Ricardo, David (1772–1823)

Paul A Samuelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA

Bryan S Turner, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, New York, NY, USA
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
This article is a revision of the previous edition article by P.A. Samuelson, volume 20, pp. 13330–13334, Ó 2001, Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract

David Ricardo is widely regarded as a founding figure in both classical economics and political economy alongside such
figures as Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. As a practicing financier on the London stock market, he brought his practical
understanding of economics to basic problems in economic theory. Although his contributions to economics have often
been criticized, his position as a founding father of the discipline is secure. A full-scale biography was published in 2013 and
his collected works were edited by Piero Sraffa in 11 volumes (1951–73). Ricardo made important contributions to political
debates in his time such as the corn trade. He made lasting contributions to both microeconomics and macroeconomics in
the law of diminishing returns and to the labor theory of value; consequently, his work was much admired by Karl Marx. By
recognizing that technological improvements could reduce the need for labor if not displace it, he anticipated what is now
referred to as the de-skilling of labor. However, according to Paul Samuelson, Ricardo’s major contribution was to the theory
of comparative advantage, which says that, given international competition, an economy should specialize. Finally, Ricardo
was a champion of free trade and the so-called laissez-faire economics. While Ricardo is highly regarded in economics, his
contribution to the theory of social classes in his analysis of rent, profit, and wages has been neglected in sociology.

One of the most influential of the classical economists, David
Ricardo was born in London in 1772 to a Sephardic Jewish
family of Portuguese origin, who had emigrated from the
Netherlands. At 14 years of age Ricardo joined his father at the
London Stock Exchange, where he acquired a practical
understanding of the actual mechanics of both domestic and
international finance. These early experiences laid the foun-
dation for his subsequent success in amassing a personal
fortune. Rejecting the orthodox beliefs of his Jewish family, he
eloped at 21 years of age with Priscilla Anne Wilkinson in
1793, a Quaker by whom he had eight children. On subse-
quently becoming a Unitarian, he was rejected by his family.
The elopement and separation from his parents resulted in
a period of personal hardship, forcing him to seek new means
to support himself.
With his practical experience of finance, he became a highly
successful stockbroker by unscrupulously trading on the bond
market during the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. He was able to
post an observer at the famous battle conducted by the Duke of
Wellington to convey the results of the military engagement. By
creating the impression that the battle had been won by the
French, he bought government bonds at a sharp discount in the
ensuing market panic to which he had contributed. This early
success formed the basis of his personal fortune, which was
estimated on his death to be worth $100 million in present day
dollar values. His private wealth allowed Ricardo to retire early
and to engage in his scientific interests. He became attracted to
the study of economics as a result of reading Adam Smith’s The
Wealth of Nations (1776) while on vacation in the English resort
of Bath in 1799. Ricardo began to write influential articles
about the pressing economic matters of the day such as the corn
trade and became acquainted in 1811, with such influential
figures as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. He engaged
a lengthy correspondence with Thomas Malthus over the role
of the landowning class in British society. He achieved prom-
inence as a member of several influential London clubs such as
the Political Economy Club, the King’s Club, and the Geolog-
ical Society. These social connections were important in his
entry into Parliament in 1818 through purchasing the borough
of Lord Portarlington for 4000 sterling. Ricardo died at Gat-
combe Park, Gloucestershire, at 51 years of age from an ear
infection that resulted in septicemia. Buried at St Nicholas
Churchyard Chippenham, Wiltshire, he never lived to see the
1836 Repeal of the Corn Laws, which was a vindication of his
pamphleteering for free trade, and he did not live to witness
Ireland’s great famine of the 1840s with its brutal confirmation
of the laws of the free market.
Among the educated public only a few names stand out in
the history of economic thought. These are Adam Smith, the
spokesman for individualism and competitive capitalism;
Robert Malthus, who earned for economics the title of ‘the
dismal science’ from Thomas Carlyle in 1849, by virtue of his
belief that any temporary gain in well-being would be under-
mined as a consequence of inducing a population explosion
that would entail diminishing returns and a retreat back to
a subsistence ration of real wages; Karl Marx, the prophet of
capitalist crises and the exponent of allegedly scientific
socialism; John Maynard Keynes, proponent of the mixed
economy, who rescued capitalism from the post-1929 Great
Depression and designed Britain’s postwar recovery by inter-
ventionist governmental macroeconomic policies and public
regulation. The classical political economy of Malthus and
Ricardo is often associated with the idea of negative unin-
tended consequences of action. Both men were criticized by
Albert O. Hirschman for their ‘rhetoric of reaction’ or the
‘perversity thesis,’ namely “any purposive action to improve
some feature of the political, social, or economic order only
serves to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy”
(Hirschman, 1991: 7). For example, raising the wages of the
working class would be self-defeating, because it would
increase the fertility rate of the poor resulting eventually in
more poverty.

