Live in a hurry to die young

(Reflections on the intergenerational

transfer of poverty)
Susana Torrado

In recent times, the expression “intergenerational transfer of poverty” has been

disseminated in Latin American academic circles (especially within international
organizations).1 This notion aims to highlight the specificity of some demographic
behaviors of the deprived strata that would determine the “reproduction of poverty”
between successive generations or, in other words, the impossibility of children of poor
parents experiencing upward social mobility (no longer being poor). From this perspective,
the hypothesis of the “intergenerational transmission of poverty” would constitute a
specific case of blocking the possibility of intergenerational social advancement,
determined by the feedback between macrosocial factors and microfamily behaviors of a
demographic nature.
The interest in analyzing this conceptualization is not only academic: based on it, it is
sometimes accepted (implicitly or explicitly) that population policies (for example, the
promotion of family planning) are suitable instruments per se to eradicate poverty. Which
obviously entails some political risks.
In this article we are going to analyze the validity of this hypothesis in the context of
Argentine society in recent decades (the long-term approach is essential here). This is the
reason why the first point of this exhibition summarizes the evolution of our country with
regard to the structure of social classes, social mobility and levels of well-being, in the
period 1945-1995.

1. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, SOCIAL COURSES, SOCIAL MOBILITY 2

Of the various development strategies that alternated during our observation period, only
three induced significant modifications in the entire social structure.
Firstly, the Justicialista movement (1945-1955)—characterized by the substitution
industrialization of final consumer goods—which, although it did not significantly
modernize the social structure, was clearly distributionist and inclusive of the most
disadvantaged strata in the fruits of economic progress.
Secondly, the developmentalist (1958-1972) - also promoting a substitutive
industrialization but now of intermediate and capital goods - which, although modernizing,
was markedly concentrating and exclusive.
Finally, the aperturist models that - with some variants - were developed after the coup
d'état of March 1976, and that diametrically changed the orientations of substitute
industrialization in force since 1930. However, within the period 1976-1995 some
differential trends must be distinguished. First, the policies developed by the military
government (1976-1983), with a clear deindustrializing, concentrating and exclusive bias,
without any hint of modernization. Second, the policies implemented during the democratic
reconstruction process that began in 1983. In fact, between this last date and July 1989 -
when the radical government gave way to the Justicialist government through elections -,
although a strategy that substantially modified the model inherited from the military
government was not implemented, efforts were made to soften its worse effects (especially
with regard to the recovery of real wages), although various political conditions ultimately
resulted in hyperinflationary outbreaks that had a hard impact on the situation of the
popular sectors. Finally, although during the years 1989-1990 the Justicialist government
tested various public policy guidelines, it was only in April 1991, with the Convertibility
Plan, when a clear development strategy was consolidated in its objectives and means of
implementation. implementation, which, on the economic level, resumes—exacerbating it
—the openness model of the military government, but now with notable success in
controlling inflation, the growth of the gross national product and the modification of
productive structures.
To illustrate the changes that the social class structure experienced as a consequence of
these different strategies, a stratification pyramid could be designed with a vertical axis
representing the various social strata arranged hierarchically, with two horizontal axes: on
the left, one that represented the volume relative of each stratum from the
Table 1
Non-agricultural Economically Active Population: distribution
according to classes and social strata. Total of the country. 1947-1980.
CLASSES AND STRATA
SOCIAL 1947 1960 1970 1980
NON-AGRICULTURAL EAP
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(thousands) (4,621) (6,022) (7,440) (8,684)
“HIGH” CLASS 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
TOTAL MIDDLE CLASS 40.6 42.7 44.9 47.4
SELF-EMPLOYED MIDDLE CLASS 14.0 14.3 11.8 12.5
- Industrial 2.5 2.8 1.2 1.3
- Merchants 7.6 7.4 7.7 8.4
- Rest 3.9 4.1 2.9 2.8
SALARY MIDDLE CLASS 26.6 28.4 33.1 34.9
- Professionals 1.9 1.8 2.3 3.4
- Technicians 6.1 5.8 7.5 9.1
- Administrative employees 10.9 14.9 16.6 14.7
- Trade sellers 7.7 5.9 6.7 7.7
TOTAL WORKING CLASS 49.6 48.5 45.2 40.2
AUTONOMOUS WORKING CLASS 4.6 5.1 6.5 6.6
- Manufacturing artisans 3.6 3.3 2.7 2.8
- Skilled workers
of services 1.0 1.8 3.8 3.8
WORKING CLASS
SALARY EMPLOYEE 45.0 43.4 38.7 33.6
- Qualified workers
industry 22.6 21.1 16.5 15.0
- Qualified workers
 construction 5.1 5.4 7.0 6.4
- Rest 17.3 16.9 15.2 12.2
MARGINAL STRATUM 9.3 8.2 9.1 11.5
- Construction laborers
and services 0.5 1.1 1.9 4.5
- Domestic employees 8.8 7.1 7.2 7.0
Source: Torrado, 1992
occupational point of view (Table 1);3 on the right, another that did the same with the part
of the national income absorbed by each stratum.4
Although it has been demonstrated that, within its own time frame, each strategy induces
differential effects on the shape of this pyramid, the long-term trend until the early 1970s
(end of developmentalism) could be summarized as follows. On the left, the maintenance of
a tiny dome, the progressive thickening of the intermediate part and the gradual narrowing
of the base. On the right, the uninterrupted widening of the dome to the detriment of the
surface corresponding to the intermediate part and the base. In short, the mutations in the
social stratification pyramid would illustrate a process characterized by the following
