Strategikon Mauritius Emperor of The East PDF

Strategikon
MAURICIO
roman emperor of
East
STRATEGIKON
(ABOUT THE
GENERAL)
Translation, introduction
and
notes of
Emilio Magaña Orúe, Julio
Rodríguez González and
José Ignacio de la Torre Rodríguez
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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Index
Index
Historical-literary introduction
Flavius Maurice, soldier and emperor
Mauritius' policy in Europe
Administrative reforms in the West
The eastern policy of Mauritius
The religious politics of Mauritius
The end of the Mauritius empire
the work and its author
The transmission of the text
Sources
The work. Content
The work in its historical context. the army
of the Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman
Empire between the 3rd and 6th centuries
The army of Diocletian and Constantine I
The army of Justinian I and Maurice
Bibliography
Historical sources mentioned in this
book
Monographs, articles and contributions to
collective works
Note on the present translation
Abbreviations
Strategikon (On the General) of Maurice,
Emperor of the East
Preamble
Book I
INTRODUCTION
Book I, chapter 1. How is it convenient for
soldiers to train in their instruction?
Book I, chapter 2. How is it advisable to
arm the riders and what basic equipment
should they be provided with?
Book I, chapter 3. About the various titles
of officers and soldiers
divide the army and its officers?
Book I, chapter 5. How tagma
commanders should choose their subordinate
officers and leaders for combat and
organize the tagmas into collusions
Book I, chapter 6. The regulations on
military crimes that must be given to the
troops
Book I, chapter 7. Regulations on military
crimes that must be given to tagma
commanders
Book I, chapter 8. About military
punishments
Book I, chapter 9. What organization
should the army have in its own territory
when there is no hostile activity?
Book II
ON THE FORMATION OF THE CAVALRY
Book II, chapter 1. On the usefulness and
necessity of forming the army in two lines
Book II, chapter 2. Of the organization of
the tagmas in the line of battle
Book II, chapter 3. Assault and defense
troops
Book II, chapter 4. About flankers and
attack flankers
Book II, chapter 5. Ambushes in the rear
or on the flanks of the enemy line
Book II, chapter 6. The depth of training
Book II, chapter 7. About collusion
Book II, chapter 8. About weapons
Book II, chapter 9. About the medical staff
Book II, chapter 10. About the pennants of
the spears
Book II, chapter 11. About spies or
explorers
Book II, chapter 12. About mensores and
betting games
Book II, chapter 13. Distances between
groupers and battle lines
Book II, chapter 14. About the size and
difference between the banners
Book II, chapter 15. About the custody of
the banners
Book II, chapter 16. About the place of
officers
Book II, chapter 17. About those who blow
the horns
Book II, chapter 18. About the battle cries
that arise in the midst of conflict
Book II, chapter 19. About the heralds
Book II, chapter 20. On the convenience of
using two banners
Book III
ON THE FORMATION OF TAGMAS
Book III, chapter 1. The symbols used to
illustrate tagma formations
Book III, chapter 2. The formation of the
tagmas claiming a force of three hundred
and ten men
Book III, chapter 3. Scheme of the same
tagma with its flanks in closed order
tagma with both flanks and the rear in closed
order
Book III, chapter 5. Tagma training
methods
Book III, chapter 6. The formation of
groupers. Explanation of the symbols that
illustrate the training of groupers and their
personnel
Book III, chapter 7. Explanation of the
symbols that illustrate the formation of the
first and second lines
Book III, chapter 8. Formation of the entire
line when the impediment is present
Book III, chapter 9. An individualized
grouper
Book III, chapter 10. Formation of an army
of moderate strength
Book III, chapter 11. About general orders
Book III, chapter 12. About orders to front-
line troops
Book III, chapter 13. About orders to
flankers
attack flankers
Book III, chapter 15. Orders to the troops
of the second line
Book III, chapter 16. Orders to troops
assigned to ambushes
Book IV
ABOUT AMBUSHES
Book IV, chapter 1. On ambushes and
stratagems against superior enemy troops
Book IV, chapter 2. About the ambushes of
the Scythians
Book IV, chapter 3. About the ambushes
carried out by both sides
Book IV, chapter 4. About the most
opportune moment for ambushes
Book IV, chapter 5. On the convenience of
using irregular formations for ambushes or
surprise attacks
Book V
ABOUT THE IMPEDIMENT
Book V, chapter 1. On the precautions to
take into account when carrying the
impedimenta to the battlefield
Book V, chapter 2. About reserve horses
Book V, chapter 3. About the non-
necessary impediment
Book V, chapter 4. About the intermediate
camps
Book V, chapter 5. About the protection of
impediments while walking
Book VI
ON THE DIVISION OF THE ARMY AND ON
MILITARY INSTRUCTION
Book VI, preamble
Book VI, chapter 1. About Scythian
instruction , simulation
Book VI, chapter 2. About wing

Book VI, chapter 3. About African-style
Book VI, chapter 4. Regarding the italic
instruction , the most common
Book VI, chapter 5. How to exercise
flankers and attack flankers
Book VII
PART A. ON THE POINTS TO CONSIDER
BY THE GENERAL BEFORE THE DAY OF
BATTLE
Book VII, part A, preamble
Book VII, part A, chapter 1. About the
blessing of the flags
Book VII, part A, chapter 2. On the
organization of collusion
Book VII, part A, chapter 3. About
gathering information about the enemy
Book VII, part A, chapter 4. On the use of
harangue to encourage troops
Book VII, part A, chapter 5. About enemy
prisoners taken by patrols
punishment of criminals
maintenance of soldiers, their horses and
their camps
Book VII, part A, chapter 8. Concerning
consultations with the merarchs regarding
the battlefield
Book VII, part A, chapter 9. On how to
water horses
rations carried in the saddlebags
wage war against unknown people
enemy's surprise attacks during the march
camps and the care of the horses inside
them
Book VII, part A, chapter 14. On how not
to loot enemy bodies during battle
Book VII, part A, chapter 15. About people
similar to the enemy
PART B. ABOUT THE POINTS TO BE
OBSERVED ON THE DAY OF THE BATTLE
Book VII, part B, chapter 1. On how not to
overwhelm the strategos during the day of
battle
Book VII, part B, chapter 2. About the
enemy archers
engage the enemy or show our own strength
before knowing his intentions
Book VII, part B, chapter 4. How to hide
the second line when you are unable to
follow the first, so that the two appear as
one
Book VII, part B, chapter 5. On the tactics
and method of dealing with a surprise attack
by the enemy
wounded
Book VII, part B, chapter 7. On the
apparent strength of the enemy
prevention of hostile reconnaissance of our
line
Book VII, part B, chapter 9. How to protect
the camp
Book VII, part B, chapter 10. How to
gather fodder
Book VII, part B, chapter 11. About an
adverse outcome
Book VII, part B, chapter 12. About a
favorable outcome in the battle
Book VII, part B, chapter 13. About
recognition
Book VII, part B, chapter 14. On how not
to expose our second line too soon
keeping the surface of weapons shiny to be
seen from afar before battle
recapitulation of the obligations of each
merarch
recapitulation of the type of obligations
assigned to the commanders of each tagma,
the moirarchs and the merarchs, so that
each one knows his obligation
Book VIII
Book VIII, chapter 1. About general
instructions for the commander
Book VIII, chapter 2. Mottos
Book IX
Book IX, chapter 1. About surprise attacks
Book IX, chapter 2. About night attacks

Book IX, chapter 3. About incursions into
hostile territory: safe advance through it and
its looting without suffering losses
Book IX, chapter 4. About passing through
gorges and rugged territory
Book IX, chapter 5. How to spy on the
enemy and how to capture scouts or
enemies trying to infiltrate our army
Book
Book X, chapter 1. How to organize a siege
of enemy fortresses if opportunity allows
Book X, chapter 2. How to conduct an
encounter with hostile incursions within our
own territory
Book X, chapter 3. How to endure a siege
that is supposed to be long
Book X, chapter 4. How to build a border
fortress cautiously and without engaging in
open combat
Book XI
ON THE CUSTOMS AND TACTICS OF THE
VARIOUS PEOPLES
Book XI, introduction
Book XI, chapter 1. How to deal with
Persians
Book XI, chapter 2. How to deal with the
Scythians, that is, Avars, Turks and others
whose way of life resembles that of the
Hunnic peoples
Book XI, chapter 3. How to deal with light-
haired people, such as the Franks, Lombards
and others like them
Slavs, the Ante and other similar peoples
Book XII
PART A. ON THE ORDER OF BATTLE
MIXED
Book XII, part A, chapter 1. How to make a
mixed order of battle formation . List of
symbols for units in a mixed force
Book XII, part A, chapter 2. The so-called
mixed order of battle.
Book XII, part A, chapter 3. The first battle
formation for cavalry
Book XII, part A, chapter 4. Another
formation
Book XII, part A, chapter 5. The order of
battle called lateral
Book XII, part A, chapter 6. column
formation
convex formation
PART B. ON INFANTRY FORMATIONS
Book XII, part B, preamble
Book XII, part B, chapter 1. What clothing
should infantry wear?
Book XII, part B, chapter 2. What should
be the training of infantrymen with heavy
weapons?
Book XII, part B, chapter 3. How should
the training of infantrymen with light
weapons and archers be?
Book XII, part B, chapter 4. About
weapons. What weapons should heavy
infantry carry?
Book XII, part B, chapter 5. What weapons
should light infantry carry?
Book XII, part B, chapter 6. What essential
equipment should you always have present
and at hand?
Book XII, part B, chapter 7. Soldiers of
each rhythm must be assigned to specialized
tasks
Book XII, part B, chapter 8. How infantry
troops and their officers should be organized
the personnel assignment and organization
of infantry tagmas be?
Book XII, part B, chapter 10. Orders that
must be given regarding punishments
the formation of heavy infantry tagmas be?
the training of light infantry be along with
heavy infantry and cavalry?
be the formation of cavalry alongside heavy
infantry?
Book XII, part B, chapter 14. In what
movements should infantry be exercised?
Book XII, part B, chapter 15. A second
exercise
Book XII, part B, chapter 16. How to start
the aforementioned movements
be the formation of the battle line and
training in resisting the enemy
Book XII, part B, chapter 18. How to
accommodate cars and impediments
be the method of marching with the enemy
nearby?
Book XII, part B, chapter 20. How to cross
wooded areas, rugged areas and narrow
passes by infantry
transport along rivers and crossing them be
in the face of the enemy?
Book XII, part B, chapter 22. How to build
fortified camps
Book XII, part B, chapter 23. Issues to be
considered by the infantry strategists on a
day of battle
Book XII, part B, chapter 24. Synopsis of
the previously mentioned instruction that
must be known by the tribunes or
commanders of the infantry tagmas
PART C. DIAGRAM OF A FORTIFIED CAMP
PART D. THE HUNT. HOW WILD ANIMALS
SHOULD BE HUNTED WITHOUT SERIOUS
INJURIES OR SERIOUS ACCIDENTS
Glossary
Thematic index
name index
Toponym index
Subject index and common names
Index of works, authors and versions of
the strategikon text
Historical introduction-
literary
FLAVIO MAURITIUS, MILITARY AND
EMPEROR R 1
Flavius Mauricius, the future Emperor
Maurice (582-602), was born in the year 539,
under the rule of Justinian I (Flavius Petrus
Sabbatius Iustinianus, 527-565), in Arabissus
(now ruins in the area of Tanir, in the
province of Kahramanmaraş, in central-
eastern Turkey), in the then Byzantine
province of Armenia III 2 . His father, a
member of an old Roman family, possibly of
Armenian origin, was called Paulus and our
man is known to have at least one brother
(Petrus) and two sisters (Theoctista and
Gordia). On the 7th December 574, Tiberius
Constantinus (the future Emperor Tiberius II
[578-582]) became Caesar, the designated
successor of Emperor Justin II (565-578), of
whom he was one of his main collaborators,
and was about that year when Mauricius, a
secret supporter of the heir, possibly had his
first military position (at least of importance),
since previously we only know of his career
that he was a notary 3 . He was named
patrician (patricius) 4 and comes excubitorum
5
, this rank that he would retain when,
surely under the influence of Tiberius, the
emperor Justin appointed him magister
utriusque militiae per Orientem (commander
of the maneuver army of the diocese 6 of the
East) in 577. From this position he
successfully directed the war against the
Persians declared that same year and which
had as its milestones the victorious battle of
Callinicum (present-day Ar Raqqah, in the
province of same name, Syria), in 580, and
the definitive great victory of 581 in the
vicinity of the city of Constantine (modern
Viransehir, in the province of Urfa, Turkey),
in the Byzantine province of Mesopotamia,
over the emperor's troops r 7 Persian
Hormuz (Hormisdas) IV (579-590),
commanded on the occasion by his generals
Tamchosroes (killed in combat) and
Adarmaanes (who managed to flee).
He ascended the throne on August 13, 582,
succeeding Emperor Tiberius II, who had
named him Caesar (our man then adopting
the name Flavius Mauricius Tiberius) on the
previous 5th, and a few weeks later (already
in autumn) he married the daughter of his
late protector, Constantine. The following
year, as was very common since the time of
Emperor Augustus (Caius Iulius Caesar
Octavianus, later Imperator Caesar
Augustus, 27 BC - 14 AD), the new emperor
assumed the consulate, but not on January
1, as was usual, but on December 25, 8 and
he exercised it alone, sine collega. Both this
event and their wedding were celebrated
with parties organized for the people of
Constantinople. From that moment on,
Maurice would be an emperor who fulfilled
his duties, moderate in his private life,
worried about the army (whose units he
reviewed very often) and a thrifter until he
became stingy, which would cause him
serious problems, such as We will see in the
following lines 9 .
Mauritius' policy in Europe

It did not take long for problems to begin
for the new emperor since in the Balkans,
the Avars and Slavs made frequent and, at
times, important incursions into Roman
possessions. Byzantines in the region. They
began the Avars who, in the same year of
Mauritius's ascension to the throne (shortly
before), took the city of Sirmium (today
Sremska-Mitrovica, in the district of Srem,
Serbia), capital of the province of Pannonia 10
, and that the following year they requested
that the subsidy they received from the
Eastern Roman Empire be increased. As their
demands were not taken into account, in the
summer of that same year they abandoned
their bases in the middle basin of the Hister
(the current Danube, called Danuvius in its
upper course) and made a deep incursion
through the Balkan peninsula, so much so
that the columns Avars reached Anchialus
(today Pomorie, in the province of Burgas,
Bulgaria), in the province of Haemimontus,
on the shores of the Pontus Euxinus (the
Black Sea), where they encountered Slavic
warriors, who were carrying out their own
raid.
Since the Empire was then entangled in a
campaign against the Persians , Maurice
decided to avert the danger using diplomatic
means and in the spring of 584 the situation
had been restored and the Slavs and Avars
had returned to their bases, although
retaining these Sirmium and signing a treaty
with the Empire that stipulated an annual
subsidy for the Avar coffers of 100,000 solidi
11
. In the summer of that same year it was
the Slavs , commanded by a certain
Ardagastos, who attacked from their bases
north of the Hister, reaching Constantinople
itself (modern Istanbul, in the province of
the same name, Turkey), the imperial
capital, whose powerful fortifications
deterred the attackers, defeated shortly after
by the Byzantine army commanded by the
doge, come rei militaris? Comentiolus on the
banks of the Ergina River (present-day Ana,
in the provinces of Kiklareli and Tekirdağ, in
the European part of
Türkiye).
In the autumn of 586 the Avars returned
to the charge, this time marching along the
south bank of the Hister and capturing
several cities, among which were Aquis,
Rateria and Bononia, all three in the province
of Dacia Ripensis, and Dorostolon,
Marcianopolis and Tropaion, all of them in
the province of Moesia II 12 . The raiders
then passed further east, to the province of
Scythia, in the great bend of the Danube that
gives access to its delta and bathed by the
Pontus Euxinus, where they were defeated in
the first instance at Libida (modern Slava
Rusă, in the district Romanian Tulcea),
where an Avar chief named Bokolobras was
captured. Meanwhile, the magister utriusque
militiae per Thracias 13 Comentiolus divided
his forces into three army corps, taking
command of one of them and placing the
magistri militum Martinus and Castus in front
of the other two. Martinus defeated the bulk
of the Avar army, commanded by the chief
Baian, next to Tomis (modern Constance, in
the Romanian district of the same name),
the provincial capital of Scythia, with the
barbarians retreating towards Zaldapa (today
Abrit, in the province of Varna, Bulgaria),
where they were in turn defeated by Castus.
The Avars retreated to the other side of the
Hister, where Castus and his men pursued
them, and were then ambushed and
defeated. The Avars then resumed the
initiative and crossed the great border river,
immediately returning to their raids.
In the following spring an army under the
command of Comentiolus went against them
who, to escape the pressure to which the
imperial troops were subjecting them,
marched south, towards the province of
Thracia, where they attacked Beroea
(modern Stara Zagora, in Haskovo province,
Bulgaria), Diocletianopolis (present-day
Hissar [Hisarya], 45 km north of Plovdiv and
15 km west of Banya, in Plovdiv province,
Bulgaria) and the provincial capital
Philippopolis (today Plovdiv , in the province
of the same name, Bulgaria) and from there
further southeast, attacking and placing
under siege at the beginning of summer the
city of Hadrianopolis (today Edirne, in the
province of the same name, Turkey), capital
of the province of Haemimontus , which was
saved by the arrival of another imperial
army, under the command of general (we do
not know his specific rank) Drocton (a
Lombard in the service of the Eastern
Empire), who had the siege lifted by the
Avars and defeated them the next day.
Meanwhile, and for their part, the Slavs
attacked Thessalonica (today Salonica, in the
prefecture of Salonica, Greece), capital of the
province of Macedonia I, on two occasions
(584 and 586), managing to reach up to the
Greek Peloponnese peninsula (in the
province of Achaea). In the spring of 588 the
Avars again prepared the invasion, when
they were denied an increase in the subsidy
they had once again received from the
Empire. To avert the danger, Maurice
ordered Priscus, his new magister utriusque
militiae per Thracias, to unleash a preventive
campaign against them, which was
victorious. Two years later, Maurice himself
inspected the damage caused by the Avars
in Anchialus and other cities in the area.
Against the Avars Magister Priscus launched
a new campaign in the summer of 593.
When the Avars seemed to be controlled,
in the autumn of that year it was again the
Slavs who made plundering raids in the
Balkans. The following years were times of
continuous Avar raids (apparently
uncontrolled), followed by Byzantine
counteroffensives. In 596 Maurice's own
brother Petrus, appointed magister utriusque
militiae per Thracias, again defeated the
Slavs in the province of Scythia, although
most of the fighting during these operations
was reduced to skirmishes and ambushes.
For its part, hostilities between the Avars
and Romans seemed to end in the summer
of 598, when a treaty was signed between
the two enemies. However, this treaty was
soon a dead letter, the war continued and in
599, although Priscus, now magister militum
praesentalis, initially thwarted an attempt by
the Avars to conquer Tomis, a harsh
imperial defeat occurred shortly after during
the campaign he led against them
Comentiolus (again magister utriusque
militiae per Thracias, replaced in office for a
time in 599 by the emperor's brother-in-law,
Philippicus), who left in the power of the
Avars twelve thousand Roman-Byzantine
prisoners for whom they demanded ransom.
Since Mauricio could not pay it, they were all
executed 14 . The following year the daring
Avars attacked Constantinople itself again,
which was once again saved thanks to its
formidable walls. A new treaty was signed
with the Avars , establishing the Hister as a
border and renewing the imperial subsidy of
the 100,000 solidi. In 602, Petrus went again
against the Slavs , crossed the Hister and,
after defeating the barbarians, received the
order there to stay and winter in enemy
lands, something that would have very
serious consequences for the emperor, as
will be seen later 15 .
Mauricio (or rather his generals) had (or
had) the opportunity to put into practice with
these people the military theories that he
would capture in his Strategikon, launching
several campaigns against them that,
although they achieved most of their
objectives, left almost no to zero the
economic resources of the Empire. It was
always precisely money, or rather, the lack
of it, the great problem of Mauricio, who had
already found the imperial coffers half empty
due to the great liberality of his predecessor
in office.
Administrative reforms in the West

In the western part of the Empire the
emperor reorganized the territorial
administration. By transforming the position
of magister militum per Italym into that of
exarch (exarchus in Latin, ἔξαρχος in Greek),
he thus created in Italy the 16th exarchate of
Ravenna, the city in which his capital was
located (today Ravenna, in the province of
the same name, Italy), in the province of
Flaminia, which had been the last capital of
the Empire Western Roman before its end in
September 476. He did the same in Africa
with the magister militum per Africam and
thus the exarchate of Africa was established,
whose capital remained in Carthago (today
ruins a little more than 12 km northeast of
Tunis, in the province of Tunis, Tunisia), in
the Zeugitan province. Both the African
conquest and most of the Italian conquest
had been the work of the famous general
Flavius Belisarius during the rule of Emperor
Justinian I (527-565) 17 .
The westernmost domains of the Eastern
Roman Empire were the Byzantine province
of Hispania or Spania 18 , approximately
made up of the present-day Portuguese
Algarve and the south and southeast of
present-day Spain (until somewhat north of
Dianium, present-day Denia, in the province
of Alicante, within the Valencian
Community), including a large part of the
valley of the Guadalquivir River, in addition
to the Balearic Islands (stolen from the
Vandals in 534) and some of the North
African lands around the cities of Tingis
(Tangier, province of Tangier, Morocco) and
Septem (the current Autonomous City of
Ceuta) which, As in the old late imperial
times, they depended on the authorities
residing in the Iberian Peninsula 19 . These
North African territories had been occupied
by the Eastern Romans around 534, but not
from the Vandals (to whose kingdom they
had belonged), but from the Visigoths who
had occupied them (at least Septem) the
previous year. The aforementioned province
of Hispania or Spania had been created to
administer the Hispanic lands under
Byzantine control from 552 (date of the
arrival of Eastern Roman troops to the
Iberian peninsular lands, specifically the
coast of the current province of Malaga)
onwards and over there A magister militum
Spaniae exercised his authority, whose first
mention dates back to the year 589. Well, in
those territories things were not going too
well, since, before Mauritius ascended to the
throne, the Gothic visi king Leovigild (573-
586) had started a war in pursuit of
removing the Byzantines from the peninsula.
Iberian. In successive and annual campaigns
(which Juan de Biclaro tells us in his
Chronica) the Visi Gothic king managed to
reduce Byzantine dominion to a narrow
coastal strip. A milestone in such conquests
was the capture of the provincial capital,
Corduba 20 (Córdoba, in the province of the
same name, in the Autonomous Community
of Andalusia) in 572, which forced the head
of the Eastern Roman administration in the
peninsula Iberian would have to be
transferred to Carthago Spartaria (the former
Carthago Nova, today Cartagena, in the
province and Autonomous Community of
Murcia). The same Carthago Spartaria was
subject to a Visi -Gothic attack in 589,
repulsed by imperial forces under the
command of the magister militum Spaniae
Comentiolus 21 . The Byzantine dominions in
Hispania (Spania) lasted, increasingly
reduced in size, until 625, when King Suintila
(621-631) definitively expelled the Byzantine
troops, perhaps (it is not certain) with the
taking of the capital, Carthago Spartaria.
Septem and the Balearic Islands did,
however, remain in the hands of the
Byzantines for decades.
The administrative reforms that Mauritius
launched paved the way for the system of
themas (from the Greek singular ϑἑμα ),
typical of later times in the Byzantine Empire.
The eastern policy of Mauritius

However, the main enemy of the Eastern
Roman Empire in those years was its eastern
neighbor, the Persian Empire. That is why
Maurice became very interested in Persian
affairs and already in the summer of 583 he
launched a war against them that began with
a campaign in the region of Arzanene (in the
east of modern Turkey). The war would be
prolonged with various alternatives until 591.
In 584 Maurice appointed the then comes
excubitorum Philippicus, his brother-in-law
(married to his sister Gordia), magister
utriusque militum per Orientem, thus putting
him in charge of operations, the new
commander-in-chief for the area launching
two expeditions into Persian territory, one
that same year and another in 585. In
successive years he continued his plundering
raids in the Persian border regions,
eventually defeating the enemy in a pitched
battle in 586 at Solachon (modern Salāh,
east of the Zergan River, in the province of
Al Hasakah, Syria). In 588, Maurice replaced
Philippicus in the position of magister
utriusque militiae per Orientem with Priscus,
a man apparently little appreciated by the
troops for his haughty character, which led
to the eastern army, concentrated at that
time in Monokarton (today Kiziltepe, in the
province of Mardin, Turkey), to mutiny
(surely the reduction by a quarter of the
troops' emoluments also had a lot to do with
this [cf. infra]), the emperor having to
reinstate Philippicus in office, something that
the soldiers reluctantly accepted, since in the
meantime they had proclaimed Germanus,
the chief of the troops (doge) of the province
of Phoenicia Libanensis (currently, the
eastern Lebanon and southern Syria).
However, when Philippicus failed to take the
city of Martyropolis (now the ruins of
Mejafarkin, in the vicinity of Mermer [the
most northeastern one], in the Turkish
province of Diyarbakir), Maurice permanently
replaced him in office by Comentiolus, who
defeated the Persians at Sisarbanon
(Şirvan, north-northeast of Siirt, Siirt
Province, Turkey) and took the disputed
fortress of Akbas (present-day Başka Kale,
near Ambar [the northeastern one] , in the
province of Diyarbakir, Turkey).
In 591 the war against the Persians
ended due to an event that occurred the
previous year, when the emperor was
presented with an excellent opportunity to
intervene in internal Persian affairs, using
them to his advantage. In 590, Emperor
Hormuz (Hormisdas) IV was dethroned and
assassinated in the course of a coup d'état
promoted by the general Bahram Chobin,
who seized the throne, on which he sat
under the name Bahram VI. The son and
heir of the deceased, Khosrau (later Khosrau
II [590 628]), took refuge in the domains of
emperor of the East. Maurice then welcomed
him, married him to a Byzantine woman,
Mary (a daughter of Maurice himself?) 22 and
provided him with diplomatic aid (the offices
of bishop Domitianus 23 ) and military aid
(commanded by Comentiolus) so that, the
following year, Chosroes could get the
Persian throne. Naturally, the aid was not
free and the new Great Persian King, prior
to receiving aid, had to sign a peace treaty
with his benefactor, which remained in force
as long as Mauritius lived, and he also had to
cede Armenia to the Eastern Empire.
Persian and northern eastern Mesopotamia.
The religious politics of Mauritius
In religious matters, Mauricio was a fervent
Catholic, who opposed it, violently when he
considered it necessary, to the Monophysite
heretics 24 , many of whom took refuge in
Persia. However, his relations with the popes
that coincided with his Empire (Pelagius II
[579-590] and Saint Gregory I [590 604] 25 )
were not good since, among other things,
they allowed the Patriarch of Constantinople
John IV (582-595) to call himself "ecumenical
patriarch", something that was not accepted
in Rome. Furthermore, Pope Gregory
negotiated a truce with the Lombards in
593, which did not have the authorization of
Maurice. From the religious sentiment of
Mauritius, the festival of the Assumption of
the Virgin Mary has survived to our times,
which is still celebrated today on August 15,
a date set by our man.
The end of the Mauritius empire

