Sect. I38 ff.
27 This is said without the intention of implying that his views were at this, or any other
time, static, complete or rounded up as a system.
 EARLY POSITION

nificantly, he did not take the step which I have suggested as possible,
and while one element of the new solution represents his new insight,
the other element preserves the insight that was contained in the origi-
nal formulation. It is not to be disposed of unless its plausibility can
be explained in a satisfactory fashion, unless another account will do
the same job better in every respect.

II. Further, it is to be stressed that Brentano was significantly

cautious even when introducing entia rationis. I think that when he
introduced these, he entered a period that was creative but fluid and
transitory. This view may appear strange to those who think of him as
the instigator of the views of Meinong, Marty and HusserI, as a man
whose main overt influence consists in the introduction of fictional
entities. Historically, this may well be true. It was at this very period
that he was most active in both the fields of teaching and publication,
but let us look at it in abstraction from these contingencies. The
introduction of entia rationis was a desperate expedient and an
expedient that could not really appeal to a man as realistic and
intellectually cautious as Brentano. 28 This solution has many features
of the despised mad dance with ideas. It leads to fantastic compli-
cations, is non-intuitive and denies common sense. All these features
are naturally repugnant to Brentano. I think that he was led to this
step by the dual pressure of the transparent plausibility of the corre-
spondence theory, and his own conviction, based on solid grounds,
that it cannot stand in the traditional form. His real attitude to this
type of solution was expressed later in these words: W&E, p. 96:
"(On the basis of the assumption of entia rationis) it is equally easy to reach the
absurdity of an infinite multitude (of entities) in another way. (Simple reflection
shows that), like God himself, there exists everlastingly an infinite multitude of
entia rationis. Let us only mention: 29 an infinity of impossibilities, of beings
of impossibilities, of beings of 'beings of impossibilities', as well as: an infinity of
'non-beings of other impossibilities', 'non-beings of realia', etc., etc. All arguments
that are valid against accepting this infinite multitude are also valid against a
theory which apparently creates only difficulties and uncontrollable embarass-
ments, without being of any service; alternative explanations are, after all,
available. (It is therefore clear) that both diverse observations and logical
analysis unite in rendering this (theory of entia rationis) completely untenable.
We ought to be very happy with this result. It is bewildering enough if we admit
onlyrealia as objects (of judgements). Platonic Forms did not help to reduce this

28 I do not wish to suggest that the adoption of this position by him was a desperate act
out of character; he was led to it by arguments, but it was desperate in the sense of being
repugnant to common sense.
29 The original reads 'insbesondere'.
28 EARLY POSITION

confusion. (This attempt) can be likened, according to Aristotle, to the case of

a man who, having decided that it was beyond his power to count relatively
small number (of e.g. objects), believed that he would be able to make the task
possible by adding (to the original amount) an incomparably greater quantity.
The (attempt at clarification by way of) adding, the 'existence of A', 'the non-
existence of B', 'the non-existence of the non-existence of A' and similar entia
rationis, is also closely similar."

I believe that although, on the one hand Brentano was led to this
explanation because at this time he did not see that "alternative
explanations are after all possible", on the other he was not, and never
could be, really comfortable with it. It is this stage that is most
notable for his constant return to old problems, constant attempts to
re-think and to re-assess all features of his position - the appearance is
created that he was much more interested in re-examining his views
than in developing them any further. Once entia rationis are abandoned,
the development of Brentano's philosophy is both smoother and more
obviously directed at further research. The vehement philosophical
soul-searching has subsided even if cautious re-examination still
characterises Brentano's methods. Characteristically, some time later
Brentano found it difficult to believe that he really meant to say such
things. It is unlikely that a man who has radically changed his basic
attitude to his work should forget this completely. Surely James Mill
could not have forgotten the effect Jeremy Bentham had on him.
Let us have a look at Brentano's own remarks to Anton Marty:
W&E, p. 89:
"I would be interested to know which section of my teaching was thus
criticised by Hofler ... Was it a paragraph in my Psychology ... or perhaps
something I said in lectures. I would genuinely like to find out what it was,
when and to whom it was written or said? It is a long time since I have read
either the Psychology or the lecture notes. What I said is right (about my
writings) as far as I can remember. However I would like to make sure that I
have not said something incorrect, because I do believe that a 'horse as an
object of thought' could never be an object of being aware of a horse. Only a
horse could be such an object. I believe that I have always said this (in which I
agree with Aristotle). On the other hand I have of course said that we may think
a horse. If we do so (Le. think a horse but not think a 'horse as an object of
thought') then we have a horse as an (immanent) object (of our thought}."

Thus the entia rationis position could not really last, but the early
Aristotelian position, in which Brentano was relatively happy, had to
be abandoned. By the very nature of it the period had to be transitory.

12. The solution offered at this stage had obvious merits. It accounts
for the intuitive fact that the truth of a statement like "2 2 = 4"+
 EARLY POSITION 29
is a very different matter from the truth of the statement "This cat is
on the mat", or of the statement "Dorothy Dix does not exist", but
it will not do. 3o Prima facie its main fault lies in that it is quite obvious-
ly a conglomeration of two different views. This, I think, is due to the
fact that while Brentano sees difficulties in the realist interpretation
of the correspondence theory, he is basically convinced that the realist
approach is correct. This becomes clear when, at a later date, he
abandons the correspondence attempt but retains his realism. It is to
be observed that the main criticism of the Aristotelian view, offered
above, consists in pointing out that it is not possible to explain satis-
factorily the concept of correspondence.
(a) The nature of the relation itself (e.g. the Gorgias difficulty).
This is dealt with by denying that correspondence is a definite and
precise relation and giving it a wide and rather vague meaning.
(b) That it is impossible to give a satisfactory account of the terms
of the relation, i.e., it is hard to explain satisfactorily what it is that
can correspond with the judgement. This is dealt with ad hoc, by
leaving, as far as possible, the simple correspondence as between
jUdgements and concrete things, and introducing special explanations
to account for other cases. More particularly, this later move amounts,
at this stage at any rate, to the introduction of entia rationis as the
expository factor.31

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE

OF ENTIA RATIONIS

I. Even though I have argued that Brentano was never really

comfortable with entia rationis, their introduction remained the most
important feature of his early position. His solution of the problem
of truth for instance, depended, in fact, on the fictional entities being
used to explain the nature of the indirect relation between some
jUdgements and reality. If I am right about his natural reluctance
towards embracing this sort of view, it might be even more important
to investigate his reasons for doing so than if I was wrong. They
must have been compelling and would have represented the only way
out from some serious difficulties encountered by Brentano at this

30 A firm distinction between the problem of definition and the problem of criteria of
truth will clarify the matter considerably. It is later drawn very clearly by Brentano.
31 Later Brentano found both these expedients quite unsatisfactory.
30 EARLY POSITION

stage of his investigations. When he abandoned entia rationis or, as

he then called them, entia irrealia, he must have resolved these diffi-
culties in another more congenial way - he must have come a long
way towards a really satisfying solution of his main problems. In view
of this, we should now consider his introduction and defence of fictional
entities.

2. We find a good general argument for the existence of mere objects

of thought, objects which are not substantial in the way in which
concrete objects are, in a fragment tentatively dated I902: W&E, p.
3I : 1
"Let us consider the following example: With respect to ourselves we form an
idea of someone who thinks, and whose thought is directed 2 towards an object.
It is the object A, the concept of which, like the concept of the thinker, might
be of something substantial. Of this substantial A 3 we say completely truthfully
that it is thought of by me (in so far as I am) the thinker. It is as true that it is
an 'A as an object if thought' 4 as it is that it is a real A. And it can cease to
exist as the real A while it continues as the object of thought, provided that the
thinker (goes on) thinking it. The other way round it will cease (to exist) as the
object of thought when the thinker ceases to think it, while it still continues
(to exist) as the real A."

This is a good prima facie argument; it appears to establish an almost

complete independence between 'A as an object of thought' and the
real 'A'. What is more, it appears to point directly to entia rationis
in the form of objects of thought. It will be quite clear that we are
capable of thinking, without difficulty, not only of things that do not
exist, but even of things that could not. Brentano's example of the
latter is a wooden laundry iron - he thinks of an implement into which
we insert burning coals before use. We can speak and think of Mr.
Pickwick, a centaur, a flying horse or a wharf laborer that does not
know how to swear. It sounds also very plausjble when we say that if
I think of something it must be an object of my thought. In fact,
to deny that it is would be decidedly odd. What would you say the
flying horse I am thinking of now was, if not the object of my thought?
But if the flying horse is the object of my thought and it does not
exist, then the object of my thought is not a concrete object. But it is
manifestly impossible to say that the object of my thought, as such,

1 O. Kraus believes on good grounds that this fragment is earlier than 1902 - the hand-
writing shows no evidence of blindness.
2 Gerichtet auf.
S Really existing.
4 Gedachtes A.
 EARLY POSITION 3I
does not exist; after all, I am thinking of something, so it must be more
than nothing, but less than something concretely there: in fact, a fiction-
al entity. We could escape the conclusion that it is an ens rationis only if
we could offer an alternative account which would not distort the facts
and would account for all of them. Later on, Brentano offers such an
explanation in a very sophisticated form. But at this stage he is not
capable of it and he is not prepared to deny what would seem obviously
true, namely, that I can think of a non-existing horse and that this
horse is then the object of my thought. We might observe that while
his later account offers an alternative explanation, it does not deny
the truth of this common sense assertion. The argument would suggest
that the ens rationis exists whenever I, or anybody else, thinks of
something, and independently of whether what we think of exists as a
concrete object or not. Why should we believe that 'A as an object
of thought' will come into being as a fictional entity only at the precise
moment of the cessation of the existence of the concrete object 'A'.
What is more, it will be difficult to offer any proof that such entities
spring into being and vanish as we happen to think of things. In fact,
an argument with the opposite purport can be presented. If this was
the case, then when I say or think "There is no square circle" my
judgement is true, but when I cease to think it, the 'non-being of the
square circle' would cease to exist. So it would seem that it is the
existence of the judgement that produces the situation that makes it
true, an obviously unpalatable consequence. It might be true that
unless we were capable of thinking of centaurs, chimeras, and other
non-existent objects, we would never become aware of the existence
of mere objects of thought, but this is a different matter altogether.
Thus the view, if pressed, leads directly to the consequences embraced
by Marty and other Brentano pupils.

3. One might expect that this would be reflected in the analysis of

truth, i.e., that instead of saying that some judgements are true be-
cause they correspond with concrete reality and some because they
correspond with entia rationis, which is the view discussed in Chapter
II, section I, one should simply say that judgements are true, if they
are true, because they correspond with the appropriate fictional entities.
But this, as Brentano was well aware, would not do. He said that those
judgements that appertain only to entia rationis are either true or
false because they stand in an indirect relation to concrete reality.
This certainly must be the case; a mere reference to objects of thought
32 EARLY POSITION

would not differentiate properly between true positive and true nega-
tive judgements where these jUdgements appertain to reality. In fact
it might be difficult to see how any relation between thought and
reality could be established on such a basis. It is not a mere matter of
choice or a psychological accident that the 'centaur as the object of
my thought' is a centaur that does not exist in reality. If it was a
centaur that exists in reality, and if I accepted the judgement in its
present form, my judgement would be false. Brentano was clearly
right when he insisted that truth, if it is to be found in correspondence,
must consist in the relation, direct or indirect, between the judgement
and the concrete reality. Thus fictional entities are relegated to their
proper position; they are not essentially needed to analyse the concept
of truth, but they seem valuable as an explanation of how we can
think both of things that exist and of others that do not exist. 5

4. Brentano produced this cautious account of the concept of truth

even though at this stage he believed that 'A as an object of thought'
accompanies exists whenever there exists someone who thinks of A.
He believed also that 'A as an object of thought' really exists. The
following quotation will make this clear: W&E, p. 31:
"If it is said: Just in this that we contrast it with the real A, we indicate that
the 'A as the object of thought' is not real, then we should reply: By no means ...
it is a really thought A and in this way, since it says the same thing, a real 'A
as an object of thought'."

Brentano remarks that - 'A as an object of thought' as an object of

thought - can be further contrasted with 'A as an object of thought'.
This leads inevitably to the infinite multiplicity that he found so
repugnant later on. The reality of the ens rationis is suspect. Does it
really follow from the fact that A is really an object of thought. Why
couldn't the concrete A be the object of my thought? I certainly am
under the impression that I think of the concrete, substantial object
when I think of the typewriter on which I am typing. Our very language
brings this out. I can say, "I am thinking now of the strawberries
that I am going to eat when I get home". When I say that, clearly I
do not mean to indicate that I intend to eat an ens rationis, namely,
'strawberries as the object of my thought'. I think that this is the sort
of consideration that Brentano treated seriously. The reason he had
for holding that whenever I think of A, 'A as an object of thought' must
exist, was that the explanation which appertained to the object of
5 cf. Brentano's arguments against HusserI, Meinong and Marty.
 EARLY POSITION 33
thought in the absence of the concrete object, would apply equally
well in a situation where the concrete object was present. But let us
observe that this argument, carried to its logical conclusion, would
have us believe in the existence of as many 'A as the object of thought,
as there are of those who think of A, which is an absurd consequence.
So the view is fraught with difficulties. However at the moment
Brentano accepts it and maintains that of the two objects, viz., the
concrete thing and the ens rationis, neither can be denied reality in
some sense. He distinguishes them as follows: W&E, p. 31:
" ... But only the first is the concept of something substantial that (both)
acts and is acted upon. The other is (the concept) of something that comes into
being only when certain action takes place, (has the character of an) accompany-
ing existence, and endures till (this action) ceases."

By 'this action' we mean here the act of thinking this object. On this
ground, it is obviously impossible to differentiate between situations
in which the concrete object does, and those in which it does not, exist.
This is so because the actuality of the 'accompanying existence' is
tied to the act of thinking the object rather than being tied to the
object itself.

5. The search for an explanation that would differentiate between

these two types of cases will, I believe, lead naturally towards Bren-
tano's later view. The germ of the idea is contained in his latest modi-
fied version of the correspondence theory of truth. He distinguished
there very clearly between the case in which the concrete reality
exists and the other cases. The distinction might be taken as indicating
the direction of further development. The cases of judgement like:
"There is no empty space" are regarded as judgements standing in
indirect relation to concrete reality. Obviously from this point of view,
the ens rationis, the 'A as the object of thought', is a device by which
this indirect relation can be achieved. As I remarked above, other
devices are logically possible. It would seem that we could tie the
actuality of the accompanying existence, i.e., the 'A as an object of
thought' in this case, to this requirement. Rather than saying that the
ens rationis emerges when someone starts thinking about A and endures
for as long as he continues to do so, we could say that the ens rationis
emerges alongside the indirect relation between a judgement and
reality and then endures for as long as the relation retains its indirect
character. We could then still say what seems intuitively correct and in
accordance with common sense, namely, that when I think of an actual
34 EARLY POSITION

horse, then this concrete, substantial, material object is at the same

time the object of my thought. 6 This, however, presents the following
difficulty: If the object of thought exists as a real object of thought,
then it is difficult to see why its existence should be tied to the fairly
formal feature, i.e., to the exact nature of the relation between the
mental act and concrete reality. Calling it an accompanying existence
solves nothing; it amounts to giving the problem a name to serve as
its solution. I am not conscious of the change of object when the rain I
am thinking of now, ceases to fall. Perhaps it is unlikely that I should
be conscious of it. But then what are the positive reasons, other than
mere theoretical convenience, for saying that such change takes place
at all. The mere theoretical convenience, however, smacks unpleasantly
of the mad dance with ideas. Perhaps we will fare better if we start
from the other end by asking what is necessary in order to explain
the indirect relation between the judgement, e.g., "There are no uni-
corns" and the concrete world in which there are no unicorns. To start
with, nothing is needed to constitute or make the relation. A relation
between an object, or objects, and a mental act does not require a link
which is similar in character to one of the termini, nor yet is in itself
such a link. To say that a relation exists between A and B is an oblique
way of referring in a specific manner to both A and B. And thought of
in this way, the ens rationis need not be real in any but the verbal
sense. Thus, we could say that the explanation of this indirect relation
would be quite sufficient if it explained how we came to describe or
indicate intelligibly and successfully the character of the relation
involved. It is not imperative then, to have entia rationis that are
real, and in a sense, outside the mind. The concept of 'A as an object of
thought' can proceed then much more freely, and the account of the
concept of truth could be accomplished possibly by way of reference to
the ways in which we apply our concepts.

6. These ideas flow naturally from Brentano's early position. But

if so, then his later position is not entirely unexpected. Let us now
look at the following quotations from the later period: W&E, p. 87 ff:
" ... my intention was to refer to objects of perception which are there even
when there is nothing corresponding outside the mind. But I did not mean to
equate 'immanent object' with 'perceived object'.
and:
6 A view accepted by Brentano later, but in conjunction with a different account of the
indirect relation.
 EARLY POSITION 35
..... One cannot say that the universal, as universal, is in the mind, and mean
by this that the object in the mind is the 'object of my thought'." 7

and:
..... referring to what you would simply call an object, but which I took the
liberty of calling an immanent object (thanks to the 'in' which is often used in
this context 8). By that I mean to stress not that it is but thatit is an object, even
when there is nothing corresponding outside (the mind). To say 'It is an object'
in this sense is to relate it to the person who, in having the experience, has it as
an object - in other words, to a person who experiences it as an object."

There is nothing really surprising in the later development of Bren-

tano's ideas.

7 The point can be illustrated by saying that neither can I perceive a horse as a horse
perceived by me', nor yet have a concept of a horse as 'a concept of a horse, had by me'.
8 The words in brackets are Brentano's own.
 CHAPTER III

THE TRANSITION

ANALYSIS OF LINGUISTIC FUNCTION

1. Let us now turn our attention to Brentano's conception of some

general philosophical difficulties. I feel that on this background we
will be in a better position to understand his later analysis of truth.!
The main point made in Sprechen und Denken is that the grammatical
and syntactical structure of language is misleading if taken uncritically
as a guide to the logical character and function of our statements. One
has to find out what is the actual use of a given phrase before one is in
a position to decide what we really mean to say when we express our-
selves in this or that way. The presentation of the paper is sometimes
misleading and might, though it need not, lead to misunderstandings. In
places, Brentano seems to misconstrue the apparent philosophical errors
implied by linguistic usages, by regarding them as errors committed
either by people who use the language unthinkingly, or by the people
who evolved the language in the first place. He tends to treat the
language as if it represented a philosophical view, and he appears to
be saying that one who does not share such philosophical errors can
still use the language provided he means something different, i.e., if he
is at least aware of the proper reduction of what he says:
"Therefore he will ... use the common modes of speech, but ... (he) conjoins
them with a completely different sense."

What Brentano really means to say is that such sophisticated users

of language are not misled by its ostensive properties. This is accept-
able, but he might be understood as saying also that when we utter
the common sentences we think the right senses alongside with them.
This certainly seems to be suggested by at least some of his attempts
1 My reference in this chapter is an unpublished manuscript under the title: Sprechen und
Denken, dating from I905. Parts of it were published in LRU. It bears the code number
EL. 66 and appears as appendix A at the end of this book. All quotations in this chapter are
from this MS.
 TRANSITION 37
at more detailed analysis. This analysis often sounds like pure reinter-
pretative reductionism. As shown by Ludwig Wittgenstein,2 this view
is wrong, - basically wrong, for the reason that if the existence of the
stream of consciousness accompanying and re-interpreting the actual
speech is accepted in all seriousness, then it takes over this part of the
function of speech, with all its appertaining difficulties. I would not
like to read Wittgenstein into Brentano, and I am willing to admit
that there might be an element of simple reductionism in his philoso-
phy. But if there is, then it is not very strong and certainly it is not
dominant. Two points have to be made here. Firstly, it is probable
that Brentano was not very explicitly aware of the whole seriousness
and of all the implications of the problems that faced him at this
juncture. He steers his way among the shoals, as it were, by feel.
Secondly, it is a mistake to interpret what he actually said with
formalistic rigidity. His purpose was mainly negative, to show that
it is a grave mistake to take the linguistic form of an utterance literally.
His positive remarks are intended to bring this out. The very nature of
one of the closing paragraphs bears witness to this:
"If one takes a word to be a name, when in fact it is not a name, if one searches
for the concept designated by this alleged name, when in fact none is associated
with it, then naturally one's definitions can never agree, and one's teaching
about the origin 3 of concepts must be hopelessly mixed up."

That he wasn't aware of at least some of the difficulties of reductionism

is shown by his insistence that verbal forms can never duplicate the
multiple complexity of thought forms. Most of the unclarity in this
paper is due, I think, to the psychological fallacy. Brentano regarded
our thinking in all its aspects as a psychological phenomenon. To
believe something would be a mental act, to take something in a
certain way would also be a mental act, etc., etc. Naturally he would
say - If A and B took the same expression differently, the expression
would be accompanied by a different mental act in each case. The one
who understands the function of a language differently thinks of it
differently. The appearance of the thoughts accompanying expressions,
is due to the simple fact that expressions are not mental acts, and under-
standing them is a mental act in each case. This is confused and
pretty clearly wrong, but it is also wrong to say that Brentano main-
tained that in order to understand speech correctly one had first to

2 Philosophical Investigations, (Blackwell), 1951.

3 And surely also about the character and function of concepts or words (cf. here the
psychological fallacy).
 TRANSITION

re-interpret it for private use. What might appear to the reader as a

description of re-interpretation, a middle step between the speaking
and understanding of what is said as it were, in fact is intended as a
direct description of the very process of grasping or understanding
the utterances. The Wittgenstein type argument mentioned above
does not apply to this, simply because the fallacy against which it is
directed is not committed. Any mistake committed here by Brentano
lies in an erroneous analysis of the concept of understanding of an utter-
ance, and this is the old psychological fallacy, discussed in Chapter II,
section 2.

2. Brentano maintains that grammatical form is a poor guide to the

sense and use of utterances. One argument is based on the alleged
difference between the possible complexity of physical (speech)
elements, and psychical (thought) elements. The complexity of thought
cannot be expressed by the far less complex verbal forms. What
is more, excessive linguistic complexity is not desirable. This point is
important because it is intended to show the need for the lack of corre-
spondence between language and thought. Several points appertain to
this problem. Letters or sounds do not have meaning in their own
right; they could not have such meaning at the same time as they
provide for the expression of all our thoughts; there simply are not and
cannot be enough of them to accomplish this. It can also be argued
independently that words can have meaning only in context. This is
quite clear in some cases, as for instance, prepositions and conjunc-
tions, but it can also be maintained that no word has meaning except
in some context. This whole point is significant and interesting; it is
clear that Brentano meant to refer to some linguistic context. The
key passage is:
" ... one could not say that he who utters the word 'horse' conveys thereby
that he has the idea of a horse. If he did not have it no-one would say that he
lied. "
This shows, as we might say, that a mere utterance is not an assertion;
we assert only if we utter in the context of linguistic practice. We
carry out conversations usually by "uttering whole sentences". In
saying this Brentano is unusually perceptive; true, he did not quite
see the enormous importance of this point. It was taken as being of
crucial importance to philosophy only very much later, by Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Brentano himself does not carry it very far. On the other
hand it wouldn't be quite right to say that he failed to see its impli-
 TRANSITION 39
cations for analysis of language and philosophy. He goes on to dis-
tinguish between cathegorematic and syncathegorematic expressions,
but he does it cautiously; he says:
" ... all the same we could select these words that, supplemented by (either)
the affirmative (or) the negative sign, lead to judgements. And such that the
concepts that form their basis are associated with them by linguistic use ...
(and) ... mark them as words that have meaning in their own right."4

This is sensible - even if all words have meaning only in the context
of linguistic practice, one could still distinguish between primary
and secondary speech elements. Brentano does not really say this, but
he could be very nearly interpreted as intending to imply it. His argu-
ment about the words being evidence of ideas 5 shows that he is clearly
aware of the essential similarity between all words. What is more,
the above quotation makes it quite clear that overmuch metaphysical
construction should not be placed on the fact that there are words
that are marked as having meaning in their own right. Establishing
this, Brentano has established beyond any doubt that our modes of
speech do not reflect, in fact, the modes of our thought, and produced
a good argument in support of the view that they could not. 6 He
remarks that over-complexity of verbal expressions is not desirable
because it would make the language cumbersome and, if carried far
enough, useless. This amounts to arguing, I think correctly, that the
usefulness of language is at least partly due to its economy of means.
But this economy can be achieved only at the cost of either distortion
or vagueness, or both. One linguistic device can be used in many ways,
but then it hasn't got a clear-cut, unambiguous meaning in its own
right. It can be understood properly only in the context of linguistic
practice. Brentano implies that this is not language's fault, but one of
its necessary characteristics.

3. Brentano argues further that language can be philosophically

misleading. It is so if we take grammatical and syntactical forms as
indicative of the function and meaning of words. He says that we:
" ... are inclined to over-realistic conceptions. They 7 think that if one is
healthy then he contains health. When he is big, largeness is in him. If he judges
then judging or judgement is in him. Therefore he unthinkingly expresses the

4 Italics mine.
5 See Appendix "A".
6 We could say that the forms of thought - the types of linguistic usage, are more varied
than the grammatical forms could ever be.
? The people who use language.
 TRANSITION

idea that he is healthy by saying that he has good health .... And since being big
is not largeness; having a known position is not space; and judging is not the
judgement, therefore, strictly speaking, a number of things are improperly added
to those which exist in fact."

There is much that is good and important, and some features that are
misleading in his discussion on this point. To take the last point first.
As remarked above, he seems to imply 8 that language embodies
philosophical thought, and that people who use it accept such views.
The implication is that anybody who understands an utterance
understands it philosophically, e.g. that if someone says "There isn't
enough space here" then inter alia he means to affirm a naively real-
istic theory of space. But there is no reason to think that this is the
case. If someone, philosophically untutored, uttered this sentence,
and if I objected to it on the ground that naive realism is wrong, he
would not know why I was protesting. I am aware that I am following
here in Brentano's own footsteps when he says:
"It is precisely the denial, on such grounds, that the sun has risen,9 that
leads to error."

But perhaps he meant that it is erroneous and impracticable to try

to reconstruct our speech to accord with our theories. What I wish to
do is to say explicitly that our language is completely neutral with
respect to such theories. The point of the common usage lies in such
things as describing the character of the living-room, or the time of
day. This must be so, since people adhering to different philoso-
phical theories understand each other perfectly when talking about
spacious rooms and sunrises. I disagree, therefore, with Brentano
when and insofar as he suggests that when one has achieved philo-
sophical sophistication one then regards the common speech differ-
ently, understands it differently and means it differently. Common
language is not a philosophical theory and does not imply one in any
way whatsoever. Since Brentano said what was quoted above, these
strictures might be a bit unkind; there is ground to believe that he was
aware of these features of language. But then he was not very clear
about it and did not work out all its philosophical implications; he was
not blind but he was confused; at the very least, he expressed himself
confusedly. This, however, is just a side-issue insofar as Brentano's
line of reasoning is concerned. He is concerned: (i) To show that the
8 At another point he denies it himself, but this mode of speech is, to say the least, grossly
misleading - see Appendix "A".
9 It is an example of a Ptolemaic view embodied in language, and 'That there is enough
space' can be substituted for our purpose.
 TRANSITION 41
structure of language does not reflect the structure of thought; in
this he is quite successful. 10 (ii) To show how it can lead to philosophical
misconceptions. Here too he is right, and I think, successful. Even if
the language is not a philosophical system and people do not use it
as such when they are engaged in unphilosophical conversation, it
will still be true that when they start philosophising they turn to it
for inspiration and then, regarding the language naively and literally
as a guide for philosophy, they draw from it unacceptable conclusions.
It is the naive philosopher, not the common user of language, to whom
Brentano's strictures properly apply. And there his objections are well
taken. He has shown that language leads to philosophical misconcept-
ions, particularly so because we tend to take the grammatical and
syntactical character of our expressions, words and utterances as
indicative of the purport and the meaning of what we are saying. From
this we are likely to draw the wrong metaphysical conclusions.

4. The paper discussed here is important because it marks the fact

that Brentano has definitely freed himself from the undue influence
of grammatical form. Not only this - he is also quite explicit about the
pitfalls of what we could call the linguistic fallacy. The point is in-
dependently significant, but it also constitutes an important and
critical step in the development of his philosophical thought. Let us
recall his argument for the reality of entia rationis - they were thought
to be real because we can really say that the A that we are thinking
about is the object of our thought. If we take Brentano's argument
about the disparity between the linguistic form and the purport of
our utterances seriously the argument loses much of its sting. But
this argument is the backbone of his case. If this case is weak on the
point of the reality of accompanying existences, it is probable that
the words 'object of my thought' are only grammatically a descriptive
name, but in fact consititute an oblique reference to the fact that I am
thinking about something. It is also probable that the link is purely
linguistic - the form of the utterance is not a picture of reality. This
too is almost exactly what Brentano said about the force of 'is' when
applied to 'space', 'beauty' or 'judgement.' 11 In view of this, one
would be tempted immediately to play up the a-way-of-making-an-
indirect-reference aspect of the case. This brings the solution nearer to

10 Insofar as it goes, and with certain reservations. See L. Wittgenstein: Philosophical In-
vestigations and The Brown and The Blue Book.
11 See Appendix "AU.
42 TRANSITION

the alternative suggestion implied as possible in Brentano's modified

version of the correspondence theory of truth,12 It also removes the
inclination to regard it as imperative that the explanation of 'object
of thought', in the cases where there is and the cases where there is not
a concrete object, should be the same in principle. After all, if the same
verbal form can have, and often does have, many different functions,
why couldn't it have them here? Thus, for Brentano. the way is open
to a further, more sophisticated development of his views.

ARG UMENTS AGAINST THE EXISTENCE

OF ENTIA RATIONIS

1. It is now time to consider Brentano's later discussion of fictional

entities. The best compact account is contained in three letters to Anton
Marty, reprinted in Wahrheit und Evidenz, pages 87-97. This will be the
text reference from which I shall take all quotations in this section,
unless otherwise specified. It will be remembered that earlier, Brentano
himself held that an ens rationis, e.g., 'A as an object of thought' is an
A really thought of, and as such it is a real object (of thought). But he
admittedly contrasted such entities with concrete objects - they were
merely accompanying existences. The advances he has made in the
analysis of linguistic function remove the temptation or need to adopt
such a position, and in fact Brentano parted with it, which is not
surprising in view of his attitude to philosophy. He now argues
explicitly against entia rationis, and in one of the letters to A. Marty,
states the position with which he disagrees in the following way:
The false view, according to Brentano, consists not only in holding
that there are jUdgement-contents that are found as actual contents
of judgements, which is the view that he himself accepted at the earlier
stage, but adherents of the full-blown theory of entia rationis also
affirm that, independently of minds, perceivers and people who are at
the moment passing judgements, there still exist entia rationis. These
are such that in fact each of them could form the content of a judge-
ment. If I pass a jUdgement, this judgement must find itself in a
specific relation to an independently existing jUdgement-content type
of entity. This is supposedly necessary in order to explain how we can
judge correctly. We judge correctly, according to this view, when our
judgement, e.g., "there is a tree" corresponds with 'there is a tree'
(or 'being of a tree') - an ens rationis, a possible content of exactly
12 See Chapter I.
 TRANSITION 43
such a judgement. This is supposed to hold especially of true judge-
ment. He goes on to say:
"In a similar way there (are shown to) exist: the 'non-being of a golden
mountain', the 'impossibility of a round square', and even the term 'exists' taken
in a special way."