features: a) a numerically tiny upper class, in the process of absolute enrichment; b) a
numerically growing middle class, in the process of progressive salariedization; c) a
numerically decreasing working class in the process of progressive desalination. All of this
at a level of critical poverty measured by income5 (close to 5% of households) that, at the
beginning of the 70s, placed Argentina among the lowest in all of Latin America (Altimir,
1979).
On the contrary, the central trends since the inauguration of the opening-up models in 1976
show: a) the deepening of the absolute enrichment of the smallest segment of the upper
class; b) the relative decrease in the size of the middle class and its progressive
desalination; c) the decrease in the relative weight of the working class and the accentuation
of its desalination; d) the rapid increase of the marginal (non-salaried) stratum. All of this in
a context of absolute impoverishment (fall below the poverty line) that now involves not
only the working and marginal strata, but also the middle classes that until recently only
experienced relative impoverishment (reduction in their levels). of life without falling
below the poverty line). So, around 1990: the incidence of poverty is not only much higher
than what Argentina had around 1974,6 but it also exceeds the urban average of Latin
American countries in 1970; The social composition of poverty is more heterogeneous,
since deprivation now affects a broader spectrum of social strata; Finally, there is now a
stratum of extreme poverty (indigents) that, although it is smaller than in the mid-1970s,
has noticeably aggravated the intensity of its underconsumption (Beccaria and Vinocur,
1991).
Approaching these processes from the perspective of social mobility, it is noted that each
development strategy induced a particular type of movement, understood as the movement
between hierarchical positions within the pyramid of social stratification, defined in
occupational terms or in terms of income.
Regarding this phenomenon, the entire period 1945-1983 has some common elements: the
massive displacement of population from the countryside to the cities (with the concomitant
creation of urban employment, inducing, in itself, occupational mobility); the expansion of
educational enrollment at all levels; the progressive “devaluation of credentials” (increase
in the titles required for the same position or decrease in the income earned by them); the
increase in the role of education as an upward channel, etc. However, also in this domain,
each strategy had specific effects that are important to synthesize here.
During the Justicialist model, from the occupational point of view, there is a generalized
process of upward structural mobility of an intragenerational nature, from modest rural
positions to autonomous urban positions of the middle class and salaried working class and
from lower segments to higher segments within the middle class. On the other hand, this
upward occupational mobility was effectively accompanied by an upward movement on the
income scale.
During developmentalism, the overall picture is much more complex. The continued rural-
urban migration is now accompanied by multiple transfers within the native urban
population or long-standing city residents. From the occupational point of view, this
strategy is characterized by the coexistence of strong flows of upward and downward
structural mobility, intra- and intergenerational, accompanied by important intersectoral
movements that are neutral from a hierarchical perspective. Correlatively, from the
perspective of income, the developmental strategy induces, on the one hand, the
improvement of the positions corresponding to the “upper” class and the upper segments of
the middle class, on the other, the worsening of the positions of the working class and the
lower segments of the middle class.
During the first moment of the opening strategy (1976-1983) the process is totally
dissimilar. First, urban employment growth is much slower than in the past, which
concentrates social mobility in the population of former urban residence. Second, the
expansion of the middle class now favors its autonomous stratum comparatively more, a
mobility that had to be fed—intragenerationally—by working class and middle class wage
earners who lost their old positions in the general process of desalination, being difficult to
accept. that these movements translated into upward mobility. Third, the salaried middle
class is growing less than in previous stages, in a context in which the process of
devaluation of credentials was accentuated and precarious middle-class employment
increased. The growth of the salaried middle class continued to be nourished—
intergenerationally—from positions corresponding to the autonomous middle class and the
salaried middle class itself, generally representing upward mobility, if the latter is defined
in exclusively occupational terms. Fourth, the marginal stratum is the fastest growing, a
flow that was fed comparatively more by urban salaried workers who lost their old
positions during the process, than by internal or external migrants (in clear numerical
decline), which is why it can This mobility should be considered downward. In short, from
the occupational point of view, the balance of the liberalization model until 1983 is one of
predominance of downward, intra- and intergenerational structural mobility. At the same
time, from the point of view of income, the mobility experienced among the marginalized,
in the working class and in most of the middle class was abruptly downward, implying, as
we already pointed out, a process of absolute pauperization in the first two groups and
relative impoverishment in the third.
Everything suggests (especially if the hyperinflationary peaks are left aside and the recent
evolution of unemployment is remembered) that from 1983 to date the trends that we have
just described in relation to downward flows on the social scale have continued, both
occupational as well as income, but now leading to: an increase in the intensity of poverty
(indicated above); an increase in its heterogeneity (notorious absolute pauperization of the
middle strata); a sharpening of its intensity among the most needy.

