North Korea Discovers The Maghreb: Propaganda Narratives in The Formative Phase of Pyongyang's Northwest African Diplomacy

ACTA KOREANA
Vol. 27, No. 1, June 2024: 125–164

doi: 10.18399/acta.2024.27.1.006
© Academia Koreana, Keimyung University, 2024
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Propaganda Narratives in the Formative Phase of
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The paper examines the formative phase of Pyongyang’s diplomacy toward

Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania through the lenses of North Korean
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and little-known region were heavily shaped by the information transmitted
by their Soviet bloc allies, and they showed less interest in the Maghreb than
East Germany and North Vietnam. When they did develop a more distinctive
attitude, the peculiar features of their propaganda narratives often indicated
a narrower and less empathetic perspective than East Germany’s. Subsequent
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other colonial and post-colonial countries were partially contradicted by
Pyongyang’s own propaganda, whose wide swings between vocal solidarity and
deafening silence revealed the conditional and selective nature of North Korean
solidarity. The prolonged news blackouts imposed upon Tunisia, Morocco, and
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the events in the Maghreb, and even to the very existence of these nations, unless
they could be presented in such a way that buttressed Pyongyang’s narratives
of militant anti-imperialist struggle. That is, the main thrust of North Korea’s
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* The author wishes to thank Georgina Asfaw, Leila Ben Mcharek, Lyong Choi, John Everard, Joseph Gilling,
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this article. I am particularly grateful to Kim Eui-Gyeong, Hanna Kim, and Lee Junhee for translating various
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work was supported by the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the
Republic of Korea and the Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-
/$%
126 Acta Koreana, Vol. 27, No. 1, June 2024
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rather than toward the countries as such. The contrast between Pyongyang’s
strong preference for armed struggle and its limited ability to provide economic
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Germany in Algeria, but lagged behind it in Morocco and Tunisia.
Keywords: North Korea, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, propaganda

narratives
Introduction
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the Mashriq (the eastern part of the Arab world, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian
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the Cold War, though several authors who provided a comprehensive overview of North
Korean foreign policy correctly pointed out that Pyongyang’s involvement in Third World
revolutions started with its recognition of the Provisional Government of the Algerian
Republic (*RXYHUQHPHQWSURYLVRLUHGHOD5pSXEOLTXHDOJpULHQQH*35$ LQWKHPLGVWRI WKH$OJHULDQ
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aforesaid monographs made only a few brief references to North Korea’s interactions with
Tunisia and Morocco.1
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sovereign states – from the following angles.
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5HODWLRQVRI 1RUWK.RUHD1HZ3HUVSHFWLYHV, eds. Jae-kyu Park, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Boulder,
&2:HVWYLHZ3UHVV ²²)RUUHFHQW1RUWK.RUHDQUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRI WKH
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May 30, 2020, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1693560784-973671832/trace-of-eternal-friendship-left-in-
faraway-algeria-and-mauritania/.
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attracted Pyongyang’s attention in a positive or negative way, which distinctions North
Korean observers made between the three Maghreb states, and which factors facilitated or
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region with which Korean policy-makers lacked any prior contacts. It describes how
Pyongyang’s Communist allies functioned as indispensable conduits during this process of
political exploration.
Second, the article examines how the North Korean media (especially 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ
⡔⏑㋘⬰WKHGDLO\QHZVSDSHURI WKHUXOLQJ.RUHDQ:RUNHUV·3DUW\.:3 GHVFULEHGGLVWRUWHG
or deliberately ignored the various political and military events that took place in the three
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views of the aforesaid events. Placing these observations into a theoretical framework, the
conclusion explores whether the distortions that appeared in North Korea’s images of the
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the motives behind these distortions.
Third, the article seeks to identify the distinctive elements of North Korea’s Maghreb
policy by comparing it with the position of other Communist regimes, instead of placing
it solely into the context of inter-Korean rivalry. In particular, it uses the Maghreb-related
articles of 1HXHV 'HXWVFKODQG WKH SDUW\ QHZVSDSHU RI WKH *HUPDQ 'HPRFUDWLF 5HSXEOLF
*'5 FRPPRQO\ NQRZQ DV (DVW *HUPDQ\ DV D FRQWURO JURXS WR SLQSRLQW WKH XQLTXH
aspects of 5RGRQJVLQPXQ·VSRVLWLRQVLQFHWKH*'5·VGLSORPDWLFDFWLYLWLHVZHUHDVVWURQJO\
motivated by its perennial competition with West Germany as Pyongyang’s policies were
driven by its rivalry with Seoul.
Instead of merely exploring a yet-untapped research niche, the article also aspires to
provide a deeper insight into the core questions of North Korean history and foreign policy.
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a distinctive attitude, and how this attitude differed from that of the other Communist
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unusually strong, historically rooted anti-colonial and post-colonial solidarity (as Pyongyang’s
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The primary sources cited in this article were obtained and examined as follows:
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Korean names of the Maghreb countries – $OFKHULD (㕄㠔⦤㔼 0DXULW·DQLD (⧀㚨⦤䁤⋀㔼
0RURN·R(⪠⡔㻸 7·\XQLVš(䉀⋀㊜ DQG7·\XQLV\D(䉀⋀ボ ²WRVHDUFKDGLJLWL]HGOLVWRI 5RGRQJ
VLQPXQ articles (1945– 7KLVFKURQRORJLFDOWLWOHOLVWDQGDFROOHFWLRQRI VFDQQHG5RGRQJ
VLQPXQ issues, both stored at Kookmin University, ZHUHREWDLQHGZLWKWKHDVVLVWDQFHRI )\RGRU
Tertitskiy and Peter Ward in the framework of the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies
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published list (5RGRQJVLQPXQNLVDPRQJQRN⡔⏑㋘⬰Ḩイ⪡⡕ 1² ZDVDOVRH[DPLQHG
WRÀOOWKHRFFDVLRQDOJDSV7KHOLVWRI WLWOHVIURP²ZDVQHDUO\FRPSOHWHZLWKDIHZ
PLQRU H[FHSWLRQV VXFK DV 0DUFK DQG 'HFHPEHU ,Q FRQWUDVW WKH
FROOHFWLRQRI VFDQQHGLVVXHVFRQWDLQHGVHYHUDOPDMRUJDSV -XO\'HFHPEHU0DUFK
0D\-XQH ZKLFKSUHFOXGHGFRQWHQWDQDO\VLVLQWKHVHSHULRGV'XULQJWKHQH[WVWDJHRI
P\UHVHDUFK,LQWHQGWRFROOHFWWKHPLVVLQJLVVXHVVRDVWRH[DPLQHFHUWDLQVSHFLÀFDUWLFOHV
Scanned volumes of North Korea’s Central Yearbook, stored at Kookmin University,
ZHUHREWDLQHGZLWKWKHDVVLVWDQFHRI )\RGRU7HUWLWVNL\LQWKHIUDPHZRUNRI WKH/DERUDWRU\
Program for Korean Studies. Of the period under examination, only Volumes 1958–1959
and 1961–1965 were available.
Articles of 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG were downloaded from the fully complete online archives
of the newspaper (https://www.nd-archiv.de/ $OOSRVVLEOHYDULDQWVRI WKHVHOHFWHGNH\ZRUGV
– such as $OJHULHQ $OJHULD $OJHULHQV $OJHULD·V DQG DOJHULVFKHDOJHULVFKHQDOJHULVFKHUDOJHULVFKHV
$OJHULDQ ²ZHUHVHDUFKHGLQGLYLGXDOO\VRDVWRLGHQWLI\HYHU\WKHPDWLFDOO\UHOHYDQWDUWLFOHLQ
a given period. Archived articles of Hungarian newspapers (0DJ\DU1HP]HW and 6]DEDG1pS/
1pSV]DEDGViJ ZHUHGRZQORDGHGIURPWKH$UFDQXP'LJLWKHFDGDWDEDVH https://adt.arcanum.
com/en/ WKURXJKWKHVHUYHURI &HQWUDO(XURSHDQ8QLYHUVLW\6FDQQHGLVVXHVRI 3UDYGD were
obtained from the collection of East China Normal University’s Cold War International
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ZDV XVHG WR DVFHUWDLQ ZKHWKHU WKH LVVXHV SXEOLVKHG LQ FHUWDLQ VSHFLÀF SHULRGV FRQWDLQHG
articles about the examined subjects. The incomplete nature of the Center’s 3UDYGD collection
precluded a comprehensive statistical analysis along the same lines as applied to 5RGRQJVLQPXQ
and 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG.
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with the assistance of Georgina Asfaw and Joseph Gilling.
Pyongyang’s Oscillating Attitude Toward the Maghreb
In the formative stage of the North Korean regime and during the Korean War, the
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countries, no matter whether they were sovereign states or not. Under such conditions,
the North Korean leadership’s views on the political developments in the Maghreb were
expressed primarily through the party-controlled media, rather than by concrete actions.
Thus, one may start examining the origins of Pyongyang’s attitudes toward the Maghreb by
subjecting the relevant articles of 5RGRQJVLQPXQ to a statistical and thematical analysis.
In light of the central position that Algeria has occupied in North Korea’s Maghreb
policy since the late 1950s, it may appear peculiar that in the early 1950s, 5RGRQJVLQPXQ paid
far less attention to the Algerian scene than Tunisia and Morocco. Having made only a
few sporadic references to the Maghreb up to 1950, in 1951–1953 the newspaper carried
a total of eighty-seven articles focused on the aforesaid three countries. If one takes into
consideration that some articles covered multiple countries, the following observations
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nature: the bulk of Tunisia-related articles appeared in 1952, only to be followed by a drastic
slump in 1953, whereas the number of articles on Morocco increased year by year. Still,
5RGRQJVLQPXQ published only a handful of scattered articles about Algeria, of which just a few
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local labor movement and the activities of the Algerian Communist Party (3DUWLFRPPXQLVWH
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reached particular intensity (e.g., the forceful replacement of the Tunisian cabinet in March
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Arab states managed to place the Tunisian and Moroccan question on the agenda of the
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To explain why North Korea’s initial interest in the Maghreb countries showed such
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I compared the patterns observable in 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ’s articles on Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia with the number and content of 1HXHV 'HXWVFKODQG’s contemporaneous Maghreb-
related articles. Notably, both the total number of 1HXHV 'HXWVFKODQG DUWLFOHV QLQHW\IRXU
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stood fairly close to the analogous data of 5RGRQJVLQPXQ. The peaks and slumps of North
Korean and East German interest in Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian developments largely
paralleled each other, but 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQGZDVXVXDOO\TXLFNHUWRJUDVSWKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRI D
local event than 5RGRQJVLQPXQ)RULQVWDQFHWKHÀUVWHSLVRGHWKDWGUHZWKHIRFXVHGDWWHQWLRQ
RI ERWKQHZVSDSHUVWRWKH0DJKUHEZDVWKH0RURFFDQSROLWLFDOFULVLVRI )HEUXDU\0DUFK
ZKHQ)UHQFK5HVLGHQW*HQHUDO$OSKRQVH-XLQSUHVVXUHG0RKDPPHG9WRGLVDVVRFLDWH
KLPVHOI IURPWKHQDWLRQDOLVW,VWLTODO ,QGHSHQGHQFH 3DUW\DQGWKHQODXQFKHGDFDPSDLJQRI
UHSUHVVLRQDJDLQVW,VWLTODO)URP0DUFKWR0DUFK1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG devoted as many as
seven articles to the crisis, whereas 5RGRQJVLQPXQ’s two analogous articles were published as
late as March 19-20.3
2
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´7·\XQLVšLQPLQGšONRHURHFKŉQJEXFKRMDNšPPRUšOFK·LU\ŉUKLSDQGDHµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ$SULO
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VLQPXQ, August 28, 1953, 4.
3
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Algeria Morocco Tunisia M. and T. A. and T. A., M. and T.

RS 1' RS 1' RS 1' RS 1' RS 1' RS 1'
1951
Jan. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)HE 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar. 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aug. 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Sep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
'HF 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 4 2 7 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1952
Jan. 0 0 0 0 3 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
)HE 0 3 1 0 1 9 0 2 0 0 0 1
Mar. 1 0 0 0 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr. 2 0 0 0 12 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 1 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aug. 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep. 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct. 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov. 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
'HF 0 0 5 2 9 5 1 5 0 0 0 1
Total 5 4 11 2 38 47 1 7 0 0 0 2
1953
Jan. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
)HE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr. 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
May 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul. 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aug. 0 0 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep. 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Oct. 0 0 4 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Nov. 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
'HF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 1 15 12 5 3 2 2 1 0 0 1
Table 1. Maghreb-related articles in 5RGRQJVLQPXQ and 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, 1951–19534
FKLQVDQJµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, March 19, 1951, 4.