660 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 20 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.61111-X

Within the economics profession, Ricardo has now ach-
ieved a prominent status, but in the past he was not always
respected and recognized. In his History of Economic Analysis,
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1954) coined the phrase ‘the Ricardian
vice’ to describe how Ricardo piled up arguments to hide his
confusion of facts and values. He also complained that Ricardo
had failed to make any real progress in the development of
a general equilibrium model. Among twentieth-century econ-
omists perhaps the most important tribute to Ricardo came
from Paul A. Samuelson (1969), who was once challenged by
Stanislaw Ulam the Polish mathematician, to name any
nontrivial universal law in the social sciences. After some
reflection, Samuelson claimed that it was Ricardo’s analysis of
‘comparative advantage,’ which stated that to achieve successful
development a society should not attempt to focus on a range
of diverse productive activities, but only on those economic
activities that gave them a comparative advantage in interna-
tional trade.
In retrospect we can now see him as the archetypical clas-
sical economist, the economist’s economist who supposedly
improved upon Smith and spelled out with Euclidean logic the
eternal behavior of the market system. In an amiable exchange
of letters with Malthus, Ricardo was undoubtedly the outright
winner, because Malthusian fears of recurrent depression
stemming from underconsumption spending were argued to
be fallacies. The self-made millionaire David Ricardo captured
the respect of the Victorian devotees to laissez-faire as well as
socialistic critics of Marxian or romantic stripe. He has recently
received an excellent if somewhat overdue full-scale biography
(King, 2013).
Ricardo was also fortunate in having Piero Sraffa edit for the
Royal Economic Society, over a period of 25 years, a magnifi-
cent and complete edition in 11 volumes of The Works and
Correspondence of David Ricardo (1951–73). Although this
collection revived interest in Ricardo’s economic thought,
oddly it seems to have contributed to a revisionist erosion of
his analytic reputation. Whereas the late-Victorian Alfred
Marshall, pillar of post-1870 neoclassicism, had idiosyncrati-
cally argued that the good modern stuff was already in Ricardo,
and whereas Keynes had written in the 1920s that Ricardo had
‘the finest mind that had come to economics’ – neither
Ricardo’s late twentieth-century admirers nor detractors could
agree among themselves as to what his different virtues and
vices actually were. A scholar who is much misunderstood
cannot be acquitted of all responsibility for ambiguity.
Reversing the usual order of intellectual progress, Ricardo
first made his mark in what has come to be called macroeco-
nomics. His unqualified verdict typifies his noneclectic style.
To finance a very long war against Napoleon, Britain
expanded its money supply of paper currency in order to
procure goods at home and abroad for its armies. Price-level
inflation was unsurprisingly part of the economic history in
that period. The eclectic theory of Adam Smith would no
doubt have predicted as well a worsening of terms of trade as
Britain and other belligerents bid up the relative prices of
needed imports. Had gold and silver been the sole money
used then in Britain and elsewhere, the 1750 theories of David
Hume would have predicted a drain of specie from London to
pay for the war-induced trade deficit of exports compared
to imports.
Ricardo, David (1772–1823) 661
However, even in those distant times much of the money
employed for purchase and sale transactions involved the use
of paper money currency. As is customary in times of war,
whatever the supply of domestic gold or silver, there ensued
a considerable rotation of the printing press to finance
government needs and accommodate the desire for the
enhanced cash necessary to conduct the enlarged volume of
goods transactions and their higher average prices. Under these
circumstances, whenever a government chooses not to redeem
paper currency notes into specie at their previous face value,
those notes will depreciate in price relative to ounces of specie.
The high price of gold is what the person in the street calls this
phenomenon and there was considerable controversy as to its
causes. Ricardo attributed all of the rise in gold prices to over-
issue of paper notes.
Today one can entertain counterfactual history. Somehow
the British government might have taxed the populace more
heavily to finance the enhanced war effort and maintain
a balanced budget and the inescapable rise in relative import
prices. As a general strategy the government could have
imposed tightness in bank lending, enforceable only at higher
interest rates, and conceivably could have kept the stock of
paper currency unchanged. The outcomes would almost
certainly have included higher unemployment and extra loss of
consumption on the civilian populace. With heroic tightness,
trade balances might even have been forced to cancel out to
zero. It is hard to envisage how normal peacetime unemploy-
ment levels could have somehow been made to prevail from
say 1795 to 1810 in this counterfactual scenario. An inflation-
free war can thus be painfully conjured up in counterfactual
history and with no wartime increment of paper currency issue.
In actual history, paper notes depreciated and price levels
soared. As happened a century later, during the 1920–23,
German hyperinflation, economists held opposing views of
appropriate economic policies. Ricardo argued that overissue
in currency M explained virtually all of the rise in the price of
bullion. Henry Thornton, practical banker and Bank of England
authority (at first), argued that the microeconomic phenomena
of adverse trade balances and war-induced buoyant business
activity explained a significant fraction of the observed appre-
ciation of bullion. Ricardo’s 1809–10 strong assertion of what