Maurice wanted to ensure his succession
within his family (although, as we will see,
he failed in that endeavor) and in 597, when
he was seriously ill and believed he was
dying, he made a will, according to which his
eldest son Theodosius would become the
new emperor, in Constantinople, while the
second, Tiberius, received the government of
Italy and the Western islands under
Byzantine rule (Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and
the Balearic Islands), with headquarters in
the ancient imperial capital, Rome. As he
recovered from the illness, these provisions
were not made effective.
Despite his military knowledge in general
and soldiers in particular, his mandate was
not free of troop mutinies. One of them was
centered in 588 in the eastern units, caused
because the usual shortage of funds in the
imperial coffers led to the army's rations
being reduced by a quarter, which together
with a change in command that was not
liked by the soldiers (a matter already
discussed in previous lines), caused the
mutiny of the aforementioned troops.
Mauricio had to revoke the measure. Another
occurred in 594 when the emperor
attempted to reduce the money given to
soldiers for clothing and equipment. Once
again the emperor had to give up and also
offer an increase in payments to veterans
and war orphans. The last and most serious
military tumult was that which brought his
successor to the throne, an officer of the
Thracian army named Flavius Phocas
(Phocas, 602-610), since in November 602,
as seen in previous lines, he He ordered that
army, at the end of a military campaign
against the Slavs , to winter north of the
Hister, in the land of barbarians, after eight
months of hard operations, preventing the
men from returning to their families during
the cold months and exposing them to
hardships. caused by weather, supply
shortages and probable enemy attacks. The
head of the army, the magister utriusque
militiae per Thracias and brother of the
emperor, Petrus, who had returned to
Constantinople claimed by Maurice, returned
to his post to try to quell the mutiny, but
failing to do so, he fled with his brother. For
their part, the mutineers, led by Phocas, set
out on the route to the imperial capital,
where an old and distrustful Maurice began
to suspect a conspiracy of his close friends,
his young (17 years old) son Theodosius and
Germanus, his father-in-law. . The reason is
that, apparently, the mutineers demanded
the replacement of Maurice by his son or,
failing that, by Germanus. Theodosius was
arrested by order of his father and flogged in
public, while Germanus was able to take
refuge in sacred places, in the Basilica of
Hagia Sophia. This was not enough to stop
what had already happened. became a
revolution and as the rebel soldiers advanced
towards the capital, revolts broke out there,
led by the two factions of the racecourse, the
greens and the blues 26 . Maurice did not act
like his predecessor Justinian I and his
consort Theodora in 532 during the Nike
revolt, coping with the situation, and,
together with his wife and eight children
(including, we assume, the hurt and grieving,
Theodosius), crossed the Propontis (the
present-day Sea of Marmara, between the
European and Asian parts of Turkey), taking
refuge in Nicomedia (today İzmit, in the
province of Kokaeli, Turkey), in the province
of Bithynia. Theodosius abandoned his family
and took refuge in the Persian court of the
former refugee Chosroes II, while Germanus
had to become a monk, leaving the field free
to the true dominator of the situation,
Phocas, who, after overcoming the
opposition of Comentiolus, head of the
garrison of the capital, on November 23 he
became emperor, crowning his wife Leontia
as empress two days later. On the 27th of
the same month, Maurice, discovered in his
refuge by a force sent by the new emperor,
was executed moments after his four
youngest sons (Tiberius, Petrus, Paulus and
Iustinus) were executed. Their bodies were
thrown into the sea except for their heads,
which were taken to Constantinople.
Comentiolus was also executed on the same
day. Maurice's widow, Constantine, and the
three remaining daughters (Anastasia,
Theoctista and Cleopatra) had to take the
veil in a monastery to escape death. Other
close friends and supporters of the late
emperor, such as his brother Petrus, were
also executed by order of Phocas.
THE WORK AND ITS AUTHOR
The treatise on military techniques
transmitted by tradition under the title
Strategikon (On the General) has generated
various problems for scholars that begin
already at the moment of considering its
authorship and dating.
The diachronic nature of the work, a
Byzantine treatise on military techniques that
draws on a large number of older sources,
has caused divergences when it comes to
dating it, and therefore attributing it to a
specific author. Written in deliberately simple
Greek, an ante quem term has been
established for its dating 27 : the year 573,
the time when the Persians once again
began to be a threat to the Roman-Byzantine
Empire. The insistence throughout the entire
treatise on talking about the Persians
confirms that the work was composed on a
date later than indicated. Other peoples
mentioned in the treaty will be the
Lombards (Longobardos), who enter the
scene, in Italy and from Danubian lands, in
the year 568, the Avars who pose difficulties
to the Empire in the seventies of the 6th
century, the Slavs in the same period, and
those before , who are no longer mentioned
after 601. Likewise, the work could not have
been composed at a time after the definitive
victory over the Persians , in 628. This
information is confirmed by the absence of
references to the Arabs, so the work
predates the 1930s of the 7th century, the
date of the Muslim invasions.
The treaty does not cite contemporary
names, which is an obstacle to settling its
dating, although it does mention three recent
events: in X 1 there is a reference to the
siege of Akbas (cf. supra) at 583; In IX 3 we
find the allusion to the poisoning of horse
grain by the Persians , probably referring to
the attempt by the enemies of Khosrow II
(whom the soldiers of Mauritius were about
to restore to his throne) in 591 to poison the
food of horses. the Roman-Byzantine troops
and horses that were helping him, and in IX
2 there is a reference to the attack of the
Avars on a city called Heraklea, in all
probability Heraclea Lyncestis (now ruins in
the southern vicinity of Bitola, in the county
of the same name, in the southwest of the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), an
event that took place in 592.
The work begins with an invocation to the
Holy Trinity. Emperor Maurice issued a
decree that all imperial documents must
begin with the formula "In the name of Our
Lord, God and Redeemer Jesus Christ."
During the mandate of Phocas (602-610) it
would be the formula Trinitarian the one
used, found for the first time in 605 28 . That
is why J. Wiita maintains that the work was
written either during the final years of the
Mauritius empire (approximately from 592)
or during the reign of Phocas (before 610).
More problematic is the author of the
treaty. Philologists such as Scheffe r 29 ,
Aussaresses 30 or Dennis 31 attribute it to the
emperor Maurice based both on the dating
arguments offered above as well as on the
title offered by a branch of the tradition
formed by the VNP codices. However, the
best text, the Laurentianus codex (d. 3r),
attributes the Strategikon to a certain
Urbikíos (Urbicius): Οὐρβικίου τακτικά
στρατηγικῆς. To this Urbicio, identified with
the writer of the time of Anastasius I (491-
518) and of whom we preserve an epigram
in the Anthologia Graeca 32 , is attributed by
R. Vâri 33 the same as Dain at first.
He will later rectify it by adhering to the
opinion of Aussaresses 34 . However, the
interpretation of Dennis 35 is more likely, for
whom it could be read οὐρβικίου instead of
αυρικίου by leaving a blank space for the
initial M of the name. This data is confirmed
by the title of the Codex Ambrosianus:
μαυρικίου τακτ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ βασιλέως μαυρικίου
τικά τοῦ ἔπειτα βασιλέως γεγονότος: «taktiká of
Maurice, who later became emperor.
J. Wiita 36 proposed, without solid
arguments, the possibility that the author is
Philippikos (Philippicus) 37 , the general and
brother-in-law of Maurice (married to his
sister Gordia) who had served with him in
the campaign against the Persians (577-581
) and then Upon ascending the throne in 582
he was comes excubitorum and the following
year magister utriusque militiae per
Orientem. He commanded troops on the
Persian border and in Thrace, here as
magister utriusque militiae per Thracias.
During the empire of Phocas (602 610)
saved his life because he became a monk
(even though his wife Gordia was still alive),
a situation from which he was removed by
the new emperor Heraclius (Heraclius, 610-
641), who reinstated him in the service and
appointed him magister again. utriusque
militiae per Orientem, a position from which
he fought against the Persians during the
last years of his life. Although he was not
very fortunate on the battlefield, he
maintained good relations with his officers
and troops. He was known for his interest in
history and the peculiarities of other peoples.
He had a special interest in the Carthaginian
Hannibal, about whom several anecdotes
appear in this treatise. During his period as a
monk, Being in his monastery 38 he had the
opportunity to reflect, investigate and write.
He died around 615. Perhaps the opinion of
D. Nicolle 39 , according to which it is possible
that this manual was written at the
beginning of the empire of Heraclius, as a
practical book for officers before the great
war that this emperor waged against the
Sassanid Persians .
In any case, whoever the author was, there
is no doubt that it is an official military
manual, promoted and approved by the
imperial power.
Regarding the style of the treatise 40 , the
author himself makes a declaration of
intentions in his prologue. His work, of a
didactic nature, is aimed at men at arms and
therefore must be devoid of rhetorical
devices, offering simple morphology and
syntax 41 . Your language should be clear and
plain, as opposed to a more elaborate and
less understandable language, so that his
work is chresimón, "profitable" (cf. the
introduction of the text), a topic that we also
find in hagiographic literature 42 . Mauricio is
thus joined to a list of Byzantine authors of
didactic works, such as Leo VI the Wise
(886-912) 43 or his son Constantine VII
Porphyrogenitus (912-959) 44 who display
clear and simple prose in their prologues. .
Thus, Mauricio's style is typical of a literary
koine that shows multiple semantic changes
and a great variety of neologisms, especially
Latinisms that come from everyday life (
παγανός I 6, οὐλτίμους I 8, βοσκάς I 9,
πουβλικίζε ται VI 4) as from the military
lexicon (σαγίττα I 1, ἄρμα Ι 2, δούξ I 3,
καβαλλάριοι I 4, τριβοῦνον I 6, κάστρου I 6,
παρατίονα I 6, δηφενσόρας II 3, φόσσαν IV 3,
κιστέρνας X 3).
THE TRANSMISSION OF THE TEXT
We have received the transmission of
Mauricio's text through the following codices:
Codex Mediceus-Laurentianus 55, 4 (= M)
copied in the mid-10th century as part of an
encyclopedic work under the reign of
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus 45 . In this
same manuscript, Mauricio's work shares a
place with other re militari authors such as
Aelianus, Asclepiodotus, Aeneas, Arrian,
Onasander or various works by Leo VI.
Greek Codex Vaticanus 1164 (=V): Irigoin
46
dates it to 1020 in Constantinople. It
stands out for presenting a large number of
gaps.
Codex Neapolitanus Greek 284 (111C 26)
(=N): Dated mid-11th century 47 . Contains
the Taktiká of Aeliano, the Stategikos of
Onesander and the Strategikon of Mauritius.
Greek Codex Parisinus 2442 (=P) like V
was copied in a scriptorium in Constantinople
48
and also contains both classical and
Byzantine military works.
Greek Codex Ambrosianus 139 (B119 sup.)
(= A) from the mid-10th century. It contains
other military writings such as the work of
Leo VI. The text corresponding to the
Strategikon is a paraphrase of it into the
Greek of the time 49 and has as its source
both the first (= M) and the second family (=
VNP).
Along with these codices we preserve the
work of León VI Problemata 50 (= Lp), a
military work organized in the form of
questions and answers where textual quotes
from Mauricio's work are offered. The
Tacticae Constitutiones (= Lt) of the same
author, organized in twenty-two books, offer
paraphrases of the Strategikon, the Taktiká
of Aelian and the Strategikos of Onesander.
Dain establishes three families in the
transmission of the text of the Strategikon
from copies made in the first half of the 7th
century and transliterated around the 9th
from uncial to lowercase, from which the
preserved manuscripts will be copied.
The first family would be represented by M
which, according to Dain 51 , is the authentic
transliteration from uppercase to lowercase.
The second, which Dain calls "interpolated
recension", would be composed of P and V
(and N which would be codex descriptus of
V) that would come from a common
archetype dated to the 10th century and
called by Dain as "Mazoneus". It presents
more than twice as many errors and
omissions as M, as well as a large number of
interpolations, glosses and additions.
There would be a third family, the origin of
a third transliteration that would have served
as the source of the aforementioned
paraphrases of Leo VI.
SOURCES
A military manual cannot be written ex
novo. This would mean disregarding years
(sometimes centuries) of previous
experience, in which the person who wrote it
would also have been trained. What an
author usually does in a text of this type is to
collect said experience, systematize it, add
his own (if he has been a soldier) and/or that
of other soldiers known to him and the
author's own original ideas and adapt
everything to the time and space in which it
is going to be used. Thus, Mauricio (or
whoever the author really was) is inspired by
hundreds of years of previous Roman military
experience, systematized in turn in other
previous military manuals (some of which
have not reached us or, probably, we do not
even have news of). of them) removing what
is already outdated for his time and adding
new forms of organization and tactics that
were proving their effectiveness in the
author's time, some of them even inspired by
practices and equipment used by the
enemies of the Eastern Roman Empire,
especially the Persians . There is no doubt
that the author of the Strategikon, whether it
was the Emperor Maurice himself or any of
the other possible authors, as could not be
the case at that time in a high-ranking
military man, knew all the literary production
on military themes that such a warlike state
like the Roman, of which the Byzantine
(Eastern Roman Empire, was its official
name) was its natural continuation and it
was normal for him to take it into account 52 .
In any case, as G says. Ravegnani (2007, p.
49), the Strategikon "is not simply an
uncritical reproduction of preceding works
but rather a primarily functional treatise for
the training of officers.
Despite what we are going to comment
below, it must be said that the Strategikon is
a quite original work, in the sense that since
the last military treatise writer that we know
before Mauritius, Vegetius (very archaizing,
on the other hand), wrote, At the end of the
4th century or the beginning of the 5th, the
way of waging war has changed a lot. As an
example, the following: in Strategikon IX 4
(for example) it is literally said "... if the
army consists only of cavalry...", when not
even in the times of the barbarian invasions
that ended the Western Roman Empire,
when the Cavalry was beginning to have
more weight in military formations, an army
composed solely of horsemen was
conceivable. Although it is clear that the
author of the Strategikon was inspired by
some sources, he did not take much of the
information, more or less extensive, literally.
Mauricio says at the end of chapter 4 of
book XI that what he has written has been
done "taking into account our own
experience and the authorities of the past."
We do not know who these "authorities" are,
since these possible sources, as said before,
have mostly only reached us as
bibliographical mentions (some not even
that) and we cannot assess what part of
influence they had on the work. which we
analyze here. Of the military authors who
have survived to us, one of them, Vegetius,
in his Epitoma Rei Militaris (Summary of
military affairs) (I 8, 11; I 27, 1), unlike
Mauritius, does make us Know which
previous authors you have based your work
on. It would be good if we reviewed them
here because, almost certainly, those same
writers would have been read by the author
of the Strategikon and influenced his work
although not necessarily in literal terms of
taking parts of them. Vegetius then says that
he has previously read the works of Cato the
Censor, Cornelius Celsus, Frontinus, Paternus
and the imperial constitutions promulgated
on military matters by the emperors
Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian 53 .
On one occasion (XII B 22), Mauricio refers
to "the ancients" 54 and certainly some of the
sources he uses to compose his work are
ancient (although we cannot specify more),
since in one of his passages (VIII 2 , 88)
mentions a series of people against whom
the Romans fought, most of whom no longer
existed as peoples at the end of the 6th
century and the beginning of the 7th: the
Hispanics, Gauls and Ligurians had been
Romanized for centuries, passing all since
212 AD (under the Constitutio Antoniniana
promulgated by Emperor Caracalla
[Septimius Bassianus, later Marcus Aurelius
Antoninus, 211-217]) to be citizens of the
Empire; There were also no Britons as such,
since the south of their island, conquered by
Rome since the invasion of 43 AD, had been
integrated into the Empire and its inhabitants
also ended up being Roman citizens from
212 onwards, in addition to the fact that at
the time in which As this manual is written,
the Roman part of Britannia had been
invaded by the Germanic tribes of Angles,
Jutes and Saxons; Parthians did not exist
either, replaced since 226 AD by the
Sassanid Persians , since that year precisely
the greatest eastern adversaries (and
perhaps the greatest enemies in general) of
the Roman Empire and then of its successor,
the Eastern Roman Empire. Those who still
existed, although divided (as always) into a
multitude of tribes, were the Germans, some
of whose ethnic groups had created
flourishing kingdoms in regions of the
ancient Western Roman Empire, such as the
Visigoths in the Iberian Peninsula, the
Ostro Goths in Italica or the Franks in Gaul,
while others were making their way in those
western lands, such as the Lombards .
The previous work that is most closely
related to that of Mauritius is the Epitoma
Rei Militaris (Summary of Military Affairs) by
Vegetius, an author from the end of the 4th
century and the beginning of the 5th century
AD, something that is totally natural, since it
is the one that is closest It is in the time at
the end of the 6th century, when the
Strategikon was written. In both this work
and that of Vegecio there are quite a few
chapter titles that suggest that the
information they are going to transmit to us
is similar and even that Vegecio could be
Mauricio's source. Once read, in many of
them this does not happen and although
they talk about the same topic, each author
approaches it in a completely different way.
In those that are similar in content, Mauricio
never reproduces a literal expression of
Vegecio, he only draws inspiration from it
and explains it in his own words. In the
following lines we will analyze these
similarities and highlight some differences.
Starting with the training, the training that
must be given to the recruits so that they
know how to ride a horse is very important,
as stated by Mauricio (I 1) (although it is
true that he refers to this training as specific
for horse archers). Vegetius also refers to
this (I 18), but for all recruits, regardless of
whether they are going to serve in cavalry or
infantry. Continuing with the instruction,
Mauricio includes in that same chapter the
training as archers that all soldiers must
have, both infantry and, above all, cavalry.
Vegetius (I 15) also speaks of such
instruction. In Strategikon I 9-17). Training is
so fundamental in an army that Mauricio
(VIII 2, 9) literally says that: «Nature
produces only a few brave men. However,
care and training make efficient soldiers", an
idea that we already see in Vegetius (III 26,
12), where it is stated that: "Nature
generates few strong men, but work with
timely training makes many strong." .
Maurice considers (VIII 2, 3) that soldiers
should never be led into battle without being
properly prepared, something with which
Vegetius (III 26, 3) fully agrees and says it in
similar words. Likewise, Mauricio speaks (XII
B 2 and 3) about how the training of infantry
should be, both with heavy and light
weapons, and of archers, of which we also
find traces in Vegetius (I 9-20 and 26-28) ,
but not too much or literal. Training or at
least "entertainment" (soldiers should not be
allowed to fall into complacency and
relaxation) is essential: Mauricio (VIII 2, 15)
believes that "soldiers must always be doing
something, even if There is no enemy
bothering us. Habitual laziness means
problems for an army", something that
Vegetius (III 26, 13) already knew, as he
says that "the army prospers with effort, but
with laziness it fails." Those responsible for
the training would be the instructor officers
that Mauritius speaks of (XII B 7), who are
those that Vegetius (I 13, 1 and II 23, 3)
calls campidoctors ("masters of arms" or
"field instructors", according to the various
translations).
When Maurice speaks (I 3) about the
assault troops and their way of advancing
and fighting he reminds us of the heavy
legionary that Vegetius speaks of (II 17, 5).
As far as weapons are concerned, Maurice
(XII B 5) mentions ballistae (crossbows) on
one occasion as part of his army, something
that Vegetius also does, but on more
occasions (II 15, 7; III 14, 13 ; IV 21, 1; IV
22, 1 and 6) and distinguishing between two
types: the manuballista and the arcuballista
(for more information on this type of
weapons, cf. the first note accompanying
Strategikon XII B 5). Likewise in Mauritius
the matiobarbulus or leaded dart is
mentioned several times (XII B 2, 4, 5, 6, 12,
16, 18, 20), but a complete chapter is not
dedicated to it as Vegetius does (I 17).
If we talk about the officers, in Mauritius
(II 16) it talks about the placement of the
officers in battle; in Vegetius (III 18) too, but
the placement is not the same.
In the work of Maurice (II 17) there is talk
of the transmission of orders on the
battlefield through the sound of instruments,
something that Vegetius also talks about (II
22) although not in the same sense.
Regarding the barracks, Mauricio (V 4)
speaks of the intermediate camps; Vegetius
(I 20-25 and III 8) talks about how to set up
a camp but not in the same sense either.
Maurice (book VII, part A) dedicates the
fifteen chapters of that part to talking about
the points to be considered by the general
the day before the battle while Vegetius (III
11) only dedicates one chapter to "What
precautions should be taken on the day
before the pitched battle.
Regarding spies, Mauricio (IX 5) talks about
ways to detect a spy in one's camp. Vegecio
also deals with the topic (III 26, 27) giving
us information that coincides with what
Mauricio describes and with words, if not the
same, then very similar.
For Mauricio it is important not to drive the
enemy to despair, in such a way that dying
in combat is for him the best of his options
and for this reason he speaks (VIII 1, 25;
VIII 2, 92) that the enemies of cities or
camps taken or surrounded on the
battlefield, a door or path must be left open
for them to escape, and not provoke that
desperation that we talked about before, but
it does not say what attitude must be taken
with said enemy once he has escaped. On
the contrary, Vegetius (III 21), says the
same of the defeated enemy in general, but
so that he can then be annihilated while
trying to flee.
Both Mauricio and Vegetius agree that the
lives of one's own soldiers must be spared,
so the first says (VIII 2, 4 and 28) that it is
good to harm the enemy with things that are
not a pitched battle, such as causing them to
starve by cutting off their supplies; The
second (III 26, 32) believes the same about
the method of hunger and also says (III 26,
31) that good commanders do not engage in
pitched battle except when conditions are
very good or due to the greatest need.
Regarding what to do with the enemies
who come over to our camp, Mauricio (VIII
2, 6) is of the opinion that a deserter from
the enemy is more useful, as a deserter,
than dead; Vegetius (III 26, 7) says
something similar: "A lot of confidence must
be placed in attracting and welcoming
enemies, if they come in good faith, since
deserters cause more damage to the
adversary than casualties."
Among the characteristics that a good
general should have, Mauricio and Vegecio
agree on many of them. Thus, Maurice (VIII
2, 7) affirms that "he who does not carefully
compare his own forces with those of the
enemy is doomed to a disastrous end", an
idea that Vegetius (III 26, 9) conveys to us
in the following words: " "It is difficult to
defeat someone who makes a correct
estimate of the enemy's forces and his own."
On another occasion, Maurice (VIII 2, 11)
says that "after obtaining a victory, the
strategos who pursues the enemy with a
dispersed and disorganized army gives it to
the enemy", something in which he
completely agrees with Vegetius, who states
(III 26, 16) that "he who undertakes a chase
with his soldiers scattered and without order
wishes to hand over to the enemy the victory
he has obtained." Later, Maurice (VIII 2, 13)
informs us that: "a good strategos is one
who uses his own skills to adapt to the
opportunities he has and the qualities of the
enemy", something that Vegetius (III 26, 6)
already He had advanced when he wrote
that: "seizing opportunities is usually more
helpful in war than courage." A good
commander cannot neglect a function as
important as keeping his men properly
supplied and thus Mauricio (VIII 2, 19)
literally says that "the commander who fails
to provide his army with the necessary food
and other supplies is making preparations for
his own defeat, even if the enemy is not
present", an idea that echoes what Vegetius
(III 26, 17) already said some time ago: "he
who does not stock up on grain and
everything necessary falls defeated without
the need for weapons. A good commander
has to know the units under his command
and know if his cavalry is better than his
infantry or vice versa, in order to get the
best out of the troops he has available and
both Mauricio and Vegecio touch on the
topic. The first (VIII 2, 20), in what refers to
cavalry, says that "the commander who
trusts in his own cavalry, especially in the
lancers, must look for wide plains favorable
for this type of troops and force the battle
there" ; Vegetius (III 26, 25) expresses his
opinion in a similar way: "he who trusts in
his cavalry must look for terrain more
appropriate for the cavalry and
accommodate the maneuvers for the soldiers
of this body"; If we talk about the infantry,
Maurice says (VIII 2, 21) that "if he [the
strategos ] trusts more in his infantry, he
must be careful to choose rugged, thick and
rugged terrain and organize the fight there",
something that Vegetius ( III 26, 26)
formulates as follows: "he who trusts in his
infantry must look for more appropriate
terrain for the infantry and accommodate the
maneuvers for the soldiers of this body."
Likewise, information is vital for the
commander of an army, not only knowing
what the enemy is doing but also knowing
what the enemy knows about oneself and
that is why Mauricio writes (VIII 2, 22): "if
we find out that our plans have been
revealed to the enemy, then we must change
all our passwords and other signals, as well
as our battle formation", words that
corroborate those written by Vegetius (III
26, 28) many years before: "when you know
that your plan has been revealed to the
"enemy, you should change tactics."
Although it is a good general to know how to
ask for and accept advice, the responsibility
of leading an army is, ultimately, that of its
commander and his alone, something that is
reflected in the words of both Maurice and
Vegetius, when the former writes (VIII 2,
23): «For what must be done, seek the
advice of many; for what you must really do,
take the advice of only a few you trust; then,
now completely alone, decide the best and
most useful plan of all and follow it", ideas
that were already in the words of Vegetius
(III 26, 29) when he writes: "Consult with
many what should be done, but what "You
are really going to consult with very few
people who you trust completely, or better
yet, only with yourself." A good general has
to know how to maintain discipline among
his troops and not allow inappropriate
relaxation, which is why Mauricio (VIII 2, 27)
says that: "In times of peace, fear and
punishment for crimes keep the troops in
tension." , but in an active campaign, great
hopes and rewards always give better
results", something with which Vegetius
would have completely agreed, since he had
written (III 26, 30): "Fear and punishment
mend the soldiers in the camp , in the
campaign the hope of rewards makes them
better. The good general must be an
opportunistic type (without the pejorative
load that this term has) because, as Mauricio
writes (VIII 2, 31), it is said that "...in war
the opportunity is fleeting and cannot be left
aside" and as Vegetius had previously written
(III 26, 6): "Seizing opportunities is usually
more helpful in war than courage." A good
general must be unpredictable for the enemy
because, in the opinion of Maurice (VIII 2,
10): "Things that are unexpected or sudden
frighten the enemy, since things to which he
is accustomed seem easier" and of Vegetius
(III 26, 15): "Surprise actions sow fear in
enemies, those used over and over again
have no value." Finally, as could not be less,
a good general must be competent when
choosing the best combat terrain (whenever
possible, of course), the one in which his
troops can perform best, especially if his own
army It is not very numerous and Maurice
writes (VIII 2, 37): «For small forces, we
must select a place with a narrowing in front,
whose width corresponds to the size of our
army. The enemy's superiority will be of no
effect in such a place since there is no space
for him. After studying the place where the
enemy is, the strategos can form a fair
estimate of his strength, since he must know
from experience how much space is required
for a given number of troops"; Vegetius,
some time ago, had already commented
something similar (III 26, 24): «Whoever is
aware of having fewer and weaker soldiers
[...] must provide himself on one flank with
the protection of a mountain, a city, the sea,
a river or any other support.
Changing the subject, if we talk about
sieges Mauritius comments (X 1 and 3)
various aspects about them, and we find
echoes of Vegetius (IV 1-30), but not too
much or literal, as happens on other
occasions.
To establish fortified camps, Maurice (XII B
22) talks about how to build them, in a
chapter in which, he himself says, he is
indebted to the ancients, in the case of
Vegetius in I 21-25 and III 8, although he
never with literal words.
Finally, when invoking divine protection,
Mauricio (II 18) informs us that one of the
cries that military units must shout is
"nobiscum Deus" ("God with us"), specifying
that it must be given while He leaves
through the interior of the camp. For his
part, Vegetius (III 5, 4) speaks of this phrase
which, according to him, could be used both
as a password and in combat where, taking
into account the confusion and shouting that
usually exists in such a situation, it would be
used as a war cry.
Leaving Vegetius alone, another interesting
author for our topic is Onasander, a writer
from the 1st century AD. who writes his work
in Greek, his mother tongue. Of the only
book of his that has been preserved, his
Strategikos ( Στρατηγικός , The General), we
find echoes in Mauritius, although not as
abundant as in the case of Vegetius. Nor, as
with the aforementioned Vegetius, are literal
phrases from Onasander used. These
references are in book VIII of the
Strategikon, both in chapter 1 entitled "On
general instructions for the commander", a
set of forty-four pieces of advice to be a
good commander, which include a series of
characteristics that a good commander must
have. general, as in chapter 2, "Mottoes",
one hundred and one maxims and advice for
the good troop commander. We already see
many of the ideas formulated in both
chapters reflected in various chapters of the
book. of Onasander: I (titled "The Choice of
a General"), II ("The Characteristics of a
Good General"), III ("The General's Advisory
Council"), IV ("The Need for a Reasonable
Cause for War »), V («Propitation of divine
power by the general before engaging the
army in battle 55 »), XXXII («The general
must not be thoughtless at all»), XXXVI 2
(«Courage in defeat») and XLII 2 (“The
general must set a good example for his
soldiers”).
Apart from these two authors, whose
influence is more evident, the text of the
Strategikon is dotted with references to other
writers, whom we will mention below.
From Frontinus and his Stratagemata (The
Stratagems), the author of the Strategikon
(VIII 1, 25; VIII 2, 92) indicates that
cornered enemies (in open fields, in cities or
camps) must be left a way of escape, and
not provoke their despair, which could cause
them to despair and fight to the death. As
we have seen above, this is recorded by
Vegetius (III 21) but Frontinus (IV 7, 16)
attributes it to Scipio Africanus, in a short
axiom that says: «Scipio Africanus used to
say that the enemy would not only be "It
had to provide him with a way to escape, but
it even had to be paved."
There are also memories in the Strategikon
of the work of Julius Caesar, such as in II 18,
where Maurice speaks of how "when the
army makes contact with the enemy, it is not
a bad idea for the men to shout and cheer,
especially for the ranks of rearguard, to
disturb the enemy and stimulate our own
troops", something similar to what Caesar
said (De Bello Ciuile III 92) when stating that
"... it was rightly established since ancient
times that instruments were played
everywhere and that "All the soldiers raised a
great cry, with which they believed they
would incite their own and terrify their
enemies." Another of these memories are
"the sharp stakes driven into the bottom [of
moats opened for this purpose]" (Strategikon
IV 3), which are nothing more than the
"lilies" (lilia) that Caesar used against the
troops of the Gaulish leader Vercingetorix. in
his siege of Alesia (the present Mount
Auxois, next to Alise-Saine-Reine, in the
department of Côte-d'Or, in France) in 52 BC
during his war in Gaul (De Bello Gallico VII
73).
There are also parts of the text that refer
us to Eastern Roman historians of the 6th
century, such as Procopius of Caesarea 56
(whom we know was alive in 560) or
Agathias (who died perhaps around 582, the
same year as Maurice's ascension to the
throne). ) who wrote about issues that had
happened shortly before, so we cannot know
if Mauricio took information from them or
had his own sources, which could even
include his own personal experience.
Something that Maurice certainly did not
take from Procopius or Agathias was the
name of a certain barbarian people that he
mentions (IV 3), the ( Huns ) Nephthalites,
since the last two are called ( Huns )
Ephthalites (Procopius De Bello Persico I 3
and 4 ; Agathias Historiae IV 27, 4).
Furthermore, in another passage, Procopius
(op. cit. I 3) calls them White Huns .
We also have some concomitance with the
work of Arrian (politician, soldier and writer
of the 2nd century AD), in the work of
Mauricio, as is the case of the cavalry games
that were practiced at the end of winter and
that are nothing more than the called hippicá
gymnasía ( ἱππικά γυμνασία ) which Arrian
tells us about in his Tactica (32, 3; 34, 1 and
44, 3). Furthermore, in XII B 9, Maurice
writes that: "For good reasons, our
predecessors fixed the depth of the column
for combat at sixteen [men]"; Those
predecessors he speaks of are precisely
Arrian (Tactica 5, 4-5).
When Maurice tells (VIII 2, 87) some
anecdote about Hannibal, it is already
collected from Polybius (Historiae III 78, 1-2)
and Titus Livy (Ab Vrbe Condita XXII 1, 3).
Likewise, the usual way of an army, which
is in a campaign or which is in transit
towards one, of starting the march daily,
abandoning the camp where it had spent the
night, of which Mauricio informs us (XII B
22), is the same thing that was done in high
imperial times, as the Jewish historian
Flavius Josephus tells us in his work Bellum
Iudaicum (III 89-91).
The matter of the ballistae, which we have
already seen a few lines above, when
comparing the manual of Mauritius with that
of Vegetius, is also treated by the
anonymous author of De Rebus Bellicis (16,
5), although he only talks about the
manuballistae (for more information on this
type of weapons, cf. the first note
accompanying Strategikon XII B 5).
As could not be the case for a cultured man
like the one who wrote the Strategikon
(whether it was Mauricio or another), the
author of this military manual knows the
classics and sometimes demonstrates it, as
when he quotes Homer (without naming
him, he calls him "the poet") (VIII 2, 82),
taking words from the Iliad, XI 802-803; XVI
44-45). Also the writings of the Athenian
politician and orator of the 4th century BC,
Isocrates, are used by Maurice when he
writes (VIII 2, 31), addressing a hypothetical
officer: «Take your time in planning, but
when you have made your decision be quick
in carry it out", something quite similar to
what the aforementioned Isocrates says in
Ad Demonicum 34: "Be slow in reflecting but
quickly carry out your decisions." Continuing
with the demonstration that the author
knows the classics, in Strategikon VIII 2, 79
it is said: "there is an ancient saying that it is
better to have an army of deer commanded
by a lion than an army of lions commanded
by a deer." », something very similar to what
the Greek Plutarch attributes (Apotegmatha
Chabriae 3) to Cabrias, an Athenian general
of the 4th century BC: «He used to say that
an army of deer led by a lion was more
fearsome than one of lions led by a deer".
This quote, a little later, is attributed by
Maurice (VIII 2, 93) to Hannibal himself. In
this case we are faced with a false attribution
of this sentence to Hannibal, something
common in ancient literature. Anonymous
phrases transmitted either by oral tradition
or through collections of sentences
(gnomologies) are attributed to one or more
characters either due to the needs of the
work, or because they adapt to the image
that is intended to be given of that character
or simply for a mere attribution. arbitrary.
The Corpus Iuris Civilis, the compilation of
legislation ordered by Justinian I, is also
represented in the Strategikon in at least one
case, where it says (I 6, 10) "If someone
causes harm to a citizen [in the course of
military operations] and refuses to
compensate him, he will pay double the
damage", something that is included, within
the aforementioned legal compilation,
specifically in Codex Iustiniani XI 48, 23.
We also find in the Strategikon various
references to historical events, some prior to
the date of writing of Mauricio's work and
others almost contemporary with it. These
historical events can be traced in various
sources, of which our author would
necessarily have news. Chronologically, the
first of them is the one that refers to, as
Mauricio says textually (IX 2), "general Lusio
in the time of Trajan." This character is the
Mauritanian prince Lusius Quietus, who
served the Roman State in the time of
Emperor Trajan (Marcus Vlpius Traianus, 98-
117) as consul, military leader and provincial
governor. It is spoken about in various
ancient sources, such as Dio Cassius (68, 22,
2; 68, 30, 1-2; 68, 32, 3; 69, 2, 5) or the
Historia Augusta (Life of Hadrian 5, 8 and 7,
2) (for more information, cf. the first
footnote of IX 2); Following the chronology,
the second reference to a historical event
that is mentioned in the Strategikon (IV 3) is
that of the emperor Decius (Caius Messius
Quintus Decius, 249-251) who faced the
Goths in 251 in the province of Moesia
Inferior and He lost his life in combat,
according to what Zosimo tells us (I 23, 2-3)
(for more information, cf. the third and
fourth notes of Strategikon IV 3); Strategikon
IV 3 talks about the defeat that the
Nephthalite Huns inflicted on the
Persians of King Peroz (Peroz I, 457-487) in
the year 487 and which we know through
the stories of Procopius of Caesarea (De
Bello Persico I 4 ) and Agathias (Historiae IV
27, 3-4) (for more information, cf. the first
and second notes of Strategikon IV 3); In
543, in Armenia, the Eastern Romans
suffered a severe defeat against the
Persians , as Procopius tells us again (De
Bello Persico II 25), a setback to which
Maurice refers in VII B 2 (for more
information, cf. the footnote to that chapter);
Another fact of arms alluded to in the
Strategikon (X 1) is probably the failed siege
that the Byzantines carried out in 583 on a
fortress in the region of Arzanene, a story
that has come down to us through the words
of the historian Theophylact
Simocatta (Historiae I 12, 1-
7),
contemporary of the events (for more
information, cf. the first footnote of
Strategikon Another specific military event
that appears in the Strategikon (IX 3), this
one taking place in 591, was an attempted
poisoning of Byzantine supplies, both human
and animal military personnel, by the
Persians , who opposed King Khosrow II, in
whose favor the imperial troops were then
fighting for and which is known to us in more
detail through the work of John of Nikiu
(Chronica 96, 17-19), a historian of the late
6th century (for more information on this
matter, cf. the footnote to Strategikon IX 3);
Finally, we have the matter of the attack on
the Macedonian city of Heraklea by the
Avars , to which Maurice refers in IX 2 and
which took place in 592, according, again, to
Theophylacto Simocatta (for more
information, cf. the third footnote of
Strategikon IX 2).
So much for the sources from which
Mauricio was or could have been inspired
and from which he must have obtained
material to compose his Strategikon. But in
turn this military manual influenced later
works 57 , of which we want to record here.
Chronologically, the first source that may
have some influence from the Strategikon is
the Acta Martyris Anastasii Persae (Act of the
Martyrdom of Anastasius the Persian), in
which an anonymous author, probably also
from the 7th century, hagiographically
recounts the martyrdom in 628 of
Anastasius, a young soldier of the Persian
king of kings Khosrau II (he was also
assassinated that same year) converted into
a monk after becoming a Christian. In this
work (Acta Martyris Anastasii Persae 13 and
23), remembering information that Mauricio
presents to us (I 1 and VI 1) about the
instruction of cavalry and the importance of
the month of March in that training, it is
indicated that "during the month of March, it
has been traditional for soldiers to equip
their horses, take them to flat terrain, and
exercise them as if they were training for
war." Leo VI the Wise, Byzantine emperor
between 886 and 912, wrote (or was written
to and he only signed later) two works of a
military nature: Problemata and Tacticae
Constitutiones where we see some
undoubted influence of Maurice, as when he
writes (VII B 12) : "Be victorious but do not
rush your victory too much", motto that is
also mentioned by Leo in Tacticae
Constitutiones 14, 25 and in the same
treatise (20, 128), Leo reproduces the
sentence of the Athenian general Cabrias
about the armies of deer or lions
commanded by a deer or a lion, which we
have already mentioned a few lines above
and which Mauricio writes in
VIII 2, 79 and 99.
Another military writer who is inspired by
Mauritius and his Strategikon is Kekaumenos,
a high-ranking Byzantine soldier, of Greco-
Armenian origin, who was active in the
second half of the 11th century and who
around 1075-1078, basing it on his own
experience and in the events that he had
experienced in his military career, he
composed his own military manual, which he
titled, like that of Mauritius, Strategikon. This
Strategikon is not a mere copy of the other
or an update, but has its originality insofar as
the military and social conditions of the
second half of the 11th century were not, by
any means, the same as those of the final
years of the 6th century, when Maurice
writes. Even so, it raises ideas already
formulated in Mauricio's book, such as the
fact that he says in the preamble of his
manual: "... we urge the strategos to make
their most important task be to love God and
Justice," and in In the work of Kekaumenos
(82) we find: "Give the order to your
generals to behave with moderation and
piety and not to act ficklely and express their
anger at anyone, and to safeguard the
judges so that they judge with the fear of
God and with Justice"; Another of these
ideas is the one expressed by Mauricio (I 9)
as: «The cultivated fields must be preserved,
the troops must not march through them and
they must not cause harm to the citizens»
and that Kekaumenos (82) transforms into: «
Do not exploit your city, the outer lands that
are under your power, nor the army, but be
a father to all of them and they will all serve
you faithfully. In Maurice VIII 1, 3, the
general is reminded that he must ensure that
his men are well supplied, paid, and feel safe
under his command, something that
Kekaumenos (80) also warns the general
about, further reminding him
that the fidelity of his men depends on it.
Finally, the last of the military writers that we
are going to mention is Miguel Attaliates,
another character from the 11th century who
in his History (16, 17) also echoes the
already famous (for the readers of this work)
saying about deer and the Lions.
THE WORK. CONTENT

The work, in its initial preparation, was
composed of eleven books, as can be
deduced from XI 4. It began with an index
and an introduction and book XII would be a
later addition by the author himself (because
it makes references to passages from other
books in the first person plural). This book
XII consists of four parts: the first focuses on
describing the mixed order of battle, of
cavalry and infantry; The second part of the
book is a short treatise on infantry; the third,
only present in the Ambrosianus codex, is a
diagram of a fortified camp; The fourth is a
brief treatise on hunting as a military
exercise, present in M and A but not in VNP.
As previously mentioned, the development
of the work is preceded by a general index.
In turn, each book is introduced by a
particular index where the chapters are
broken down by their title. The chapters are
of variable length, from those with only a
few lines to those made up of numerous and
extensive paragraphs. Of the books, more
than half (the exceptions are VII, VIII, X and
XII) have a title that approximately informs
their content. Several of the books include
diagrams made with symbols (each of which
refers to a type of soldier) showing the
arrangement of troops in different orders of
battle.
Before starting the content, the author It
begins with an invocation to the divine
powers (the Holy Trinity and the Virgin Mary)
and a short prologue as a justification of the
work that follows, in which it indicates that
the state of the army has been neglected for
a long time and that this military manual,
aimed at high-ranking military personnel,
aims above all to provide practical
usefulness, starting from the beginning and
without presupposing any military concept as
previously known. It is, therefore, a work for
novice generals 58 . Of course, for the author,
love of God and justice are essential
conditions for good military work.
Book I, with nine chapters, as an
introduction, makes some general
considerations on training, weapons and
equipment, ranks of officers and troops,
organization of the army and units, and
military regulations and punishments for
those who violate them.
Book II has twenty chapters and bears the
generic title "On the formation of chivalry." It
continues to explain concepts that refer to
specific types of troops, weapons, medical
staff, troop organization in the line of battle,
ambushes, pennants on spears, battle cries
and banners and their use during combat.
Book III, which has sixteen chapters, is
titled "On the formation of tagmas ", but it
not only refers to this type of unit (formation
in closed order, training methods), but also
talks about another (the mere ), in addition
to the orders that must be given to each
type of troop, also including diagrams that
represent different ways of forming the army
for battle.
Book IV is a short book, with just five
chapters, titled "On Ambushes" and it
analyzes the different types of ambushes,
how to do them, when the most opportune
time is and what types of troops can be used
to carry them out.
Book V is also short, composed of five
chapters and is titled "On impedimenta." This
part provides ideas on how to carry and
protect all the material necessary for the
proper functioning of the army, both in the
form of supplies for the troops (some
necessary and others dispensable) and in the
form of spare horses.
Book VI, also with five chapters, is titled
"On the division of the army and on military
training", but, then, it says nothing about the
topic announced in the first part of the title
and, after a preamble before chapter 1 ,
which highlights the importance of constant
training for soldiers, focuses on explaining
the different types of training that at that
time were taught to Roman-Byzantine
soldiers, mostly taken from peoples who
were enemies of the Empire: Scythian,
Alana, African and Italic.
Book VII is a long book, without a generic
title that does have each of the two parts
into which it is divided: A, «About the
general. The points to be considered by the
general before the day of the battle", and B,
"On the points to be observed on the day of
the battle." In part A, also with an
introduction before chapter 1 (with fifteen
chapters in total), numerous and disparate
details are explained that a general in
command of an army must take into account
before fighting and ranging from the blessing
of the flags to the way of treating one's own
soldiers who are of the same race as the
enemy, including harangues, prisoners taken
from the enemy, the way of watering horses
or the rations carried in saddlebags. Part B
also has seventeen chapters on very variable
details, from how not to overwhelm the
general on the day of battle to the
obligations of each type of officer, including
information about the enemy,
reconnaissance (own and enemy), polishing
of one's own weapons or what to do whether
victory is achieved or whether it favors the
enemy.
Book VIII has no title and is very short in
chapters, just two, but both long in content.
The first talks about the general instructions
of the army commander, grouped into forty-
four points, while the second, entitled
"Mottos", breaks down into one hundred and
one short points the specific things that a
good general can never forget if he wants to.
succeed in your work.
Book IX, also without a generic title, has
five chapters and deals with various topics,
such as surprise and/or night attacks, how to
make incursions into hostile territory, how to
cross gorges and other difficult terrain, or
how to You have to spy on the enemy while
preventing him from doing the same with
your own army.
Book border fortress.
Book such as the Persians or the Turks ,
such as those of the western border, as well
as those who resemble the Huns ( Avars or
Scythians ) such as the Slavs or the
former "and other similar peoples", or those
that the author calls "peoples of hair of
course" ( Franks , Lombards "and others
like them").
The XII and last book also does not have a
generic title but is divided into four parts (the
first two much longer) that do have one: part
A is titled "On the mixed order of battle" and
has seven chapters; Part B, with an
introduction and twenty-four chapters, is
titled: "On infantry formations"; Part C is
titled “Diagram of a Fortified Camp” and that
is all it includes, while Part D (also without
chapters) is titled “On Hunting.” "How to
hunt wild animals without serious injuries or
serious accidents." Part A (which includes
diagrams) illustrates to the officers to whom
this military manual is directed the various
formations that an army can adopt to
confront the enemy, while part B (which also
includes a diagram) goes into numerous
details about own infantry: clothing, training
of both heavy and light infantry, weapons,
equipment, formations, castramentation,
formations without and with cavalry, how to
march (over various types of terrain), form
for battle, transport equipment... .
The author of the Strategikon (whether he
is the Emperor Maurice or any other) tells us
that this military treatise is the result, on the
one hand, of the teachings of ancient
authors and, on the other hand, of his
personal military experience (which he
himself qualifies in the Preamble of
"limited"). From these ancient authors (the
works of most of whom have not survived to
us) the author has taken a series of
references (not many and not always very
clear) to older military events (apart from the
events that are contemporary to him). and
which have already been reflected in chapter
III of this historical-literary introduction).
These events are: the defeat of Emperor
Decius at Abrittus (next to present-day
Hisarlak, near Razgrad, in the province of
Ruse, Bulgaria) in the summer of 251 by the
Goths (IV 3); the ambush suffered by the
army of the East in Anglon (a place near
present-day Dvin, south of Yerevan
[Yerevan], in the province of the same
name, in Armenia) in 543 by the Persians
(VII B 2); the operations of the Mauritanian
prince in the service of Rome Lusius Quietus
in the East during the war of the emperor
Trajan against the Parthians in 114-117 (IX
2). He also mentions ancient generals, such
as Hannibal the Carthaginian (Aníbal Barca)
(VIII 2, 87 and 89) or Scipio Africanus
(Publius Cornelius
Scipio Africanus) (VIII 2, 93).
Also noteworthy are the digressions that
Mauricio makes, almost with an
ethnographic character, when talking about
the different enemy peoples that the Empire
has to face: Persians , Scythians , Avars ,
Slavs , Germans from various tribes...
The military assessment that we can make
of this work, intended primarily for mainly
cavalry armies, is that, in principle, it is a
complex military manual since the
maneuvers it proposes for the different
situations on the battlefield and before and
after the Combat is, in general, complicated
and carrying it out correctly depended on
having very well-trained soldiers. Training a
soldier according to the parameters indicated
in the manual was a long, laborious and
expensive task, which brings us to another
military characteristic of the Strategikon:
given that in a battle one's own soldiers die
and training them properly is so expensive,
one must risk them in battle only when it is
essential or the immediate conditions of the
battle predict a victorious combat. This, in
turn, leads us to another military
characteristic easily related to one of the
clichés about the Byzantines: their ease at
negotiation and dissimulation. The author of
the Strategikon likes to pretend: that his own
army is larger, that his men have better
weapons than the enemy, that he has more
food than him, that his cavalry is better than
that of the adversary... In this sense he is
typically Byzantine, valuing deception more
than force and direct action: we must try to
deceive the enemy so that he does not force
combat and our side can achieve its
objectives without risking precious troops.
In Mauritius times, the main combat
weapon is the cavalry and this is reflected in
the manual. The days of the glorious legions
(heavy infantry units) that made the Roman
Empire great have passed. The foot soldiers
now remain as secondaries on the battlefield,
we will not say that as simple auxiliaries to
the horse soldiers but almost. One even
speaks (Strategikon IX 4) of armies made
only of cavalry.
We see that the Strategikon is a military
manual to be put into practice in numerous
of its instructions. Furthermore, insisting on
the practical aspect, he dedicates several
chapters to analyzing how to deal with each
of the peoples who, during the years prior to
the preparation of the book, had confronted
the Eastern Roman Empire and who,
predictably, would return. to do it, so it was
convenient to know them.
Likewise, the Strategikon dedicates many
lines to explaining the characteristics of a
good general ( strategos ): he must be a
man of honor, God-fearing, thoughtful, brave
when necessary, astute when the occasion
requires it, he must understand the mentality
of his men and ensure their well-being, he
must know how to coordinate his troops,
know when, when giving punishments to his
soldiers, he should be inflexible or
compassionate, intuit when it is time to sow
doubt among the enemy... Such are the
demands that the high officer who managed
to fulfill all these premises would be an
exceptional commander not only in the army
of the Eastern Roman Empire but in any
other army of any other era.
THE WORK IN ITS HISTORICAL