4
I am indebted to Lee Junhee for his assistance in identifying those 5RGRQJVLQPXQ articles which covered multiple
Maghreb countries.
The marked chronological and thematic similarities between the two newspapers’
Maghreb-related articles indicated that Pyongyang’s initial attitudes toward this faraway
DQGOLWWOHNQRZQUHJLRQZHUHVWURQJO\LQÁXHQFHGE\WKHWHQGHQFLHVSUHYDOHQWLQWKH6RYLHW
EORFPHGLD1RWDEO\WKHÀUVWDUWLFOHV5RGRQJVLQPXQ and 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG published on the
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1951 were closely preceded by comparable articles in 3UDYGD, and in January 1952, 5RGRQJ
VLQPXQ emphatically quoted the Soviet newspaper’s assessment of the Tunisian situation.5
Seen through the lens of Soviet geopolitical considerations, rather than North Korea’s
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7XQLVLDXQGHUZHQWDSHUFHSWLEOHLQFUHDVHLQ²2Q)HEUXDU\3UDYGD devoted
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and the Soviet bloc diplomats were well aware of the NATO plans aimed at transforming
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Under such conditions, the Communist states had good reason to welcome any nationalist
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FRQWUDVWHG,VWLTODO·VLQWUDQVLJHQWQDWLRQDOLVPZLWKWKH7XQLVLDQ1HR'HVWRXU3DUW\·VHIIRUWVWR
UHDFKDFRPSURPLVHZLWK)UDQFHZKLOHDODWHUUHSRUWRQWKH7XQLVLDQSURWHVWVRI )HEUXDU\
1952 noted with satisfaction that “the North African peoples’ movement for independence,
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WKHSODQVRI WKHLPSHULDOLVWVµ6
Another peculiar feature of 5RGRQJVLQPXQ’s narrative was that its editors went to great
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)UHQFKZRUNHUV´ZLGHO\VXSSRUWHGµ7XQLVLD·VVWUXJJOHIRUIUHHGRPWKH\HIIHFWLYHO\DGRSWHG
the ideological perspective of the Soviet leaders. 5RGRQJVLQPXQ’s analytical concepts – such
as its strong interest in the socio-economic dimension of nationalist resistance – likewise
VKRZHGDGLVWLQFWLYH0DU[LVW/HQLQLVWLQÁXHQFH7
7KHIHDWXUHVGHVFULEHGDERYH²D6RYLHWLQÁXHQFHGQDUUDWLYHDQGDVORZHUUHVSRQVHWR
events in the Maghreb than 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG’s – may also be observed in Pyongyang’s initial
UHDFWLRQ WR WKH VWDUW RI WKH $OJHULDQ LQVXUJHQF\ 1RYHPEHU 2Q 1RYHPEHU
5RGRQJVLQPXQGLGH[SUHVVXQUHVHUYHGDSSURYDORI $OJHULD·VUHVLVWDQFHDJDLQVW)UHQFKFRORQLDO
rule, but it imposed a selective and manipulative narrative on the Algerian scene when it
quoted a statement that the PCA Politburo issued about the events. By presenting the PCA’s
5
,X=KXNRY´&KWRSURLVNKRGLWY0DURNNR"µ3UDYGD)HEUXDU\´3URWLYIUDQWVX]VNRJRNRORQLDO·QRJR
UH]KLPDµ 3UDYGD 'HFHPEHU ´0LQMRN FKŉN FKD\X ZD KDHEDQJ šO ZLKD\ŉ 7·\XQLVš LQPLQGšO šQ
NZŉOJLKD\ŉWWD 3SšUDXGDMLURQS·\ŉQJ µ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, January 30, 1952, 4.
6
+XQJDULDQ/HJDWLRQLQ)UDQFH5HSRUW)HEUXDU\´$SROLWLNDLKHO\]HWDODNXOiVD$IULNiEDQµ0DJ\DU
1HP]HWL/HYpOWiU 01/ ;,;-N)UDQFH²GRER]+XQJDULDQ/HJDWLRQLQ)UDQFH
5HSRUW 2FWREHU ´)UDQFLD J\DUPDWRN KHO\]HWHµ 01/ ;,;-N )UDQFH ² GRER]
+XQJDULDQ/HJDWLRQLQ)UDQFH5HSRUW)HEUXDU\´7XQLV]LHVHPpQ\HNµ01/;,;-
N)UDQFH²GRER]
7
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VLQPXQ0DUFK ERWKDUWLFOHVWUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
standpoint as an authoritative assessment, the North Korean editors tacitly followed the
example set by a 3UDYGD article dated ten days earlier, but effectively tiptoed around the fact
that the PCA played no role whatsoever in the eruption of the insurgency.8 In fact, the leaders
RI WKH1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQ)URQW )URQWGHOLEpUDWLRQQDWLRQDOH)/1 ZHUHE\DQGODUJH´KRVWLOH
WR DQG KDUGO\ LQÁXHQFHG E\ FRPPXQLVPµ9 Having carried two articles on the Algerian
VLWXDWLRQLQ1RYHPEHU'HFHPEHUDQGDVLQJOHDUWLFOHGXULQJWKHÀUVWHLJKWPRQWKVRI
1955, 5RGRQJVLQPXQ started to pay focused attention to Algeria only in September 1955, when
WKHZDUXQGHUZHQWDGUDPDWLFHVFDODWLRQDQGWKH)UHQFKDXWKRULWLHVEDQQHGWKH3&$7KXV
Pyongyang’s attitude considerably differed from 1HXHV 'HXWVFKODQG’s, for the latter published
QROHVVWKDQÀIWHHQDUWLFOHVRQWKH$OJHULDQLQVXUJHQF\ZLWKLQLWVÀUVWPRQWK10
,Q 2FWREHU WKH '35.·V JURZLQJ LQWHUHVW LQ WKH $OJHULDQ FULVLV IRXQG D FOHDU
expression in a long 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ article that provided a detailed overview of Algeria’s
geographical features, natural resources, population, and historical past, ostensibly in response
to the inquiries of readers unfamiliar with this faraway land. Notably, the article’s historical
narrative started with the 19thFHQWXU\)UHQFKLQYDVLRQRI $OJHULDZKLOHLWVGHVFULSWLRQRI WKH
FXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQZDVKHDYLO\IRFXVHGRQWKHVRFLRHFRQRPLFPLVHU\LQÁLFWHGE\FRORQLDOUXOH
rather than the country’s cultural and religious peculiarities. Its author laid disproportionate
emphasis on the PCA’s fairly limited contribution to Algeria’s liberation struggle, and insinuated
that due to the growing U.S. economic and military presence in Algeria, the population now
VXIIHUHGXQGHUWKHGRXEOH\RNHRI )UHQFKDQG$PHULFDQLPSHULDOLVP11
By 1956–1957, Algeria had greatly overshadowed Tunisia and Morocco in 5RGRQJ
VLQPXQ·V0DJKUHEUHODWHGDUWLFOHV VHH7DEOH 7KLVUHYHUVDORI WKHQHZVSDSHU·VHDUOLHUIRFXV
RQ WKH ODWWHU WZR FRXQWULHV VHHPV WR KDYH UHÁHFWHG WKH JURZLQJ GLYHUJHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH
QHJRWLDWHGGHFRORQL]DWLRQRI 0RURFFRDQG7XQLVLD 0DUFK DQGWKHUDSLGO\HVFDODWLQJ
war in Algeria, thus implying a North Korean preference for violent anti-colonial struggle.
)RULQVWDQFH5RGRQJVLQPXQ carried no article about Mohammed V’s triumphant return from
H[LOH 1RYHPEHU ZKHUHDV1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG devoted as many as ten articles to this
important event.12
'XHWRWKHSUHVHQFHRI )/1JXHUULOODVLQ7XQLVLDDQG0RURFFRWKHHVFDODWLQJ$OJHULDQ
War was bound to affect the neighboring Maghreb countries, too, but their renewed friction
ZLWK)UDQFHGLGQRWQHFHVVDULO\IXUWKHUWKHLQWHUHVWVRI WKH&RPPXQLVWVWDWHVLQJHQHUDODQG
North Korea’s in particular. Seeking to persuade the U.S. to throw its weight behind his efforts
to put a negotiated end to the war, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, the leader of the
1HR'HVWRXU3DUW\SXUSRVHIXOO\NHSWWKH6RYLHWEORFVWDWHVDWDUP·VOHQJWKOHVW:DVKLQJWRQ
8
´2EVWDQRYNDY$O]KLUHµ3UDYGD1RYHPEHU´$OFKHULDVDW·DHµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, November 15, 1954, 4
WKHODWWHUDUWLFOHWUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
9
$OOLVRQ'UHZ:H$UH1R/RQJHULQ)UDQFH&RPPXQLVWVLQ&RORQLDO$OJHULD (Manchester: Manchester University
3UHVV ²
10
´7HUURULQ$OJHULHQµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG1RYHPEHU´$OJHULHQV3DWULRWHQLQKDUWHQ*HJHQZHKUµ1HXHV
'HXWVFKODQG, November 5, 1954, 5.
11
.DQJ<ŉQVX´$OFKHULDFKŉQJVHµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ2FWREHU WUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
12
´0DURNNRHUZDUWHWVHLQHQ6XOWDQµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, November 16, 1955, 5.
be put off by their diplomatic presence in Tunis.13 In response to Tunisia’s recurring border
FODVKHVZLWK)UDQFHLQWKHIDOORI KHDJDLQWXUQHGWRWKH86EHVHHFKLQJLWWRSURYLGH
Tunisia with arms.14 5RGRQJVLQPXQGXO\SUHVHQWHGWKHUHVXOWLQJ)UHQFK$PHULFDQGLVSXWHDV
DÀVVXUHZLWKLQWKH´LPSHULDOLVWFDPSµEXW%RXUJXLED·VSUR$PHULFDQVWDQFHSURYHGWREH
directly inimical to Pyongyang’s aspirations.15 In 1957–1959, during the General Assembly’s
annual debates over the Korean question, Tunisia’s UN delegate consistently supported the
U.S.-backed draft resolutions which proposed that only a South Korean representative, rather
than the representatives of both Koreas, be invited to attend the debate, thus expressing an
RSHQSUHIHUHQFHIRUWKH52.RYHUWKH'35.16
&RPSDUHGZLWKWKHGLOHPPDSRVHGE\%RXUJXLED·VUHOLDQFHRQ´$PHULFDQLPSHULDOLVPµ
DJDLQVW WKH WKUHDW IURP ´)UHQFK LPSHULDOLVPµ WKH )/1·V JXHUULOOD ZDU DJDLQVW WKH )UHQFK
army was far easier to present in a form compatible with Pyongyang’s dominant propaganda
QDUUDWLYHV)ROORZLQJWKH&RPPXQLVWOHG:RUOG)HGHUDWLRQRI 7UDGH8QLRQV· :)78 SURWHVW
DJDLQVWWKH)UHQFKDXWKRULWLHV·PLVWUHDWPHQWRI $OJHULDQWUDGHXQLRQDFWLYLVWVLQ'HFHPEHU
WKH'35.IRUWKHÀUVWWLPHGLUHFWO\H[SUHVVHGYHUEDOVXSSRUWIRU$OJHULD·VVWUXJJOH
LQ WKH IRUP RI D OHWWHU WKDW WKH *HQHUDO )HGHUDWLRQ RI 7UDGH 8QLRQV *)78 DGGUHVVHG
to the Algerian labor unions – a gesture that nevertheless paled in comparison with the
FRQFHUWHGPHVVDJHVRI VROLGDULW\ZKLFKWKHPDVVRUJDQLVDWLRQVRI WKH'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLF
RI 9LHWQDP '59FRPPRQO\NQRZQDV1RUWK9LHWQDP KDGVWDUWHGWRLVVXHDVHDUO\DV-XQH
+DYLQJDFKLHYHGWKHLULQGHSHQGHQFHIURP)UDQFHDIWHUDVHYHQ\HDUZDUWKH1RUWK
9LHWQDPHVHOHDGHUVQDWXUDOO\IHOWDVWURQJV\PSDWK\IRUWKH$OJHULDQVZKRZHUHQRZÀJKWLQJ
the same enemy.17
The unusually high number of Algeria-related articles that 5RGRQJVLQPXQ published in
$SULO DQG 1RYHPEHU HYLGHQWO\ UHÁHFWHG WKH :)78·V JOREDO FDPSDLJQ RQ EHKDOI RI
$OJHULDDZHHNRI VROLGDULW\ $SULO DQGDGD\RI VWUXJJOH 1RYHPEHU 187KHÀUVW
YLVLW RI DQ $OJHULDQ GHOHJDWLRQ LQ WKH '35. -XO\ OLNHZLVH WRRN SODFH LQ D EURDGHU
international context, since the delegates – a group of students headed by Mohamed Khemisti
– visited China and North Vietnam, too. In the latter countries, they were received even by
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and President Ho Chi Minh, respectively, whereas the highest-
UDQNLQJ1RUWK.RUHDQOHDGHUZKRPWKH\PDQDJHGWRPHHWZDV'HSXW\3ULPH0LQLVWHU&K·RH
13
+XQJDULDQ/HJDWLRQWR)UDQFH5HSRUW)HEUXDU\´7XQLV]LKHO\]HWNpSµ01/;,;-M6PDOOFRXQWULHV
7XQLVLD ²,9
14
Stanley Shaloff, ed., )RUHLJQ5HODWLRQVRI WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV²$IULFDYRO :DVKLQJWRQ'&8QLWHG
6WDWHV*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2IÀFH 'RFXPHQWV²
15
´&KHJXNFKXšLFKLQ\ŉQJJDQšLPRVXQN\ŉNKZDµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, November 19, 1957, 4.
16
United Nations, <HDUERRNRI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV, 90.
17
´6R]LDOLVWHQYHUXUWHLOHQ$OJHULHQ0DVVDNHUµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG'HFHPEHU´&KLNFK·RQJFKXQJDQJ
ZLZŉQKRHHVŉ$OFKHULDURGRQJFKRKDPU\ŉQPDHQJHN\ŉQJQ\ŉšLS·\ŉQMLµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ'HFHPEHU
WUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH Ngoc H. Huynh, “7KH7LPH+RQRUHG)ULHQGVKLS$+LVWRU\RI 9LHWQDPHVH
Algerian Relations (1946– µ %$VHQLRUWKHVLV8QLYHUVLW\RI 3HQQV\OYDQLD
18
´$OFKHULDLQPLQšOFKLMLKDQšQNXNFKHU\ŉQGDHVŉQJFKXJDQVŉQJGDHKLFKLQKDHQJ 6HJ\H&KLQJQ\ŉQ&KXQJJXN
3·DUDQ:ŉOODP7RJLO&KŉQ$UDS1RMR5\ŉQPDHQJ µ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, April 10, 1957, 4.
<RQJJŉQ19
1956 1957
Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia
Jan. 3 0 0 3 0 0
)HE 0 0 0 6 0 0
Mar. 0 3 1 2 1 1
Apr. 1 3 0 15 0 1
May 1 0 1 3 0 0
Jun. 5 2 0 1 0 0
Jul. 2 1 1 7 0 0
Aug. 0 0 0 1 0 1
Sep. 1 0 0 4 0 0
Oct. 5 1 0 4 1 1
Nov. 2 1 0 10 0 2
'HF 3 0 0 11 1 1
Total 23 11 3 67 3 7
Table 2. Maghreb-related articles in 5RGRQJVLQPXQ, 1956–1957
At the 1st$IUR$VLDQ3HRSOH·V6ROLGDULW\&RQIHUHQFHKHOGLQ&DLURIURP'HFHPEHU
WR -DQXDU\ WKH &RPPXQLVW VWDWHV ² LQFOXGLQJ D '35. GHOHJDWLRQ ² MRLQHG
IRUFHVZLWK*DPDO$EGHO1DVVHU·V(J\SWWRFKDPSLRQWKHFDXVHRI $OJHULD·V)/12Q0DUFK
GHVLJQDWHGDV$OJHULD'D\E\WKHFRQIHUHQFHWKH1RUWK.RUHDQDXWKRULWLHVMXVW
like their Soviet, Chinese, Egyptian, and Tunisian counterparts, held mass rallies to express
their solidarity with Algeria.20 Nonetheless, this impressive concord between Pyongyang’s
various partners began to disintegrate within barely half a year, compelling the KWP leaders
WRWDNHVLGHV)RUWKHÀUVWWLPHVLQFH5RGRQJVLQPXQ had started monitoring the North African
OLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQWV0DJKUHELSROLWLFVEHFDPHDGLSORPDWLFPLQHÀHOGIRU1RUWK.RUHD
Pyongyang Caught Between the FLN’s Sponsors
$V HDUO\ DV )HEUXDU\ 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ reported that the Algerian nationalist leaders
contemplated establishing a provisional government, but they had not decided yet which
Arab country should host it.21 By mid-1958, the latter question became a matter of increasing
19
´&K·RH <RQJJŉQ SXVXVDQJ $OFKHULD KDNVDHQJ WDHS·\RGDQ šO FKŉSN\ŉQµ 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ, July 22, 1957, 1
WUDQVODWHG E\ /HH -XQKHH &OHPHQW +HQUL 0RRUH &RPEDW HW VROLGDULWH HVWXGLDQWLQV /·8*(0$ ²
$OJLHUV&DVEDK(GLWLRQV
20
+XQJDULDQ/HJDWLRQLQ(J\SW5HSRUW-DQXDU\´$]i]VLDLDIULNDLRUV]iJRNV]ROLGDULWiVLNRQIHUHQFLiMDµ
01/ ;,;-M (J\SW ² GRER] 5HHP $ERX(O)DGO ´%XLOGLQJ (J\SW·V $IUR
$VLDQ+XE,QIUDVWUXFWXUHVRI 6ROLGDULW\DQGWKH&DLUR&RQIHUHQFHµ-RXUQDORI :RUOG+LVWRU\ 30, no. 1/2
´$OFKHULDšLQDOHFKHKD\ŉNDNFKLHVŉFKLSKRHFKLQKDHQJµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ0DUFK&RQJ
3DQ´/DJXHUUHG·$OJpULHHWOHVUHODWLRQVIUDQFRFKLQRLVHVµ 3K'GLVV8QLYHUVLWpGH/\RQ ²
21
´&KD\X$OFKHULDFKŉQJEXVXULP\HMŉQJµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ)HEUXDU\ WUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
XUJHQF\IRUWKH)/1OHDGHUVDQ[LRXVDVWKH\ZHUHWRFRXQWHU&KDUOHVGH*DXOOH·VSODQWR
hold a referendum in Algeria, but they were caught between the competing interests and
YLVLRQV RI WKH WZR SRWHQWLDO KRVW FRXQWULHV ² 1DVVHU·V 8QLWHG $UDE 5HSXEOLF 8$5 DQG
%RXUJXLED·V7XQLVLD,QWXUQWKHLUGLOHPPDDIIHFWHG1RUWK.RUHDWRRVLQFHWKH'35.KDG
just expressed its solidarity with each of the three Arab countries involved.
,QUHVSRQVHWRWKH6DNLHW6LGL<RXVVHI LQFLGHQW )HEUXDU\ ZKHQWKH)UHQFKDLU
IRUFHERPEHGD7XQLVLDQYLOODJHLQUHWDOLDWLRQIRU)/1UDLGVIURPRYHUWKH7XQLVLDQERUGHU
5RGRQJVLQPXQKLJKOLJKWHG7XQLVLD·VSURWHVWVDJDLQVW)UDQFH·V´SURYRFDWLYHEHKDYLRUµLQQROHVV
WKDQQLQHWHHQDUWLFOHVIURP)HEUXDU\WR-XQH22 In June-August 1958, however, a growing
ULIW DSSHDUHG LQ 7XQLVLDQ)/1 UHODWLRQV FDXVHG E\ %RXUJXLED·V HIIRUWV WR UHDFK D PRGXV
YLYHQGLZLWK)UDQFHDQGKLVDWWHPSWVWRQXGJHWKH)/1WRZDUGDQHJRWLDWHGVHWWOHPHQW7KHVH
GLVSXWHVXOWLPDWHO\FRPSHOOHGWKH)/1OHDGHUVWRSURFODLPWKHLUSURYLVLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWLQ
&DLUR 6HSWHPEHU UDWKHUWKDQ7XQLV6WLOOWKH\VRRQUDQDIRXORI 1DVVHUWRRZKHQ
the latter unsuccessfully pressured them to side with him against Bourguiba, who broke
diplomatic relations with the UAR in October.23
)DFLQJWKLVLQWHU$UDEGLVSXWHWKH1RUWK.RUHDQVHIIHFWLYHO\WRRN1DVVHU·VVLGH,QD
dramatic reversal of its earlier sympathetic focus on Tunisia, 5RGRQJVLQPXQ abruptly imposed
a news blackout, and failed to publish any Tunisian-related article from June 24, 1958 until
$XJXVWEXWFRQWLQXHGWRKLJKOLJKWWKH8$5·VIULHQGO\H[FKDQJHVZLWKWKH'35.DQG
other Communist states. In light of Pyongyang’s persistent efforts to win Nasser’s friendship
ZKLFKHQDEOHGWKH'35.WRRSHQDWUDGHRIÀFHLQ&DLURLQ-XO\24 WKLVFKRLFHZDV
fairly predictable, all the more so because the Soviet bloc countries unambiguously preferred
Nasser over Bourguiba. Nevertheless, 5RGRQJVLQPXQ, unlike 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, refrained from
GLUHFWO\FRQIURQWLQJ7XQLVLDSUREDEO\EHFDXVHWKH'35.RIÀFLDOVUHDVRQHGWKDWKLJKOLJKWLQJ
DQLQWHU$UDEGLVSXWHZRXOGXQGHUFXWWKHLUHIIRUWVWREODPH´:HVWHUQLPSHULDOLVPµIRUDOOWKH
woes of the Arab world.25
7KHSURFODPDWLRQRI WKH)/1·VSURYLVLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWFUHDWHGDULIWEHWZHHQ1RUWK
.RUHD·V &RPPXQLVW DOOLHV WRR 7KH &KLQHVH OHDGHUVKLS UHFRJQL]HG WKH *35$ DV HDUO\ DV
September 22, preceded only by the UAR, Morocco, and a few other Arab states.26 In
contrast, the USSR and its East European satellites adopted an evasive attitude toward the
GPRA’s increasingly insistent requests for diplomatic recognition, and preferred to maintain
FRQWDFWV ZLWK WKH )/1 WKURXJK WKHLU PDVV RUJDQL]DWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ WKHLU JRYHUQPHQWDO
22
6HH´3XOODQVŉPDQKDHQJHWDHKDQ7·\XQLV\DFKŉQJEXšLWDQKRKDQFKRFK·Lµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ)HEUXDU\
23
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQWKH8$55HSRUW0DUFK´(OOHQWpWHND]DOJpULDLNRUPiQ\EDQµ01/;,;-
M$OJHULD²GRER]*LDPSDROR&DOFKL1RYDWL´/DSROLWLTXHWXQLVLHQQHIDFHjOD
JXHUUHG·$OJpULHµ&RQÁXHQFHV0pGLWHUUDQpH 6SULQJ ²0DWWKHZ&RQQHOO\$'LSORPDWLF5HYROXWLRQ
$OJHULD·V)LJKWIRU,QGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKH2ULJLQVRI WKH3RVW&ROG:DU(UD 2[IRUG2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
²$OLVWDLU+RUQH$6DYDJH:DURI 3HDFH$OJHULD² 1HZ<RUN7KH9LNLQJ3UHVV ²
24
+XQJDULDQ)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\/HWWHUWRWKH+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQWKH8$5-XO\´$.RUHDL'HPRNUDWLNXV
.|]WiUVDViJpVD]($.NDSFVRODWDLµ01/;,;-M(J\SW²GRER]D
25
´%RXUJXLED$JHQWGHV,PSHULDOLVPXVµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, October 18, 1958, 5.
26
3DQ´/DJXHUUHG·$OJpULHHWOHVUHODWLRQVIUDQFRFKLQRLVHVµ
organs.27,QWKHIDFHRI WKHVHDOWHUQDWLYHVWKH'35.RSWHGIRUWKHIRUPHUDSSURDFKZKHQ
on September 25, it granted GHMXUH recognition to the GPRA.28 Subsequent North Korean
propaganda would falsely claim that “when the Provisional Government of the Algerian
5HSXEOLFZDVVHWXSWKHJRYHUQPHQWRI WKH'35.UHFRJQL]HGLWDKHDGRI RWKHUFRXQWULHVµ29
In reality, Pyongyang’s action seems to have been inspired by China’s example, since 5RGRQJ
VLQPXQ had mentioned the Chinese recognition of the GPRA a day before the KWP leaders
FURVVHGWKH5XELFRQDQG6LQR'35.UHODWLRQVZHUHH[FHSWLRQDOO\FORVHWKURXJKRXW30
While the European Communist states feared that Paris might sever diplomatic relations with
WKHPLI WKH\UHFRJQL]HGWKH*35$WKHGLSORPDWLFDOO\LVRODWHG'35.FRXOGHDVLO\DIIRUGWR
VLGHZLWK$OJHULDDJDLQVW)UDQFHEXWE\GRLQJVRLWLPSOLFLWO\VKRZHGDSUHIHUHQFHIRU%HLMLQJ
over Moscow.31
North Korea’s quick recognition of the GPRA must have made a favorable impression
RQ WKH )/1 OHDGHUV ZKR FKDIHG DW ZKDW WKH\ UHJDUGHG DV WKH (DVW (XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV·
XQZDUUDQWHGIHDURI )UHQFKUHWDOLDWLRQ32 Nevertheless, Pyongyang continued to lag behind
%HLMLQJ DQG +DQRL LQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ FRQWDFWV ZLWK WKH $OJHULDQ OHDGHUVKLS 7KH ÀUVW *35$
GHOHJDWLRQVWKDWYLVLWHG&KLQDDQG1RUWK9LHWQDP %HQ\RXFHI %HQNKHGGD'HFHPEHU
2PDU2XVVHGLN$SULO IDLOHGWRDGGWKH'35.WRWKHLULWLQHUDU\WKHÀUVW*35$YLVLW
in North Korea took place as late as May 1960.33 North Korea’s Red Cross Society seems to
have started providing humanitarian aid to Algerian refugees in March 1959, while its East
*HUPDQFRXQWHUSDUWKDGVHQWWKHÀUVWVKLSPHQWRI WKLVNLQGDVHDUO\DV1RYHPEHU34 In
27
+XQJDULDQ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWU\ 0HPRUDQGXP 2FWREHU ´$] $OJpULDL ,GHLJOHQHV .RUPiQ\ GH IDFWR
HOLVPHUpVHµ01/01/;,;-M$OJHULD²GRER]+XQJDULDQ)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\
0HPRUDQGXP 2FWREHU ´$OJpULiQDN Q\~MWRWW VHJpO\HNµ 01/ ;,;-N $OJHULD ²
GRER]
28
´/LVWRI 5HFRJQLWLRQVRI WKH3URYLVLRQDO*RYHUQPHQWRI WKH$OJHULDQ5HSXEOLFµ:LOVRQ&HQWHU'LJLWDO
Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121604.
29
“Immortal Contributions to the African Countries’ Struggle for National Liberation and Building a New
6RFLHW\µ 1DHQDUD, April 17, 2017, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1546674892-802640663/immortal-
contributions-to-the-african-countries%e2%80%99-struggle-for-national-liberation-and-building-a-new-
society/.
30
´&KXQJKZD,QPLQ.RQJKZDJXN$OFKHULD.RQJKZDJXNULPVLFKŉQJEXUšOVšQJLQµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, September
24, 1958, 4.
31
+XQJDULDQ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWU\ WR WKH +XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ LQ WKH 8$5 /HWWHU 1RYHPEHU ´$]
$OJpULDL.|]WiUVDViJLGHLJOHQHVNRUPiQ\DHOQ|NpQHNOHYHOHµ01/;,;-M$OJHULD²GRER]
005582/2/1958.
32
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQWKH8$50HPRUDQGXP1RYHPEHU´$]$OJpULDL,GHLJOHQHV.RUPiQ\NpUpVHµ
01/;,;-M$OJHULD²GRER]
33
.\OH +DGGDG)RQGD ´5HYROXWLRQDU\ $OOLHV 6LQR(J\SWLDQ DQG 6LQR$OJHULDQ 5HODWLRQV LQ WKH %DQGXQJ
'HFDGHµ 3K' GLVV 0DJGDOHQ &ROOHJH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 2[IRUG ² +XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ LQ WKH
'HPRFUDWLF 5HSXEOLF RI 9LHWQDP '59 5HSRUW -DQXDU\ ´$] DOJtUL NRUPiQ\GHOHJiFLy YLHWQDPL
OiWRJDWiVDµ 01/ ;,;-M 9LHWQDP ² GRER] L +XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ LQ WKH
'595HSRUW-XO\´$OJtULNDWRQDLGHOHJiFLy9LHWQDPEDQµ01/;,;-M9LHWQDP²
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34
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VLQPXQ0DUFK´''5+LOIHIU$OJHULHQµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, November 25, 1957, 5.
1RYHPEHUZKHQD*35$PHPRUDQGXPHQXPHUDWHGWKHVWDWHVZKLFKWKH)/1OHDGHUV
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by its absence.35,QOLJKWRI WKHVHOLPLWDWLRQVRI $OJHULDQ'35.FRRSHUDWLRQLWLVGRXEWIXO
WKDWWKH)/1OHDGHUVZHUHVR´H[WUHPHO\JUDWHIXOµIRU3\RQJ\DQJ·VLQLWLDOGLSORPDWLFVXSSRUW
as Barry K. Gills suggested.36
In the fall of 1959, the North Korean leaders once again found themselves on a
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ÀUVWWLPH$OJHULD·VULJKWWRVHOIGHWHUPLQDWLRQEXWKHVWLOOH[SUHVVHGDVWURQJSUHIHUHQFHIRU
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WKHODWHVWIRXU\HDUVDIWHUWKHDFWXDOUHVWRUDWLRQRI SHDFHµ:KLOHWKH)/1·VUHVSRQVHVWRGH
Gaulle’s proposal were of a reserved and ambiguous nature, on October 16 Beijing’s New
&KLQD1HZV$JHQF\ 1&1$ SXEOLVKHGDFRPPHQWDU\WKDWEOXQWO\GLVPLVVHGLWDVDPHUH
´FKDQJHRI WDFWLFVµDQGD´SORWWRVWUDQJOHWKH$OJHULDQSHRSOH·VVWUXJJOHIRUIUHHGRPµ37 In
contrast, on October 31 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev welcomed de Gaulle’s initiative,
ZKLFKKHVDLGFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\SOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQUHVROYLQJWKH$OJHULDQFRQÁLFWLQ
a peaceful way.38
Much in the same way as they had acted in September 1958, the North Korean leaders
implicitly sided with Beijing against Moscow. On November 3, 5RGRQJVLQPXQ carried a long
signed article that condemned de Gaulle’s proposal as a deceitful attempt to conceal his
FRPPLWPHQWWRWKHROGFRORQLDOSROLF\RI ´LQWHJUDWLRQµ39,Q2FWREHU'HFHPEHUWKH
'35.GDLO\SXEOLVKHGQROHVVWKDQQLQHDUWLFOHV LHWKUHHWLPHVDVPDQ\DV1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG
RQ WKH )/1·V PLOLWDU\ DFKLHYHPHQWV EXW LW GLG QRW H[SORUH WKH JURZLQJ ULIW EHWZHHQ GH
*DXOOHDQGWKH)UHQFKXOWUDV – a theme to which 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG drew attention as early as
November 1959 – until the XOWUDV·RSHQUHYROWLQ$OJLHUV -DQXDU\ 40
7KHÀUVWDQGRQO\YLVLWRI D*35$GHOHJDWLRQLQWKH'35. .ULP%HONDFHP0D\
OLNHZLVHLQYROYHGWKH.:3OHDGHUVLQWKHPXOWLODWHUDOFRQWURYHUVLHVRI WKH$OJHULDQ
:DU ,W WRRN SODFH ULJKW EHWZHHQ .KUXVKFKHY·V WZR YLVLWV LQ )UDQFH 0DUFK ² $SULO
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over Algeria, and when the GPRA demonstratively engaged the Communist states to make
35
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Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121599.
36
Gills, .RUHDYHUVXV.RUHD, 67.
37
Horne, $6DYDJH:DURI 3HDFH²´'H*DXOOH·V1HZ$OJHULDQ3ORWµ3HNLQJ5HYLHZ, October 27, 1959, 25.
38
´)UHLQH:HOWRKQH.ULHJµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, November 3, 1959, 4.
39
.LP7ŉNK\ŉQ´$OFKHULDLQPLQšLFKŉQJšLšLW·XMDHQJšONDURPDJšOKLPšQŉSWDµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, November 3,
WUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
40
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VLQJPLQMXšLFKDGšOKRVDQJJDQHPXMDQJFK·XQJGROµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ-DQXDU\´.UDZDOOLQ$OJLHUµ
1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, November 12, 1959, 7.
)UDQFH·VDOOLHVDZDUHRI WKHULVNVRI VXSSRUWLQJGH*DXOOH·V$OJHULDSROLF\41 The extensive