It is particularly firmly asserted by the adherents of the theory that

entia rationis are important because only on this assumption is it
possible to explain the difference between the correct and the incorrect
judgement. This is so because the correctness of a judgement can be
described or defined as correspondence between the judgement and
what is the case. But the concrete object is not what is the case'!
Nor could the object perform the function because it could never
account for the complexity and diversity of judgements. We must
therefore say that:
" ... an affirmative (judgement) corresponds to the real being, and a negative
(judgement) corresponds to the real inexistence, of the object."

Brentano disagrees with the whole position and protests:

" ... According to me, on the contrary, all that is indicated in those cases is
a linguistic usage. This usage inclines us to posit fictitious new entities, and crea-
tes a misunderstanding about our psychical functions 2 because it leads us to
regard instances of denial as instances of affirmative judgement."

(e.g., A judgement affirming the non-existence of a square circle.)

This quotation shows inter alia, how important his arguments in
Sprechen und Denken were at this formative phase in Brentano's
philosophic development.

2. Now the above position is not quite the same as Brentano's own
early view. It was developed and supplemented by his pupils who made
much of it and used it much more extensively than the master himself.
Neither Husserl nor Meinong nor Marty shared Brentano's natural
reluctance for this kind of solution. What is more, they did not share his
deep distrust and dislike of adventurous philosophical theorising. In
the theory of entia rationis they saw a very useful tool for just this
purpose. The resultant view is a product of Brentano's own initial
position worked out, systematised and adapted to apply to a far wider
range than he himself ever envisaged. Nevertheless, his present dis-
cussion of the problem is both important and relevant. The arguments

1 Compare here Strawson's discussion of fact, also Herbst and Mackie in AJP.
2 Note the psychological fallacy.
44 TRANSITION

used dispose of his own old position as easily as they do of the later
views of his pupils and followers. What is more, they show a great deal
of insight that is of importance to our study.

3. Writing to a philosopher who was markedly reluctant to give up

the criticised position, Brentano used an imposing array of arguments.
The main line of attack is this: Entia rationis are not necessary. In
every case in which they are claimed to be the only necessary and
sufficient explanation, alternative accounts are in fact available. If
not necessary then entia rationis are highly objectionable as they
posit needless entities, lead to complications and cloud up issues. It is
a corollary of this argument that such entia non-realia, as Brentano
now dubs them, are not even capable of the explanatory function for
which they are supposedly necessary and for which they were intro-
duced in the first place. I argued before that Brentano was not really
favourably disposed to this type of solution and that he was not con-
tent with this theory at any stage. I feel that it might be fair to say that
he was always inclined to think that fictional entities would be an
objectionable assumption unless one was really forced to adopt it -
unless they were really necessary. Earlier, however, he believed that
they were needed because they provided the only explanation, and
naturally enough he believed also that they would explain what they
were called upon to explain.

4. Even though Brentano's new position is quite different, it is

clearly a development of the old one, and it flows from the same
attitude of mind. One can even see how he could come to think that
his new position was less different from the old one than it was in
fact. He naturally was inclined, at the later stage, to interpret his old
remarks in the light of his new advancements. The point that is
significant here is that they lend themselves to such an interpretation.
Let us now see what is the crucial difference between the old view as
discussed in Chapter II, section 2, and the new one. Brentano says:
"The object of a perception is not a "perceived thing" but just a "thing".
For instance, a perception would have, as its object, a horse, not a "perceived
horse" ("immanent" here is merely used to indicate that which is to be called
an object.3)
However that object as such is not given. The perceiver (may 4) have some-
thing as an object (of his perception), without this something existing."
3 Brentano's own parentheses.
4 I have added the word 'may' in brackets - it is clear from Brentano's writings that he
could not intend to imply that this 'something' cannot exist, i.e., he believes that an existing
thing can be an object of perception.
 TRANSITION 45
He stresses further that when he calls something an 'immanent object'
then he intends to make the point that it has the character of an object,
not that it exists or that it is real in this sense. This is clearly opposed
to the conclusion of the argument before, when he insisted that what
is really thought of is a real object of thought. 5 The same facts as before
are singled out and accepted, but they are interpreted in a different
way. In his first letter to A. Marty, Brentano does not make clear what
the new way is, but remembering the paper on Sprechen und Denken,
it is not difficult to supply the missing link. When one uses a noun,
one does not necessarily refer to an entity. When one says, for instance,
"There are thoughts", one refers obliquely to the fact that some people
think. People are entities here, but the fact that they think does not
create new entities - thoughts. When I say "This was an image of a
cathedral", I refer obliquely to the fact that I imagined a cathedral,
but the fact that I have imagined it does not create a new entity,
namely, 'the image of a cathedral'. Similarly, when I say "A horse was
the object of my thought", I refer obliquely to the fact that I was
thinking of a horse, but the fact that I was thinking does not create a
new entity, viz., 'a horse as an object of thought'. Without the tech-
nique from Sprechen und Denken, we could be mislead into believing
that such entities are in fact created, or that they must exist if we
think about, e.g., horses. But the new linguistic analysis shows this
view to be unnecessary and erroneous. Once free, we can see easily that
the view is not only false but absurd. Many arguments can be brought
forward to show it directly, but first let us consider a supplementary
argument used by Brentano. It runs as follows:
"It is quite incorrect to say: "Universals are 'universals in the mind' and have
no independent status", or something which amounts to the same, if this is to
be taken as meaning, e.g., that whatever is described as immanent in this
fashion is a "horse as an object of thought", or a "universal as an object of
thought'.' (According to such a theory) a 'horse thought of in general', would be a
'horse thought of in general here and now by me'. This horse, as thought by me,
would have to be associated with me, as an individual thinking being, and, what
is more, it would have to be the object of my thought."

This is in fact an argument directed primarily not against Brentano's

earlier position (ChapterII), but against a position amended to acco-
modate the view that objects of thought are not real entities. It is a
half-way position in that it makes the object of thought dependent on
the concretely existing person who thinks and denies its existence
5 Having changed his mind, Brentano might have thought of it as re-interpretation or
elucidation of the old statement, hence his protest that he never accepted entia rationis.
 TRANSITION

outside the mind, but it does not quite reach the stage at which
entia rationis are regarded as mere entia liguae. This amended position
will not do since, Brentano argues:
" ... it is clear in this case that the "horse as an object of thought" could be
only an object of introspection. 6 In fact, however, it is clear that neither the
things perceived nor the things thought of, in general terms, are conceived of
as objects of introspection. (If we think of introspection as "second order
awareness" and of perceiving or thinking as "first order awareness"), then to
postulate that we can be aware only of a "horse as an object of thought" would
involve us in having to deny that first order awareness can have any object at
all. I protest therefore against the absurdity ascribed to me."

The only way in which we can conceive of it without absurdity is by

reference to the linguistic function of the expression 'A as an object of
thought'. In Sprechen und Denken, Brentano has given some examples
of how such expressions can be regarded as oblique references to con-
crete objects and concrete reality. Thus his present position concerning
the matter of entia rationis is clear. Let us observe that this analysis
can easily be used in conjunction with his finally amended version of
the correspondence theory of truth reached in the paper Uber den
Begrijj der Wahrheit. 7 Brentano made at least one such attempt,S but
having distinguished between the definition of truth and the problem
of evidence or criteria of truth, he moved on further.

5. According to Brentano, the argument that entia rationis exist

because the fact that I can think of A shows that 'A as an object of
thought' must be a possible object of my thinking, is insufficient. It
is clear that this is not what one indicates when one says "I think of A".
After all, one could just as well say "I think of 'A as an object of
thought''', and only this would indicate that one regarded' A as an
object of thought' as an entity, and thought of it. Therefore the original
sentence does not imply an existence of an ens rationis, viz., 'A as an
object of thought'. Armed with his new conception of linguistic
function, Brentano is now prepared to state firmly that:
" . .. it is not required for the 'being of A' to appear 9 in order to render
(the formerly incorrect) judgement 'A is' correct. I is enough if A appears.
Similarly, if the judgement 'A is' is to be rendered incorrect, it is not required
that the 'non-being of A' should appear - it is merely required that A should

6 The original sentence is very unclear. I took the liberty of rendering its sense rather than
its form. (Compare also O.K. !O3.)
7 See Chapter II, section r.
S See Chapter IV, section 3.
9 'Appear' and 'disappear' are used to mean coming into and going out of existence;
these terms can apply to objects, qualities and feeling, i.e., to reality.
 TRANSITION 47
disappear. If only the last happened, and nothing else whatsoever,lo would not
this fact alone give us all the grounds, (which might ever be needed for deciding)
that my judgement: ("There is no A") is correct? This fact,11 however, concerns
only realia. There is no doubt that this is the case. l2 After all we must agree, on
your own admission,l3 that the actual disappearance of A is equivalent to the
supposed emergence of the 'non-being of A'.
There is, therefore, not the slightest reason left to lead us to suppose that such
pseudo-objects (Undinge) exist."

Thus there is no argument for the position. But there are arguments
against it. If any object is a possible object of thought and if this is
taken both literally and seriously, viz., it is thought that it is a real
object, it follows, according to Brentano, that such an object can be
separately conceived of - presumably because unless it can be inde-
pendently referred to, no case has been made out to show that it is
a real object rather than an aspect or view of an object. Thus the smile
is not a real object, it is only an aspect of the Cheshire cat's face.
Hence it is protested:
"Whoever maintains that an impossibility, or something similar, can in fact
be imagined, commits an error.l4 A similar error is involved in saying either
that (an impossibility) exists, or that it is an object of correct judgement."

Over and above this, the acceptance of fictional entities leads directly
to unpalatable consequences. Firstly, it leads to indefinite and un-
checkable multiplications of useless entities. Secondly, if applied to the
problem of truth, it leads to an infinite regress. This, because if we have
to establish the correspondence between judgement a and 'A as an
object of thought' in order to establish the truth of the judgement a,
then presumably we have to establish also the judgement that a
corresponds with 'A as an object of thought'. This can only be done
by establishing this judgement as true, i.e., by establishing the corre-
spondence of this later judgement with its own object of thought. In
the light of such arguments the theory appears wholly implausible.

10 In this place Brentano used a bracket. I put the sentence in footnote for the sake of
clarity of style. It reads: (to add this, in order to guard oneself against the propensity to
take other dealings with supposed entia rationis).
11 i.e., the disappearance of A.
12 i.e., it is the case that the disappearance of A alone would give sufficient and complete
grounds for asserting "There is no A".
13 Brentano means to say that unless this equivalence is admitted, in the required sense,
one could not use entia rationis as an explanation of the difference between correct and
incorrect judgement. (O.K. II9 argues the point fully.)
14 It is not thereby claimed that the expression 'to imagine the impossibility of b' is
erroneous when used unphilosophically, but merely that it is philosophically misleading and
that it is erroneous to suppose that its form indicates its logical character. (cf. Carnap's
discussion of semantics; semantics would seem to be an attempt to remedy such failings of
language.)
 TRANSITION

6. Besides being implausible, entia rationis are also useless. They

perform no useful function at all and no one should be tempted to
accept them. In Brentano's own words - These are the facts that even
the protagonists of such a theory must acknowledge:
" ... for all statements about your entia rationis, one can find equivalent
statements about realia. For instance, the statement: "There is an impossibility
of a", is equivalent to the apodictically rejecting statement :15 "A is impossible".
In my discussion of the temporal mode of awareness,16 I did prove that the
temporal entia rationis 17 are not an exception to this rule.
It is not only the case that judgements (about entia rationis) are equivalent
to judgements about real objects, but it is also the case that the latter must
always accompany the former. Therefore judgements about entia rationis
would appear redundant, and their (supposed) existence, against the economy
of nature.
All these features, however, fit my analysis in the minutest detail. (They are
easily explicable) if one thinks of these (putative entities) 19 as entia linguae,
and regards them as fictions created through a misunderstanding of the nature of
linguistic usages. (In this case the misunderstanding consists in assuming that
each noun must refer to an entity) and thereby needlessly multiplying the
number of entities." 20

7. It is clear from the above that Brentano has now completely and
irrevocably abandoned entia rationis. To the careful observer it should
be clear also that this is part and parcel of a continuous development of
his ideas. The new approach to language, its function and use, is here
of crucial importance. It armed Brentano with a new technique,
freed him from cumbersome preconceived notions and allowed him
to view philosophical problems in a new light. There is a tendency to
regard the abandonment of entia rationis as the crucial turning point
in Brentano's philosophy. In this way one is inclined to divide his
development into two rough stages, pre and post the change of heart
about fictional entities. This division is satisfactory with respect to
the time element, but otherwise it has serious shortcomings. It is
clear, on the basis of the above remarks, that the arguments against
entia rationis in fact follow and are dependent on the re-assessment of
linguistic function. It is only on this basis that the arguments for entia
15 The original reads 'Urteil'. Usually I translate this word by 'judgement'; here it would
be misleading.
16 The original reads 'Vorstellens'.
17 e.g. 'future', 'past', 'the past', etc.
18 Objects' are not meant to indicate material objects as entities, e.g., qualities are ac-
ceptable.
19 i.e., whatever Marty would call ens l'ationis.
20 It is impossible to render the meaning of the german text in anything like the original
form. The words in brackets put in explicit form what is implied but not stated in the original.
Elsewhere this very point was stated explicitly by Brentano himself.
 TRANSITION 49
rationis can be shown not only to be false, but implausible. What is
more, Brentano refers explicitly to this. If we were to disregard the
new analysis of linguistic function completely then the re-assessment
of entia rationis would appear deus ex machina. It would also make the
change appear much more abrupt and conceal to some considerable
extent the continuity of the development of Brentano's views. It
might lead one to regard the later position as Brentano's new view,
whereas in fact it is the old position developed, amended and made
even more subtle in the light of new developments. Certainly, con-
siderable parts of the old theory were abandoned in their entirety,
but it is a significant fact that the impulse for doing so came from
within, not from without Brentano's philosophy. It is also significant
that the change was not abrupt - the result of a sudden discovery,
but gradual - the result of detailed and careful, scholarly study. All
this can be seen dearly when we regard Brentano's re-assessment and
analysis of linguistic function as the operative element of the change.
This, then, is the correct view.
 CHAPTER IV

THE TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

I. ME NT AL ACTS

1. The theory of mentality was an important part of Brentano's

overall philosophical position, and it is often enough regarded as its
mainspring. We could term it more precisely the theory of mental
acts. Brentano's psychology was, of course, of independent importance.
His distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology, his
theory of intentional relations, his criticism of faculty psychology
and of the attempts to base it entirely on physiology, were extremely
influential, so that Brentano was always regarded as one of the im-
portant figures in the development of psychology, even when philoso-
phers tended to overlook his work. Brentano himself regarded psy-
chology as the basic discipline in the field of humanities. But, as I have
argued in Chapter II, this was a mistaken view, amounting to taking
the term 'humanities' literally and drawing spurious conclusions from
this unwarranted assumption. The whole view rested on the confusion
between logical, methodological and psychological investigations.
In Brentano's writings there is ample evidence of it. Consequently it is
a mistake to take his word for it and regard psychology as central for
his whole philosophical position. It is also a mistake to regard develop-
ments in this field as operative changes for all other areas of discourse.
In fact, the core of his position was formed by logical analysis, par-
ticularly analysis of linguistic function. Further, it consisted of metho-
dological analysis - the two, often enough, closely bound together.
It is his insistence that both psychology and philosophy are sciences
and his views concerning proper philosophical methods as well as
proper methods in descriptive and genetic psychology that determine
the character of Brentano's position. In philosophy he regarded careful
investigation, with proper regard to particular points, as of para-
mount importance. Audacious theorising was definitely suspect, as it
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 51
amounted to a "mad dance with ideas"; the proper approach was to
be based on "careful psychological analysis", i.e., on careful logical
investigation. 1 His analysis of linguistic function, his discovery of
systematically misleading features of language, were the most im-
portant features of this investigation. Psychology was to be approached
empirically but with due regard being paid to the important regu-
larities - Brentano was well aware of the dangers of thoughtless
amassing of unrelated empirical data. Here the logico-philosophical
analysis again came into its own; it determined the character and
direction of psychological investigations. Thus Brentano was a phi-
losopher first and foremost. His philosophy enabled him to make
important advances in the field of psychology but, characteristically,
they were philosophers' advances. The character of the science, its
method and its basic concepts were investigated, analysed and con-
ceived anew in an illuminating and fruitful way. I am inclined to
regard psychology as one of the most important fields in which Bren-
tano applied his logico-philosophical discoveries. Generally, however,
the unity of this and other fields of Brentano's research activity is
taken at his own valuation and consequently overstressed on the one
hand and on the other hand, regarded in the wrong way. In saying
this, I do not wish to deny that there is some connection between these
investigations, or that it is illuminating or important to consider all
the aspects of Brentano's position. Consequently I shall devote this
section to the discussion of his theory of psychical phenomena.

2. On pages 124-5 in volume I of his Psychologie, Brentano says

this about the characteristic features of mental phenomena:
"Each psychical phenomenon is characterised by what the scholars of the
middle ages called the intentional 2 (or even mental) inexistence of the object.
We ... call it the relation to a content. The direction towards an object (here we
do not understand (object) as something concrete 3) or the immanent objectivi-

1 The change of terms is the result of correcting the psychological fallacy.

2 Brentano explains the use of 'intentional' as follows (Psychology Vol. 2 p. 8 footnote 2.):
"This expression was misunderstood in this, that it was taken to indicate purpose and striving
towards a goal. So perhaps it would be better to avoid it. The Scholastics used much more
frequently 'objective' instead of 'intentional'. The fact that is here indicated is a psychically
significant object. This is present in one's consciousness whether it is merely thought of,
desired, intended, or something like it. If I prefer the expression 'intentional' I do so because
I regard the likelihood of misunderstanding to be even greater if I were to refer to what is
thought of, as something thought of, as 'objectively existing'. Especially since it is the
modern way to describe in this way something really existing in contradistinction to
purely subjective phenomena corresponding to no reality."
3 'reales' - the two sentences in brackets in this fragment were put there by Brentano
himself.
52 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

ty.4 Each (psychical phenomenon) contains in itself an object even though it

does not (contain it) always in the same way. In an idea something is represented.
In a judgement something is accepted or rejected. In love it is loved, in hate it
is hated, in desire desired, etc."

From his argument against Sir William Hamilton,5 it will be quite

clear that he means to assert that each mental act is directed towards
something that, though intentional, is nevertheless a real object, or
really objective, with respect to this mental act. This is a view remi-
niscent of his early view concerning the real existence of objects of
thought, which is not surprising since it comes from the same period.
It is admittedly true that such an object isn't always an outside
object, nevertheless a reference is then made to the immanent in-
existence, the content or something of this sort that is said to be sub-
jectively objective. I think that this can be understood on the model
of saying that, for instance, a green horse is in my visual field. Now
this horse does not exist, nor do I think it does, but it really is in my
visual field, and in this field it appears just like a real object horse
would appear in my visual field if I saw it. Thus the green horse is a
subjective element of my mental state, but subjectively it has an
appearance of an objective thing. This would seem to be the sort of
case that Brentano has in mind.
According to Brentano, when Hamilton says that in these cases all
is subjectively objective, then he virtually contradicts himself, since
when we cease to speak of the object we are no longer in a position
to talk of the subject either. Thus Brentano thinks of the subject-
object relation as the minimum condition for the existence of a mental
act. At this stage he thinks of these immanent objects as real, since
they are really objects of thought,6 but not real in the sense of being
concrete objects. This colours his views and is, I think, clearly visible
in the above-mentioned arguments. His position is then, that psychical
phenomena are characterised by having a relation to something as an
immanent object, i.e., to something as an object of thought.7 These
mental phenomena, for instance knowledge, joy, desire, etc., exist
really, 8 but for instance colour, tone, warmth, etc., exist only phenome-

4 'immanente Gegenstiindlichkeit'.
5 He admits certain affinity with Hamilton's view. See Psych. I, p. 127, Psych. II, p.126
and Hamilton's Lectufe on Metaphysics I, p. 188, also II, p. 433. I accept Brentano's inter-
pretation of Hamilton's view.
6 cf. here Chapter II, section 2.
7 A view clearly argued against at a later date; cf. Chap. III, section 2 - 'object of thought'
stands here for any object of a mental act.
8 See Psych. I, p. 129.
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 53
nally and intentionally.9 Besides this relation to something as an
object, psychical acts have some other characteristics as well. They
are either ideas or they are based on ideas. The character of extension
is not applicable to them. They are the only objects of direct awareness
and, despite their diversity and multiplicity, they form, from the
point of view of the one who has them, a unity. But according to
Brentano, intentional inexistence of their object is the main and most
significant of all the features of mental acts. 10 Since the psychical
act consists in an intentional relation between two termini, and since
a relation can only take place between two real termini, the existence
of both termini is prima facie implied. The existence, however, is not
necessarily the concrete being, i.e., like the existence of this book, the
chair on which you sit, and the lamp that gives you light. This can be
seen easily when we consider someone thinking of a unicorn, or the fact
that Mr. Pickwick did not really exist. But since we have here a
relation we must have two existent termini. The thinker, he who
desires, loves or thinks, is concretely just like this typewriter which I
am using now. But what about Mr. Pickwick and the unicorn, a
chimera, etc.? Well, they have intentional inexistence. But then we
could say that all mental contents are so characterised; there is no
reason to deny that this follows. The whole reasoning, however, refers
back to the logic of relations.
Characterisation of this intentional inexistence presents many diffi-
culties and many ways out were attempted, notably by the abler of
Brentano's pupils. The most popular solution was to accept the existence
of entia rationis - those, rather than concrete objects, were to be the
mental contents and objects of thought. This too was the solution that
Brentano himself adopted at the earlier stage. l l As mentioned above,
this was not the type of view which would naturally suit him, but he
had to accept it while he still believed that both the termini of the
psychical relation must be real in at least some sense. Thus the inten-
tional inexistence is something real though not something concrete.
This view in turn was forced upon him by his interpretation of the
nature of relation. He was, in effect, assuming that whenever one
speaks of a relation one refers to the same sort of thing. Relations differ
from one another but whenever we say "There is a relation R between
termini T and T 1", we are referring to something that clearly falls
9 This is not existence in the everyday sense - it can be described as intentionally real
but still an inexistence. It is real since it is really in the mind.
10 See (j bel' die Grunde del' Entmutigung aUf Philosophischem Gebiete.
11 cf. Chapter II, section 2.
54 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

within the class of relations. There is a certain set of characteristics

that appertain to all members of this class and one of them is that the
relation implies both the termini, both of them real in at least some
sense.
Many attempts at re-examination of the problem of intentional
inexistence were based on the acceptance of the above basic view.
However, at a later state Brentano himself abandoned it. All this is
more or less common knowledge. What I wish to stress here is the fact
that this view is the result of the very naive realism with respect to
linguistic forms which Brentano had so successfully criticised in
Sprechen und Denken. If we abandon linguistic naturalism, we must
consider the possibility that the word 'relation' in 'intentional relation'
works differently from how it works in other combinations and other
contexts. If so, then the temptation to posit intentional inexistences
will be largely removed. In this case we could offer a more complex and
more subtle account of psychical phenomena without the need to posit
fictional entities. This is what Brentano has in fact done at a later stage.
Thus it is again shown that his re-assessment of linguistic function was the
operative change for the other changes and advances in his philosophy.

3. At the early stage, Brentano thought of mental phenomena as

genuine relations - relations of coexistence - implying some kind of
existence or reality for both termini of the relation. He thought also
that one of these termini was an immanent object or object of conscious-
ness. 12 I have done little enough to explain exactly what he meant by
such an object. But for the purpose of this book it is sufficient to note
that his concept of relation led him to the acceptance of such odd
entities and finally to the acceptance of entia rationis. 13 Upon the re-
examination of linguistic function and linguistic usages, he denied, in
keeping with his new 'reductionism', that the relation between a
mental act and its object is a genuine relation in the orthodox sense.
This 'relation', even if it is linguistically indistinguishable from other
uses of the word, is not a relation of coexistence. In fact it implies the
existence of only one concrete object, namely of he who thinks, feels,
hates, desires, judges, etc.1 4 Thus it can be said that it is not a genuine
relation in the strict sense. This is not surprising since the word
12 A view criticised by Husser!.
13 Good discussions on the subject are Psych. I Introduction by O. Kraus and the intro-
ductory chapter in Most.
14 Here Brentano goes beyond Husser!, who retained the orthodox concept of relation and
tried to save the day be introducing 'ideal concepts'.
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 55
'relation' is not, as Brentano would say, a genuine name. It is much
more a syncathegorematic expression, i.e., it has meaning only in
linguistic context. There is, however, a significant similarity between
mental phenomena and genuine relations and it is this: Whoever has
the concept of a relation or a mental act, must have the idea of two
separate termini, one represented in modo recto, the other in modo
obliquo. 15 Thus the family resemblance between these two uses of
'relation' is apparent. In this light, the immanent object is seen to be
a mere linguistic fiction; it is an ens linguae, not even an ens rationis.
When we think, we think of concrete objects. We do not think about
representations of these objects. This much is obvious to an unbiased
mind. A very good discussion on this point is to be found in Psych. II
Anhang (19II); Let us quote. Having said that a genuine relation im-
plies the existence of both termini, Brentano continues (p. 134):
"It is quite different with psychical relations. If one thinks (about) something
then he who thinks must indeed exist, but this is in no way the case with the
object of his thought.16 In fact if he denies something this cannot be the case
if his denial is right. Therefore the thinker is the only object (whose existence is)
demanded by the psychical relation, The (other) 17 terminus of the so-called
relation does not have to be given in reality. One could therefore doubt whether
we have here something really relative, whether it is not more likely the case
that this is something that is in certain respects like the relative, something that
could therefore be called relational."

Thus the difference between the two uses of 'relation' is clearly stated.
The similarity is stated as follows (ibid.):
"The similarity consists in the following. Exactly like the one who thinks of
a genuine relation, also he who thinks of a psychical activity, must, in a way,
think of two objects at the same time. One, so to say, in recto, the other in
obliquo. If I think of a flower-lover then the flower-lover (himself) is the object
of which I think in recto, flowers are what I think of in ob/iquo. This however is
similar to the case when I think of someone as larger than Caius. The larger
one is thought of in recto, Caius in obliquo".18

4. Brentano is now free of fictional entities, entia rationis, contents

in themselves, intentional inexistences, etc. He is still faced with the
problem of giving a plausible and positive account of our thinking,
and of objects of thought. He does this by maintaining that only the
real can be the object of our consciousness. He says (Psych. II, p. 162):

15 This leads Brentano to reformulation of the concept of relation in general.

16 i.e., with this that he has as an object of his thought. cf. OK. 4.
17 The word 'other' is clearly demanded by the sense of the text.
18 This leads Brentano to maintain that this is really the defining characteristic of any
~~ .
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

"In the same way in which the centaur cannot be made into an object, so
the existence or the non-existence of a centaur cannot be made into one. It is
only the one who acknowledges or denies 19 a centaur (that can become an object).
In this case however the centaur will at the same time appear as an object in a
specific oblique mode ... "
Brentano means to say that when there is someone who thinks (e.g.
denies the centaur), then when we think of the whole situation we think
of him who denies a centaur in modo recto, but we must also think of
the denied, viz. the centaur, but this time in modo obliquo. He is quite
certain that only the thinking one need exist in order to make it
possible. Only he of whom we think in modo recto must exist, be real,
and be a concrete object. This that we think of in modo obliquo need
not be at all - to think of it in this fashion is to think of someone
thinking it, and that someone thinks of it is no proof of its existence.
The situation 'A thinks of B' can be actual, provided only A exists. The
fact that we think of "B" in this oblique fashion neither says or implies
anything about its existence. Therefore, insofar as our concept of
someone who thinks of a centaur is concerned, the centaur is not an
actual concrete object in the sense that it is neither known or said, nor
yet supposed to be one. The thinker is an actual concrete object; he
must at least be supposed to be if we are to say seriously that he
thinks of something. But we must remember that the mere fact that
we think of a flower-lover does not prove his existence. However,
when there is, for example, a centaur-lover, he must be, but the cen-
taur needn't. But the centaur, if we speak of the centaur-lover, is an
object of which we think, albeit in modo obliquo. Brentano says:
"And so it is generally true that only objects that fall under the general
concept of the real can become objects of psychical relations".
This is so because when we think, for example, of the centaur in modo
obliquo, we must think of it qua a real object and accept or deny it as
such. When we acknowledge the moon, we say that such a real object
is given or exists. When we deny the centaur, we say that there is no
such real object, or, to bring out the way in which we think of it, we
say that such a real object (viz. the centaur) is not given or does not
exist. If it is objected that this will not explain the nature of mental
acts, and specifically that it cannot provide an explanation of how
judgements like: "There is no unicorn" can be both sensible and true,
Brentano replies that to each statement about entia rationis there
must correspond a statement about realia,20 therefore it must be more
19 This ties up with his theory of judgement. See next section.
~o See quotations and discussion in Chapter III, section 2.
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 57
sensible to regard all our statements as either direct or indirect
references to realia. The problem can be solved on the basis of his re-
assessment of linguistic function. See here Psych. II, p. 21 3: 21
"Who thinks, thinks something. Since this characterises the concept of
thinking, this concept cannot be uniform while the word 'something' has more
than one meaning ... "
"One has to maintain also the following. It is not only possible to say, who
thinks, thinks something, but also that he thinks (of) something as something:
as e.g. of a man as a man or conversely in a vague way as of a living thing 22 .. .'1
"But nothing is more obvious than (this), that the second something is not
to be understood in the sense of 'something thought of'. Who thinks of a stone
does not think of it as a 'stone thought of', but as of a stone. Otherwise, even if
he acknowledged it he would acknowledge it only as an object of thought ... "

Therefore when we think we must think of real objects and it is the

analysis of linguistic usage and function that should explain the exact
nature of the indirect reference to the reality of the stone or centaur
contained in the words : "!think that a stone (centaur) exists". Similarly
with other comparable expressions, but here one has to remember that
such indirect reference to reality can, and in fact does, take very
many different forms. This reference to the new analysis of language
is made explicitly later on (Psych. II, p. 215), in answer to the obj ection
that we often think of abstracts that are not and could not be repre-
sented as real objects. His opening words are:
"I reply that this can be explained by the following: that in our language not
all words have meaning in their own right, but that many have meaning only in
connection with other (words)."
Thus it is again easy to demonstrate that linguistic analysis occupies
the central position in Brentano's later philosophy. He himself obvi-
ously thought of it as a major breakthrough, enabling him to free
himself from numerous misconceptions, and to correct many errors of
long standing. But he thought of this very field as psychology, in the
most misleading sense in which he used the term. In view of this, it is
not surprising that he thought of psychology as the central discipline
for his whole philosophy. After all, besides other things, it contained
this most important element. However, according to our corrected
terminology,23 this is not the case, and psychology is demoted from

21 A dictation from February, 1915 - Von den Gegenstiinden des Denkens.

22 This leads Brentano ultimately to the view that all awareness is general in character.
23 Throughout I have levelled this criticism on Brentano's use of the term 'psychological'
and its implications. It has to be remembered that this is a criticism for not having made an
advance rather than for having committed an error. Seen in this light it is not unfair to the
author.
58 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

its central position. Logical analysis, and in particular the analysis of

linguistic function, is seen to take its place.