CONTEXT. THE ARMY OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE AND THE EASTERN ROMAN
EMPIRE
BETWEEN THE 3RD AND 6TH
CENTURIES
The army of Diocletian and Constantine

I
The army of the Eastern Roman Empire of
the time of Maurice is the direct heir of
which, reformed by the emperors Diocletian
(Caius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus, 284-
305) and Constantine I (Caius Flavius
Valerius Constantinus, 306-337) 59 , would be
again perfected by the reform of Justinian I
(527-565). The reforms undertaken by the
first two emperors mentioned consisted,
broadly speaking, on the one hand of
increasing the number of men in the ranks
(probably up to five hundred thousand), who
would be divided into two types of troops:
the border troops (limitanei), in charge to
monitor the limits (the border, the limes) of
the Empire and to do what they could in the
face of a invasion, and those of maneuver
(comitatense s 60 , of comitatus [retinue,
entourage]) that, stationed in the rear,
would go to the attacked point to contain the
invasion. Regarding the command structure,
the civil and military powers were separated,
leaving the provincial governors without the
military powers that they had had until then
and entrusting these to the duces (each
doge commanded a provincial border army),
to the committees (each come did the same
with the comitatensis army of a dioecese or
group of provinces) and, above them, other
officers that today we could classify as army
generals: the magistri militum, who could be
chiefs of the infantry ( magistri peditum
[literally, "masters of the infantry"]), of the
cavalry (magistri equitum ["masters of the
horsemen"]) or of both bodies at the same
time (magistri utriusque militiae ["masters of
both militias"]).
The units reduced their size (for example,
the legions went from a theoretical staff of
five thousand five hundred soldiers per unit,
to a number that ranged between one
thousand and one thousand two hundred)
and although the infantry continued to be
the fundamental nucleus of the Roman army,
The cavalry, which in high imperial times was
almost a mere auxiliary to the foot troops,
gained much more importance 61 .
As recruitment, voluntary in imperial times
(only in exceptionally dangerous occasions
could conscription be resorted to), it became
increasingly difficult due to the
socioeconomic conditions of the Late Roman
Empire, despite Diocletian's order to make
the offices hereditary ( among which the
military was included), Constantine I
promoted the inclusion of barbarian
mercenaries among the Roman units, doing
on a large scale what his predecessors had
only carried out. out to a much lesser extent.
The fact that barbarians were part of the
Roman army increased disproportionately
when, as a result of the shortage of troops
caused by the failed Persian campaign of
Emperor Julian (Flavius Claudius Iulianus,
360 363) 62 and due to the disaster of
Emperor Valens (Flavius Valens, 364-378)
before the Gothic visi 63 , it led Valens's
successor, Theodosius I (Flavius Theodosius,
379-395) to open the Roman army even
more to the barbarians, but not by framing
them in Roman units with Roman
commands, but by signing with entire towns
a treaty (foedus) by which those barbarians
(the first precisely the Visigoths ) began to
serve in the Roman army as foederati (
federates ), with their their own military
structure and under their own commands, in
exchange for the Roman Empire providing
them with supplies or land to get them
themselves.
Finally, a mention of the Roman imperial
navy. In traditional Roman armies, and
except in wars against eminently naval
powers such as Carthage and in the great
campaigns against pirates (such as the one
carried out by Pompey [Cneus Pompeius
Magnus] in 67 BC), naval squadrons had
played a secondary role, limited to the
surveillance of the seas, the transportation of
troops and supplies from one side of the
imperial seas to the other and occasional
controls of pirate outbreaks. The naval
system implemented by Augustus at the
beginning of the Empire was beginning to
decompose and be substantially modified,
but at the beginning of late imperial times
there were still two large fleets (classes)
based, one in Misenum (modern Miseno di
Bacoli, in the Italian province of Naples), and
another in
Ravenna, until in 330 Constantine I ordered
the transfer of both to Constantinople. Other
regional fleets, of lesser importance,
completed the naval device, monitoring areas
such as British waters (the classis
Britannica), those of the Black Sea (the
classis Moesica in the west and the classis
Pontica in the east), those of the eastern
Mediterranean (the classis Syriaca, to the
north, and the classis Alexandrina, to the
south) or the various river flotillas that
monitored the waters of the Rhine (which
together made up the classis Germanica) and
Danube (the classis Histrica) rivers. They
were commanded by prefects (praefecti) and
the ships that comprised them varied in size
and shape depending on the missions for
which they had been designed.
The army of Justinian I and Maurice

Emperor Justinian I, when conceiving the
idea of reestablishing the Roman Empire in
all its splendor, recovering the lands lost in
the West first with the division of the Empire
in January 395 and then with the conquest of
them by various barbarian peoples
throughout the 5th century, he realized that
the army was going to be indispensable to
carry it out. The good economic situation
that Justinian inherited from his predecessors
when he came to the throne in 527 allowed
him to form an army of about one hundred
and fifty thousand men 64 in total (far less
than the eastern part of the Roman world
would have in times of the single Empire).
When an army went on a campaign, the
number of its members was much smaller:
the example is usually given to the army of
the magister utriusque militiae per Orientem
65
Flavius Belisarius who, sent in 533 to take
over the North African kingdom of the
Vandals, was formed by sixteen thousand
men, of which ten thousand were infantry,
five thousand cavalry, both categories
between regular and federated troops, in
addition to another thousand soldiers of
various origins 66 . Two years later, Belisarius
himself undertook the conquest of Sicily, a
step prior to landing on the Italian peninsula,
with barely seven thousand, four thousand
between regulars and federates and three
thousand Isaurians 67 . Regarding the
conditions of service, the soldiers were
professional and the emperor took care,
whenever possible, to ensure that they were
well equipped and trained.
For fundamentally economic reasons (it
was cheaper to maintain), in Justinian's army
the largest part was made up of the light
infantry, but the main body was the cavalry
(both light and heavy), whose personnel was
increased compared to the previous
century. . most of These soldiers were part
of the maneuver armies (the old
comitatenses), both central (the praesentalis
armies, for being "in the presence" of the
emperor), and regional. Within the units that
formed them, horse archers (equites
sagittarii) were especially appreciated. The
bucellarians constituted the elite of the
armies and the various corps of
bucellarians constituted at that time the
personal guard of a general in the field 68 .
The federates (foederati), as we have seen
when we see the composition of Belisarius'
troops in his expeditions to Africa and Sicily,
continued to exist, but reorganized and
restructured. Now they became regular units,
mostly cavalry, commanded by Roman
officers, composed of foreigners who enlisted
as individuals. Foreign tribes continued to
occasionally be recruited en masse, soldiers
who in the Roman-Byzantine army were
known, as in the old days of republican
Rome, by the name of socii or allies. They
also had this category (although they were
officially called symmachoi) border towns
that did not directly participate in the
Byzantine army, but did receive subsidies
from the emperor to maintain surveillance on
the border they controlled, in the case of the
Arabs (or Saracens). who monitored part of
the possible areas of friction with the
Sassanid Persians . Likewise, there
continued to exist border soldiers (limitanei),
organized as a militia composed of infantry
and cavalry units of peasant-soldiers who,
when they carried out their surveillance on
the banks of a large border river (the
Danube, above all), received the name of
ripenses. or riparienses (from lat. ripa:
shore). If necessary, the limitationei/ripenses
were temporarily assigned to the maneuver
armies, in the style of the ancient
pseudocomitatenses (cf. note 60). Likewise,
we know of the existence of urban militias in
the cities, most of the time used as police
forces. The emperor's security was entrusted
to mostly horse soldiers, the excubitors, and
to selected officers, who formed the body of
the protectors domestici. Finally there would
be the ships of the imperial navy and its
crew members, direct heirs (ships and men),
both in missions and ships, organization and
main naval bases of the late Roman fleets of
the 4th century.
Regarding the armament and equipment of
the Eastern Roman armies, as these lines are
nothing more than an introduction for the
translation of the Strategikon, we will not go
into the subject, but in this regard the reader
can consult the works of R. D'Amato (2005),
S. McDowall (1994 and 1995), D. Nicolle
(1992) and I. Syvänne (cf. all of them in the
bibliography).
Regarding the proportion between infantry
and cavalry in the armies in the field, taking
as an example the aforementioned army of
Belisarius, about six thousand of the soldiers
were cavalry (a thousand of them bucellars
of Belisarius himself) and the rest of infantry,
of all of whom at least half were barbarian
mercenaries.
The soldiers' salary was received partly in
cash and partly in kind and a body of
accountants and military auditors were in
charge of distributing it to the units, which
also had medical bodies and military priests.
The high command was, naturally, headed
by the emperor. Under him and appointed by
him were the magistri utriusque militiae, one
for each diocese or set of provinces (magistri
utriusque militiae per Illyricum, per Orientem
and per Thracias) and two more, called
magistri utriusque militiae praesentalis, were
in charge of ensuring the defense of
Constantinople. Sometimes there were three
magistri u. m. praesentalis and sometimes
the commands of the dioceses were also split
(for example, there were at the same time
two magistri u. m. per Orientem) 69 . To
assume responsibility for new fronts, new
military commands were created in the
Justinian era, such as those of magister
militum per Armeniam (or m. m. Armeniae),
magister militum per Africam (or m. m.
Africae) and magister militum per Spaniam
(or m. m. Spaniae). Under all these high
commands were the dukes (duces) who
commanded the troops in each specific
province and, already in Mauritius times
(although an innovation by Justinian I), the
strategos , who led armies in campaign 70 .
The federates were
commanded by the comes foederatum.
The way to enter the Eastern Roman army
of this time, being a professional army, was,
in most cases, volunteering, with compulsory
recruitment occasionally used to fill the
ranks. Those responsible for Justinian's
recruitment offices did not ask the origin of
the recruits and men of all origins were
admitted, as long as they agreed to swear
obedience and fidelity to the emperor, to the
Roman laws and to the officers designated to
command them on the Gospels. Border
militias used to be recruited from inhabitants
of their region.
Already in the time of Mauritius, the
military organization of the Eastern Roman
Empire was basically that of the time of
Justinian I, with some novelties such as the
creation of the optimates , the progressive
integration of the bucellarians into the
regular army and the little relevance to the
that the role of the border militias was
reduced. Another important novelty was that
compulsory recruitment had been imposed in
the imperial domains, as interest in enlisting
in the army had fallen greatly, so volunteers
began to become scarce, with the
consequence that conscription had to be
implemented. However, some social groups
were excluded in principle from it, such as
freedmen, serfs and officials (whether from
the State or members of the local
administration). Slaves were part of the
army, although, naturally, not in combat
missions, only as workers at the service of
soldiers. Others who could also be part of
the army as combatants were prisoners
taken in military campaigns. These Vandals,
Goths , Persians , Avars , etc., had the
choice of becoming slaves after their capture
or enlisting in the ranks of their captors.
Many chose the latter option. Responsibility
for the recruitment process remained in the
hands of the provincial (the duces) and state
(the magistri militum) military chiefs.
Likewise under the Mauritius empire, unit
type designations were not fixed and could
be applied to both mounted and foot units.
Nor was the number of soldiers per unit fixed
(as we can see throughout the development
of the Strategikon). The tagma or flag was
the main type of unit, especially in the
cavalry. It had between three and four
hundred men and was commanded by a
tribune or count ; The aritmos used to be
the basic infantry unit and had approximately
the same number of men as a tagma or
flag; three tagmas or flags formed a
moira or chiliarchy , whose contingent had
to be between two thousand and three
thousand soldiers, under the command of a
moirarch , chiliarch or duke ; Three
moiras or chiliarchies form a meres ,
which should not exceed six thousand or
seven thousand soldiers, commanded by a
merarch or stratelates . As we see, adding
numbers of soldiers the figures do not agree,
but in the Strategikon (I 4) it is stated very
clearly. The army in the field was
commanded by a strategos , supported by
a hypostrategos . The rest of the chain of
command, below the tribune or count, was
made up of the hecatontarch (who
commanded one hundred men), the
decarca (ten) and the pentarch (five).
1 To biograph the Emperor Maurice there are

numerous sources, among which we can mention the
Historiae Ecclesiasticae of Evagrius, John of Ephesus
and Nicephorus Callisto; the Historiae, by Teofilacto
Simocatta and Agathías; the Chronicae, of Juan de
Nikiu and Miguel el Sirio; the Epistolarum Registrum,
of Pope Gregory I; the preserved Fragmenta of
Menander the Protector; the Compendium
Historiarum, by Jorge Cedreno; the Historia
Langobardorum, by Paul the Deacon; the
Chronographia, by Gregorio Bar Hebreo; the Vita
Eutychii, by Eustratio or the Epitome Historiarum, by
Zonaras and, in addition, the Chronicon Paschale or
the Chronicon Anonymi ad annum Domini 1234
pertinens. Everything that is told in these works can
be seen, systematized and structured, in
MARTINDALE (1992) pp. 855-860.
2 This province was the ancient late Roman empire
of Armenia II which, with its capital at Melitene
(modern Eski Malatya, Malatya Province, Turkey), was
in turn a subdivision of the early Roman empire of
Cappadocia.
3 A notarius was a type of accountant and, if he
was assigned to a military unit, together with the
librarius he kept the accounts of the unit. We do not
know if Mauricio worked until then in a civil or military
office.
4 That is, ennobled. The title of patricius was
generally linked to the granting of a high office.
5 The excubitors, whose commander was the comes
excubitorum, constituted a special bodyguard of the
emperor, created in 468 by the Eastern Roman
Emperor Leo I (Flavius Valerius Leo, 457-474) and
which in the 6th century included three hundred
soldiers recruited from the harsh inhabitants of the
mountainous province of Isauria (in the south of
present-day Turkey, around the the western province
of Mersin, the eastern province of Antalya and the
southern province of Karaman). At least originally,
they dressed in the old Roman style. At the beginning
of the 7th century it had ceased to be a unit with
military value and had become a contingent destined
for parades and military parades. About them, cf.
NICOLLE (1992) p. 9 and D'AMATO (2005) p. Four.
Five.
6 Dioceses were groupings of bordering provinces
governed by a vicar (vicarius), a civil official appointed
by the emperor. The institution of these territorial
demarcations dated back to the empire of Diocletian
(Caius Valerius Aurelius Diocletianus, 284-305).
7 King of Kings, was his official title.
8 It had been many years since annual consuls had
not been appointed on a regular basis. When Maurice
assumed his consulship there had been no consuls
since Tiberius II took office in 579. As the Roman
custom for dating documents was according to
consular years, when there was a year in which
consuls were not appointed, the formula was used
annus I (or II, or III, or whatever corresponds) post
consulatum and the name of the last consul or consuls
(if two had been appointed in the reference year, as
was traditional).
9 On the personality of Mauricio, cf. the
Ecclesiastical History (V, 19) of Evagrius. It is true that
the description he makes of Maurice seems more like
a panegyric than something realistic, but it must be
taken into account that the author wrote his work
under his empire and dedicated it to him in 593.
10 In the division of Roman lands in January 395
between the Eastern and Western Empires, the
province of Pannonia II, where Sirmium was located,
was left in the western part. Its incorporation,
although only in part, to the East occurred in the
course of the conquests of Justinian I (527-565) who,
since he had no more Pannoniae in his power,
renamed the territory as the province of Pannonia,
simply.
11 Solidus: gold coin of 4.55 g and a fineness of
0.900 introduced by Emperor Constantine I (Caius
Flavius Valerius Constantinus, 306-337) in 309 and
used until the end of the empire of Constantine VII
(912-959).
12 Aquis (ancient Ad Aquas, today probably the ruins
next to Miloševo, in the northern vicinity northwest of
Negotin, and south of Prahovo, in the Bor district,
Serbia), Rateria (ancient Ratiaria, today Arčar, in the
province of Montana, Bulgaria), Bononia (today Vidin,
also in the province of Montana, Bulgaria), Dorostolon
(ancient Durostorum, today Silistra, in the province of
Ruse, Bulgaria), Marcianopolis (today Šumen, also in
the province of Ruse, Bulgaria) and Tropaion (the
former Tropaeum Traiani, today Adamclisi, in the
district of Constanta, Romania).
13 Since the capture of Sirmium by the Avars in 582,
the sources do not mention the maneuver army
(exercitus comitatensis) of Illyricum, so it would
probably have been dissolved and its soldiers
incorporated into the maneuver army of Thracia
(ELTON [2007a ] p. 277).
14 We cannot assure that it was under the command
of Comentiolus or Philippicus when such a war crime
was committed (forgive us for the anachronism, when
applying a concept from the 20th century to an event
from the 6th century) because we do not know how
long these prisoners had been in their hands. of the
Avars . About all this, cf. MARTINDALE (1992) pp.
324-325 and 1025. Philippicus was married to Gordia,
sister of Maurice.
15 Something that is completely in accordance with
what Mauricio formulates in his Strategikon (XI 4),
where, although applied in that case to the
Scythians , he says: "... it is preferable to launch
attacks against them in the winter, when they cannot
easily hide in the bare trees, when the footprints of
the fugitives can be located in the snow, when their
group family is in need and when it is easy to cross
over frozen rivers.
16 The exarch united in his person the civil and
military powers of the region he governed, which
represented a return to the late Roman imperial
system of separating said powers, placing them in the
hands of different officials.
17 The exarchate of Ravenna is mentioned for the
first time in the sources in the year 584 and that of
Africa in 591 (ELTON [2007a] p. 277).
18 On this topic, cf. two recent works: VALLEJO
GIRVÉS (2012) and GÓMEZ ARAGONÉS (2013). A few
years older: VIZCAÍNO SÁNCHEZ (2009).
19 With the creation of the administrative system of
dioceses in the times of the aforementioned emperor
Diocletian, the province of Mauretania Tingitana, to
which the two mentioned cities belonged, became
dependent on the dioecese Hispaniarum or diocese of
the Hispanias, governed in its civil aspects by a
vicarius (vicar) resident in Emerita Augusta (present-
day Mérida, province of Badajoz, Autonomous
Community of Extremadura, Spain). However, the
Byzantine dominions in that ancient province barely
went beyond the lands that surrounded these
localities.
20 D. Gómez Aragonés (2013, pp. 55-56) is of the
opinion, however, that it is unlikely that this city had
ever been in Byzantine hands. This would imply that
Corduba would never be the capital of the dominions
of the Eastern Empire in the Iberian Peninsula.
21 We do not know if this is the same Comentiolus
who was the emperor's general and right-hand man
and who has already been mentioned several times.
The only reference to the Comentiolus assigned to
Hispania is an inscription (Corpus Inscriptionum
Latinarum II 3.420; L'Année Épigraphique 1998, 624;
Hispania Epigraphica 7, 1997, 444 ab) deposited in
the Municipal Archaeological Museum of Cartagena
which, translated into Spanish, says : «The patrician
Comenciolus, sent by the emperor Maurice against the
barbarian enemies [...] general of the army of
Hispania [...]». Regarding the doubt of its attribution
to that character or to others, cf. VALLEJO GIRVÉS
(2012) pp. 294 et seq.
22 However, she would be another wife in Chosroes'
harem, since the Persians practiced polygamy.
23 Domitianus was a cousin of Maurice and bishop of
Melitene (modern Eski Malatya, in the Turkish
province of Malatya), despite which he lived in
Constantinople, as an advisor to the emperor. About
this character, cf. KAEGI, W.E. and KAZHDAN, A.
(1991): "Domitians", in The Oxford Dictionary of
Byzantium (Alexander P. Kazhdan, Ed.), Oxford-New
York.
24 Monophysitism is a religious doctrine of Christianity
that emerged in the first half of the 5th century. The
Monophysites were of the opinion that Jesus Christ
had two natures, the divine and the human,
"separate" but "confused", in such a way that the
human nature was diluted in the much more powerful
divine nature, which in practice led to that Christ had
only one nature, the divine. The official Church
maintained (as the Catholic and Greek Orthodox
Churches maintain today) that the two natures exist in
Jesus Christ and that they do so "without separation"
and "without confusion." Monophysite beliefs are
currently maintained in the Syrian Orthodox, East
Syrian (from India), Coptic (from Egypt), Ethiopian
and Eritrean Orthodox Churches and the Armenian
Apostolic Church.
25 This despite the fact that around 580, during his
time (until 585) as a papal apocrisiary (ambassador)
in Constantinople, he had met the future emperor
Maurice and made friends with his family.
26 The hippodrome (for the Romans, the circus) of
Constantinople was a hotbed of political, religious and
social passions. Of the old four traditional factions,
identified by color (the reds, the whites, the blues and
the greens), only the blues and greens remained,
which had absorbed the other two. The fans of these
sports teams were not content just to cheer them to
death on the racetrack, but were easy prey for
demagogues who wanted to direct the factions' desire
to seek quarrels to their advantage. Furthermore, at
this time each of them adhered to a version of
Christianity: Catholics (Orthodox) the blues, and
Monophysites the greens. They generally
counterbalanced each other but when they joined
together they could trigger real revolts, such as that
of the Nike in 532 against Justinian I or this one
against Maurice.
27 DAIN (1967) pp. 317-392, especially 344-346;
WIITA (1978) pp. 15-49.
28 WIITA (1978) p. twenty-one.
29 SCHEFFERUS, J.: Arriani Tactica et Maurici Artis
militaris libri duodecimo, Uppsala, 1664.
30 AUSSARESSES (1906) pp. 23-40.
31 DENNIS (1981a) pp. 13-18; DENNIS (1984) p. XV.
32 Anth. Graec. IX 210.
33 VÂRI (1894).
34 DAIN (1967) p. 3. 4. 5.
35 DENNIS (1981a) pp. 16-17.
36 WIITA (1978) pp. 30-49.
37 About this character, cf. MARTINDALE (1992) pp.
1022-1026.
38 That of the Theotokos (an invocation of the Virgin
Mary), which he himself had founded years before in
Chrysopolis (Üskudar [Escútari], today a
neighborhood in the Asian urban area of Istanbul, in
the province of Istanbul, Turkey).
39 NICOLLE (1995b) p. 27.
40 BROWNING (1989) pp. 103-133.
41 ALEXIOU (2002) p. 77.
42 BROWNING (1989) pp. 103-104.
43 LEON VI, Tacticae Constitutiones, Migne PG 107,
1093A.
44 CONSTANTINE PORPHYROGENITOS, De
Administrando Imperio I 1; De Caerimoniis V 2, 4;
Alexiou has compared the work of Maurice with
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus whose two works,
De Administrando Imperio and De Caerimoniis,
contain evidence of this linguistic change with a high
proportion of Latinisms for technical terms of the
ceremonial dress suggesting close connections
between East and West; on this matter, cf. ALEXIOU
(2002) p. 77 and 467, no. 17.
45 DAIN (1946) pp. 183-185; IRIGOIN (1958) pp.
208-227; IRIGOIN (1959) 177-180.
46 IRIGOIN (1959) pp. 189-190.
47 DAIN (1946) pp. 232-234; DAIN (1967) p. 386.
48 DAIN (1946) pp. 227-232; IRIGOIN (1959) pp.
189-190; DAIN (1967) p. 387.
49 DAIN (1967) p. 385.
50 DAIN (1967) pp. 354-357.
51 DAIN (1946) pp. 187-198; DENNIS (1981a) pp. 31-
33.
52 On military treatises prior to Mauritius, cf. DAIN
(1967) pp. 317-344.
53 About all these characters from Roman history, D.
Paniagua Aguilar, in its edition by the aforementioned
author (Flavio Vegecio Renato: Compendio de Tactica
Militar, Edic. Chair. Madrid, 2006, pp. 148-150, nos.
41-48), gives abundant information, which we can
complete more. The first of them, Cato the Elder (the
Censor), was actually called Marcus Porcius Cato
(234-149 BC) and was a Roman politician, consul in
195 BC, perhaps the most traditionalist of all the
politicians that his homeland gave, author of the
famous phrase "delenda esse Carthago" ("Carthage
must be destroyed") (PLUTARCH: Life of Marcus Cato
17) which pointed out that until the Carthaginian city
was destroyed, Rome could not let its guard down (he
would not reach it). Let's see, since the ruin of
Carthage finally took place in 146 BC). From his
literary production, as far as military matters are
concerned, it is known that around 180 BC. C. wrote
an encyclopedic manual titled Libri ad filium (now
lost), intended for the education of his son (Marcus
Porcius Cato Licinianus) as a good citizen and which,
touching on various fields of knowledge, also had a
part dedicated to military matters; Cornelius Celsus
(Aulus Cornelius Celsus) lived between c. 25 BC and
50 AD and was a Roman scholar who wrote, perhaps
in the time of the emperor Tiberius (Ti. Claudius Nero,
14-37), a kind of encyclopedia entitled Arts, of which
only the eight books dedicated to the art of healing
and collectively titled De Medicina have survived.
Among the lost parts of the work is one dedicated to
military affairs; Frontinus (Sextus Iulius Frontinus)
lived between the years 30 and 104 and, apart from
his literary production, was an important Roman
politician and military man (he was governor of
Britannia in 75-78, a few years later proconsul of Asia
and became consul three years later). times: in 73 or
74, in 98 and in 100). He wrote some literary works,
some on administrative matters and some on military
themes, such as a theoretical treatise on military art
(lost and of which we only have references in other
works) and his Stratagemata (Stratagems), a
collection of examples of tactics and stratagems used.
by military men from the Greek and Roman worlds,
which fortunately has been preserved; Paterno is
Publius? Tarrutenius Paternus, a high official in the
Roman administration of the 2nd century AD who was
secretary ab epistulis latinis (secretary of the Latin
chancellery) of the emperor Marcus Aurelius (Marcus
Aelius Aurelius Verus, 161-180), member of his
comitatus ("General Staff"), carrying out various
missions during the emperor's Danubian wars. in the
170s, and in 179 appointed Praefectus Praetorio
(commander of the Praetorian Guard). Around 182,
with Commodus (Lucius Aelius Aurelius Commodus,
180-192) on the throne, while still in office, he was
accused of participating in a conspiracy and had him
executed by the emperor. Regarding his literary
production, this was of a legal nature, systematizing
in four books (now lost) the legal doctrine of the
Roman military system. The little of his work that has
survived to us is found in the Digesta, a part of the
Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian I. (Flavius Petrus
Sabbatius Iustinianus, 527-565); of the emperors
Augustus (Caius Iulius Caesar Octavianus, later
Imperator Caesar Augustus, 27 BC - 14 AD), Trajan
(Marcus Vlpius Traianus, 98-117) and Hadrian (Publius
Aelius Hadrianus, 117-138) we will not say anything
here that cannot be found in any encyclopedia. We
will mention the issuance on their part of many
military constitutions (constitutions): decrees and
provisions promulgated by them and that affected
army affairs, many of which have come down to us
included in the aforementioned Justinian Corpus.
54 Although in this case, seeing the topic discussed in
that paragraph (how a military camp is built and
organized), we can know that it is referring to authors
such as Polybius (Historiae), Pseudo-Hyginius (De
Munitionibus Castrorum) or Vegetius (Epitoma Rei
Militaris).
55 Always taking into account, naturally, that the
divine power to which Onasander refers is that of the
Greco-Latin gods, while the divine power to which
Maurice asks for help is that of the God of the
Christians.
56 Some of the Procopyan influences on Mauricio's
work are studied by Lillington-Martin (2010).
57 On Byzantine military writers after Mauritius, cf.
DAIN (1967), pp. 346-390.
58 It is well known that until not too distant times, a
man could obtain an important military command not
by demonstrating his military expertise, but through
his social status, family relations or royal or imperial
favor, which implied that Many generals obtained
important military responsibilities while being at least
inexperienced and often incompetent (the Roman and
Byzantine empires, in the case at hand, are full of
examples).
59 Regarding these reforms, on which we are not
going to focus too much here because they are not
the subject of this study, there is an abundant
bibliography, among which we can cite: NISCHER, EC
(1923): "The Army Reforms of Diocletian and
Constantine and their Modifications up to the Time of
the Notitia Dignitatum", Journal of Roman Studies 13;
PARKER, H.M.D. (1933): “The Legions of Diocletian
and Constantine,” Journal of Roman Studies 23; VAN
BERCHEM, D. (1952): L'armée de Dioclétien et la
réforme constantinienne, Paris; HOFFMANN, D.
(1970): Das spätrömische Bewergunsheer und die
Notitia Dignitatum, Düsseldorf; SIMKINS, M. (1979):
The Roman Army from Hadrian to Constantine,
Oxford; McDOWALL, S. (1994): Late Roman
Infantryman 236-565 AD, Oxford; McDOWALL, S.
(1995): Late Roman Calvalryman 236-565 AD, Oxford;
DIXON, K.R. and SOUTHERN, P. (1996): The Late
Roman Army, London; CROMWELL, R.S. (1998): The
Rise and Decline of the Late Roman Field Army,
Shippensburg (Pennsylvania); NICASIE, M.J. (1998):
Twilight of Empire. The Roman Army from the Reign
of Diocletian until the Battle of Adrianople,
Amsterdam; RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ, J. (2006): "The
military reforms of Diocletian and Constantine",
Historia 16, 357, March. In addition to all this, in the
corresponding chapters in more general works.
60 Among these maneuver troops, two other
categories would be created throughout the 4th
century; the palatinae (from palatium or palace, place
of residence of the emperor), assigned to the person
of the emperor, and who became the most prestigious
troops of the Empire, and the pseudocomitatenses (or
false comitatenses), border troops temporarily
assigned (sometimes in a fixed way) to the
comitatenses armies, but without having (hence the
pseudo-) the prestige, pay and conditions of service of
the units of this category (better than those of the
limitationei, from which the pseudocomitatenses came
).
61 This importance had already been prefigured by
the reforms of Emperor Gallienus (Publius Licinius
Egnatius Gallienus, 253-268), who greatly increased
the recruitment of cavalry units among the peoples of
the Empire with special skills for this military specialty
(equites Mauri or Mauretanici, equites Dalmatae and
equites Osrhoenae) and constituted heavy cavalry
units (the clibanarii or cataphractarii) in the Persian
style.
62 Which began very promisingly but ended with a
full-fledged retreat that caused numerous casualties,
including that of the emperor, who died in a skirmish
on June 26, 363 near a town called Phrygia (currently
of unknown location, but in the vicinity southeast of
Sāmarrā', Salahuddīn [Saladin] province, Iraq).
63 Emperor Valens and a large part of the maneuver
army of the eastern part of the Empire (the western
part was then commanded by Gratian [Flavius
Gratianus, 375-383], Valens's nephew), were
annihilated by the Visigoths along with the city of
Hadrianopolis (modern Edirne, in the Turkish province
of the same name), in the province of Haemimontus,
on August 9, 378.
64 Agathías (V 13, 7) tells us that the contingent The
Empire's military had reached that number from the
six hundred and forty-five thousand men it had had at
the time of the unified Empire. Other estimates
(SYVÄNNE [2013] p. 11) place the total contingent of
the Justinian army at between three hundred
thousand and three hundred fifty thousand soldiers
and Procopius of Caesarea himself (De Bello Gothico
VI 28, 10) raises it (exaggeratedly, in our opinion) to
half a million soldiers during the war against the Ostro
Goths in Italy (535-554). Cf. also McGEER and
KAZHDAN (1991) p. 184.
65 Despite being appointed leader of this expedition
to western lands, he maintained the title.
66 Procopius De Bello Vandalico III 11, 2 and 10-11.
67 Procopius De Bello Gothico V 5, 2. The Isaurians
belonged to a mountainous ethnic group in the south
of present-day Turkey whose members had a
reputation for being good soldiers. In early imperial
times they lived in the rugged western part of the
province of Cilicia, a region that at the beginning of
the 4th century AD It was converted into the province
of Isauria. With men of this origin, the emperor
Probus (Marcus Aurelius Probus, 276-282) came to
create three legions during his Empire: the I Isauria
Sagittaria, the II Isauria and the III Isauria (for the
history of these units, see RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ, J.:
History of the Roman legions, Madrid, 2001 [2nd
edition of 2003], each in its corresponding entry).
With Leo I the Isaurian (Favius Valerius Leo, 457-474)
one of his own came to occupy the throne of the
Eastern Roman Empire, succeeded by his son-in-law,
also an Isaurian, Zeno (Tarasicodissa, 474-491) and
with Leo III, also called the Isaurian (717-741), the
members of this ethnic group came to provide the
Byzantine Empire with a dynasty, the Isauric, which
would maintain the throne until the year 802.
68 The aforementioned Belisarius had seven thousand
of them under his command (Procopio De Bello
Gothico VII 1, 18-20).
69 RAVEGNANI (2007) p. 71.
70 RAVEGNANI (2007) pp. 72-75; SYVÄNNE (2013) p.
13
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Note on the present

translation
The Greek edition on which our translation
has been based is that of GT Dennis, Das
Strategikon des Maurikios, Vienna, 1981.
This edition is accompanied by a glossary of
technical and military terms. For quick
reference, in the translation itself those
entries contained in the glossary have been
highlighted in bold.
Abbreviations
c.: around.
cap.: chapter.
cf.: confront.
col., cols.: column, columns.
ed., eds.: editor, editors.
ed.: edition.
Fig.: figure (illustration)
Gl.: Glossary.
Int.: Introduction.
lat.: in Latin.
n., ns.: note, notes.
ND Or.: Notitia Dignitatum, pars Orientis.
p., pp.: page, pages.
PIR2: DESSAU, H., GROAG, E., STEIN, A.,
PETERSEN, L. and ROHDEN, P. von:
Prosopographia Imperii Romani, Berlin-
Amsterdam, 1933. (2nd edition).
RE: Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen
Altertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart, 1895
onwards.
Tx.: Text.
vol., vols.: volume, volumes.
Strategikon
(About the general) of
Mauritius, emperor
Eastern
PREAMBLE
BOOK I
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1. In what way is it convenient that
the soldiers are trained in their instruction
Episode 2. How is it advisable to arm the
riders and what basic equipment should
they be provided with?
Chapter 3. About the various titles of officers
1 and soldiers
Chapter 4. How is it advisable to divide the
army and its officers?
Chapter 5. How tagma commanders should
choose their subordinate officers and
leaders for combat and organize tagmas
into collusion
Chapter 6. The regulations on military crimes
that must be given to the troops
that must be given to the commanders of
the tagmas
Chapter 8. About military punishments
Chapter 9. What organization should the
army have in its own territory when there is
no hostile activity?
BOOK II
ON THE FORMATION OF THE
CHIVALRY
Chapter 1. On the usefulness and necessity of
forming the army in two lines
Episode 2. Of the organization of the tagmas
in the line of battle
Chapter 3. Assault and defense troops
Chapter 4. About flankers and attack
flankers
Chapter 5. Ambushes in the rear or on the
flanks of the enemy line
Chapter 6. About the depth of training
Chapter 7. About collusion
Chapter 8. About weapons
Chapter 9. About the medical team
Chapter 10. About the pennants of the
spears
Chapter 11. About spies or explorers
Chapter 12. About mensores and betting
games
Chapter 13. On the distances between the
groupers and the battle lines
Chapter 14. About the size and difference
between the banners
Chapter 15. About the custody of the
banners
Chapter 16. About the place of officers
Chapter 17. About those who blow the horns
Chapter 18. About the battle cries that arise
in the midst of conflict
Chapter 19. About the heralds
Chapter 20. On the convenience of using two
banners
BOOK III
Chapter 1. The symbols used to illustrate
tagma formations
Episode 2. The formation of the tagmas
claiming a force of three hundred and ten
men
Chapter 3. Scheme of the same tagma with
its flanks in closed order
both flanks and the rear in closed order
Chapter 5. Tagma training methods
Chapter 6. The formation of groupers .
Explanation of the symbols that illustrate the
formation of groupers and their personnel
Chapter 7. Explanation of the symbols that
illustrate the formation of the first and second
lines
Chapter 8. Formation of the entire line when
the impediment is present
Chapter 9. An individualized grouper
Chapter 10. Formation of an army of
moderate strength
Chapter 11. General orders
Chapter 12. Orders to front line troops
Chapter 13. Orders to the flankers
Chapter 14. Orders to attack flankers
Chapter 15. Orders to the troops of the
second line
Chapter 16. Orders to troops assigned to
ambushes
BOOK IV
ABOUT AMBUSHES
Chapter 1. About ambushes and stratagems
against enemy troops
superiors
Episode 2. About the ambushes of the
Scythians
Chapter 3. About the ambushes carried out
by both sides
Chapter 4. About the most opportune
moment for ambushes
Chapter 5. On the convenience of using
irregular formations for ambushes or surprise
attacks
BOOK V
Chapter 1. On the precautions to take into
account when carrying the impedimenta to
the battlefield
Episode 2. About reserve horses
Chapter 3. About the non-necessary
impediment
Chapter 4. About the intermediate camps
Chapter 5. About the protection of
BOOK VI
ON THE DIVISION OF THE ARMY AND
ON MILITARY INSTRUCTION
Preamble
Chapter 1. About Scythian instruction,
simulation
Episode 2. About wing instruction, simulation
Chapter 3. About African-style instruction,
simulation
Chapter 4. Regarding the italic instruction,
the most common
Chapter 5. How should flankers and
flankers be trained?
stroke
BOOK VII
PART A. ABOUT THE GENERAL. THE
POINTS TO CONSIDER BY THE
GENERAL BEFORE THE DAY OF THE
BATTLE
Preamble
Chapter 1. About the blessing of the flags
Episode 2. On the organization of collusion
Chapter 3. About gathering information about
the enemy
Chapter 4. On the use of harangue to
encourage troops
Chapter 5. About enemy prisoners taken by
patrols
Chapter 6. About the punishment of
criminals
Chapter 7. On the maintenance of soldiers,
their horses and their camps Chapter 8. On
consultations with the merarchs about the
battlefield Chapter 9. On how to water horses
Chapter 10. About the rations carried in the
saddlebags
Chapter 11. On how to wage war against
unknown people
Chapter 12. About the enemy's surprise
attacks during the march
Chapter 13. About the camps and the care of
the horses inside them
Chapter 14. On how not to loot enemy bodies
during battle
Chapter 15. About people similar to
enemy