was called the ‘bullionist view’ won him instant celebrity,
particularly with the dogmatic James Mill. But this economic
debate was not really a zero-sum game in which Ricardo’s gain
had to equal Thornton’s loss. Both men agreed on the likely
longest-run outlook. The price of gold in terms of paper would
be the same in 1850 if, in the many preceding decades, the
supply of paper currency was limited enough to permit free
specie–currency convertibility at the old 1790 ratio. In this
instance, the so-called ‘Ricardian vice’ was his use of long-run
true relations to characterize actual short-run patterns in
economic history.
After the first decade of the nineteenth century, Ricardo
concentrated mostly on microeconomics. In 1815 (and not prior
to then), along with Malthus and Edward West he helped to
articulate the ‘law of diminishing returns’ and its consequences
for land rent determination. Society’s product, for example,
corn, is produced by labor and by land, both working together.
When you increase labor in two equal increments, working on
fixed land, you acquire two successive increments of corn. But
662 Ricardo, David (1772–1823)
the second gain is presumptively less than the first – a techno-
logical law of nature. Thus the wage that the competitive
market can pay to labor goes down when labor/land density
increases, and the rent that the market will pay for land will go
up. This is not a new idea – it is in Benjamin Franklin (1755)
early in the eighteenth century and already in Smith (1776) –
but it is an important insight that needed to be made explicit.
Already Ricardo had perceived what he considered faults in
Adam Smith. Posterity can be grateful that this perception
tempted Ricardo into economics, even though it can be argued
convincingly that Smith was mostly correct in the cases where
Ricardo criticized him. For example, in the capital-and-land-
and-produced-capital models that both writers worked with,
Smith was right to jettison the ‘labor theory of value’ as soon as
either the interest rate and/or the land rent rate becomes
significantly positive.
As between the two tasks of political economy –
(1) understanding how relative scarcities of factors of produc-
tion constrain the alternative availabilities of different goods
and their valuation relations; and (2) how society’s harvest gets
distributed among and between the different social classes of
workers and owners of property – Ricardo arbitrarily declared it
was distribution that was all important. Yet nowhere in the
11 volumes of his Works and Correspondence (1951–73) will the
reader find a complete and satisfactory theory of distribution
that went beyond what was already in Smith, Malthus, Mill, or
modern mainstream writers.
Perhaps the lack of a university education contributed to
Ricardo’s methodological style. Frequently, he asserted general
‘truths’ that admit of important exceptions; repeatedly he failed
to distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions for an
argument. He was a superb miniaturist but with an absence of
coherence, particularly in his post-1815 textbook phase.
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage in international
trade, similar to that of the contemporary Colonel
Robert Torrens, is a brilliant example of his miniaturist
virtuosity.
Perhaps with hindsight, this is a somewhat harsh judg-
ment on 1810–23 David Ricardo, but one can be even
harsher on Ricardo’s twentieth-century commentators. The
brightest and the best of them – Piero Sraffa, George Stigler,
Samuel Hollander, Mark Blaug, and scores of others – while
understanding that the positive interest and time-phasing
of production generically invalidate Ricardo’s champion-
ing of the labor theory of value (as, indeed, Ricardo himself
intermittently admitted), at the same time they appear
blind to the parallel fact that positive rent(s) on scarce
land(s) must similarly invalidate the labor theory of value.
Edwin Cannan, Knut Wicksell, Jacob Viner, and Lionel
Robbins are exceptions to this general criticism about how
labor/land intensities generically invalidate any labor
theory of value in the same logical way that time intensities
are known to do so.
Around 1815, between his macroeconomic works on gold
and his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817, 1819,
1821), Ricardo puzzled over a simple scenario involving a farm
good (corn) and one or more manufactured goods (cloth and
other products), all produced by, say, homogeneous labor,
homogeneous land, and by one or more produced inputs (corn
seed, raw materials from farming used for manufactures, and
durable tools). He may even have worked out, in an unpub-
lished manuscript that has not survived, a one-sector farm-only
model. A determinate model of distribution could have
cogently defined a long-run stationary-state equilibrium for
(real corn wage rate, interest rate, real corn rent rate) ¼ (W/
Pcorn ¼ w
,
r , Rent/Pcorn ¼ R*). How would it have gone?
Like Malthus and other predecessors, Ricardo would have
specified exogenously a classical ‘subsistence wage’ rate, w
,
needed to keep population just reproducing itself. Like his
classical successors Ricardo would have specified exogenously
a minimal interest rate,
r , needed to keep capital(s) just
reproducing themselves. Land being a classical constant, A,
its
stationary equilibrium rent rate he would residually determine
once variable labor-and-capital stocks, Lt and Kt, dynamically
converged to their long-run, asymptotic stationary equilibrium
levels: Lt / L*; Kt / K*, when K is a single scalar. Finally,
short-run determination of wt and rt would be market-clearing
rates dependent on the relative transitional abundances
of Lt and Kt.
Here is how in the spirit of Prokofiev’s ‘Classical’
Symphony, an ambitious neophyte in a 1932 Hicks–Wicksell
neoclassical workshop might synthesize these classical insights
into a coherent simplistic dynamic :
equation system, using the
notational convention dYt/dt ¼ Y t :
:
Factor supplies : Lt =Lt ¼ j