2. COMPARATIVE DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS

We define the term “demographic dynamics” (Torrado, 1990b) as the synthesis of the facts
related to the size and growth of a population, with its composition according to various
attributes (among which sex and age stand out) and with its space distribution. In turn,
these facts depend on the level and fluctuations of the so-called “demographic phenomena”:
marriage; fertility; mortality; internal migrations and international migrations. The implicit
assumption is that the national demographic dynamics is a weighted sum of the dynamics
corresponding to socially and spatially differentiated groups, the respective weighting
coefficients being the specific weight of each of said groups in the total population.
To analyze the effect that demographic dynamics have on the production, reproduction or
eradication of poverty, our analysis strategy will seek to establish whether there are
significant differentials in the demographic behavior of the poor strata compared to the
non-poor and, if so, investigate what its effects would be on the determination of poverty
status. Note that our unit of analysis is families and not isolated individuals. Note also that,
in addition to the facts and phenomena that we subsume in the concept of “demographic
dynamics”, we are going to analyze the nature of some other dimensions of household
behavior that are crucial with respect to our analytical purpose: the education of children;
the family division of labor; family organization and life cycle.
The statistical information that we will use at this point comes almost exclusively from the
last two national housing and population censuses. This implies that our poverty
measurement is necessarily restricted to the NBI approach (census do not investigate
income). However, for our current purposes, this constitutes more of an advantage than a
disadvantage since, with respect to the Poverty Line, the NBI approach polarizes inequality
between the poor and the non-poor more, therefore enabling better detection of
differentials.
In the case of the 1980 census, it is a total reprocessing carried out in the Federal
Investment Council, taking households as the unit of account and discriminating them
according to the social strata that appear in Table 1.7 Consequently, the comparison of
behaviors does not It passes here through the poor/non-poor dichotomy, but through the
distinction of various social strata, from the top to the base of the stratification pyramid.
This procedure may somewhat dilute the distances between the polar categories, but it has
the great merit of contextualizing the analysis of differentials in a broader social spectrum.
In any case, it is amply proven that, in 1980, the bulk of NBI households were concentrated
in the lowest social strata of the hierarchical scale, especially in the marginal ones (Torrado,
1992), so the indicators of This last stratum can be taken as illustrative of the universe of
poverty.
Regarding the 1991 census, our data come from special tabulations obtained in connection
with a study carried out for the National Council of Women.8 In this case we do work on
the poor/non-poor dichotomy, with the advantage that The universe of NBI households can
be differentiated according to whether they are headed by a man or a woman, which, as will
be seen, introduces invaluable analytical precision.
2.1 Mortality
The consumption of life—the most important, although intangible, of the goods that make
up the family basket—is measured in Demography by “failure” indicators related to
mortality and morbidity.
At a macro level, mortality depends on factors whose modification is beyond the control of
isolated individuals, since they concern aspects such as advances in preventive and curative
medicine, the existence of infrastructure services (drinking water, sewage network),
environmental sanitation, etc. One of the earliest facts proven in population analyzes is that,
at all latitudes, men are not equal in the face of death, that is, that the consumption of life,
both quantitative and qualitative, is differential according to social class in reason,
precisely, of these types of factors.
On a quantitative level, the indicators available to show this inequality in the case of
Argentina are neither the most suitable nor the most current, but they allow reasonably
acceptable conclusions. It can be seen in Table 2 that, in 1980, while the Federal Capital
had an average of 73 years of life expectancy at birth, Chaco and Jujuy were only around
64 years. It is clear that if we could measure this distance between, on the one hand, the
wealthy classes of the Federal Capital and, on the other, the needy strata of the poorest
provinces, this ten-year difference would be much greater. Evidence in support of this
thesis is provided by the (approximate) measure of mortality in the first years of life, from
the same Table 2: it is confirmed that the probability of dying before reaching the age of 3
is around 13 per thousand. in the Professional stratum of the Federal Capital, while this
value increases five or seven times when moving to the stratum of unskilled workers in the
most backward provinces. It would not be risky to assume that the life expectancy of the
poorest social strata in the poorest regions of the country (55-60 years?) could be 15 or 20
years lower than that of the richest social segments in the richest areas. rich
Table 2
Comparative mortality profiles
Various jurisdictions, 1980.
Jurisdictions Esperanza Approximate infant mortality1
selected life Population Professional- Workers not
(1980) total qualified finals
Federal Capital 72.7 15.3 12.7 21.1
Córdoba 70.8 31.0 20.7 40.9
Country total 67.7 34.6 13.5 51.2
Chaco 64.4 47.2 32.4 59.1
Jujuy 63.8 63.7 29.3 90.9
Source: National Health Statistics Program and CFI, 1989.
Note
1 Probability (per thousand) of dying before reaching 3 years of age (approximate
estimate).
On a qualitative level—focusing exclusively on the health dimension of quality of life—we
are even more unable to measure the magnitude of the differentials. Indeed, survival
indicators (such as those mentioned above) say nothing, for example, about the greater
prevalence of different forms of morbidity or disability among poor survivors compared to
non-poor survivors, although it would be difficult to deny the existence of such inequality
(Livi-Bacci, 1994).
Now, the highest level of mortality of the needy undoubtedly determines, comparatively, a
greater number of events that can favor entry or permanence in the condition of poverty,
such as widowhood, orphanhood, the premature loss of key relatives. in family solidarity
networks (grandparents, for example), etc. The same can be said about the greater
frequency of episodes that leave consequences of chronic diseases or permanent
disabilities. All of which—still reinforced by individual behaviors derived from the
condition of poverty itself (malnutrition, poor hygiene, pseudomedical practices)—
determines a greater and earlier vulnerability of the poor to the vicissitudes of health,
illness and death and , therefore, a lower capacity to formulate and sustain a long-term life
project.