OBSERVED ON THE DAY OF THE
BATTLE
Chapter 1. On how not to overwhelm the
strategos during the day of battle Chapter 2.
About enemy archers Chapter 3. About how
we should not engage the enemy or show our
own strength before knowing his intentions
Chapter 4. On hiding the second line when it
is unable to follow behind the first, so that
the two appear as one
Chapter 5. On the tactics and method of
dealing with a surprise attack by the enemy
Chapter 6. About the wounded
Chapter 7. On the apparent strength of the
enemy
Chapter 8. About prevention of
hostile reconnaissance of our line
Chapter 9. About how to protect the
camp
Chapter 10. How to gather fodder
Chapter 11. About an adverse outcome
Chapter 12. About a favorable outcome in the
battle
Chapter 13. About recognition
Chapter 14. On how not to expose our
second line too soon
Chapter 15. About keeping the surface of
weapons shiny to be seen from afar before
battle
Chapter 16. On the recapitulation of the
obligations of each merarch
Chapter 17. About the recapitulation of the
type of obligations assigned to the
commanders of each tagma , the moirarchs
and the merarchs , so that each one knows
his obligation
BOOK VIII
Chapter 1. About general instructions for the
commander
Episode 2. Mottos
BOOK IX
ABOUT SURPRISE ATTACKS
Chapter 1. About surprise attacks Chapter 2.
About night attacks Chapter 3. About
incursions into hostile territory: safe advance
through it and its looting without suffering
losses
Chapter 4. About passing through gorges and
rugged territory
Chapter 5. How to spy on the enemy and how

to capture scouts or enemies trying to
infiltrate our army
BOOK
Chapter 1. How to organize a siege of enemy
fortresses if opportunity allows
Episode 2. How to conduct an encounter with
hostile incursions within our own territory
Chapter 3. How to endure a siege that is
supposed to be long
Chapter 4. How to build a border fortress
cautiously and without engaging in open
combat
BOOK XI
ABOUT CUSTOMS AND TACTICS

OF THE VARIOUS PEOPLES
Introduction
Chapter 1. How to deal with Persians
Episode 2. How to deal with the Scythians ,
that is, Avars , Turks and others whose way
of life resembles that of the Hunnic peoples
Chapter 3. How to deal with light-haired
people, such as the Franks , Lombards and
others like them
Chapter 4. How to deal with the Slavs , the
Ante and other similar peoples
BOOK XII
MIXED
Chapter 1. How to make a mixed order of
battle formation. List of symbols for units in
a mixed force
Episode 2. The so-called mixed order of battle
Chapter 3. The first battle formation for
cavalry
Chapter 4. Another formation
Chapter 5. The order of battle called lateral
Chapter 6. column formation
Chapter 7. The so-called convex formation
PART B. ABOUT THE FORMATIONS OF

INFANTRY
Preamble
Chapter 1. What clothing should infantry
wear?
Episode 2. What should the training be like?
of the infantry with heavy weapons
Chapter 3. How should the training of
infantrymen with light weapons and archers
be?
Chapter 4. About weapons. What weapons
should heavy infantry carry?
Chapter 5. What weapons should light
infantry carry?
Chapter 6. What essential equipment should
you always have present and at hand?
Chapter 7. Soldiers of each rhythm must be
assigned to specialized tasks
Chapter 8. How infantry troops and their
officers should be organized
Chapter 9. How should the personnel
assignment and organization of infantry
tagmas be?
Chapter 10. Orders that must be
given about punishments
Chapter 11. How should the formation of
heavy infantry tagmas be?
Chapter 12. How should the training of light
infantry be along with heavy infantry and
cavalry?
Chapter 13. What should be the formation of
cavalry alongside heavy infantry?
Chapter 14. In what movements should
infantry be exercised?
Chapter 15. A second exercise
Chapter 16. How to start the aforementioned
movements
the battle line and training in resisting the
enemy
Chapter 18. How to accommodate cars and
impediments
Chapter 19. What should the method be like?
march with the enemy nearby
Chapter 20. How to cross wooded areas,
rugged areas and narrow passes by infantry
Chapter 21. What river transport and river
crossing should be like in the face of the
enemy
Chapter 22. How to build fortified camps
Chapter 23. Issues to be considered by the
infantry strategists on a day of battle
Chapter 24. Synopsis of the previously
mentioned instruction that must be known
by the tribunes or commanders of the
infantry tagmas
PART C. DIAGRAM OF A
FORTIFIED CAMP
PART D. ABOUT HUNTING. HOW I
KNOW
THEY MUST HUNT WILD ANIMALS
NO SERIOUS OR SERIOUS INJURIES
ACCIDENTS
1 We translate as officers what in the Greek text is
called archons ( ἀρχόντοι ), the equivalent of a Roman
prefect (praefectus).
Preamble
Words and actions guide the Blessed
Trinity, our God and Savior, constant
hope and security of the Divine
Assistance running major companies
and beneficial to a favorable conclusion 1 .
If what we have written were
deficient, since we are limited men and
We have been motivated by the sole
devotion to the State,
the Holy Trinity will solve it
turning it to our favor by providing
guide those who read it. Can this happen
through the intercession of Our Lady,
Immaculate, always Virgin Mother of God,
Mary, and for All Saints, for the
blessing of Our Lord for ever and ever
the ages. Amen.
The state of the armed forces has long been
neglected and [its maintenance] has fallen so
completely into oblivion, so to speak, that
those who assume command of the troops
understand nothing of the most obvious
matters and suffer all kinds of of difficulties.
Sometimes soldiers are blamed for lack of
training, sometimes strategists for
inexperience. We have resolved, therefore, to
make as good a writing on this subject as we
can, succinct and simple, basing ourselves
partly on ancient authors and partly on our
limited experience in active service, paying
more attention to practical usefulness than to
lexicon. By doing this, we have no intention of
opening new fields or improving old ones.
Those addressed writings to men with
knowledge and experience, full of topics not
easily understood by laymen, taking for
granted the basics, introductory matters that
are particularly necessary in our days.
In our opinion, it is essential not to take for
granted even the most obvious things, which
are essential if one wants to command troops
successfully. We have, therefore, designed
rather a modest manual or introduction for
those dedicated to the generalship, which
should facilitate progress for those who wish
to advance a better and more detailed
knowledge of those tactics and theories. For
this reason, as we already highlighted, we
have not paid attention to the precision or
sound of the words. What we are doing is not
something sacred. Our concern, rather, has
been with the usefulness and brevity of the
expression. Hence, a good number of Latin
terms and other military expressions in
ordinary use have been used for a simpler
understanding of the issues discussed. If,
then, anything useful is found in this text,
thanks be to the Almighty, who has given us
favored with some understanding in these
matters. And if each strategos by his own
experience and diligence should come to
know even more about these matters, thanks
again be given to the Lord, who gives us all
good things, and so perhaps with our efforts
we will be judged with mercy. Firstly, we urge
the strategos to make their most important
task to love God and justice 2 ; Having
achieved this, he must strive to win the favor
of God, without which it is impossible to carry
out any plan, no matter how well hatched it
may seem, nor can any enemy be defeated,
even if it seems weak. All these things are
governed by the Providence of God, a
Providence that extends to both birds and
fish. Like a helmsman, even the best, finds
that his skill is of no use when the wind does
not blow favorably, but when he has it on his
side and puts his skill to it has no difficulty in
doubling the speed of the ship, so also the
good strategos , armed with the favor of
God and without pause for inertia, using his
tactical and strategic knowledge, safely
directs the army that has been entrusted to
him and is capable of to counteract the
various machinations of the enemy 3 . This is
what turns things around to one's advantage
and what brings one's plans to a favorable
conclusion. To those with whom he deals, the
strategos must appear calm and
unconcerned; Your food and clothing should
appear plain and simple, your surroundings
should not appear elaborate and ostentatious;
He must appear to be tireless and attentive in
attending to his duties, not negligent or
carefree; With diligence and persistence you
will be able to straighten out the most difficult
situations. If one does not show concern for a
problem, the problem will not show concern
towards him.
He should often deliberate over his most
serious problems and implement what he has
decided with as little delay and risk as
possible. Opportunity is the doctor of
problems. To his subordinates, he must
appear balanced. He should not be easy to
deal with those who have committed acts of
cowardice or negligent acts in the hope of
being considered a good leader, for a good
leader does not encourage cowardice and
laziness. On the other hand, you should not
punish hastily and without full investigation
just to show that you can act firmly. The
former leads to contempt and disobedience;
the other serves to deserve hatred with all its
consequences. Both are extremes. The best
path is the union of fear and justice, that is,
imposing a fair punishment on criminals after
proof of guilt. This, for reasonable men, is not
a punishment but correction and help in
maintaining order and discipline.
1 Emperor Maurice had issued a decree that all

imperial documents should be headed with the
formula: "in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ, our
God and Savior." Later, the formula of the Trinity came
into common use. The first mention we have of the
use of this last formula is from the year 605. Cf. WIITA
(1977) p. twenty-one; DENNIS (1984) p. 8, no. 1.
2 Five hundred years after the teachings of the
Strategikon, Kekaumenos, a Greek-Armenian nobleman
who lived in the second half of the 11th century, wrote
another military treatise also called Strategikon in
which he presents as basic doctrines emanating from
the Mauritius text or even almost copied, as is the case
of chapter 82: «Give the order to your generals to
behave with moderation and piety and not to act
ficklely and express their anger at anyone, and to
safeguard the judges so that they judge with the fear
of God and with Justice ».
3 In Codex Iustiniani I 46, 4pr. There is talk of the
importance of the general in command (which would
be a strategist for Mauricio) in areas
borders in relation to maintaining the capacity of their
forces, their number and quality (training) and the
positions assigned to them.
Book I
Chapter 1. In what way is it convenient that
the soldiers are trained in their instruction
Episode 2. How is it advisable to arm the
riders and what basic equipment should
they be provided with?
Chapter 3. About the various titles of officers
and soldiers
Chapter 4. How is it advisable to divide the
army and its officers?
Chapter 5. How tagma commanders should
choose their subordinate officers and
leaders for combat and organize tagmas
into collusion
that must be given to the troops
that must be given to the commanders of
the tagmas
Chapter 8. About military punishments
Chapter 9. What organization should the army
have in its own territory when there is no
hostile activity?
INTRODUCTION
Book I, chapter 1. How is it convenient

for soldiers to train in their instruction?
The infantryman must be trained to shoot
arrows quickly on foot, both in the Roman
and Persian ways 1 . Haste gives the arrow
speed and strength. This must also be
practiced, for its usefulness, by the riders. In
the same way, shooting it at the wrong time
is useless, even if it seems to have been
launched correctly. By This must be learned
by the infantry to shoot quickly at close range
at a spear or some other type of target.
Galloping riders should also practice shooting
quickly, forward, backward, right and left.
Also that they can dismount 2 and quickly
mount the race, to shoot one and another
arrow and then replace the taut bow in its
sheath 3 if it is large enough, or in a half
sheath appropriate for this use. And with their
hand take the spear that they carry on their
back, so that they have the bow tempered in
the sheath and can exchange it for the spear.
And quickly, also in reverse, replace the spear
on your back and take up the bow.
It is really useful to have soldiers do these
exercises, also while marching through their
own territory, riding on their own horses.
These exercises, likewise, do not interfere
with walking and fatigue the horses less.

arm the riders and what basic
equipment should they be provided
with?
With soldier training progressing suitably, it
is necessary for officers to arm their own
soldiers and provide them with the necessities
for the campaign while they remain in winter
camps. Each soldier must have the weapons
that correspond to his rank and receive pay
according to his prerogatives. This applies,
above all, to the commander of a meres , a
moira or a tagma , and for the
hecatontarchs , decarcas , pentarchs and
tetrarchs , for the bucellarians and
federated troops. All of them must have
dimensions mesh with hood, long to the
ankles and made with straps and rings and
with its lining. Helmets with small feathers at
the top. They must also have bows
appropriate to their strength and not more
powerful, even a little weaker is better.
Quivers large enough to be able to fit drawn
bows into them when necessary, with
bowstrings available in the saddle bags;
covered quivers with capacity for thirty or
forty arrows. In his baldric, small files and
punches, cavalry spears of the Avar type
with banners and with leather straps in the
middle of the handle, swords, round
necklaces also of the Avar type, with linen
hair on the inside and more rarely on the
outside. r 4 . Foreign novices who have no
skill with the bow must have spears with
shields. It's not a bad idea for bucellarians
to use iron gauntlets, small tassels on the
hind and front quarters of the horses and
small cloaks over the chain mail on the
shoulders. Likewise, the more careful the
soldier's weapons and equipment are, the
more proud he will be of himself and the
more formidable he will appear to the enemy.
It is also necessary that all young Romans,
except foreigners, up to the age of forty be
required to know how to shoot as prescribed
or at least in part, but, in any case, to carry a
bow and quiver . They must have two spears
so that if one is not at hand, if possible the
other is available. Likewise, inexperienced
soldiers should use lighter bows. If they do
not know this art, they must come to know it
and master it over time, which is necessary.
It is necessary that the horses, especially
those of officers and those with specialized
functions, have a head of iron for the head
and iron protectors for the chest and neck
with felt 5 , all in the Avar style 6 especially
those that they must fight and be on the front
line 7 .
Saddles should have wide, thick blankets;
The flanges must be of good quality. On the
saddles there must be two iron stirrups 8 , a
leather bag, a lasso and a saddlebag on the
saddle, the size in which they can place
rations for three or four days for the use of
the soldiers. Four tassels on the hindquarters
and one tassel on the head and also one
under the horse's chin 9 .
The riders ' clothing must be wide and long
in the style of the Avars , that is, linen tunics
made of goatskin or raw wool. So when they
sit on the horses it seems like they are
covering their knees and they are seen like
this. elegant.
Likewise, they must also be provided with a
large cape, that is, a felt cloak with a hood
and sleeves, all long enough to cover the
loriga and the bow. So, in the event that
heavy rain falls or there is humidity in the
environment due to dew, it protects the stem
and the arch. In this way the weapons are
protected and the use of the bow or spear is
not prevented. Cloaks or capes are also
necessary during scouting patrols. Thus, in
this way, the enemies do not distinguish the
shine of the armor, evidently because it is
covered, and it also protects them from their
throwing weapons.
Likewise, each community must have a
store as well as sickles and axes to meet any
need. That the stores be of an avarian style,
as they combine usefulness and good
appearance 11 .
Likewise, that soldiers, especially those who
receive rations for family members, be forced
to provide themselves with servants, whether
slaves 12 or free men, in accordance with
current laws 13 . And let the soldier be diligent
when spending his pay. You must also take
care to register [in the military registry] the
servants in your service and their weapons,
and a search must be made to know under
what type of title they receive their pay, lest
after becoming careless and being left
without servants they are forced at the time
of combat to separate themselves from their
fellow ranks to monitor the impediment, and
to avoid that there are few who fight in the
front ranks. But if, as could easily happen,
any of the men are unable to afford servants,
then it will be necessary to require three or
four lower-ranking soldiers to collaborate in
the maintenance of a servant. A similar
arrangement must be followed with the pack
animals, which are necessary to transport the
soldiers' lorigas and tents.
It is also necessary that the upper part of
the grouper flags be the same color, and the
flags of each moira must also have their
own color so that each tagma can quickly
recognize its flag. It is also necessary that
any peculiar flag be added to the top of the
flags, so that it is recognized by the soldiers,
and among them each grouper , moira and
tagma are recognized and distinguished. The
banners of the merarchs must be
particularly striking and visible, so that they
are recognized by their troops at a great
distance.
The strategos must take care that the
impedimenta carts carry reserve weapons,
especially bows and arrows, to replace those
same weapons, which are easily lost.
It is also advisable that the officers of the
tagmas , during the winter, not be afraid to
buy the necessary things in the region if they
lack them and that the merarchs investigate
how many horses there are and what kind
and type of equipment the soldiers under
their command carry, in order to Let the
strategos worry about buying everything
that the soldiers may need at this time.
It is advisable that in addition to the leather
jacket for the lórigas, the soldiers have
another lighter one, which in times of conflict
or during skirmishes must be carried behind
the saddle, on the back of the horses' backs.
Then, in the event of a mishap, if the men
with the reserve horses disappear for a day,
the lorigas will not be left unprotected and
damaged. And the soldiers will not always be
burdened with the weight of the lóriga.
Book I, chapter 3. About the various

titles of officers and soldiers
Now that we have described the training of
the individual soldier and his weaponry, we
thought we should also explain the meaning
of the names of the officers, units and other
soldiers participating in all tactical exercises.
Our intention in doing this is to give our
readers more accurate knowledge so that, at
the first mention of these names, they cannot
say that they do not know what is being
talked about.
First, the head and commander of the entire
army is called the strategos , the second
man after him is the hypostrategos . The
merarch is in charge of commanding a
grouper ; he moirarch is the one who
commands a moira and is called duke 14 . A
grouper or division is a group composed of
three moiras . A moira is com p used by
tagmas , arhythms or flags 15 . A 16th
count
or tribune is the one who commands the
tagma , aritmos or flag . Ilarca is the term
for the first of the hecatontarchs , who is
second in command to a count or tribune .
A hecatontarch commands one hundred
men, just as a decarca commands ten and
the pentarch five. The Tetrarch , also
known as the 17th Guard, is the head of the
rearguard and last in line. Standard Bearer
18
carries the flag insignia. The next in
command after him is the orderly. The
moirarch of the optimates is called a
taxiarch . The auxiliary soldier or shield
bearer of one of the optimates is called a
man-at-arms.
Assault troops or 19 is the term used for
those who leave the main line of battle and
advance towards the retreating enemy.
Defense troops 20 are those who follow
them, not charging or breaking the ranks, but
marching in good order as support for the
assault troops if they retreat 21 . Nurses 22
is the name of those who continue behind the
lines to rescue and care for those injured
during battle. The advance guards 23 are
those troops that go ahead of the main
column to reconnoitre and look for good
roads and places to establish camp.
Mensores 24 are those who measure and
prepare the camps. Spies are called scouts 25 .
Flankers are those assigned to protect the
flanks of the first line. flankers of attack
are those designed to envelop the enemy
wings. The impedimenta consists of the
soldiers' supplies, including servants, the herd
of animals 26 and other beasts.
divide the army and its officers?
After the soldiers have been armed
according to the regulations and preparations
have been made to obtain the necessary
supplies for the army and each class of
officers and men has been named, the army
must be divided into various units and
commands and Competent officers must be
put in charge.
The tagmas must be formed by a variable
force of three hundred to four hundred men
maximum and must be placed in command of
counts , also called tribunes ,
prudent and competent. The
tagmas must be organized into moiras or
chiliarchies consisting of two thousand or
three thousand men, depending on the size of
the army and placed under the command of
competent moirarchs , also called dukes or
chiliarchs , prudent and disciplined. These
moiras , then, are grouped into three equal
groups under the command of the
merarchs , also called stratelates ,
prudent, practical, experienced and, if
possible, capable of reading and writing. This
is especially important for the commander of
the central grouper , called a
hypostrategos , who can, if necessary, take
over all the tasks of a strategos .
The army, therefore, is organized as
follows. Firstly, the cavalry is divided into
several tagmas , the tagmas into moiras or
chiliarchies , the moiras into three mere
equals, that is, center, right and left, which
comprises the battle line under the command
of the strategos . The tagma must not
exceed four hundred soldiers, except on
optimates flags . The moira must not be
more than three thousand, nor the mere
more than six thousand or seven thousand.
In case the army is larger than this, it is best
to place the additional troops outside the
grouper formation as a reserve in the
second line, to guard the flanks and protect
the grouper 's rear, and to ambush and
envelop the enemy. The grouper or the
moira should not be too large, lest by being
larger and more extensive they cause
disorder and confusion within themselves.
Not all tagmas should have the same
strength, so that it is not easy for the enemy
to calculate the size of the army from the
number of banners . Thus, the statement we
made above must be observed, that is, the
tagma must not contain more than four
hundred men nor less than two hundred 27 .
Book I, chapter 5. How tagma
commanders should choose their
subordinate officers and leaders for
combat and organize tagmas into
collusion
After the organization of the army, each
commander must organize and divide his own
tagma into conspiracies . Firstly, from
among the entire tagma he must select men
he trusts, judicious and courageous, as
hecatontarchs , taking particular care in the
election of the ilarchs , who are the tagmas
' second in command. Next you must choose
the decarcas , who must be brave, good at
hand-to-hand fighting and, if possible, good
marksmen with the arc. They are followed by
the pentarchs and tetrarchs , whose
qualifications must be similar. Finally, there
should be two additional men by collusion to
act as column guards, making five specially
qualified men in each column. The rest, both
veterans
and recruits, must be divided into
conspiracies . After having carefully
distributed the soldiers, the commander must
assign to the troops, once valued according to
the qualities of each one, the best men first
and then the others in correlative order.
Two alert and intelligent men must be
chosen as heralds and also two others as
standard bearers . This small selection and
designation must be made in the
concoberniums , that is, in the columns. If
there are no serfs, the soldiers in the worst
military condition should be assigned to take
care of the unit's set of animals, one man for
every three or four animals. Another man, a
competent one, will be chosen from the
regular troops and will receive a standard ,
and all the equipment and animals must
follow him. Finally, the commander must
determine which and how many columns
should form on the right of the banner and
which and how many on the left.
Book I, chapter 6. The regulations on
military crimes that must be given to
the troops
When the troops have been organized and
the collusions formed, the tagma must be
configured by decarchies . It is well for men
to be familiar with the regulations regarding
military crimes established in the laws. On the
other hand, a written copy should be given to
commanding officers so that they can explain
them to the men when they have time:
1. If a soldier disobeys his own tetrarch or

pentarch he must be punished. And the
same if a pentarch or tetrarch disobeys his
decarch , or the decarch his hecatontarch
.
2. If a member of the tagma dares to
disobey his commanding officer, the count or
tribune of the tagma , he must suffer the
death penalty.
3. If a soldier is unfairly treated by
someone, he must appeal to the commanding
officer of his tagma , but if he is unfairly
treated by his officer he will go to the
immediately superior officer.
4. If someone decides on their own to
extend their leave, they must be expelled
from the army and as a civilian handed over
to the civil authorities.
5. If any soldier, regardless of the reason,
defies his commanding officer or conspires or
supports a sedition or mutiny against him, he
shall suffer capital punishment, particularly
the ringleaders of the conspiracy or mutiny.
6. If someone who has been charged with
the defense of a city or fortress were to
betray it or desert his position against the
orders of his commanding officer, he must
suffer extreme punishment.
7. If someone is found guilty of wanting to
desert to the enemy, he must suffer the
maximum punishment, not only him but also
anyone else who knew about it, because he
did not inform his commanding officer.
8. If someone, after having listened to his
decarca 's orders, does not carry them out,
he must be punished. But if he does so out of
ignorance of orders, the decarca must be
punished for not having informed him
beforehand.
9. If anyone finds a stray animal or any
other object, small or large, and does not
report it or hand it over to his commanding
officer, not only he but anyone who knows
about it must be punished, both as thieves.
10. If someone causes damage to a citizen
29
and refuses to compensate them, they will
pay double the damage.
11. If someone who receives an allowance
for his weapons neglects them, if his decarca
does not force him to acquire them or does
not inform his commanding officer, then both
the soldier and the decarca will be punished.
Book I, chapter 7. Regulations on
military crimes that must be given to
tagma commanders
12. If someone disobeys his own
commanding officer he must be punished
according to the laws.
13. If someone harms a soldier, he must
compensate him by paying double the value
of the damage done and will pay an equal
amount if he causes harm to a citizen. If, in
winter time, in camp or during the march,
whether an officer or a soldier, causes
damage to a citizen without making the
appropriate restitution, he will pay him double
the value of what was damaged.
14. If in time of war someone boasts of
letting a soldier go on leave, he will pay a fine
of thirty nomismas 30 . During winter permits
can be granted for two or three months. And
in peacetime, the soldier must be prohibited
from going on leave outside the boundaries of
the province.
15. If anyone is in charge of the defense of
a city or a fortress and surrenders or
evacuates it while being able to defend it,
unless forced to do so by danger to life, he
must suffer the death penalty.
After these regulations on crimes have been
read, the tagmas must be formed in order of
battle and the punishments for crimes during
combat be known to the assembled troops.
Book I, chapter 8. About military

punishments
After the organization of the tagmas , the
following list of punishments must be read in
both Latin and Greek.
16. If during the formation of battle lines
and combat a soldier abandons his post or his
standard and flees, or if he retreats to the
place of departure, or if he plunders the
dead, or runs off to pursue the enemy, or
attacks the enemy's impedimenta or camp,
we order that he be executed and that all the
loot he has taken be confiscated and given to
the common fund of his tagma , since he has
broken ranks and betrayed his comrades.
17. If at the time of a general action or
battle the troop that has been formed for
combat turns around - I hope this never
happens -, without a good, acceptable and
obvious reason, we order that the soldiers of
the tagma who have first fled and have
withdrawn from the battle line or their own
groupers are decimated 31 by shooting them
down with arrows and by the other tagmas ,
since by breaking their formation they are
guilty of the complete breakup of groupers .
But if it happens that some of them were
wounded in battle, they should be exempted
from such punishment.
18. If a banner is captured by the enemy –
I hope it never happens – without a good and
obvious excuse, we order that those in charge
of the custody of the banner be punished
and reduced to the lowest rank in their unit or
in the battalion in which they are inscribed. If
it happens that anyone is wounded during the
battle, he must be exempted from such
punishment.
19. If a grouper or the entire formation is
put to flight - I hope it never happens - in the
vicinity of a camp, and if the men do not
retreat towards its defenses or do not seek
refuge within it, but carelessly run in another
direction, We order that these daredevils be
punished for abandoning their comrades.
20. If a soldier throws away his weapons
during battle, we order that he be punished
for disarming and arming the enemy.
Book I, chapter 9. What organization

should the army have in its own
territory when there is no hostile
activity?
A large army should not assemble in a place
where there is no hostile activity, because
with free time soldiers may engage in sedition
and prepare improper plans.
When battle is expected, the army must
march in formation, advancing, either in
moiras or in meres . Marching in formation
is safer for soldiers both in our own territory
and in hostile territory. It is very important
that each moira carries his own impedimenta
and advances behind his own standards , as
described elsewhere, and not mistake the
standards of other units. While the enemy is
at a distance, the march must be in moiras
or in meres . The entire army should not be
stationed together in one place because men
can quickly become hungry, the size of the
army can be easily estimated by the enemy,
and forage can be difficult to find. As soon as
they get closer to the enemy, more or less
six, seven or even ten days away, the troops
must begin to gather and set up camps at the
same time, as explained in the chapter on
camps.
If the march is carried out through unknown
regions or places, messengers must be sent
a day ahead with the mission of calculating
the dimensions of the entire place where the
camp will be set up and to allocate a certain
section of land equal to each groupers . The
advance guards must also ride a day ahead to
find water and forage.
When troops in the field encounter rough,
wet territory, dense forest or other terrain
difficulties, some soldiers must be sent ahead
to clear and level it as much as possible, so
as not to exhaust the horses. The men sent
for this must not belong to the scouts or
other special unit.
When the army is on the march, the
strategos in command must be at the front,
preceded by specially chosen troops as an
honor guard. Their replacement horses and
the standards of the bucellarians must
march with them. Right behind him must
march the espatarians and the
bucellarians , and finally their impedimenta.
The commanding officer of each grouper or
moira must position his own column in a
similar manner, either as part of a larger
group or marching alone.
When a river is crossed or other difficulties
are encountered in unknown territory,
advance guards must be sent ahead and,
after a first inspection of the area, they must
inform the strategists of the nature of the
terrain, while competent officers must make
the precise arrangements to cover the
passed. If the locations are of unusual
difficulty, then the strategist in charge must
abandon the column and remain in place until
everyone has safely crossed the difficulty. But
the strategos must do this only if the enemy
is not in the surroundings, since in that case
he must not remain still, but the officers in
charge of each group must execute such a
mission until all the soldiers under his
command have passed into battle. except.
Otherwise everyone will try to move forward
immediately, which is a cause of friction and
grievances.
Cultivated fields must be preserved, troops
must not march through them, and they must
not cause harm to citizens 32 . But if it is
absolutely necessary to pass through the
cultivated fields, it will be ordered by the
commanding officer of each moira or simply
wait until the tagmas under his command
have crossed. Such an officer must keep the
fields in good condition for the next unit and
subsequently leave the area. In turn, each
commanding officer behind him must perform
the same action, and in this way the good
order of the strategos and the integrity of
the farmer will be assured.
When the state of the terrain is expected to
be difficult, if we surprise or encounter wild
animals along the way, it is prohibited to
chase them, as this causes noise and
confusion and tires the horses unnecessarily.
In times of peace, however, hunting is
necessary for soldiers.
If the army is small, one should not plan to
take it through inhabited areas, whether in
friendly or hostile terrain, as its size can be
seen by spies and the information passed to
the enemy, but rather advance by other
routes.
END OF BOOK ONE
1 Apparently, the way that the Romans had of holding

the arrow and the bowstring before shooting, adopted
after the model of the nomads of the steppe, was to
do so with two fingers, the index finger and the thumb.
The Persians did not do it this way and for that
reason maneuver used the middle, ring and little
fingers. On this, cf. BIVAR (1972) p. 285. The military
confrontations of the Eastern Romans with peoples
who made abundant use of the bow and arrow, such
as Persians , Avars and Huns , forced the soldiers of
Constantinople to adopt these weapons and train their
men in the appropriate tactics to get the most out of
them. possible benefit. That the Roman-Byzantines
achieved great advances in the art of military archery
(both on foot and on horseback) is proven by the texts
of Procopius of Caesarea (De Bello Persico I 18, 31-35
and De Bello Gothico V 27, 26-29 and VIII 32, 6-10)
that talk about the havoc that the imperial archers
wrought against Persians or other Goths . On this,
cf. McGEER, E. (1991): "Archery", in The Oxford
Dictionary of Byzantium (Alexander P. Kazhdan, Ed.),
Oxford-New York.
2 This type of training is mentioned by Flavius
Vegetius (author between the 4th and 5th centuries
AD) in his Epitoma Rei Militaris (Summary of Military
Affairs) I 18. In another source (Life of Saint
Anastasius the Persian [Acta Martyris Anastasii Persae,
ed. of H. Usener, Programa Universitatis Bonnae 1894,
23]) states that in the month of March soldiers were
urged to equip their horses and train them for combat.
3 The Greek term used is θηκίος (theca).
4 We can see what a large part of this Avar panoply
would be like in one of the gold pieces from the
Nagyszentmiklós Treasury (in the Kunsthistorisches
Museum in Vienna, Austria) and dated between the 6th
and 8th centuries. In this piece (circular in shape) we
see a horseman (probably a victorious prince)
equipped with chain mail and with a spear in his right
hand, while holding by the head, with his left, a
prisoner on foot, also dressed in coat of mail.
5 The felt served to protect the animal from rubbing
against the metal elements of the protections.
6 Cf. note 8.
7 Here it refers to the decarchs , pentarchs ,
tetrarchs and the two lines of guards.
8 The cavalry of the armies of Antiquity did not use
the stirrup and it had recently been put into use in the
army of the Eastern Roman Empire. Since the
Byzantines did not have a special term for it, Maurice
uses the word σκάλα (step or ladder). This is the first
time that "stirrups" are referred to in Western
literature. In this regard, P. Rance (2007, pp. 357-358)
opines that this innovation, possibly of Avar origin,
was really important for horse archers, since It
improved its stability, and allowed faster training for
riders. Cf. also CUTTLER and McGEER (1991).
9 The horse ridden by the rider described in note 8
shares some of the elements mentioned. However, it
does not have stirrups, a detail by which perhaps the
dating that specialists have made of the piece could be
further refined (cf. again note 8), which would thus be
closer to the 6th century (when the stirrup was still
almost a rarity) than to the 8th century (when such an
element was much more widespread).
10 On the military customs of this time in terms of
clothing, cf. D'AMATO (2005).
11 These Avar tents would differ in nothing or almost
nothing from those of the steppe tribes. These are
round felt tents that allow them to be more resistant to
winds and snow storms. Its use soon spread
throughout the army, and was still used in the 11th
century, according to the illustrations of the copy
preserved in the National Library of Madrid of the
Chronicle (Sinopsis Historion) by Juan Skylitzes.
12 The possession of a slave by a not excessively
courageous soldier could be a double-edged sword for
the soldier, since in case of desertion on his part the
Codex Iustiniani (VII 13, 4) It guaranteed freedom to
the servant who denounced his master's action.
13 In the long title 17 (De Castrensi Peculio) of
Digesta XLIX the legislator does not refer at any time
to this obligation although he does mention (XLIX 17,
6, 17, 15.3 and 17, 18.3) the possession of slaves by
soldiers.
14 The Greek text presents the Latin term dux.
15 These three types of units would differ in that the
aritmos was an irregular type unit, which in the
armies of the unitary Roman Empire (before the
division between East and West) would have been a
numerus. A tagma or a flag would be regular units,
but in the opinion of H. Elton (2007a, p. 278) all of
these terms would be generic to refer to a regiment or
unit.
16 In the Greek text you eat.
17 In the Greek text ο ὑ ραγὸς.
18 In the T. bandophorus (or bandifer) and in Greek
βανδοφόρος . The standard bearer was chosen from
among the bravest soldiers of the unit (Procopio De
Bello Vandalico IV 10, 4).
19 In the Greek text cursors.
20 In the Greek text defenders.
21 The tactical type presented here is reminiscent of
that of the heavy legionary of Vegetius (Epitoma Rei
Militaris II 17, 5), which must not undertake, at the
first opportunity, nec fugere, nec sequi ("neither flight
nor pursuit").
22 From lat. deputati, and in the text δηποτάτοι .
23 In the Greek text anticensors.
24 In the Greek text mensores .
25 In Greek κατάσκοποι. The VNPA manuscripts then
offer the reading: " He is the one who presides over
the assembly of soldiers before the battle ") that GT
Dennis considers an interpolation.
26 It refers to the animals that followed the army,
including reserve horses, pack horses, and livestock
intended to feed the soldiers.
27 Before the author said three hundred and now he
says two hundred.
28 Here the word veterans refers to experienced
soldiers and not to discharged soldiers (emeriti, in old
Roman times). Such a license was received if the
current legislation was complied with (Codex Iustiniani
V 65, 1 and VII 64, 9) and as had happened since the
time of the High Roman Empire, after twenty years of
service.
29 The Greek text speaks of "taxpayer" (
συντελεστήν ). However, we believe it is more
appropriate "citizen", insofar as he is a free man, a
citizen of the empire who pays his taxes. However, this
mention of the citizen is curious when in the Corpus
Iuris Civilis, specifically in Codex Iustiniani XI 48, 23,
the citizen is not mentioned, but rather the free man
and the colonist.
30 The nomisma (Greek νόμισμα ) was the Byzantine
denomination of the solidus, a gold coin of 4.55 g and
a grade of 0.900 introduced by Emperor Constantine I
(Caius Flavius Valerius Constantinus, 306-337) in 309
and used until the end of the reign of Constantine VII
(913-959). In the 6th century this coin maintained its
weight of 4.55 g (1/72 of the Roman pound ) and two
smaller subdivisions also made of gold, the tremissis
with 2.27 g and the semissis with 1.50 g, equivalent
respectively. to half and a third of nomisma. The
payment, therefore, of this fine must have been a
really heavy burden for the offender.
31 The Greek text speaks of ἀποδεκατοῦσθαι , which
literally means "decimate", although from the context it
is deduced that at this time the term has lost its
classical meaning and no longer means "execute one
soldier in ten."
32 Kekaumenos, Strategikon 82: "Do not exploit your
city, the outer lands that are under your power, nor
the army, but be a father to them all and they will all
serve you faithfully."
Book II
ON THE FORMATION OF THE
CHIVALRY
Chapter 1. On the usefulness and necessity of
forming the army in two lines
Episode 2. Of the organization of the tagmas
in the line of battle
Chapter 3. Assault and defense troops
Chapter 4. About flankers and attack
flankers
Chapter 5. Ambushes in the rear or on the
flanks of the enemy line
Chapter 6. About the depth of training
Chapter 7. About collusion
Chapter 8. About weapons
Chapter 9. About the medical body
Chapter 10. About the pennants of the
spears
Chapter 11. About spies or explorers
Chapter 12. About mensores and betting
games
Chapter 13. On the distances between the
groupers and the battle lines
Chapter 14. About the size and difference
between the banners
Chapter 15. About the custody of the
banners
Chapter 16. About the place of officers
Chapter 17. About those who blow the horns
Chapter 18. About the battle cries that arise
in the midst of conflict
Chapter 19. About the heralds
Chapter 20. On the convenience of using two
banners
Book II, chapter 1. On the usefulness