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Pyongyangites to welcome the arriving delegation, a dinner hosted by Kim Il Sung, a joint
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welcome Krim received in China and North Vietnam in April-May 1960, but stood in a
striking contrast with the single laconic article that 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG devoted to the visit of
DQRWKHU*35$GHOHJDWLRQLQ(DVW*HUPDQ\ 0DEURXN%HOKRFLQH-XQH 42
Actually, the fact that Pyongyang proved more able to reach a consensus with the
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Krim’s delegation to express solidarity with the recent South Korean revolution against
Syngman Rhee and demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the ROK, but neither Krim
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:HVW*HUPDQJRYHUQPHQW ²HYLGHQWO\EHFDXVH:HVW*HUPDQ\FRQVWLWXWHGDQLQGLVSHQVDEOH
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sensitivities into consideration.43
This is not to say that the KWP leaders’ views were fully in harmony with that of their
Algerian partners. The North Koreans seem to have been markedly less enthusiastic about
WKHÀUVWURXQGRI )UHQFK)/1QHJRWLDWLRQVKHOGLQ0HOXQRQ-XQHWKDQWKH
East Germans. While 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG welcomed the prospect of a negotiated peace and
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WKHÀDVFR44
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41
Jeffrey James Byrne, 0HFFD RI 5HYROXWLRQ $OJHULD 'HFRORQL]DWLRQ DQG WKH 7KLUG :RUOG 2UGHU (Oxford: Oxford
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV ²&RQQHOO\$'LSORPDWLF5HYROXWLRQ, 224–25.
42
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VPD\DSRPD\DJRGDµ35.0D\LQ3·\ŉQJ\DQJVRU\ŉQWDHVDJZDQSLPLOVŉFK·RO, ed. T’ongil
0XQKZD <ŉQ·JXVR 6ŉXO .·RULD .·RQW·HQFK·X 5DHS ´.LP ,OVŉQJ VXVDQJ $OFKHULD .RQJKZDJXN
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''5µ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, June 29, 1960, 1.
43
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VPD\DSRPD\DJRGDµ0D\LQ3·\ŉQJ\DQJVRU\ŉQWDHVDJZDQSLPLOVŉFK·RO, ed. T’ongil Munhwa
<ŉQ·JXVR 6ŉXO .·RULD .·RQW·HQFK·X 5DHS ² ´&KRVŉQ 0LQMXMXšL ,QPLQ .RQJKZDJXN FKŉQJEX
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VLQPXQ, July 6, 1960, 4.
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But when the U.S. government attempted to mediate between the two sides by instructing
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ministers, the North Koreans seem to have been far more irritated by this unexpected
turn of events than their East European comrades.46 1HXHV 'HXWVFKODQG as well as various
+XQJDULDQ&]HFKRVORYDNDQG5RPDQLDQGDLOLHVDFFXUDWHO\UHSRUWHGWKHPHHWLQJDQGQRWHG
its potentially advantageous implications (such as the implicit recognition the U.S. thus
granted to the GPRA, and the friction that this initiative might generate between Paris and
:DVKLQJWRQ 47 In contrast, 5RGRQJVLQPXQVKDUSO\FRQGHPQHG$PHULFD·V´PHGGOLQJµLQWKH
)UHQFK$OJHULDQQHJRWLDWLRQVDQGSUHVHQWHGWKHHYHQWVLQDJURVVO\GLVWRUWHGIRUP&LWLQJD
1&1$QHZVUHSRUWDVLWVVRXUFHWKH'35.GDLO\PHQWLRQHGRQO\WKDWWKH86DPEDVVDGRU
LQ3DULVGLVFXVVHGWKHVWDOOLQJRI WKHWDONVZLWKWKH)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQW LHLWIDLOHGWRPDNH
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5RGRQJ VLQPXQ continued to lay a strong emphasis on the theme of armed struggle, as it
carried eighteen articles (that is, two and a half times as many as 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG RQWKH
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realities, since “once President de Gaulle had conceded the principle of self-determination
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Army seriously, and instead began to rely mainly upon political and diplomatic methods and
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stage, 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG covered the progress of the negotiations almost on a daily basis. In
contrast, 5RGRQJVLQPXQ·VDQQRXQFHPHQWRI WKHeYLDQ$FFRUGV 0DUFK ZDVFORVHO\
SUHFHGHG E\ ÀYH DUWLFOHV RQ IURQWOLQH HYHQWV WKXV VHHNLQJ WR FUHDWH WKH LPSUHVVLRQ WKDW
$OJHULDKDGZRQLWVLQGHSHQGHQFHRQWKHEDWWOHÀHOGVUDWKHUWKDQDWWKHQHJRWLDWLRQWDEOH50
7KH'35.GDLO\HQWKXVLDVWLFDOO\SUHVHQWHGWKH$FFRUGVDV´DKLVWRULFYLFWRU\RI WKH$OJHULDQ
SHRSOH·VKHURLFDUPHGVWUXJJOHµEXWWKH1RUWK.RUHDQOHDGHUVSULYDWHO\UHJDUGHGWKHPDVD
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45
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FKŉQJEXNDNŉEXµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ$SULO,VWYiQ.RYiFV´0HJFVDOWUHPpQ\HNµ1pSV]DEDGViJ, April 7,
1961, 1.
46
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¶&DOPO\·µ1HZ<RUN7LPHV, April 5, 1961, 13.
47
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0DJ\DU1HP]HW, April 6, 1961, 3.
48
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50
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L\ŉP\ŉQJšLFKŉNNXQšOVDOVDQJµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, March 15, 1962, 4.
WKH*35$ZDVFRPSHOOHGWRPDNHWR)UDQFH51
Pyongyang’s Preference for Morocco over Tunisia
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anti-colonial struggle largely paid off as far as Algeria was concerned. Badly in need of
international support, the GPRA was willing to reciprocate Pyongyang’s militant solidarity
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REWDLQIURPWKH'35.ZDVRI DSROLWLFDOUDWKHUWKDQHFRQRPLFQDWXUH-XGJLQJIURPZKDW
'HSXW\)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHUV<X&K·DQJVLNDQG3DN.ZDQJVŉQJWROG+XQJDULDQ$PEDVVDGRU
.iURO\3UiWKDQG6RYLHW&KDUJpG·$IIDLUHV1(7RUEHQNRYUHVSHFWLYHO\.ULP%HONDFHP·V
delegation eagerly inquired about North Korea’s wartime military experiences, but showed
little interest in discussing economic issues.52 In contrast, the post-colonial Tunisian and
Moroccan governments, understandably enough, were strongly concerned to obtain external
development assistance – a factor that helps to explain why East Germany, having been
overtaken by Pyongyang in Algeria, was more able to gain a foothold in these two countries
WKDQWKH'35.
)RULQVWDQFHLQ$XJXVWWKH7XQLVLDQDXWKRULWLHVWROGDQ(DVW*HUPDQHPLVVDU\WKDW
“neither diplomatic nor consular relations were acceptable but that a trade mission would
EHFRQVLGHUHGµWKHQLQIRUPHGWKH:HVW*HUPDQHPEDVV\WKDW´LI WKH\ZDQWHGHYHQDWUDGH
mission refused, it was up to them to increase West Germany’s trade with Tunisia so as to
PDNHDQ(DVW*HUPDQWUDGHPLVVLRQXQQHFHVVDU\µ53 In May 1960, the Tunisian government
GLGVLJQDWUDGHDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH*'5ZKHUHDV3\RQJ\DQJ·VÀUVWWUDGHDJUHHPHQWZLWK
Tunis was concluded as late as 1981.54 Thus, Tunisia’s focus on drawing concrete economic
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'35.1RUWK.RUHD·VFRPPHUFLDOSRWHQWLDOFRXOGQRWPDWFK(DVW*HUPDQ\·VDQGLQWKH
HDUO\V6RXWK.RUHDKDGQRW\HWEHFRPHDVXIÀFLHQWO\DWWUDFWLYHHFRQRPLFSDUWQHUZKRVH
assistance Tunisia might have wanted to ensure by stimulating competition between Seoul
and Pyongyang.
When Morocco signed trade agreements with East Germany in June 1959 and August
51
´<ŉQJXQJMŉNPXMDQJW·XMDHQJHVŉWDOVŉQJKDQ$OFKHULDLQPLQšLU\ŉNVDMŉNVšQJQLµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, March 22,
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQ$OJHULD5HSRUW'HFHPEHU´$.1'.NDSFVRODWD$OJpULiYDOµ01/
;,;-M.RUHDGRER]
52
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D .1'. QpKiQ\ NO pV EHOSROLWLNDL NpUGpVpUŋOµ 01/ ;,;-M .RUHD ² GRER] E
1(7RUEHQNRY´'QHYQLNYUHPHQQRJRSRYHUHQQRJRYGHODNK6665Y.1'57RUEHQNRYD
1(]DSHULRGVPD\DSRPD\DJRGDµ0D\LQ3·\ŉQJ\DQJVRU\ŉQWDHVDJZDQSLPLOVŉFK·RO, 11.
53
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54
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1960, the West German ambassador in Rabat likewise attributed these steps to the government’s
GHVLUHWR´VSXURQWKH:HVW*HUPDQVµVLQFHDVKHWROGKLV%ULWLVKFRXQWHUSDUW6LU&KDUOHV
'XNH WKH 0RURFFDQ*'5 DJUHHPHQWV ZHUH ´PDLQO\ LQ WKH QDWXUH RI SURSDJDQGDµ DQG
H[SHFWHGWRUHPDLQXQGHUIXOÀOOHG55 As far as practical assistance was concerned, Morocco
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'35.SURPSWO\VHQWFRQGROHQFHPHVVDJHVWR0RURFFRLQWKHZDNHRI WKHGHYDVWDWLQJ$JDGLU
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truckloads of humanitarian aid as early as March 7, its North Korean counterpart followed
suit as late as mid-April. In any case, 5RGRQJVLQPXQ’s coverage of the earthquake was limited
WR WKHVH LQVWDQFHV RI RIÀFLDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ ZKHUHDV 1HXHV 'HXWVFKODQG GHYRWHG D GR]HQ
articles to the catastrophe, giving a vivid picture of the human toll and the relief efforts.56
,QWKHSROLWLFDOVSKHUHWKH1RUWK.RUHDQVIRXQGLWPRUHGLIÀFXOWWRVHHH\HWRH\HZLWKWKH
post-colonial Tunisian and Moroccan administrations than with the Algerian guerrilla leaders.
Bourguiba in particular was prone to take diplomatic steps that were hardly compatible with
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1DVVHU $GRSWLQJ 6RYLHW WHUPLQRORJ\ 1RUWK .RUHD·V &HQWUDO <HDUERRN ODEHOHG ERWK
7XQLVLD·V1HR'HVWRXU3DUW\DQG0RURFFR·V,VWLTODODV´SDUWLHVRI WKHQDWLRQDOERXUJHRLVLHµ
but as early as March 1958, the KWP leaders implicitly expressed a less favorable assessment
of Tunisia than of the Moroccan kingdom.57)RUWKHÀUVWWLPHWKH\LQFOXGHG0RURFFRLQ
the list of those countries whose heads of state and prime ministers received ceremonial
greetings from their North Korean counterparts on their national holidays, whereas Tunisia
ZDVJUHHWHGRQO\E\WKH'35.·VPDVVRUJDQL]DWLRQV58 Pyongyang’s reserved attitude was not
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in March 1958, both Mao Zedong and Soviet leader Kliment Voroshilov sent greetings to
Bourguiba.59,QVWHDGWKHGLVWLQFWLRQWKH'35.PDGHEHWZHHQWKHWZR0DJKUHEVWDWHVPD\
have been inspired by the recent divergence of their positions on the Korean question. In
January 1957, both countries had voted for the U.S.-backed UN draft resolutions on Korea,
but in November 1957, Morocco switched to abstention, whereas Tunisia clung to its pro-
55
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56
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$JDGLUµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, March 8, 1960, 5.
57
&KRVŉQ &KXQJDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD &KRVŉQ FKXQJDQJ Q\ŉQ·JDP 3·\ŉQJ\DQJ &KRVŉQ &KXQJDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD
.
58
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QDHJDNVXVDQJ.LP,OVŉQJ µ5RGRQJVLQPXQ0DUFK´7·\XQLV\DWRQJQLSFKXQ\ŉQHFKHKD\ŉXULQDUD
VDKRHWDQFK·HGšOHVŉ7·\XQLV\DVDKRHWDQFK·HGšOHFK·XNFKŉQµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, March 21, 1958, 1.
59
´*OFNZXQVFKWHOHJUDPP:RURVFKLORZVDQ%RXUJLEDµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG0DUFK´&KLQDDQGWKH
:RUOG,Q%ULHIµ3HNLQJ5HYLHZ, March 25, 1958, 19.
ROK stance. By doing so, Tunisia adopted a more pro-American standpoint on Korea than
on the Chinese question, since during the General Assembly’s September 1957 debate over
China’s representation in the UN, the Tunisian delegate abstained from voting instead of
siding with the U.S. Possibly this is why Mao sent a greeting to Bourguiba, but Kim Il Sung
did not.60
1RUWK.RUHD·VVXEWOHSUHIHUHQFHIRU0RURFFRRYHU7XQLVLDVRRQWXUQHGRXWWREHMXVWLÀHG
EHFDXVHWKH-XO\86PLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ/HEDQRQ ZKLFKWKH'35.JRYHUQPHQW
promptly condemned61 HOLFLWHGVKDUSO\GLIIHUHQWUHDFWLRQVIURPWKHWZR0DJKUHEVWDWHV,Q
July-August 1958, both Morocco’s Consultative Assembly and the country’s UN delegate
protested against the intervention, and Prime Minister Ahmed Balafrej started talks with
)UDQFHDQGWKH86DERXWWKHZLWKGUDZDORI IRUHLJQWURRSVIURPWKHFRXQWU\·VDLUEDVHV²DQ
initiative that soon caught 5RGRQJVLQPXQ’s attention. In contrast, Bourguiba readily endorsed
Washington’s action.62 This new manifestation of Tunisia’s pro-American stance, combined
DVLWZDVZLWK%RXUJXLED·VFODVKHVZLWK1DVVHUDQGWKH)/1SUREDEO\LQÁXHQFHGWKH1RUWK
Korean authorities’ decision to impose a fourteen-month blackout on news about Tunisia.
1RWDEO\ WKH ÀUVW DUWLFOH WKDW EURNH 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ’s long silence covered Bourguiba’s
GHFLVLRQWR DEROLVK 7XQLVLD·V FXVWRPVXQLRQ ZLWK)UDQFH $XJXVW WKDWLV D VLJQ
RI UHQHZHGFRQÁLFWZLWK3DULV63 In practice, however, this step meant a switch to the dollar
market, i.e., a development hardly in accordance with Pyongyang’s traditionally anti-American
Middle East policy.64 Worse still, Tunisian-Egyptian relations remained tense throughout
1960, as Bourguiba rebuffed Nasser’s tentative attempts at reconciliation.65 Probably this is
why 5RGRQJVLQPXQ soon re-imposed its news blackout on Tunisia, publishing only a single
article about the country between September 11, 1959 and July 23, 1961.
7KHHYHQWWKDWÀQDOO\HQDEOHGWKH1RUWK.RUHDQOHDGHUVWRHQJDJH7XQLVLDRQWKHLURZQ
WHUPVZDVWKH)UHQFK7XQLVLDQPLOLWDU\FODVKRYHUWKH%L]HUWHQDYDOEDVH -XO\
5RGRQJVLQPXQUHDFWHGWRWKH%L]HUWHFULVLVÀYHGD\VODWHUWKDQ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, but when it
did so, it expressed the leadership’s standpoint in the form of a signed three-column article
FDOOLQJ IRU VROLGDULW\ ZLWK EHOHDJXHUHG 7XQLVLD )URP -XO\ WR $XJXVW WKH QHZVSDSHU
60
United Nations, <HDUERRNRI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV8QLWHG1DWLRQV<HDUERRNRI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV,
90, 97.
61
Gills, .RUHDYHUVXV.RUHD, 68.
62
+XQJDULDQ/HJDWLRQWR)UDQFH5HSRUW'HFHPEHU´7XQLV]pV0DURNNyiOOiVIRJODOiVDD]LUDNLIRUGXODW
NDSFViQµ01/;,;-N0RURFFR²GRER],9&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\
´0RURFFDQ3UHPLHU$VNV86WR5HFRJQL]H¶3ULQFLSOHRI (YDFXDWLRQ·µLQ&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH%XOOHWLQ'DLO\
%ULHI$XJXVW6HFWLRQ,,$VLD$IULFD&,$(OHFWURQLF5HDGLQJ5RRP &(55 KWWSVZZZFLDJRY
UHDGLQJURRPGRFV&(175$/,17(//,*(1&(%8//%'SGI ´0RURN·R FKŉQJEX
0RURN·RURSXW·ŉšLRHJXNNXQGDHFK·ŉOJŉUšO\RJXµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, August 8, 1958, 4 (translated by Hanna
.LP
63
´7·\XQLV\DND3XOODQVŉZDšLNZDQVHWRQJPDHQJK\ŉSFKŉQJšOS·HJLµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, August 24, 1959, 4.
64
+HQU\*LQLJHU´7XQLVLD$EDQGRQV)UHQFK7UDGH7LH4XLWV&XVWRPV8QLRQLQ%LGWR(QWHU'ROODU0DUNHWµ
1HZ<RUN7LPHV, August 21, 1959, 1.
65
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQWKH8$55HSRUW$XJXVW´$]($.pV7XQLV]NLEpNOpVHµ01/;,;-N
(J\SW²GRER]
FDUULHGQLQHDUWLFOHVRQWKHFULVLVLQFOXGLQJ.LP,O6XQJ·VÀUVWHYHUPHVVDJHWR%RXUJXLED
Thereafter Pyongyang added Tunisia to the list of those countries whose heads of state
received ceremonial greetings from their North Korean counterparts on their national
holidays (in contrast, East Germany’s President Wilhelm Pieck had sent a message of greetings
WR %RXUJXLED DV HDUO\ DV 0DUFK 66 7KDW LV WKH '35. RQFH DJDLQ VRXJKW WR H[SORLW
7XQLVLD·VFRQÁLFWZLWK)UDQFHEXWWKH%L]HUWHFULVLVWXUQHGRXWWREHPRUHDGYDQWDJHRXVWKDQ
WKH6DNLHW6LGL<RXVVHI LQFLGHQWDQGWKHDEURJDWLRQRI WKH)UHQFK7XQLVLDQFXVWRPVXQLRQ
EHFDXVH 1DVVHU·V YRFDO VROLGDULW\ ZLWK 7XQLVLD YLVjYLV )UDQFH EURXJKW DERXW D 7XQLVLDQ
8$5UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ DIDFWUHDGLO\QRWHGE\WKH'35.<HDUERRN67 DQGWKXVD1RUWK.RUHDQ
overture toward Bourguiba no longer ran the risk of alienating Nasser.68
,QWXUQWKH%L]HUWHFULVLVVHHPVWRKDYHOHGWRDVKLIWLQ7XQLVLD·VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGWKH
.RUHDQTXHVWLRQ:DVKLQJWRQ·VRSSRVLWLRQWR%RXUJXLED·VIRUFHIXOPHDVXUHVDJDLQVW%L]HUWH
DQGWRKLVGHFLVLRQWRWDNHWKHGLVSXWHWRWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO 816& JHQHUDWHGVWURQJ
resentment among the Tunisian leaders (an issue 5RGRQJVLQPXQ observed as early as July 24,
196169 DQGSUREDEO\OHVVHQHGWKHLUZLOOLQJQHVVWRDGDSWWRWKH86VWDQGSRLQWRQ.RUHD70
$WWKH'HFHPEHU81GLVSXWHRYHU.RUHDWKH7XQLVLDQGHOHJDWHQRORQJHUVXSSRUWHG
WKHSUR52.GUDIWUHVROXWLRQ DVKHKDGGRQHDVODWHDV$SULO ,QVWHDGKHDEVWDLQHG
IURPYRWLQJ²DIDFWGXO\UHSRUWHGE\WKH'35.<HDUERRN71
Nonetheless, the Tunisian government continued to give North Korea the cold
shoulder as far as practical cooperation was concerned. Charged with the task of establishing
DPEDVVDGRULDOUHODWLRQVZLWK7XQLVLDLQ-XQHWKH'35.DPEDVVDGRULQ&]HFKRVORYDNLD
YLVLWHG WKH FRXQWU\ ZKHUH KH PDQDJHG WR PHHW %RXUJXLED DQG )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU 6DGRN
0RNDGGHP7KHKRVWDXWKRULWLHVWUHDWHGKLPDVEHÀWWHGKLVUDQNEXWVKRZHGOLWWOHLI DQ\
readiness to discuss the Korean situation in depth, and turned down his initiative on the
grounds that Tunisia did not intend to enter into diplomatic relations with states divided by the
Cold War. The ambassador attempted to counter this argument by pointing out that Tunisia
did maintain ambassadorial relations with West Germany, but to no avail. The Tunisians
66
5L +\ŉQJVX ´7·\XQLV\D H WDHKDQ VLQJPLQMXšLMDGšO šL PXU\ŉN FK·LPJRQJ šO FKŉMLVLN·LUDµ 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ, July
´7·\XQLV\D .RQJKZDJXN WDHW·RQJQ\ŉQJ +DELEš 3XUšJLED NDNKDµ &KRVŉQ 0LQMXMXšL ,QPLQ
.RQJKZDJXNQDHJDNVXVDQJ.LP,OVŉQJ µ5RGRQJVLQPXQ-XO\´*OFNZQVFKHIU7XQHVLHQµ1HXHV
'HXWVFKODQG, March 21, 1959, 5.
67
&KRVŉQ &KXQJDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD &KRVŉQ FKXQJDQJ Q\ŉQ·JDP 3·\ŉQJ\DQJ &KRVŉQ &KXQJDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD
.
68
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQWKH8$55HSRUW$XJXVW´$]($.pV7XQLV]NLEpNOpVHµ01/;,;-N
(J\SW²GRER]
69
´7·\XQLV\DVDW·DH 3XUšJLEDJD0L²<ŉQJšLULSFKDQJšOSLQDQ3XOODQVŉNXQGDHND0LJXNFKHPXJLUšOVD\RQJ µ
5RGRQJVLQPXQ, July 24, 1961, 4.
70
1LQD'DYLV+RZODQGHG)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQVRI WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV²$IULFDYRO :DVKLQJWRQ'&
8QLWHG6WDWHV*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2IÀFH 'RFXPHQWV²
71
United Nations General Assembly 15th6HVVLRQ)LUVW&RPPLWWHHth Meeting, April 12, 1961, United Nations
'LJLWDO/LEUDU\6\VWHPKWWSVGLJLWDOOLEUDU\XQRUJUHFRUG"OQ HQ Y SGI8QLWHG1DWLRQV<HDUERRN
RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 1HZ <RUN 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 2IÀFH RI 3XEOLF ,QIRUPDWLRQ &KRVŉQ
Chungang T’ongsinsa, &KRVŉQ&KXQJDQJQ\ŉQ·JDP, 474.
were less dismissive toward his proposal to initiate commercial exchanges, but instead of
GLVFXVVLQJ 1RUWK .RUHD·V VSHFLÀF RIIHUV WKH\ DGYLVHG KLP WR FRQWDFW WKH 7XQLVLDQ FKDUJp
d’affaires in Prague.72)ROORZLQJWKHGHSDUWXUHRI WKHDPEDVVDGRU5RGRQJVLQPXQ pointedly
LJQRUHG7XQLVLDIRUDQHQWLUH\HDU²DQDWWLWXGHSUREDEO\LQÁXHQFHGQRWRQO\E\WKHÀDVFRRI
KLVPLVVLRQEXWDOVRE\WKHUHVXPSWLRQRI )UDQFR7XQLVLDQUHODWLRQVLQ-XO\ DQHYHQW
GXO\QRWHGE\WKH'35.<HDUERRN DQGWKHJURZLQJIULFWLRQEHWZHHQ7XQLVLDDQGQHZO\
independent Algeria.73
Pyongyang Between Morocco and Mauritania
$VQRWHGHDUOLHUWKH'35.OHDGHUVKDGPRUHUHDVRQWREHSOHDVHGE\0RURFFR·VDWWLWXGH
toward the U.S. intervention in Lebanon than by Tunisia’s. In 1957–1960, 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ
did present the newly independent Moroccan state as a nation whose legitimate aspirations
FODVKHGZLWKWKHSROLFLHVRI $PHULFD RYHUWKH86DLUEDVHVLQ0RURFFR )UDQFH RYHUWKH
$OJHULDQ:DUDQG)UHQFKPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHLQ0RURFFR DQG6SDLQ RYHU,IQLDQG:HVWHUQ
6DKDUD 74 Actually, North Korea’s ideologically inspired focus on these disputes was fairly
MXVWLÀHG IURP D SUDJPDWLF SHUVSHFWLYH WRR ,Q DQG HDUO\ ZKHQ WKH 0RURFFDQ
government was still reluctant to endorse the irredentist demands voiced by Istiqlal’s radical
IULQJHLWDGRSWHGDSUR:HVWHUQVWDQFHRQWKH.RUHDQTXHVWLRQ,QFRQWUDVWLWVÀUVWIRUPDO
WHUULWRULDOFODLPWR,IQL:HVWHUQ6DKDUDDQG)UHQFKUXOHG0DXULWDQLDVXEPLWWHGDVLWZDVWR
the UN on October 14, 1957, was closely followed by a neutralist shift in its attitude toward
Korea at the UN General Assembly meeting of November 29, 1957.75
In light of Pyongyang’s overall sympathy for Morocco’s nationalist aspirations, it was
fairly paradoxical that the KWP leaders made no public effort to exploit the favorable
RSSRUWXQLW\ WKDW 0RURFFR·V WHUULWRULDO FODLP WR 0DXULWDQLD LH LWV UHIXVDO WR UHFRJQL]H
WKLV QHLJKERULQJ FRXQWU\ DV D VRYHUHLJQ VWDWH SURYLGHG WR WKH 6RYLHW EORF LQ JHQHUDO DQG
WR WKH '35. LQ SDUWLFXODU :KHQ WKH QHZO\ LQGHSHQGHQW 0DXULWDQLD DSSOLHG WR MRLQ WKH
UN, Morocco attempted to block its admission, and its efforts were initially supported
by Moscow. At two successive UN meetings (Political Committee, November 15–26,
72
+XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ LQ &]HFKRVORYDNLD 5HSRUW -XQH ´.DSFVRODWRN D .RUHDL 1pSL 'HPRNUDWLNXV
.|]WiUVDViJpV7XQLV]N|]|WWµ01/;,;-M.RUHD²GRER]EI
73
&KRVŉQ &KXQDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD &KRVŉQ FKXQJDQJ Q\ŉQ·JDP 3·\ŉQJ\DQJ &KRVŉQ &KXQJDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQ$OJHULD5HSRUW)HEUXDU\´$OJpULDLWXQp]LDLNDSFVRODWRNpVDUDEDWL
NRQIHUHQFLDµ01/;,;-M$OJHULD²GRER]EI
74
6HH´0RURN·RPLQMRNNXQ6ŉEDQDNXQFKLQMLUšOW·DUKZDQµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ'HFHPEHU´0RURN·RZDQJ
L$OFKHULDLQPLQGšOHWDHKDQU\ŉQGDHVŉQJšOS·\RVLµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ$SULO´0RURN·RVLQPXQLVŉEX
6DKDUDHWDHKDQFKXJZŉQšO\RJXµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ'HFHPEHU
75
'RXJODV($VKIRUG´7KH,UUHGHQWLVW$SSHDOLQ0RURFFRDQG0DXULWDQLDµ7KH:HVWHUQ3ROLWLFDO4XDUWHUO\ 15,
QR ²/\DNDW$OL´7KH:HVWHUQ6DKDUD,VVXH'HFRORQLVDWLRQRU*UHDWHU0RURFFRµ 3K''LVV
-DZDKDUODO1HKUX8QLYHUVLW\ 8QLWHG1DWLRQV<HDUERRNRI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV, 90.
6HFXULW\&RXQFLO'HFHPEHU² WKH6RYLHW8QLRQYRWHGDJDLQVW0DXULWDQLD·V
admission.76,QFRQWUDVW:DVKLQJWRQUHDGLO\UHFRJQL]HG0DXULWDQLD·VVWDWHKRRGPXFKWRWKH
chagrin of Rabat.77 Under these conditions, Morocco’s Korea policy moved further away
from the American position and closer to the Soviet one. In late 1960, a Moroccan diplomat
LQIRUPHGWKH86FKDUJpG·DIIDLUHVLQ5DEDWWKDWKLVJRYHUQPHQW´ZLOOVRRQUHFRJQL]HERWK
1RUWK9LHWQDPDQG1RUWK.RUHDDVDIXUWKHUGHPRQVWUDWLRQRI ¶SRVLWLYHQHXWUDOLW\·µ7KH
&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\ &,$ FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH0RURFFDQJRYHUQPHQW´PLJKWVHHWKLV
UHFRJQLWLRQDVDPHDQVRI LQFUHDVLQJ>6RYLHW@EORFWLHVRUDVDQDSSURSULDWHUHVSRQVHWRWKH
6RYLHWYHWRRI 0DXULWDQLD·V81DGPLVVLRQµ78 On April 10, 1961 (i.e., a few days before the
*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\·VYRWHRQ0DXULWDQLD WKH0RURFFDQGHOHJDWHIRUWKHÀUVWWLPHH[SUHVVHG
the view that the representatives of both Koreas be invited to take part in the debate over
the Korean question, and explained his stance by recalling “the problems created for his
FRXQWU\ E\ WHUULWRULDO VHSDUDWLRQµ79 Thus, the Moroccan-Mauritanian dispute was at least
temporarily advantageous to North Korea’s interests, but Pyongyang made no attempt to
woo Morocco by expressing public support for its territorial claims. On the contrary, 5RGRQJ
VLQPXQ – unlike 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQGZKLFKVWDUWHGWRFRYHUWKHLVVXHDVHDUO\DV)HEUXDU\
– pointedly ignored the dispute throughout its entire duration, nor did it publish any article
RQ0DXULWDQLDXQWLO1RYHPEHUZKHQWKH'35.JRYHUQPHQWDEUXSWO\DQQRXQFHG
that it reached agreement with Nouakchott on the establishment of diplomatic relations.80
,Q2FWREHUZKHQ0DXULWDQLDZDVÀQDOO\DGPLWWHGWRWKH815RGRQJVLQPXQ made no
reference to this breakthrough, though it triumphantly reported Mongolia’s simultaneous
admission.81 (Actually, the two events were directly interrelated, because at the UNSC session
of October 25, 1961, the USSR tacitly consented to Mauritania’s UN membership in exchange
for Mongolia’s entry.82 7KXV 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ adopted a peculiar hedging position, because
it did not acknowledge Morocco’s territorial claims, but by ignoring the very existence of
Mauritania, it implicitly questioned its statehood.
Unlike 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ WKH ² YROXPHV RI WKH '35. <HDUERRN GXO\ OLVWHG
76
.RQUDG%DQDœ´$Q,QGHSHQGHQW&RXQWU\RUD3DUWRI 0RURFFR"7KH,VVXHRI WKH,QGHSHQGHQFHRI 0DXULWDQLDµ
&DKLHUVG·pWXGHVDIULFDLQHV ²
77
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+RZODQG :DVKLQJWRQ'&8QLWHG6WDWHV*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2IÀFH 'RFXPHQW
78
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,QWHOOLJHQFH%XOOHWLQ'HFHPEHU&(55KWWSVZZZFLDJRYUHDGLQJURRPGRFV&(175$/
,17(//,*(1&(%8//%'SGI
79
United Nations General Assembly 15th 6HVVLRQ )LUVW &RPPLWWHH rd 0HHWLQJ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 'LJLWDO
/LEUDU\6\VWHPKWWSVGLJLWDOOLEUDU\XQRUJUHFRUG"OQ HQ Y SGI
80
´0DURNNRIRUGHUW0DXUHWDQLHQµ1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG)HEUXDU\´.LP,OVŉQJVXVDQJNNHVŉ0DXULW·DQLD
+RHJ\R.RQJKZDJXNWDHW·RQJQ\ŉQJHJHFKŉQPXQ 7XQDUDNDQHWDHVDJšSšLRHJ\RNZDQ·J\HNDVŉOFKŉQJGRHQ
NŉWNZDNZDOO\ŉQKD\ŉ µ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, November 15, 1964, 1.
81
´<XHQDQMŉQSRMDQJULVDKRHND0RQJJRUšO<XHQHNDLSVLN·LONŉWšOFK·RQJKRHHNZŉQ·JRKDQšQN\ŉOFKŉQJšO
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82
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Mauritania among the newly independent African countries, that is, they did not question its
statehood. Still, the Yearbook likewise refrained from covering the Moroccan-Mauritanian
dispute, though its editors were undoubtedly aware of the problem, since Volume 1962
made a brief reference to the diplomatic row that the Tunisian recognition of Mauritania’s
independence triggered between Tunis and Rabat.83
It appears likely that the KWP leaders dodged this thorny issue because it would have
been diplomatically disadvantageous to take sides in a dispute that pitted the Arab states (all
RI ZKLFK VDYH 7XQLVLD EDFNHG 0RURFFR·V VWDQGSRLQW XQWLO DJDLQVW WKH 6XE6DKDUDQ
$IULFDQFRXQWULHV PRVWRI ZKLFKUHDGLO\UHFRJQL]HG0DXULWDQLD·VVWDWHKRRG )XUWKHUPRUH
WKH\SUREDEO\UHDVRQHGWKDWGHSLFWLQJDQHPELWWHUHGFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQWZR7KLUG:RUOGVWDWHV
OHWDORQHWZRJURXSVRI GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVZRXOGZHDNHQWKHLUVWULGHQWO\´DQWLLPSHULDOLVWµ
narrative.84 Their attitude toward the Moroccan-Mauritanian dispute had so much in common
with China’s similarly evasive approach that they must have gained some inspiration from it,
LQWKHVDPHZD\DVWKHLUSRVLWLRQRQWKH$OJHULDQ:DUKDGEHHQLQÁXHQFHGE\%HLMLQJ·V85
Notably, Pyongyang forged diplomatic ties with Nouakchott only after Algeria, Egypt,
DQG WKH 8665 KDG UHFRJQL]HG 0DXULWDQLD86 7KHVH SUHFHGHQWV VHHP WR KDYH LQÁXHQFHG
1RUWK .RUHD·V GHFLVLRQ VLQFH WKH '35. <HDUERRN GXO\ PHQWLRQHG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI
Soviet-Mauritanian relations.87 Providing an introductory overview for a readership hitherto
blissfully unaware of the existence of this troublesome country, in November 1964 5RGRQJ
VLQPXQEULHÁ\RXWOLQHG0DXULWDQLD·VHDUOLHUFRORQL]DWLRQE\)UDQFHDQGLWVSUHVHQWGRPHVWLF
SROLFLHVEXWIDLOHGWRPDNHDQ\UHIHUHQFHWRLWVVWLOOXQUHVROYHGFRQÁLFWZLWK0RURFFR88
'HWHUPLQHGDVWKH1RUWK.RUHDQVZHUHWRVWHHUFOHDURI WKHGLVSXWHWKH0DXULWDQLDQ
problem may have ultimately affected their efforts to gain a foothold in Morocco. As
QRWHGEHIRUHWKHFRQÁLFWLQGXFHGWKH0RURFFDQOHDGHUVWRFRQVLGHUUHFRJQL]LQJERWKWKH
'35. DQG WKH '59 ,Q 0DUFK ZKHQ D 1RUWK 9LHWQDPHVH GHOHJDWLRQ KHDGHG E\
)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU8QJ9DQ.KLHPYLVLWHG0RURFFRWKH0RURFFDQJRYHUQPHQWGLGHVWDEOLVK
ambassadorial relations with Hanoi – a fact the North Koreans were clearly aware of.89 In
83
&KRVŉQ&KXQJDQJ7·RQJVLQVD&KRVŉQ&KXQJDQJQ\ŉQ·JDP, 477.
84
.30LVUD´5HFRJQLWLRQRI 0DXULWDQLD$&DVH6WXG\ZLWK3DUWLFXODU5HIHUHQFHWR,QGLD·V6WDWH3UDFWLFHµ,QGLD
4XDUWHUO\QR ²
85
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GDWHG²ZKLFKEULHÁ\PHQWLRQ0DXULWDQLD7KH\VFUXSXORXVO\UHIUDLQHGIURPH[SUHVVLQJ&KLQD·VYLHZV
on the Morocco-Mauritania dispute, although New China News Agency did report Mauritania’s admission to
WKH811HZ&KLQD1HZV$JHQF\´6HFXULW\&RXQFLO9RWHVWR$GPLW035µ2FWREHULQ)%,6'DLO\
5HSRUW)RUHLJQ5DGLR%URDGFDVWV2FWREHU,DPJUHDWO\LQGHEWHGWR-RVKXD.XHKIRUSURYLGLQJPH
ZLWKWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQZKLFKKHREWDLQHGIURPWKHRQOLQH)%,6GDWDEDVHRI WKH86/LEUDU\RI &RQJUHVV
86
+XQJDULDQ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWU\ 0HPRUDQGXP 1RYHPEHU ´0DXULWiQLD HOLVPHUpVH pV GLSORPiFLDL
NDSFVRODWIHOYpWHOHµ01/;,;-N6PDOOFRXQWULHV 0DXULWDQLD ²GRER],9
87
&KRVŉQ &KXQJDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD &KRVŉQ FKXQJDQJ Q\ŉQ·JDP 3·\RQJ\DQJ &KRVŉQ &KXQJDQJ 7·RQJVLQVD
.
88
´0DXULW·DQLDµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ1RYHPEHU WUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
89
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQWKH8$55HSRUW$SULO´9LHWQDPL'HPRNUDWLNXV.|]WiUVDViJ¶-yDNDUDWpV
*D]GDViJL·GHOHJiFLy($.EHOLOiWRJDWiVDµ01/;,;-M(J\SW²GRER]E
&KRVŉQ&KXQJDQJ7·RQJVLQVD&KRVŉQFKXQJDQJQ\ŉQ·JDP, 477.
FRQWUDVWWKHVXEVHTXHQWYLVLWRI '35.0LQLVWHURI (GXFDWLRQ<L,ON\ŉQJ -XO\