2. JUDGEMENTS

I. Brentano's account of judgement stands in close relationship to

his account of mental phenomena. Having decided that mental acts
are characterised by the fact that they bear an intentional relation to
their object, Brentano proceeds to affirm that they are classified by
reference to differences in the character of this relation. There are
three classes of psychical phenomena: Awareness,l Emotions and
Judgements. In each of these classes we discern a different type of
intentional relation. In the first case it is the having of something as
an object, the thinking of something as something. The other two
classes add a new dimension to the relation and are in this way similar
to each other while different from mere awareness. Emotions are
characterised by an emotional attitude to the object, which Brentano
calls love or hate. Dissent or assent characterise judgements. Both
emotions and jUdgements involve awareness - "Nothing can be the
object of judgement if it is not the object of awareness." (Psych. II,
p. 38) In unguarded moments, Brentano says that thus the object
of emotion or judgement is twice in the consciousness, but all that he
seems to mean by this is that here we have a double relation to the
same object. At times this is weathered down even more and he says
merely that anything that is the object of a judgement or of an emotion
can always be an object of awareness. This seems to be all that he
needs to say in order to carry his point, viz. that awareness is the basic
class of mental phenomena.

2. Brentano claims that direct reference to our experience will show

that this is the correct view. On the other hand, people who propounded
opposing and false views have been known often enough to lodge the
very same claim on behalf of their own views. However, according to
Brentano, their views can be shown to be incorrect,2 and then his
own view will be seen as the only satisfactory solution. This is repre-
'Vorstellung' sometimes translated as representation.
1
(Psych. II, p. 38 ff.) This discussion is used as an indirect proof of Brentano's own view.
2
He claims that we deny that e.g. judgements and awareness differ in the character of intention-
al relation, we are left with unsatisfactory alternatives only; and so:
(a) The crucial difference might be the difference in content, viz. in the object of the mental
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 59
sented as an argument sufficient in itself; nevertheless Brentano
produces a direct argument. This argument is well worth considering
since besides supporting his view, it will serve to implement and eluci-
date it. In Psychologie (II, p. 65 fL), it is claimed that the difference
in character between awareness on the one hand and judgements as
well as emotions on the other, can be demonstrated directly in at
least four points. Here it should be noted that emotions and jUdgements
are treated as a class of phenomena different from mere awareness; no
attempt is being made as yet to cite these features that would differ-
entiate between judgements and emotions. When we compare the
mere having of an idea with love or hate, viz. emotions or assent and
dissent, viz. judgements, we can see that in each of the latter cases
there is involved a double intentional relation. The reader might find
that the reference to double relation misleads him, or that it makes it
more difficult to understand Brentano clearly, to assent to, or even
to follow his arguments. If so, it might be best to say that what Bren-
tano really claims is that in the case of judgement and emotion we
have to do with an intentional relation involving a new dimension, a
dimension that is not present in mere awareness. This he demonstrates
successfully. The references to a double intentional relation, a double
handling of the one object, a double existence of the same object in our
consciousness, all represent attempts at further characterisation of
this new dimension. But the original point is of much greater importance
than this follow-up. It is the original point that is an essential part
of Brentano's account of the differences between types of mental
phenomena. There is some reason to believe that he himself would
act. But this view is quite implausible; clearly we can be aware of love and judge (assent to)
the same object - this is an undeniable fact.
(b) The difference lies in consequences of the psychical phenomenon (A. Bain). This will not
do; if the phenomenon had different effects, these must be accounted for; what produces the
difference? Presumably it cannot all be due to circumstances, since then it would not serve
to differentiate mental acts.
(c) Perhaps judgements are characterised by inseparable association of ideas (James Mill, H.
Spencer). Given such association, the disposition is always visible only in its effects - the
disposition is not a quality of the present mental act; no proper difference is therefore
established.
(d) Intensity of the act; but the clearest idea is not a judgement, and a weak judgment is not
a mere idea; what is more a mere idea can be more vivid than a judgement; this is obvious.
(e) Judgement is the connection or division of ideas - but some mere ideas have two elements
(I think of a red tree without assenting or loving it). Mill and Spencer, saw this and said a spe-
cial connection is required, viz. inseparable association. J. S. Mill was near the truth when he
said "It does not merely bring to mind a certain object ... it asserts something respecting it
... "; but he does not go far enough when he is content to say that this connection is sui
generis. Also some judgements (existential) have only one element, i.e. judgements of the
form "A is" - this is seen clearly when we realise that existence is not a predicate. (Brentano
produces some good arguments to prove this.)
60 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

agree with this view. His references to the double relation are signifi-
cantly careless, while his arguments concerning what we called the
difference in dimension are both full and worked out in considerable
detail. It would be fair, then, to retain this difference in emphasis. 3
Let us now consider the arguments:
(i) Mere ideas do not contradict one another. The idea of a cat does
not contradict or deny the idea of a dog. We say sometimes that, e.g.,
cold and warm are contrary, but this is so only because they can't
both be experienced at the same time while affecting the same sense.
At any rate, all that we could say on this basis is that we could have
ideas of contrary objects but not that we have ideas (mere ideas)
that contradict each other. Emotions and judgements are both
capable of contradicting other emotions and judgements directly.
What is more, they contradict each other with respect to the
same object. If I say Homer existed and someone says that he
did not, we have the same object in mind. If I did love Lucy but do not
anymore, both my emotions relate to the same object. Thus we have
here a direct contrast consisting in that between in the relation to the
same object of our opposing judgements and emotions respectively.
This is exactly the type of contrast that cannot have a place in mere
awareness, which consists in the very fact, always the same, that we
think of something as something - that something is the object of our
consciousness. 4 Thus it is demonstrated that emotions and judgements
are characterised by a dimension of intentional relation of which mere
awareness is incapable. 5
(ii) In mere awareness, the difference of intensity consists only in the
degree of sharpness and liveliness of the experience itself.6 It cannot
consist in anything else, since such awareness is the barest experience.
This sort of experience can be more or less vivid, but it can hardly
have any other attributes. Brentano himself claims only this much -
that we are immediately aware of the fact that the mere idea can be
only more or less vivid. Other types of intensity do not belong to it.
The explanation that I have added would make the argument suspect;
we could say that it looks as if mere awareness had all such features
by definition. If so, then it is not an empirical matter at all. There is
3 I do not intend to imply that Brentano did not seriously think that a double relation was
involved in one sense or another. '
4 The first formulation is the careful and exact one; it comes from Brentano himself;
the other is intended to be more intuitive - in a wayan explanation.
5 Brentano thought that this could be seen with greater sureness in the example of emotions.
He uses emotions to introduce this view, claiming that here judgemen ts are like emotions.
6 'Impression' would unduly narrow the field of idea.
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 6r

some truth in this. Brentano has classified mental acts, and the classifi-
cation is a matter of logic, at least in so far as certain regularities are
regarded as crucial and treated as differentiae specificae. This limits
the field of other attributes that could be ascribed to, e.g., mere ideas.
But this much is not a matter of logic - the classification fits, in fact
we experience emotions and mere ideas, we judge. If we did not,
the classification would be a mere figment of imagination. Brentano
argues that it is not, that it is a fair account of mental phenomena.
But, since the characterisation of certain types of mental acts has
logical ramifications, the argument, besides proving Brentano's point,
implements his description by showing what is involved in it. Emotions
and jUdgements are capable of a new dimension of intensity; with
emotions it is the intensity of our attitude. We can be dimly aware
of our intense hatred of Hitler; we can also be vividly aware of it;
but the intensity of our hate does not depend on the vividness of our
impression. We can be more or less certain of our jUdgement, but our
certainty is not tied to how vividly we are aware of it. Here we can
see why Brentano speaks of a double intentional relation. The relation
consisting in having Hitler as the object of our thought can be at its
weakest, while the relation consisting in hating Hitler is at its strong-
est. 7 This might be an oversimplification, but the point with which I
am concerned here is that, looked at in this way, mere awareness will
appear as an undercurrent of all other mental phenomena, and this is
the point that Brentano wishes to establish.
(iii) Mere ideas do not involve virtue or lack of it, knowledge or error.
As above, they flow from the fact that mere awareness is mere experi-
ence, and also as above, it can be seen as immediately given if we are
capable of mere awareness. If I merely have an idea, one which is in no
way tied to action or belief, of a theft from the Bank of New South
Wales, I am not only not morally culpable, but not even tempted, nor
am I in error if the theft did not and will not take place. Judgements
involve us in either truth or error. Emotions involve us in being morally
right or wrong,S but mere awareness does not involve us in any compa-
rable way. Here again the new dimension of these types of mental
acts is demonstrated.
7 This way of speaking may be improper, (it is not taken from Brentano); but the fact that
in these cases we are, but when we are concerned with, e.g., A being bigger than B, we are
not, tempted to talk about the intensity of the relation, may be a point about mental acts
and intentional relations as such.
8 This is an interesting point of view, but not the subject of this book. For more detailed
information see: Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis, better in the later O. Kraus edition, and
for a commentary, Most.
62 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

(iv) It is doubtlessly the case that the flow of our ideas as such is
subject to some laws of psychology. It is also the case that this under-
lies all mental phenomena. But significantly, emotions and judgements
are subject to their own special laws of development and succession.
There is a new criterion of being satisfactory. According to Brentano,
these are, in the field of emotions, the special concern of ethics, in the
field of judgement, the special concern of logic. These new laws of
development are seen as dealing with the features inherent in the new
dimension, the dimension not present in mere awareness. Incident-
ally, the fact that these are different laws shows that this, so to say,
superstructure, is different with jUdgements and emotions - hence
these are different too. Whether we agree with all the implications of
these arguments, whether we accept all the views expressed or indi-
cated in them, we must admit that Brentano has produced solid
support, and incidentally an illuminating elucidation of his view that
judgements and emotions differ from mere awareness in this - that
the intentional relations involved are of a different order and exhibit
a new dimension. 9 Generally he has argued well for the view that at
least in this case the fundamental difference between classes of mental
phenomena consists in the difference in the character of their relation
to their respective objects.

3. On p. 70 (Psych. II), Brentano sums up his argument as follows:

"Firstly, our experience shows directly the difference in the relation to the
content (of the mental act) that we regard as awareness and judgement.l0
Secondly, if this was not the case then no difference could (be shown to) exist
between them. It is not tenable to regard either the difference in intensity or
the difference in content as (the difference) between mere awareness and judge-
ment.
Thirdly, finally when we compare the difference between judgements and
awareness with other cases of difference (between) psychical (Phenomena), we
find that not a single of these features is missing here that show themselves as
different when the consciousness stands in a completely different relation to its
object.ll Therefore if not here, then in no other case could we acknowledge
such a difference in the psychological field."

There were, according to Brentano, two causes of denial of this true

view. The one is psychological; it consists in this - that in tact even

9 This can be admitted even when one disagrees that e.g. ethics and logic are concerned
with types of mental acts. This view of psychology, that sounds so odd today, was shared,
for example, by]. S. Mill (vide Deductive and Inductive Logic B., chapter 4, para. 3).
10 Brentano discusses judgement - the difference mentioned is the difference between
awareness and judgement.
11 Brentano means here the accompanying differences.
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

the simplest mental phenomena include a judgement over and above

the mere awareness. In this way we might find it difficult to draw the
correct demarcation line, and in some cases this may lead us to believe
that all mental phenomena are concerned with knowledge. In fact,
judgement is always the secondary element of the psychical phenome-
non. A similar error is possible with respect to feeling.12 This tends to
give the whole account an a priori flavour. And it is not certain that
this is necessary. We could, after all, be idly aware of things - the
sun, the warmth, the humming, and if we are day-dreaming, our
judgement could be in a state of suspension, the real and the merely
imagined, the liked and the disliked forming a whole composed of
elements not distinguished from each other. This description is neither
strange nor unlikely. If we say that after all we judge the sun to
be the sun, the warmth to be warmth and so on, here Brentano
suggested an answer. This is part of the description of mere awareness,
the having of something as an object, the thinking of something as
something. The second cause is linguistic. We are misled by our words
and by our linguistic constructions. 13 It is especially clear on pages
74-5 of the second book of Psychologie that Brentano states explicitly
that it is the linguistic form that has led to the erroneous view that
judgement is the combination or separation of ideas. In view of what
was said above, in Chapter III, section I, it is significant that here
again one finds explicit reference to linguistic analysis, and signifi-
cantly it is with respect to these linguistic causes of error that Bren-
tano goes into great detail. It is here that he works out many ramifi-
cations of the resultant errors.

4- How then are emotions different from judgements? Brentano

maintains that each class of psychical phenomena has its specific
perfection amounting to its complete satisfaction; this is discussed
inter alia in Psych. II, pps. 121-3. The complete satisfaction of
awareness is, according to him, the awareness of beauty; 14 the complete
satisfaction of fudgement is the knowledge of truth; the complete
satisfaction of emotions consists in the striving towards higher goods
- in effect, it consists in loving the worthwhile, the ideal. We could

12 See Psych. II, pps. 71-3.

13 See Chapter III, section I.
14 Brentano's account of beauty presents difficulties. It is hard to think of aesthetic en-
joyment as mere perfect awareness; it also seems to introduce a new dimension of perfection,
a new type of discrimination. (For example, let us think of the perfect awareness of excruciat-
ing pain.)
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

take this as suggesting the following criterion of the essential differ-

ence between emotions and judgements. Assent and dissent, as well as
love and hate, each form a natural sequence. It is truth to which one
naturally assents, and its lack, (i.e. falsity), that one dissents from. It
is the worthwhile, the ideal, that one loves, the unworthy that one
hates. And so even though love is different from hate, it forms its
natural opposite. And even if dissent is different from assent, it forms
its natural oposite. In this way there is a natural difference between
these two classes, a difference that does not exist between, e.g., will
and emotions. This difference consists in this-that the relation proper
in the one class forms a natural complement of the other relation
proper in it, but e.g. hate, a relation proper in the one field, in this
case ethics, does not form a natural complement of a relation proper
(e.g. assent) in the other field, in this case logic. Thus judgements and
emotions are seen to form naturally separate classes. The relation of
'seeing something as something' which marks mere awareness could
present difficulties if this class of mental phenomena were not previously
distinguished from judgements and emotions on other grounds. Let us
consider the argument that Brentano uses in support of the claim that
will and emotion are not different classes (Psych. II, p. 84 ff.):
"Let us take as an example the following sequence: Sadness - longing for a
missing good - hope that we will achieve it - demand that we achieve it - courage
to undertake the attempt - the act of willing (oneself) to action. The one extrem-
ity is a feeling, the other an (act of) will."

He concludes that in such a case there is no reason for dividing these

phenomena into two classes, no criterion, and no possibility, of
drawing the distinction. But this is just another application of
the argument used above to distinguish emotions and judgements.
The second edition of the Psych. II (p. I52 ff.), contains an interesting
discussion of this problem, which is an afterthought added to avoid
misunderstandings caused by the first edition of the book. Brentano
maintains there that though these classes of mental phenomena are
similar in that they, unlike awareness, involve opposites, viz. love
and hate and assent and dissent respectively; yet, despite even further
analogies, they are different from each other because to love something
is very different from believing that something is the case. Clearly it
is possible to believe something and to hate it at the same time. One
point is, according to Brentano, of special significance. In the field of
judgement, there is truth and falsity, but according to the principle of
excluded middle there is no in-between value. In contrast in the field
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

of emotions (love and hate) there is a sliding scale of middle values;

what is more, it is in this field, and in this field only, that we can dis-
tinguish the good in itself and good as a means to something else. Thus
the difference in character between the two types of psychical acts is
convincingly demonstrated.

5. These then are the main features of Brentano's account of judge-

ment. These persisted largely from the earlier to the later period.
There were developments of course, some of which were in fact appli-
cations of the advances in the theory of mental acts. But there were
also other changes: In the early period Brentano believed for instance
that all judgements could be reduced to existential jUdgements. In his
own words, (Psych. II, p. 60):
"It is therefore doubtlessly possible to show that all categorical sentences, that
in fact all sentences that express judgements, fall back on existential sentences. "15
Later he changed his view and admitted that some jUdgements consist
essentially of two elements - he called them double jUdgements - since
according to him they do not consist in a combination of ideas but in a
combination of jUdgements. 16 In Psych. II, Brentano approaches the
problem of analysis of the traditional forms of judgement.1 7 Negative
jUdgements cannot be equivalent to existential judgements if they are
particular, since all affirmative jUdgements are particular and all
negative jUdgements are, according to him, general. This is so because
the denial of this view would lead to positing negative objects - and
such entia rationis are not possible. True, we talk that way, but the
philosophical error is due precisely to the fallacy of taking linguistic
forms too seriously. In order to preserve the sane view we have to
introduce combinations of judgements rather than combinations of
ideas, particularly in the case of o. According to Brentano, only this will
explain how this judgement appears both negative and particular.
15 i.e. sentences that express existential judgements. See also Brentano's footnote.
16 'Doppelurteile'; these views were first suggested and discussed in USE, but particularly
see Psych. II, p. 164-172 and p. 283; ibid. Introduction by Oscar Kraus, p. xiv.
17 Here is Brentano's analysis of the forms a, e, i, 0 in short:
(i) - equivalent to the existential judgement: SPis. The one judgement is-assenttoS (subject);
the other judgement is - the accepted subject is assented to as conjoined with the predicate P.
(0) - no existential equivalent. The one judgement is - assent to S (subject); the other -
dissent trom the S that was assented to as conjoined with predicate P.
(e) - equivalent to the existential judgment: there is no SP consists in denial of at least one
of the two judgements in i, but always at least of the first one, since this denies the whole and
produces the equivalence.
(a) - consists in affirming that anyone who disagrees with both the judgements at once is
wrong - no one can affirm S and deny its combination with S at the same time. (See Psych.
II, pp. 164-9.)
66 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

The judgement consists of the particular affirmative existential

judgement "s is" and the negative judgement that the S that is assent-
ed to is not conjoined with the predicate P. This second judgement is
essentially general - it does not posit a negative entity, but it applies
to the particular S assented to in the first affirmative judgement.
Therefore the full judgement of this form does not possess an existent-
ial judgement equivalent. This seems more like common-sense. There
are no negative entities, but on the other hand, it leads to some views
that are far from intuitive. Witness the view that all negative judge-
ments are essentially general and all affirmative essentially particular.
One is tempted to say that this complication is due to the over-simpli-
fication of the concept of linguistic function. True, Brentano no
longer accepts the linguistic realism, but his conception of the 'in-
direct' relation between the statement and concrete reality is still
relatively simple. Perhaps if we approach the problem without any
preconceived ideas and free ourselves from this approach through
investigating the relation between the statement and reality we will
fare better. It might be better to look at our statements as tools
that we use in our life and in our dealings with other people. If the
relation with the concrete reality is thus seen as being accomplished
indirectly via our non-linguistic activities, perhaps then we will have
no need for such complex explanations of reasonably simple statements.
Thus I am suggesting that Brentano would have done better if he had
said that words and sentences have meaning only in context, rather
than implying, as he did, that they have meaning only in linguistic
context. I feel that these remarks are in place. Brentano disliked
explanations contrary to common sense; we have seen this on the
example of fictional entities. It seems reasonable that he would welcome
any development that would remove elements of this type of explan-
ation that still persisted in his philosophy. What is more, to widen
the context, in which we consider the function of words and other
linguistic devices, to reach beyond the field of speech alone, seems the
next and obvious step to take. A step, in fact, that might be regarded
as the continuation of Brentano's own research. According to Bren-
tano, even if we consider sentences that possess existential sentence
equivalents, we find that they are logically equivalent, but psycho-
logically they are different. In this case, Brentano's use of 'psychologi-
cal' makes it difficult to see what he intended to convey. He cannot
mean that, in fact, when we say "No Sis P", we normally (psycho-
logically or introspectively) take it to mean: It is not the case that both
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

the judgements'S is' and 'The S that is admits of P as predicate' are true,
and certainly the second judgement is false. At other places he speaks of
us being misled by language because we take it to mean literally what
it appears to be saying. But it would seem to be carrying it far too
far to maintain that it means something so very different from what it
appears to mean, as suggested for example, by the above translation.
However, he denies that the difference involved here is logical and the
only interpretation of his point that appears plausible to me is that
the two sentences have the same point but they work differently.
There is some support for it in the fact that Brentano regarded the
working of statements to be subject to laws of logic. This interpretation
is vague, but not objectionable in itself. However, there is really no
sufficient evidence in Brentano's writings to attempt a full elucidation
of these ideas. Nor is it to be supposed that Brentano has worked
them out with complete lucidity. The actual working out in detail of
such complex linguistic forms by Brentano may often appear suspect.
It is not the purpose of this book to work it out and either defend or
criticise Brentano on this issue. But it should be observed that even if
we disagree with some, or even most of his detailed analysis, his general
point concerning linguistic usages is well taken and the use he makes
of it in philosophical discourse quite justified and illuminating. It is
particularly instructive when used to remove and explain conceptual
errors. Perhaps Brentano should be given credit for concentrating on
this kind of application; he was very sure of his criticisms, but possibly
not equally sure of his positive attempts.

3. AN ATTEMPT TO RETAIN THE CORRESPONDENCE

THEORY WITHOUT ENTIA RATIONIS

1. The view which Brentano reached in the article, Uber den Begriff
der Wahrheit, discussed above, was possible because he introduced at
the time some entia rationis - some judgements were then thought to
correspond, in the non-strict sense explained, with concrete reality,
some with entia rationis; so for instance, some analytic jUdgements
would correspond with logical impossibilities and similar entities. If
facts are thought of as those with which statements correspond, they
must be fictional entities; the same applies to states of affairs and so
on. Neither of these can be regarded as a concrete thing.! Brentano
1 Cf. here ASP Symposium - Strawson's contribution.
68 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

started to rethink the problem of truth fundamentally when he aban-

doned the view that such fictional entities are possible. 2 In I907 he
wrote a paper entitled: "Wahrheit ist eine art von Obereinstimmung,"
(see Appendix "B"), in which he attempts to defend the correspondence
theory while denying fictional entities. This paper has not been publish-
ed previously; it bears the mark EL. 67 in the Mayer-Hillebrand
classification. All quotations in this section are from it. 3

2. This short and sketchy paper is interesting because it bridges the

earlier and later views of Brentano. It starts off by a discussion
of the nature of names. The upshot of this discussion is this: All real
names are names of concrete things. A number of statements are
shown to represent jUdgements concerning concrete objects. It is
maintained that whether they appear grammatically as negative or
affirmative sentences is no indication of whether they represent
negative or positive judgements. 4 These include sentences seemingly
affirming fictional entities. The whole thing is done by mentioning
and explaining examples. Here is a reasonably clear sample of the text
that is generally difficult and hard to follow: 5
"I appear to say something affirmative when I say that there is an impossi-
bility, but in fact I negate and negate apodictically. Possibility belongs also to
negatives. When I say that something is possible, then I say (in effect) that it
does not contain a contradiction, or that it should not be acknowledged that
it is not. 6
Objectives like: 'willed', 'loved', 'wished', 'thought', form another class.
When I say that there is something thought of, then properly understood, I
say there is something that thinks.7 When I say something is wished for, then I
say that there is something that wishes. Expressions like 'good' i.e., 'lovable'
are related to these ... "

The techniques from Sprechen und Denken are applied here to a

number of particular names divided into several classes, but basically
it is the same point sketchily worked out. This, together with the denial
of entia rationis, forms the background of this, the last attempt at the

2 See Chapter III, section 2.

3 O. Kraus dates the new 'teaching' of Brentano about I905. This would place this paper
early in the new period. Mayer-Hillebrand, in reply to my article in Philosophy and Phenome-
nological Research, places the new 'teaching' about 1912 - which makes this paper part of
the transitory period. I tend to agree with Kraus, with the proviso that any strict division of
this kind seems to me questionable.
4 Sometimes a negative sentence represents a positive judgement, e.g. the double negative.
5 This was a note obviously written for Brentano's own use and no attempt was made to
fill in the gaps or to explain the moves.
6 See Chapter III, section I and Chapter IV, section 2.
7 i.e. that something thinks - stressing the existence of what thinks.
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 69
modification of the Aristotelian correspondence theory. By far the
most interesting part of the first section of the paper is the one concern-
ing the term 'true'; here it is:
"The expression true is used as an attribute of assertions and of judgements.
Who says this, refers to himself, or to someone else as judging and he indicates
that he (or the other) judges rightly, in so far as they have a certain kind of
judgement (content 8). 'True' is therefore not a real name, like the names that
signify objects. And again the names that signify abstracts are no real names."

The reference to 'a certain kind of judgement' is cryptic; most probably

it represents an attempt to leave the correspondence theory of truth
an open possibility. It is more important to observe that 'true' is here
explicitly regarded as an expression that has meaning only in linguistic
context (synsemanticon). The view that someone who uses the word
'true' refers to someone as judging rightly is not taken up in this
paper but it represents the germ of the idea that is in fact worked out
more fully in Brentano's ultimate view.

3. If the first section of the paper demonstrated the new linguistic

technique, the second can be regarded as applying it to the problem of
truth. This appears obviously true. But in discussing this paper, let us
remember that it is both sketchy and difficult, that all the connections
and explanations and back references are assumed as given - they
have to be provided by the reader himself and included in the account
of the view presented even if they do not appear in the text. Since the
term 'truth' is a synsemantic on, it is to be regarded as an indirect way
of referring to reality. We ought to work out the reference if we wish
to analyse the term fully. The correspondence theory of truth can be
regarded as correct if this analysis will provide at the same time a
plausible analysis of the concept of correspondence. 9 This is what is
attempted in the paper. An analysis is offered of truth as correspondence
between judgement and reality. In this, Brentano uses reduction
techniques indicated in the first part, and attempts to show by
implication that no judgement need be thought of as concerning
a fictional entity - it concerns something concrete and either affirms
or denies it. The following are particular examples of the reductions
attempted by Brentano:
(i) If one says there is a privation oj water, one does, in effect, say that
there is no water.

8 In this case the parentheses are Brentano's own.

9 Brentano argues later that this concept cannot be satisfactorily interpreted.
70 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

(ii) Also, impossibilites belong to negation - to affirm that an im-

possibility exists, is to negate apodictically.
(iii) 'Wanted' and 'Loved' refer, in the last resort, to someone who
wants and someone who loves.
(iv) To say "This is good" is, in fact, equivalent to affirming that one
who approves of it cannot do it without doing something proper.
This, in tum, cannot be said unless I mean to indicate that I approve
of it myself.

4. Against this, one could easily produce the usual arguments

against reductionism. It would be possible to argue that, in at least
some cases, the statements allegedly equivalent to each other are not,
in fact, equivalent. One can further object that, to say what Brentano
says in (iv) is putting the cart before the horse; e.g., the assertion "I
approve of the thing, and if you approve of it you do something proper
because it is a good thing", is not a tautologous assertion. What is
more, it seems to state a proper relation in the proper order. That a
thing is a good thing seems the best of reasons for approving of it. This
should be enough to indicate that one could plausibly maintain that the
statements representing the 'reduced' sentences are, in fact, different,
and have different logic, from the reduced statements. But these are,
according to Brentano, logically equivalent, and admittedly they differ
psychologically 10 and of course grammatically. Here we are again
faced with the problem of deciding what constitutes such equivalence
and such difference and all its appertaining difficulties. This is im-
portant here, since Brentano is applying the detailed reductions in an
attempt to solve the problem of truth. If one wished seriously to
accept Brentano's reductionism, one would be led to believe that
language is in fact a very complex system used solely to communicate
elements of a more straightforward system of logical thought. While
this Camapian belief is not logically impossible, it is nevertheless
improbable, especially in view of the fact that expressions which, ac-
cording to Brentano, differ only superficially, have genuinely different
uses and usages. And no better reason can ever be given for claiming
that they are genuinely different. If one takes this remark seriously,
one might be inclined to think that, at this stage, Brentano was led
to deny that they are genuinely different, simply in order to rescue the
correspondence theory of truth. This, however, would be an ad hoc
10 In Brentano's sense of 'psychological'. Properly understood, it might perhaps escape
our criticisms.
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 7I
procedure which is justly suspect.!! Later on, Brentano himself became
dissatisfied with this solution and offers arguments to show that the
concept of correspondence cannot be worked out in a satisfactory
manner. In this paper, however, he accepts the reduction, at least for
the moment, and goes on to argue that:
(a) When one thinks of something in a negative manner, then the
idea denies a concrete thing.
(b) When one thinks of something positively, when it is not the case,
then the idea does not deny the concrete, but it does not correspond
with it either.
In positive thinking, correspondence is sometimes lacking but
no denial of reality is involved. Negative thinking does not ever
involve correspondence with reality, but sometimes we have a case
of contrariness in detail.1 2 The whole analysis is based on the idea
that here we have to do with an indirect reference to reality. Here is
the passage in point:
"When I say: 'There does not exist a not-red object' then this means that 'In
so far as I conceive of it in this fashion,13 there is nothing real that accords with
me.' In this notice is given that I conceive of it.14 And in general it seems to be
the case that when I say something I give notice that I think and of what I
think. 15 In this it is always the case that part of my assertion is indirect. 16 The
indirect communication is clearly seen where we have to do with two negations,
e.g. 'There is not a red object', 'All objects are red. or 'Each object is red'."

The attempt to retain the correspondence theory is then to be made

by treating some expressions as indirect. One might argue that this
attempt involves a confusion between what I say and what is implied
by what I say and that therefore no explanation is provided. It is ex-
actly this point that has to be settled before one can accept any of
Brentano's detailed reductions. His own explanation is that there
exists a psychological difference. I am inclined to take it to mean that
even if two expressions make the same point, or achieve the same com-
munication, i.e., according to Brentano, are, logically equivalent, it is
still possible and often the case, that this can be achieved in signifi-
cantly different ways - according to Brentano's terminology, psycho-
logically different ways.!7 The problem lies in giving an account of the

11 Compare C. S. Peirce in Biichler - The Philosophy of Peirce, Ch. II.

12 If assertions are partly negative, partly positive - (complex) - both can partly apply.
13 As being a red object.
14 i.e. of the red object.
15 'vorstelle' literally 'conceive of'. I use 'think' for the sake of style.
16 This looks like confusion between what I say and what is implied by what I say.
17 This terminology is misleading here as elsewhere.
72 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND

significant difference; it is suggested that this consists in either direct

or indirect reference, but then what I say indirectly, I say - I do not
merely imply. The best explanation of this seems to be that what is
said indirectly is the point of what I am saying, what is merely implied
is not. In fact, the point of the assertion that is said to imply X is not
to state X. This is why we say that it implies something rather than
that it states it.

5. Significantly, the passage quoted above is directly followed by a

straight account of the modified correspondence theory. Brentano says:
"What does it mean: "To accord with reality in conceiving (of something)?
This will appear from the concept of contradiction. If I conceive of something
negatively then this conception contradicts the respective reality when it
exists. If I have a positive idea of something that is not, then this positive idea
does not contradict something real but (on the other hand) it tloes not accord
with anything real. Sometimes in a positive conception there is no accord with
something real, but in these cases there is never a contradictory opposition to
the real. A conception that is partly positive and partly negative can sometimes,
in virtue of its positive aspect, fail to accord (with the real) and sometimes in
virtue of its negative aspect it can contradict (the real), and sometimes both
could be the case. There/ore we must say that i/ a judgement is to be true (then) it
must, in virtue of its positive aspect harmonise with reality, and in virtue of its
negative aspect it should not be in disharmony with it. The statement that truth
consists in correspondence of thought and reality must be explained or amended in
this sense." (Italics mine.)