and necessity of forming the army in
two lines
To form the entire army simply in a line
facing the enemy for a general cavalry battle
and to keep nothing in reserve for any
eventuality in case of reverse is the sign of an
inexperienced and absolutely reckless man.
For it is not, as the layman might imagine, by
the number of soldiers, by unquestionable
audacity or by a frontal assault, that battles
are decided, but with the help of God, by
strategy and by experience. Strategy helps to
use times and places, surprises and various
tricks to outwit the enemy with the idea of
achieving objectives even without actually
fighting. Strategy is essential for survival and
is the true characteristic of an intelligent and
brave strategist . Experience enables the
army to maintain discipline and coordination
as well as its own personal survival, while
diversifying its battle formations as well as
attacks, and not only to thwart the enemy's
tricks but to turn them against itself.
With this always in mind, ancient military
writers organized their armies into drungos
1 , divisions and moiras of varying strength
depending on the situation, just as the Avars
and Turks align themselves today, staying in
that formation, and therefore can quickly be
called to support any unit that may need it in
battle, since they do not just line up in a
battle line, as the Romans and Persians do,
thus risking the fate of tens of thousands of
cavalry at a time, but they form two lines,
sometimes even three, distributing the units
in depth, especially when their troops are
numerous, and easily undertake any type of
action. Forming the entire army in a single
battle line, especially if it is composed of
spearmen, is, in our opinion, exposing oneself
to some danger. If it is a large army, it will be
forced to spread over a great distance, part
will be located in unfavorable terrain and the
width of the line will be a cause of disorder
and difficult management, there will be no
coordination between the units and, as a
result , can break before even making contact
with the enemy. Then, if she could be
outflanked or attacked unexpectedly by the
enemy and if she has no support from her
rear or flank, without any protection or
reserve forces, she will be forced to retreat in
a hasty flight.
Furthermore, in modern combat no one can
really supervise the entire battle from the
moment the line is deployed, and some can
desert their flags undetected and give the
others an excuse to retreat. If they withdraw,
there is no way to get them back into combat
by controlling the flight, no one will be able to
get them back, as we said, when the army
withdraws. Some troops forming in a single
line may appear to be the victors of the battle
and defeat the enemy, but in the confusion
their formation will certainly be broken and
the pursuit will be carried out in disarray. If
the retreating enemy should turn against the
pursuers, as the Scythians frequently do, or
if some other force should appear
unexpectedly in ambush, then the pursuers
will certainly be forced to retreat since, as has
been said, there is no one to prevent this.
unexpected attack. It seems that forming all
the troops in a single line has one and only
one advantage in appearance, which is that
from a distance such a line can appear
imposing and large in size and can quickly be
used in enveloping movements, but this can
also be easily completed in other ways, as will
be explained later. We believe that, as far as
human reasoning goes, there are many
urgent reasons that lead us to consider that
there must be two lines, one of them as
support, according to the diagram that we will
give below. Firstly, the troops located in the
first line will fight with greater fervor knowing
that their rear is protected by the second line
and their flanks by the flank protectors.
Second, a soldier in the first line will not flee
so easily when he knows that many other
soldiers are stationed behind him, that is, in
the second line, and none will flee from his
position. In combat this is extremely
important. Assuming the first line retreats or
is stopped, then the second line is there as
support and a place of refuge. This makes it
possible to concentrate troops and send them
back against their attackers. Also, when we
are chasing the enemy, we can make our
attack safely, because if the enemy returns
against us or if there is a sudden attack from
another side, then the second line can hold,
engage in battle and protect the first. In
addition, if the first line is defeated and
therefore cannot return to action against the
enemy, the second, still in good order, can
easily join the battle against the enemy, even
when, as mentioned, the enemy has defeated
to the first line. The enemy formation will
necessarily be broken and disorganized by the
fight when it encounters a force still in good
order, that is, the second line. And the most
important reason is that not only is the
double line of battle, as mentioned, the most
appropriate against an enemy force of equal
number, but also against superior forces,
which is clear from reason and from the study
of the diagram that we will see later.
Perhaps some may object that if the first
line falls into confusion and retreats, the
second will easily be pushed back by the first.
Our answer is that if victory seems precarious
with two lines, as explained, what hope can
there be when there is only one line and it
breaks? If again someone objects that the
army formation is weakened by dividing it
into two lines of battle, we could accept it as
valid if the force were really divided and half
remained out of the action. But the truth is
that we did not really divide the troops, but
we have only changed their formation. What
happens is that the entire army that was
previously deployed in a long, thin line, now
forms in two. We have not removed anything
from the action, but only modified its
disposition and, according to the methods
described, increased its strength.
Book II, chapter 2. Of the organization

of the tagmas in the line of battle
For the reasons mentioned above, each
cavalry army, whether large or of medium
power, must be divided into moiras
and in groupers , or in the so-called
drungos of various sizes. Obviously the
strategos must use all the forces of his
intelligence to avoid as well as he can openly
employing an unsubdivided army in battle,
especially if he fights against nations
marching to war in an organized manner. If
we have an army made up of infantry, it will
be formed as explained in the book dedicated
to it. If the entire force is mounted and is to
fight against other mounted troops, the
cavalry is divided into three lines. Form the
first line, called prómajo s 2 in three equal
divisions and each division or meres
composed of three moiras . The
hypostrategos must maintain his position in
the central meros , the other two merarchs
in the divisions on each side, each one in the
center between the moirarchs under his
command.
Book II, chapter 3. Assault and defense
troops
The proportion of assault and defense
troops in these divisions must be such that
one-third of each meros consists of assault
troops , preferably archers, stationed on the
flanks, and the remaining two-thirds, in the
center of each meros , must consist of
defense troops .
Book II, chapter 4. About flankers and
attack flankers
Next to the grouper on the left of this first
line, where hostile flanking and enveloping
movements are most likely to occur, station
two or three flags as flankers with their
front aligned like that of the grouper . Next
to the grouper on the right he parks one or
two flags of archers, known as attack
flankers . It forms the second line, called
support, which must consist of, more or less,
a third of the total army, formed in four
groups as indicated in the subsequent
diagram, located within an arrow's throw of 3
from one flank to the other. Double-team
these groupers to prevent attacks from the
rear. Of the two groups at the ends of this
line, a flag must be highlighted an arrow's
shot in the rear to form the third line, the
rearguard. In order for there to be three
spaces exactly in the center of the groups of
the second line formed and to make the
second line appear to be a unified body of
troops and not become disorganized when
moving, one or more flags should be placed
at these intervals, at along the entire distance
of empty space. They should be two or more
riders deep or, better yet, four or more,
depending on the size of the army so that
when it is time to provide shelter for the
retreating front line troops, those three flags
4
located in the empty spaces are withdrawn
to the rear, leaving the empty spaces free for
the retreating troops. In this way they make
empty spaces a refuge for retreating troops,
as we have shown, and, at the same time,
they can bring back men who were trying to
desert beyond the rear. Additionally, when
forming the third line with the rear, the flags
can help drive out any enemy forces that
appear from the rear to harass the second
line and keep that sector intact. Now, if the
army is of medium potential, that is,
composed of five thousand to ten thousand or
twelve thousand soldiers, the second line
should consist of a mere two instead of four,
leaving a free space to receive the troops in
withdrawal. If the army consists of less than
five thousand soldiers, the second line must
consist of only one grouper .
Book II, chapter 5. Ambushes in the

rear or on the flanks of the enemy line
Added to the above, three or four flags ,
called ambush troops, must be posted on
both sides of the battle line, in the manner
explained elsewhere. They are there to
prevent the enemy from trying to ambush us
on our left, and they can themselves launch
attacks against the enemy's right if the terrain
is favorable. It should be noted that well-
timed attacks against the enemy's flanks and
rear are more effective and decisive than
frontal attacks. If the enemy's forces are
smaller than ours, such attacks take them by
surprise and inflict great damage, as the
enemy troops will find it difficult to reach
safety. If the enemy force is equal to ours, or
even greater, he will find himself in serious
trouble, believing that the attacking troops
are numerous. Consequently, a small army
should not confront a larger, organized
enemy in open battle except in case of
necessity. If such a need arises, do not group
all troops in front, and even if the enemy is
superior in number direct your operations
against his rear or flanks. For it is dangerous
and uncertain under all conditions and against
any people to establish a purely frontal
combat, even if the enemy stations a small
troop in the front.
In summary, all cavalry tagmas are divided
into a first and a second line, in the manner
described, especially if the army is large. They
are divided into defense troops ,
assault , flankers ,
attack flankers , ambush troops, support
troops and rear troops.
Book II, chapter 6. The depth of training
Regarding the depth of the line of each
tagma , it is sufficient, according to the
traditional scheme as the ancients wrote, to
place the columns four soldiers deep. Greater
depth is considered useless and useless. In
fact there will be no pressure from the rear to
the vanguard as happens in an infantry
formation, which could force the men in the
vanguard to advance against their will, since
the horses cannot use their own heads to
push the marching men. before them, as the
opposite happens with the infantry. The
leaders of the columns, those located in the
vanguard, do not receive support from denser
ranks, whether they are spearmen or archers.
The spearmen in the ranks beyond the fourth
row cannot reach the first line, the archers
are forced to shoot higher because there are
men in front of them and the result is that
their arrows are not effective in battle against
the enemy. If anyone doubts this, they will be
convinced by experience. Therefore, as
established, a depth of four soldiers is
sufficient.
Thus, however, it is true that the number of
high-quality soldiers, those capable of acting
as column leaders in close combat in each
tagma , is limited. It is therefore necessary
to regulate the depth of the formation
according to the type of unit. Thus, the
federated , aligned in the center of the first
line, they are placed with a depth of seven
men, followed by an orderly , if they have
one, and their demarcation will be
organized according to such formation. The
companies of the vexilations 5 , located to the
left of the federated ones , will have their
own decarchy of about seven men; The
Illyrians 6 , to the right of the federated , will
have a decarchy of about eight men. The
other tagmas , composed of unchosen
troops, will organize their decarchy varying
from eight to ten men. If it happens that any
of these tagmas of unchosen troops is
placed in the first line, let him put eight or ten
men per column, since these tagmas are
weaker. The optimate tagmas , however,
because they are chosen troops and are
generally located in the second line, will have
five soldiers followed by two ordinances so
that each decarchy will have seven men.
The depth that we have described will remain
the same in the event that these tagmas
were transferred to the first line. Foreign
contingents, if organized by themselves, will
deploy according to their own customs. It is
advantageous to employ these contingents as
assault or ambush troops .
The depth, seen in this way, should not
exceed eight soldiers or at most ten soldiers
deep 7 , no matter how weak the tagma is,
but never less than five soldiers deep, even
for the best units, since the realized depth of
The manner referred to and in the
appropriate proportions is appropriate. The
length of the first line of battle, that is, the
number of soldiers in that line, should not be
very small. The injudicious practice carried
out up to the present has been forming all
the tagmas equally ten soldiers deep, with
the result that, when lined up for inspection,
the spies can easily and quickly estimate the
strength of the entire army by counting the
leaders of each column, assuming that this is
the regulatory depth and that the same
proportion is maintained. The second line is
made up of the remaining men. It is evident,
as explained above, that the orderlies are
placed with the tagmas of the optimates ,
and with the federates those assistants who
perform the same service.
Book II, chapter 7. About collusion

Collusions must be formed with older men
and young men in the appropriate proportion.
Otherwise, the elderly, if they train by
themselves, may be weak, and the young,
inexperienced men, may fall into
disorganization.
Book II, chapter 8. About weapons

Armament should be diversified as follows.
In the first line, the leader of the column and
his subordinate, that is, the second in the
column, and the last in the column must all
carry spears. The rest, located in the middle,
who know how to shoot with a bow, must be
archers and not carry a shield. For it is
impossible to use the bow effectively on
horseback while also carrying a shield on the
left arm.
Book II, chapter 9. About the medical

staff
Added to what was said above, eight or Ten
of the least valid soldiers from each tagma
must be assigned as a medical corps to each
flag , especially on the front line of battle.
They must be alert, quick, lightly dressed and
unarmed. Their mission is to follow about one
hundred feet 8 to the rear of their own
tagma , to pick up and help anyone seriously
wounded in battle, or anyone who has fallen
from their horse or is unable to fight, so that
the wounded are not stepped on by the
second line or die from abandonment of their
wounds. For each rescued person, health
worker 9 must receive one more nomisma in
his pay from the treasury. Then, when the
second line passes and expels the enemy,
they must collect the remains of the dead
enemies left on the battlefield after the first
charge, and take them to the decarcas or
column leaders of their own tagma ,
receiving a part of the spoils by the decarcas
as a reward for their work. For we believe
that allowing them to do this is a fair and
adequate benefit to the column leaders when
they have won in combat, since more than
anyone else, they have done everything
possible in the fight during the first charge,
and they also have no the opportunity to
dismount and break ranks to loot for
themselves.
To make it easier for the medical staff and
the injured or fallen, they will all ride rescue
horses. These horses must place both stirrups
on the left side of the saddle, one in front, as
is customary, and the other behind the first.
When two want to ride the horse, the
paramedic and the soldier who is being taken
from the battlefield, the first rides with the
normal stirrup in front and the soldier with
the other stirrup. It is essential that they
carry canteens with water for soldiers who
may be unconscious from their wounds.
Book II, chapter 10. About the pennants

of the spears
We do not recommend carrying pennants
on spears during battle, as they are useless in
combat. On the contrary, they are useful to
present a refined presence during reviews,
sieges or stops. For if the spear is thrown or
stuck, the pennants reduce accuracy and
range, and when the archers shoot, they
interfere with the arrows of the archers
behind them. Furthermore, during charges or
retreats, when turning around, they can be
an unnecessary hindrance, and for this reason
they should not be used in combat. It is
possible, however, to maintain both
situations, the exquisite appearance of the
ranged battle line as well as its usefulness.
The flags must fly until the enemy is within a
10 mile distance, then they must be rolled up
and kept in their covers.
Book II, chapter 11. About spies or

explorers
Furthermore, spies or scouts must be
assigned to each tagma of the optimates
and federates , and to each grouper of the
ordinary troops, two for each tagma , a total
of eight or twelve to each grouper . They
must be sober, alert, healthy and of good
appearance. Stationed at intervals, depending
on the nature of the terrain, before the battle
and until the start of the final combat, they
must keep both the enemy and their own
units under observation to prevent any
ambush or any other hostile tricks.
Book II, chapter 12. Over the
mensores and betting games

Furthermore, there must be a certain
number of mensores who must march with
the advance guards and establish the camp
site. The same number of settlement or
preparatory parties must be detached with
them in advance, to recognize the roads and
guide the army towards the camp.
Book II, chapter 13. Distances between
groupers and battle lines
When the line of battle is formed as
described above and illustrated in the
diagram, it is necessary for the groupers of
the first line to move fairly close to each
other, so that the distance or interval
between one grouper and another is not
great, but yes enough not to crowd each
other as they march and make them appear
sufficiently separated. The flankers should
march together until they are close to the
enemy, then they should move to the side
about an arrow's shot away from the
grouper on the left, no more, especially if
the enemy's line is as long as ours.
Attacking flankers should be placed in a
similar position to the right, as much as the
situation requires. The groupers in the
second line should be about an arrow's shot
away from each other. Until the enemy is
close, the second line should follow the first
at a distance of a mile or more, depending
on the terrain, so that, as much as possible,
they remain unseen by keeping the enemy at
a distance and changing their tactics.
according to your observations. But when the
enemy approaches and sees the second line,
he has no time to change his plans; then the
second line must move four arrow shots from
the first line and regulate its movement
accordingly. During the battle he should not
be too far behind the front line to be unable
to provide support, and he should not be too
close to avoid mixing with it during the battle,
especially when a lot of dust is raised. If too
close, the second line can attack before the
enemy formation breaks in pursuit of the first
line, which will be dismasted and unable to
cooperate with the second. The tagmas
stationed on both sides in the rear of the
second line's flanks must be within an arrow
shot to protect their rear and be able to
advance at the same distance.

difference between the banners
In each group , the flags or banners of
the tagmas must be moderately small and
easy to transport. We cannot protect them if
they are long and bulky. The only
distinguishing feature should be in their ties 11
. But the flags of the moirarchs must be
larger and of a different design. In the same
way, those banners of the merarchs must
be differentiated from those of the
moirarchs under their orders. The flag of the
hypostrategos must be different from those
of the merarchs . Finally, that of the
strategos must be clearly distinguishable,
more visible than all the others, and familiar
to all, so that, in the event of a setback of the
troops, seeing it, they can easily, as has been
said, concentrate again and regroup. .
Book II, chapter 15. About the custody

of the banners
When all the standards have been placed
along the line, as shown in the diagram,
fifteen or even twenty of the best men from
each unit should be detailed to protect and
defend each standard .
Book II, chapter 16. About the place of

officers
Senior officers must station themselves in
safe places, so that they do not advance and
fall in battle, which could demoralize the
soldiers. For if one of the subordinate officers
falls, no one will know except the men of
their own tagma . But if one of the most
prominent officers falls, his death, being
known by all or most of the troops, will make
the entire army fearful. Therefore, when the
army is within one or two arrow-shots of the
enemy's battle line, the hypostrategos and
the merarchs must stand on the same line
as the banners and from there supervise and
regulate the formation. When the charge is
about to begin, their best escorts, who are
located on either side of them, must stand in
front of them as a screen, and are the only
ones who engage in close combat. The
strategos , at the time of the charge, is
there to direct the formation, supervise and
adapt to the enemy's movements. At the right
moment he must join his own tagma , which
is formed, not for battle, but as a kind of
signal to mark the limits and guide the first
and second line, that is, in the middle of the
second line. .
Book II, chapter 17. About those who

blow the horns 12
We do not consider it desirable for many

horns to be blown or blown during battle, as
this causes noise and confusion, and
commanders will not be able to understand
orders. If the terrain is flat, then one horn is
enough in the center of each battle line. If
the terrain is rough, or if a strong wind or the
noise of water makes it difficult to hear orders
clearly, then it will be fine to blow one horn
on each of the other groupers , so three will
be blown along the battle line. . The more
silence there is, the calmer the rookies are,
the less excited the horses are, the more
fearsome the battle line seems to the enemy
and the more easily recognizable the orders
are. For these reasons, any sound is out of
place after the line has been set in motion.
Book II, chapter 18. About the battle

cries that arise in the midst of conflict
The battle cry, "nobiscum" 13 , was
customary to shout when the charge began,
which is, in our opinion, extremely dangerous
and harmful. Shouting it out at that moment
can cause lines to break up. Because of the
shout, the most timid soldiers approaching
combat may hesitate at the moment of
collision, while the most daring, awakening
their military ardor, may hastily push too far
forward and break formation. The same
problem occurs with horses, as they are very
different in temperament. The result is that
the battle line will be uneven and without
cohesion. In fact, the formation can be
broken even before charging, which is very
dangerous.
Instead of shouting, prayers should be said
in the camp on the day of the battle before
anyone leaves the gate. All, led by the
[military] priests, the strategos and the
other officers must recite the “Kyrie Eleison”
14
in unison. So, in the hope of success, each
grouper must shout the "nobiscum Deus" 15
three times as he marches through the camp.
As soon as the army leaves the camp to form
for battle, absolute silence must prevail and
no unnecessary words must be said. Well,
this keeps the army in better order and the
officers' orders will be understood more
quickly. The entire spirit of the charge is
guided by the circumstances, the necessary
closing of ranks, the presence of the enemy
and no other indication is necessary. But
when the army makes contact with the
enemy, it is not a bad idea for the men to
shout and cheer, especially for the rear ranks,
to unsettle the enemy and stimulate our own
troops 16 .
Book II, chapter 19. About the heralds

The function of the heralds , it seems to
us, is very useful, since before the battle they
speak to the troops to give them courage and
remind them of their previous victories. When
his speech ends, each tagma must form and
prepare.
Book II, chapter 20. On the convenience

of using two banners
Since we know that the enemy generally
bases his estimate of the strength of an army
on the number of banners , we thought it
would be necessary for each tagma to have
two identical banners . One is the normal
banner , the one that corresponds to the
count or tribune of each tagma . The other
is that of the hecatontarch , also called
ilarch . Both must be carried by the tagma
and receive equal honor until the day of
battle. On the day of battle only the normal
standard should be flown, as flying a large
number of standards causes confusion and
men may not recognize their own. In this way
it is possible for the army to appear stronger
due to the number of banners , and on the
day of battle they only use the normal, easily
recognizable one. Tagmas that have been
severely reduced in strength should not be
allowed to fly their banners in open battle,
but should be grouped under another banner
. The reason is that being so few they will not
be able to protect themselves, and having
many banners flying could create confusion
among the groupers . As has been said,
however, things must be prepared so that
each flag has no less than two hundred men
and no more than four hundred 17 .
END OF BOOK TWO
1 Δρούγγοι in the original Greek. Among the Latin
authors, the drungos is mentioned in the Historia
Augusta (Life of Probus 19, 2 [attention: in the Latin
original, because in the Spanish translation (cf.
Bibliography) speaks simply of "corps of troops"]) and
by Vegetius (III 16, 3 and 19, 2). Under his command
was the drungarius.
2 Ancient term already recorded in sources since the
time of Homer (Iliad III, line 31), which referred to the
"best fighters." The word continued to be used by
classical authors, although already in its military
meaning: the first line of battle, the strongest,
according to Leo VI in his Tacticae Constitutiones (XII
43).
3 The distance known indefinitely as "an arrow shot"
was generally equivalent to about three hundred
meters. W. McLeod (1965, pp. 1-14) and E. Schilbach
(1970, p. 42), refine it a little more and according to
them it would be 328.84 meters. However, A. Bivar
(1972, p. 283) believes that in the military treaty of
Mauritius, the distance marked by an arrow shot would
be significantly smaller, about 133 meters. H. Elton
(2007b, p. 543) places the effective military range of
an arrow shot at about 100 m.
4 Here there is an inaccuracy on the part of the
author, since he talks to us about three flags when, a
few lines before, he only talks, without specifying,
about one or more.
5 A vexilation (from lat. vexillatio) is originally a
detachment (legionary, auxiliary or irregular) of
infantry, cavalry or mixed, more or less large
(depending on the mission to be carried out),
temporarily separated from a unit, for a specific
mission. In late imperial times it began to designate a
cavalry unit of about five hundred men belonging to
the maneuver armies (comitatenses, those who were
at the rear of the borders, ready to go to the points
where their defense had been overcome) or to the
palatines (palatini, those who accompanied the
emperor). In Byzantine times its meaning would not
have changed much.
6 The Illyrians (illyrici) were the "descendants" of the
equites illyriciani units that were abundant in late
imperial times, such as, for example, the equites
scutarii Illyriciani (ND Or. XXXII 19 [Ed. of O. Seeck]),
the equites Dalmatae Illyriciani (ND Or. XXXII 21
[Id.]), the equites scutarii Illyriciani (ND Or. XXXIII 16
[Id.]), the equites promoti Illyriciani (ND Or. XXXIII 17
[Id.]), and many other units «surnamed» Illyriciani.
7 It is the model of the classical Greek phalanx.
8 We do not know if he uses the Roman or Byzantine
foot for his measurement. The first is equivalent to
29.56 cm, while the most common measurement of
the second was 31.23 cm. On this, cf. Schilbach
(1970), pp. 13-16.
9 These nurses or health workers are called in the text
δηποτάτοι . About these soldiers, cf. McGEER, E.
(1991): "Medical Services, Military", in The Oxford
Dictionary of Byzantium (Alexander P. Kazhdan, Ed.),
Oxford-New York.
10 The Roman mile is equivalent to 1478.5 m, a
measurement that could still remain in the 6th century.
Cf. again Schilbach (1970) pp. 32-36.
11 Ties: elongated piece of fabric that is added to the
flagpole just above it, remembering decorations, facts
about weapons, etc.
12 We translate the term βουκίνων as horns. In Latin,
the one who plays the horn would be the bucinator (cf.
cornet ).
13 Latin expression that means "With us." It must be
remembered that in Mauricio's work the Latin orders
are written in the Greek alphabet. On this topic, you
can consult: KAZHDAN, A. and McGEER, E. (1991):
"Commands, Military", in Oxford Dictionary of
Byzantium (Alexander P. Kazhdan, Ed.), Oxford
University, Oxford-New York.
14 "Lord, have mercy".
15 Vegetius, in his Epitoma Rei Militaris III 5, 4, tells
us that the phrase Nobiscum Deus ("God with us") can
be used as a password or during combat (presumably
in this case as a war cry).
16 Already Caesar (Caius Iulius Caesar) (BC III 92),
more than six hundred years before, said something
similar: «and it was not in vain that it was arranged in
Antiquity that the signal of attack would sound
everywhere and all the soldiers would shout loudly;
and they thought that with these procedures they not
only frightened their enemies, but also incited their
own." 17 In book I, chap. 4, Mauricio himself tells us
that a tagma must have a force that can range
between three hundred and four hundred men.
Book III
Chapter 1. The symbols used to illustrate

tagma formations
Episode 2. The formation of the tagmas
claiming a force of three hundred and ten
men
its flanks in closed order
both flanks and the rear in closed order
Chapter 5. Tagma training methods
Chapter 6. The formation of groupers .
Explanation of the symbols that illustrate

the training of groupers and their
personnel
Chapter 7. Explanation of the symbols that
illustrate the formation of the first and
second lines
Chapter 8. Formation of the entire line when
the impediment is present
Chapter 9. An individualized grouper
Chapter 10. Formation of an army of
moderate strength
Chapter 11. General orders
Chapter 12. Orders to front line troops
Chapter 13. Orders to the flankers
Chapter 14. Orders to attack flankers
Chapter 15. Orders to the troops of the
second line
Chapter 16. Orders to troops assigned to
ambushes
ON THE FORMATION OF TAGMAS 1 2
Book III, chapter 1. The symbols used

to illustrate tagma formations
Flag 1
Tagma Prefect6
F Rider or soldier with any type of weapon
x they can handle
6
K Book III, chapter 2. The formation of
the tagmas claiming a force of three
í hundred and ten men
R
K This is the formation of the tagma as it
K lines up for battle and begins its advance.
k He must definitely march in open order so
6Trumpets
that the horsemen do not crowd together and
become fatigued before the fight. They
should be spaced far enough apart so that
everyone can easily turn their horse
whenever they want. The order is: Largiter
ambula 3 . Then, riding at a trot, the soldiers
advance against the enemy, as illustrated in
diagram 4 .
Coat holder 2
Hecatontarch or ilarch
Decarca with spear and shield
Pentarch with spear and shield
The third in line with a bow without a
shield
The fourth in the line with a bow without a
shield located in the rear
The fifth in line with a bow without a
shield
tagma with its flanks in closed order
When the enemy is a mile away, the
decision to make is to protect the flank and
the order is: Ad latus stringe 5 . The cavalry
lines will move in closer order between them
continuing their advance towards the enemy
as shown in the diagram.

tagma with both flanks and the rear in
closed order
When we are three or four arrow shots from
the enemy line, the decision to make is to
protect the flanks and rear depending on the
circumstances. The order is: Iunge 6 . Then
they will gradually contract as the
advancement continues. The archers will fire
and the tagma together in close order will
begin the charge, as shown in the diagram.
Book III, chapter 5. Tagma training

methods
When the flag has been aligned in the

established order, the herald must shout the
following command: Silentium. Nemo
demittat, nemo antecedat bandum, sic uenias
uero aequalis facies, bandum capture, ipso
seque cum bando miles. Talis est comodum
militis barbati. If uero bandum demittes eo
moda non uero uices. It will be thousands
ordinem positum. Ipsum serue et tu bandifer,
siue pugnas siue seques inimicum siue
aequalis facies, non forte minare ut ne
sparges tu suum ordinem 7 .
Each tagma must be trained as follows.
Give the signal, move forward and stop,
either in formation or on the run. If the
commander wants the troops to advance, he
shouts: Moue 8 , which is called "kineson" 9 in
Greek. The signal can also be given by bugles
or by waving the banner . Thus the tagma
advances. If you want to stop them, shout
the order: this 10 or give the signal by hitting
a shield or moving the hand, or with the
horns. And so the tagma stops.
In case you first want them to march in
open order, the order is: equaliter ambula 11 .
To close ranks with the greatest precision
from the flanks and rear, as illustrated in the
previous diagrams, the order is: ad latus
stringe, the decarcas : ad decarchas, the
pentarchs : ad pentarchas 12 . Then all the
troops, side by side, close together, not on a
single flank, but from both sides, compressing
towards the center, that is, towards the
standard bearer . This maneuver should
also be practiced by the groupers , since in
this way the lines can close quickly and in
good order. Just as the decarcas align
themselves, so the tetrarchs or those last in
line must align themselves. Well, if the
soldiers close ranks accurately, effectively
They keep the troops in front of them and
dissuade them from abandoning their
positions in combat and fleeing to the rear.
At the order of: iunge 13 , the soldiers close
in from the rear for the charge. With the
troops advancing in close formation,
particularly after having closed in tight
formation from the flank, the archers fire, and
the order to be given is: fire 14 . The
decarchs and pentarchs then lean forward,
covering their heads and part of the necks of
their horses with their shields, holding their
spears as high as their shoulders in the
manner of the blond races 15 , and protected
by their shields, they advance in good order,
not too fast, but at a trot, to prevent the
momentum of the charge from breaking their
ranks before colliding with the enemy, which
is a real risk. All rearguard archers must
shoot.
When pursuing the enemy on horseback,
they must sometimes charge in open order,
sometimes together in close order. If done in
open order, the order is: cursu mina 16 . And
they must ride at that speed for about a mile
. If done in closed order, the order is: cum
ordine seque 17 . And they pursue the enemy
together in closed ranks.
To go back a little and then turn around:
when the commander q wants to retreat in
open order yells: yield 18 . And at a gallop the
troops retreat with one or two arrow shots
towards the men positioned in close order.
The commander shouts again: turn mine 19 .
Then they turn, facing the enemy. The troops
must practice this maneuver frequently, not
only in forward charges, but also to the right
and left, and the same as if they were
directed towards the second line.
Sometimes the intervals of that second line or
the spaces between the lines must regroup
and all together in an irregular formation
charge against the enemy. While practicing,
the spears must be kept high and not lowered
to the side, so as not to impede the free
movement of the horses.
To change the front to the left or right in an
orderly manner, the flankers and attack
flankers have to make the necessary
maneuver. The first order is: depose sinistra
20
. If it is to the right: depose right 21 . And
they change the front. If it only involves one
flag , then that flag changes the front. But if
there are several, then the first changes by
itself, and the others according to the
movements of the first.
To change the formation when soldiers hold
their position and when changes the front of
the battle line: if a small enemy force
suddenly attacks from the rear, the order to
give is: transform 22 . Keeping their place,
each soldier rotates and only the officers and
standard bearers move to the new front
line from the new rear. If a large enemy force
appears behind them, the order is: transmute
23
, and the unit marches together following
the banner .
During training and formation, the tagma
should not be limited to the line formations
shown in the diagrams, which concern only
the main charge, but also irregular formations
should be practiced, marching forward and in
various types of circular movements, first
retreating and turning around, then surprise
attacks against the enemy, and finally
providing quick support to units in trouble. If
the tagmas acquire some capacity in these
maneuvers, they will be prepared to operate
in closed or open formation and to form in
any eventuality. When such training has been
properly carried out, the soldiers begin to
become familiar with them or with most of
them, and these nine maneuvers prepare the
tagmas for any emergency, whether being
prepared to fight in open order, in closed
order, as flankers or as attack flankers ,
as they will have become accustomed to all
formations. It is also essential, of course, that
flags begin to be used to align and cooperate
with each other, as well as the entire line of
battle, but in such a way that they do not
reveal all our formations to the enemy. Before
combat, the army should not form in full line
of battle, that is, when they are training they
should not line up in the first and second
lines, with flankers , attack flankers ,
troops hidden in irregular formation or in
ambushes. These dispositions are more a
matter of strategy than tactics, and should
not be prepared in advance during training,
but should be decided upon at the point of
encountering a specific need.
At the time when a single flag is being
trained, a moira , a meres or the entire
front line must be aligned in three parts. If it
is a single flag that is training itself, most of
the men should be formed in open order. On
the same line with them, about ten horsemen
should be placed in a single column on each
flank in close order. A few soldiers, say ten,
should take their position on the opposite side
to represent the enemy so that our men can
have the impression of directing their charge
against them. When the advance begins,
troops in open order, separated from their
close order support, move quickly as if they
were in combat. After riding steadily forward
for a mile or two, they return to the middle
distance, make three or four quick charges to
the right and left, and then begin again. After
all this, they gallop to their original position in
the area between the two groups in close
order and all ride together in close order as if
to confront the enemy they were pursuing.
The same type of training should also be
practiced by the moiras . Some of your flags
should form in open order, others in closed
order. They must then change roles, those in
open order change to closed, and vice versa,
with the result that all of them will be
prepared for what corresponds. The same
principles apply in the training of groupers ,
both in the first and second lines of battle.
When several troop flags in open order
practice enveloping charging movements and
divide into two groups riding against each
other, with one part charging outwards and
the other inwards, great care must be taken
to avoid collisions between the riders.
The flankers and attack flankers , along
with those irregular groups hidden behind the
drungos , must practice individually. When
the enemy lines extend beyond ours on both
sides, it is up to the flankers and attack
flankers to hold our line and protect it
against the enemy's enveloping movements.
These flankers and attack flankers must
be trained in the movements of surrounding
and enveloping enemy lines shorter or equal
in size to ours. A few horsemen, say one or
two flags , should line up in front of them in
a single line to make it look like the enemy
line, so that the attacking flankers
according to the length of the enemy line can,
first, overtake it and then the drungos or
irregular groups gathered together can
quickly and quickly charge against the enemy
line and fall on the enemy rearguard.
These maneuvers are simple, they affect
the enemy rearguard and can be practiced by
a single tagma or by several teams without
disrupting our order of battle against the
enemy. The other maneuvers described below
are not essential. These exercises must be
given in writing to the merarchs and
moirarchs . They should be practiced not
only on flat terrain, but also on mountainous
and waterlogged terrain. Even in hot weather
it is a good idea to train and practice them.
Nobody knows what will happen.
Book III, chapter 6. The formation of

groupers. Explanation of the symbols
that illustrate the training of groupers
and their personnel
MEROS OF THE FEDERATIONS. TRAINING

Moira in Moira in Moira in
training training training
open closed open
The merarch
Flag in open order

Randera in dinner order
Book III, chapter 7. Explanation of the
symbols that illustrate the formation of
the first and second lines7
The hypostrategos
The medical body 77
Flankers
Attack flankers
Armed Optimates
Reserve horses, if any
Impediment, if any
Flag of the impedimenta guard, if there is
one
Taxiarch of the Optimates
Book III, chapter 8. Formation of the
entire line when the impediment is
present
7The strategos
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Groupers Tagma Groupers Tagma Groupers Tagma Groupers

SECOND LINE OR SUPPORT LINE
KKXKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKEKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKXKKKKKKKK
KKKKKKKKKKKKKIKKIIKK IKKlUtniK KKKKKKKXKKX
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If it happens that the army is of a force of

more than fifteen thousand men, it is
permissible, and indeed advisable, to organize
the second line into four groupers with three
spaces between them, as the diagram shows,
so that each grouper of the first line can
have its own space. If the army is of
moderate strength, say five thousand or six
thousand to fifteen thousand men, then the
second line should be composed of two
groupers and an open space according to
the following diagram showing a single
grouper . If the army is even smaller, five
thousand men or less, then a grouper must
be stationed as a second line. The open
spaces in the second line between groupers
must be proportionate to the number of units
formed in the first line, so that each space is
one-quarter width of the grouper in the first
line. That is, if the grouper in the first line
has six hundred horsemen, the open space in
the second line must be about one hundred
and fifty. As mentioned above, the depth of
the tagma stationed in that open space
should normally be four men deep, so that, if
necessary, it can be prepared for offensive
action. But if the army is of moderate
strength, it is not enough to fight but it is
enough to remain and keep the second line
intact.
Book III, chapter 9. An individualized
grouper
Example of an individualized grouper
formed as previously described. If this
grouper must retreat by turning in the
direction of the second line and receives
shelter in the middle of it, the tagma
standard bearer or his commander shouts:
"suscipe" 25 .
Book III, chapter 10. Formation of an
army of moderate strength
KKKKKKKK KKKKKKKK KKKKKKKK
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SECOND LINE
This scheme, with the second line consisting
of a mere and no more, is appropriate when
the army is of moderate strength, that is,
from two thousand to five thousand or six
thousand men or less. In an emergency, the
first line should be placed at the end or flanks
of the second line, not at its height. If the
entire army consists of five thousand to ten
thousand or twelve thousand men, the
second line should be divided into two
groupers with an open space between them,
as previously explained in the diagram of a
single grouper , and if the first line is
overcome can find refuge there. If we are
dealing with an army of fifteen thousand or
twenty thousand men or more, the second
line must consist of four groups with three
open spaces, as explained in the chapter that
deals with it. This arrangement of the line is
essential when the army is exceptionally
numerous.
Arrangement of flankers and attack
flankers when the enemy's battle line is
longer or shorter than ours.
If the enemy battle line is considerably long
on both sides, our center, not the flanks,
must advance to fight ahead of the other
units.
THE ENEMY BATTLE LINE
Yo ■ ■
31N383
THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST LINE OF BATTLE WITH THE FLANKERS

HIDDEN UNTIL THE MOMENT OF CONTACT
FOREHEAD
FLANK GUARDS MEROS MEROS MEROS FLANKERS
HIDDEN GRAPES
ENEMY LINE -
31383 ’ '
FORMATION OF THE FIRST LINE BATTLE WHEN THE ENEMY LINE IS LONGER
AND THERE IS NO TIME TO EXTEND OURS UNTIL IT EQUALIZES
FOREHEAD .
FLANK GUARDS MEROS MEROS MEROS FLANKERS
WRAPPING MOVEMENT
ENEMY WHEN YOUR LINE IS SHORTER
AT BOTH ENDS AND WHEN BOTH
BATTLE LINES APPROACH
TOWARDS THE OTHER.
Troops prepared to launch an enveloping or
flanking movement should advance a little
more slowly to make it easier for the flankers
to encircle the enemy line before making
contact. If, on the other hand, our line is
being engulfed because it is shorter, then the
troops from our second line behind it must
attack the rear of the forces enveloping us.
HOW THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE

PERFORMED
WRAPPING WHEN THE LINES
THEY ARE OF EQUAL STRENGTH.
Book III, chapter 11. About general

orders
When Roman forces have been organized

and trained, first by tagmas and later by
meros , the officers of each meros must be
called together and given the following basic
written instructions. Just as rabbits and other
small animals, when pursued and hunted, do
not flee in hasty flight, but look back to see
how vigorously their attackers pursue them
and regulate their career accordingly, how
much more do men, who possess intelligence
and fight for such a cause, be careful in
preparing their purposes of attack and retreat
in battle and must not do like water that
flows now forward and now backward, so
that with each small advance made by the
enemy or by They themselves do not lose
control and take unnecessary risks, but must
remain at their post and strive for every
possible way to defeat the enemy. Pushing
the enemy back a short distance and letting
him go is not a decisive victory. Nor is it a
defeat to retreat a little and then stop again.
Only the end of the battle is clear to both
sides and that is why they must fight, so that
it is shown clearly. When the officers
understand the principles of the formations
and practices mentioned above, which
contribute to the execution of those
maneuvers and after the training of the
individual units, the entire battle line should
be formed once or, even better, twice
depending on the principles illustrated by the
maneuvers.
front-line troops
The orders must be given to the officers of
the first line or line of combat to conform
their movements based on those carried out
by the central groupers , where the
hypostrategos is generally located. They
must keep up with this grouper and carry
out their charge at the same time. If the
enemy flees because of the charge, then the
assault troops must quickly pursue them by
continuing their pursuit directly to the enemy
camp. The defense troops must follow them
without stopping but maintaining their
formation. So, in case the enemy turns and
the assault troops cannot keep up the fight
in close formation, they can gain shelter
among the defending troops and regroup.
If it happens that during the battle any
grouper , or all, must retreat, they must do
so behind the second line within an arrow
shot or two and the usual and appropriate
thing to do is to order, announcing it loudly,
to turn again against the enemy. They must
thus be able to force the enemy to retreat. If
not, they should retreat a little and
counterattack. And if, after one or two
attempts, they have still not succeeded in
defeating the enemy, then the second line
must advance, the first taking shelter behind
the second and covering the empty spaces in
it, and in the area between the second and
the third The first line must be remade and
attack the enemy in irregular formation
together with the second line. If the enemy
retreats, he must be pursued without mercy.

flankers
The flankers should be ordered that if the
enemy's flank extends beyond ours, they
must make every effort, tilting their own
flank, which is the side of the shield 26 , to
extend our flank and do the same, to prevent
the encirclement of the enemy. complete
groupers . But if the enemy flank is shorter,
they must activate the advance in crescent
formation and envelop it before the grouper
launches its attack, which is just before the
charge signal is given. If the lines are of equal
dimension, the flankers must remain in
position in close order and join the charge of
the rest of the groupers .

attack flankers
Orders should be given to the attacking
flankers so that, until the enemy is within
two or three arrow shots of our line of battle,
are, as explained, remaining hidden behind
the right wing. A tagma with its decarchs
and pentarchs should be placed in the front
row, with a depth of about five men, enough
if the troops are good. The other tagma
must be located irregularly after the first. The
banners , that is, their culminating parts,
must not be carried displayed, but lowered,
so as not to be seen and recognized by the
enemy until the appropriate moment. If the
enemy flank extends beyond ours, they must
first lean to the flank, that is, to the side of
the spear 27 . While the grouper on the right
slows their pace a little they can extend their
formation to half an arrow's reach until they
overtake the opposite wing. As they turn on
them and envelop them, the order: Exi 28 will
be given, and the covert drungos will
suddenly charge from behind with great
strength and speed. If the enemy flees, they
must not pursue him, but must join the other
tagmas and immediately attack the rear of
the rest of the enemy units. But if the enemy
line is shorter, they must immediately
advance from the grouper and, in a crescent
formation, envelop it. If the lines are of the
same length, they should extend their
formation a little to flank the opposite wing
and then, as stated, charge. Now if, while the
attacking flankers are deploying and the
enemy's are doing so in the same way, then
you must immediately launch the charge
against them while they are still moving. Well,
by enveloping him on the flank, the enemy
will have to expose his right and his formation
will lose cohesion. Not only must the attack
flankers regulate these enveloping
movements so that they are neither too slow
nor too early, but the commander of the
entire group must calculate his assault to
coincide with the attack of the attack
flankers as soon as they begin to cause
damage. confusion among the enemy. Your
purpose should be to envelop the enemy
block in front of you if you can. On the other
hand, they must extend their line as much as
the enemy is doing so. If the enemy battle
line is longer, then they should encourage the
attacking flankers to go towards their role.
It should be noted that attack flankers , as
stated, can carry out surprise attacks with
impunity even in open terrain.
Book III, chapter 15. Orders to the
troops of the second line
The second line must be ordered to follow
and configure its movements in accordance
with the unit of the center in which the
strategos is normally located. At the
moment the first line makes contact with the
enemy, the second line should be about three
or four arrow shots behind it, so that if the
enemy retreats, it will follow in support of the
first line in close formation, maintaining its
formation, and without stopping. If our first
line is defeated, the retreating units must be
allowed to pass through the tagmas of the
third line and thus find refuge. The second
line must continue its advance in good order
without breaking up, with the troops of the
first line, and must not break formation until
the final result of the battle and its return to
the camp. You must always maintain your
formation and not break it in pursuit of the
enemy.
Now, if the battle remains in doubt as far as
the first line is concerned, and if first one side
gains the advantage and then the other, then
the second line must wait and watch how the
situation develops, uttering two or three
passionate shouts. of support to give courage
to our troops and discourage the enemy. You
must be very careful not to jump into action
prematurely or position yourself too close to
the front line so as not to create confusion
and unexpected defeat.
If in your case it happens that the second
line is broken, you must retreat as far away
as the rear guard or the third line is and
reorganize. If they hear that the enemy is
ambushing the rear, if it is only a small
outpost and the troops of the third line are
capable of dealing with it, in that case they
should be sent after them. But if there are
not enough troops in the defense, the men of
the second line must turn such As they are,
with the commanding officer with the
standard advancing in the rear, and with the
line facing both sides, the enemy attack can
easily be stopped. If the enemy retreats, one
or two flags from the rear must attack him.
If the enemy is expected to be numerous, the
commander gives the order: "transmute " 29 .
In each tagma the decarcas march to the
rear, so that it becomes the new front.
Let this remain a permanent regulation for
all troops and that no one from the second
line dare charge even if the first line were
defeated.
Book III, chapter 16. Orders to troops

assigned to ambushes
Troops sent to ambush or attack the enemy
front line should be ordered, first of all, to
send patrols ahead so that the detachment
does not unexpectedly encounter an enemy
force or an ambush from the flank or rear. of
the enemy's first line. The enemy often places
his forces in two lines of battle and if our
raids against his first line have not been
carefully planned, our own troops can end up
being ambushed by the enemy.
Consequently, if the enemy is situated in two
lines, an attack should not be launched
against the rear of his first line, but against
one flank or wing, even if, as mentioned, the
attack takes place from one or both. sides.
This type of attack must be coordinated so
that we do not advance too much with
respect to our battle line or too late, but
when the two lines are two or three arrow
shots apart, then the detachments sent to the
ambush must attack the enemy. . But if the
men have been properly trained, as explained
above, it is not necessary to spend any more
time on those instructions, as they will be
able to deal with each situation accordingly.
END OF THE THIRD BOOK
1 Understood as a banner.
2 Understood as an assistant.
3 «In open order. March!”
4 In the Laurentian manuscript only the central body
is developed.
5 "Close the flanks!"
6 "Close ranks!"
7 "Silence. Let no one back down. Let no one
advance in front of the banner. Advance at the same
pace as the front line. Keep your eyes on the banner.
Follow him with your own company, soldier. This is
how the brave soldier must act. If you abandon the
banner you will not win. Soldier, maintain your
assigned position. standard bearer , maintain your
position in the fight and, pursuing the enemy or even
on the front line, do not charge impetuously causing
your ranks to break. In the original text, this entire
paragraph is in Latin, but written in the Greek
alphabet, with the peculiarities of the spelling of this
language with respect to Latin, such as putting
silention instead of the correct Latin silentium,
antekedat instead of antecedat. ..
8 "March!"
9 κίνεσον.
10 "High!".
11 "In line, march!"
12 "On the flank, close!"... "To the decarcas !"... "To
the pentarchs !"
13 "Close ranks!"
14 "Charge!"
15 Barbarians from the north, Germans from the
west.
16 "Charge at a gallop!"
17 "Stay in order!"
18 "Back off!"
19 "Turn and charge!"
20 "To the left, change the front!"
21 "To the right, change the front!"
22 "Change!".
23 "Change places!"
24 Deputator.
25 «Incorporation!».
26 The left side.
27 The right side.
28 "Advance!"
29 "Change positions!"
Book IV
Chapter 1. On ambushes and stratagems
against superior enemy troops
Episode 2. About the ambushes of the
Scythians
Chapter 3. About the ambushes carried out
by both sides
Chapter 4. About the most opportune
moment for ambushes
Chapter 5. On the convenience of using
irregular formations for ambushes or
surprise attacks
ABOUT AMBUSHES
Book IV, chapter 1. About the

ambushes and stratagems against
superior enemy troops
Well-planned ambushes are of the greatest
value in war. In many ways, ambushes have,
in a short period of time, destroyed large
forces before the enemy has had a chance to
bring his full line of battle into action. Some
commanders take advantage of favorable
terrain, such as dense forests, valleys, steep
hills, ravines, and mountains that extend
beyond the enemy battle line. Commanders
have used these geographic features to
conceal troops and to keep them undetected
at a distance and from being attacked. Then,
suddenly charging into the enemy rearguard
before the main battle begins, these attacks
lead to disorder and defeat. Other
commanders, When the terrain does not
allow this advantage, they cannot mount the
ambush near the enemy line, but rather on
the flank, between the enemy lines and those
of their own army or even in the rear of their
own flank. Sometimes they can station the
larger force in the ambush and keep a small
troop in front of the enemy. This is
particularly used against blonde-haired 1
people and other undisciplined people.

of the Scythians
Instead of placing a large number of troops,
some commanders place the smallest part of
the army in line. When the charge is made
and the lines collide, those soldiers quickly
flee, the enemy begins to pursue them and
begins to disorganize. Our troops ride past
the ambush site, and then the hidden units
charge and attack the enemy from the rear.
Those who were escaping turn back and the
enemy forces are caught in the middle. The
Scythian peoples always do this.
carried out by both sides
Some commanders have dug a trench eight
or ten feet deep and fifty or sixty feet wide,
for a good distance. They cover it with
branches, straw and earth and so it looks just
like the earth around it and there is no way
you can tell the difference. The excavated
earth should not be left there so that nothing
strange can be seen. At several points in the
middle of the trench those commanders They
leave some passes of solid land, well marked
and known by their own army at the right
moment. Near the trench, on both sides, they
place troops in ambush, hidden where they
cannot be seen, and place the rest of the
army in line in front of the trench. When
battle begins, the men in front of the trench
pretend to be defeated and retreat safely
through the solid sections known to them.
The enemy begins an irrepressible and
impetuous pursuit and falls into the trench.
Then, the ambushed soldiers suddenly charge
and the men who have pretended to retreat
turn back. Most of the enemy will be in
danger, some will have fallen into the ditch
while others will escape in disarray due to the
unexpected disaster. This is the stratagem
with which the Nephthalites 2 defeated
Peroz, king of the
Persians 3 .
This type of ambush, however, requires a
lot of time and many workers, and can be
easily discovered by enemies through
deserters or scouts. Others, applying the
same type of stratagem in swampy terrain,
locate two or three solid passes and report
them to their army when it is in formation.
The troops line up in front of such passes
and, when the action begins, they pretend to
flee, doing so over the passes and leading the
enemy directly into the swamp. Then the
ambushed troops on the flanks suddenly
charge against them and the men who were
pretending to retreat counterattack and
destroy the enemy. The Scythian tribes of the
Goths used this against the Roman Emperor
Decius when they crossed the Danube and
invaded Thrace and waged war against him in
Messiah 4 . At that time Decius was successful
using the same strategy, pretending to
retreat, in an intense combat that he engaged
in to destroy many of them 5 .
This same type of trap can be performed on
the enemy even without a trench or swamp.
At the appropriate time, without the enemy's
knowledge, iron caltrops linked together
should be spread or placed in position so that
they can be easily recovered after being used.
They must extend along the entire length of
the battle line and to a depth of one hundred
feet . Four or five passages should be left in
the middle, about three or four hundred feet
wide, known to our army and clearly marked
by three large sticks, spears ending in strange
shapes, piles of earth or stone, or other
obvious marks. These marks must be placed
not only at the entrance of the passages or in
the front covered by the caltrops , but also
at the back of the passages so that, once the
action has started, when the units pretend to
retreat and have passed through those tracks,
the markers can be removed or knocked
down by the riders assigned for that purpose.
Soldiers in ambush on both flanks can then
charge while the enemy is tripping over the
caltrops and finding difficulty in both
advancing and retreating.
The same type of action can be performed
without using the caltrops . Here and there
round pits must be opened, of the type called
"horse breakers." They should be one foot in
diameter and two or three feet deep, with
sharp stakes fixed at the bottom 6 . The pits
should be dug in alternating rows, not in a
straight line, about every three feet in all
directions, and should cover an area of one
hundred and fifty feet , as long as the battle
line. At the time of battle, now, the first line
should be placed about a mile in front of
these obstacles, and the second about two or
three arrow shots behind the obstacles, not
as widely spaced as the line of battle but in
line with the free spaces between the various
units. In an emergency, then, when the front
line troops withdraw, they can do so safely
between those spaces and, if necessary, the
second line can advance through those same
spaces to attack the enemy. If the entire
battle line is placed behind obstacles, with no
units in front, the line must be placed two or
three arrow shots behind it. When the enemy
advances, they encounter obstacles at the
same moment that their horses, falling into
the holes, are annihilated. When our line is
formed behind obstacles, the free spaces
between said obstacles should not be very
wide so that a large number of enemies
cannot engage in dangerous combat.
Any of these devices or stratagems must be
prepared secretly by a small group of trusted
men. The work must be done on the same
day of the battle or the day before in the
afternoon, at that point where the combat is
expected, and there they must wait for the
enemy. At the right moment, the trusted
group must inform the soldiers, especially the
standard bearers , so they can know what
to do. During the retreat, they must not do so
in regular formation, but the flags must
continue in a non-rigid formation one after
the other according to the location of the
open spaces. All soldiers should be ordered to
follow their own standards , especially
during retreat, to avoid, hopefully not
happening!, moving between the traps and
falling into them.
Of all the stratagems described above, it is,
in our opinion, that of thistles that can be
used most easily and secretly in all types of
terrain. The strategos must also, of course,
form the battle line according to the terrain.
If it is decided to make an assault against the
enemy line, as described in the previous
book, one or two flags should be deployed,
or even more, depending on the size of the
army, with good soldiers under the command
of brave and intelligent officers. Depending
on the terrain, one group must undertake
operations against the enemy line on its right
flank, and the other group can do the same
on the left. If the enemy launches an attack,
those units must repel it and not give it time
to reach and harass our battle line. If the
enemy does not attack, then they themselves
must attack in that sector or attack by
surprise the enemy impediment if they can
risk being close at hand, or the rear or flanks
of the enemy line. In case the enemy forms in
two lines or there may be units prepared for
ambushes behind their own line, to search for
and damage our men, our men who have
been assigned for ambush tasks must make a
careful reconnaissance of the terrain and,
therefore, Therefore, be prepared for any
movement of the enemy.
Book IV, chapter 4. About the most

opportune moment for ambushes
The moment for an ambush must be
carefully chosen. They should not make their
attack too far from the main line because,
being fewer in number, they may be
overwhelmed by the enemy. They also cannot
be delayed for too long, because if they
appear after the main battle has begun they
are useless. Ambush units and the main body
of the army must move at the same time,
whether there is one ambush or two. It is
even better to move the main body of the
army a little before the ambush units so that
the main line of battle, advancing in the open,
will distract the enemy's attention, while the
others proceed under cover. They must
coordinate their movements thanks to scouts,
signals and feedback. If one happens to take
the lead by a shortcut, it should slow down
and wait for the other so that, if possible,
both the ambush units and the main line of
battle make contact with the enemy at the
same time. Preferably, ambush units should
attack just a little earlier. The purpose of this
is that when the enemy begins to disband
because of the ambush, then the main battle
line will advance and attack. For the same
reason, if the terrain allows, ambushes should
be carried out from both sides, especially if
the army is large. One part of the army must
be used to repel enemy attacks, while the
other attacks him. Then, if one of them
remains intact, even though its assaults might
be ineffective, or if in the meantime the main
line of battle is repulsed, it must not, for
these reasons, give way to the enemy, retreat
to the second line and mix with the fugitives,
but must remain outside and try to attack the
enemy rear and thus pick up his own fleeing
men.
Book IV, chapter 5. On the convenience
of using irregular formations for
ambushes or attacks
by surprise
We designate them to ensure that
detachments are designated for ambushes,
for attacks on the rear or flanks of the enemy
battle line, to protect the rear, flanks or
impediment, for rapid support of a unit that is
being hard pressed. or for small
reconnaissance they are much more effective
if they adopt an irregular formation than one
appropriate in a long line of battle, completely
placed in decharchies and pentarchies .
The line, in truth, turns out to be more
impressive, it is stronger, and in combat it
can charge more safely, but it is not really
very flexible and is slow and clumsy when
making emergency maneuvers. The irregular
formation has the opposite characteristics. It
can be easily hidden for an ambush, does not
require too much space and can be
maneuvered quickly in an emergency. For
these reasons, some time must be devoted to
its practice and its basic elements must
become obvious through practice. It must be
adapted to the size of the available force and
the configuration of the terrain. If a large or
good-sized unit of the main army is to be
placed in ambush with the idea of attacking a
place, it must be formed in decharchies or
pentarchies . But if a few units are deployed
or the attack is carried out from different
points, then the irregular formation is the
most indicated. In other words, the difference
between the two formations is this: the first is
for large operations where there is little risk,
the other is for quick support, chases, raids
and causing confusion. This latter formation,
considered appropriate for cavalry, must be
learned by constant training in the manner
described for the individual flags . If the skills
are acquired properly, there will be no need
for instructions or other orders. Training itself
and training teach each man what to do.
Some, too cautious and hesitant to change,
may perhaps argue that this formation is too
complicated and variable and is,
consequently, too much
problematic. They must realize that athletes,
charioteers and others who are concerned
with mere fun, do this only for material
success and reward, even a very mediocre
one, and the only price for failure is their own
embarrassment, but they undergo many
hardships and training. They rigidly restrict
their diet and never stop training in order to
learn various ways to hurt others. their
adversaries, ways to keep themselves free
from being hurt, and how to break the
encircles in which they might be trapped 7 .
How much more, then, should we practice
these formations and training without rest,
with flexibility and intelligence? In this case,
failure means immediate death or flight,
which is worse than death. On the contrary,
success means gratification, material gains,
fame, eternal memory. We must not trust
ourselves to a single training, because an
accidental mistake can mean the lives of too
many men. Ultimate responsibility may never
be known, but for the mistake of one all may
suffer. Of course, it is not necessary to write
much about this, even pointing out the
reasons can make the book too long. It is
more work to read about these workouts than
to do them.
END OF THE FOURTH BOOK

1 cf. note 68.
2 Here we see that Mauritius calls this barbarian
people Nephthalites ( Huns ). Other authors, such
as Procopius of Caesarea (De Bello Persico I 3 and 4)
and Agathias (Historiae IV 27, 4), call them
ephthalites. These people are sometimes also called
White Huns . Procopius, op. cit. I 3.
3 Procopius, De Bello Persico I 4-5; Agathias, Historiae
IV 27, 3-4. The king is Peroz I (457-484). This victory
was in the year 483 and the (n)phthalites forced the
Persians to pay them tribute, thus taking revenge for
the crushing defeats they had suffered before the
Persians previously, such as those caused by the
kings Bahram V (420-438). ) or his son and successor
Yazdegerd II (438-457).
4 Summer of 251 AD At the Battle of Abrittus (next to
present-day Hisarlak, in the vicinity of Razgrad, in the
province of Ruse, Bulgaria), in the Roman province of
Moesia Inferior (Moesia Inferior), in the present region
of Dobrudja (between Bulgaria and Romania ), the
emperor Decius (Caius Messius Quintus Decius, 249
251) was defeated and killed by the Goths of the
leader Kniva (Zosimo I 23, 2-3). About this battle, cf.
also RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ (2005) p. eleven.
5 As Maurice explains well, the emperor Decius knew
the tactics, with which he had already won on some
occasions. However, overconfidence resulted in the
death of the emperor in the battle mentioned above.
6 These are the famous "lilies" (lilia) that Julius Caesar
used in his siege of Alesia (the current Mount Auxois,
next to Alise-Sainte-Reine, in the department of Côte-
d'Or, in France) in 52 BC during his war in Gaul (BG VII
73).
7 Here it seems clear that gladiators are being
described, even though their activities were prohibited
since the time of Justinian I (527-565). Are we,
therefore, facing a new case of the legal maxim "it is
followed but not fulfilled" or just a historical archaism?
Book V
Chapter 1. On the precautions to take into
account when carrying the impedimenta to
the battlefield
Episode 2. About reserve horses
Chapter 3. About the non-necessary
impediment
Chapter 4. About the intermediate camps
Chapter 5. About the protection of
Book V, chapter 1. About the

precautions to take into account when
carrying the impedimenta to the field of
battle
The impediment must be considered
essential and must never be neglected. It
should not be left behind unprotected or, on
the other hand, carelessly carried onto the
battlefield. Included in the impedimenta are
the servants necessary for the soldiers, their
children, and other members of the soldiers'
families. If their safety is not guaranteed,
soldiers begin to become careless, hesitant
and discouraged in battle. An intelligent man
makes an effort to gain benefit at the
expense of the enemy without any harm to
himself. First of all, we advise that not a large
number of servants be sent to the area where
the main battle is expected, whether this be
in our own territory or outside, in a foreign
one, but rather a moderate number
composed of vigorous men. There should be
enough servants per squad to take care of
the horses, as well as to avoid much
confusion, untimely expense, and distractions
among them. At the time of battle, these
servants must be left behind in the camp,
whether the battle is fought on our territory
or on the enemy's, and some infantry units
that are present must join the assigned
troops. to the impediment. This must be done
carefully, as explained in the section on
camps.
Book V, chapter 2. About reserve horses

Reserve horses must also be left with the
impedimenta. We cannot doubt the reason
why soldiers leave their servants in charge of
their reserve horses on the day of battle.
Whether in victory or defeat, there is too
much tension, disorder and confusion for
anyone to recognize their reserve horse in
such a crowd and expect to ride it. This was
one of the good reasons why we have to
provide horses to help the medical corps in
such circumstances.
In small skirmishes or exploratory parties,
soldiers must have reserve horses, which
must be healthily maintained and in good
condition until the day of battle. But when the
battle begins, it is up to us to judge that it is
not necessary to have the reserve horses
near the line of battle. Instead, they should
be left in the camp as they can easily begin to
become disconcerted when only watched by
young servants.
Book V, chapter 3. About the non-
necessary impediment
If the infantry is present and the battle
seems imminent and without delay, whether
in our territory, in friendly territory or just on
the border, then in a fortified place about
thirty or fifty miles away, where forage and
water are sufficient, Most of the unnecessary
impedimenta and reserve horses, tools and
other unnecessary equipment on the day of
battle should be left guarded by one or two
flags , and they should be ordered to
accumulate fodder for four or five days and
protect the horses inside the enclosure until
the battle is over. A few good men should be
chosen, whom everyone knows, and
stationed at intervals between this place and
the front. They must inform those in charge
of the impediment. Depending on how the
battle progresses, they must notify the troops
that have been left with the impediment to
remain in the same place where they were
left, move to another suitable place or rejoin
the main army.
Book V, chapter 4. About the

intermediate camps
Troops moving from that base camp
prepared for combat should carry with them
their spare horses, small tents, or a pair of
heavy cloaks, one to cover themselves if
necessary and the other to make a tent or
shelter. Also twenty or thirty pounds of
biscuits, flour or some other provisions of that
kind, especially if they are going to fight
against the Scythians . They could also set
up a suitable camp near the enemy.
Fortifications must be erected around that
camp, even if the army is to remain there for
a single day. Each flag must store its fodder
or hay for the day there, so that in case the
army suffers a setback in battle and has to
beat a hasty retreat, it has the option of
remaining in that camp. If there are one or
two camps there, there will be a day's
supplies for the horses and they will not be
forced to search for forage or grass in the
midst of so much confusion and run the risk
of being wounded if they search for supplies
with the enemy around, or avoid travel
through places that the enemy threatens in
search of resources, or be forced to march
without provisions. Even if the army must set
out without using these supplies, some men
will have to be assigned to burn the forage
and later reintegrate into the force.
major.
Book V, chapter 5. About the protection
of impediments while walking
During the march, when the enemy is
nearby, the impediment must always be in
the middle, so it cannot be subject to enemy
harassment due to lack of protection. The
troops during the march must not mix or be
confused with the impedimenta, but must
keep apart. The pack must march on its own
after its own group , and the soldiers must
travel light on their own.
END OF THE FIFTH BOOK
Book VI
Preamble
Chapter 1. About Scythian instruction,
simulation
Episode 2. About wing instruction, simulation
Chapter 3. About African-style instruction,
simulation
Chapter 4. Regarding the italic instruction, the
most common
Chapter 5. How to exercise flankers and
attack flankers
ON THE DIVISION OF THE ARMY AND

ON MILITARY INSTRUCTION
Book VI, preamble

Constant exercise is of the greatest
importance to the soldier. It is easy, however,
for the enemy to know what is happening
through spies and deserters, and as a result
the entire practice is rendered ineffective.
Actually, the exercises described above are
sufficient, since their simplicity makes them
adaptable to any formation without revealing
our complete battle plan. Still, if there is
opportunity for a more sophisticated exercise,
each grouper individually must practice
various formations and exercises, first of all
those mentioned below in common use and
then the additional ones, which are not really
essential. Each formation or exercise must be
identified in a special way, so that the soldiers
who are training in these maneuvers can
recognize the differences and are not
disconcerted by them, and even so that they
cannot know what plan the strategos
intends to follow when he arrives. the
moment of battle. At the moment, there are
three simulated formations: the Scythian, the
Alana, the African, and one for regular use,
the Italic.
Book VI, chapter 1. About Scythian

instruction, simulation
The Scythian formation is one in which the
tagmas are all formed in the same way, as in
previous times, not with some of them
prepared as assault troops and others as
defense troops . They must be placed in a
single line, divided into two moiras instead
of the usual three. The two flanks of the
groupers move as if they were beginning an
enveloping maneuver, one advancing towards
the other, and surrounding an open space.
They continue advancing in a circle, the right
wing on the outside, the left wing on the
inside, and they ride toward each other's line.
This is usually part of the chivalry games in
winter time, during the month of March 1 .
Book VI, chapter 2. About wing

In the Alan system, the troops, some
intended for assault and others as defense
troops , are placed in a single battle line.
This is divided into two moiras , located at a
distance between two hundred and four
hundred feet from each other. The assault
troops gallop forward as if it were a chase,
and then return, filtering between the
intervals or free spaces of the main line.
Then, together with the defending troops ,
they return and charge against the enemy. In
another maneuver the assault troops turn
around at these intervals and charge both
flanks of the enemy unit and the men
maintain their original relative positions.

In the African system, troops are placed in a
single battle line, which has been the usual
practice until now. The middle moira is made
up of defense troops and both wings of
assault troops . Picking up speed, as in
pursuit, the center of the moira remains
behind, in close formation, while the assault
troops on both flanks begin to advance.
Then, when the time comes to return, one
moira remains in position or slows down on
the exposed side, while the other quickly
returns to the defending troops . The wing
that has stopped then begins to move
towards the defending troops , the other
wing moves quickly to meet the other wing,
going to one side in the direction of the
advancing wing, and in this sense, the two
wings meet. face to face, but without
colliding. There is another formation similar to
this in which the troops are aligned on the
opposite side, that is, the central moira is
composed of assault troops , and the
wings, of defense troops , but they follow
the same movements. To be correct, this
formation should be called the Illyric system.

instruction, the most common
The Italic exercise is both a formation and
an exercise that, in our opinion, is suitable to
be used against any people. It consists of two
lines, a front line and a support line, with
assault troops and defense troops , with
flankers , attack flankers and ambush
detachments, all of which have been
explained above and illustrated with
diagrams.
In general, we should practice these various
exercise systems, so that others cannot know
which one we consider more important. When
the front line has been trained, the second
line may not be on the field with the first, but
only the first line, and that without its
flankers , attack flankers and ambush
detachments, which seems simpler and more
important to us. . For the rest, instead of a
second line, a few horsemen can remain
there to represent it, so that the troops of the
first line can get used to the distance to cover
to seek their salvation. Likewise, the second
line can be trained by itself with few troops
stationed in the place of the first line, so that
the second line becomes accustomed to
sheltering the first line when necessary.
Book VI, chapter 5. How to exercise
flankers and attack flankers
Flankers and attack flankers can be
trained separately in their own formations
before the war, so they can begin to get used
to the enveloping movements without giving
them away. Firstly, attacking flankers can
be stationed behind cover behind the right
flank or can be placed even with the main
line. One way or another, when it's time to
make their enveloping move, they lean to the
right and ride as far as necessary. By
maintaining formation, they can return to
their original position so as to envelop the
enemy line at the same time. Likewise, the
flankers , stationed next to the grouper on
the left, lean to the left, ride as far as
necessary and quickly return to their original
position so as to make our line of extension
equal to that of the enemy.
END OF BOOK SIX

1 About this activity in this month precisely, as has
already been commented in a previous note, the life of
Saint Anastasius the Persian (Acta Martyris Anastasii
Persae, edic. of H. Usener, Programa Universitatis
Bonnae [1894], 13) tells us that "during the month of
March, it has been traditional for soldiers to equip their
horses, take them to flat terrain, and exercise them as
if they were training for the war". Likewise, even in the
6th century, equestrian games ( Ἱππικὰ γυμνάσια ) were
practiced, which Arrian tells us about in the 2nd
century (Tactica 32, 3; 34, 1 and 44, 3).
Book VII
PART A. ABOUT THE GENERAL. THE
POINTS TO CONSIDER BY THE
GENERAL BEFORE THE DAY OF THE
BATTLE
Preamble
Chapter 1. About the blessing of the flags
Episode 2. On the organization of collusion
Chapter 3. About gathering information about
the enemy
Chapter 4. On the use of harangue to
encourage troops
Chapter 5. About enemy prisoners taken by
patrols
Chapter 6. About the punishment of
criminals
Chapter 7. On the maintenance of soldiers,
their horses and their camps
Chapter 8. Concerning consultations with the
merarchs regarding the battlefield
Chapter 9. On how to water horses
Chapter 10. About the rations carried in the
saddlebags
Chapter 11. On how to wage war against
unknown people
Chapter 12. About the enemy's surprise
attacks during the march
Chapter 13. About the camps and the care of
the horses inside them
Chapter 14. On how not to loot enemy bodies
during battle
Chapter 15. About people similar to
enemy

Chapter 1. On how not to overwhelm the
strategos during the day of battle
Episode 2. About the enemy archers
Chapter 3. About how we should not engage
the enemy or show our own strength before
knowing his intentions
Chapter 4. On hiding the second line when it
is unable to follow behind the first, so that
the two appear as one
Chapter 5. On the tactics and method of
dealing with a surprise attack by the enemy
Chapter 6. About the wounded
Chapter 7. On the apparent strength of the

enemy
Chapter 8. About prevention of
hostile reconnaissance of our line
Chapter 9. How to protect the camp
Chapter 10. How to gather fodder
Chapter 11. About an adverse outcome
Chapter 12. About a favorable outcome in the
battle
Chapter 13. About recognition
Chapter 14. On how not to expose our second
line too soon
Chapter 15. About keeping the surface of
weapons shiny to be seen from afar before
battle
Chapter 16. On the recapitulation of the
obligations of each merarch
Chapter 17. About the recapitulation of the
type of obligations assigned to the
commanders of each tagma , the moirarchs
and the merarchs , so that each one knows
his obligation

BATTLE
Book VII, part A, preamble

Just as a ship cannot cross the sea without
a pilot, one cannot defeat an enemy without
tactics and strategy. With both and with the
help of God it is possible to defeat not only an
enemy force of equal numbers but also a
much superior one. Therefore it is not true,
as some inexperienced men believe, that wars
are decided by courage and the number of
troops, but, counting on the favor of God,
with tactics and generalship, and our interest
must be with Those are better than spending
our time mobilizing a large number of men.
The aforementioned provides security and
advantage to men who know how to use
them well, considering that the other option
brings problems and financial ruin.
The commander must take advantage of
favorable times and places to fight the
enemy. First, he must protect himself against
hostile attacks that could harm our men and
then he can try to launch one against the
enemy. Above all, he must be on the lookout
for enemy ambushes, sending frequent and
long-range patrols in all four directions in the
area surrounding the battlefield. You must
avoid disorderly and uncoordinated chases.
We must not allow the strategos himself to
take part in raids or other reckless attacks.
These must be entrusted to other competent
officials. Well, if one of the subordinate
officers makes a gross mistake or fails, the
situation can be quickly redirected. But if the
commander-in-chief of the army fails, his
failure can pave the way for complete
disorder.
The desirable strategist is one who
carefully studies the enemy before entering
combat, and can protect himself against his
strengths and take advantage of his
weaknesses. For example, if the enemy is
superior in cavalry, he can destroy their
fodder. If the enemy has superior numbers of
troops, cut off their supplies. If the enemy
army is made up of diverse peoples, corrupt
them with gifts, favors, promises. If there is
dissension between them, deal with their
bosses. If those people rely on the cavalry
lance, lead them into difficult terrain. If those
people rely on the bow, he lines up the army
in open terrain and forces them to fight in
close hand-to-hand combat. Against the
Scythians or the Huns launch your assault
in February or March when their horses are in
miserable condition after suffering the rigors
of winter and proceed in the same way as has
been suggested with the archers. If enemies
march or camp without taking proper
precautions, launch unexpected attacks both
day and night. If they are reckless and
undisciplined in combat and not seasoned in
difficulties, make them believe that you are
going to attack, but delay and prolong things
unnecessarily until their ardor cools, and
when they begin to hesitate, then launch your
attack on them. If the opponent is superior in
infantry, lure him into an open field, not too
closed, and from a safe distance hit him with
javelins.
War is like hunting. Wild animals are hunted
by scouting, nets, waiting, stalking,
surrounding and other similar stratagems
rather than by pure force. In war we must
proceed in the same way, whether the
enemies are many or few. Simply trying to
dominate the enemy in the open field, hand-
to-hand and face-to-face, even when you
seem to win, is a very risky undertaking and
can result in serious harm. Apart from an
extreme emergency, it is foolish to try to win
a victory that is very costly and that only
entails empty glory.

blessing of the flags
A day or two before hostilities begin, the
merarchs must see to it that the flags are
blessed and then present them to the tagma
standard bearers .
organization of collusion
The commanding officer of each tagma
must organize it into collusions and keep
them in top shape.

gathering information about the enemy
The gathering of information about the
enemy must be done by continuous
dispatches of skillful scouts with keen
eyesight, at appropriate intervals, by spies
and patrols, to obtain information about the
enemy's movements, their strength and
organization and thus be in position. to
prevent being surprised by it.
Book VII, part A, chapter 4. On the use

of harangue to encourage troops
At the appropriate time, troops must be
gathered by groupers or moiras , not all
together in the same place. To give them
courage they must be harangued,
remembering their previous victories,
promising rewards from the emperor and
rewards for their loyal service to the State.
Written orders must be communicated by the
officers of each tagma .

enemy prisoners taken by patrols
If some enemies are captured by a patrol or
defect to us, then, if they are properly armed
and in good physical condition, they cannot
be shown to the army, but secretly sent to
another location. But if they appear in a
miserable condition, be sure to show the
deserters to the army, make the prisoners
walk around the army naked and parading,
and beg for their lives so that our men may
think that all enemy soldiers are so miserable.
punishment of criminals
In the vicinity of the enemy and with an
imminent battle, the commanding officers of
the tagmas should be ordered to protect
themselves against soldiers punished for
having committed crimes in those few days
and not to treat all soldiers harshly. Instead,
they should be careful in dealing with those
who are suspected of harboring some cause
for grievance. But if they prove to be
incorrigible, then use some plausible pretext
to send them away, somewhere else, until
after the battle so that they cannot go to the
enemy and supply him with some information
that he should not know. Men of the same
race as the enemy must be sent away first
and must not be thrown into the fight against
their own people.
maintenance of soldiers, their horses
and their camps
When battle is imminent, the need for
provisions against the possibility of defeat
must be taken into account and precautions
taken to protect against its adverse effects. In
particular, food should be stored for a few
days for both men 1 and horses. Fortified
camps must be built in suitable places,
according to the plan to be explained later, in
which water is safely stored for emergencies.

consultations with the merarchs
regarding the battlefield
The strategos must gather the merarchs
and make plans for the battle 2 , paying
attention to the location where it will take
place.
water horses
Officers should be ordered early, at the first

blast of the trumpet on the night before the
day of battle, to be sure to lead their horses
to the water. If you neglect this, your men
may be left behind when it comes time to line
up for combat.

rations carried in the saddlebags
Orders should be given to each soldier that,
when he goes to his assigned place in the
formation, he carries in his saddlebags one or
two pounds of bread, barley, boiled flour, or
meat, and in a small bag a small bottle of
water, not of came. These things may be
needed both in victorious circumstances and
in others that may happen. This is often
necessary when a defeated enemy flees to a
fortified position and one must spend the
night there, or lie in wait for them, or
continue the battle until the evening. Rations
must be prepared so that operations are not
interrupted due to their lack.