yielded little if any tangible result. 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ laconically reported that the two sides
DJUHHGWR´VHHNHFRQRPLFDQGWUDGHH[FKDQJHVµ²DQRXWFRPHWKDWIHOOVKRUWQRWRQO\RI
WKH'59·VGLSORPDWLFEUHDNWKURXJKEXWDOVRRI WKH*'5·VLWHPL]HGWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVZLWK
Morocco.90 Hassan II, the successor of Mohammed V, warmly welcomed Yi’s proposal to
forge diplomatic relations, but when the North Koreans attempted to translate his promise
LQWRFRQFUHWHDFWLRQWKHRIÀFLDOVRI WKH0RURFFDQ)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\DGRSWHGDPRVWHYDVLYH
DWWLWXGH)LUVWWKH\UHSOLHGWKDWWKH\ODFNHGHQRXJKWUDLQHGGLSORPDWVWRVHQGDQHQYR\WR
3\RQJ\DQJWKHQUHEXIIHG<L·VVXJJHVWLRQWRRSHQD'35.HPEDVV\RQDXQLODWHUDOEDVLVDQG
ÀQDOO\UHIXVHGHYHQWRPHQWLRQWKHWKHPHRI GLSORPDWLFUHODWLRQVLQWKHMRLQWFRPPXQLTXp
The frustrated North Koreans concluded that “the king skillfully maneuvers between the
socialist and imperialist camps, and voices pleasant, nice phrases for popular consumption,
EXWRQHFDQVHQVHDVWURQJ:HVWHUQLQÁXHQFHRYHUKLVSROLF\µ91
Morocco’s marked preference for Hanoi over Pyongyang was all the more conspicuous
because the UAR leaders treated Khiem and Yi in an even-handed manner, offering consular-
general relations to both Communist states.92 The fact that South Vietnam had opened
an embassy in Rabat as early as 1960 created a precedent for granting identical status to
Hanoi, whereas South Korean-Moroccan talks on diplomatic relations were still in progress
DWWKHWLPHRI <L·VYLVLWWKXVSUHYHQWLQJWKH'35.IURPLQYRNLQJWKHSULQFLSOHRI HYHQ
handedness.931HYHUWKHOHVV0RURFFR·VSUHIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWRI WKH'59WXUQHGRXWWREH
an ephemeral phenomenon. The Moroccan leaders, having agreed to forge ties with Hanoi,
soon started to drag their feet. In 1962, a North Vietnamese diplomat arrived in Rabat to
set up an embassy, but the host authorities kept him waiting for over a year, only to abruptly
expel him in the end.94
The apparent inconsistencies in Morocco’s attitude towards Pyongyang and Hanoi may
be better understood if one takes into consideration that the reversal of Moscow’s Mauritania
policy must have disappointed the Moroccan leaders, and probably dissuaded them from
HQJDJLQJWKH'35.DQGWKH'59DQ\IXUWKHU$WWKH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\PHHWLQJRI $SULO
1961, the Soviet bloc delegates no longer opposed the admission of Mauritania but abstained
from voting, lest they hinder the admission of Mongolia. Since this episode occurred after
Khiem’s visit but before Yi’s, it may explain why the Moroccan authorities treated the latter
90
´8ULQDUDFKŉQJEXFK·LQVŉQWDHS·\RGDQšL0RURN·RSDQJPXQNZDNZDOO\ŉQKDQ&KRVŉQ0RURN·R kongdong
N·RPP\XQLN·Hµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ-XO\ WUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
91
+XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ WR WKH '35. 5HSRUW 6HSWHPEHU ´.LP 7KH +L NOJ\PLQLV]WHUKHO\HWWHV
WiMpNR]WDWyMDD]DIULNDLRUV]iJRNEDQMiUWNRUHDLGHOHJiFLy~WMiUyOµ01/;,;-M.RUHDGRER]
5/bf, 007486/1961.
92
+XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ LQ WKH 8$5 5HSRUW $XJXVW ´eV]DNNRUHDL pV GpONRUHDL GHOHJiFLyN NDLUyL
OiWRJDWiVDµ01/;,;-M(J\SWGRER]L
93
&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\´0RURFFR0D\5HFRJQL]H1RUWK9LHWQDPDQG1RUWK.RUHDµ&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH
%XOOHWLQ'HFHPEHU.
94
+XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ LQ 0RURFFR 5HSRUW $XJXVW ´$ 9LHWQDPL 'HPRNUDWLNXV .|]WiUVDViJ
GLSORPDWiMiQDNNLXWDVtWiVDµ01/;,;-M0RURFFR²GRER]I
delegation colder than the former.95$WWKH81PHHWLQJVKHOGLQ'HFHPEHU0RURFFR