2.2 Nuptiality
In 1980, nuptiality was analyzed through three parameters (Table 3). First, the intensity of
definitive celibacy does not show an association with social position but with the diffusion
of female work: thus, the occupational segments that contain more women—the middle
salaried stratum (in which teachers, paramedics, administrative employees, etc.), on the one
hand, and domestic employees, on the other, are those who hold
Table 3
Comparative nuptiality profiles.
Country total, 1980
INDICATOR % Celibacy Age % Unions
definitive1 marriage2 consensual3
STRATUM
SOCIAL
TOTAL POPULATION 9.4 22.7 11.5
“HIGH” 2.7 24.3 3.6
AUTONOMOUS MEDIUM STUDY 4.2 23.4 7.0
AVERAGE SALARY 9.0 22.3 6.0
SELF-EMPLOYED WORKER STATUS 5.3 22.4 14.1
STATE OF SALARIED WORKER 4.6 21.2 13.4
MARGINAL STUDY
Unskilled workers 5.6 20.9 25.0
Domestic employees 19.4 22.7 27.7
Source: Own elaboration based on CFI, 1989.
Table 4
Comparative nuptiality profiles.
Country total, 1991
INDICATED Age Percentage of heads with marital status
to the
CATEGORY house- United Married Sepa- Divorce- Widowed Single
HOUSEHOLD ment1
Total households 23.3 12.4 58.9 4.9 1.4 12.6 9.7
Total non-poor households 23.9 10.0 61.7 4.7 1.6 12.8 9.2
Total UBN households 20.3 25.3 43.8 6.5 0.6 11.6 12.2
Total NBI households/
Female boss 25.1 9.3 10.1 17.7 1.4 41.0 20.5
Total NBI households/
Male boss 20.3 29.7 53.3 3.4 0.3 3.4 9.8
Source: Own elaboration based on the 1991 census.
Notes Tables 3 and 4
1 Percent of single women at age 50 (fictitious cohort).
2 Average age at first union (legal or consensual) for women.
3 Percentage of consensual unions in the total number of unions.
so higher levels of singleness, this fact being notable among the latter (whose rate is around
20%). The higher incidence of definitive celibacy in a stratum depresses its level of
fertility, because being single is associated with a lower exposure to the risk of conceiving.
This fact must be taken into account when using fertility rates calculated on women of all
marital statuses, as we will see later.
Second, the average age at marriage—an index that has a very limited range of variation—
fluctuates around 22-24 years in the middle class and between 21-22 years in the working
class and the segment of unskilled workers. , highlighting the exception of domestic
employees (around 23 years old). If the latter are left aside, in fact, it is observed that
marriage becomes earlier as one descends the social scale. In 1991 (Table 4), this pattern is
perceived more clearly: among the non-poor the age at marriage is 24 years, while among
the NBI it is 20 years. Within the latter, however, the index reaches 25 years in households
headed by women versus 20 years in those headed by men. Now, it is known that early
marriage is associated with a greater or lesser number of marriages induced by prenuptial
conceptions, the latter variable whose behavior can be inferred from the level of adolescent
fertility according to marital status (Table 5), as we will see. right away.
Finally, another indicator that informs about differential patterns of nuptiality is the
incidence of consensuality (a behavior generally associated with greater instability of
unions): in 1980, the percentage of consensual unions in the total number of unions is low
(6 -7%) in the middle strata; intermediate (13-14%) among workers; high (25-28%) in the
deprived strata. This pattern of much higher consensuality among the poor was confirmed
in 1991 (Table 4), although now with a very interesting distinction: de facto unions are
concentrated in NBI households headed by men (the vast majority of which have a
complete family, as shown). will be seen later), the high percentage (53%) of legally
married heads that exists in this category of households is notable. On the contrary, female-
headed NBI households (single-parent families) show a pattern of marriage associated with
the highest incidence of permanent celibacy (highest number of single women), highest
levels of mortality (very high number of widows) and the most frequent voluntary breakup
of the bond (higher number of separated and divorced women).
2.3 Fertility
Interstratum differentials are very pronounced with regard to procreation. Table 5 shows
the global fertility rate—an indicator of general fertility (that is, concerning all women)—
according to which the average number of children per woman is less than 3 in the middle
class, it fluctuates around 3.5-4 among workers and between 4-5 in the deprived strata.
Regarding this phenomenon, the 1991 data (Table 6) better measures the distance that
exists between the poor and the non-poor: 5 children on average among the former; 2.5
between the seconds. On both dates, subfertility is evident in the stratum of households
lacking a female head, a fact attributable to the higher incidence in this segment of
definitive celibacy, and this despite the notable weight that births originating from single
women have in it.
Adolescent fertility is another behavior of great significance in marking the differences
between poor and non-poor with respect to family formation patterns. Table 5 presents an
indicator of this phenomenon discriminated by the marital status of the young women.9 As
can be seen, the value of the total index is around 14, while the stratum indices differentiate
three levels with a profile identical to the of general fertility: a low level (6 to 8) that
contains the middle strata; an intermediate level (14 to 17) that includes workers; a high
level (21 to 27) that groups the marginalized. In 1991, although measured with a different
indicator, adolescent fertility also tripled when passing
Table 5
 Comparative fertility profiles.
Country total, 1980
INDICATORS Rate Birth Fertility Index
global adolescents2 ments
Fertility stratum Total Married Single extramarital
SOCIAL didad1 trimon.3
TOTAL POPULATION 3.26 13.8 92.9 4.2 25.2
“HIGH” STANDARD 2.41 1.6 52.9 0.6 3.5
SELF-SELF-EMPLOYED STUDY 2.74 6.3 73.1 1.9 14.7
HALF-WAGE STUDY. 2,95 7,7 82,3 2,2 10,9
EST.OBR. SELF-EMPLOYED 3.36 13.8 94.6 3.8 28.3
EST.OBR. SALARY EMPLOYEE 3.85 17.4 97.5 4.1 23.3
MARGINAL STUDY
Unskilled workers 4.98 26.7 109.6 7.6 38.1
Domestic employees 3.65 21.0 98.5 9.8 54.9
Source: Torrado, 1993.
Table 6
Comparative fertility profiles.
Total for the country, 1991.
INDICATORS Rate Birth Rate- Birth- Birth-
global fertility of extra-genetic clumps
CATEGORY fertility ado- dre dre marriage-
HOME age 1 child 4 single 5 united 6 children 7
Total households 2.9 46 8.9 26.8 38.5
Total non-poor households 2.4 34 7.7 20.0 30.1
Total UBN households 5.0 92 11.2 41.3 56.1
Total NBI households/
Female boss 3.6 81 33.4 28.5 80.3
Total NBI households/
Male boss 5.3 95 7.7 43.3 52.3
Source: Own elaboration based on the 1991 census.
Notes Tables 5 and 6
1 Average number of children born alive per woman at age 50 (fictitious cohort).
2 Number of children born alive per 100,000 women aged 14-19.
3 In the total number of births in 1980, percentage of those originating from unmarried
mothers (single, married, widowed, separated and divorced).
4 Total live births that occurred in 1991 to women aged 14-19, out of the total number of