This attempt can easily be criticised as regards its interpretation of

the notion of correspondence with reality. Brentano, while admitting
that it does not say very much, defends it as useful. It might be argued
that his defence is not satisfactory, that in fact he says too little to be
of any real use, and also that, regardless of its usefulness, this inter-
pretation, or any interpretation of correspondence for that matter, is
open to serious positive objections. As later this point is taken up by
Brentano himself, I shall not enlarge on it here; besides remarking
that in this account a great deal is taken for granted. It is assumed
that one understands, or at least can understand, what reality
is, what is the jUdgement, or whatever it might be that is said to
correspond with it, and also what is meant by 'correspondence.' All
that is the subject of searching inquiry later on.

6. The paper contains one more paragraph which is worthy of atten-

tion, especially in conjunction with Brentano's later position. It runs
as follows:
 TRANSITION AND BACKGROUND 73
"In any case the criterion of truth does not lie in the correspondence with
reality or in the lack of contradiction with it, but in evidence. (The truth of a
judgement is the correspondence with what is, was or will be, or the lack of
contradiction with it)."

This draws a distinction between an account of the criteria of truth and

an account of the concept of truth. It stresses that to explain what truth
is is not equivalent to explaining why and when judgements or state-
ments are true. On the other hand, to give an account of evidence is
not the same as giving an account of truth. In maintaining this,
Brentano is right, and is drawing an important distinction which must
be kept in mind if the problem of truth is to be dealt with satisfactor-
ily. It could be argued that in his ultimate view, Brentano does not
provide any clear answer to the second problem - what is the truth of a
judgement? 18 However, he does not say or think so himself. The
solution that is so nearly a refusal to answer the question might be
interesting in itself, but it is well to remember that his position in-
corporates, besides this, a number of important and instructive points.
The entire discussion is subtle. instructive and complete; there is more
to it than just the ultimate view.

18 For an important qualification of this see Chapter VI.

 CHAPTER V

LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

I. CRITICISM OF THE CORRESPONDENCE FORMULA RES

I. It is now time to consider Brentano's final position concerning the

problem of truth. Several of his writings contain relevant passages. l
I shall firstly consider his ultimate criticisms of the correspondence
theory of truth, and pass on to his positive suggestions later on. In
order to do this I shall take a number of papers together and pick
passages and arguments in the order which suits me. In discussing any
argument I may refer to relevant passages in any of Brentano's
writings. The five papers mentioned in the footnote on this page
will, however, form the main text to which I shall refer. Towards
the end of the discussion the problem of evidence will have to be
considered as well. My purpose, as in the previous sections, is not
merely to interpret Brentano, but to learn from his arguments as much
as possible about the problem of truth and its difficulties. I also hope
to find some help by paying attention to Brentano's insight into the
problem, as evidenced in those arguments. What I think to be the
most important insight or the most illuminating passage might not
always be what Brentano himself would have regarded as such. It is
however what I shall pay closest attention to. One could therefore
maintain that the resultant picture is not always a really good picture
of what Brentano would regard as the correct and balanced view
concerning truth, but more a picture of what I regard as Brentano's
1 Five papers are particularly important here. Three of these were published in W &E,
pp. 121-39. They are:
(i) "Zur Frage der Existenz der I nhalte und von der adequation rei et intellectus." (Nov. 20. 1914)
(ii) "Ober den Sinn des Satzes: "veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus"." (May II, 1915.)
(iii) "Ober den Satz: "veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus"." (EL. 45)
Two were not published as far as I know. They are:
(iv) "Ober den Sinn und die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satzes: "veritas est adequatio rei
et intellectus"." (May 12, 1915) Translated in Appendix' C". (EL. 28)
(v) "Kurzer Abriss einer allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie". (no date.) Chapter 4 translated in
Appendix "D". (EL. 96).
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART) 75
important and interesting contribution to the subject. On the other
hand, paying due regard to the character of Brentano's philosophy, it
could be maintained that the approach which I have adopted is the
only one that suits the subject really well. I am inclined to think that
this is correct and that my representation of Brentano is fair. If,
however, we wish to say that scholarship consists in tracing out
what the man actually said and what precisely he meant when
saying these words, then this is not what I am aiming at. By this
I mean that such is neither the primary nor the sole aim of the book.
Perhaps it is safer to say that this account should not be primarily
thought of as a scholarly investigation.

2. Brentano approaches the problem by way of an attempt at clari-

fying the sense of the sentence: "V eritas est adequatio rei et intet-
lectus" - for quick reference I shall call this sentence the corre-
spondence formula. More particularly, he seems to discuss three words,
namely '"Yes', 'inteUectus' and 'adequatio'. To start with, we shall take
these words in turn and consider in some detail Brentano's account of
them as well as his objections to the way in which they were unreflect-
ingly used by the protagonists of the correspondence theory of truth.
In W&E (p. 125-6), he sets out the traditional sense of the corre-
spondence formula as follows:
"If it had the sense that is (generally) given to it then anybody who recognises
that an object is would do it in virtue of the fact that he would recognise a
certain identity between something in his mind 2 and something outside (it).
And the recognition of this identity would be presupposed in that one would
(have to) be able to compare the one with the other."

But how, he asks, can something in the mind be compared with some-
thing outside it? And if the knowledge of that wich is outside the mind
cannot be gained by such a comparison, then surely it must be found
where it is immediately given, i.e. in immediately evident compre-
hension. This is a foretaste of Brentano's ultimate view,3 but for the
present we shall concentrate on his criticisms of the correspondence
theory of truth. These are important since at an earlier date he held the
view himself and is now parting company with it. The general purport
of this treatment is that not only is the correspondence formula unsatis-
factory as a whole, but that each significant feature of it is un-
In seinem Geiste.
2
Brentano holds that a true judgement is either immediately evident, or else it agrees
3
with an evident judgement or a set of evident judgements. (The double judgement analysis
of the terms a, e, i, 0 ties in with this view.)
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

satisfactory in itself in this context. The whole is a misconception

based on an unreflective and unsophisticated acceptance of the linguistic
forms. I think that Brentano is quite successful in criticism, and this
makes the discussion important. What makes it even more interesting
is his careful and detailed treatment of the problem. Let us now turn
our attention directly to the three terms listed above:

3. 'Res', a 'thing' or an 'object', perhaps 'something concrete'.4

Brentano says that it could be taken to mean a thing in general (W&E,
p. I3I). It is used, according to him, to denote that which is outside the
mind. He says (Appendix "C"):
"It is sometimes thought that the word 'Adequatio' denotes a special relation
of equivalence. 5 Whenever a judgement is true, this relation is supposed to
hold between something outside the mind, which formed the judgement, and
something in this mind. That which is outside the mind is denoted by the word
'res', that which is in the mind, by the word 'intellectus'."

If we take seriously that 'res' is that which is outside the mind, this
would imply, if the correspondence theory is accepted, that whenever a
judgement is true there must be a thing outside the mind that corresponds
with it. 6 Then (a) A problem is created because it might seem impossi-
ble that this is the case, and (b) A further problem is created because
it would seem necessary that a one/one relation should exist between
each judgement and its corresponding Res. 7
Brentano produces several particular difficulties appertaining to this:
(a) It is possible to judge about a thing in its absence, i.e., when it does
not exist. For instance, it is possible to say that there is no centaur
(see Appendix "C", para. 6), or, we may add, that a centaur is half a
horse and half a man, or that it is a mythical figure. The last is a true
affirmative judgement, but where is the 'Res' that corresponds with
our understanding? The only way in which this can be solved, accord-
ing to Brentano, would consist in employing entia rationis, viz. 'the
existence of a centaur as a mythical figure,' etc., etc. as shown above
in Chapter III, Section 2. Brentano argued successfully against these
fictional entities on several grounds. For instance, in (i) W&E p. I26-7,
para. I4), he remarks that if one accepts these entities this will lead to
4 See W&E (OK. 168). I list words which one might, at times, be tempted to use to trans-
late 'res'.
5 The German word used is 'Gleichheitsverhiiltnis'.
6 'Mind' and 'understanding' are used by me for 'intellectus'.
7 If two different judgements correspond with the same state of affairs, how are either of
them to be verified? (See the Gorgias difficulty.) If meaning is determined by verification
they become identical and I/I correlation obtains, but is this really plausible?
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART) 77
the supposition of an indefinitely large multitude of entities which it
would be quite impossible to grasp. There would exist - existences,
existences of existences, non-existences, existences of non-existences,
potentialities, fulfilments and non-fulfilments of potentialities, etc.,
etc. This is a bad thing in itself, but what is even worse, is that anyone
attempting to determine a single case of correspondence would become
involved in an examination of an infinite regression of these entities.
It might be argued that these unpleasant consequences tend to dis-
appear if we limit entia rationis to facts, situations, or states of affairs.
Our judgement "A centaur is a mythical figure" corresponds then with
the fact, that a centaur is a mythical figure, and this fact does not
imply further facts ad infinitum. 8 As against this, let us observe that
Brentano maintains (W&E, p. 122-(i)), that to imagine something is to
imagine an object. It is impossible to have an idea of a non-object.
Clearly he thinks that in order to make sense of the correspondence
theory of truth we must conceive of the correspondence as obtaining
between our ideas (Vorstellungen) and concrete objects, but an ens
irreale is not a concrete object. It is true that Brentano does not ever
consider states of affairs, concrete situations or concrete facts. One
should observe, however, that these are not concrete in the required
sense. It is impossible to point to a state of affairs, situation or fact;
it is impossible to picture these as objects, and this is clearly what
Brentano believes is needed in order to have an idea of it. On the other
hand, if we suggest that this realist position should be abandoned, and
maintain that facts, while not concrete objects, can correspond with
propositions, it becomes hard to see how these differ from assertions,9
i.e., from what is in fact primarily thought of as being either true or
false.

4. The example discussed in the above paragraph was a case of an

affirmative judgement and therefore cannot be dealt with by the
expedient suggested in "Wahrheit ist eine art von iJbereinstimmung".10
What is more, Brentano suggests (W&E, p. 132 (ii)), that 'Res' must
mean the same in all cases:
"It is clear that the meaning of the term 'res' does not change in all these
cases. l l It would also be a great mistake if a term was used in a definition in
8 Even though it implies some further facts, e.g. that someone or some people created a
'centaur', but this is, of course, quite a different matter.
9 Cf. Strawson, ASP Symposium.
10 See Chapter IV, Section 2 above - the expedient is directed at negative judgements only.
11 Discussed in the preceeding paragraphs.
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

an equivocal way. This, however, would be the case if the expression 'res' was
to be regarded as (having) different senses in negative judgements and (in
judgements) modified according to tenses. 12 (This) because the definition should
be such that it fits all true judgements."

An ambiguous term cannot properly be used in definition 13 - a defini-

tion must have constant meaning and it must fit all cases, otherwise
it is useless. However, if all the cases are thought of as being true when
"not in harmony" with reality, then the theory becomes suspect.
Either it becomes very vague indeed, or it is thrown back on the view
that truth consists in correspondence between understanding and the
facts. However, as observed above, it may be difficult to give a satis-
factory account of the nature of facts.

5. Not limiting the discussion to the points mentioned above, Bren-

tano produces other puzzling cases arising out of the nature of 'Res'.
These, however, lead back to the same problems:
It is possible to judge about past things; also
It is possible to judge about future things; (W&E, p. 132, Appendix
"e", para. 7); and even about possibilities, etc.; (W&E, p. 123).
A further problem that sheds some new light on the question of facts is
posed by negative judgements. (W&E, p. 138, Appendix "e", para. 6).
Brentano observes that the thing, e.g. a blue tree' cannot exist if the
judgement "there is no blue true" is true. Brentano says, in EL. 28
(Appendix "e"):
"If, besides the above examples of affirmative judgements, we bring under
consideration also negative judgements, we are subjected to further doubts. A
number of those are also true. So, for instance, the negative judgement "There
is no centaur". On the one hand the centaur is represented in the mind and so it
is included in the negative judgement. On the other hand, however, in reality
there are no centaurs and therefore it would seem impossible to discover here
the relation of equivalence. What is more, if in reality there was a centaur, the
judgement would be false."

The case of such negative jUdgements is puzzling unless we adopt the

existence of an ens rationis, e.g. the non-eXistence of a blue tree (or of a
centaur), with all its unpleasant consequences. Should we wish to say
that it is a fact that a blue tree does not exist, or that the situation,
state of affairs, case is that there is no blue tree, then we would
be faced with the following dilemma: Either the fact, state of affairs,
etc., means the same as an assertion or a judgement, or it means

12 The German text reads: "Temporal modalisierten Urteile". (See OK. 169).
13 This is in direct contrast to the paper discussed in Chapter II, Section 1.
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART) 79
something else. In the first case we would be comparing two identical
judgements when we compared the fact (state of affairs) that there is
not a blue tree with the judgement "There is not a blue tree". 14 This
does not sound plausible. In the second case we must again suppose an
indefinitely large multitude of facts (states of affairs, etc.) to corre-
spond to all possible negative judgements.

6. Another type of problem arises from the question "Is there a

one/one correlation between the understanding and Res?" There are
some difficulties in this supposition because it would seem possible
that more than one judgement can refer to the same state of affairs.
Notably it is the case that, e.g. the privation of a blue true corresponds
both with the true judgement "There is no blue tree" and with the
false judgement "There is a blue tree" (W&E, p. 132 (ii)). Furthermore,
Brentano observes, the judgement can refer to its object either in
modo recto or in modo obliquo. What is the case is thus not tied very
closely to the judgement. A change in judgement does not imply a
change in objective reality. (W&E, p. 138 (iii)). These points may seem
trivial and easily dealt with, but at least they show that it is impossible
to explain the truth of the judgement simply by correlating the idea
with the thing.15 It will be necessary to specify, as it were, the standing
of the idea with respect to that of the jUdgement, e.g., as Brentano says
(Appendix "e", para. 6):
"To this it would be replied that the centaur exists in the mind that passes
the judgement in the capacity of a denied thing. Outside the mind the centaur
does not exist, but there exists therefore the non-existence of the centaur, and
this is the object that corresponds with the centaur which exists as a denied
thing in the mind. In this consists the required relation of equivalence." 16
One might well ask then - if we have to specify the standing of the
idea in the above mentioned way-what else are we doing but specifying
the kind of relation existing between the understanding and the thing?
And if we are not doing anything more, how can we refer to the re-
lation twice - once to explain the nature of the judgement in question,
and again to see whether it is true? This problem will become especially
acute if we wish to say, as Brentano wished to say, that it is the very
same concrete thing that is the object of our judgement; 17 because
14 Cf. W &E, p. 133. This suggestion is not as preposterous as it might seem when offered
as an explanation and not as a criterion of truth.
15 Compare here Austin's ingenuous interpretation in ASP Symposium.
16 Compare here the correspondence of statement with facts, states of affairs, what is the
case, etc.
17 Representation - mere idea, is different from judgement in that it has a different in-
80 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

then, to specify the relation is to explain the nature of the mental act.
(It could, e.g., be a mere representation, an affirmative judgement, a
negative value judgement, etc., etc.). But to explain why it is that
sort of mental act, for example an affirmative judgement, is not the same
as explaining whether it is it true; nor yet is it the same as explaining
what it is for this judgement to be true. Sometimes Brentano says that
a judgement is true when it is 'applied' properly, but without further
elucidation this does not seem very exciting. Sometimes, more
plausibly, he goes on to say that in order to see whether a judgement is
in fact 'applied' properly, one should consult the evidence. Even in
this case, however, one fails to receive full satisfaction because it is
impossible to distinguish, by reference to evidence, between establish-
ing 'X' and establishing 'X is true'. This is so because the evidence in
both cases must be the same. Therefore this suggestion, if accepted as
the final answer, would imply that the words 'is true' are quite re-
dundant.1 8 Brentano's final view, as represented by O. Kraus (W&E,
p. 26), is that: "The assertion 'the judgement A is true' expressed the
thought (that) ... it is impossible that an evidently true judgement
could be materially different from judgement A." I do not find this
satisfactory for it seems to me that the proposed explanation of truth
expresses a different thought, and refers to a fact, strictly implied by
the fact that assertion A is true, but obviously different from it. 19

7. Another argument of Brentano's which should be discussed under

the heading of 'Res' is the one introduced in W&E, p. 34-5 (ii). He
considers there the view that what corresponds with our understanding
(in the case of a true judgement) is not any particular thing but the
totality of all things. What we say either does or does not correspond
with the universe. Past and future events are dealt with by reference
to the totality of things and causal laws. Brentano treats this attempt as
obviously unsatisfactory and produces only two arguments against it:
(a) The view presupposes the truth of determinism, and yet this is a
controversial matter. Settlement of other controversial issues is also
implied.
(b) The solution is impractical and useless; if it was correct, no one
tentional relation to its object - the idea cannot be the object of a judgement unless of course
the judgement is about an idea. The concrete thing can be the object of an idea and of a
judgment.
18 Cf. Strawson: ASP Symposium and Anal. IX.
19 Despite this, I am of the opinion that this position is plausible. If it is adjusted in the
light of the above it becomes very nearly satisfactory. Vide: - my article "It is True" in
"Mind" 1965/6.
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART) 81

could ever know whether any judgement was in fact true; but this is
an implausible consequence. We may add that this view would raise
again the problems of the one/one correlation between judgement and
fact - according to it, one situation, the universe, corresponds to all
judgement.

2. CRITICISM OF THE CORRESPONDENCE FORMULA

INTELLECT US AND ADEQUATIO

1. In view of the above discussion, we must conclude that the concept

of 'res' or the object outside the mind, to which our judgement is said
to correspond, is far from satisfactory. Whichever way we approach
it, it presents numerous difficulties, and attempts at clarifying these
simply result in further puzzles. But this concept must be made clear
and plausible if the correspondence formula is to have any real use.
This, then, would be enough to carry Brentano's point, but he goes on
to analyse the remaining concepts of 'inteUectus' and of correspondence.
Intellectus - the mind, understanding or the idea.! Brentano says
(Appendix "C", para. 4): "This which is outside the mind is denoted
by the word 'Res', that which is in the mind, by the word 'inteUectus'."
This, taken as it stands, immediately raises the problems discussed
above. In W&E, para. 2, p. 131, it is further claimed that inteUectus
does not denote the faculty but rather its act, seen in abstracto. 2
No one says that he who thinks, or judges (or that the judging faculty)
is true, but only that the thought or judgement is true. However,
according to Brentano, to say that someone judges correctly comes
to the same as saying that his judgement is true. This seems quite
correct, but we could claim that it cannot remove the distinction
between the assertion or statement on the one hand and the mind and
the mental event on the other hand. This distinction is indicated
independently by the fact that it is not necessary to specify who passed
the judgement and when, in order to pronounce it true. This is support-
ed further by the fact that more than one person can pass the same
judgement. Therefore' inteUectus' is not established satisfactorily for the
purpose of the correspondence theory. Perhaps we could adopt the view
that it is the assertion or statement that can properly be said to be either
true or false. In this case it must be the assertion that corresponds
1 Again I list these words that one is at times tempted to use in translation of 'inteUectus'.
2 The 'act seen in abstracto' comes very close to what I would wish to call assertion.
82 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

with 'Res', if truth consists in such correspondence. It is, however,

doubtful whether assertions or statements can correspond with objects
or states of affairs. In this way it is again shown that the corre-
spondence theory is of doubtful value.

2. Brentano's point in this context seems to be as follows: In order

to render the correspondence formula operative, all three elements,
viz. 'res', 'inteUectus' and the sense of 'adequatio' have to be established
in their own right. This is so, presumably, since correspondence is a
proper relation and as such implies the independent existence of
both termini. 3 'Res' was shown to be doubtful but 'inteUectus' can only
be used if the word is a proper name, viz. name of an entity.4 But
entia rationis are not entities. Discarding these and applying the new
linguistic analysis, we see that 'inteUectus' and its equivalents are not
proper names; each of them is a syncathegorematic expression. As
such, it has meaning only in linguistic context and does not name an
entity. This is so since it consists in an indirect reference to reality
and its grammatical form is no indication of its function. Actually we
tend to take statements like "His judgement is true" as the basis
of our use of the term, and the alleged correspondence is not between
the faculty of thinking (intellectus) and the real but between the real
and such acts (judgements). However, when we say, syncathegore-
matically, "his judgement is true", we say in effect that he judges
correctly. No entity is therefore established that could be regarded as
an entity sufficient to be a terminus of the relation of correspondence.
These points are not made directly, at least in the papers mentioned
here, but they are made clearly enough by implication. Neither term
of the relation is satisfactory; now what about the relation itself?

3. Adequatio 5 - equivalence, correspondence, etc. Having disposed

of the Aristotelian conception consisting in the view that the corre-
spondence comes to this - that the true judgement combines what is
in reality combined and separates what is in fact separated6 Brentano
affirms that 'adequatio' is usually taken to be a relation between a
judgement and something outside it (Appendix "B", para. 2, (iv)). This
interpretation invites all the problems arising out of the interpretation of
both 'res' and 'inteUectus'. There is, for instance, the type of difficulty
3 Quite clearly, the said correspondence, is not the mental act.
4 This is the minimum requirement.
S Consideration of this involves some reference to all relevant points.
6 See Appendix "D", para. 2.
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

concerned with negative assertions and assertions about the past or

the future. (W&E, p. 133-4, and Appendix "C", para. 6-7.) This was
already discussed in the paragraph above. However, let us observe
here that this difficulty is not limited to the fact that when we say
there is no devil there is no devil to correspond with our idea. There is
a further problem concerning the relation itself. We might try to solve
the first difficulty by supposing an ens rationis, i.e. the non-existence-
of-a-devil introduced in order to correspond with our judgement. This
fictional entity would be regarded then, as a correlate uniquely
appropriate to our jUdgement. The new difficulty cannot be solved in
this way, because as Brentano observed, (W&E, p. 134), it consists in
the fact that this ens rationis is not appropriate to the jUdgement. The
above mentioned fictional entity corresponds, strictly speaking, with
an affirmative judgement, namely the judgement "There is a non-
existence of a devil". The judgement "There is no devil", however, is
obviously about the devil, not about the "non-existence of a devil".
This is so, simply because it is in fact different from the judgement
directly concerned with this fictional entity. Admittedly, a positive
judgement about the one implies a negative judgement about the
other; but the fact that strict implication holds between two assertions
is not to be equated with identity of these assertions; I + I = 2 and
2 + 2 = 4 jointly imply that I + I + 2 = 4, but it does not follow
from this that the expression "Both 'I + I = 2' and '2 + 2 = 4' are
true" is identical with the expression "I + I + 2 = 4 is true".
This sort of consideration leads Brentano to affirm that the corre-
spondence between understanding and what is the case (Sache) is mis-
construed if it is understood as implying the existence of both termini.
He says therefore (in W&E, p. 124), that the word adequatio does not fit
the case when it is assumed that it implies a relation which in turn
implies the existence of both termini. In fact, according to Brentano,
it does not imply the existence of the object, or does so only in a
special sense, in which sense anything thought of exists in the mind-
this, even if the concrete existence of such a thing is expressly and
properly denied. It will easily be seen that an object existing in the
mind in the above sense will not solve our problem, for if the truth of
our judgement was to be tested by correspondence with this object,
it could be tested without considering anything but the mind and its
'content' - and then we should be able to find out the truth of an
empirical statement, e.g. "There are no 7-legged cows", without any
reference to experience. To accept this would defeat the very purpose
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

of the correspondence theory of truth, besides being implausible in

itself.7 But the word 'correspondence' as used here is also used in a
special way as indirect reference to reality. The correct way of ap-
proaching the problem is to examine the function of the word 'is' in the
expression 'X is true'. When we do this, we see that to look for a
genuine relation of 'adequatio' is completely out of place here. This is
so because, as Brentano says (in W&E, p. I27), 'is' in 'is true' means
nothing else but "according to whether A is or is not, the judgements of
the people of whom the first assents to A and the other dissents from
it, it is either the first or the second that is right." In this way the
equivalence is shown to be an ordinary syncathegorematic expression,
and as such, it is not a name of, nor does it imply, a relation.

4. With regard to the view that 'adequatio' consists in the corre-

spondence of what is thought and what is the case, Brentano says {see
Appendix "C", (v)):
"We cannot fail to see that even if this conception were correct then at least
the way in which it is expressed would have to be regarded as grossly misleading.
It is possible to speak about the relation of equivalence in cases of a mere idea 8
of, either the body, or the connection of tree with green. In this case it is however
impossible to speak of truth, because truth belongs to judgements." 9

This difficulty is presented by the fact that we can talk sensibly about
a mere idea corresponding or failing to correspond with what it is an
idea of (Appendix "C", para. 5). Truth, however, belongs only to
judgements or assertions, certainly not to mere ideas. An idea, when
thought of as a mere representation (Vorstellung) can be faithful or not,
detailed or not, clear or unclear; but it could be neither true nor
false. 10 This consideration lends further support to the view that truth
applies properly to what the act of jUdging achieves (the act seen in
abstracto), namely to an assertion or statement. An assertion is essential-
ly different from a representation, and if we are testing assertions we
are not testing mere representations. This makes the correspondence
test seem implausible. Not implausible merely because it can also be
used to test representations, but even more so because the testing of ideas
rather than assertions would appear to be the most fitting and natural

7 This was not discussed by Brentano; a further difficulty would arise out of an attempt to
distinguish the required correspondence from the intentional relation which characterises
judgement. Cf. above para. 7.
8 Vorstellung.
9 See W &E, p. 3 ff. The reply below does not answer this criticism.
10 Cf. here also Most p. 23 ff.
 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART) 85
task for this method. It is precisely representations that would appear
most fittingly tested by investigating the alleged correspondence
between them and the things represented by them. An interesting
corollary of this is this: If we try to explain truth by reference to ac-
ceptance, the argument applies. l l In contradistinction to the above, it
is not the case that accepting a mere idea is a paradigm case of ac-
ceptance, but such acceptance is certainly possible. This points to the
fact that, in order to use acceptance for the explanation of truth, we
must ask: What sort of acceptance can be used to explain the nature
of truth: and if we ask this question, we have to re-think the whole
problem. When we re-think it, we will either improve the acceptance
theory or abandon it. This argument, then, has implications of im-
mediate contemporary relevance.

5. How, then, are we to interpret the correspondence (adequatio)?

According to Brentano (W&E, p. 137), when we say in general that
truth means correspondence of understanding and what is the case, we
are saying something very general, which we take to have a number of
important metaphysical implications. At the very least, we are trying
to imply that if one judges truly one is paying properregard to reality.
However, this general statement, if not worked out in more detail,
soon degenerates into a mere metaphor. Looking closer, we see that
'adequatio' cannot mean equality (W&E, p. r"32). 12 We can easily see
that it is impossible that the relation could be identical in the af-
firmative, negative, present, past and future judgements. Each of
these judgements could be, at different times, passed upon the same
obfect and be true. If the relation between a true judgement and its
object was always the same, it would be hard to see wherein their
difference consisted. 13 If the relation was one of identity, it would
have to be the same in each case. Add to this the other difficulties,
which, in Uber den Begritt der Wahrheit have led Brentano to adopt a
very general interpretation of the notion of correspondence, and we are
faced with a dilemma. The position would seem unsatisfactory whether
we interpreted 'adequatio' widely or narrowly. We might try to say, as
Brentano says (W&E, p. 124), quoted above, that when we talk about
correspondence we simply mean to indicate that, depending on whether
there is or there is no A, the jUdgements of those who accept A in the

11 Cf. Strawson, ASP Symposium and Anal. IX.

12 Cf. the Gorgias difficulty.
13 This may lead to something like the view of J. L. Austin; See ASP Symposium.
86 LATE POSITION (CRITICAL PART)

first case, or reject it in the second, are correct.14 This has the ad-
vantage that it is always A that is the object of the judgement. If A
is accepted, the judgement is affirmative, if it is rejected, negative.
There is then no need to postulate entia irrealia. Although this may save
Brentano's realism, it cannot solve the problem of correspondence
because the dilemma, as described above, still applies. There are
other kinds of judgements besides the affirmative and negative, and
they often refer to their object in different ways. These different ways
have to be accounted for.

6. The correspondence formula is thus shown to be untenable. It

sounds plausible when we take the words in an unsophisticated, un-
reflective way. This is not to say that when we say "X is true" we
express ourselves improperly,15 but we are philosophically in error if
we take the linguistic form as indicative of the sense and use of this
phrase. If we do this we are led to treat it as indicative of a proper
relation between two termini, but a careful analysis shows that this is
an error. "X is true" is, in fact, a complex phrase; it is not a direct
description of reality but represents an indirect metaphor by which we
express what we wish to say.16 The correspondence formula is thus
wrong. This, however, leaves us with a problem - What do we say
when we say "X is true"?

14 This is not parallel to the view of Strawson for obvious reasons.

15 See Sprechen und Denken.
16 This is what Brentano would say.
 CHAPTER VI

LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART)

I. TRUTH

I. The solution of the problem posed at the end of the last chapter is
attempted by Brentano in his ultimate positive account of truth.
This account is very cautious; it refers to evidently true judgements
and ultimately comes to saying that a properly established judgement
is what we call a true judgement. But does this really amount to a
full and satisfactory analysis of the concept of truth? In a way, yes.
Many misconceptions have been removed and many important features
of the problem brought to light. The main source of error -linguistic
naivete - was pointed out and analysed. We now have a much firmer
and more sophisticated conception of truth. Lastly but not least, we
are provided with an explanation that accounts for the use and usage
of the phrase "X is true". This explanation is not circular since it
explains 'true judgement' by reference to 'evident judgement'. In
another way we are not satisfied. We feel that the metaphysical puzzle
has not been resolved satisfactorily; it tends to reappear if we scrutinise
the phrase 'evident judgement'. Furthermore, we might find that the
actual 'reduction'l is not quite satisfactory. Perhaps it was not suffi-
ciently demonstrated that the account offered is an account of the
meaning of 'true'. Perhaps no answer was really provided to the
question: "What do we mean by the words 'X is true'? ".

2. Brentano's final view is as follows, (W&E, p. 139, para. 3):

"All this comes really to nothing more than this, that truth belongs to the
judgement of him who judges correctly (richtig); i.e. it belongs to the judgement
of that person who judges as someone would judge about this matter if he judged
about it with evidence. Therefore to one who asserts the same as would be
asserted by one who expressed an evident judgement." 2
I mean 'reduction' very generally.
1
'To judge with evidence' is either to express a self-evident judgement or to judge on
2
the basis of evidence.
88 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART)

It will be seen that in this passage the correspondence idea is finally

abandoned. Now Brentano maintains that to say that a judgement
is true is to mean that it is either evident itself, or that it is reducible
to an evident jUdgement. 3 A remark in an earlier paper (W&E, p. 133,
para. 5,4 sheds further light on this position. Here Brentano claims
that when one investigates a judgement, one compares what one knows
about the object of the judgement with what one knows about the
judgement in question. One finds that some judgements fit with one's
knowledge of the object and others do not - this is all that it is
necessary to ascertain in order to be able to say whether a given judge-
ment is true. This, says Brentano, represents insight for anyone who
believes that truth is the same for everybody. But those who would
wish to provide a criterion for finding out whether their own judge-
ments are true must be disappointed. Obviously he means that the
criterion produced is the proper criterion for finding out whether
statements of others, but not one's own, are true. I can check upon my
own judgements only by referring to evidence. 5 This suggests strongly
that the above is an account of the meaning of the sentence "X is
true," (W&E, p. 133):
"If, then, this is the sense of the sentence (in question) then it is in fact such
that it is, to start with, illuminating for those who realise that the truth is one
for all. But it is obvious at the same time that one would be seriously misled if
one thought that this sentence provides not only a criterion for asserting truth
or falsity about someone's opinion in a way that pre-supposes the knowledge
of truth on one's own part. But (that it provides) also a way in which one can
himself arrive at the truth."