no longer supported the Soviet position on Korea but reverted to its customary abstention.96
In May-July 1962, the end of the Algerian War led to a further shift in Morocco’s foreign
SROLF\ZKLFKZRXOGXOWLPDWHO\ZRUNWR3\RQJ\DQJ·VGLVDGYDQWDJH´$OJHULDQLQGHSHQGHQFHµ
the CIA observed, “removed the principal deterrent – Morocco’s forthright aid to the
UHEHOOLRQ²WRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI FORVHUWLHVZLWK)UDQFHµVWLPXODWHGFRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQ
WKHWZR0DJKUHEVWDWHVIRU)UHQFKDLGDQGEURXJKWWKHLUODWHQWWHUULWRULDOGLVSXWHVWRWKH
fore.97)ROORZLQJ+DVVDQ,,·V0D\PHHWLQJZLWK'H*DXOOH5DEDWFRQFOXGHGDQXPEHU
of economic agreements with Paris.98 %\ WKH HQG RI WKH \HDU SUR)UHQFK SROLWLFLDQV KDG
achieved a dominant position in the Moroccan leadership, whereupon the sidelined Istiqlal
sought to forge ties with the U.S. embassy. In July 1962, Morocco’s territorial claims to Algeria’s
Tindouf province triggered a border clash between the two Maghreb states, foreshadowing
the Sand War of September-October 1963.99 But from North Korea’s perspective, the
most adverse aspect of Hassan II’s new foreign policy was that on July 6, 1962, Morocco
established ambassadorial relations with South Korea.100 The KWP leaders had every reason
WREHGLVSOHDVHGE\WKHVHGHYHORSPHQWV+DYLQJUHSRUWHGD)UHQFK0RURFFDQERUGHULQFLGHQW
RI 0D\ ZKLFKWXUQHGRXWWREHDFDWDO\VWIRU+DVVDQ,,·VPHHWLQJZLWK'H*DXOOH101
5RGRQJVLQPXQ failed to publish any article on Morocco until March 3, 1963.102
Conclusion
In several important respects, Pyongyang’s early encounters with the three Maghreb countries
foreshadowed the patterns of its post-1962 relations with the region. The North Korean
media showed a manifest preference for Algeria over Morocco and Tunisia as early as 1956–
1957, and especially in the second half of the Algerian War – a preference mirrored by the
divergent attitudes the Maghreb countries displayed toward the two Koreas. Pyongyang’s
vocal solidarity with the Algerian guerrillas and the spectacular features of Krim Belkacem’s
95
United Nations, <HDUERRNRI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV 1HZ<RUN8QLWHG1DWLRQV2IÀFHRI 3XEOLF,QIRUPDWLRQ