women aged 14-19 in 1991 (per thousand).
5 In the total number of births in 1991, percentage of those originating from single mothers.
6 In the total number of births in 1991, percentage of those originating from conjoined
mothers.
7 In the total number of births in 1991, percentage of those originating from unmarried
mothers (single, married, widowed, separated and divorced).
non-poor to the poor (Table 6). It is interesting to note that the majority of these early births
concern married women, a fact that undoubtedly reflects the effect of marriages induced by
prenuptial conceptions. Also notable is the fact that it is in the deprived strata where the
portion of teenage mothers who remain single is comparatively higher (Table 5).
A final phenomenon—crucial to our problem—is the context of legality in which births
occur. The profound differences in these patterns of behavior are manifested, in 1980,
through the percentage of extramarital births (that is, originating from mothers not legally
married): 11%-15% in the middle class; 23%-28% in the working class; 38%-55% among
the marginal. The data from 1991 allow us to summarize this pattern of variation by saying
that said percentage goes from single to double when moving from the non-poor to the
poor; They also reveal a feature of intra-poor heterogeneity: extramarital births are much
more frequent in households headed by women than in those headed by men, while among
the former they originate to a much greater extent in single women than in united women
(Table 6).
It is extremely important to remember that this lag in the modernization of procreative
behaviors exhibited by the poor compared to the non-poor is not so much the effect of an
ideal of a large family as the result of the barriers that these sectors encounter for the
regulation of their fertility, that is, for access to knowledge and availability of effective
contraceptives. And this is as a consequence of the pronatalist public policies continuously
implemented in this area (Torrado, 1993b). In fact, until now, government action in
Argentina has always tended to promote fertility not so much through effective incentives
as through coercive obstruction of access to effective contraceptive methods, especially in
the sphere of public institutions. health. The main consequence of these policies was to
prevent or hinder the regulation of fertility in the most deprived strata (which have the
public sector as their health effector), since the higher strata counteracted this with their
own means (made feasible by their high educational levels). government action. A
predictable result was the most pronounced decrease in fertility in the latter, which
translates into the fertility differentials that we observed above.
It must be remembered that an ineffective regulation of fertility (that is, having unwanted
children) is an element that can favor poverty through, among others, the following
mechanisms: more out-of-wedlock births; earlier motherhood; short duration of the interval
between successive births (a fact that affects the mother's health); births that, within a
family, increase competition for already scarce resources; In short, resorting to induced
abortion as a method of family planning, a practice strongly associated with higher
maternal mortality. All of these events were also foreseeable results of the coercive fertility
policies that have primarily affected the disadvantaged strata of Argentina.
2.4. Age structure
Greater fertility determines that the age composition of the poor is “younger.” Thus, in
1980, the population aged 0-14 years represented around 30-31% in the middle class, 33-
37% among workers, and 37-40% among the marginalized (See table 10 below). In 1991, a
more precise indicator (the ratio of children/adults in complete families) shows that the
number of children (103) per 100 adults in UBN households almost doubles that of non-
poor households (Table 11). The intra-poor differences here favor female-headed NBI
households, which, due to their lower fertility, bear a lower burden of children than male-
headed NBI households.
2.5 Internal and international migrations
Spatial mobility has historically acted as one of the most effective demographic
mechanisms to escape critical social situations (Rodgers, 1984). Remember, for example,
the great transoceanic migrations of the 19th century or the massive transfer of the rural
population to the cities at the beginning of capitalist accumulation almost all over the
world.
To evaluate the effect of this phenomenon in our country, it is necessary to separately
analyze internal and international migrations in recent decades, that is, since poverty
emerged at statistically significant levels.
Argentina, it is known, is a country of early urbanization. This means that, by the end of the
1960s, the bulk of the population transfer from the countryside to the cities had already
been completed. However, it should be noted that, during the period 1970-1980, internal
migrations had a different dynamic than in the past (Torrado, 1992): a) the magnitude of
interprovincial internal movements decreased significantly with respect to previous periods;
b) in the total number of movements, rural-urban movements had much less weight than
urban-urban movements: c) a considerable part of the movements (both from the
countryside and from other cities) were intra-provincial, that is, they were directed mainly
towards the provincial capitals; d) a substantial segment of urban-urban transfers originated
in large cities located outside the destination province, that is, they were flows between
large or intermediate-sized agglomerations; e) there was a significant volume of return
migrants from the Greater Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area to their provinces of birth. In
short, during this decade, internal migrants changed their traditional orientation from the
less developed regions towards the large agglomerations of the Pampas region, to retreat to
their places of origin or to other centers in the interior of the country. Although the relevant
data from the 1991 census have not yet been published, various evidence suggests that
these trends continued through 1980-1990. Now, such facts can legitimately lead to the
conclusion that, starting in the 1970s, the creation of urban employment in these
agglomerations ceased to constitute a channel for the absorption of the most modest or
disadvantaged social strata in the interior of the country and, therefore, Therefore, internal
migrations lost the powerful role of promoting mechanism of upward social mobility that
they had played in previous moments of our recent history.
As far as international migration is concerned, its smallness has been known since the
second post-war period. But, if not for its quantitative effect, in relation to our problem it is
essential to mention the immigration policy with respect to neighboring countries that
prevailed since then and almost until today (Torrado,1990a). In this field, in effect,