wage war against unknown people
If we find ourselves at war against a
powerful people whose ways of acting are
unknown to us, and the army, not knowing
what awaits it, begins to get nervous, then
we must be very careful to avoid engaging in
open battle with it. Before any combat, the
first and safest thing to do is to choose some
experienced and skilled soldiers, do it secretly
and launch attacks against some detachments
of the enemy. If they succeed in killing or
capturing some enemies alive, then most of
our soldiers will take this as evidence of our
own superiority and will overcome their
nervousness, strengthen their morale, and
gradually become ready for the fight.

enemy's surprise attacks during the
march
If the enemy launches a surprise attack and
the conditions are not favorable for battle
because the terrain is rugged and densely
covered, or because we have no advantage,
then we should not consider fighting there.
Instead, we must work to keep our forces
gathered, occupying a favorable camp
position and delaying combat until a time and
place is most favorable and not be forced to
fight when we don't want to. Once this is
done, it does not mean that we are fleeing
from the enemy, but rather that we are only
avoiding a weak position.
camps and the care of the horses inside
them
When the enemy approaches our camp, and
especially if it seems that the fight is going to
take place in the Scythian manner, our
options are as follows. If the army remains
within the fortifications and waits there for
the enemy, enough hay or grass for the
horses should be prepared for one or two
days. But if the army is marching with the
idea of moving to another camp and there
lining up for battle, then it must take with it a
day's supply of hay or grass and deposit it in
the new fortification. This is because it is not
easy for the enemy to allow the servants to
go foraging on that day or to take the horses
to graze. But if the enemy were very close, it
would be a good idea, as mentioned, for each
man to gather the necessary forage during
the march. Because generally, after having
set up camp, the servants will not be able to
go out and collect the forage, especially if the
enemy cavalry exceeds us in number.
Book VII, part A, chapter 14. On how

not to loot enemy bodies during battle
Looting the dead or attacking the enemy's
barracks or camp before the definitive end of
the battle must be discarded, it is very
dangerous and can be disastrous. The
soldiers must be properly warned in advance,
as is clear in the military code, that they must
absolutely stay away from these types of
acts. Quite often this type of thing has caused
troops who have already won a battle to be
defeated and even annihilated, because after
dispersing throughout the battle area, they
have been annihilated by the enemy.
people similar to the enemy
Long before the battle, troops of the same
race as the enemy must be separated from
the army and sent to any location to prevent
them from defecting to the enemy side at the
critical moment.

how not to overwhelm the strategos

during the day of battle
On the day of battle, the strategos should
not take on too many tasks, lest he be under
too much stress and overlook some really
important matters due to fatigue. He should
not be seen to be worried but should ride
jauntily along the lines and encourage all the
troops. He should not interfere in the battle, it
is not the task of a strategos , but that of a
soldier. After making all the necessary
preparations, you will need to position
yourself in a suitable location from which you
can observe which troops are putting
pressure on the enemy and which might be
slacking. When necessary, you must be
prepared to send aid to a unit in trouble using
your reserves, which are flankers and
support troops.
rear.

enemy archers
In combat against archers, we must avoid
placing our troops on the lower slopes of the
mountains and on rough terrain as much as
possible. Our troops will have to form on top
of the hills or, if not, come down from the
mountains on all sides and position
themselves on level and open ground, to
prevent our detachments from being
disrupted by an enemy ambush launched
from the heights 3 .
Book VII, part B, chapter 3. On how not
to engage the enemy or show our own
strength before knowing his intentions
Contact must not be made with the main

body of the enemy or they will not be allowed
to observe our own formation clearly before
reconnoitring their lines and having detected
whether they are planning an ambush.
Book VII, part B, chapter 4. How to hide

the second line when you are unable to
follow the first, so that the two appear
as one
If the site of battle is unobstructed open
ground in which the second line cannot easily
be concealed, then, to prevent the enemy
from watching closely as the army advances
to battle, the second line should advance at a
short distance from the first to that both give
the enemy the impression of being a single
battle line. About a mile away from the
enemy, our second line should slow down,
gradually stop behind the first line at the
appropriate distance and assume its usual
formation. This makes it difficult for the
enemy, or even our own allies, to have a
clear idea of how we are deploying our
troops.

tactics and method of dealing with a
surprise attack by the enemy
If an enemy contingent is reported to have
evaded our flankers and ambush troops and
is attacking our main line, then one of the
flags stationed on the flanks of our second
line must go to their support. If the enemy
attacks from one side, support can come from
that flank; if he attacks from both sides, then
from both flanks. Likewise, if the attack is
directed against the rear of the second line
and the rear troops are not strong enough to
deal with it, the units on the same flank must
send help. This way, the rest of the troops
can focus on their duties supporting the front
line.

wounded
After the battle, the strategos must
provide quick care to the wounded and bury
those who have fallen in combat because this
is a religious duty and a great moral help for
the living.

apparent strength of the enemy
If the enemy army is large and appears
formidable due to the large number of men
and horses, we should not place our army on
high ground while the enemy still remains at
a distance because, fearful at the sight of
such a large army, our men They will quickly
begin to lose courage. Instead, our men must
form on low ground where they will not see
or be seen by the enemy. When the enemy
approaches within a mile or a half mile ,
then the army must advance to high ground
so that the battle can begin before the troops
lose confidence. But if no such place is found
and the enemy can be easily seen from a long
distance, then spread a rumor along the
battle line that the enemy force consists
mostly of horses and supply wagons, not in
men.
prevention of hostile reconnaissance of
our line
One or two flags should always be kept a
mile or two in front of the main body before
combat while the troops are forming their
lines, to prevent the enemy from observing
our formation and modifying his accordingly.
protect the camp
If the army does not have many infantry,
the soldiers' servants should be left behind,
stationed along the fortification, each
assigned to guard posts along the inside of
the moat and provided with a weapon they
know how to handle, bow, javelin or sling. A
flag should remain with them to patrol and
protect the camp gates, and a competent
officer should be placed in command of the
entire barracks.
The impediment should never be taken to
the front line. During a battle he is too easy
prey for the enemy. Now, if it happens that
the enemy makes a surprise attack on our
marching troops and there is no time to
establish a camp and, as explained, secure
our impediment, then it must be stationed
with the units on the right flank of the second
line and one or two flags of any troops that
are available should be used to protect it.
gather fodder
If it has not been possible to gather a
supply of forage in advance as we
recommend, then on the day of the battle,
when the heavy infantry is forming up, the
servants should go to collect it in the rear
area of the battle line or camp , accompanied
by a few patrols drawn from the troops left
behind to protect the camp. While the battle
is going on, they will be able to collect plenty
of fodder. Servants may also be instructed to
observe a signal given from a certain height
and clearly visible to inform them that the
enemy is approaching. This may be a smoke
signal or the sound of a trumpet, that is, the
call signal. When this happens, the foragers
must return as quickly as they can and take
refuge in the camp so that they will not be
cut off from the outside.
All of this is essential because the outcome
of the action is uncertain. In case of defeat, if
the soldiers have provisions for themselves
and their horses, they may choose to
maintain their positions, to renew the fight, or
to withdraw immediately in good order, as
long as their horses remain in good condition,
before the men lose. their spirit or the horses
their strength. But if the provisions are not
kept in good condition, then after a defeat no
one bothers to go out to collect fodder, with
the result that the horses, losing their
strength, generate discouragement among
the men. Hunger and fear crush any ability to
plan to improve the situation. It is absolutely
essential to provide and keep on hand food
for the horses for a day or two, or longer if
possible, even if there is good grass near the
camp.
Book VII, part B, chapter 11. About an
adverse outcome
If the first day of battle ends with a defeat,
it is absolutely undesirable and useless in our
opinion to try to take those same troops that
have been defeated on the battlefield and
send them back into combat immediately or
in the following days. We very seriously warn
any strategists against any thoughts of
doing this. It is an extremely difficult thing for
anyone to achieve. No one recovers quickly
from defeat except the Scythians , and it is
particularly strange to the Romans.
Therefore, if the strategos realizes the
mistake he made and hopes to remedy it
through a second battle, the soldiers as a
whole fail to understand the reasons for a
deliberate new march towards combat.
They are more likely thinking that the defeat
happened by divine will and will lose their
spirit completely. Therefore, then, unless
absolutely necessary, for a few days after a
defeat, no attempt should be made to line up
again for battle and resume the offensive. It
is better to rely on stratagems, deception,
carefully calculated surprise moves, and so-
called "fight and flight" until the troops forget
their lack of courage and their morale begins
to grow again.
If the army is in good spirits and, for good
reasons that are difficult to enumerate here,
the strategos thinks he might launch
another attack, he will place the shattered
first line as the second, and make the second
the first, keeping the tagmas. selected from
the previous first line, provided that the
second is smaller and could be weaker.
When a battle ends in defeat, there should
be no indecision or delay, unless, of course,
there is reason to wait for the arrival of allies
or some other form of aid, or unless, as may
happen, the enemy has made negotiation
offers. This should not be made public
without good reason, but rather this
information should be distributed discreetly. If
the terms of peace are merciful and what has
been proposed can be carried out
immediately, an agreement should not be
discarded, but should be confirmed by
hostages or by oath. But if the terms are
harsh and what has been proposed in a
meeting is to gain time and relax the vigilance
of our troops, the terms of peace must be
spread by rumors that circulate, making them
even less favorable, since when men
understand how harsh the peace terms are,
they will begin to become angry and feel
compelled to resist the enemy more forcefully
and be more obedient to their own officers.
The more delay there is, the greater the
demoralization of the defeated and the more
confident the winner becomes. Therefore,
before the men begin to become completely
demoralized, the strategos must gather the
commanders of the tagmas , as well as the
decarchs and pentarchs , harangue the
troops and signal that this is not the time for
discouragement but rather for anger against
the enemy and so that the courage of all
disguises the failure of a few. If there is time
to wait for the defeat to be amended in the
open field, the formations described should
be used. But if such is not the case, it is very
important to show a bold front in the face of
dangers. If the enemy's victorious troop
consists mainly of infantry, then we should
leave without delay on horseback and in good
order and establish a safe camp somewhere
else. If the winning troop is cavalry, Persian
or Scythian for example, it is better to
abandon superfluous and slower properties
and horses and stay on foot. Except for a
small mounted force, all other forces must
remain on foot in two phalanxes or
formations, or in a single rectangular
formation. In the middle should be the horses
and supplies, with the soldiers on the outside,
as described, and the foot archers in front of
them. This way the army can move or retreat
safely.
Book VII, part B, chapter 12. About a
favorable outcome in the battle
On the contrary, if the outcome of the battle
is favorable, one should not be satisfied
merely with driving back the enemy. This is a
mistake made by inexperienced leaders who
do not know how to take advantage of an
opportunity and who like to hear the saying:
"Be victorious but do not rush your victory too
much" 4 . By not taking advantage of the
opportunity, these people will only cause
more problems and call the latest results into
question. There is no need to rest until the
enemy is completely destroyed. If the enemy
seeks refuge behind fortifications, harass him
and prevent him from obtaining more
supplies for men and horses until he is
annihilated or signs a treaty advantageous to
us. One should not relax after a short chase
or after battle and in the dangers of war one
should not risk the success of the entire
campaign for lack of persistence. In war, as in
hunting, a half miss It is also a complete
failure.
Especially after a victory, special care must
be taken to maintain good order among the
soldiers. Thus, although much has been
written about this type of order, by itself it is
not enough to guarantee one's safety and the
punishment of the enemy, but, with the help
of God, the primary factor is the direction of
the war by the strategos . You must take full
advantage of the times and places. If, for
example, you decide to engage in a pitched
battle, you must inspect each suitable
location to find one that is open and level for
your spearmen. He should not only send
patrols to observe the sectors to the right, left
and rear at a distance of two or three miles
from the beginning to the end of the battle,
but also the entire territory in front, in case
there are ditches or
other traps.
recognition
On the day of the battle, as has been
stated, the patrols, which are to be doubled,
are to scout early in the morning two or three
miles in each direction from the place where
the fighting is expected to occur. They must
have orders not only to observe and report
the enemy's movements, but also to arrest
any of our men who want to defect to the
enemy. Out there they can easily intercept
deserters from our army, and even in the
event that enemy soldiers in full equipment
desert to our side, the patrols can provide
them with safe passage and protect them
from being assaulted by any outlaws that may
be in the vicinity.
The patrols covering the area in front of our

main body must carry out their task within an
arrow's shot of the enemy line opposite ours
and see if the enemy is secretly digging some
trenches or planning some other trap, and
therefore keep away. our own men from
unexpected disasters. In unfavorable terrain
or at critical moments, not only one patrol
should be sent, but a second should cover the
same terrain, so that, in the event that one is
captured, the other, which follows it, knows
about it. If our lines are prepared and the
terrain is suitable, we should not wait for the
enemy, so as not to give them time to adapt
their formation to ours, but the safest thing is
to launch our attack immediately.

how not to expose our second line too
soon
In case the main charge must be delayed
for good reason, the second line in particular
should be kept hidden, in the woods, if there
are any in the vicinity, or on low ground in
the rear, to prevent, from being seen too
soon by the enemy, he takes care of it and
neutralizes it through ambushes and other
stratagems.

keeping the surface of weapons shiny to
be seen from afar before battle
We know that the Romans and even all
other peoples, when they observe the battle
lines of others at a distance, generally think
that it is more likely win the battle with a line
of careless appearance than with one of
shining armor. This point of view is erroneous
because, after God's judgment, the battle will
be decided by the leadership of the
strategos or the morale of the troops. This
being so, the authorities 5 say that if there are
forests or hideouts nearby, the army must
hide in them and not be visible to the enemy
in advance, so it will not be possible for them
to organize countermeasures. This should be
done until you are a mile or two away. If the
terrain is open and the air is clear, then men
should be trained not to wear their helmets
but to carry them by hand until they are close
to the enemy. If their shields are small they
should be worn on the chest to cover their
chain mail and their cloaks should cover the
shoulder pieces of the chain mail until the
appropriate time. The tips of their Spears
must also be hidden, so that our army does
not shine at a distance, as has been said.
Finally, by presenting such an appearance,
something that our enemies also make use
of, they will be impressed and thus, before
the battle, they will lose confidence.

recapitulation of the obligations of each
merarch
One third of each grouper must consist of
assault troops and must be placed on the
flanks of each of them; The other two-thirds,
in the center, must be defense troops . The
pennants should not be attached to the
spears at the time of loading, but should be
removed and placed in their cases. The
pennants should be carried on the spears
until the enemy is a mile away and then they
should be folded. The banners of the
tagmas must be of the small type, those of
the moirarchs must be larger and of a
different format and in the same way as
those of the merarchs , those of the other
officers must stand out. The "nobiscum"
should not be shouted during the charge,
only while moving to the battle line. When the
charge begins, the troops, particularly those
in the rear, should cheer and shout, with no
other noise necessary. Not many horns
should be blown at the time of battle, those
of the merarchs are enough. The merarch
must be placed in the middle of the central
group , between the defending troops .
The moirarchs must be in the middle of the
groupers or on both sides, between the
stormtrooper flags . It is the responsibility
of the commanding officer of each moira or
tagma to see which men under his command
are prepared to observe all the rules
cataloged here.
When the lines are being formed, the
heralds must inspect the area where the
battle is taking place, that is, the terrain
between our lines and the enemy. Heralds
must be alert for pits, swampy areas, or any
other type of traps that may be placed. If any
of this is found, our lines should remain in
place, allowing the enemy to advance through
those places, and then charge over good
ground. Not only must the merarch 's
standard have a different appearance from
the others under his command, so that it is
easy to recognize by all his subordinate
standard bearers , but when the army
halts, it must be carried in a distinctive
manner, for example by holding it and doing
so. swing up or down, leaning to the right or
left, or erect at the head of the banner, or
swinging it straight and waving it frequently.
In this sense, even in the confusion of battle,
it should be easily recognized among all other
banners . The banners of all merarchs
must not be carried in the same way, but
each one must be different, and these
movements must be practiced during training,
so that all men can begin to become familiar
with them. Not only does this help the various
bannermen under the merarch 's command
locate their own groupers quickly, but it also
makes it easy for stragglers, recognizing the
banner of each grouper to which they
belong and even finding their own tagma .
Men of the same race as the enemy must
be separated before the day of battle and
sent anywhere on some plausible pretext. As
has been said, the merarch must have a
written program for the training of all the
tagmas of the groupers .
recapitulation of the type of obligations
assigned to the commanders of each
tagma, the moirarchs and the merarchs,
so that each one knows his obligation
Whether the flag or tagma is in service
with the rest of the army or is camping
elsewhere alone, the "Trisagion" 6 and other
customary practices should be chanted early
in the morning before any other obligation
and again in the morning. the afternoon after
dinner and the retreat.
The collusions and the depth of the
columns, depending on the quality of the
units, must be formed according to the
diagram given at the beginning and must
include both veterans and rookies. The first
two and the last two of each column must be
armed with a spear, the third and fourth with
a bow, and the rest with whatever they can
best handle.
Pennants should not be carried on spears
during combat because they are a nuisance to
the troops carrying them and to those
following them 7 .
Of the less qualified soldiers, six or eight
must be assigned as guards to care for the
wounded during combat.
Two efficient, alert and energetic men
should be selected as spies or scouts and two
others as heralds .
Two competent men should be selected as
mentors with the obligation to inspect the
future camp site.
Two soldiers must also be chosen to be part
of the exploratory parties to reconnoiter the
routes.
The two columns closest to the banner
should be designated to protect it during
combat.
A competent harangue 8 must be chosen.
An experienced and well-disciplined soldier
should be put in charge of protecting the
impediment.
In large tagmas , two banners must be
displayed before the battle, one belonging to
the tagma commander, and the other to the
main hecatontarch , also called ilarch . The
recruits or columns must be divided equally
between them. On the day of battle,
however, the two standards should not be
flown, but only that of the commanding
officer.
On the day of battle, each soldier must
carry a bottle of water and a measure or two
of biscuit or food in his saddlebags.
Before the end of the battle, while it is
going on, no soldier must be allowed to
plunder the enemy, and this order must be
frequently repeated.
The tagma must be formed according to
the symbols and diagrams given above.
During the march, soldiers should not mix
with the impedimenta, especially if contact
with the enemy is expected. Each flag must
march forward by itself, and the impedimenta
cars behind or in another position that the
situation dictates.
The training must be carried out according
to the movements explained above and if an
officer does not know the details of the nine
exercises described they must be given to
him in writing.
It is essential that horses begin to get used
to not only quick maneuvers on open, level
terrain, but also on thick, rugged,
mountainous terrain, and on rapid ascents
and descents of hills. If they become
accustomed to these different types of
terrain, then none of the men or horses will
be surprised or worried by any type of terrain.
Even in hot weather, horses should not be
given too much water and for this reason it is
not advisable to camp near rivers 9 . For
maneuvers, then, the horses must be taken
to rough ground and trained there, or the
flags must be placed in regular formation on
rough ground and each man must gallop over
the ground as he finds it before him and
return along the same via. Men who reserve
their horses and neglect training of this kind
are really setting themselves up for defeat. It
is also a good idea for troops to start doing
this training in hot weather, because no one
knows what situation may arise.
END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK
1 In Codex Iustiniani XII 37, 1, it is stipulated that

soldiers must be provided with lamb and pork, in
addition to the usual biscuits, bread, wine and vinegar.
2 There is a curious article on this issue of the
communication of orders between the army officers
and its possible variables in the absence of it or the
poor transmission (due to betrayal) of the orders:
LAMPORT, SHOSTAK and PEASE (1982).
3 At Anglon (a place near Dvin, south of Yerevan
[Yerevan], in the province of the same name, in
Armenia), in the always disputed Armenia, the
Byzantines faced a Persian force in 543, whom they
apparently defeated in the battlefield. However, it was
a trap and during the pursuit of the fleeing, the
Byzantines fell into an ambush of archers that
decimated their forces, turning a victory into a
massacre, also killing their leader, the magister
utriusque militiae or comes rei. militaris (we do not
know his position for sure) Narses (Procopius, De Bello
Persico II 25) (not the famous Narses, general also of
Justinian I).
4 This proverb is mentioned by Leo VI (Tacticae
Constitutiones [Edic. of Paris, 1863] 14, 25) and by
Miguel Attaliates (Michaelis Attaliatae Historia [in
Corpus Scriptorum Byzantinorum, ed. YO. Bekker,
Bonn, 1853] 26, 17).
5 It refers to the preceding, older authors.
6 The Trisagion ( Τρισάγιον ), from the Greek "thrice
sacred" is probably an expanded version of Isaiah 6:3
and Revelation 4:8. It is one of the oldest hymns of
Christianity. Its origin probably dates back to between
the 4th and 5th centuries, and although a legend says
that it was revealed to the inhabitants of
Constantinople to implore divine mercy during the
catastrophic earthquakes that devastated the city in
the year 447, under the empire of Theodosius II
(Flavius Theodosius, 408-450), in the work of Saint
John Chrysostom († September 14, 404) this liturgical
hymn already appears. So we must justify its origin
more by a reaffirmation of the official Church against
the heresies that are beginning to emerge, such as
Arianism, than by the dramatic event of the
earthquakes. Its use became official at the Council of
Chalcedon (451). There are various versions of the
Trisagion. The best known is that already mentioned
from the Divine Liturgy of Saint John Chrysostom in its
catechumenal part, but this is sung only by the priest,
while the one referred to in this work is sung by the
soldiers. In all of them the fundamental part is the
following:
῞Αγιος ὁ Θεός Holy God,

῞Αγιος n Ἰσχυρός Holy Strong,
῞Αγιος ᾿Αθάνατος Immortal Saint,
Ἐλεέισονὑμάς take pity on us.
About this religious hymn, cf. also TAFT, RF (1991):

"Trisagion", in The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium
(Alexander P. Kazhdan, Ed.), Oxford-New York.
7 The reason for this blunt statement, in book II,

chapter 10.
8 The Greek text presents the Latinism καντάτορα
/cantator.
9 It seems reasonable to us not to give the horses too
much water, but what seems absurd to us is camping
far from the water, unless Mauricio thinks that the
horses will try to get to the water no matter what,
whether their owners want it or not, potentially
causing disorder.
Book VIII
Chapter 1. About general instructions for
the commander.
Episode 2. Mottos
Book VIII, chapter 1. About general

instructions for the commander
1. Carrying out very critical operations, the
strategos should not stand aside as if this
mission were not with him, but should
perform such work by working with his troops
as much as possible. Such behavior will lead
the soldier to be more obedient to his officer
and do his job better by having respect for
him.
2. When certain crimes are common
among soldiers, one must be moderate.
Do not judge and punish everyone

indiscriminately, lest widespread punishment
lead to a larger conspiracy and a loss of
discipline. It is wiser to punish only a few of
the ringleaders.
3. The strategos ' way of life should be
unadorned and simple like that of his soldiers;
He must display brotherly affection towards
them, he must give orders in a gentle
manner, and he must always be sure to give
advice and discuss essential matters with
them in person. Your interest should be in
their protection, their food and their regular
pay 1 . Without these things it is impossible to
maintain discipline in an army. In justly
punishing offenders it must appear ruthless.
At the first sign of a disciplinary problem, you
should take full action and not delay the
matter until it is more serious. The strategos
is successful when he presents himself to his
men as immovable and just. It must also
ensure that civilians are deprived of weapons.
4. You must be moderate and vigilant in
your way of life. It's a good idea to deliberate
on difficult problems at night. During the
night it is easier to make plans, because one's
spirit is free from external disturbances.
5. It is essential to be cautious and take
your time to make plans and, having made a
decision, carry it out without any doubt or
fear. Fear after all is not caution, but an
invention of evil.
6. A healthy mind does not become unduly
elated by success or unduly depressed when
things are not going well.
7. It is safer and more advantageous to
overcome the enemy by planning and
strategy than by brute force. In the first case
the results are achieved without losses, while
in the second some price must be paid.
8. It is very important to spread rumors
among the enemy that you are preparing
something, and at the right moment, do
something else. Your plans for large
operations should not be known by many, but
by very few and very close to you.
9. One should not always use the same
operational methods against the enemy, even
if they seem to work. Often the enemy will
begin to get used to our ways and inflict
disaster on us.
10. Alarming rumors of cheating or
betrayal, whether on the part of the enemy or
our own, should not be dismissed or
overstated, but appropriate measures should
be taken to confront them and put an end to
them before they become a reality.
11. The enemy must be deceived by false
news about our plans, brought to him by our
deserters.
12. Courage in our troops must be
awakened by reporting a victory over the
enemy won by our men somewhere else.
13. News of defeats suffered by our people
must be kept secret and reports must state
the opposite of the truth.
14. Defeated troops should not be allowed
to fall into despair, but must regain hope in
various good ways.
15. During combat one must overlook
crimes committed by soldiers, but afterwards
men guilty of sedition must be eliminated.
16. Our own dead must be buried secretly
at night, while those of the enemy must be
left out in the open, in order to discourage
the enemy.
17. When an enemy embassy arrives, ask
about its leaders, and treat them very
friendly, so that their own people will suspect
them.
18. Acts of cowardice by our soldiers must
be kept secret and the condemnation not
made public, as that could create a worse
problem.
19. To cross a river without difficulty,
simply dig a deep trench in the bank, fill it
with wood and send most of the troops
across the river, then the remaining men can
burn the wood and while it is burning, the
soldiers will be able to cross it without issues.
20. One way to arouse discord and
suspicion among the enemy is to refrain from
burning or looting the property of certain
prominent men on his side and only them.
21. One way to take a besieged city is by
sending letters tied to arrows promising
freedom and immunity; this can also be done
through released prisoners.
22. Great precautions must be observed in
pursuing the enemy through terrain suitable
for ambushes. It is also a good strategy to
stop at the right time, so you can come back
later and attack more effectively.
23. We must not be fooled by the enemy's
acts of humanity or by his intentions to
retreat.
24. Cowardly officers, who are known for
their doubts and paleness, must be assigned
to auxiliary forces during combat.
25. When a populous city is taken, it is
important to leave the doors open so that the
inhabitants can escape and not be driven to
absolute despair. The same applies when an
enemy's fortified camp is taken 2 .
26. Even in friendly territory, fortified camps
must be established; A strategist should
never say: "I didn't expect that."
27. For a safe retreat make a fire in one
place and calmly go to another place; the
enemy will head towards the fire.
28. Letters must be sent to deserters who
have gone over to the enemy so that they fall
into enemy hands. These letters have to
remind the deserters that they must organize
in advance the right moment for their
betrayal; In this way the enemy will begin to
suspect them and they will have to flee.
29. When dangerous or surprise operations
arrive, cowards must be separated by the
procedure of having men who are sick or
whose horses are weak removed from the
front. Cowards, then, will claim to be sick,
and therefore can be separated from others.
They may be assigned to guard fortresses or
some other task that involves little danger.
30. We must campaign against the enemy
when the grain is ripe, so that our troops do
not lack provisions and also the expedition
will cause the enemy more damage.
31. We must not give weapons to those
who promise to fight on our side when their
real intentions are not very clear.
32. After a victory, we must not act
carelessly, but rather keep our guard as high
as possible against surprise attacks by the
defeated.
33. The enemy's ambassadors should not
be treated with contempt, even when we are
much stronger.
34. An army, no matter how strong,
besieging a city, should never leave its camp
unguarded. You should not think that
fortifications are enough to guarantee your
security, but rather you should maintain it
with patrols.
35. Those suspected of deserting must be
told the opposite of what we propose to do,
so that they can use it to deceive the enemy,
and betrayal must be prevented during
periods of truce or temporary peace.
36. In no way should we believe the reports
that come from deserters or dissidents, but
their information must be verified with the
statements made by prisoners taken in raids
and in this way the truth will be verified.
37. In no way should an oath sworn to the
enemy be broken.
38. After God, we must place our hopes of
salvation in our weapons, not only in our
fortifications and stockades.
39. Soldiers are to be ordered to be
prepared to march on a holy day 3 , in the
rain, day or night. For this reason, the time or
day should not be said in advance, so they
must always be prepared.
40. Risks should not be taken without
necessity or without real hope of winning.
Doing this is the same as fishing with gold as
bait.
41. Residents of the area seeking refuge
should not be welcomed indiscriminately.
Often, they have been deceptively sent by the
enemy to plot against their host.
42. We must also guard against deserters
approaching a besieged city, for they are
often sent by the enemy to start fires and
while the defenders are busy putting them
out, the enemy attacks.
43. Troops defeated in the open field
should not be left aside or, although it may
seem a good idea, allowed to take refuge in a
fortified camp or some other strong place, for
while their ferocity is still fresh, they may
attack again. By not being lenient towards
them, the soldiers will be able to resume the
fight with greater conviction.
44. If the strategos considers that he is
ready to engage in battle with the enemy, he
should try to take the fight to enemy territory
instead of fighting in his own. Men who take
war into enemy territory are more aggressive.
They will also feel that the war in which they
are involved is being waged not only for the
country but also for their own personal
safety. This is not necessarily true if the war
takes place in their own territory, in which the
existence of fortresses eliminates the risk for
men, since in case of retreat they can easily
take refuge in them.
Book VIII, chapter 2. Mottos

1. Before going in search of danger, the
strategos must worship God. When he is
about to enter danger, his courage increases
because he can pray to God with the
confidence of a friend.
2. The man who spends the most sleepless
nights with his army and who works hard to
train his troops runs the lowest risks in
fighting the enemy.
3. Never lead soldiers into combat before
you have had sufficient proof of their bravery.
4. It is good to cause harm to the enemy
by deception, raids or hunger, and never be
seduced by a pitched battle, which is more a
demonstration of luck than bravery.
5. Only those battle plans that the enemy
does not suspect before taking action are
successful.
6. Deception is often an aid in war. An
enemy soldier who deserts to us, without
stratagem, is of the greatest use, because the
enemy is harmed by deserters more than if
the same soldier had been killed in action.
7. He who does not carefully compare his
own forces with those of the enemy is
doomed to a disastrous end.
8. Courage and discipline will be able to
achieve more than a large number of soldiers.
Thus, often, the configuration of the terrain
has ensured that a weak own force is
increased to the maximum.
9. Nature produces only a few brave men.
However, care and training make efficient
soldiers. Soldiers who are kept working
increase in courage, while too much rest
makes them weak and lazy. Therefore, care
must be taken to keep them busy.
10. Things that are unexpected or sudden
scare the enemy, because the things he is
used to seem easier.
11. After obtaining a victory, the strategos
who pursues the enemy with a dispersed and
disorganized army gives it to the enemy.
12. The cause of war must be just.
13. A good strategist is one who uses his
own skills to adapt to the opportunities he
has and the qualities of the enemy.
14. It is not useful to gather the entire army
in assembly or to send for men when they are
off duty. These causes only produce discord
in the army.
15. Soldiers must always be doing
something, even if there is no enemy
bothering us. Habitual apathy means trouble
for an army.
16. A prudent commander will not lead an
allied force into his own territory if it is larger
than his own army. Otherwise he can mutiny,
expel our people and take control.
17. When possible, an allied force should be
composed of several peoples to reduce the
danger of men uniting for some evil purpose.
18. We will have to place our forces in the
same way that the enemy does, infantry
against infantry, and the same with light
troops, cavalry, heavy infantry and so on.
19. The commander who fails to provide his
army with the necessary food and other
supplies is making preparations for his own
defeat, even if the enemy is not present.
20. The commander who relies on his own
cavalry, especially the lancers, must look for
wide plains favorable for this type of troops
and force battle there.
21. If he trusts more in his infantry, he
must be careful to choose rough, thick and
rugged terrain and organize the fight there.
22. If we learn that our plans have been
revealed to the enemy, then we must change
all our passwords and other signals, as well
as our battle formation.
23. For what must be done, seek the advice
of many; for what you must really do, take
the advice of only a few you trust; then, now
completely alone, decide the best and most
useful plan of all and follow it.
24. The army must gather near its
impediment or it must be brought to it.
25. Don't rely solely on the scouts to
recognize the paths, but let the strategists
carefully observe them with their own eyes.
26. Those who are constant, with keen
eyesight, trustworthy, serious and with more
affection for their reputation than money
should be chosen as explorers; These men
make accurate reports. But those who are
foolish, cowardly, and excited by the prospect
of material gain are unlikely to tell the truth
and can easily endanger both the strategos
and his army.
27. In times of peace, fear and punishment
for crimes keep troops in tension, but in
active campaign, high hopes and rewards
always give better results.
28. The strategos reaches its full potential
when he attempts to destroy enemy forces
more by hunger than by force of arms.
29. If an enemy spy is captured while
observing our troops, then it may be wise to
release him unarmed if all our units are
strong and in good shape. The enemy will be
absolutely astonished by your reports. On the
other hand, if our forces are weak, the spy
must be treated roughly, forced to divulge the
enemy's secrets, and finally put to death or
sent away somewhere under escort.
30. If soldiers show signs of cowardice,
various tricks must be used to restore their
courage.
31. Take your time planning, but when
you've made your decision, be quick. in
carrying it out 4 . In war opportunity is
fleeting and cannot be left aside.
32. Let the army see that you are not
excessively elated after a victory and that you
are not deeply depressed by a defeat.
33. A fearsome strategos is not one who
utters terrible words but one who performs
frightening actions for the enemy.
34. Decide at night what needs to be done
and carry out what you planned during the
day. One cannot plan and act at the same
time.
35. The strategos who is excessively harsh
with his subordinates and the one who is too
lenient are both unsuitable for command.
Fear leads to great hatred, and if you are too
soft you are despised. It is better to take the
middle ground.
36. After agreeing to a treaty or truce with
the enemy, the commander must be sure that
his camp is guarded with strong and secure
defenses. If the enemy chooses to break the
agreement, he will only earn a reputation for
disloyalty and the disapproval of God, while
we will remain safe and our word will be
given truth. A strategist will not say: "I
didn't expect that" 5 .
37. For small forces, we must select a place
with a narrowing in front, whose width
corresponds to the size of our army. The
enemy's superiority will be of no effect in
such a place since there is no space for him.
After studying the place where the enemy is,
the strategos can form a fair estimate of his
strength, since he must know from
experience how much space is required for a
given number of troops.
38. If we want to prevent the enemy from
knowing the strength of our forces, we must
order our troops to march on foot in close
formation. This can be misleading and
prevents the enemy from forming an estimate
of our forces.
39. It is a good idea to maneuver so that
the sun, wind and dust are behind our men
and in front of the enemy. As their vision
darkens and their breathing becomes labored,
we will quickly gain victory.
40. We must line up our troops for battle
before the enemy. This puts us in a position
to do whatever we want and barely gives the
enemy time to arm themselves.
41. If we are prepared to charge first, we
can attack the enemy safely, with our men
full of confidence, and inspiring fear in the
enemy, who will be worried.
42. When the battle line has been
established, the first order to the soldiers is to
maintain formation and the intervals between
the lines.
43. It's okay to care a lot about the injured.
If we neglect them, we will find that the rest
of the troops will deliberately not fight well
and our negligence will cause us to lose some
who could have been saved.
44. Soldiers who have put the enemy to
flight must be prohibited from looting.
Otherwise, while they are scattered, the
enemy army will be able to form again and
attack them.
45. The strategos fails if most of the army
is destroyed in a single battle.
46. An army that loudly shouts its war cry
can cause terror in the enemy.
47. A strategos who takes nothing for
granted is secure in war.
48. If the enemy has a strong troop of
archers, wait for wet weather, which affects
bows, to launch your attack against them.
49. Our strategos must adapt their
stratagems to the disposition of the enemy
leader. If he were bold, he must be induced
to take premature and imprudent actions; If,
on the other hand, he is indecisive, he can be
struck down by continuous surprise attacks.
50. The strategos must be impartial when
dealing with his own men and with allied
forces. He must be a fair judge for both.
When you give gifts to allies, you must make
a corresponding increase in rewards for your
own soldiers.
51. In time of war he will have to work
harder than his own soldiers on their own and
worry less about his share of the profits. This
enhances your reputation and earns
everyone's good faith.
52. Aware of the uncertainties of war, the
strategos must be willing, even after victory,
to listen to proposals from the enemy with a
view to peace on advantageous terms.
53. The strategist must pay more
attention to weapons than to the rest of the
team, aware that this can be obtained even in
enemy territory, but that without weapons he
will not defeat the enemy.
54. The best strategos is not the man
from a noble family, but the man who can be
proud of his own actions.
55. The strategos must correctly manage
not only immediate matters, but also keep in
mind matters for the future.
56. The best strategist is he who does not
voluntarily set up a dangerous and highly
uncertain battle and refrains from emulating
those who carry out thoughtless operations
and are admired for their brilliant successes,
but he who makes the enemy move and he
remains secure and always in position.
circumstances of your own choosing.
57. A greedy strategos is a ruin to his own
people and an object of contempt to the
enemy.
58. A strategos who loves luxury usually
destroys the entire army.
59. The best commander is the one who
inspires courage at the right moment and
stops the bad thoughts of fearful soldiers.
60. A strategos who desires peace must
be prepared for war, since barbarians become
very nervous when faced with an adversary
completely prepared for fighting 6 .
61. If someone makes a mistake in
ordinary affairs he can usually remedy it in a
short interval, but mistakes made in war
cause lasting damage.
62. Those who have committed many
negligences should not be entrusted with
even ordinary responsibilities.
63. The intelligent strategist takes into
account not only probable damages, but also
those that may be completely unexpected.
64. Peace is a time of training for war and
battle, a display of bravery.
65. The strategist should not go to bed
before reflecting on what important things he
has failed to do and what he has to do the
next day.
66. It is okay for the strategos to master
his passions at any time, but especially during
war.
67. The strategist should not be hasty in
placing trust in people who promise to do
something; If you do, almost everyone will
think you are foolish.
68. Long and careful deliberations promise
a great safeguard in war, since hasty and
impetuous generals ordinarily commit serious
blunders.
69. The strategos must be an example to
his subordinates of how things should be
done, exercising himself in the highest ideals,
doing what is right and refraining from doing
those things that his soldiers must also refrain
from doing.
70. The strategos must be sure of the
good disposition of his troops by means of an
oath.
71. If the strategists know the inclinations
and tendencies of each officer and each
soldier, he will know better what tasks should
be assigned to each one.
72. The strategist who wants to keep his
plans safe from the enemy should never
boast about the quality and quantity of his
own troops.
73. When both sides are equally well
armed, the better tactician will win.
74. The strategist who possesses some
rhetorical skill will often be able to inflame
weak hearts to battle and easily restore
courage to a defeated army.
75. The strategos must know the territory
well, whether it is healthy and safe, or
whether it is unhealthy and inhospitable for
his troops, and whether necessities such as
water, wood and fodder are nearby. Because
if they are at a certain distance, then
obtaining them will be difficult and
dangerous, especially in the presence of the
enemy. It is also good to occupy all the hills
in the area before the enemy has a chance to
do so.
76. Often, moves that mislead the enemy
can be very advantageous. For example, if he
makes it look like he is going to set up camp,
the enemy can be induced to do the same,
then while the enemy is dispersed making the
necessary preparations, the strategos can
place his troops and attack, or he can
withdraw his army if the terrain is not
favorable.
77. In his movements, the strategos must
act like a good fighter, he must feint in one
direction to try to deceive his opponent and
then make good use of the opportunities he
finds, and in this sense he will be able to
defeat the enemy.
78. During battles and in every action
against the enemy, the learned strategos ,
even the most courageous, will always keep
in mind the possibility of failure and being
defeated and will make plans for it in case
that happens.
79. The mood of the strategos is
immediately communicated to his troops and
there is an old saying that it is better to have
an army of deer commanded by a lion than
an army of lions commanded by a stag 7 .
80. Allied forces must not be mixed with our
own forces. They must camp and march
separately. It is important that we hide our
formations and fighting methods from them,
to prevent them, knowing them, from
reporting them to the enemy at a certain
moment.
81. In time of war the best way to know
what is most advantageous is this: what is
good for you is bad for the enemy and what
benefits the enemy is exactly the opposite for
your troops. It is in our interest to do nothing
or avoid anything that the enemy might do or
avoid. There is only one thing we must do:
whatever we think must be for our own
benefit. If you imitate the enemy and do what
he is doing for his own benefit, what you will
do is harm yourself. On the contrary, if you
do something for your benefit and the enemy
tries to imitate you, he will harm himself.
82. The troops must be placed in several
lines, and a certain number of assaults must
be made against the enemy, remembering
the words of the poet: "You, who are not
tired, could easily drive back to the city men
fatigued by battle . "
83. For multiple reasons, and not
coincidental ones, it is dangerous to extend
the battle line indefinitely.
84. An army of equal strength to that of the
enemy is necessary if our goal is merely to
win, but it must be greater if we try to occupy
the conquered territory.
85. The strategos must have more cavalry
than infantry. The latter is suitable for close
combat, while the former will easily pursue or
retreat, and when dismounted, the men are
all prepared to fight on foot.
86. A wise strategist will not engage in
pitched battle against the enemy until an
exceptional opportunity or advantage
presents itself.
87. Change your appearance often so that
you appear different while forming the battle
line, before charging, when encountering the
enemy, when you are eating, and when you
are sleeping. By doing this you will not be
easily captured by the enemy or by some
traitor. Hannibal the Carthaginian wore wigs
and a variety of styles of beards and thus the
barbarians thought that he was a
supernatural being 9 .
88. We will have to choose the terrain not
only because it is the most appropriate for
our weapons, but also taking into account the
various peoples with whom we will face.
Parthians and Gauls maneuver well on flat
terrain. The Hispanics and the Ligurians fight
best in the mountains and hills, and the
Britons in the forests, while the Germans are
best in the swamps of their lands 10 .
89. Whatever terrain the strategos
chooses he must make his troops familiar
with it. This way they will be able to avoid
difficult points and, thanks to their knowledge
of the area, they will fight the enemy with
confidence.
90. When the strategos leads his men into
battle, he must present a cheerful
appearance, avoiding a sad appearance.
Soldiers often estimate their chances by the
strategos ' appearance.
91. After victory, the strategos must not
allow the men to break ranks quickly, since it
happens quite often that the enemy, knowing
that our men have abandoned their guard in
their joy and have broken ranks, has regained
their courage, returns to the fight and turn
our victory into a defeat.
92. When the enemy is surrounded, it is
good to leave a hole in our lines to give him
the opportunity of escape, in case he judges
that flight is better than remaining and trying
his luck in battle 11 .
93. An army is judged by the spirit of its
strategos . Hannibal the Carthaginian
understood this well, since when he learned
that Scipio 12 was leading the Romans, he
spoke highly of the disposition of his army to
those who criticized him for beginning so
slowly to march and fight against those whom
he had often defeated. . He defended himself
saying, "I would rather deal with a troop of
lions led by a deer than with a herd of deer led
by a lion."
94. The State benefits a lucky strategos
more than a brave one. The first achieves its
results with a little effort, while the other
does it with some risk.
95. It is better to avoid a bully opponent
than one who never lets up. The latter has no
secrets about what he is doing, however it is
difficult to know what the former is doing.
96. The strategos must be severe and
persevering in investigating the charges
against his men, but compassionate in
punishing them. This will earn him the trust
of his men.
97. The strategos must be calm in
emergencies, prudent in advice, courteous
with his collaborators. He will succeed in
battle if he charges at the enemy not like a
wild beast, but in a calculated manner.
98. The strategos should not be ignorant
of any of the situations that can easily occur
in war. Who can try to achieve what he does
not understand? Who could provide
assistance in situations where danger is
beyond their reach?
99. The strategos must make plans to
defeat the enemy not only by weapons, but
also through their food and drink, making the
water unfit for drinking and poisoning the
grain. We must also know how to protect
ourselves against such measures and how we
can avoid falling victim to them.
100. The strategos should always have a
body of chosen troops near him, which can
be sent to support hard-pressed sections of
the army. He must not advance too hastily
against the enemy, because if a setback
occurs, the entire army may be destroyed.
101. When the strategos gives a public
speech, he may even say something in praise
of the enemy. This will convince our men that
you will never deprive them of the praise we
might receive from others and that we will
make them share in our honors.
END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK
1 Kekaumenos (Strategikon 80) also warns the