96
United Nations, <HDUERRNRI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV8QLWHG1DWLRQEV<HDUERRNRI WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV,
137.
97
&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\´0RURFFRXQGHU.LQJ+DVVDQµ2IÀFHRI &XUUHQW,QWHOOLJHQFH6SHFLDO5HSRUW
March 22, 1963, 1, CERR, https:/ZZZFLDJRYUHDGLQJURRPGRFV&,$5'3$
pdf, 2.
98
7KH%ULWLVK(PEDVV\WR5DEDWWRWKH)RUHLJQ2IÀFH5HYLHZRI WKH3UHVV-XO\71$352)2
171604 001.
99
+XQJDULDQ (PEDVV\ LQ 0RURFFR 5HSRUW $XJXVW ´0DURNNy EHOSROLWLNDL KHO\]HWHµ 01/ ;,;-M
0RURFFRGRER]F+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQ0RURFFR5HSRUW2FWREHU
´$OJpULDLPDURNNyLKDWiUNRQÁLNWXVµ01/;,;-M0RURFFRGRER]
100
0RRQ´%HWZHHQ,GHRORJ\DQG,QWHUHVWµ
101
´.LQJRI 0RURFFRWR6HH'H*DXOOHµ1HZ<RUN7LPHV, May 10, 1962, 3.
102
´3XOODQVŉNXQGDHND0RURN·RNXNN\ŉQJšOWRFK·LPEŉPµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ, May 13, 1962, 3.
visit in North Korea stood in a sharp contrast with 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ’s deafening silence on
7XQLVLD ² 0RURFFR ² DQG0DXULWDQLD ² DQGWKHGLSORPDWLF
UHEXIIVWKH'35.·VHQYR\VVXIIHUHGLQ5DEDWDQG7XQLV,QWXUQSRVWFRORQLDO$OJHULDEHFDPH
WKHYHU\ÀUVW$UDEVWDWHWRKRVWDUHVLGHQW1RUWK.RUHDQDPEDVVDGRUZKHUHDV7XQLVLDDQG
0RURFFR ZRXOG QRW HQWHU LQWR GLSORPDWLF UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH '35. XQWLO DQG
respectively. Both Morocco and Tunisia established ambassadorial relations with Seoul long
before they forged such ties with Pyongyang, whereas Algeria would keep its distance from
the ROK until 1990.103
7KHIDFWWKDWWKH'35.IRUJHGDFORVHUSDUWQHUVKLSZLWK$OJHULDWKDQZLWK0RURFFR
and Tunisia had much in common with the Maghreb policy of the Soviet bloc states (whose
YLHZV VWURQJO\ LQÁXHQFHG 3\RQJ\DQJ·V LQLWLDO DWWLWXGHV WRZDUG WKH UHJLRQ EXW LW DOVR KDG
special features. Notably, East Germany’s trade representatives faced restrictive measures in
post-colonial Algeria in the same period when their North Korean comrades were allowed
WRRSHQDIXOOÁHGJHGHPEDVV\²DFRQWUDVWIXUWKHUDFFHQWXDWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWLQ0RURFFR
DQG7XQLVLDWKH*'5PDGHLQURDGVIDVWHUWKDQWKH'35.104 Algeria’s peculiar preference
IRU3\RQJ\DQJRYHU(DVW%HUOLQZDVHYLGHQWO\URRWHGLQWKH)/1·VZDUWLPHH[SHULHQFHVVXFK
as North Korea’s early recognition of the GPRA. At the same time, Algeria’s post-colonial
partnership with Pyongyang was overshadowed by its even closer ties with Hanoi, a situation
whose origins could also be traced back to the events of 1956–1959.
In the initial phase of their Maghreb policy, the North Korean leaders showed perceptibly
OHVVLQWHUHVWLQWKLVUHJLRQWKDQ(DVW*HUPDQ\DQG1RUWK9LHWQDP)RULQVWDQFH5RGRQJVLQPXQ
UHDFWHGODWHUDQGOHVVH[WHQVLYHO\ RUQRWDWDOO WRVXFKHYHQWVDVWKH0RURFFDQFULVLVRI
the start of the Algerian insurgency, the return of Mohammed V, and the Agadir earthquake
than 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQGDQGWKH'35.ZDVFRQVLGHUDEO\VORZHULQIRUJLQJWLHVZLWKWKH)/1
WKDQWKH'59$FWXDOO\LWZDVIDLUO\XQGHUVWDQGDEOHWKDW1RUWK.RUHD²DFRXQWU\UDYDJHG
E\DQLPPHQVHO\GHVWUXFWLYHZDUGHYRLGRI DQ\WUDGLWLRQDOFRQQHFWLRQHLWKHUWR)UDQFHRU
the MENA region, lacking experience in Arab-Islamic studies, and highly dependent on
the factual information and analytical concepts supplied by its Soviet and Chinese allies –
happened to be a latecomer as far as the Maghreb was concerned. Still, these facts revealed
WKHGLVWRUWLRQVRI 3\RQJ\DQJ·VVXEVHTXHQWQDUUDWLYHVZKLFKSUHVHQWHGWKH'35.DVDVWDWH
traditionally motivated by an especially strong solidarity with other colonial and post-colonial
nations.105
The North Korean media inspected this WHUUD LQFRJQLWD through multiple distortion
lenses that were constructed partly by their Soviet/Chinese sources and partly by the
VSHFLÀFSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI WKHPLOLWDQW.:3OHDGHUVZKRZHUHLQFUHDVLQJO\UHOXFWDQW
WR HQGRUVH WKH 6RYLHW LGHD RI SHDFHIXO FRH[LVWHQFH )URP WKH EHJLQQLQJ WKHLU DWWHQWLRQ
103
´$OFKHULDFKXMDHXULQDUD+ŉ6ŉNVLQFK·RGDHWDHVD$OFKLHHWRFK·DNµ5RGRQJVLQPXQ$SULO0RRQ
´%HWZHHQ,GHRORJ\DQG,QWHUHVWµ
104
+XQJDULDQ(PEDVV\LQ$OJHULD5HSRUW1RYHPEHU´$]1'.QHKp]VpJHL$OJpULiEDQµ01/;,;-
M$OJHULD²GRER]
105
6HH´,PPRUWDO&RQWULEXWLRQVWRWKH$IULFDQ&RXQWULHV·6WUXJJOHµ
was disproportionately focused on those episodes of Maghrebi politics when the local
SROLWLFDODFWRUVZHUHRQDFROOLVLRQFRXUVHZLWK)UDQFHDQGRUWKHRWKHU:HVWHUQSRZHUV²D
preoccupation that helps to explain why 5RGRQJVLQPXQ neglected Algeria until the start of
DUPHG UHVLVWDQFH ZK\ LW XQGHUUHSRUWHG WKH )UHQFK*35$ WDONV DQG KLJKOLJKWHG $OJHULDQ
military operations even in those periods when political negotiations came to the fore, why its
VWURQJLQLWLDOLQWHUHVWLQ7XQLVLDXQGHUZHQWDVWHHSGHFOLQHDIWHULWVQHJRWLDWHGGHFRORQL]DWLRQ
EXWUHYLYHGZKHQHYHUVRPHVWUDLQRFFXUUHGLQ)UHQFK7XQLVLDQUHODWLRQVDQGZK\LWZHQWWR
extreme lengths to conceal those disputes that pitted the North African states against each
other, rather than against the Western powers.
In essence, Pyongyang’s dominant narratives presented the Maghreb as yet another
EDWWOHÀHOGRI WKHJOREDODQWLLPSHULDOLVWVWUXJJOHGLVSOD\LQJOLWWOHLQWHUHVWLQLWVGLVWLQFWLYHVRFLR
cultural features. Notably, the North Korean delegation attending the AAPSO conference in
Cairo effectively used the Algerian War as a stick to beat Pyongyang’s own enemy when
LWLQVLQXDWHGWKDW´WKHFRORQLDOZDUE\WKH)UHQFKLPSHULDOLVWVLQ$OJHULDLVEXWSDUWRI WKH
DJJUHVVLYHSURYRFDWLRQVRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHDFWLRQOHGE\WKH86LPSHULDOLVWVµDQGOLNHQHG
)UHQFK DWURFLWLHV LQ $OJHULD WR $PHULFD·V DOOHJHG DWURFLWLHV LQ .RUHD106 :KLOH WKH '35.
Yearbooks meticulously described the geographical, climatic, and economic conditions of the
various Third World states, the brief historical overviews they provided were near-exclusively
focused on the colonial and post-colonial periods. Volume 1959 constituted a partial exception,
DVLWSDLGGXHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSUHFRORQLDOFLYLOL]DWLRQRI (J\SW,QGLDDQG,QGRQHVLDEXW
its chapter on Algeria began with a brief reference to the period of Ottoman rule, and
FRQWLQXHGZLWKDGHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQRI )UHQFKFRORQL]DWLRQDQG$OJHULDQUHVLVWDQFH107 In a
VLPLODUYHLQD'35.HQF\FORSHGLDGDWHGVWDUWHGLWVVHFWLRQRQ0RURFFR·VKLVWRU\ZLWK
WKH )UHQFK DQG 6SDQLVK LQWUXVLRQV RI WKH th century, showing cavalier disregard for the
long-standing existence of the pre-colonial Moroccan state.108 Ironically, the North Koreans
subjected the Maghreb countries to the same treatment that they themselves had experienced
from the Soviet bloc media. In 1947–1950, the Hungarian newspapers seeking to inform their
readers about little-known, faraway Korea routinely started their narrative with a reference
to Japanese colonial rule and the wartime Soviet liberation, disregarding the fact that the
existence of Korean statehood long predated the Japanese conquest.109
Thus, the Maghreb image constructed by North Korea’s propaganda narratives was
GHÀQLWHO\DGLVWRUWHGRQH\HWWKHQDWXUHRI WKHVHGLVWRUWLRQVSURYHGGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHELDVHV
WKDWWKHWKHRULVWVRI 2ULHQWDOLVPLGHQWLÀHGLQ:HVWHUQDQG6RXWK.RUHDQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI
Arab-Islamic societies. The latter portrayals were prone to highlight the exotic otherness of
Arab-Islamic traditions, juxtaposing them with Western/Korean values and customs, and
106
Central Intelligence Agency, “The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference: An Analysis of Communist Strategy and
7DFWLFVµ&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH%XOOHWLQ2FWREHU&,$(OHFWURQLF5HDGLQJ5RRP &(55 KWWSVZZZ
FLDJRYUHDGLQJURRPGRFV&(175$/,17(//,*(1&(%8//%'SGI
107
&KRVŉQ&KXQJDQJ7·RQJVLQVD&KRVŉQFKXQJDQJQ\ŉQ·JDP, 57, 180, 186.
108
3DHNNZDFKŉQVŉYRO 3·\ŉQJ\DQJ.ZDKDN3DHNNZD6DMŉQ&K·XOS·DQVD WUDQVODWHGE\/HH-XQKHH
109
6HH´.RUHDµ6]DEDG1pS, June 27, 1950, 2.
presenting these contrasts as evidence of cultural incompatibility and/or inequality. Through