government action was characterized by placing legal obstacles on the settlement and not
on the entry of immigrants, which tended to ensure a fluctuating supply of undocumented
labor in the lower-skilled groups, obviously favoring growth of the most disadvantaged
social strata.
2.6 Demographic growth
Now, the combination of the behaviors that we have just described determines that, at the
level of the country as a whole, the demographic growth of the poor stratum is faster than
that of the non-poor, as explained below.
The combination of earlier marriage, higher fertility and a younger age structure determines
that the birth rate is comparatively higher: in 1980, the Gross Birth Rate was 18-25 per
thousand in the middle class; 25-30 per thousand among workers; 28-34 per thousand
among the needy (Torrado, 1993b).
Mortality—measured by health indicators such as the approximate infant mortality rate—is,
as we saw, much higher in deprived strata. However, given that the age structure of the
latter is younger, their Crude Mortality Rate is lower than that of the non-poor.10
The combination of a higher Gross Birth Rate with a lower Gross Mortality Rate
determines that the vegetative growth of the poor strata is higher than that of the non-poor.
Finally, the composition of international migratory flows in Argentina in recent decades
shows that manual workers immigrate (construction laborers and domestic employees from
neighboring countries), while Argentine technicians and professionals emigrate. That is to
say, migratory growth at the national level is clearly favorable to the deprived strata.
Obviously, the combination of higher vegetative growth and higher migratory growth
translates into greater total demographic growth in the same social categories.
Let us emphasize that all development strategies actively contributed to this last result
through their migration and birth policies.
2.7 Education
For 1980 (Table 7), we can first observe the schooling rates corresponding to the three
levels of formal education. As can be seen, children's access to the primary level, although
unequal (87% versus 92%), does not establish substantial differences between polar strata.
On the contrary, other indicators show that there are obvious symptoms of inequality as
early as primary school. On the one hand, it is noted that the completion of this level does
introduce notable inter-stratum discrimination: the percentage of adults without a complete
primary education among the marginalized (60%) represents one and a half times that of
the working class strata and three times that of the middle class. . On the other hand, school
delay is highly differential: the percentage of children who attend primary school being
behind the normal age fluctuates around 20% in the middle class, rises to around 35%
among workers and again among 42-47% among the marginal. This means that, although
the initial incorporation of children into primary school seems to be a universally
widespread fact, their performance (completeness and calendar) varies significantly
according to the social stratum to which they belong. Access to secondary level, on the
contrary, does introduce a clear social differentiation from the start: in the middle class, the
schooling rate oscillates between 55-60%, reaching 33% among workers (that is,
Table 7
Comparative education profiles.
Total for the country, 1980.
INDICATORS School enrollment rate Delay No pri-
STRATUM Level Level Level on the Maria level
SOCIAL primary1 secondary2 higher3 primary4 complete5
TOTAL POPULATION 90.6 39.4 7.6 32.1 36.4
“HIGH” STANDARD 92.2 76.5 28.9 12.5 6.3
HALF-AUTO STATION. 92.4 55.5 12.0 20.3 22.0
HALF HOUSEHOLD STUDIO. 92,3 59,0 13,0 22,0 15,6
AUTOMATIC WORKSTATION 90.0 33.2 3.8 32.4 41.0
EST.WORKSALAR. 90,9 33,1 2,3 35,9 39,6
MARGINAL STUDY
Unskilled workers 87.1 16.6 0.9 46.8 63.4
Domestic employees 86.7 15.3 1.1 42.2 59.1
Source: Own elaboration based on CFI, 1989.
Table 8
Comparative education profiles.
Total for the country, 1991.
INDICATORS Percent School rate Delay in Percent
households larization the level of illiteracy
CATEGORY under climate primary level4 betos7
HOME educational6 primary1
Total households 37.3 95.7 17.4 4.0
Total non-poor households 32.4 98.1 12.8 2.6
Total UBN households 67.8 89.4 33.5 11.6
Total NBI households/Female head 68.9 88.8 35.1 15.2
Total NBI households/Male head 60.2 89.6 33.1 10.8
Source: Own elaboration based on the 1991 census.
Notes Tables 7 and 8
1 Percentage of population aged 6 to 12 that attends primary school.
2 Percentage of population aged 13 to 18 that attends secondary school.
3 Percentage of population aged 18 to 29 that attends higher education.
4 Percentage of population aged 13 to 15 that attends primary school.
5 Percentage of the population aged 15 years and over with a level of “never attended” or
“incomplete primary school” in the total population aged 15 years and over who “never
attended” or “does not attend but attended”.
6 Households in which members aged 15 years and older have an average of less than 6
years of formal schooling.
7 Percentage of the population aged 15 years and over that does not read in the total
population aged 15 years and over.
that is, approximately half of the modal values within the middle class), and decreases
again to half (16%) in the case of the deprived. Finally, schooling at the higher level,
although it greatly widens the distances between the strata, leaves them in similar relative
positions, being notable the fact that both the working class and the deprived strata are
virtually excluded from this educational level.
The 1991 data (Table 8) confirm these trends, better highlighting the depth of the fracture
that separates the poor from the non-poor in terms of education: primary enrollment is 10
points lower among the former than among the latter , while the rate of school delay is no
longer double but triples that of some with respect to that of others. Furthermore, other
dimensions of differential access to education are now discernible: first, it is confirmed that
illiteracy is a phenomenon almost exclusive to the poor; Second, it is observed that the
educational context in which poor children are socialized is extraordinarily more
unfavorable than in other strata, given that the percentage of homes with a low educational
climate (an indicator of the total educational capital that families have) is between those of
68% against 32% in the latter; Third, it is also confirmed in this dimension that NBI
households headed by women are worse off than their counterparts headed by men (69%
versus 60%).
2.8 Family division of labor
For the analysis of this dimension of life strategies, we only have relevant data for 1980,11
which are recorded in Table 9.
The greater number of children in deprived strata does not seem to have a significant
impact on the burden borne by active members of households in this position. The
economic dependency ratio is 1.5 in the middle class; 1.6-1.7 among workers; 1.8 among
unskilled workers and 1.3 among domestic workers. This fact is attributable to the
differential participation in the economic activity of non-chief members, as described