Þ
ajεðwt  w
: [1]

ðrt 
r Þ; At hA
K t =Kt ¼ b
¼ 1
1=3

Kt
Factor demands : wt ¼ s =L2=3
1=3 2=3 [2]

Lt =Kt
rt ¼ s
where s
is an exogenous parameter denoting level of technical
productivity.
When the modern crank of deduction gets turned, Ricardo’s
[1] and [2] do lead convergently to a determinate classical

0, as t / N,
stationary state. From any initial (L0 K0 A)
 


Kt A;
wt ; rt ; Lt A;
Rt
   
1  2  1   1 [3]
/ w
;
r ; s
w

r ; s
; s


r 2 w
½rw :
3 3 3
One must commend the classical tradition for so subtle an
accomplishment. The version worked out here differs from
Paul Samuelson’s ‘canonical’ model, which had more faithfully
adhered to the conventional labor-capital ‘dose’ version
(Samuelson, 1978).
This above supply–demand equilibrium is definitely not
independent of the problem of how consumers wish to allocate
their earned incomes among the many goods, when there are
many noncorn goods in the market. Then there are no ‘natural
prices’ definable independently of how consumers choose to
spend their incomes.
Definitely goods’ relative price ratios do not remain
close to proportionality with their respective embodied
labor contents, P it /P jt s (Lit /qit)/(Lj/q jt). Likewise embodied
land contents (Ait /qit)/(Ajt/q jt) and embodied capital contents
(K it /qit)/(K jt /q jt) similarly fail as approximations to empirical
actual P i/P j ratios.
Since Ricardo did not coherently understand the intricacies
of his own classical scenario, he never realized how