the creation of such binary models, Orientalist narratives simultaneously outlined the
peculiarities of the Oriental Other and the distinctiveness of the Self.110 Notably, E. Taylor
Atkins, a scholar who had serious reservations about the Saidian theory of Orientalism, made
compatible observations in his study on Japanese perceptions of colonial Korea:
7KH-DSDQHVHJD]HRQ.RUHDQDDUWLFXODWHGDQWLPRGHUQDPELYDOHQFHRIIHULQJFRQFUHWH
LPDJHV RI SUHPRGHUQ ´RWKHUVµ ZLWK ZKRP WKH PRGHUQ ´VHOI µ FRXOG EH UHDGLO\
FRQWUDVWHG«&RJQL]DQWRI DQFLHQWHWKQRORJLFDODQGFXOWXUDOWLHVEHWZHHQWKHPVHOYHV
DQGWKRVHXSRQZKRPWKH\JD]HG>-DSDQHVHREVHUYHUV@FRXOGQRWKHOSEXWSRQGHUZKR
they really were, if they indeed were encountering their own primitive selves.111
In contrast, North Korean propaganda presented Western imperialism, rather than the Arab-
Islamic societies, as the hostile Other, and selectively focused on those aspects of Maghrebi
politics that were most compatible with Pyongyang’s own ideological theses (like the episodes
RI YLROHQWDQWLFRORQLDOVWUXJJOH UDWKHUWKDQWKRVHWKDWZHUHPDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQW7KDWLVWKH
'35.OHDGHUVFRQVFLRXVO\WULHGWRFRQWURODQGPDQLSXODWHWKHSURFHVVRI JD]LQJ$V$WNLQV
SXWLW´WKHDFWVRI JD]LQJDQGEHLQJJD]HGDWIXQGDPHQWDOO\WUDQVIRUPHGERWKWKHREVHUYHU
DQGWKHREVHUYHGµ112\HWWKHJD]HRI WKH1RUWK.RUHDQPHGLDVHOHFWLYHO\WUDQVIRUPHGWKH
realities of the Maghreb to prevent any transformation of the state’s entrenched dominant
QDUUDWLYHV,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKHSRZHUG\QDPLFVFRPPRQO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRI JD]H
existed more between the regime-controlled media and its domestic audience than between
WKHREVHUYHU 1RUWK.RUHD DQGWKHREVHUYHG WKH0DJKUHE $VVXFK1RUWK.RUHD·VJD]H
DWWKH0DJKUHEPD\EHGHÀQHGDVDVHOIDIÀUPDWLYHRUVHOIMXVWLI\LQJJD]HUDWKHUWKDQDIRUP
RI LPSHULDOJD]H
6WLOO3\RQJ\DQJ·VJD]HDWWKH0DJKUHEGLGVKDUHVRPHIHDWXUHVZLWKWKHLPSHULDOJD]H
7KHODWWHU'DYLG6SXUUQRWHGSODFHVWKHLPSHULDOREVHUYHU
DERYHRUDWWKHFHQWHURI WKLQJV«VRWKDWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGFODVVLÀFDWLRQRI WKLQJV