below.
The activity rates of men aged 15-19 clearly discriminate social position: they range around
33-39% in the middle class; about 59% among workers; 69-73% in the marginal stratum.
The participation rates of women aged 15-19 show a similar position. Note that the
unfavorable distance of the poor segments would widen even further if child labor could be
adequately measured, something that the indices at 14 years of age already suggest.
The rates at ages 65 and older are preferentially associated with the salaried component of
the categories (among non-salaried workers, retirement from the activity takes place later)
than with social position. However, it is clear that the elderly (men and women) from
marginal strata must prolong their active life comparatively longer, especially among
domestic workers.
Changing perspective, the activity rates of different non-head members of the household
can now be observed depending on the type of family. Within complete families (both
spouses present), the work of spouses is in direct relation to social position: it is more
frequent in the middle class (rates between 24-31%), it decreases among workers (about
17% ), and again among skilled workers (15%); Households with domestic workers
constitute an exception with a level of 20%. In this same type of family, on the contrary, the
work of young children is inversely related to social position: the rates are 30-36% in the
middle class; 47% among workers; 50-55% among the marginal. Note that, for the same
stratum, the activity rate of young children is always significantly higher in single-parent
families than in complete ones.
In summary, the family division of labor is clearly differential according to class
membership. With specific reference to the deprived strata, it is found that belonging is
associated with a lower participation in the activity of married women (that is, a greater
dedication to domestic activities), as well as a greater and earlier incorporation into the
work of children and adolescents. It is fundamentally the work of children and young
people that is the factor that neutralizes the effects of increased fertility on the relationship
of economic dependency in poor families. However, given that this greater labor
participation of children and adolescents is also marked by marginality and precariousness,
their contribution to family income is not enough to modify the critical poverty situation of
the household to which they belong.
2.9 Family organization and life cycle
If we now observe the differential family organization, for 1980 (Table 10) the following is
confirmed: a) the weight (12-15%) of single-person households is significantly higher in
the deprived strata than in the rest; b) despite the higher fertility and the much higher
incidence of non-nuclear families, the average size of households in these categories does
not differ excessively from the rest (4.6-4.9 people among the marginal ones; 4 .5 among
workers; 4 in the middle class); c) this last fact is explained by the greater frequency among
the needy in families
Table 10
Comparative profiles of family organization. Total for the country, 1980.
INDICATORS Size Percent of households2
through Family By
households Uniper- Not-with- Family Family no cent
STRATUM multi-person- jugal3 mono-com- nuclear6 of
SOCIAL sonales1 parents4 whole5 children7
TOTAL POPULATION 4.2 10.4 5.0 12.4 72.2 42.5 30.8
“HIGH” STANDARD 4.0 5.4 0.2 2.8 91.6 27.8 31.4
AUTO MEDIA STUD. 4.1 5.1 2.8 5.0 87.1 36.2 29.7
MEDIUM ASAL EST. 4,1 8,0 4,3 6,8 80,9 34,3 31,4
AUT.OBR.ST. 4.4 6.7 3.6 6.0 83.7 41.7 33.0
ASAL WORK STUDY 4,5 5,7 3,1 4,7 86,5 39,2 37,1
MARGINAL STUDY
Workers did not qualify. 4.9 11.7 4.6 8.1 75.6 45.3 40.3
Domestic employees 4,6 14,5 6,3 34,4 44,8 55,4 37,2
Source: Own elaboration based on CFI, 1989.
Table 11
Comparative profiles of family organization.
Total for the country, 1991.
INDICATORS Size Percentage of households2 Ratio
means of dependence
households Uniper- Not-with- Family Family dence
CATEGORY multi-person- jugales3 mono- com- de
OF HOMES sonal1 parents4 whole5 children8
Total households 4.0 13.5 5.4 13.7 67.4 62.3
Total non-poor households 3.9 13.2 5.4 13.3 68.1 54.2
Total UBN households 4.9 14.9 5.9 17.7 61.5 102.6
Total NBI households/
Female boss 4.4 29.3 9.7 51.0 10.0 88.5
Total NBI households/
Male boss 5.0 11.6 3.8 5.8 78.8 103.3
Source: Own elaboration based on the 1991 census.
Notes Tables 10 and 11
1 Average household size, excluding single-person households.
2 Of the total number of households, percentage of the indicated category.
3 Households made up of non-relatives or non-nuclear relatives (neither spouses nor
children).
4 Households in which the primary marital nucleus is made up of a single parent and his or
her unmarried children.
5 Households in which both spouses are present in the primary marital nucleus.
6 Ratio (%) between non-nuclear family households (extended plus composite) and nuclear
family households.
7 Percent of population aged 0-14 years in the total population of the stratum.
8 Ratio (%) of the population aged 0-14 years to the population aged 15-64 years, in
complete families.
single-parent and non-marital households. Identical patterns of differential family
organization between poor and non-poor can be seen in 1991 (Table 11), with the addition
that here we can see how much more acute these traits are in poor female-headed
households. In summary, in the deprived strata - especially when households are headed by
a woman - forms of family organization (single-person households; non-marital
households; single-parent families; non-nuclear families) are more frequent than - in terms
of community of interests, solidarity and protection—are usually less favorable for their
members than complete nuclear families.
As if that were not enough, the latter are also less conducive to personal promotion in
marginalized sectors. This is because their family life cycle—which we could call
“pressing”—is characterized, as we saw, by earlier unions, greater consensuality, more
children at shorter intervals, and lower life expectancy. Naturally, a life cycle that forces
one to live in a hurry to die young, not only does not contribute to the social promotion of
individuals but also hinders it, due to the burden of family responsibilities that must be
assumed from an early age.
Obviously, the personal life trajectories of the members of these strata also conspire against
their social promotion. Leaving school early, lower educational performance, earlier
incorporation into low-skilled work activities and no career opportunities—all factors
enhanced by the “pressing” family cycle—translate into personal destinies that are much
more arduous than in other social layers.
The overall result is that, even without taking into account the economic endowment that
the family can provide (in the forms of capital, assets, access to credit, etc.), children who
are socialized in these strata endure a great handicap with respect to to the possibilities of
social advancement open to children from other social contexts.

3. THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFER OF POVERTY

We affirm at the beginning that the thesis of the “intergenerational transfer of poverty” is
closely related to the phenomenon of social mobility.
The latter, as will be remembered, can be of different types: “structural” (modification in
the relative number of positions available for each social category); “replacement”
(individual change made possible by vacancies in other positions); “demographic” (derived
from interstrata differences in the levels of vegetative and migratory growth). These types
of mobility are analytically independent of each other, although they may coexist over time.
However, in general, structural mobility: a) accounts for most of the total mobility in a
specific situation; b) is the one that depends most closely on development strategies, since
the most distinctive feature of the latter is the quantity and quality of the jobs they create
and/or destroy.
We also pointed out at the beginning that this thesis would be stating a specific case of
blocking the possibility of intergenerational social advancement (of any type), determined
by the feedback between macrosocial factors and demographic factors.
Now, comprehensively interpreting everything seen above about the changing forms of
social mobility in Argentina according to the characteristics of the development strategies
prevailing during the period 1945-1995, as well as the differentials in the socio-
demographic dynamics of the poor with respect to the non-poor, we would conclude the
following:
a) in determining critical poverty levels, in addition to macrosocial factors, certain socio-
demographic behaviors typical of deprived strata may have decisive weight;
b) Notwithstanding the above, the specific influence of these behaviors with respect to the
possibilities of social advancement will depend on the quantity and quality of social
mobility experienced in each specific situation. In contexts of intense upward structural
mobility, demographic factors may perhaps hinder social promotion but not prevent it.
Meanwhile, in situations of neutral or downward structural mobility, demographic factors
can effectively become an insurmountable obstacle to promotion;
c) therefore, the statement that there is “intergenerational transmission of poverty” is not
valid in the abstract. Furthermore, to the extent that structural mobility depends directly on
the nature of development strategies, it can be concluded that, in the social reproduction of
poverty, public policies are much more important than individual or family behaviors.
This would explain why, until the beginning of the liberalization model in the mid-1970s,
poverty in Argentina had not reached statistically significant levels. Precisely because,
before that moment, all development strategies, with greater or lesser intensity depending
on their nature, induced high flows of upward structural social mobility, which neutralized
the effect of demographic behaviors associated with the condition of poverty.
Consequently, it could be concluded that the implementation of adjustment models has not
only essentially contributed to producing poverty at the macro level (due to regressivity in
income, increased unemployment, etc.), but, by nullifying social permeability, it has also It
has restored all its effectiveness to the demographic mechanisms that favor its reproduction
or hinder its eradication.

Grades

1 See Uthoff (1989), González de la Rocha (1993), ECLAC (1993).

2 This part is based on Torrado (1992) and Torrado (1994a).
3 For the definition of the social strata (non-agricultural) that are differentiated in Table 1,
see Torrado 1992, Methodological Annex. Note that this Table only contains data from four
of the five censuses that were carried out in Argentina during our observation period. In
effect, the information from the 1991 census published to date is completely insufficient to
prepare a diagnosis of the changes in the profile of the social class structure during the
1980s, fundamentally, because no data has yet been released. on the Occupation Group and
the Branch of Activity. On the other hand, the data already published from the 1991 census
suffer from surprising and unexpected shortcomings for this analytical purpose, a topic
whose approach falls outside the limits of this work.
4 Table 1 only allows you to visualize what would be the left axis of this pyramid. There
are no suitable data to represent its right side (income distribution by social strata).
5 As is known, in our country two different approaches have been used to measure poverty:
the so-called Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UNB), used in censuses and in the Permanent
Household Survey (EPH); known as the Poverty Line (LP) or Insufficient Income (used
only in the EPH). According to the first approximation, those households that show a lack
of access to certain essential services, fundamentally those related to adequate housing, are
considered poor. According to the second, those households whose family income does not
cover the value of a basic basket of goods and services of minimum cost are considered
poor. On the other hand, both approaches have been used in combination in order to
establish distinctions within the universe of poverty, discriminating, for example, against
the “structural” poor (indigent or deprived), the “emerging” and the “pauperized”
( Beccaria and Vinocur, 1991, Torrado, 1994a).
In this text, when we use data to illustrate the evolution of poverty, we will limit ourselves
to those constructed based on the LP, which are more valid for capturing short-term
variations than those derived from the NBI approach. On the other hand, we will talk about
poverty incidence to refer to the quantitative importance of poor households within a given
total of households. We will refer to the intensity of poverty when we describe the greater
or lesser severity of the deprivation within a group of households already categorized as
poor. The heterogeneity of poverty is the concept that accounts for the greater or lesser
presence, within the universe of the poor, of the social strata present in the situation
analyzed: the more strata this universe contains, the greater the heterogeneity will be.
6 In the Buenos Aires suburbs, the percentage of poor households evolved as follows (data
kindly provided by Luis Beccaria according to its elaboration based on the EPH):
 1980 1986 1988 1991 1992 1993
7.6% 9.0% 25.1% 23.3% 19.4% 17.9%
7 See IFC, 1989.
8 See Torrado, 1994b.
9 This is the marital status at the time the census was taken and not at the time of
conception or birth.
10 This fact can be proven through indirect measurements that we cannot elaborate on here.
11 At the time (October 1994) of requesting the special tabulations of the 1991 census from
INDEC, the data on the EAP had not been completed.

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