If we accept this as the account of the meaning of 'true' we should

realise that it is very close to the acceptance theory,6 and also that it is
pretty vague. It is partly this vagueness that makes it difficult to
apply here many of the criticisms valid against a full-blown acceptance
view. But to accept this as the final account of the meaning of 'true'
would, I think, amount to misrepresenting Brentano. There is good
reason to believe that he thought that 'true judgement' meant 'correct
judgement'. This is why he can talk of "oneself arriving at the truth".
This is also why he is in a position to ascertain that evident judge-

3 See Most p. 23 ff. and oK. Einleitung to W&E.

4 Actually it is not dated earlier. Obviously Brentano's opinions fluctuated at this time,
and he did not hold unwaveringly to one position. On the other hand, he might have been
merely trying out different ideas. I have followed Kraus' lead in ordering the papers in
logical sequence.
5 Evidence will be discussed in Section 2 of this chapter.
6 Vide P. F. Strawson, ASP Symposium.
 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART) 89
ments are true. But when we ask: What is it for a judgement to be
correct - then the puzzle seems to reappear as strong as ever. In
explanation of the plausibility of the correspondence story, Brentano
says, (W&E, p. 132 (v)), that the correspondence formula really comes
to this - that of two contradictory judgements, only one ( and its
equivalents) can fit the case. But surely this is not much of an ex-
planation of what it is for such a judgement to be correct. Brentano
goes on to explain what judgements ate true. viz. the evident judge-
ments, and by implication, all other judgements that agree with these
in the relevant way. Thus, in effect the term 'true', in at least one good
sense, is left as an unexplained primary term. The great virtue of this
account lies in this: (a) that Brentano avoids crippling misconceptions,
and (b) that he has shown some popular and misleading accounts to be
false or misleading or both.
According to Brentano, all that I can say about my own judgement is
either that it is evident or that it is equivalent either to an
evident judgement or to a set of evident jUdgements. But since
the judgement consists in either assent or dissent, what is evident
is that one should assent or dissent. This is significant, and it
makes the claim that Brentano is offering a full account of truth more
plausible. However it leaves many of the features that have in the
past led to the correspondence view still quite puzzling. When we
refer to usage we find that typically when I say "X is true", I have
tested 7 a judgement and express the fact that I am in agreement with it.

3. It is to be observed that in fact the tested judgement does not have

to be anybody's judgement; it can be merely an envisaged jUdgement.
If it concerns a matter I have knowledge of, I can test it in the des-
cribed way-if I lack the knowledge, 1 cannot. 1 might then say: "I do
not know whether there are any pink swans in Swahililand". It is also
to be observed that Brentano seems to be wrong when he says that my
knowledge of pink swans is a criterion for pronouncing the assertion
"There is at least one pink swan" true. 8 If 1 am challenged and say:
"I know that there is at least one pink swan", I do not produce evidence.
1 am merely emphatically staking my reputation on the truth of this
statement. That 1 might get away with this is of no importance. I can,
of course, produce evidence. 1 can say: « 1 saw one, two months ago,
in Swahililand". 1 can produce a photograph, etc., etc. However, any
7 Tested by comparing with my own judgement, etc.
8 I take it that 'criterion' implies reference to 'evidence for'.
go LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART)

evidence that I can produce can be used as much to test my own, as

anybody else's judgement. Furthermore, the testing for truth suggest-
ed above can only take place in the presence of an actual or envisaged
assertion;9 it can never be used as an opening move. The nearest
approach to opening in this way lies in envisaging the assertion as the
first step. What is more, commentary based on one's own conviction is
the paradigm case in which we use 'true'. One may then be led to
inquire whether it is the case that 'true' is essentially a got-it word, to
be used in this sort of situation.

4. This suspicion is strengthened when we consider some of the other

arguments used by Brentano against the correspondence theory.l0
Brentano argues that the correspondence test is useless for testing the
truth of judgements, on the following ground: In order to carry out
the required comparison, I must be able to establish first of all the
facts concerning both the termini involved and their relation, but if
I have done so, I have already passed the judgement in question. If,
in order to be sure of any judgement I must first establish its truth in
this way, I am forced into an infinite regression. Thus correspondence
cannot be used to establish the truth of a judgement. In view of what
has just been said above (Section 2), it would appear that, if this is the
whole criticism, correspondence could be used to establish the truth of
an actual or envisaged assertion but not to establish the assertion for
the first time, e.g. it could not be used in the absence of a definite
assertion. It would also appear that in cases where we lack knowledge
we do not seek to establish the truth of any judgements or assertions,
but simply to establish the facts. Evidence is needed to establish the
facts. Truth applies, as Brentano himself claims, to judgements or,
as we may suggest, to assertions or statements. "Is true" is an ex-
pression of a judgement passed upon an assertion (or jUdgement.) It
would not seem to be directly concerned with facts as such. l l This
observation, I believe, is both very interesting and very important,
even though Brentano himself failed to see all its ramifications. It
might be taken as suggesting that what Brentano offers merely as an
account of the usual criterion for testing the truth of somebody else's
assertion amounts in fact to an important insight which could be
developed into a satisfactory account of the nature of truth itself.

9 'Assertion' here is obviously more fitting than 'judgement'.

10 W&E, p. I37 and p. 133, and Appendix "D", para. 2.
11 To say a true fact simply means really a fact.
 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART) 9I
It is, however, not the purpose of this book to follow up this line of
thought.1 2

5. The best compact statement of Brentano's ultimate view is to be

found on pps. I37-9 in Wahrheit una Eviaenz. Here the correspondence
formula is explicitly abandoned and the new attempt clearly formu-
lated - the fragment ends with the quotation used to open Section 2
of this chapter. Brentano argues that the correspondence formula has
to be abandoned because in order to perform its alleged function it
would have to refer to a relation between two termini of which at
least one is unknown. But if the 'res' or 'rerum' were really known
beforehand, then in this fashion the truth would be already appreciated
and the formula redundant, therefore this is an absurd requirement. In
fact, he argues, good evidence is our only guarantee of the truth of a
judgement. This evidence can be either immediate or based on proof
which in itself refers back to immediately evident jUdgements. What
then is the meaning of 'true'? Brentano argues that whoever passes a
judgement is concerned with concrete reality. We speak of truth when
we judge rightly about this concrete reality, of falsehood if we judge
incorrectly. This is what makes the correspondence formula sound
plausible. If Brentano is right about this, then his own story cannot be
a form of the correspondence formula. This is how we should explain
his view: When we judge we assent to or dissentfrom something. This
dissent or assent is directed at concrete reality. The relation between
the form of the sentence expressing such judgements and the concrete
reality is sometimes reasonably straightforward and direct; but often
it is indirect, complex and rather difficult to account for. Disregarding
these difficulties, we can see that sometimes it would be proper to
assent and sometimes to dissent. We can have either immediate or
indirect evidence for it. When the assent or dissent is proper we call
a judgement true, when it is improper we call it false; this is what we
mean by the two terms. On p. I38 of W&E, Brentano himself says:
"Everyone who judges puts himself in an assenting or dissenting fashion in
relation to something, and under this something we must understand something
concrete. 13 But this concrete (reality) is not always exactly like the one who
judges about it."

Brentano wishes to say that the judgement does not always accord
with what is judged about, but he wishes to avoid giving the impression
12 I have developed it elsewhere vide my article 'It is True' Mind 1965/6.
13 Sachliches.
92 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART)

that there is a correspondence between thought and things. He wishes

to insist that it is the one who judges that is either right or wrong
about what he judges. There is often a difference between the judgement
of such a person and this that the judgement refers to.1 4 He continues:
"He who judges does not always stand in an assenting relation to it,15 but
sometimes in a dissenting one. Also some things to which he who judges stands
in some relation, are not represented in modo recto but in modo obliquo. In such
a case the respective thing does not have to exist in any way (even) if the judge-
ment itself is correct. Only this thing must be that, as is always the case with
representations in obliquo, it is at the same time represented in modo recto."

Here Brentano applies his findings from 5prechen und Denken to the
problem of truth. He does it perhaps in a more satisfactory manner
than ever before. We are shown some of the complexity of the relations
that can exist between the one who judges about reality and those
concrete situations to which his judgement appertains. When we
understand the complexity we see that there is no need for misleading
accounts, e.g.:
"Also when I judge correctly that a thing is impossible it is not the case that a
thing must be. My judgement <loes not say this 16 in any way, but it contains the
apodeictic denial of a thing."

All this shows, according to Brentano, that in these cases we cannot

speak of correspondence in the proper sense. Presumably, to speak of
correspondence is to make an indirect reference to what really happens.
But since the correspondence formula is not a common mode of speech
but a philosophical theory, it cannot be defended in the way in which
the continued use of common expressions is defended by Brentano in
5prechen und Denken, so it is best abandoned. What then makes the
correspondence formula sound plausible? Brentano replies (W&E, p.
139) :
"I reply - what one means, seems to refer to nothing other than this, that
he who judges that something is; is not; is possible; is impossible; is thought
by someone; believed by someone; hated by someone: that it was; that it will
be, etc., judges truly if the respective thing is; is not; is possible; is impossible;
is thought of ... , etc."
To build a correspondence theory on a basis no firmer than this is
misleading. Such a theory implies a proper relation of correspondence,
i.e. properly a relation with two terms that can be accounted for, and
14 The sentence used by him is clumsy because Brentano wishes to avoid all the pitfalls
of language. Inter alia he does not want to refer to opinions, judgements, etc.
15 The concrete reality.
16 i.e. that a thing must be - indicates might be a better word. (This fragment is still on
p. 138, W&E.)
 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART) 93
properly a correspondence. But if we accept this view we pre-suppose a
great deal more than we are justified in asserting. In fact some of it is
contrary to what we know to be a fact. It is sufficient, and at any
rate it is all that we can say, to say that truth obtains when we assent or
dissent in cases where we should assent or d~ssent.17 How our judge-
ment is related to its object, how the sentence which expresses it is
related to reality, how we know that we should assent or dissent
respectively, are further problems. Brentano gave some indication of
how we should go about solving them. But they are problems inde-
pendent of the problem of explaining the meaning of 'true'.

6. This then is Brentano's ultimate view. Ultimate but not final -

it is clear that the position is not worked out in all detail and, I think,
also, that he did not think of it as the final solution. He was at the
stage when he tried out several suggestions just after having finally
broken with all the vestiges of the correspondence view. He made
considerable advances, has gained a much better and more sophisticat-
ed insight into the problem, and up to a point, he had definite views
about it. These he presented, discussed and defended, but over and
above this from the point he has reached, he engaged in further
analysis and research. Only death has prevented further development
and further advances. The correctness of this appraisal becomes ap-
parent when one takes a closer look at his discussion of evidence, which
plays a central role in his account of truth.

2. EVIDENCE

1. In order to understand better the ramifications of Brentano's

ultimate conception of truth, we must consider his account of evidence.
The best short texts on the subject are available in USE, section 26 and
Anmerkung 27, also in W&E, pps. I40-I50. The selection in W&E
consists of three short papers;1 these will be the main reference for
our present discussion. Among the unpublished MS., EL. 3I (I9I5),
17 Falsehood is the opposite.
The titles of these posthumously published papers are:
1
(a) Gedankengang zur Lehre vonder Evidenz, (1915).
(b) Uber Evidenz, (1915).
(c) Von del' Evidenz, (1915).
The interpretation in this section is often conjectural since the evidence of Brentano's own
writings is meagre and fragmentary. See also D. Frydman: Zagadnienie Oczywistosci u
Franciszka Brentany, in Charisteria, P.W.N. Warsaw, 1960.
94 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART)

Zur Lehre von der unmittelbaren tatsiichlichen Evidenz is directed to

this point and seems to be illuminating. 2

2. It is Brentano's view that every proof must start with some pre-
suppositions that are evidently true, that is, if the proof is to be satis-
factory. The chain of reasons must have an end. It is therefore im-
possible to prove the truth of every judgement that is true. Some judge-
ments, though true, may fail to be evident and these then have to be
established by reference to other immediately evident jUdgements.
He maintains: (W&E, p. I40, section 3)
"Therefore if there is at all an evident truth (there must be) also one that is
evident immediately and without proof. What then is this that distinguishes it
from all so-called blind judgements."

And there must be evident judgements if there are true jUdgements

that are not authoritative in themselves. After all, we have knowledge,
and knowledge rests on authoritative judgements - judgements that are
both true and evident, jUdgements that have the character of insight.
Only experience allows us to distinguish these judgements from others,
and the distinguishing mark is clarity rather than a feeling of certainty.
Some of them are a priori and some are a posteriori; the former are
evident in themselves, the latter concern only our own inner experi-
ence. 3 This leaves a host of unanswered problems that appear whenever
we wish to tidy up the above view. Brentano points out the difficulties
arising from some attempts but does comparatively little in the positive
way. He is testing the more obvious suggestions as he usually did at the
start of a research attempt. 4 Brentano remarks that we cannot answer his
arguments by claiming that authoritative judgements are those shared
by all or most people ,since ,according to him, such a view leads to a vicious
circle. How then do we know that a judgement is evident? It cannot be the
case that we have, e.g., an irresistible inclination to accept such a judge-
ment because even an idiot can have an idee fixe, and this can be quite
irresistible. Nor can this account for conflict cases. We will have to look
for a better way of determining which jUdgements are evidently true.
Brentano sees that it is futile to try to determine wholly by analysis
what makes a judgement evident. When we look at such judgements
we see that these are cases of judgements displaying a simple sign. 5
2 EL. 32 and EL. 33 are also of some interest.
3 The next chapter will deal with these two types respectively.
4 Usually starting by discussing the views of others. Here he does not go very far beyond
this stage; the views of others are discussed in USE, p. 64 ff.
5 Merkmal.
 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART) 95
This sign can be seen or discovered but it is quite impossible to give an
analytic account of it. How then are we going to find it? The following
is suggested (W&E, p. I43):
"We will solve our problem by having a look at several evident judgements
and by putting them, by way of comparison, alongside others that fail to
possess this differentiating property. In this way we make it clear to ourselves
what is and what is not red and what is and what is not coloured."

When we do this we should make it clear to ourselves that, e.g., seeing

that this book looks red to me is the same as seeing that the judge-
ment "This book looks red to me" is evidently true. We see it with
such clarity that any question as to our reasons for assenting to this is
out of place. This move is similar to what G.E. Moore did in Principia
Ethica with respect to good. Good, according to Moore, is a simple
quality; we can apprehend it but we cannot explain it. But there is a
significant difference. Brentano does not refer to a simple quality.
Whether the sign possessed by evident jUdgements is a quality or not
is a separate problem discussed in some more detail in (b) and (c),
and there he comes to the conclusion that to regard such signs as
accidents of judgements is not quite satisfactory. It was denied above
that we know what is evidently true simply because we cannot reject
it. These judgements in themselves are characterised as correct. Bren-
tano maintains that this feature which is possessed by some judgements
does not consist in that which is evident excluding error. It is only
when we contemplate some jUdgements that are true or false but are not
evidently true or false, and compare them with some others that carry
with them such evidence, that we learn to discriminate between these
two types of judgement. There is no further explanation of this. It
is just a fact about our world and ourselves, that we in fact can and do
discriminate between such different kinds of judgements. This is as
far as he is prepared to go. In one paper, (c), he argues that to regard
the difference between evident and non-evident judgements as an
accident of judgements is better than regarding it as their differentiae
specificae, but even there this view is not really accepted. 6

3. The account of evidence is therefore reasonably vague and open.

An overall picture is never presented, but some points are made quite
clearly. The concept of evidence itself is treated very widely and so it
is said, (W&E, p. I45):

6 He says that the investigation is incomplete.

96 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART)

"When I say that an evident judgement is a certain judgement I do not

exclude that one (can) recognise in an evident manner that something is for him
probable." 7

In general, we can only say that to say that something is evident to

me is the same as saying that I am sure of it. What is more, I must be
sure, in a very clear manner, of the truth of some jUdgements. Unless
I were, I would not be in a position to prove any jUdgements to be true.

4. This cautious tenet is the kernel of Brentano's views concerning

evidence. It comes to saying that it is a brute fact about our world,
that I am sometimes sure of the truth of some of my judgements.
Unless this were the case we could not even begin to discriminate
between true and false, certain and uncertain judgement, but we do
in fact, and we do it reasonably well. What can be evident in a judge-
ment is the fact that its content is to be either assented to or dissented
from. The judgement, as we remember, rests on an awareness, or better
still, it can be said to contain all the elements of a mere idea,8 and
this is what is either accepted or rejected in the appropriate fashion.
To give an example: I have a mere idea of a white horse standing in
front of me. To assent to it is to judge affirmatively that there is a
white horse standing in front of me; to dissent from it is to judge nega-
tively. The judgement is an evident judgement if I know directly
that I should assent to, or conversely, dissent from, this idea. 9 I may
sometimes be mistaken about the events in the world, even if I am
sure that I am right, but then sometimes I am not mistaken,lO and
often when I am mistaken I can find out whether or not I am, in fact,
mistaken. We are not infallible, but mostly we are capable of discerning
the truth.ll Now we are left with an unresolved puzzle: If all true
judgements are either evident or 'equivalent' to evident jUdgements,
and if no jUdgements about the external world are really evident, how
then are true judgements about this world possible ?12 The truth of
statements a priori and statements concerning one's own inner experi-
ence, however, is explicable. The concept of assent to, or dissent from,
7Brentano was very interested in and did a lot of work on probability.
8Vorstellung, (idea, view or representation) - Awareness.
9 Which is not a separate part - an idea, but a reference to the elements of the judgement.
10 This is closely bound up with Brentano's views about the possibility of evident judge-
ments concerning the external world.
11 See here Kas., p. I93.
12 Brentano is inclined to regard the existence of the external world as hypothetically
true. I have some misgivings as to whether this fits really well with his philosophic tempera-
ment (See Psych. III, e.g., p. II), hence I do not know whether we should regard this view as
ultimately crystalised.
 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART) 97
the content of the judgement also poses a difficult problem. It will
be clear that I can assent to the 'horse on the lawn', and that this may
come to judging that there is, in fact, a horse on the lawn. But I can
also assent to Mr. Pickwick, and then I do not judge that Mr. Pickwick
really exists, but yet I am not denying him as a man might who didn't
believe that the book was ever written. In this sense, however, I
dissent from H. Ritter if, by H. Ritter is meant the hero of "Ritter's
Odd Peregrinations," a book written by Bertrand Russell. This diffi-
culty is another instance of the puzzles arising from the problem of the
relation between our judgements and the concrete reality. Assenting
to Jock's love for White Horse whisky, dissenting from a given mathe-
matical proposition, etc., etc., are other examples of this difficulty.
To talk about evidence does not clarify it. Here we are again confronted
with the area of problems arising from Sprechen und Denken, and left
on the margin of Brentano's main investigation.

5. The above is an attempt at careful interpretation of F. Brentano's

ultimate views on evidence. In this area, the task is more difficult
than usual. Most of the papers directly attacking the problem were
written in 1915, and it is quite obvious that at that stage Brentano was
in the middle of research into this matter. His various opinions are
not really consolidated so that the impression is created that they are
so many independent attempts at the question. One thing is common to
all these fragments. Brentano was careful not to say too much, not to
accept as facts or as a reasonable interpretation what was not es-
tablished as such. These fragments, though obviously experimental
work-outs, are carefully considered. Minor points are often stated
with more assurance than the main ones, and the import of the dis-
cussion for the overall problem is not often stated explicitly. All this
conveys the impression that he is feeling his way towards better under-
standing of the problem of evidence. Here more than anywhere else it
would be a: mistake to talk about Brentano's final views; he was just
beginning proper research into the matter.

6. Since Brentano's analysis of truth refers to evident judgements, it

would be a mistake to regard this as finally settled, when the problem of
evidence is still in the early stages of investigation. I have suggested
above that Brentano has not really offered an account of the term
'true'. He said, in effect, that true is what is either immediately or
demonstratively evident. As we have seen, he is also inclined to main-
98 LATE POSITION (POSITIVE PART)

tain 13 that it is a brute fact about our world that we are sometimes
justifiably certain of our judgements. In this light, the explanation of
the term 'true' might come to saying that if I accept the idea - there
is a white horse in front of me - and I should accept it, then my judge-
ment is true. If we ask, how do we know that we should e.g. assent, we
are told, disregarding for the moment the difficulty about the external
world, that it is sometimes evident that we should, and that this is
not the same as saying that it is sometimes evident that our judgement
is true. We know now why we say that some judgements are true and
how we find out whether some other judgements are true. But do we
know what we mean by 'true judgement'? Brentano's answer seems to
be that by 'true judgement' we mean either an assent to an idea,14
when it is obvious or demonstrable that such assent is correct or a
dissent from an idea when it is either evident or demonstrable that
such dissent is correct. By falsehood we mean an assent to an idea when
it is either obvious or demonstrable that it is out of place, or a dissent from
an idea when it is either obvious or demonstrable that this is out of place.
In a sense, this is an explanation of the term 'true judgement', but in a
sense it is not. In this latter sense we might say: When I ask what we mean
by 'true judgement', I am asking precisely this - what is it for an assent
to, or respectively a dissent from an idea, to be obviously or demonstra-
bly correct? To this question Brentano provides no answer. An answer
might have been provided if his analysis of evidence were complete, and
this analysis, in as far as it is carried out, is an attempt to provide it.
However, it would be quite profitless to try to guess what Brentano
would have done if he had carried his research further than he did carry
it in fact. After all, he could have abandoned the whole attempt.
What he has provided is nevertheless invaluable. A thorough, careful
and subtle analysis of the concept of truth and its ramifications:
An account and analysis that is illuminating and largely avoids saying
the wrong thing. Sometimes it fails to be fully satisfactory, but it is
seldom positively unsatisfactory. This feature makes Brentano's
analysis of truth particularly valuable to future researchers. He seems
to have had a particularly fine feeling for the realities of the case -
a grasp that often prevented him from committing an error even when
he could not produce the final answer to his problem, sometimes even
in those cases when he would not be able to give any explicit reasons
for refusing to say the wrong thing.
13 I use this form since I do not believe that Brentano had yet formulated a firm view on
evidence.
14 'Idea' is used here to indicate the mere awareness as the content of the judgement -
see discussion above.
 CHAPTER VII

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

SELF-EVIDENT JUDGEMENTS, 'A PRIORI'

AND ~ POSTERIORr

1. Having said all that we said in previous chapters, let us have a

look at some of the interesting points discussed by Brentano in con-
nection with the problem of truth. We judge with evidence about our
own present inner experience.! Brentano is inclined to deny that an
evidently factual judgement about the external world is possible. 2
This view is related to his theory of mental acts in its later form.
Since it is the case that when we judge 3 we must exist, but the things
about which we judge do not have to exist, therefore we have evidence
only of ourselves. To this, one might reply that what is evident is this-
that we should assent to, e.g., there is a real (existent) horse on the lawn.
In view of this, the argument might be regarded as invalid unless we
wish to divorce mental acts completely from reality, which in turn is
very much against the spirit of the rest of Brentano's philosophy. In
fact, there is good reason to believe that he did not consider the fact
that we are sometimes mistaken, even when we are certain, as a fatal
objection to the possiblity of knowledge. After all, when we are not
mistaken we are not mistaken, but it is not logically necessary that we
cannot be mistaken. This makes it plausible to maintain that the view
of Bretano's which we are discussing is developed without sufficient
regard to other important elements of his analysis of truth. 4 This,
1 The evidence is said to belong to secondary awareness (sekundiires Bewusstsein) which
amounts to direct cognition of one's own mental act; this secondary awareness is an aspect
of the mental act in question, so a factual evident judgement is possible here. On the other
hand, our own mental acts can become primary objects of our cognition, and then our
judgements are not evident. cf. D. Frydman: Zagadnienie Oczywistosci u Franciszka Bl'entany,
(Charisteria).
2 See here the unpublished MS., EL. 31. I am being tentative for reasons stated above.
S Like in the case of every mental phenomenon.
4 However one must remember that the denial of the possibility of evident knowledge of
the external world is made repeatedly and persistently by Brentano; on the other hand it is
not entirely clear what he meant by 'evident judgement'. See here Section 5 below.
lOO RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

however, is not extraordinary in itself. It was Brentano's usual method,

to attack any new problem with a completely open mind and without
ties to any of his other views. These come under close scrutiny only
after he has brought his research to fruition. At that stage he might
throw all the related elements into the melting pot and consider the
whole of the problem anew and on its merits, taking all of his new
knowledge into account. With the problem of evidence and related
matters, this stage is not yet reached, and it is therefore a mistake to do
too much comparing of these opinions with others of his tenets. If
one wished to guess, one would have to say that in the end Brentano
would most likely incline to common-sense, and away from the logically
neat but extraordinary and surprising view. Having made these
reservations, let us proceed. In W&E, p. 150, Brentano says:
"It is impossible that something is actually affirmatively and immediately
evident to someone, unless it is the case that his thinking of it would involve a
contradiction on the assumption that it does not follow."
If this is taken seriously, it follows that it would be self-contradictory
to take the judgement as evident and deny the existence of the object.
Brentano goes on to say, (ibid., p. 150):
"And it is also impossible to regard something affirmatively as necessary
without regarding this thing as factual ... "
In neither case is it required that it should be logically necessary to regard
every evident judgement as true - only the ramifications of regarding
it as true are necessary.5 I think that in this discussion Brentano is
trying to give an account of avowals,6 and their difference from other
judgements. He is suggesting that only these are both evident and
'a posteriori,' but the ramifications of this view are not worked out in
great detail, and it would be a mistake to regard it in this form as
authoritatively indicative of Brentano's views on the whole. 7 We
must, however, note seriously at least this much - that he maintains
that all 'a posteriori' evident judgements concern only our own inner
experience. Judgements 'a priori', on the other hand, are evident in
themselves. This poses the problem, noted above, of how we achieve
any knowledge of the external world.

3. This problem is dealt with in LRU. Here, Brentano distinguishes

three classes of knowledge that is normally regarded as at least some-
5 Brentano observes that it would be inconsistent to regard our own evident judgements
as possibly false. (d. Kas., p. 189 ft)
6 These are first person present tense singular subjective statements (judgements.)
7 See also LRU, p. III and p. 141 ff. for reprint of parts of W&E with additions from Kas.
 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH 101

times evident. These classes are: (a) Experience from outside our own
mind, for instance, the seeing of something etc.; (b) The inner experience,
and (c) A clear, fresh memory of past psychical or physical phenomena.
The inner experience often results in evident judgements, since our
secondary awareness is an aspect of the judgement in question. This
was accepted all along; in fact it is a complex form of the view that we
ourselves must be the best and complete authority of our own experi-
ences. The position is not argued in this form, but the view is implicit
in the arguments used to support Brentano's contention.
Brentano denies that memory is ever evidently true; if challenged, the
judgement based on memory must be justified and, though in some
cases the probability of error may be very small, it must be clear that
the memory judgement can never be immediately evident. Brentano
denies also that prediction of the future could be evidently true - judge-
ments of this kind can be challenged, as evidenced by the Cartesian
assertion that God could have created us a moment ago with all our
present memories, and by the obvious fact that we can be mistaken
in any prediction about the future. If such jUdgements can be chal-
lenged, they must be justified and hence cannot be self-evident.
It makes no sense to challenge a self-evident judgement. We are clearly
left, at the end of this reasoning, with the puzzling problem of our
knowledge of the external world, which we possess, but for which we
simply cannot account. This will have to be discussed in more detail.
It appears that the following was Brentano's view: 8

4. Judgements concerning the external world are never genuinely

immediately evident. That is, it is never immediately evident that, for
example, the green that I experience refers to a real greenness of the
real leaves of a real tree that exists in itself in this exact form, quite
independently of being perceived, sensed or thought of. 9 When one
perceives something, one perceives the real object, not an object as an
object of thought, nor yet sense-data. But the nature of the mental
activity is such that the psychical phenomena - me hearing a real
noise - can take place, provided only that I exist, and independently
of the existence of a real noise. To hear a noise is to have a noise as the
object of our (auditory) perception, but it is the real noise that is the
object of the mental act. Brentano denies that the noise, as the object

8 See LRU, pp. 144-154. (It should be remembered that the account in LRU is completed
and adjusted by the editor, F. Mayer-Hillebrand.) See also Kas., pp. 193-198.
9 But it could be immediately evident that I have a green sense-datum.
102 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

of thought, has independent existence or that it is a sign or repre-

sentation of the real object. I think that he is rather inclined to think
that one's hearing a noise or seeing a white horse are reasons for one's
belief in the existence of these objects, viz. the real noise and the white
horse respectively,lO These are not regarded as infallible reasons, even
if they are the best that we can have. Now it is immediately evident to
me that I hear a noise or that I see a white horse, and the judgements
"I hear a noise." and "I see a white horse" are evidently true. But it is
not immediately evident to me that the fact that I hear the noise is
in this instance a correct reason for affirming the existence of the noise.
After all, I could hear a noise when there is none. In this light, judge-
ments about the world outside us cannot ever be immediately evi-
dently true, that is, they cannot ever be self-evident. I think that it is
clear that in at least this context, one must regard Brentano's references
to 'evident' as references to self-evident jUdgements. It is not quite
clear to me what he meant by this word in general. I have the impres-
sion that at least sometimes he meant no more than simply certain,
and sometimes he seems to mean' analytic'. One cannot be certain that
this confusion exists, nor yet that it does not. But to return to our
main point, we must refer to our reason in order to distinguish cases
of perceptual error from cases of veridical perception, and we have in
fact developed ways and means of deciding it. In general we must say
this: When our perception is veridical, we really hear the noise, see
the object, etc. When it is not, we only think that we do. Sometimes
Brentano talks as if we should say more than this 11 - we perceive our
world well enough to live in it, but we do not perceive directly what it
is really like. 12 About this, we can only make causal hypotheses. This
has sometimes been expressed by saying that the perception of the
outside world can only be phenomenally correct. This, however, is
misleading - we are immediately certain only of the existence of some-
one who feels warm, hears a noise, sees a horse, etc., etc. - noises,
temperatures, colours, etc., are given neither as real objects in the
outside world, nor yet as objects of our consciousness, if these are to
be regarded as entities. There is no direct cognition of the material
world, but it is a mistake to talk about sense data as if they were ob-
jects. Thus we find that the true import of our way of talking can be
10 Cf. W&E, the letters to A. Marty and LRU, p. I46. (Here Brentano points out the diffi-
culties but does comparatively little in the positive way.)
11 See LRU, p. I53-I54. This does not seem to fit really well with all of his other views.
12 Brentano's view here tends strongly towards the making, and playing upon, the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities.
 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH 103

understood correctly by reference to Brentano's analysis of linguistic

function. 13 According to him, we should realise that, for instance,
references to sense data, perceptual green, and so on, are to be under-
stood as indirect references to real objects, viz. people seeing, hearing
and generally sensing. Thus it would be safe to say that, according to
Brentano, we have good reasons for regarding some judgements about
the external world as true - these judgements are not self-evident but
it would be a mistake to demand that they should be. In the final
reckoning, our reason for saying or believing things about the external
world rest on what we see, hear and sense. The connection between this
and the external world was never worked out in detail by Brentano
himself, but perhaps we should remind ourselves about his insistence
that the concrete objects are the objects of our thought. The key to
the whole matter seems to lie in this area.