takes place according to the writer’s own system of value. Interpretation of the scene
UHÁHFWVWKHFLUFXPVSHFWLYHIRUFHRI WKHJD]HZKLOHVXSSUHVVLQJWKHDQVZHULQJJD]HRI
the other.113
110
Edward W. Said, 2ULHQWDOLVP 1HZ <RUN 3DQWKHRQ %RRNV ² ² ² 'D\H -HRQ ´7KH
&RQVXPSWLRQ RI WKH 'LDEROLF $UDE ,PDJH LQ ¶2ULHQWDO· .RUHD ¶7KH 2WKHU· (QMR\LQJ WKH ,PDJH RI ¶WKH
2WKHU·"µ 6LWXDWLRQV ² 0DULD 0 -DPDVV ´,PDJHV DQG 3HUFHSWLRQV RI 0XVOLPV DQG $UDEV LQ
.RUHDQ3RSXODU&XOWXUHDQG6RFLHW\µ 0$GLVV)ORULGD,QWHUQDWLRQDO8QLYHUVLW\ ²
111
E. Taylor Atkins, 3ULPLWLYH 6HOYHV .RUHDQD LQ WKH -DSDQHVH &RORQLDO *D]H ² (Berkeley: University of
&DOLIRUQLD3UHVV ²
112
Taylor Atkins, 3ULPLWLYH6HOYHV 3.
113
'DYLG 6SXUU 7KH 5KHWRULF RI (PSLUH &RORQLDO 'LVFRXUVH LQ -RXUQDOLVP 7UDYHO :ULWLQJ DQG ,PSHULDO $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ
'XUKDP1&'XNH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV ²
North Korean media practices – especially the prolonged, all-encompassing news blackouts
LPSRVHGXSRQ7XQLVLD0DXULWDQLDDQG0RURFFR²LPSOLHGWKDWWKH'35.OHDGHUVDWWULEXWHG
no intrinsic news value to the events occurring in the Maghreb, and even to the very existence
of these countries, unless they could be presented in such a way that buttressed Pyongyang’s
narratives of militant anti-imperialist struggle. North Korea’s inclination to assess Arab-
Islamic realities in terms of its own value-preferences was succinctly expressed by Kim
0DQ·JšPWKHKHDGRI WKH.:3&HQWUDO&RPPLWWHH·V$JULFXOWXUH'HSDUWPHQW,QIRUPLQJ
D+XQJDULDQGLSORPDWDERXWKLVUHFHQWYLVLWLQ$OJHULDKHFULWLFDOO\UHPDUNHGWKDWWKH)/1
leaders pursued a vague, protean policy, as they professed their commitment to socialism, but
wanted to build a distinctive brand of socialism that would be compatible with Islam. As he
put it, “One can build socialism only on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism, and this theoretical basis has little if anything in common
ZLWK,VODPµ114
All in all, it seems that the narratives stressing North Korea’s historically rooted
VROLGDULW\ZLWKRWKHUFRORQLDODQGSRVWFRORQLDOFRXQWULHVDQGLWVLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWK7KLUG
World nationalism, were partially contradicted by Pyongyang’s own propaganda, i.e., the
very sphere in which Communist party-states traditionally expressed their transnational
solidarity.115'XULQJWKHÀUVWGHFDGHRI WKH'35.·VH[LVWHQFHWKH.:3OHDGHUV·YLHZVRI WKH
Middle East and North Africa were heavily shaped by the factual information and analytical
concepts transmitted by their Soviet bloc allies, and when they did start to form a more
distinctive attitude toward the Maghreb, this attitude initially showed a perceptible Chinese
LQÁXHQFH0RUHRYHUWKHGLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHVRI 1RUWK.RUHD·VSURSDJDQGDQDUUDWLYHVRIWHQ
LQGLFDWHG D QDUURZHU SHUVSHFWLYH DQG KHQFH E\ LPSOLFDWLRQ D OHVV HPSDWKHWLF DSSURDFK
than, say, East Germany’s. The wide swings between vocal solidarity and deafening silence
– a phenomenon particularly conspicuous in 5RGRQJ VLQPXQ’s articles on Tunisia, but also
REVHUYDEOH LQ 3\RQJ\DQJ·V FRQWUDVWLQJ DWWLWXGHV WRZDUG WKH )/1·V DUPHG VWUXJJOH DQG LWV
negotiating efforts – revealed the conditional and selective nature of North Korean solidarity.
One may say that the main thrust of Pyongyang’s solidarity was directed toward certain
VSHFLÀFDFWLRQVRI WKH0DJKUHEFRXQWULHVUDWKHUWKDQWRZDUGWKHFRXQWULHVDVVXFK
References
$ERX(O)DGO5HHP´%XLOGLQJ(J\SW·V$IUR$VLDQ+XE,QIUDVWUXFWXUHVRI 6ROLGDULW\DQG
114
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01/;,;-N.RUHDGRER]
115
)RUVXFKDFDGHPLFQDUUDWLYHVVHH0RH7D\ORU1RUWK.RUHD7ULFRQWLQHQWDOLVPDQGWKH/DWLQ$PHULFDQ5HYROXWLRQ
² &DPEULGJH&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV ²DQG%HQMDPLQ5<RXQJ*XQV*XHUULOODV
DQGWKH*UHDW/HDGHU1RUWK.RUHDDQGWKH7KLUG:RUOG 6WDQIRUG6WDQIRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV ²
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newstream/1546674892-802640663/immortal-contributions-to-the-african-
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people of Tunis rose up for national freedom and liberation (3UDYGD·V DVVHVVPHQW @
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Young, Benjamin R. *XQV *XHUULOODV DQG WKH *UHDW /HDGHU 1RUWK .RUHD DQG WKH 7KLUG :RUOG.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021.
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North Korea Discovers The Maghreb: Propaganda Narratives in The Formative Phase of Pyongyang's Northwest African Diplomacy

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North Korea Discovers The Maghreb: Propaganda Narratives in The Formative Phase of Pyongyang's Northwest African Diplomacy

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ACTA KOREANA

Vol. 27, No. 1, June 2024: 125–164

The paper examines the formative phase of Pyongyang’s diplomacy toward

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Keywords: North Korea, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, propaganda

Pyongyang’s Oscillating Attitude Toward the Maghreb

Algeria Morocco Tunisia M. and T. A. and T. A., M. and T.

Table 1. Maghreb-related articles in 5RGRQJVLQPXQ and 1HXHV'HXWVFKODQG, 1951–19534

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Table 2. Maghreb-related articles in 5RGRQJVLQPXQ, 1956–1957

Pyongyang Caught Between the FLN’s Sponsors

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Pyongyang’s Preference for Morocco over Tunisia

Pyongyang Between Morocco and Mauritania

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University of California Press, 2010.

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