unattainable was his hankering to have all relative prices
determinable purely by objective technology and cost data.
Subjective variabilities (1) of consumers’ utilities and demand
choices, and (2) of intertemporal saving-and-consuming
choices – which became central preoccupations of post-1870
neoclassical thinkers to the classical school – were thus
already unavoidable in the capital, land, and labor models of
classical theory and in the competitive scenarios that Marx
grappled with all his working life. This inevitability will come
with pain for the small sect of Sraffian neo-Ricardians who
proliferated after 1925 and especially 1960.
Ricardo was low keyed and civil in argumentation, albeit
firm in holding to his strong positions. The letters between
Ricardo and Malthus, notwithstanding their obvious differ-
ences, were a model of courtesy and affection. Despite Ricardo’s
typical unqualified dicta, he did not hesitate to change his
mind and admit to previous mistakes. Marx, who abhorred
classical authorities and for whom ‘Parson’ Malthus was
a particular bête noir, was uncharacteristically soft toward
Ricardo. Here is an illustrative incident. After the first edition of
Principles, but prior to its third edition, Ricardo had declared
that technical invention must always help all factors of
production, including the working man. He encouraged disci-
ples, like J.R. McCulloch, to affirm this strong view. However,
on reconsideration, Ricardo came to realize that some inven-
tions can assuredly replace labor and reduce the demand for labor in
the short and the long run. Therefore, despite warnings from his
friends that this position would weaken the case for laissez-faire,
Ricardo added a new chapter on Machinery to the third (1820)
edition of the Principles, presenting exposition and numerical
examples designed to show how labor’s share of national
income could suffer from certain possible inventions and how
long-run equilibrium populations and gross income levels
could be permanently lowered. With virtually no exceptions,
ancient- and twentieth-century authorities agreed that for once
Homer had nodded. For once Ricardo must have invoked
rigidity of wage rates with its resulting unemployment, thus for
once denying J.-B. Say’s sacred dogma that overproduction is
impossible in a capitalist system. Karl Marx praised the scholar
for his honesty.
It is a story that casts discredit on virtually all. The Ricardo–
McCulloch original sweeping position was gratuitously wrong.
A new wind that raises an economy’s potential for production
and consumption most certainly can do harm to some compet-
itors while helping others. Ricardo did not claim, as J.S. Mill and
Vilfredo Pareto were to argue subsequently, that gainers could
always bribe losers so that with intervention all could gain. Nor did
Ricardo’s new understanding motivate him to abandon
a dogmatic defense of laissez-faire. His critics on Machinery, both
then and in our time – including Knut Wicksell, Nicholas Kaldor,
Joseph Schumpeter, and George Stigler – failed to see the
absence in Ricardo’s exposition of any denial of dogmatic Say’s
Law and its ruling out theoretical harm from under-
consumption. Instead his usual classical scenario of population
decline dictated by the induced drop in the wage below an
alleged equilibrium subsistence rate would, as the Machinery
chapter alleged, call for an ultimate drop in population and gross
product as a result of labor-saving invention(s). Just as the
Industrial Revolution was beginning to raise wages by a genuine
Ricardo, David (1772–1823) 663
filter-down process, the armchair philosophers were getting their
first intimations of the complexity of how a market system hands
out its distributive awards.
In summary, David Ricardo, like the twentieth-century
economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, impor-
tantly pushed voters and public opinion toward libertarian
laissez-faire. Victorian England’s Whig society and Manchester
School owed much to him. In the modern debate about how
a modern mixed economy can optimally compromise between
market mechanisms and democratic rules of conduct, Adam
Smith and John Stuart Mill appear to be more subtle classical
thinkers. From these two, autocratic rulers like Lenin, Stalin,
and Mao could have had much to learn. But among the
worldly philosophers, David Ricardo must be counted as an
important influence on the formation of the twenty-first-
century mind.
While Ricardo’s status among classical economists is secure,
he has not received sufficient attention from sociologists.
Ricardo developed the basis of a theory of social classes before
Karl Marx’s class conflict theory and before Max Weber (1978)
had developed his famous model of ‘class, status, and power.’
There were important social classes in Ricardo’s work – the
working class who depend on wages, the landowning class who
extract rent, and the bourgeoisie who exploit the labor of the
workers to create profit. Ricardo had been especially critical of
‘Old Corruption,’ namely the ability of the rent-seeking aris-
tocracy to dominate Parliament in their own narrow interests.
In classical sociology, Marx argued that with the maturation
of capitalist society there would be a class polarization and two
dominant classes would appear – the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie – as the driving force of history. Barrington Moore
(1966) in The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
provided a more complex comparative analysis more consist
with Ricardo in which democracy required a thriving bourgeois
class, while authoritarian regimes are the product of a weak
bourgeoisie and an alliance between the peasantry and aristo-
cratic landowning class such as the Junkers in Germany. He
advanced the slogan – ‘No bourgeoisie, no democracy.’
Advanced capitalist societies are no longer so obviously strati-
fied into social classes that exert collective political influence,
and some sociologists argue that, following Ricardo, the tech-
nological revolutions of the twentieth century have brought
about some de-skilling of the workforce leading to an erosion
of the political clout of the working class (Braverman, 1974).
Modern societies are instead characterized less by class conflict
and more by growing income inequality and the hollowing out
of the middle class (Krugman, 2003). These sociological
debates indicate that Ricardo should be regarded as a founder
of modern sociology as well as of classical political economy.
See also: Economic Growth: Measurement; Economics, History
of; Innovation and Technological Change, Economics of;
Libertarianism; Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766–1834); Market
Structure and Performance; Marx, Karl (1818–83); Monetary
Policy Since the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis; Political Economy,
History of; Regulation, Economic Theory of; Smith, Adam
(1723–90); Social Stratification; Sociological Theory; Stock
Market Predictability.
664 Ricardo, David (1772–1823)

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