5. I suppose that one might think of it in the following way: It has

been shown that only concrete objects can be the objects of our thought.
If this is correct then it would be nonsense to claim that we can think
that our thoughts can have objects, if there are no concrete things.
Thus the very fact that we can think at all shows that there must be
an external world; on it rests the possibility of any success in this field.
Admittedly we err sometimes, but the very possibility of such mistakes
is predicated upon the success of the mental activity on the whole.
But it cannot fail to succeed on the whole; indeed it cannot even get
going in the first place if every move made is a mistake. In this way we
see that at least some judgements about the external world must be
successfu1,14 Therefore we have a knowledge of the external world;
but since any of these judgements can be challenged, none of them can
be immediately evident. The important point, however, is that it
makes no sense to challenge the totality of such jUdgements.

6. In the above paragraph I tried to develop the argument in a way

that appears to me to be in keeping with both the spirit and method
of Brentano's philosophy. This is not Brentano's own argument and is
not presented as such, but it is an argument that Brentano might well
have developed. Another feature of this argument is this - It is not an
attempt to work out in detail the ramifications of what Brentano has
actually said, but an attempt to think further, though in a kindred
13 See Appendix "A".
14 In fact the majority must be successful.
104 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

spirit, about the problem. In this, my approach differs from that of A.

Kastil.1 5 He too tries to bring Brentano's views a step further, but he
takes his actual words as both his proof and starting point, This is, I
think, a mistake. It wasn't Brentano's own method and it is particular-
ly out of place with regard to these of his views that were still in the
formative stages of development. To say that Kastil does this and no
more might be harsh; he did try to continue the work in the master's
spirit. But there is enough of this over-reverent attitude to the actual
words written by Brentano to affect his whole assessment of the
master's philosophy, and to be particularly noticeable in what are,
from the commentator's point of view, the twilight zones.

7. The type of self-evident knowledge that we have not yet dealt with
is our knowledge 'a priori'.1 6 Let us now turn our attention to it.
That something is or exists can be seen as a fact, but it cannot be seen
as a necessity. Therefore self-evident judgements 'a posteriori', that is,
in fact, immediately evident jUdgements concerning our inner experi-
ence, cannot be apodeictic. Now jUdgements 'a priori' have no ex-
istential content, therefore they can be apodeictic. We see that an
'a priori' judgement is true by contemplating the concepts on which it
is based. Our insight is the insight into the nature of concepts and their
relations. In as much as such concepts are definite and have definite
relations, we can see that our judgements are necessarily true. The
jUdgements "z +2 = 4", "What has size must have shape as well",
"Nothing can be red unless it is coloured," etc., will serve as
examples. If the concepts are vague, it might be difficult to discern
the truth, but still, in this field what is true must be true. It is, however,
a mistake to conclude from this that we have here a knowledge that is
completely 'a priori' knowledge, fully independent from experience.
Brentano would maintain that even though the judgement "Nothing
can be red and blue all over at the same time" is 'a priori', yet the
concepts on which it is based, with which it in fact deals, are not
'a priori' concepts. They have been formed on the basis of experience.
This, he is inclined to hold, is true about all 'a priori' judgements the
concepts involved are always abstractions from our experience - there
exists no true' a priori' science. This is so even while it is the case that
some sciences, e.g., mathematics, are truly analytic in the sense that
they are concerned only with conceptual and not with factual points.
15 See Kas., pp. 193-198 and other places.
~6 See Kas., pp. 193 and 198- 200; also LRU, pp. 162-192, and VUE, p. 52 ft.
 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH 105

This is a reasonable comment, but perhaps it could be difficult to adapt

it to deal with pure formal calculi.l 7 No concepts of the ordinary kind
are involved in such calculi, only arbitrary relations between arbitrary
signs. Here Brentano could conceivably make one of two replies: One
- He could maintain that such calculi do not represent any knowledge
at all and do not consist of judgements. This would be a slightly
strained reply, since a formal logician could state a proposition of the
uninterpreted calculus, and could be either right or wrong in it. But
still we could protest that he would not deal with concepts. This reply
then is seen to pose a rather difficult question. On the other hand, I
think that Brentano would be more likely to produce another answer.
Two uninterpreted calculus is a technique which is not merely based on
abstraction from experience, it is based on abstractions from concepts
- so the pure sign is seen as an abstract idea of a concept. In this way
the connection with experience, though rarified, persists. In this way
we can still say that a proposition of an uniterpreted calculus is an
indirect reference to something concrete. I offered this comment to
illustrate the spirit of Brentano's philosophy and the adaptability,
nay, the natural suitability of his views, when faced with contemporary
problems. He has presented a method and philosophical views that can
be developed naturally and without strain in the contemporary con-
text.

2. THE RELATION BETWEEN SELF-EVIDENT AND

DEMONSTRABLE KNOWLEDGE

1. To wind up our investigation we need to deal with one further

problem, namely the relation between self-evident and demonstrable
judgements. 1 It is Brentano's view that one who judges correctly, but
whose judgement is not immediately evident, must agree, in object and
quality of the judgement, with someone who judges with immediate
evidence. The fact that it is those who judge, rather than the contents
or import of jUdgements, that are thus said to agree, is important.
Brentano says that truth is represented both by he who judges with
evidence and also by someone who judges in a way analagous to the
way in which one would judge if one judged with evidence. This way
of talking has the advantage that it does not set up misleading entia
17 Pure formal calculi are not considered by Brentano for obvious reasons.
1 See LRU, pp. 192-199, 197-202; also W&E in various places. But Brentano's own texts
are sparse and the views presented are largely a result of conjecture.
I06 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

linguae, viz. judgements, truths, falsehoods, etc. To give examples:

(a) If John Doe looks at an actual horse on the lawn and judges; "I
see a horse on the lawn", he judges with evidence. His judgement is
self-evident, true and known by him to be such. Now if someone,
miles away, judges at the same moment: "John Doe sees a horse on the
lawn", his judgement is not self-evident, it is, as Brentano would have
it, blind. Yet this judgement is true 2 because it corresponds, in object
and quality,3 with John Doe's own self-evident judgement. (b) When
I judge: "3 5 = 243", and I am competent, I judge with evidence -
my judgement is both true and known by me to be true. When a child,
having listened to me, judges that "3 5 = 243", and does it simply
because I said so, the child's judgement may be confused and it is
certainly blind, but it is nevertheless true, since it agrees in object and
quality with my own evident judgement. This is the way in which
Brentano thought about the relation between evidently true judge-
ments and other true jUdgements. 4 I think, further, that he thought of
it in the following manner: To demonstrate that a blind or confused
judgement is true is to demonstrate that this judgement is equivalent
in object and quality to an evident judgement or to a series of evident
jUdgements. A number of suggestions of this sort are to be found in
his writings. Now this picture fits quite well a series of progressively
more complex mathematical tenets, but in other fields it is fraught
with difficulties.

2. The main problem lies in establishing the required equivalences.

As has been amply demonstrated in the previous section, this cannot
be done with respect to our knowledge of the external world. This is
simply because on the one hand no judgements about the external
world are self-evident, and on the other hand no series of intro-
spective judgements is equivalent to any judgement about any objects
external to us. Our knowledge of these matters must be based on some-
thing other than equivalence with self-evident judgements if the self-
evident jUdgements are what Brentano suggests they are. It is hard to
believe that Brentano would accept a rigid limitation of truth to
analytic and introspective matters. His very insistence that it is
concrete objects that can be and are the objects of our thought, and
that consequently we assent to or dissent from the acceptance of such

2 Which I call demonstrably true.

3 i.e. it is also affirmative, assenting and about the said horse.
4 I say this with all the reservations appertaining to our knowledge of the external world.
 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH I07

concrete objects as actual, shows that such a limitation would be

contrary to the spirit of his philosophy. This leads obviously to a
difficulty. All true jUdgements are said to be self-evident or traceable
by a series of equivalences to some self-evident judgements. It is also
affirmed that jUdgements are par excellence concerned with concrete
objects, and this tenet is an essential part of Brentano's philosophical
attitude. Yet he denies that we can judge with evidence about the
external world, and by implication, about concrete objects. It would
seem inconsistent to make all the three statements at once. It would
appear that we must decide whether true judgements about concrete
objects and the external world composed of them are possible, and it
might appear that this issue is crucial for Brentano's philosophy.
However, it is never really faced. Brentano is content with throwing
out vague and plausible suggestions of the type cited at the beginning
of this section. This is due to the fact that his interest was directed
primarily towards the particular points which he was at that moment
investigating. In a wide field, it would be manifestly impossible to
provide all at once the thorough and detailed investigation of all the
relevant particular points as well as an assessment of general issues.
In the absence of an investigation which could establish all these
points in a respectable manner, any firm assertions about the problem
as a whole would, according to Brentano, constitute an unwholesome
dance with ideas. So Brentano moved in an orderly fashion from one
important particular point to another. 5 As to their wider ramifications,
he did two things - he asked to what extent these affect his present
particular investigation and he threw out the suggestions that indicated
fruitful ways of looking at the problem and that might conceivably be
helpful in determining future research. These suggestions are interesting
and might be important but it would be a mistake to regard them as
solutions, and a misunderstanding to think that Brentano offered them
as such. It is important to realise that this is not accidental but a
direct result of Brentano's philosophical method. It would be wrong to
try to work out the more general implications of the investigation in
question. There is not enough evidence for it. All that one can do at
this stage is to note, and keep in mind, the most important and ap-
parent features of the situation. The serious synthesis can take place
only when sufficient ground work has been completed. 6 This is Bren-
tano's methodological theory and his practice.
5 It would be just to say that the exact nature of evidence was the step on which he was
last working.
6 It was not completed by Brentano regarding the subject of this chapter.
108 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH

3. Another point of difficulty lies in Brentano's conception of the

equivalence of judgements, or rather, statements themselves. He
regards many statements ostensibly about abstract entities, etc., as
indirect references to concrete reality. In several instances he says that
certain pairs of statements are equivalent, and by the way, seems to
suggest a way in which such equivalences would be worked out. 7
These suggestions will not stand careful scrutiny and again they are
characteristically presented at several points in the course of other
discussions and are left more or less on the margin of the main investi-
gation. One wishes to ask this: We worry about equivalences of state-
ments, but even if this can be worked out, what about equivalences
of judgements? Surely there are new untouched problems there? And
there is also the little-investigated area of the exact relation between
judgements and statements. Truly it was said that statements express
judgements, and that some complex and abstract statements are in-
direct references to concrete reality. But where do we go from here,
and in particular, what is the relation of a complex syncathegorematic
expression like "This is an expression of a general and necessary mathe-
matical truth well-known to all mathematicians" to our actual particular
judgement? It is obvious that many questions are left unanswered, nay,
uninvestigated.

4. All this is not really a fault in Brentano's philosophy. That he

limited his investigations to what could be handled shows good judge-
ment; that he refused to pronounce on matters that he did not investi-
gate shows even better. This is not contradicted by the fact that he
made suggestions in these areas, nor by the fact that he had opinions
that went far beyond his carefully considered tenets. Only in this way
is it possible to do a really honest and thorough job without losing
sight of its wider significance, or of one's reasons for doing what one
is doing in this particular field. At this particular moment it might well
be regarded as remarkable that Brentano never lost this intellectual
balance. When one becomes familiar with his method, one realises more
and more how foolish it would be to regard everything that Brentano said
as on a par with everything else. To do so is tantamount to regarding
the ad hoc, the merely recurring and the ultimate 8 suggestions as
equivalent in importance to, and equally representative of, Brentano's
philosophy as statements that were the result of years of careful and
7 See Chapter IV, Sections 2 and 3 above, for statement and criticism of these suggestions.
8 Ultimate in the sense of being the last remarks on the subject.
 RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH I09

detailed investigation. It would be tantamount to either a failure or

a refusal to recognise significant differences between his opinions,
suggestions, hypotheses, theories and what he himself regarded as
important discoveries or established facts. To do this is to do Bren-
tano a grave injustice.

5. In the last few sections I have dealt with topics closely connected
with Brentano's main lines of investigation, but nevertheless marginal.
I have dealt with them because they seem to me to form the natural
next step in research, and I thought that by dealing with them I would
be able to illustrate Brentano's actual methods, his approach to philo-
sophy and the extent of his investigations and achievements. I hope
that I have also shown that Brentano was quite explicit about the
limitations of his results, even while he was aware of their importance
and ramifications. It should be possible to see that even in these areas,
when he was not explicit, he had enough feel for the problem not to
assume that a particular insight would explain more than it could in fact.
It is important to notice all this if one is to understand adequately the
philosophy of Franz Brentano. His methods, approach to problems
and the reservations he regarded as necessary, are a clear indication
of his conception of philosophy. He thought of philosophy as a science
- a science where careful and vigorous research is both proper and
necessary: A discipline where arguments are necessary and detailed
investigation of paramount importance. Intelligent guessing cannot
take the place of research, but it might sometimes be necessary to
guess in order to get the investigation going. Generalities based on
slender grounds are not and cannot be regarded as results, but general-
isations are useful, provided of course that one is aware of their limi-
tations. Mere cleverness and juggling with concepts is out of place -
the only effect it can have is to give philosophy a bad name.
 CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. This, then, is Brentano's analysis of truth. It is illuminating and

thorough but it is neither complete nor final. I tried to present it as
such, and I am sure Brentano himself would agree. But to say this is
not to deny that he regarded some of his results as conclusive nor yet
to deny that they were conclusive. One of his more important a-
chievements lies in demonstrating that the concept of truth is not a
concept of a property, quality or feature of either the universe or of our
jUdgements. To say that a judgement is true is tantamount to saying
that he who passed this judgement did not err. This sensible view
removes the temptation to regard the analysis of truth as a cure-all
or, at the very least, as the starting-point of any proper investigation.
It leaves entirely open the problem of determining whether we have
or have not erred. It could be argued that the concept of evidence
fills this space, but the real import of saying that I have passed an
evident judgement is that I am sure of my judgement. Why I am sure
could be, and unless more is said, must be, regarded as an open
question. It was suggested that the certainty derives from the scruti-
ny or the awareness of the nature of concepts used in the case of
judgements 'a priori'. In the case of judgements 'a posteriori', only
introspective judgements are evident, this largely because they simply
cannot be questioned. 1 It will be clear that both these points are ele-
ments of philosophical theory, independent of the claim that to pass an
evident judgement is to be really sure of the judgement that we are
making. It is, however, self-contradictory to assert that I have in this
sense judged with evidence, but perhaps I am mistaken. Some doubt
may be cast on this opinion because Brentano oscillates between saying
that evident jUdgements are those of which I am really sure, i.e., those
that seem evidently true to me while I am passing them, and talking
1 This is a far from satisfactory account, but it is introduced here merely to introduce the
kind of point made by Brentano.
 CONCLUDING REMARKS III

as if evident judgements were always self-evident in the sense of

logically certifiable. However, I think that the above opinion is in
the main correct since the view that I can pass an evident judgement
and yet be mistaken seems to be held quite firmly. Yet self-evident
judgements (in the sense of logically necessary) do not admit the possi-
bility of mistakes. 2 This is not the place to develop particular points,
but enough was said to support the claim that Brentano has at the very
least established the correct view that the discussion of the nature of
truth is not an investigation concerning a metaphysical philosopher's
stone, but a logical inquiry, having both the potentialities and the
limitations of one.

2. Brentano claims, in effect, that a judgement is true if it is in accord

with an evident judgement, or else if it is evident itself. If this is the
case, then the sense of 'true' established for non-evident jUdgements
is secondary and rests on the primary sense attributed to 'true' when
applied to evident judgements. It is possible, then, to maintain either
that an evident judgement is an evidently true judgement or not. In
the first case, no independent sense of 'true' is established with respect
to the evident judgement and the whole attempt is futile. If we refuse to
say this and admit that there exist evidently false judgements, (e.g.
2 + 2 = 69), then if we try to define 'truth' in terms of evidence we
are faced with the following dilemma - if one defines evidently true
in terms of 'true', one is arguing in a circle; if one does not, one fails to
establish any definite sense, unless a further argument is provided.
This dilemma will perhaps fail to arise if we say that to see "2 + 2
= 69" as a false judgement is equivalent to a true judgement "2 + 2
=F 69". This reply, however, is fraught with difficulties which in-
volve the whole account of jUdgements and evidence. In fact, with
regard to immediately evident judgements, Brentano maintained
that we can see clearly and distinctly (Klar und Deutlich) that the
object of the judgement should be, in fact, acknowledged, or rejected,
as the case may be. He is saying, in effect, that in some cases we can
see whether the judgement is true or false. Hence, in a good sense,
Brentano has failed to provide a satisfactory account of 'true'. 3
On the other hand, it should be said in fairness, that most of Brentano's
discussion on the subject of evidence is preliminary and results in
2 This can be taken as throwing some light on Brentano's discussion of our knowledge of
the external world.
S See Chapter VI, Section I for more detailed discussion of this point. Further references
in Chapter I, Section 2.
112 CONCLUDING REMARKS

suggestions rather than firm tenets. The above remarks will neverthe-
less serve to remind us about some of the problems inherent in it.4

3. Brentano has established many points and provided a number of

important suggestions. Let us now survey briefly those of his observ-
ations that appear to be of more importance for the future research
into the matter. Brentano has shown that the correspondence theory is
not acceptable. His detailed reasoning concerning the nature of the
relation itself and the nature of its termini is quite conclusive. The
relation itself cannot be properly explained: If it is discussed in general
terms it soon degenerates into a mere metaphor. However, if an attempt
is made at giving it a more definite meaning, we find that there
are grave objections to each suggested solution. None of the suggested
particular determinations can account for all past, future and negative
assertions. We are in difficulties whether we assume that both termini
of the relation must exist or not. It is impossible to characterise
sufficiently well the thing with which our judgement is to correspond.
If it is outside the mind, we cannot give a consistent picture of it;
even entia rationis will not help because they would naturally corre-
spond to affirmative judgements only. Should they correspond also
to negative jUdgements, then how could the same situation corre-
spond closely enough with both? Further difficulties arise with regard
to inteUectus, etc. 5 In view of all these difficulties, it is quite clear
that it is impossible to resurrect the correspondence theory. We must
therefore investigate other possibilities.

4- The field of investigation is further delimited by Brentano's

argument concerning the question - To what does 'true' properly
apply? This argument is not complete, but it makes the important
distinction between the primary, basic applications of the word, and
the secondary, dependent applications of it. This point, supplemented
by the further argument that what is true in 2 2 = 4 is neutral +
between different formulations and utterances of it, determines
clearly the fruitful direction of the inquiry. Brentano's distinction
between investigation of the 'nature' of truth and of the 'criteria' of
truth is doubly important: Firstly it further determines the field under
scrutiny; secondly it enables us to avoid errors which result naturally
from confusing these two different issues.
4 See Chapter IV, Section 2.
5 See Chapter I, Section I and Chapter V, Sections I and 2; also Chapter IV, Sections 3.
 CONCLUDING REMARKS II3
5. Brentano's difficulties are often as important and as illuminating
as his achievements. One of the most instructive is the difficulty
concerning the relation of truth to evidence, mentioned above. I have
maintained that he has failed to establish a sense of 'true' in at least
one sense. I wish to say also that he has failed to give a satisfactory
account of evidence. To say that we see clearly and distinctly is to
say little. 6 It must be observed that no single monolithic account of
evidence can be given - different types of assertions are established in
different ways; when this is seen, the problem must be approached in
a different frame of mind. Brentano has not explained satisfactorily
why a judgement can only be true if it is in accord with an evident
judgement. An explanation is, however, necessary. If 'true' and 'evi-
dent' do not mean the same, then the evident jUdgement is pre-
sumably also true. What then is the difference? The cue to the solution
lies in Brentano's own observation. He maintains that the paradigm
case of truth-asserting occurs when we compare what we know about the
facts with what we know about the jUdgement. On the one hand, it
accentuates the essential difference between truth and evidence,7 on
the other hand, it suggests that an assertion of truth is essentially a
commentary. This is the suggestion taken up by Ramsey and Straw-
son.s Brentano's own statement is not open to the objections, which
apply to Strawson's more developed position, although it is also less
informative. Its advantage lies in this - that Brentano does not deny
that assertions of truth assert, and that they are about other assertions
(judgements). This is why he suggests that" ... is true" is used as a
commentary rather than adopting the Strawsonian view that it is a
mere acceptance device. When this is taken up seriously, it is seen
to be of real importance.

6. Brentano's theory of mental acts and judgements was important

and influential; his discussions of entia rationis and intentional relation
affected the development of at least the continental philosophy and
psychology, but it is his investigation and re-assessment of linguistic
function that was the major break-through. It became the mainspring
of his philosophy, and in the later period is referred to in most of the
important discussions. In this, Brentano was remarkably ahead of his
time. I doubt whether any philosopher before Ludwig Wittgenstein
6 When one says this, one should remember clearly that Brentano did not produce a full
account, and did not undertake a full investigation of the notion of evidence.
7 Those who seek criteria (evidence) must be disappointed by the definition of truth.
S See, for instance, ASP Symposium.
II4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

saw the importance of this sort of point quite as clearly as Brentano

did. This facet of his philosophy did not remain without influence.
The very title of Anton Marty's work 9 is a proof of this, but it is to be
regretted that Brentano himself did not work it out more directly and
in more detail. He was content to show that there is often a disparity
between linguistic form and linguistic function. He offered many
examples, but after he had established the fact that many locutions
that appear to make direct reference to all sorts of entities should be
regarded as making indirect references to concrete reality, he proceeded
to apply his findings in other fields. He did not engage seriously in the
task of working out the exact nature of this reference; he did not even
take up his own suggestion that no linguistic device can properly be
regarded as a direct symbol of a concrete object. When others have
taken up the threads, the resultant discussions have been neither as
interesting nor as subtle as they might have been in Brentano's own
hands.

7. Enough has been said to show conclusively that Brentano was an

important philosopher - that he was capable both of remarkable
subtlety and penetrating insight. In the main, he was a realist and a
common-sense philosopher; he led a revolt against the metaphysical
mad dance with ideas as represented by Hegel. It was only when he
was nearing his grave that the careful, scientific approach to philosophy
began to have the upper hand outside his own school.1 0 Perhaps it
should be mentioned here that besides being an important thinker,
he was also a great teacher, a modest man and a remarkable lecturer,
capable of holding audiences spell-bound. But to describe either the
man or his philosophy in generalities cannot do him justice and is
contrary to the spirit of his own endeavours. In this book I hope to
have provided an introduction to his philosophy.

9Die allgemeine w-ammatik und Sprachphilosophie.

10British philosophy was much more akin in spirit to Brentano's own. But even here it
moved towards Absolute Idealism and away from realism and common sense.
APPENDICES
 APPENDIX "A"

EL. 66: 1 Sprechen und Denken. (16. VIII. 1905)

Die Sprache soll ausdrucken, was wir denken. Die Aussage entspricht
dann dem Gedanken. Manche glauben daraufhin, daB Aussagen und Ge-
danken vollstandig und darum auch Teil fUr Teil im Fall der Wahrhaftigkeit
einander ahnlich seien. Doch dies ist keineswegs der Fall. Wir sprechen
Worte, d.h. wir erwecken in anderen eine Reihenfolge von physischen
Phanomenen, welche ihrer Natur nach den psychischen nicht gleichen,
insbesondere auch bei weitem weniger mannigfaltig sind. So wurde unser
Wortvorrat nicht weit reichen, wenn jedes Gedankenelement durch ein
gesprochenes Element wiedergegeben werden soUte. Wir mussen zum Aus-
druck der Gedankenelemente Komplikationen von Sprachelementen an-
wenden, und so ist denn z.B. klar, daB in dem Wort "Baum" das b, das a,
das u, das m fUr sich allein kein Gedankenelement anzeigt. Diese notwendig
gewordene Komplikation wurde aber zu unendlicher Weitschweifigkeit
fUhren und den raschen Fortgang der Rede in stOrendster Weise beein-
trachtigen, wenn nicht umgekehrt auch eine Vielheit von Gedankenele-
menten sprachlich einheitlich einen Ausdruck fande. Was flir eine FuIle
von Gedankenelementen liegt in dem, was das kurze Wort "Staat" z.B.
ausdruckt !
Nicht bloB die einzelnen Buchstaben eines Wortes bedeuten nichts fUr
sich, es gibt auch ganze Worte, die fUr sich nichts bedeuten, wie z.B. Par-
tikeln, Prapositionen, Konjunktionen, Adverbien, casus obliqui von Sub-
stantiven und Adjektiven. Nur in der Zusammensetzung mit andern
Worten zu Satzen tragen sie zur Bedeutung des Gesprochenen bei, ja, in
gewisser Weise kann man behaupten, daB auch aIle Hauptworter und
Eigenschaftsworter nut mitbedeutend seien. Man kann nicht sagen, daB
derjenige, welcher das Wort Pferd ausspricht, einen dadurch mitteile, daB
er die Vorstellung eines Pferdes habe. Ratte er sie nicht, so wurde niemand
sagen, er habe gelogen. Kein Gesprach wird auch durch bloBes Nennen von
Namen gefUhrt, sondern durch Aussagen von Satzen. Wenn man aber
dagegen geltend macht, daB man, wenn man einen einen Namen aussprechen
hort, doch daraufhin vermuten konne, daB er eine ihm entsprechende
Vorstellung habe, so lieBe sich in gewissem MaB ahnliches auch von Par-

1 Cf. pp. 36-42.

 APPENDIX "A"

Translation of EL. 66: Sprechen una Denken. (I6. VIII. IgOS)

The language should express what we think. In such case the utterance
corresponds with the thought. Some think therefore that in the case of
truthfulness, expressions and thoughts correspond completely, and therefore
also part by part.! This is in no way the case. We say words, i.e. we awaken
in others a stream of physical (phenomena). (These), because of their charac-
ter, are not equivalent to psychical (phenomena), and, in particular, they are
by far less diverse. Hence our verbal art would not be very far-reaching 2
if every thought-element had to be represented by a speech-element. In
order to express (all) thought-elements we have to utilise complications of
speech-elements. It is for instance clear that in the word 'tree' the letters 't',
'r', 'e', do not stand for particular thought-elements. But this (sort of)
complication, that had become necessary, would lead to endless prolixity
and would prejudice in a most injurious way the swift flow of speech. (That
is) if it were not the case that on the other hand a multiplicity of thought-
elements finds expression in the same verbal form. 3 For instance what rich-
ness of thought-element lies in that which is expressed by the short word
'state'.
It is not only the case that particular letters have no meaning in them-
selves; there are also words which mean nothing in their own right, e.g.
prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, casus obliqui of substantives and ad-
jectives. Only in conjunction with other words and sentences do these con-
tribute to the meaning of speech. 4 In a way it is even possible to maintain
that all nouns and adjectives have meaning only in relation to other speech-
elements. 5 One could not say that he who utters the word 'horse' conveys
thereby that he has the idea of a horse. If he did not have it no one would say
that he lied. (It is) also (the case) that no conversation is carried by mere
calling of names, but much more by uttering (whole) sentences. If one uses
(as an argument) against it (the fact) that when one hears someone calling
a name, then one could suppose on this ground that (the caller) has the
1 i.e. there is a one/one correlation between parts of thoughts and parts of utterances.
2 In the sense of not being sufficient.
3 It is impossible to render exactly the complex form of the German sentence.
4 cf. A. Marty: Synsemantica and A utosemantica.
5 The sense rather than the exact sentence was rendered here.
lIB APPENDIX A

tikeln sagen, wie denn, wenn man einen "Aber" sprechen hort, sich ver-
muten HiBt, daB er die Vorstellung von einem Gegensatz habe. Immerhin
mogen wir solche Worte, welche durch ein affirmatives oder negatives
Unterscheidungszeichen erganzt, zum Ausdruck eines Urteils fuhren, dessen
zugrundeliegender Begriff ihnen durch den Sprachgebrauch assoziiert ist,
mit ARISTOTELES schon als solche auszeichnen, welche ffir sich eine Bedeu-
tung haben. Diese Bedeutung wird der betreffende Begriff sein.
Doch auch hier ist eine gewisse Einschrankung von Noten. Wir bedienen
uns einer Sprache, die nicht unser Werk ist, sondern die wir von der Tradition
unseres Volkes ubernehmen. Dieses Yolk wurde aber notwendig bei seiner
Sprachbildung ebensowohl von seinen irrigen, wie richtigen Anschauungen
beeinflusst, und wir konnen nicht umhin, uns, auch wenn wir selbst von
Irrtumern frei sind, in unserer Sprechweise ihnen einigermaBen zu akkomo-
dieren. Das Yolk neigt zu ultrarealistischen Auffassungen. Es glaubt, daB,
wenn einer gesund ist, in ihm eine Gesundheit verweile; wenn er groB ist,
in ihm eine GroBe sei, wenn er urteile, in ihm ein Urteilen oder auch ein
Urteil sei. Es druckt den Gedanken, daB einer gesund sei, darum auch un-
bedenklich so aus, daB er sagt, er habe eine gute Gesundheit, und sagt,
statt, daB etwas ortlich bestimmt sei, es habe einen Ort, sei in einem Raum,
erfUlIe einen Raum. So sagt es denn auch ganz unbedenklich nicht bloB, daB
es ein Gesundes, ein GroBes, ein ortlich Bestimmtes, ein Urteilendes, son-
dern auch, daB es eine Gesundheit, eine GroBe, einen Raum, ein Urteil gebe.
Da nun die Gesundheit nicht das Gesunde selbst, die GroBe nicht das GroBe,
der Raum nicht das raumlich Bestimmte, das Urteil nicht das Urteilende ist,
so wird, genau genommen, hier eine Menge von Dingen ganz unberechtigt,
den wirklich bestehenden hinzugefUgt. Sollen wir nun aller dieser Rede-
wendungen uns entschlagen? Sollen wir die Fragen, die in solcher Rede-
wendung gestellt werden, negieren? Es ist klar, daB dies so unpraktisch
ware, wie wenn ein Koperniker auf die Frage, ob die Sonne aufgegangen sei,
dies auf Grund seiner Verwerfung des Ptolomaischen Systems verneinte.
Nicht urn die Differenz der astronomischen Ansichten handelt es sich ja in
diesem Augenblick. Es wfirde geradezu irrefuhren, wenn er aus solchem
Grunde den Aufgang der Sonne verneinte. Ahnlich wurde offenbar auch der
fehlen, welcher uber die Verkehrtheit der Theorie von den formalen Teilen
aufgeklart, leugnete, daB ein Korper in einem Raume sei oder ein Denk-
ender ein gewisses Urteil habe. Er wird also vielmehr die gewohnlichen
Redewendungen in Anwendung bringen, aber freilich ahnlich wie der
Kopernikaner bei dem Gebrauche ptolemaischer Ausdrucksweise einen
wesentlich anderen Sinn damit verbinden. Sagt er, daB eine Schonheit sei,
so will er nur dasselbe sagen wie, daB ein Schones sei. Die Vorstellung, die
seinem Urteile zugrundeliegt, ist nicht die einer Form der Schonheit, und
somit sieht man, daB der Ausdruck "Schonheit", obwohl grammatisch ein
Hauptwort, fUr ihn nicht eigentlich ein Name ist. Mit einem "ist" im eigent-
lichen Sinne des Wortchens hat er es nicht verbunden, sondern mit einem
aequivoken "ist", das in der Art fungiert, daB es, zu dem Hauptwort
"SchOnheit" gesetzt, dasselbe leistet wie das eigentliche "1st", zu dem
Worte "Schones" gesetzt, leistet. Es weckt so den Begriff und die Aner-
kennung des Schonen in uns.
 APPENDIX A II9
respective idea, then (it has to be observed) that, up to a point, one can say
something similar about conjunctions. As for instance if one hears someone
saying 'but', he could suppose that he (the speaker) has an idea of 'something
opposite'. All the same we could select these words that, supplemented by
(either) the atfirmative (or) the negative sign, lead to judgements,6 and such
that the concepts that form their basis are associated with them by linguistic
use. (We could then), following ARISTOTLE, mark them as (words) that have
meaning in their own right. The respective concept would then be this
meaning.
But here too we have to note a limitation. We use a language that is not
the result of our work. We adopt it as part of the tradition of our people.
These people were, however, influenced, in building their language, as
much by their false as by their correct views. And therefore even when we
are not ourselves mistaken, we cannot help accomodating ourselves to
some extent (to such errors). The people (as a society) are inclined to over-
realistic conceptions. They think that if one is healthy then he contains
health. When he is big, largeness is in him. If he judges, then judging, or a
judgement is in him. Therefore he unthinkingly expresses the idea that he is
healthy by saying that he has good health. He says that he has a place, is
in a place, or fills a place, instead of saying that his place (position) is
determined. And so he says also, quite unthinkingly, not only that there are
healthy and big things, things whose position is known, and things that
judge, but also that there are: health, size, space and judgement. And since
(being) healthy is not health, being big is no largeness, having a known
position is not space, and jUdging is not judgement, therefore strictly
speaking, a number of things are improperly added to those that exist in
fact. Should we therefore refuse (to accept) all such linguistic usages, should
we negate all the questions that are formulated in accordance with these
usages? It is obvious that it would be as impractical as (an act of a) follower
of Copernicus, who - on the ground that the Ptolemaic system is false -
would reply in the negative to the question whether the sun has yet risen.
The question does not appertain to differences in astronomical theory. It is
precisely the denial, on such grounds, that the sun has risen, that leads to
error. Similarly the one who denied that an object is in space or that some-
one is thinking, passes a certain judgement, would err obviously, if he did
it because he became convinced of the perversity of the theory of universals. 7
Therefore he will be much more likely to use the common modes of speech,
but, just like the follower of Copernicus, while he uses the Ptolemaic figures
of speech, he conjoins them with a completely different sense. When he
says that beauty is, then he says only this much, that there is something
beautiful. The idea on which the judgement is based is not one of the form
of beauty. In this way one realises that the expression 'beauty', even
though grammatically a noun, is not really a name for him. He did not join
it with 'is' in the proper sense of the word, but only with an equivocal 'is'
which works in the following manner: In conjunction with the noun 'beauty'
(it) accomplishes the same that is accomplished by the proper 'is' when it
6 cf. Brentano's theory of existential judgements of the form 'A is'.
7 The German reads - der Theorie von den formalen Teilen.
I20 APPENDIX A

DieseAequivokation des "ist", welche ebenso dem "es gibt", "es besteht",
"es existiert" u. dgl. eignet, hat sich vielen irgendwie bemerkbar gemacht,
ohne aber vollstandig von ihnen begriffen zu werden. Sie meinten manch-
mal, das "ist" in einen Sinn besage, daB etwas wirke, wahrend es im andern
Sinn allein auf solches anwendbar sei, was keines Wirkens fahig sei. Allein
es ist ausser allem Zweifel, daB wer sagt, daB etwas sei oder bestehe oder
existiere oder wirklich sei, nicht das geringste darliber aussagen will, ob es
wirke oder nicht. Auch bleibt man ganz im Unklaren darliber, ob sie sich das
eine "ist" und das andere "ist" wie zwei Arten denken, die einer Gattung
unterstehen und einen gemeinsamen Charakter haben, und ob sie dem, was
wirkt, zuschreiben, daB es in zweifachem Sinne ist, dem anderen aber, daB
es nur in einem der beiden Sinne ist u. dgl. Nach uns waren, wie man leicht
erkennt, auch diese Fragen schlechterdings zu verneinen. Das "es gibt" ,
wenn wir es grammatisch mit dem Subjekt "SchOnheit" oder "Raum"
verbinden, fungiert nicht bloB nicht wie das "ist" wenn wir es mit dem
Subjekt "ein Schones" oder "Raumliches" verbinden, sondern es fungiert
das "es gibt" in diesem FaIle ebenfalls nicht wie in jenem. Es fungiert in
jedem offenbar nur in einer Weise. Auch haben sie nicht die Konsequenz
gezogen, daB SchOnheit, GroBe, Urteil, Raum usw. keine wahren Namen
mit zugehOrigen Begriffen seien. Vielmehr hat z.E. BOLZANO und einige,
die ihm in neuester Zeit folgen, aber auch SIGWART und andere geradezu
das Gegenteil gelehrt. J a man kann sagen, das Vorurteil, das jedes Haupwort
und Eigenschaftswort ein wahrer Name sei und auch von den Philosophen
als Name verwendet werden konne, besteht so wie einst bei ARISTOTELES
noch heute ganz allgemein und hindert den wahren Charakter der Mehr-
deutigkeit des "ist", "es gibt" usw. zu begreifen, veranlaBt vielmehr vol1ig
willklirliche und dem gemeinen Sprachgebrauch schlechterdings wider-
sprechende Unterscheidungen zwischen existieren und bestehen, sein und
Dasein haben u. dgl.
Wenn man ein Wort flir einen Namen nimmt, das in Wahrheit kein Name
ist, wenn man den durch den angeblichen Namen bezeichneten Begriff sucht,
wahrend ihm keiner gesellt ist, so kann man natlirlich sich in der Definition
niemals einigen und auch die Lehre yom Ursprung der Begriffe muB dadurch
heillos verwirrt werden. So wurden denn die vermeintlichen Begriffe von
vermeintlichen Namen der Anlass flir eine vielfache Verkennung der wich-
tigen psychologischen Tatsache, daB aIle unsere Begriffe aus Anschauungen
stammen. In der Tat, die Begriffe Sein, Nichtsein, Notwendigkeit, Moglich-
keit, ja selbst die Begriffe SchOnheit, GroBe usw. stammen aus keinen
Anschauungen, aber nur darum, weil es solche Begriffe gar nicht gibt und
die betreffenden Hauptworter gar keine wahren Namen sind. Dasselbe gilt
auch von dem Begriff der Zeit, der Gegenwart, Vergangenheit, Zukunft,
ja auch yom Begriff des Gegenwartigen, Vergangenen, Zuklinftigen, Bei-
spiele, die gewiB hinreichen zu zeigen, wie Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie
und Ontologie hier gemeinsam aufs verderblichste infiziert werden muBten.
 APPENDIX A 121

is conjoined with the word 'beautiful'.s In this way it awakens in us the

concept and acceptance of beautiful.
This equivocation 9 of 'is' happens in a similar way with: 'there is', 'it is',
'it exists', etc. (It) has come to the notice of many who have failed, however,
to understand it fully. Sometimes they thought that in one sense 'is' says
that something has an effect, whereas in another sense it belongs alone to
these things that are incapable of having any effects. This much however is
beyond any doubt - that he who says that something is, or obtains, or
exists, or is real, does not have the slightest intention or saying anything about
whether it has an effect or not. We are also left completely in the dark
whether (they think of) the one 'is' and the other 'is' as of two kinds that
belong to one species and have a common character, whether they ascribe
to this that has effects that it is in a double sense, while the other is only in
one of the two senses, etc. According to us, as is easily seen, the following
also can hardly be denied. That when 'there is' is grammatically conjoined
with either the subject 'beauty' or (the subject) 'space' then it is not only
the case that it does not function like 'is' when it is conjoined with the sub-
jects 'beautiful' or 'spatial', but the 'there is' (itself) does not function in the
one case as in the other. Obviously, in each case it functions in only one way.
Neither have they 10 faced up to the consequence that: 'beauty', 'size',
'judgement', 'space', etc. are not real names with (their) appertaining con-
cepts. On the contrary, e.g. BOLZANO and some of his contemporary follow-
ers, as well as SIGWART and others, held exactly the opposite. Yes, one can
say that the prejudice that each noun and adjective is a genuine name, and
that it can be treated as such by philosophers, which was once found in
ARISTOTLE, is even today generally accepted. It stands in the way of
grasping the true character of the ambiguity of 'is', 'there is', etc. On the
contrary, it occasions distinctions between: existing and subsisting, being
and having a being, etc., that are completely arbitrary and quite contrary
to linguistic usage.
If one taken a word to be a name, when in fact it is not a name, if one
searches for the concept designated by this alleged name, when in fact none
is associated with it, then naturally one's definitions can never agree,
and one's teaching about the origin of concepts must be hopelessly mixed up.
In this case the alleged concepts (appertaining to) the alleged name would
be the case of a multifarious misconception of the important psychological
fact, that all our concepts have their origin in images. In fact the concepts of
being, non-being, necessity, possibility and even the concepts of beauty, size,
etc., do not originate with observations, but only because there are no such
concepts and the respective nouns are not real names. The same is true of
the concepts of: time, the present, the past, the future, and also of the con-
cepts of something, present, past, future. These examples surely suffice
to show that Psychology, epistemology and ontology must be fused here
together in the strongest manner.

8 This is, in effect, a description of a syncathegorematic use.

9 cf. G. Ryle: Systematically Misleading Expressions.
10 Whom Brentano criticises.
 APPENDIX "B"

EL. 67: Wahrheit ist eine Art von tJbereinstimmung. (rg07)

r. Klassen von N amen

r) grammatisch: Hauptworter, Eigenschaftsworter, Partizipia,
Infinitive, Gerundia,
Fiirworter, Zahlworter
2} grammatisch: die Hauptworter teils konkret, teils abstrakt,
die Infinitiva teils zielend, teils ziel1os.

2. Namen von Realen z.E. Gold, Mensch, Heer, Staat, Menschen, Rotes,
Drei (Dreieck?)
Niehtreales: Negativa, z.B. Niehtrotes, Niehtmensch (Privativa scheinen
sozusagen Halbreale. Sage ich von einem Negativum, es sei, z.E. "Einel
Niehtmensch ist", so leugne ich, daB ein gewisses Ding Mensch ist. Deut-
licher ist es, wenn ich sagen wiirde, der Mangel von Wasser ist, so sage ich:
Wasser ist nicht vorhanden). Zu den Negativen gehoren auch die Un-
moglichnennenden. Wenn ich sage, die Unmoglichkeit besteht, so glaube
ich zu affirmieren, negiere aber, und zwar negiere ieh apodiktisch. Zu den
Negativis gehOrt auch Moglichkeit. Sage ich, etwas sei moglich, so sage ieh,
es enthalte keinen Widerspruch, oder es sei iiberhaupt nieht zu erkennen,
daB es nicht sei.1
Ene andere Klasse sind die Objectiva, wie z.E. gewollte geliebt, ge-
wiinscht, gedacht. Sage ich, ein Gedachtes sei, so sage ieh, eigentlich ge-
sprochen, ein Denkendes sei. Sage ich, ein Gewiinschtes sei, so sage ich, ein
Wiischendes sei. Verwandt damit sind die Ausdriicke gut, d.h. liebenswert.
kann etwas sein, was nieht ist (dann ist es ja wiinschenswert). Es sagt
weniger als mit Recht gewiinscht, welches zuriickzufiihren ware auf ein mit
Recht Wiinschendes. Es sagt eigentlich nur, daB es nicht sein kann, daB
eines es wiinscht, ohne daB er es richtig wiinscht. Soweit zeigt sieh, daB
gut eigentlich ein negativer Begriff ist, denn es ware viel1eicht bedenklich,
zu sagen, wer etwas wiinschenswert nenne, driicke aus, daB er selbst es mit
Recht wiinsche.
Der Ausdruck wahr wird als Attribut von Aussagen gebraucht, von Ur-
teilen. Wer das sagt, spricht von sieh oder von anderen als Urteilenden und
1 The text in this paragraph was kept strictly in its orginal form, as is the general practice
in all the German texts quoted in this book.
 APPENDIX "B"

Translation of EL. 67: Wahrheit ist eine Art von Obereinstimmung (3907)
(An attempt to adhere to the correspondence theory after abandoning
fictional entities.)

I. Classes of names
r)
Grammatically: Nouns, adjectives, participles,
Infinitives, gerunds,
pronouns, numerals
2) Grammatically: The nouns partly concrete, partly abstract.
Infinitives partly of transitive, partly of intransitive
verbs.

2. Names of concrete things,l e.g., gold, man, army, state, red, three
(triangle?) Unreal: negatives, e.g., not red, not a man (privativa appear, so
to say, half-real. If I say of a negative that it exists, e.g. "the non-human
is," 2 then I deny that a given thing is human (a man). This would (appear)
more clearly (in such cases as, e.g.) when I say there is a lack of water (then)
I deny that there is water.) Impossibilities also belong to the negatives.
I appear to say something affirmative when I say that there is an impossi-
bility, but in fact I negate and negate apodeictically. Possibility belongs
also to negatives. When I say that something is possible, then I say (in
effect) that it does not contain a contradiction, or that it should not be
acknowledged that it is not. 3
Objectives like: 'willed', loved', 'wished', 'thought', form another class.
When I say that there is something thought of, then properly understood,
I say there is something that thinks.4 When I say something is wished for,
then I say that there is something that wishes. Expressions like 'good', i.e.,
'lovable', are related to these. Something that does not exist can be lovable
(it is then desirable 5). This says less than 'rightly desirable' which ought to

N amen von Realen.

1
'Eine Nichtmensch ist' - this cannot be duplicated in English at all; this is the nearest,
2
if not perfect translation that I could think of.
3 This is a clear statement of Brentano's re-assessment of the purport of such assertions.
It leads him to the view that all particular statements are affirmative, all general, negative.
4 i.e. that something thinks - stressing the existence of what thinks.
5 In the sense of worth wishing for.
124 APPENDIX B

er bezeichnet sie als richtig urteilend, insofern sie einen gewisse Art von
Urteilen haben (Inhalt). Wahr ist also auch kein realer Name. Wie die
Namen, welche Objekte bedeuten, und wieder die Namen, welche Abstrakta
bedeuten, keine Realnamen. Ausdriicke, welche etwas als vergangen,
zukiinftig bezeichnen, sind keine realen Namen. Aber auch Ausdriicke,
welche etwas als gegenwartig bezeichnen, sind keine realen Namen. Dies
ist recht offenbar, wenn man spricht von einem realen Mangel, es gilt aber
allgemein. Es handelt sich urn einen besonderen Modus des Vorstellens,
Urteilens, Wiinschens u. dgl. N atiirlich sind die abstrakten Ausdriicke:
Gegenwart, Zukunft, Vergangenheit noch weniger Namen von Realen. Auch
von Ausdriicken wie Raum, Zeit, gilt ebenso wie von den Ausdriicken
"im Raum sein", "in der Zeit sein", daB sie keine N amen von Realen sind.

Es ist klar, daB wenn einer sagt "es gibt" und dann einen realen Namen,
z.B. "es gibt einen Menschen", daB "es gibt" einen andern Sinn hat als
wenn ich sage "Es gibt (oder es besteht) die Unmaglichkeit von etwas."
Wollte ich dem "es gibt" dieselbe Bedeutung geben, so miiBte ich den Satz
umbilden und z.B. sagen statt "die Unmaglichkeit von A ist" - "A ist nicht
maglich". So auch, wenn ich sage, es gebe Tugend, miiBte ich vielmehr
sagen, es gebe Tugendhafte, oder da auch Tugendhaft kein realer Begriff
ist, indem er ja nur von eventuellen Tugendhandlungen spricht, miiBte
man sagen, es gebe Leute, welche sich sittlich gut betatigen, es gebe Leute
ohne Schwierigkeit, sich sittlich gut zu betatigen, es gebe Leute und sie
hatten nicht Miihe, sittlich gut zu handeln. Man kommt also auf eine
Vereinigung von Affirmation und Negation.
Wenn ich sage "es gibt einen nichtroten Karper, so scheint dies zu sagen"
es gibt ein Reales, welches - so wie Reales mit Vorstellendem iibereinstimmt
- mit mir iibereinstimmt, der ich vorstellend Karper positiv vorstelle und
Rot negativ von ihm pradiziere.
Wenn ich sage "es gibt nicht einen nichtroten Karper", so heiBt das dann
"es gibt nicht ein mit mir, indem ich so vorstelle, iibereinstimmendes Reales."
Dabei wird immer die Behauptung, daB ich dies vorstelle, mit ausgesprochen,
und iiberhapt scheint das bei allem, was ich ausspreche, so zu sein, daB ich
immer auch kundgebe, daB ich und was ich denke. Somit ist immer ein
Teil meiner Aussage indirekt. Recht deutlich ist die Beteiligung des 1n-
direkten, da wo zwei Negationen involviert sind, wie z.B. "es gibt nicht
einen nichtroten Karper" - "aIle Karper sind rot" oder "jeder Karper ist
rot".
Was heijJt "Vorstellend mit der Wirklichkeit ubereinstimmen"?
Es ergibt sich dies aus dem Begriff des Widerstreitens. Stelle ich etwas
negativ vor, so widerstreitet dieses Vorstellen dem betreffenden Realen,
wenn es ist. Stelle ich etwas positiv vor, was nicht ist, so widerstreitet diese
positive Vorstellung nicht einem Realen, aber es stimmt auch mit keinen
Realen zusammen. Beim positiven Vorstellen also fehlt die Ubereinstim-
mung in gewissen Fallen; es besteht aber nie ein kontradiktorischer Wider-
streit zu Realem. Bei negativem Vorstellen besteht nie Ubereinstimmung
mit einem Realen, aber es besteht manchmal kontradiktorischer Wider-
 APPENDIX B 125

be based on someone rightly desiring something. Really this only says that
it is not possible that someone should desire it without desiring it rightly.
(From what we have said) up to now it appears that good is really a negative
concept, because it would be perhaps possible to say that if someone calls
something desirable he expresses (the thought) that he desires it rightly.6
The expression true is used as an attribute of assertions and of judgements.
He who says this, refers to himself, or to someone else as judging and he
indicates that he (or the other) judges rightly, in so far as they have a certain
kind of judgement (content 7). 'True' is therefore not a real name, like the
names that signify objects, and again the names that signify abstracts are
no real names. Expressions that denote something as past or future are
not real names. So too, expressions that describe something as present are
not real names. This is clearly visible when one speaks of a real lack (of
something), but it applies generally. Here we have to do with special modes
of conceiving, judging, wishing, etc. Obviously the abstract expressions:
'the present', 'the future', 'the past', are even less names of something real.
Neither are expressions like: 'space', 'time', real names, nor yet the ex-
pressions: 'to be in space', 'to be in time'.

It is clear that 'there is' has a different sense when one says 'there is' and
follows it by a real name like, e.g., "there is a man", rather than when I sayS
"there is (or there exists) an impossibility of something". If one wishes to
give the same meaning to the 'there is' then one would have to transform
the sentence and e.g. instead of saying "there is the impossibility of A"
say "A is impossible". Similarly when I say there is bravery, I should
rather say there are brave (men), or (in view of the fact) that even 'brave'
is not a real concept, in that it speaks only of the possible brave acts, one
should then say that there are people who behave morally well; there are
people who behave morally well without difficulty; there are people who do
not find it troublesome to behave morally well. Thus one arrives at a
fusion of affirmation and negation.
If I say "there is a non-red object" then this looks like saying there is
something concrete that accords with me, just like concrete things accord
with those who have ideas, (and it does it) in such a way that in so far as I
have an idea of an object I conceive of it in a positive way, and with respect
to redness I predicate negatively of it. 9
When I say: "there does not exist a non-red object" then this means
that "In so far as I conceive of it in this fashion,lo there is nothing real that
accords with me." In this, notice is given that I conceive of it. l l And in
general it seems to be the case that when I say something I give notice that
6 This is negative since good = desirable; desirable is, here, rightly desirable, and this in
turn was shown to have negative purports.
7 In this case the parentheses are Brentano's own. This, as much of this paper is not clear
and needs elucidation.
S The use of 'one says' and 'I say' parallels Brentano's own text; it is unlikely that it has
any significance; it merely reflects the difficulties of dictation.
9 This is a free translation but not a paraphrase.
10 As being a red object.
11 i.e. of the red object.
I26 APPENDIX B

streit. Ein Vorstellen, das teilweise positiv, teilweise negativ ist, kann manch-
mal dem positiven Teile nach nicht iibereinstimmen, manchmal dem nega-
tiven Teil nach widerstreiten. Manchmal kann auch beides der Fall sein.
Wir miissen also sagen, damit das Urteil richtig sei, muB es in seinen posi-
tiven Momenten mit der Wirklichkeit harmonieren und in seinen negativen
nicht mit ihr disharmonieren. Die Bestimmung, die Wahrheit sei die Uber-
einstimmung von Denken und Wirklichkeit, muB in dieser Art erkHirt oder
emendiert werden.
Dabei ist hinsichtlich der Temporalmodi zu bemerken, daB die Uberein-
stimmung sowohl als auch der Mangel an Widerstreit zwischen dem gegen-
wartig bestehenden Urteil und der Wirklichkeit dann als gegeben zu denken
ist, wenn das Betreffende mit dem Temporalmodus des Urteils resp. nicht
ist (oder war oder sein wird). Man konnte in Bezug auf die Zeit modi noch
hinzufiigen, daB Ubereinstimmung sowohl als Widerstreit bestehen wiirde,
wenn der betreffende Urteilende in die betreffende Zeit versetzt und mit
dem Modus der Gegenwart urteilend gedacht wiirde. Freilich fiihrt das zu
Komplikationen, indem ein kompliziertes Urteil zugleich mehrere Tem-
poralmodi verwenden kann, z.B. wenn einer sagt "es gibt einen gewesenen
Konig und gegenwartigen Bettler und kiinftigen Konig mit erneuter Macht."
Das Kriterium der Wahrheit eines Urteils ist jedenfalls nicht die Uber-
einstimmung mit der Wirklichkeit und der Mangel eines Widerstreits mit
ihr, sondern die Evidenz. (Die Wahrheit eines Urteils ist die Ubereinstim-
mung mit dem, was ist, war und sein wird und der Mangel eines Widerstreits
mit ihm).
Wo es sich urn ein apodiktisches Urteil handelt, hat man es, wie ander-
warts gezeigt, mit einer Verursachung des evidenten Urteils durch die Vor-
steHung zu tun. Besteht diese Verursachung wirklich oder ist sie der
Natur nach nicht unmoglich, so sind die hier geforderten Ubereinstim-
mungen und Mangel des Widerstreits gegeben.
 APPENDIX B 127

I think and of what I think. 12 In this it is always the case that part of my
assertion is indirect. 13 The indirect communication is dearly seen where
we have to do with two negations, e.g. "There is not a non-red object" =
= "All objects are red" or "Each object is red".
What does it mean: "To accord with reality in conceiving (01 something)?"
This will appear from the concept of contradiction. If I conceive of some-
thing negatively then this conception contradicts the respective reality
when it exists. If I have a positive idea of something that is not, then this
positive idea does not contradict something real but (on the other hand)
it does not accord with anything real. Sometimes in a positive conception
there is no accord with something real, but in these cases there is never a
contradictory opposition to the real. A conception that is partly positive
and partly negative can sometimes, in virtue of its positive aspect, fail to
accord (with the real) and sometimes in virtue of its negative aspect it can
contradict (the real), and sometimes both could be the case. Therefore we
must say that if a judgement is to be true (then) it must, in virtue of its
positive aspect, harmonise with reality, and in virtue of its negative aspect
it should not be in disharmony with it. The statement that truth consists
in correspondence of thought and reality must be explained or amended in
this sense.
At this stage the following ought to be said about temporal modes. (In
these cases) the correspondence with, as well as the lack of contradiction
between, the present judgement and reality can be regarded as given when
the respective (case) is not (or was not, or will not be) in accord with the
temporal mode of the judgement. One can say about the modes of time that
the correspondence, as well as the contradiction (with reality) will take
place when the respective judging person is put in the respective time, and
thought of as judging in the present tense. Admittedly this leads to compli-
cations, because a complex judgement could apply to several temporal
modes at once, e.g. when one says: "There is a former king, the present
beggar and a future king with renewed power".
In any case the criterion 01 truth does not lie in the correspondence with
reality or in the lack of contradiction with it, but in evidence. (The truth 14
of a judgement is the correspondence with what is, was, or will be, or the
lack of contradiction with it.)
When we have to do with an apodeictic judgement, then, as was shown
before, it is a case of an image 15 causing an evident judgement. If this
cause really exists, or if it is not impossible according to nature, then the
correspondence and the lack of contradiction described above is given.

12 'Vorstelle' - literally 'am aware of' or 'conceive of'. I use 'think' for the sake of style.
13 This looks like confusion between what I say and what is implied by what I say.
14 Italics mine.
15 Here I felt that 'Vorstellung' should be translated 'image' rather than 'idea' or 'concept'.
 APPENDIX "e"

EL. 28: Ober den Sinn und die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satzes
"Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus". (I2. V. I9I5)

I. Der Satz "veritas est adaquatio rei et intellectus" ist einer von denen
die wir von friiheren Zeiten iibernommen haben. Wieder und wieder wird
er geltend gemacht und man glaubt in ihm eine von vorneherein ein-
leuchtende Behauptung auszusprechen.
2. Ehe man dies zugibt, muB man denn aber doch iiber seinen Sinn und
die Bedeutung jedes darin verwandten Terminus im Klaren sein. Und eine
Untersuchung dariiber erscheint umso dringender geboten, als man bei
einiger Aufmerksamkeit die Erfahrung macht, daB hier wesentlich ver-
schiedene Auffassungen bestehen.
3. Manche glauben mit dem Worte adaquatio sei ein gewisses Gleichheits
verhaltnis bezeichnet, welches bei jedem wahren Urteil zwischen etwas was
ausserhalb des urteilenden Verstandes und etwas, in dem urteilenden Ver-
stand bestehe, gegeben sei. Das ausserhalb des Verst andes Bestehend
werde mit dem Ausdruck "res", das in dem Verstande Bestehende mitdem
Ausdruck "intellectus" bezeichnet.
4. Verdeutlichen wir uns die Meinung zunachst an ein paar Beispielen
affirmativer Urteile. Ein wahres Urteil ist der Satz "ein Baum ist griin".
Hier besteht in Wirklichkeit ein Baum in Verbindung mit griin und auch
der Urteilende verbindet das eine mit dem anderen. So stimmt sein Urteil
zu dem, was die Sachen zeigen und in dieser Uebereinstimmung von Ge-
dachtem und Sachlichem solI jene Adaquatio erblickt werden, welche dem
wahren Denken eignet und es von dem falschen unterscheidet. Nehmen wir
statt dieses Beispiels ein Urteil, das nicht kategorisch Subjekt und Pradikat
miteinander verbindet, sondern nur einfach ein Ding anerkennt, wie es in dem
Existenzialsatz geschieht, also z.B. den Satz "es gibt einen Korper", so
finden wir auch hier den Korper sowohl ausserhalb des Verst andes als von
diesem anerkannt bestehend und somit wieder jene eigentiimliche Art von
Gleichheit, welche die Wahrheit des Urteils ausmachen solI.
5. Betrachten wir die beiden Beispiele genauer, so konnen wir uns nicht
verbergen, daB, wenn diese Deutung die richtige ware, die Ausdrucksweise
als sehr miBverstandlich getadelt werden miiBte. Auch bei bloBer Vorstel-
lung der Zusammensetzung von Baum und Griin und bei bloBer Vorstellung
eines Korpers konnte man von einem Gleichheitsverhaltnis sprechen, nicht
aber von Wahrheit, da Wahrheit nur dem Urteil zukommt.
 APPENDIX "C"

Translation of EL. 28: Ober den Sinn und die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung
des Satzes "Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus". (12. V. 1915)

I. The sentence "Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus" is one of these

that we have inherited from older times. Again and again it comes to be
regarded as correct, and one is inclined to believe that it expresses a
thoroughly illuminating proposition.
2. Before one accepts this opinion, one should see clearly what it means
and be able to understand thoroughly each of the terms used in it. Carpful
examination reveals that different interpretations are possible and therefore,
an investigation of this matter becomes even more imperative.
3. It is sometimes thought that the word 'Adequatio' denotes a special
relation of equivalence. Whenever a judgement is true, this relation is sup-
posed to hold between something outside the mind, which formed the judge-
ment, and something in this mind. That which is outside the mind is denoted
by the word 'res', that which is in the mind, by the word 'intellectus'.
4. Let us explain the meaning (of this) firstly on two examples of affir-
mative judgement. The sentence "The tree is green" represents a
true jUdgement. Here, on the one hand, we have a concrete tree really
conjoined with green. On the other hand, he who passed the judgement
connected the one with the other, therefore his judgement fits what is
exhibited by the concrete things. The adequatio which belongs to true
thinking, and marks it off from false thought, is supposed to consist in this
correspondence between what is thought and what is the case. If we re-
place our example by an existential proposition, i.e. one that indicates a
simple acceptance of a thing, rather than indicating a categorical connection
between a subject and predicate, e.g. the sentence "There is a body", we
find the body is both acknowledged by the mind and exists outside this
mind, and therefore there obtains again a special kind of equivalence in
which the truth of the judgement is supposed to consist.
S. If we look at these two examples more closely, we cannot fail to see
that even if this conception were correct then at least the way in which it is
expressed would have to be regarded as grossly misleading. It is possible to
speak about the relation of equivalence in cases of a mere idea, of either
the body or the connection of tree with green. In this case however it is
impossible to speak of truth, because truth belongs only to judgements. 1
1 See W&E, p. 3 ff.
130 APPENDIX C

6. Noch groBere Bedenken erheben sich, wenn wir statt wie in den er-
brachten Beispielen affirmative Urteile, negative Urteile in Betracht ziehen.
Auch von diesen sind ja viele der Wahrheit teilhaft. So z.E. das negative
Urteil, es gibt keinen Zentauren. Hier wird der Zentaure vorgestellt und
geht so auch in das negative Urteil ein, aber in Wirklichkeit besteht kein
Zentaure und so scheint von jenem Gleichheitsverhaltnis nichts zu ent-
decken. ja, besHinde er in Wirklichkeit, so wurde das negative Urteil
geradezu falsch sein.
Hierauf antwortet man, der Zentaur bestehe im urteilenden Verstand als
geleugnet, ausserhalb des Verst andes aber bestehe, eben weil der Zentaur
nicht bestehe, das Nichtsein des Zentaurn und das sei die Sache, welche
dem als geleugnet im Verstande bestehenden Zentaurn entsprechen und mit
ihm in dem verlangten Gleichheitsverhaltnis bestehe.
7. In ahnlicher Weise will man sich auch helfen, wenn man statt auf Falle
negativer Urteile, auf solche Falle affirmativer Urteile verweist, welche
etwas mit einem modus prateritus oder modus futures anerkennt. Sagt
einer, Casar ist gewesen, so sagt er eine Wahrheit aber nur in dem urteilenden
Verstand nicht auBer ihm besteht ein Casar, da er ja langst den Tod gefunden
hat und so scheint denn auch von jener Gleichheit zwischen einem ausser-
halb des Geistes und innerhalb seiner gegebenen nicht geredet werden zu
konnen. Hier sagt man, Casar bestehe zwar allerdings nicht ausserhalb des
Geistes, aber das Gewesensein des Casar bestehe ausserhalb desselben und
dieses sei das Ding, welches mit dem im Geiste bestehenden als vergangen
anerkannten Casar ubereinstimme und das verlangte Gleichheitsverhaltnis
zeige.
8. Es ist leicht zu zeigen, daB diese Erklarung und Verteidigung zuruck-
gewiesen werden muB.
Vor allem muB man dagegen protestieren, daB unter dem Ausdruck
"res" ein Nichtsein einer Sache und ein Gewesensein oder Zukunftigsein
einer Sache verstanden werden konne.
 APPENDIX C I3I

6. If, besides the above examples of affirmative judgements, we bring

under consideration also negative judgements, we are subjected to further
doubts. A number of those are also true. So for instance the negative judge-
ment "There is no centaur". On the one hand the centaur is represented in
the mind 2 and so it is included in the negative judgement. On the other
hand however, in reality there are no centaurs and therefore it would seem
impossible to discover here the relation of equivalence. What is more, if in
reality there was a centaur, the judgement would be false.
To this it would be replied that the centaur exists in the mind that passes
the judgement in the capacity of a denied thing. Outside the mind the
centaur does not exist, but there exists therefore the inexistence of the
centaur, and this is the object that corresponds with the centaur which
exists as a denied thing in the mind. In this consists the required relation of
equivalence. 3
7. The above defence would also be employed when, rather than with the
negative, one were to be confronted with affirmative judgements that
acknowledge something, either in modus praeteritus or modus futurus. If
one says "There was Caesar" he says what is true. But Caesar exists only in
the mind that passes the judgement, not in the outside reality, because he
died4 a long time ago. Hence it would seem that also in this case we are not
entitled to talk about the equivalence (which is supposed to exist) between
something inside and something outside the mind. 5 It would be maintained
here that even though Caesar does not exist outside the mind, still there
exists the fact that Ceasar did exist. This then is the thing that corresponds
with the Caesar that is acknowledged in the mind as having existed in the
past, and the correspondence establishes the required relation of equiva-
lence. 6
8. It is easy to see that this explanation and defence (of the correspondence
theory) must be abandoned.
Above all we must protest against the view that the expression 'res'
could denote the inexistence of something or a future or past existence of
an object.

Here the fragment ends. Brentano clearly intended to continue it by arguing

against fictional entities. (See Chapter III, Section 2.) The purport of the
discussion would seem to be that one can make sense of the relation of
correspondence between the judgement (assertion) and something outside
it only by introducing fictional entities. In the absence of such entia irrealia,
the relation cannot be plausibly accounted for. 7

2 'Vorgestellt' is translated as 'represented in the mind'.

8 Compare here the correspondence of statements with facts; states of affairs, what is the
case, etc.
4 Ceased to exist.
5 I translate der Geist by 'mind'.
6 Modus tutUYUS is not discussed, but it can easily be seen that the discussion applies to it
mutatis mutandis.
7 Compare here Austin's ingenious attempt and Strawson's reply to it in ASP Symposium.
 APPENDIX "D"

EL. 96: Kurzer Abriss einer allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie. Kapitel 4.

4.Kapitel. Von der Wahrheit und Evidenz.

1. In ahnlicher Weise wie das Wort "gesund", ist auch das Wort "wahr"
mehrdeutig, wobei wie dort auch hier eines ist, was im eigentlichen Sinne
so heiBt, wahrend alles andere nur wegen seiner Beziehung zu jenem so
genannt wird. Dort der Leib, hier das Urteil.
2. Wann aber nennen wir ein Urteil wahr?
ARISTOTELES sagt, wenn es verbindet, was in Wirklichkeit verbunden, und
trennt, was in Wirklichkeit getrennt ist. Doch passt diese Definition nicht
auf jene Falle wahrer negativer Pradikationen, wo dem Pradikat nichts in
Wirklichkeit entspricht. Sie passt ferner nicht auf die einfachen Anerken-
nungen und Verwerfungen, wie: A ist. A ist nicht. Und wo sie paBt, ist sie
unbrauchbar, urn erkennen zu lassen, ob ein Urteil unter sie £ant. WiiBten
wir aber schon, daB in Wirklichkeit ein S mit einem P verbunden (oder nicht
verbunden) sei, so hatten wir das fragliche Urteil ja schon gefant.
3. Es lasst sich von Wahrheit iiberhaupt keine zerlegende Definition geben,
weil es sich beim Unterschied von wahren und falschen Urteilen urn etwas
Elementares handelt, das man erlebt haben muB.
4. Da sowohl anerkennende als verwerfende, sowohl einfach anerkennende
als pradizierende Urteile falsch sein konnen, kann in der sogen. Urteils-
qualitat das die Wahrheit ausmachende Moment nicht liegen. Ebensowenig
in der sogen. Quantitat, denn es gibt Irrtiimer unter allgememen und be-
sonderen Urteilen. Ebensowenig in der Relation, denn es gibt Irrtiimer unter
kategorischen wie unter den hypothetischen und disjunktiven. Auch nicht
in der sogenannten Modalitat, denn man kann sich iiber bloBe Tatsachen
ebenso irren wie iiber Gesetzte.
5. Aber damit sind die Urteilsdifferenzen nicht erschopft. Die innere
Wahrnehmung zeigt uns auch den Unterschied von blinden und evidenten
Urteilen. Er lasst sich, weil elementar, nur an Beispielen klar machen.
Blind das Urteil: Farbiges ist. Evident: Ich sehe. Ich denke. Blind: Un-
raumliches ist unmoglich. Evident Es kann nicht etwas zugleich sein und
nicht sein. 2 ist groBer als I etc.
6. Damit ist der Wahrheitsbegriff geklart, denn "wahres Urteil" und
"evidentes Urteil" sagt dasselbe. Wobei man nur noch unmittelbar und
mittelbar evidente zu unterscheiden hat, d.h. solche, die selbst und fiir sich
einleuchten, und solche, die auf Grund von Beweisen einleuchten.
 APPENDIX "D"

Translation of EL. 96: Kurzer Abriss einer allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie.

Chapter IV.

Chapter 4. On Truth and Evidence.

I. The word 'true' is used in more than one sense in a way similar to that
in which the word 'healthy' is used. In both cases the word is applied primar-
ily to only one thing, and all other things are called this name only because
they bear some relation to this thing. This primary object is in one case the
judgement, in the other, the body.
2. When, then, is a judgement called true?
ARISTOTLE believed that it was true when it combines what is in reality com-
bined, and when it parts what is in reality apart. At the very least, this
definition does not fit the cases of true negative prediction, as in these cases
nothing real corresponds with the predicate. Furthermore, it does not fit
simple cases of assent or dissent, e.g. 'A is' and 'A is not'.
In these cases where this definition fits, it is useless for the purpose of
finding out whether a judgement satisfies it. If we know already whether,
in reality, S is combined with P, then we have already accepted the judge-
ment in question. 1
3. It is impossible to give an analytic definition of truth. 2 This is because
the difference between a true and a false judgement is something elementary
that must be experienced to be understood.
4. It is impossible that the criterion of truth 3 should lie in the quality of
the judgement, because both assenting and dissenting, both simple and
predicative judgements, can be false. It is equally impossible for it (the
criterion) to lie in the so-called quantity, because both particular and general
statements can be mistaken. It would be hard to find it in the relation,
because mistakes can be found among categorical, hypothetical and dis-
junctive (judgements). Nor yet can it be found in the so-called modality,
because it is as easy to be mistaken about simple causes as it is to be mis-
taken about laws.
1 Here Brentano seems to confuse criteria and a definition of Truth, even though he has
drawn this distinction clearly elsewhere.
2 This seems correct - only an account can be given. However, Brentano's reasons seem
less acceptable. Observe also that his argument implies that judgement is a mental event.
3 The German reads: "das die Wahrheit ausmachende Moment".
134 APPENDIX D

7. Einwand gegen diese Definition: Da "ein Urteil ist nicht wahr" soviel
besagt wie "ein Urteil ist falsch", wurde nach ihr jedes blinde falsch sein.
Falsch ist aber doch nur, was einem wahren widerspricht, wahrend doch
ohne Widerspruch, was einer evident urteilt, von einem andern blind
geleugnet werden kann. Anwort: "Wahres Urteil" ist aequivok. Im ur-
sprunglichen Sinne heiBt es soviel wie evidentes; in ubertragenem Sinne
aber wird auch ein blindes, das mit einem evidenten in allen andern Stucken
ubereinstimmt, wahr genannt.
8. Damit ist jener Wahrheitsbegriff geklart, der allein dem Skeptizismus
stand halt und Dogmatismus sowohl als Subjektivismus uberwindet.
Bezuglich der beiden erst en ist dies ohne wei teres klar. Bezuglich des letzten
ist nur auf den Satz des Widerspruchs zu verweisen. Im Widerspruch zu
Einsichten k6nnen nur blinde Urteile stehen. Widersprechende k6nnen
unm6g1ich beide evident sein. Falsch aber heiBt, was dem evidenten wider-
spricht.
 APPENDIX D I35
5. The above, however, does not exhaust all the differences between
judgements. Introspection acquaints us also with the difference between
evident and non-evident judgements. 4 This difference can only be explained
by examples, because it is elementary. The judgement 'there are colours' is
not evident, but '1 see' or '1 think' is evident; 'Non-spatial (objects) are
impossible', is not evident, but 'nothing can exist and tail to exist at the same
time' and '2 is bigger than I' are evident judgements.
6. This explains the concept of truth, because "a true judgement" is seen
to say the same as " an evident judgement". Then it is only necessary to
distinguish between judgements that are immediately evident and those
that are seen to be evident in another way, i.e., those which are self-illumin-
ating and those that are known by way of proof. 5
7. Against this definition it can be said: "A judgement is not true" must
mean then the same as "A judgement is false" - hence it will follow that
each non-evident judgement is. false. But only those judgements are in
fact false which are contrary to a true judgement, whereas it is possible
that, without contradiction, what one judged evidently (to be the case) can
be problematically denied by someone else. 7 Reply: There is an equivocation:
"a true judgement" means originally as much as an evident judgement. In
the secondary sense also, a non-evident judgement is called true, if it corre-
sponds in all other respects with an evident one.
8. In this way the concept of truth is established in the only sense in
which it can both avert scepticism and defeat dogmatism as well as sub-
jectivism. Concerning the first two - it will be clear without further argu-
ments. Concerning Subjectivism, it is only necessary to apply the principle
of non-contradiction. Only non-evident judgements can be regarded as
opposite to (evident) insights. Contraries cannot both be evidently true.
'False', however, denotes the same as contrary to what is evidently (true).8

4 Brentano uses: 'evidenten und blinden Urteilen'.

5 cf. here the discussion of evidence.
6 Brentano must mean that "It is not the case that a judgement is immediately known
to be true" is equivalent to "A judgement is false".
7 'Problematically accepted' must have been meant here unless the evident judgement
was negative.
S This is a sketchy argument; it turns on the point of how a subjectivist can distinguish
false from not self-evident judgement.
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54. Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, edited by F. Mayer-Hillebrand.
A. Franke, Berne, 1963.

Besides the published works, Brentano left a large number of manuscripts

and fragments, most of which were microfilmed and catalogued by F.
Mayer-Hillebrand. Copies of these microfilms are at the moment kept by:
In Austria: Library of the University of Innsbruck.
In Germany: The Staatsbibliothek, in Munich, and Goethe-Museum
in Frankfurt.
In U.S.A.: University Libraries of: Harvard, Berkeley, North-
western, Minnesota; The library of Congress in Wash-
ington; and some in the library of Brown University,
Providence, Rhode Island (typed copies only).
In Mexico: The University of Mexico.
In South America: The Library of the Philosophy of Law in Buenos Aires.
In Australia: The Baillieu Library, University of Melbourne.
 A SELECTION OF UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS OF
FRANZ BRENTANO 1

EL. I Von der Erkenntnis, I903 (typed).

EL. 7 Zu Poincares Erkenntnisiehre, I9I6.
EL. 8 ZU Poincares Erkenntnistheoretischen Aufstellungen.
EL. I I Gegen die Behauptung der Willkur der Ersten Aufnahmen bei
der Bestimmung der Wahrscheinlichkeit (typed).
EL.2I Zum Bertrand'schen Sehenproblem.
EL.23 Uber die Kompatibilitat gewisser blinder und konfuser Urteile
mit entgegengesetzten Evidenten, I9I6 (typed).
EL. 24 Klar und deutlich, 1916 (typed).
EL. 26 Dber Gieichheit und Verschiedenheit der Erkenntnis, 1916
(typed).
EL. 27 Klarheit und Deutlichkeit, 1915 (typed).
EL. 28 Dber den Sinn und die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satzes:
Veritas est adequatio ... etc., 1915 (typed).
EL. 3I Zur Lehre von der unmittelbaren tatsachlichen Evidenz, 1915
(typed).
EL. 32 Gegen die vermeinte Evidenz der ausseren Wahrnehmung, 1907
(typed).
EL·33 Vom Ursprung unserer Dberzeugung von der Korperwelt, 1907
(typed).
EL·36 Die Erkenntnistheorie, 1906 (typed).
EL·4I Von den transcendentalen Begriffen und Erkenntnissen, (typed).
EL. 42 Zur Frage nach Moglichkeit transcendenter Erkenntnisse, (typed).
EL. 43 Zur Frage nach der Existenz der Inhalte, 1914 (typed).
EL. 45 (& 46) Dber den Satz: Veritas est ... etc., 1915 (typed).
EL·49 Natiirliche Klassifikation unserer Erkenntnisse.
EL. 50 Gesamtheit der Wahrheit nach ... geordnet.
EL. 53 Von der Definition (typed).
EL. 54 Aussage (typed).
EL. 59 Zur Klassifikation der Wissenschaften (typed).
EL. 6I Die verschiedenen Bedeutungen von Begriff, 1906 (typed).
EL. 62 Verhaltnis von Begriffen (typed).
EL.63 Vom analytischen Urteil (Kant's Irrenlehre) (typed).

1 Numbers refer to a list of manuscripts prepared and arranged by Professor F. Mayer-

Hillebrand, Innsbruck.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
EL. 66 Sprechen und Denken, 1905 (typed).
EL. 67 Wahrheit ist eine Art von Ubereinstimmung, 1907 (typed).
EL. 69 Logisch wichtige Ausdrticke (typed).
EL. 71 Russells Paradoxon von Klassen, 19II (typed).
EL. 80 Logik (typed).
EL. 85 Vom Denken von Ens Rationis, 1960 (clear hand).
EL. 89 Cogitare, 1904-
EL. 91 Von den GegensHinden des Denkens, 1915 (clear hand).
EL. 93 Gedanken zur Lehre von der Evidenz (clear hand).
EL. 93a Zur Lehre von der Evidenz, 1915 (typed).
EL. 95 Die Erkenntnistheorie ist ein Teil der Psychologie, 1909.
EL. 96 Kurzer Abriss einer allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie (typed).
M·3 Die Philosophie, 1914 (typed).
M.20 Ontologie, 1908 (typed).
M.25 Ursache (typed).
M·33 Meinongs Relationslehre (typed).
M·3 8 Uber Seiend, Wahr und Gut, 1908 (typed).
M·45 Von Ens Rationis (typed).
M·5 1 Universel Denkendes und universel Seiendes, 1917 (typed).
M·53 Vom Denken (typed).
M.57 Worterklarungen (typed).
M.63 Die verschiedenen Bedeutungen des 'ist' , 1908 (typed).
M.65 Entia Rationis, 1917 (typed).
1\'1. 88 Vom Seienden in uneigentlichem Sinne, 1916 (typed).
TS.14 Realitat und Intentionalitat, 1893.
N.12 Uber Mach's "Erkenntnis und Irrtum".
N.17 Zur Wtirdigung des Positivismus von E. Mach, 1900.
Sp. I Durch die Sprache geben wir uns als denkende erkennen.
Sp. 2 Relativa keine N amen.
Sp. 3 Sprache, 1905.
Sp·4 Zur Sprachphilosophie.
Sp. 5 Urteil (der Glaube) man denkt nicht Dinge, sondern dass sie
sewn.
Sp.6 Von der Sprache, Denkmodi etc. (typed copy also).
Sp·7 Sprache.
H·3 Descartes Meditationen, 1888/9.
H.19 Bemerkungen tiber die Teodizee von Leibnitz (typed copy also).
H.23 Leibnitz - Russell, 1915 (typed copy also).
H·35 Was an Reid zu Loben ... ,1916 (typed copy also).
H·40 Zu Descartes.
H·48 A. Comte und die Positive Philosophie.
E.3 Vom Lieben und Hassen (published?).
E. 17 Von der Erkenntnis des Guten und Schlechten.
E. 19 Begriff der Philosophie von den Menschlichen Dingen.
E. 21 E thikkolleg.
Ps. I Gegen den Nominalismus.
PS·4 Zur Lehre von Anschauung, 1916 (clear hand).
Ps.6 Von dem Objektiven.
144 BIBLIOGRAPHY

PS·9 Wer denkt denkt Etwas (clear hand).

Ps. I I Zur Lehre von Universalien (aIle Begriffe sind universeIl).
Ps.14 Von den Objekten, 1908 (clear hand).
Ps. IS Vorstellen und Urteilen, 1906.
Ps. 16 Yom Objekt, 1906.
PS.21 Abstraction.
Ps.26 Antikritik einer Rezension der "Klassifikation" (clear hand).
Ps.28 Aphorismen - Etwas deutlich vorstellen.
Ps.29 Perzipieren, Aperzipieren, deutlich Aperzipieren, etc.
PS·30 Zur Sprache (clear hand).
Ps. 32 Psychische Synthesen (clear hand).
PS·3S Uber das VorsteIlen, before 1908.

The above selection is made from one part of Franz Brentano's manu-
scripts, which was lent to me by Professor J. C. M. Brentano, and which
is now in the possession of the Baillieu Library of the University of Mel-
bourne.
I selected the papers which seem to throw some light on problems of
truth or problems connected with it in F. Brentano's philosophy. Sometimes
the connection is fairly remote.
Whenever two manuscripts of a similar scope were available, I selected
the more legible manuscript for inclusion in the list. Some, but not many,
have been included in publications.
The selection represents only a very small part of the manuscripts of F.
Brentano left unpublished after his death'
 GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 1

A. BOOKS

I. Aristotle, Metaphysica, tr. W. D. Ross. Oxford, 1908.

2. Bergmann, H., Untersuchungen zum Problem der Evidenz der inneren
Wahrnehmung. Halle, 1908.
3. Bentham, J., Theory of Legislation, tr. R. Hildreth, ed. E. Dumont.
London, 1864.
New Ed. by C. K Ogden. Kegan Paul, 1931
4. Hamilton, W., Lectures on Metaphysics. Edinburgh, 1859.
5. Collective Charisteria, especially Chapter VI (D. Frydman: Zagadniene
Oczywistosci u Franciszka Brentany. Warsaw, P.W.N. 1960.
6. Stewart, D., The Collected Works. London, 1854.
7. Dyroff, A., Ober den Existentialbegriff. Freiburg, 1902.
8. Geyser, J., Auf dem Kampfelde der Logik. Freiburg, 1926.
9. Heidegger, M., Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Leipzig, 1914.
10. Hillebrand, F., Die neuen Theorien der Kategorischen Schliisse. Vienna,
1891.
II. Kastil, A., Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Francke, 1951.
12. Kraus, 0., F. Brentano, zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre.
Munich, 1919.
13. Kraus, 0., Brentanos Stellung zur Phaenomenologie und Gegenstands-
theorie. Leipzig, 1924.
14. Margolius, H., Die Ethik Franz Brentanos. Leipzig, 1929.
15. Marty, A., Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik
und Sprachphilosophie. Halle, 1908.
16. Mentzer, W., Gegen den Empirizismus. Leipzig, 1925.
17. Mill, J. S., A System of Logic. Any Edition.
18. Most, 0., Die Ethik Franz Brentanos. Helios-Munster, 1931.
19. Passmore, J., A Hundred Years of PhilosoPhy. London, 1957.
20. Tatarkiewicz, W., Historia Filozofii. Warsaw, 1958.
21. Wagner, J., Die Kritik an Kants Philosophie bei Bolzano, Brentano,
ihren Schiilern und Max Scheller. 1923.
22. Werner, A., Die Psychologisch-erkenntnistheorethischen Grundlagen der
Metaphysik F. Brentanos. Munster, Dissertation. 1930.
1 This bibliography does not contain titles already mentioned in the preceding biblio-
graphy of F. Brentano's works.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

23. Whewell, W., Novum Organum Renovatum Cambridge, I858.

24. Windischer, H., Brentano und die Scholastik. Innsbruck, I936.
25. Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, I953.
26. Wittgenstein, L., The Blue and the Brown Books. Blackwell, I958.

B. ARTICLES
Analysis:
Vol. I9: S0rensen, H. S., An Analysis 0/ 'to be' and 'to be true'.
Vol. 21: Grossman, R, Acts and Relations in Brentano.
Vol. 22: Kamitz, R, Acts and Relations in Brentano.

Australasian Journal 0/ PhilosoPhy:

I952: Herbst, P., The Nature 0/ Facts.
Mackie, J., The Nature 0/ Facts, (a reply to Mr. Herbst.)

J ahrbuch /ur Philosophie und Phaenomenologische Forschung:

Vol. IV: Pfander, A., Logik I. Ab. Die Lehre vom Urteil.
Vol. VII: Betzger, A., Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis.
Erganzungsband: Lipps, H., Das Urteil.

Kantstudien:
22 (I9I9): Utitz, E., F. Brentano.

Mind:
I876: Land, J. P. N., Brentano's Logical Innovations.
I904: Russell, B., Meinong's theory 0/ complexes and assumptions.
I938: Acton, H. B., Man-made Truth.
I950: Cousin, D. R, Carnap's theories 0/ Truth.
I952: Toulmin S. E. & Baier, K., On Describing.
I953: Hall, E. W., On describing describing.
I955: Kotarbinski, T., Pansomatism.
I965/6: Srzednicki, J., It is True, (to appear at the time of the publi-
cation of this book).
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
I943/4: Ducasse, C. J., Propositions Truth and the Ultimate Criterion 0/
Truth.
Bergmann H., Brentano's Theory 0/ Induction.
I94 8/9 : Kaufman, F., R. Carnap's Analysis 0/ Truth.
I953/4: Chandbury, P. J., Knowledge and Truth Phenomenological Inquiry.
Hart, Brentanos 'Grundlegung und Au/bau der Ethik'.
Srzednicki, J., Remarks Concerning the interpretation 0/ Franz
Brentano's Philosophy.
Mayer-Hillebrand, F., Remarks Concerning the interpretation 0/
Franz Brentano's Philosophy, (a reply to Dr. Srzednicki).
Srzednicki, J., A reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand.

Philosophisches J ahrbuch:
I930: Fels, H., Brentano und Kant.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (ordinary volumes)
XXI: Symposium, The Character of Cognitive Acts.
XXVI: Morris, C. R., Judgement as the fundamental act in Knowledge.
XXXII: Ryle, G., Systematically misleading expressions.
XXXV: Acton, H. B., The Correspondence Theory of Truth.
LI: Brown, N. J., Judgement and the structure of Language.

Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung

XVIIJ1: F. Mayer-Hillebrand Ruckblick auf die bisherigen Bestrebungen
zur Erhaltung und Verbreitung von Franz Brentanos philoso-
phischen Lehren und kurze Darstellung dieser Lehren (this contains
a very full bibliography up to and inclusive of 1963).
 INDEX

Note re appendices: All index references are to the English text of Brentano's papers.
No references are made to bibliography.

Acceptance Theory of Truth, vide "Strawson".

A Hundred Years of PhilosoPhy (J. Passmore) XV.
Aristotle (Aristolelian) XV, 10, II, 18, 22, 23, 26, 28, 69, 82, II9, 121, 133.
Assent-Dissent, vide "Judgment".
Assertion (statement etc.) 13, 21, 22, 28, 29, 38, 57, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84,
90, 108, II2, II3, 123, 125, 126.
AUSTIN, J. L., 13, 20, 24, 25, 79, 13l.
Awareness (Vorstellung), 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 80, 84,85, 96, 98, 99, 101, 125, 127,
13I.
BAIN, A., 59.
BENTHAM, 28, also vide "Theory of Legislation"
BOLZANO, 12I.
BRENTANO, J. C. M. professor (son of the philosopher), VII.
Brentano Trust, VII.
CARNAP, Rudolf, 47, 70.
Cathegorematic-Syncathegorematic, 39, 55, 69, 82, 84, 108, II7, 12I.
Charisteria, vide "Frydman"
Correspondence formula vide: "Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus"
Correspondence Theory of Truth, 10, I8-29, 31, 32, 33, 42, 43, 46, 67-73, 74-86, 88, 89,
90, 91, 92, 93, lIZ, II6-I27, I29-I3I.
Concrete, vide "Real".
COPERNICUS, II9.
CORNFORD, F. M., (his editions of Platonic dialogues), 6, 9.
DESCARTES., 20, 12I.
Die Ethik Franz Brentano's: (0. Most) IX, 22, 54, 61, 84.
Die Philosophie Franz Brentano's: (A. Kastil) IX, 1,5, 9, 14, 16.
Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil: (F. Mayer-Hillebrand), IX, XVIII, I, 4, 6, 13, 36, 100,
101, 102, 104, 105.
Double Judgments (Doppelurteile), 65, 75.
Double Relation (in Judgments and Emotions), 58, 59, 60, 6l.
DUMONT, E., vide "Theory of Legislation".
Emotions, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 80, 123, 125.
Entia Linguae, vide "Linguistic" and "Entia Rationis".
Entia Rationis XV, XVI, 19, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29-35, 41, 42-49, 53, 54, 55, 65, 66, 67, 68,
69, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 106, II2, II3, 131,
Evidence (evident) XVIII, 73, 74, 75, 80, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93-98, 99, 100, 101, 104,
105, 106, 107, IIO, III, II3, 127, 133, 135.
Facts (factual) 21, 24, 25, 26, 67, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 90, 100, 104, II3, I3l.
Fictional Entities, vide "Entia Rationis".
FRANCKE, A., (Verlag) XIV.
Franz Brentano (0. Kraus), 10.
 INDEX I49
FRYDMAN, David., 93, 99.
Gorgias difficulty (re: correspondence theory of truth) 19, 20, 25, 29, 76, 85.
HAMILTON, Sir William., 52.
HEGEL, II4.
HILLEBRAND. F., 4, 6, 23.
HERBST, Peter., 43.
HUSSERL, Edmund., XV 14, 27, 32, 43, 54·
Imagination, 22.
Immanent, 35, 44, 45, 51, 52, 54·
Inexistence, 43, 51, 52, 53, 131. vide also "Intentional".
Intentional, (relation, inexistence etc.) 14, 19, 20, 21, 50-58, 58-67, 80, 84.
Introspection, 46, 66, 106, IIO.
Judgements - "theory of", main text, 58-67.
Judgement - 'traditional analysis of', 65, 66, 67.
Judgement - 'content', 42, 43, vide also "Objects of thought".
KASTIL, Alfred., XVII, XVIII, I, 2, 5, 9, 14, 16, 96, 100, 101, 104.
KRAUS, Oscar, XI, XVII, XVIII, I, 2, 5, 10, 14, 23, 24, 30, 46, 47, 54, 55, 61, 65, 68,
76, 78, 80, 88'
Kurzer Abriss einet" allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie, I32-I35.
Linguistic forms, entities, function etc., 25, 36-42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57,
58, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 76, 82, 86, 87, 103, II3, II4, n6-I2I.
Logic, 16.
Logic, Sematics, Metamathematics, (A. Tarski), IX, 12.
Love and Hate, vide "Emotions".
MACKIE, J., 43·
MARTY, Anton., XV, 7, 16, 27, 28, 31, 32, 42, 43, 45, 48, 102, II4, II7·
MAYER-HILLEBRAND, F., VII, XVII, XVIII, I, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 68, 101.
Meaning, 12.
Mental- acts, events, mind etc. XVI, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 33, 34, 37, 38, 50-58, 59-67
79, 81, 82, 88, 99, 101, II3, II7, 129, 131, 133.
MEINER, Felix, (publisher) VII, XVIII.
MEINONG, XV, 27, 32, 43.
Mental contents, vide "Objects of thought".
MILL, James., 22, 28, 59.
MILL, J. 5., 5, 6, 59, 62.
MOST, Otto., vide "Die Ethik Franz Brentano's"
MOORE, G.E., 95.
Objects of thought - of Judgement - mental etc., 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 4 1, 42, 44,
45, 46, 47, 50-58, 58----'73· 77, 79, 83, 85, 86, 101, 103, 105, 106, 125, 131. also vide.
"Mental" and "intentional".
Objects - real (a real, a concrete thing), 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 30, 33, 34, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53,
54, 55, 56, 67, 68, 71, 76, 77, 79, 80, 85, 86, 88, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 129.
PEIRCE, C. 5., The Philosophy of. (Ed. Buchler), 71.
PLATO, Platonic, 27.
Proposition, vide "Assertion".
Probability, 96.
Psychical, vide "Mental"
Psychology, Psychological fallacy, 15, 16, 17, 37, 38, 43, 50, 51, 57, 62, 66, 70, 71, II3,
121.
Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, VII, IX, XV, XVII, 2, 13, 14, 16, 22, 23, 28,
50-58, 59, 65·
PTOLEMY, II9.
RAMSEY, II, II3.
Real, the real, reality, concrete, objective., 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34,41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 66, 67, 69, 72, 78, 79, 83, 84,
85, 91, 92, 93, 97, 99, 105, 108, 114, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133·
Relation (Intentional vide "intentional"), 14, 52, 53, 54, 55, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84,
85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 97, 104, II2, 129, 131, 133.
Representation (Vorstellung), vide "Awareness"
150 INDEX

RVLE, Gilbert, 121.

Semantica-Synsemantica, vide "Cathegorematic".
SIGWART, 121.
SPENCER, Herbert, 22, 59.
Sprechen und Denken. 36-42, 43, 45, 46, 54, 68, 86, 92, II6-I2I.
Statement, vide "assertion".
STRAWSON, P. F., 24, 67, 77, 80, 85, 88, II3, 131.
Syncathegorematic, vide "Cathegorematic".
TARSKI, Alfred., vide "LogicSematics Metamathematics".
Theory of Legislation, (Bentham-Dumont) translation R. Hildreth., I, 2, 5, 6, 7.
Thought, vide "Mental".
TWARDOWSKI, Kazimierz., XV.
(jber den Sinn und die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satlles "Veiitas est adequatio rei et intel-
lectus", I28-I3I.
Understanding, 37, 38, 79, 81, 83, 85·
Universals, 45.
Unpublished manuscripts of F. Brentano, VII, XVII, XVIII, 3, 6, 17, 74-86, 93, 94, 99,
also vide: "Sprechen und Denhen", "Wahrheit ist eine Art von Ubereinstimmung"; "(jbel'
den Sinn und die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satzes" V eritas est adequatio rei et intel-
lectus"; "Kurller Abriss cineI' allgemeinen El'kenntnistheorie".
Veritas est adequation rei et intellectus (or the correspondence formula) 74-86, 89, 91,
92, II6-I27, 129, 131.
Versuch Ober die Erkenntnis (Ed. A. Kastil), IX, 104.
Vom Ursprung SittUcher Erkenntnis (Ed. O. Kraus)., IX, IS, 61, 65, 93, 94.
Wahrheit ist eine art von Obereinstimmung, 67-'73, 77, I22-I27.
Wahrheit und Evidenz, (Ed. o. Kraus), VII, IX, XI, XVII, 10, II, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23,
24,25,27,28,3°,32,33,34,35,42-49,67, 74-8I, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89,9°,91,92,
93-98, 100, 102, 105.
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig., 4, 26, 37, 38, II3.