general of the same fact, reminding him of the loyalty
that soldiers show to the commander who cares for
them.
2 In Spanish there is a saying that perfectly illustrates
this situation: "A fleeing enemy, a silver bridge", whose
formulation Melchor de Santa Cruz de Dueñas (Spanish
Floresta of Apothegmas and Sentences, Toledo, 1584)
attributes to D. Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba (1453-
1515), called the Great Captain, during his campaigns
in the kingdom of Naples in 1503-1504. The exact
phrase of Santa Cruz is (second part, chap. 3): "make
the silver bridge to the enemy who flees." This phrase
or variants of it has been formulated by such
prestigious and well-known writers as Miguel de
Cervantes, who reproduces it (in The Ingenious
Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha, second part,
chapter. 78) as presented by Santa Cruz or Félix Lope
de Vega y Carpio, who in his play (or attributed to him,
there are doubts) The Star of Seville (act I, scene IV)
makes one of his characters say : "that the enemy
must be made a silver bridge."
3 That is, on Sunday or any other religious holiday.
4 We see a clear example of the deep knowledge that
our author has of Greco-Roman culture in this
sentence, derived from a reflection by Isocrates (Ad
Demonicum 34 [in the book Discourses, ed. de Madrid,
1979]), Athenian politician and orator who lived in the
4th century BC, and who says: "be slow in reflecting
but quickly carry out your decisions."
5 It is insisted on, cf. VIII 1, 26.
6 The Romans already said it: Si vis pacem, para
bellum ("If you want peace, prepare for war").
Vegetius (Epitoma Rei Militaris III, prologue, 8) collects
the phrase somewhat modified and says: Igitur qui
desiderat pacem, preparet bellum ("So whoever
desires peace, let him prepare for war").
7 This is also cited by Leo VI (Tacticae Constitutiones
20, 128) and almost exactly as we find it in the words
of Plutarch (Apotegmatha Chabriae 3 [in the book
Maxims of Kings and Generals, in Moralia, ed. of
Madrid, 1987]) puts in the mouth of the Athenian
general of the 4th century BC Cabrias saying verbatim:
"[Cabrias] used to say that an army of deer led by a
lion was more fearsome than one of lions led by a
deer."
8 Cf. Homer, Iliad XI 802-803; XVI 44-45.
9 Cf. Polybius, Historiae III 78, 1-2. Titus Livy, Ab
Vrbe Condita XXII 1, 3.
10 The mention of all these peoples does not make
sense at the end of the 6th or beginning of the 7th
century , when this manual is written: for example, the
Parthians did not exist since 226 AD They were
replaced by the Sassanid Persians , the greatest
enemies of the Byzantines at the time of writing this
military manual. The Gauls were conquered by Julius
Caesar in the middle of the 1st century BC; the last
Hispanics were subdued at the end of the 1st century
BC; the Ligurians fell under the power of Rome in the
middle of the 2nd century BC; the various tribes of
Britons and Germans fought against the Romans for
centuries, without ever being completely subdued.
Naming all these towns indicates that the author had
documented himself in much older works.
11 Cf. note 101.
12 Publius Cornelius Scipio, called Africanus, consul in
205 BC and 194 BC, was the one who ended the
Second Punic War after his victory at Zama (today Al
Jamah [Jama], province of Tunis, Tunisia) over
Hannibal on October 19, 202 BC
13 Leo VI (Tacticae Constitutiones 20, 128). The same
expression is used by the tactician Nicephorus Uranos
(FOUCAULT [1973] p. 311). It is not known where
Maurice got this quote from, but if it is true that
Hannibal said it, then the Carthaginian leader was well
versed in what generals before him said, since Plutarch
attributes this to him (cf. note 106) to the Athenian
general of the 4th century BC Goats. As it is evident
that, for reasons of the times in which they lived,
Hannibal (247-183 BC) could not read Plutarch (c. 46
or 50 - c. 120 AD), it also seems undeniable that both
Hannibal and Plutarch took this phrase from an
unknown and now lost source.
Book IX
Chapter 1. About surprise attacks
Episode 2. About night attacks
Chapter 3. About incursions into hostile
territory: safe advance through it and its
looting without suffering losses
Chapter 4. About passing through gorges and
rugged territory
Chapter 5. How to spy on the enemy and how
to capture scouts or enemies trying to
infiltrate our army
Book IX, chapter 1. About surprise

attacks
It is, of course, an ancient maxim that
teaches us to try to attack the enemy without
suffering any harm ourselves, and intelligent
strategists will keep this in mind and always
give it the highest priority. This objective will
be achieved if the assaults on the enemy are
carefully planned and carried out with
alacrity. These assaults will prove to be very
effective not only against numerically
equivalent forces, but also against those
vastly superior. For this reason it is desirable
to be vigilant in seeking the best
opportunities and pretexts for striking the
enemy before he can prepare, especially if
there is reason to consider that his forces are
superior to ours. In these types of cases it is
better, as has been said, to try to use
different types of surprises and tricks as much
as possible, rather than facing a pitched
battle that involves dangers that could prove
fatal.
Some commanders receive emissaries from
the enemy and reply in gentle and flattering
terms, sending them back with honors, and
then immediately follow in their footsteps and
attack them unexpectedly. Others send
embassies with favorable proposals and then
suddenly go on the attack. Others march
after the enemy in their camps after
gathering information about how they
organized their camp, and then on a night of
the full moon, two or three hours before
dawn, they make their attack. Archers are
essential for an operation of this type. After
verifying that the enemy is advancing in
disarray and allowing their troops to fall
behind, some commanders attack him in the
middle of his marching column and inflict
serious damage. Others, hidden in ambush,
suddenly decide to attack the enemy. Some
try to escape from the scene of the action
and once provided with the necessary
information about everything that happened,
they charge against the enemy. Others drive
a herd of animals in front of them and
therefore the enemies must deviate to
surround it and then, when they see the
enemy in disarray and moving to all sides,
they can fall on him.
Some attacks can be carried out in open
fields, for example, if in the area between us
and the enemy there is a river that is difficult
to cross, especially for cavalry. A bridge can
be built there, with as many wooden cross
beams as necessary, pontoons and with two
towers erected at each end, both made of
wood, dry masonry or earth. When
necessary, then, this bridge can be used to
cross safely or to retreat, and it is up to the
strategos to decide how long it should
remain standing, whether to attack safely or
to retreat and destroy the bridge. However, in
operations of this type and in raids into
enemy territory, we must not burn or destroy
supplies in those regions through which we
wish to return so as not to regret it. We think
it is essential to maintain these bridges also in
the event of a battle in the open field, when
the camps are near a river. If crossing a river
becomes difficult at any point along the
riverine space, especially in the area where
the enemy is stationed, on the day of battle
the bridge can still be removed without
obstacles and without crowds. In the event of
a setback, the bridges can remain safe under
the protection of the camp, and the troops
will not be forced against their wishes to
cross the bridge under enemy attack. For
these reasons the camp must be located on
the enemy side of the river.
Book IX, chapter 2. About night attacks
The direction of night attacks varies
depending on commanders. Some set up
camp within a day's march of the enemy and
sent a legation or two to offer overtures of
peace. After offering the enemy hope of
reaching an agreement and getting him to
back off, these strategists then marched
their army through the night and attacked
unexpectedly before dawn. This was done by
general Lusius in the time of Trajan 1 . Others
stood in combat formation for several days
near their camp as if for a pitched battle.
They wanted to make it seem that they were
frightened by the enemy and that therefore
they could not venture beyond the area of
their own camp. So, while the enemy was
relaxing, they attacked at night. This is what
Jan 2 of the Avars did to the Roman cavalry
at Heracleia, as they did not remain safely
inside the fortifications with the infantry, but
were outside unprotected 3 . Others made use
of a suspected deserter to inform the enemy
that morale was low. They feigned a hasty
retreat, but marched only a short distance
and there they set up camp. Then suddenly
at night they attacked the enemy.
Night attacks are best suited for archers or
javelin throwers, both mounted and on foot.
They are effective against towns that fight
both on foot and on horseback, as long as
tents have not been set up all over the place,
dispersed and unguarded. They are also
effective against enemies who are not experts
in the use of a bow or other thrown weapon,
but prefer to fight hand-to-hand. These
operations must be carried out at night with a
full moon or when there is enough light along
the entire line of march to keep the men in
contact in the dark and not get lost. Starlight
is also worth it. The army must always move
on alert and prepared for action, transporting
only what is necessary. The soldiers must
regulate their march according to the distance
between the two camps to arrive two hours
before dawn at a place one or two miles
from the enemy camp, since by facilitating
the march before combat they will not be
exhausted. There the army must remain
hidden and attack the enemy just before
dawn.
Expeditions of this type must be guided by
men who know the region thoroughly so as
not to lead the army astray. Absolute silence
must be observed without any clarion calls or
other loud noises of any kind. But if it is
necessary for the army to stop or advance,
the signal may be given by a whistle, a simple
tap on a shield, or by an order. To avoid any
noisy confusion or overstretching of the
formation, resulting in stragglers, a loose line,
and shouted orders, all of which could clearly
reveal the army's approach to the enemy, the
army must move, not front as for a battle,
but in column, that is, in a straight line, the
units marching in line one after another,
observing, of course, the depth of the
formation. When the army approaches the
enemy, it must then remain under cover,
reorganizing its line and, depending on the
terrain, launch attacks from two or three
sides. This should not be done from all four
sides, because the enemy could find
themselves completely surrounded and could
close lines and fight, but rather one side
should be left open so that those who want to
escape can do so. At the same time, if the
attacking army is large, one or two trumpets
should be blown, and if it is smaller, more
trumpets should be blown to make the enemy
believe that it is larger.
Some army units must always remain in
reserve, not taking part in the action at that
moment, but remaining prepared until they
are necessary to provide cover for our men in
case of retreat. Attacks of this type, especially
if it is against cavalry, must be carried out
with great care and with good preparation, as
much as if it were for a battle in the open
field, so that if this could not be carried out
according to the plan, because the enemy has
been warned and has lined up in formation to
confront us, our army will not also find itself
unprepared and be completely defeated in
the subsequent battle. If the enemy army
consists of infantry and our army is composed
of cavalry, then it is obvious that we will
cause serious damage to the enemy, or we
could retreat without damage since the
infantry will not be able to pursue us. If the
attack is made at night against a fortified
camp, or in daylight, or against troops on the
march, or against their impediment, some
units must be dedicated to obtaining supplies.
On the other hand, if all or most of the
soldiers begin to be used in this, the enemy
will be able to attack and we would risk the
entire army.
Book IX, chapter 3. On raids into hostile

territory: advance
safe for him and his plunder without
suffering loss
One can safely attempt an incursion into
hostile territory under two conditions: if the
assault is carried out after defeating the
enemy in battle or if we know that he is
unprepared or incapable of action. In these
cases the enemy should be attacked without
warning. Also even if the enemy forces are
more numerous but undisciplined, and if they
are undisciplined and disorganized, like the
Slavs , the Ante and other peoples of the
same type; or when our men can take and
hold a position, such as a bank or a mountain
pass, from which they can wound the enemy
without being hit by him.
Above all, the strategos must be
concerned about supplies for the army when
it enters enemy territory.
He must ensure that they are transported in
common supply carts by the soldiers
themselves or in some other way. That's
because if the enemy destroyed local
supplies, the army could suddenly find itself
at a critical moment in the middle of hostile
land. Marches should not be made at night
into hostile territory, unless, of course, they
are made to remain secret. For example, it
may be absolutely necessary to avoid enemy
detection in order to seize rough terrain
quickly or cross it without being located by
the enemy. But before setting off on any type
of march, great care must be taken to
reconnoiter the routes.
Serious efforts should be made to capture
alive inhabitants of the country with the aim
of obtaining information from them about the
strength and plans of the enemy. The
interrogation of prisoners must be done by
the strategos himself and not by anyone
else. Very often very important and
completely unexpected information has been
revealed by this interrogation. The strategist
should not, however, rely too much on the
demonstrations of deserters or traitors,
certainly not as much as on those of men
captured in surprise attacks, because it is
common for deserters and prisoners to
deliberately give false information. You should
not pay attention to the statements made by
one person but rather give credence to the
coincidence of several sources, especially, as
already said, in the case of prisoners taken in
surprise attacks or deserters. Deserters from
the enemy who claim to have some secret
information must be confined or held
somewhere else and warned that if their
statements are true they will be rewarded,
but if they lie they will be executed.
If the enemy army is concentrated
somewhere outside its fortifications, none of
our soldiers should be allowed to go out to
loot and pillage, since they must first advance
against the enemy. If the outcome of the
battle is favorable, the soldiers should not
postpone the opportunity to plunder but,
while the enemy is still very frightened and
confused, our soldiers should remain vigilant
until their forces are completely defeated and
dispersed or until the a favorable peace with
unequivocal guarantees. If the enemy is
certainly concentrated but avoids taking
action, then our troops should try to march in
formation and lay waste to the enemy camp.
But if we plan to return along the same route
and are not well supplied with food and
forage, then we should replenish local
supplies and destroy them only on the return
trip. The vanguard should put some signs on
the route and other places where there may
be confusion. If it is in a wooded area, they
may be placed in trees; If it is a desert area,
a cairn of stones or mounds of earth will do.
Those will be recognizable by the troops
marching behind and the army will not get
lost.
The troops sent to loot should not all be
involved in the looting, but rather divided into
two forces, the first to carry out the looting
and the other, the larger group, to follow and
protect it. This must be observed whether the
expedition is directed against a region,
against a fortified enemy camp, against a
herd of cattle, against supply wagons, or
against anything else. The same procedure
must be followed if the entire army marches
together on a pillaging expedition. All men
should not engage in looting, but if the
opportunity arises to collect supplies, some
should go in search of them while the others
continue in regular formation, to avoid that,
as everyone is busy with looting or collecting
supplies, these be taken by a surprise attack
or ambush before the troops return to
formation.
Except in the case of an emergency, we
think it is more advantageous not to take a
few men from different units and detach
them for an expedition, an exploratory
mission, or some other military obligation. It
is better to highlight an entire tagma , or a
flag or one of its subdivisions, under the
command of an ilarch or decarca . It may
be necessary to form a special unit in certain
circumstances; for example, if most of the
soldiers are unwilling for any reason to do the
job or if the horses are in poor condition. In
both circumstances, then, the party must be
composed of men whose morale is high and
whose horses are in good condition for the
undertaking undertaken. In general, however,
it is dangerous to take a few men occasionally
from each tagma for some tasks. Prominent
men cannot be advanced too far lest they
lose the support of their companions and
become unaware of each other. Additionally,
units left behind are stripped of their best
soldiers.
When the strategos has plans to take a
fortress or some hill or some other place, he
should not let his men know about it until
they are on the site and he orders them to
begin the task. If it is really necessary for the
army to camp or pass near an enemy fortified
position, one of the officers with light troops
under his command should station himself
near the entrance roads to the fortification to
prevent any sudden departure of the enemy.
The same precautions should be taken when
passing through gorges. A bivouac or camp
should not be located in the vicinity of an
enemy fortification or in a wooded area. But if
it is absolutely necessary to camp there, the
guard must pay careful attention in case of
night attacks by the enemy. It is better to
look for an open place, without obstacles, on
high ground, with defensive terrain, for the
camp.
Entering hostile territory, the impediment
must follow behind, but if the enemy is close
it must take a position in the middle of the
army. Wagons and prisoners, if any, must be
kept separate from the regular troops, both
on the march and in camp, so as not to be in
the path of the soldiers if they have to fight a
sudden enemy attack. In enemy territory,
scouts or advance guards should not be sent
ahead without due precautions and sufficient
support. Only prisoners and deserters can be
relied upon enough for information about the
nature of the terrain.
Setting up camp, the army must march
within the enclosure in proper formation and
in good order. But, if the enemy approaches,
and there are infantry in the army, you must
first park the tanks, then prepare the trench
in the prescribed area, and then place the
light troops ready for action at close range.
The impedimenta will then be able to get into
good order and camp.
The outer posts can then be dismantled, and
the soldiers themselves enter into formation
and establish themselves in the camp. But if
the enemy is not in the vicinity, it is sufficient
to follow this procedure with a single
drungos or a grouper , and the rest to
march and camp.
If the enemy is nearby and in close
formation, or if our camp is near a wooded
area or rough terrain, we must not let the
horses graze freely, but keep them inside the
camp and be careful to send scouts outside
leaving the horses inside. Care must be taken
to collect supplies from what is found in
nearby towns and stock up on forage, but be
sure that they are accompanied by light
troops of each grouper , proceeding in
formation in case of a sudden attack by the
enemy. If the army spends some time at the
location, and if there is opportunity and room
to forage, assuming that the enemy troops
are at a great distance, then the horses may
be allowed to graze. But double or triple
patrols should be systematically sent out in all
directions at a considerable distance and
arranged at regular intervals. Some soldiers
who engage in looting on their own must be
arrested and handed over to their own
commanders for punishment, to prevent the
rest from taking the liberty of indulging in
looting, leaving the strategists without
troops and leaving the army in danger.
If wine or grain is found from the area, it
should not be drunk or eaten before being
given to the prisoners to taste. Water from
wells should not be drunk because it could
often have been poisoned. It must be
remembered that in the wars against the
Persians even the barley was sprinkled with
some poison and was not Few horses
perished, because as there was no grass, the
soldiers were forced to feed their horses local
barley 4 .
Instructions should be given to the men
that in the course of an unexpected problem
while marching, they should not run in all
directions and be frightened, but should
direct each formation towards the place
where the incident has occurred. By following
this procedure, they will be prepared to
confront the enemy, be able to better
concentrate their forces and avoid confusion.
In case of attack, not only can it be effective
to always maintain patrols in front, but also a
rear guard of medium strength, well armed
but without much equipment, commanded by
a competent officer who should be stationed
about fifteen or twenty miles in the rear. .
Good patrols could be established in case
there are army stragglers who have been left
behind due to illness or some other reason, or
in case of sudden enemy attacks. These
attacks mostly happen when troops are
marching carelessly and when those deployed
cannot easily return to support the troops
behind them. This has happened even in our
own territory with the aim of finding soldiers
dispersed without permission from their
commanders and acting disorderly, and to
identify men inattentive to their military
obligations.
Book IX, chapter 4. About passing
through gorges and rugged territory
Except in the case of a serious emergency,
we do not recommend that cavalry, while in
hostile territory, march along narrow and
rugged terrain, a fact quite difficult for
infantry; This could be particularly unwise
during the summer. Even such defiles are
difficult for foot soldiers, but if there is only a
mile or so, cavalry can dismount and
traverse them safely. We define those gorges
in which there is only one path through as
difficult and narrow. When other routes exist
or can be improvised, the gorge must be
overcome without impediment.
Now, if our army has to pass through
narrow defiles, and we hope to return by the
same route, and if it is wooded and, as we
have described, it is not very long, then when
we first pass through it the trees must be cut
down. and the field, leveled and cleared in
the usual manner. If the road is narrow and
steep, and therefore cannot be leveled, then
a detachment of sufficient strength, whether
on horseback or on foot, should be sent
forward to seize it and take up positions at
the dominant points until our return. In the
most critical locations it may be necessary to
do both, cut down the trees or clear the land
and leave adequate strength. Troops passing
through the gorge, accompanied by supply or
looting carts, should divide into two groups or
formations marching on foot in column along
the flank, especially when they are
transporting looting carts. They should do this
if there are infantry, who can usually pass
through dense or narrow areas with ease. If
the army consists only of cavalry, the troops
must dismount and place supplies and
baggage in the center. In both situations or
locations, a strong force of good light troops
selected from the main body should be added
to the double column assigned to guard
supplies and loot, stationed on all four sides
of the double column as much as the terrain
allows. Your task is to march along both sides
and prevent any attack that attempts to
harass the column. This should allow the
main body to protect supplies and product
from looting without being disrupted or
disordered, and its men to fight off the
attackers. How can the troops in the double
column do everything, protect the loot in
formation and deal with surprise attacks from
the enemy? To do this, then, the troops that
can be spared must be assigned to march
outside the double column on all four sides,
especially in the rear. This way it is relatively
easy to pass through the most difficult places
under any conditions. If there are no infantry
in the army and the cavalry must therefore
dismount and proceed on foot, their horses
must not be left with them but placed in the
center of the formation, to prevent if the men
marching in the vanguard begin to alarmed or
disturbed, even for no reason, and their
horses are with them, they can easily mount,
break ranks and cause serious damage. If the
column includes prisoners or the proceeds of
plunder, and if the enemy appears on one
side of the line of march or both, wherever it
occurs, the prisoners, always tied, must be
lined up outside the column and used as a
shield, so that the enemy does not shoot out
of consideration for them, or if he does they
will kill the prisoners instead of our soldiers. If
during the march the army heads towards an
unexpected critical situation, gets stuck in a
narrow pass and cannot retreat without real
danger, then it is better to come to an
agreement with the enemy, giving up part or
all of the loot. This way the army can stay
safe instead of taking unnecessary risks. But
if the enemies do not want to reach an
agreement, then the prisoners must be
executed before their eyes. The army can
then, after escaping the gorge, remain in that
country and raze it mercilessly or maintain
formation as best it can and concentrate on
escaping. The chief concern of the strategos
who is caught in a gorge, especially a long
one, should not be to try to force passage
through it, particularly in summer when the
dense foliage makes it possible for the enemy
to cause major problems, before the enemy
forces have been expelled or their own troops
have taken the dominant heights of the pass.
Book IX, chapter 5. How to spy on the

enemy and how to
Capture scouts or enemies trying to
infiltrate our army
The configuration of cavalry and infantry
formations and the disposition of other units
creates large differences in their strength.
This can lead to a serious error for those who
observe it simply and without experience.
Taking a cavalry formation of six hundred
men in front and five hundred deep, which
amounts to three hundred thousand men5 ,
each horse in formation occupies a space
three feet wide, the entire line is then
eighteen hundred feet and each space It is
eight feet long, so the entire line will be four
thousand feet deep. The rectangle in this
way formed on both sides is eighteen
hundred feet wide by four thousand feet
long, everything said added together is eleven
thousand six hundred feet , making the
perimeter of the rectangle two and a quarter
miles , and containing three hundred
thousand soldiers. But now, if we line them
up in a single line, allocating a space three
feet wide to each horse, this becomes nine
hundred thousand feet , which is equivalent
to one hundred and eighty miles 6 . If they
march in dispersed groups, we must admit
that they will occupy a greater space and to
the observer they will appear more numerous
than if they marched in regular formation.
And if they march on inclined or mountainous
terrain, even more so.
Therefore, if a commander wants to make
his army appear more formidable, he can
form it into a very thin line, extending it over
long distances, or leave gaps in the line. An
observer will not be able to estimate your
combat strength or other contingencies. And
in this sequence, there are other points to be
considered. If the army is well equipped and
the men and horses present a good
appearance, instead of keeping them
together, form thin columns, of different
depths not too far apart. If it simply appears
long, you have to distribute the troops
throughout the area and camp them in
different places. Therefore, as there are great
differences in both formation and
organization, exploration should not be
entrusted to men who are inexperienced or
unreliable in their reports. Many people are
unable to establish a good estimate in their
reports if an army exceeds twenty thousand
or thirty thousand soldiers especially if they
are Scythians , who are mostly horsemen.
Likewise, one should not be worried and
imagine a large army when looking at a long,
thin line of battle. Unless its depth is
proportional, its current strength will not be
great. The depth must be studied and if the
impediment marches after the main force or it
consists only of soldiers, more exact
information must be obtained about the
numerical strength of an army through
deserters, prisoners, and observation of its
passage. through narrow defiles and from the
observation of camps when all the enemy
forces camp together.
When a camp is not fortified, the outer
guard posts must be located according to the
nature of the terrain. If the accesses are
narrow, a few are enough. In unobstructed
terrain and open fields, there should be more
of them in different places, in contact with
each other and more advanced. Surveillance
is particularly necessary at night when the
enemy can easily and freely move to observe
the outer posts and if they are weak can
surprise and attack them. For this reason, the
exterior posts must be at a certain distance
from each other and change location
frequently.
It is the scouts' obligation to closely observe
the enemy's positions and movements with
intelligence and cunning. The men chosen for
this must be lightly armed and mounted on
fast horses. Spies must be very daring and
move freely among the enemy, so it must be
valued that they are of the same race. The
men in charge of patrols must be trustworthy,
very virile and superior to other soldiers in
their physical appearance, morale and
equipment, so that they project a noble
image in the confrontation with the enemy
and if they are captured, make a good
impression. about themselves. The officer in
charge of the patrol must be selected for his
cunning, intelligence and experience, and not
just anyone will do. This type of commission
requires intelligence, cunning rather than
bravery. While the enemy is still at a great
distance, scouts should only be sent when the
tactician wishes to receive information about
the enemy's movements, the nature of the
roads, or fortified places. When planning a
raid for the purpose of taking prisoners, the
scouts must join the patrols, but they must go
ahead of them to observe from covert
positions and the patrols must follow along
the routes they indicate.
In uncertain circumstances, a single patrol
should not be sent in a single direction, but
rather several patrols that communicate with
each other according to the nature of the
terrain. They must go quite far and so that if
the enemy remains at a good distance from
our men and maneuvers to avoid one of the
patrols, they run into the others and do not
slip away . The most advanced patrol must be
made up of few men. In the next one there
should be more, and in the third even more.
Patrols should be inspected to see how they
are doing. Very trusted officers should be
sent to do surprise inspections to observe
how they are doing things. Anyone found
negligent must be punished for putting the
entire army in serious danger. An expert
scout, even before the enemy comes into
view, should be able to estimate the strength
of his army by certain signs, such as the
extent of the ground trodden by his horses
and the size of his camp. You must be able to
estimate the time of passage through the
area by observing the excrement of men and
horses, as well as their footprints.
If the camp is fortified by a moat or a
regular stone wall and mounted troops have
been authorized to settle within the
fortifications, then patrols should not be sent
too far to avoid unnecessary wear and tear
on the horses. But if the cavalry is
bivouacking outside, patrols must be carefully
organized.
Soldiers sent on patrol missions must be
trained to take prisoners. They must be
trained for this just as they are for hunting,
stalking without being seen or detected. A
few must let themselves be seen and then
return while the others circle the area unseen
and hidden as much as the terrain allows.
Individually they should be displayed in
multiple locations while the central body
moves to another location where they can
hide for the entire night. The best time for
this is when the enemy has been reported to
be quite far away and would not suspect such
activity.
The mission of the patrols must be kept
secret not only from the enemy but also from
our men, so that if some soldiers want to
desert they fall unexpectedly and directly into
their hands.
The commanding officers of the tagmas
must be aware that we are interested in
capturing spies or explorers. Each officer
must announce to his men that the next day
around the second or third hour 7 a trumpet
will sound. Everyone, soldier or servant, must
immediately find themselves in their tent.
Anyone found outside your store will be
punished. After everyone has entered,
officers will then be able to come out,
observe, and arrest anyone found standing
outside the stores. The members of the
conspiracy must detain any stranger who
enters their tent and hand them over to their
own commander. This will verify one of two
things: the arrest of a stranger who is outside
because he does not know where to go, or if
he is bold enough to enter the tent of one of
the conspiracies , he will be recognized as a
stranger and handed over to the commander
of the conspiracy .
Anyone caught in this way must be
detained, whether he appears to be Roman or
a foreigner, and must be interrogated to
obtain his true identity. This can easily be
done in a regular camp in which the army,
cavalry or infantry, is concentrated, or it can
be done separately in the camp of a grouper
or tagma . Spies can also be detected by
other means and a variety of signals must be
practiced and different orders or signals can
be given. These procedures not only expose
enemy spies, but also accustom our own
soldiers to obey their officers and follow their
orders carefully, particularly if reasonable
punishment is meted out to all those who
show carelessness in these matters.
It is not a bad idea to give soldiers other
orders of this nature, especially when the
troops are idle, to test them and get them
used to following orders.
END OF THE NINTH BOOK
1 Lusius Quietus was a Mauritanian prince who, at the

head of the famous horsemen of his land (the equites
Mauri or Mauretanici) served in the Roman army
during the empires of Domitian (Titus Flavius
Domitianus) (81-96) and, above all, of Trajan (Marcus
Vlpius Traianus) (98-117), with this in his two Dacian
wars (101-102 and 105-106) and in his Parthian war
(114-117). Perhaps in 115 he was consul and in 116 or
117 he was even governor of Iudaea. Being one of
Trajan's "hard core" generals, upon his death and the
ascension to the throne of Hadrian (Publius Aelius
Hadrianus) (117-138), opinion with them he opposed
the new emperor's plans to abandon the last eastern
conquests, for which he was removed from his
positions and in the first months of 118 executed, after
a summary trial, along with three other former
generals of Trajan (Caius Avidius Nigrinus, Aulus
Cornelius Palma and Lucius Publilius Celsus) by order
of the Prefect of the Praetorium Publius Acilius
Attianus, under the accusation of having participated in
what has been called "consular conspiracy." Lusius
Quietus is mentioned by Dio Cassius in several
passages (68, 22, 2; 68, 30, 1-2; 68, 32, 3; 69, 2, 5),
as well as by the Historia Augusta (Life of Hadrian 5, 8
and 7, 2). The incident reported here apparently must
have taken place near Nisibis (now Nusaybin, Mardin
Province, Turkey) or Edessa (now Sanliurfa, Urfa
Province, Turkey) in 116 AD About this character, cf.
GROAG (1927) cols. 1874 1890 and PIR 2 letter L, p.
113, no. 439.
2 Jan (khan): title that certain peoples of the Eurasian
steppes gave to their leaders.
3 This happened in the year 592 (Theophylacto
Simocatta, Historiae 6, 5; also, cf. also MIHĂESCU
[1967] pp. 401-417). The Heraclea referred to here is
surely Heraclea Lyncestis (now ruins on the southern
outskirts of Bitola, in the county of the same name, in
the south of the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia), then in the Byzantine province of
Macedonia II.
4 In 591 the troops of Emperor Maurice fought to
return the Persian throne to its rightful owner,
Chosroes II (590-628), after a revolution had killed his
father Hormuz (Hormisdas) IV (579-590) and forced
him to take refuge in Constantinople. During the war,
the troops of the Eastern Empire, commanded by the
magister vtriusque militiae Narses (not the famous
Narses of the time of Justinian I), suffered an attempt
by Khosrow's enemies to poison their supplies, both
those of the soldiers like those of horses, an attempt
thwarted by the vigilance of Narsés' men, according to
what Juan de Nikiu tells us, Chronica 96, 17-19.
5 We do not know where this exaggeration could have
come from since an army of 300,000 men and, in
addition, all horsemen (that is, at least with 300,000
horses to care for, feed...) is absolutely unthinkable for
this era if only for logistical problems. . Agathias (V 13,
7), estimated the total strength of the army of the
Eastern Roman Empire a few decades earlier, in the
time of Justinian I (527-565) at 150,000 men between
infantry and horsemen.
6 All this would be equivalent to an army that
marches spread out over just over 266 kilometers.
7 Daytime hours are counted from sunrise to sunset,
so they have variable duration depending on the
season; Therefore, the second or third hour in
summer, the preferred time for military campaigns,
would be approximately between 05:42' and 06:58',
the second, and 06:58' and 08:13', the third
(HACQUARD, DAUTRY and MAISANI [2003] p. 44).
Book
Chapter 1. How to organize a siege of enemy
fortresses if opportunity allows
Episode 2. How to conduct an encounter with
hostile incursions within our own territory
Chapter 3. How to endure a siege that is
supposed to be long
Chapter 4. How to build a border fortress
cautiously and without engaging in open
combat
Book X, chapter 1. How to organize a

siege of enemy fortresses if opportunity
allows
Our camp must be
Truly fortified. A large number of our bravest

explorers must be stationed around it,
covering especially the most unusual places,
in order to avoid the siege or forces outside
the walls launching sudden attacks against
us, whether day or night, exposing the army
to danger. This is what happened in Arzanene
when some of our strategos were captured
while besieging a fortress 1 .
The first thing the besiegers must do, if
possible, is to deprive those within the walls
of their necessities, both food and water. If
the besieged have these supplies in
abundance, then it is necessary to resort to
siege engines and fighting. Try to have
soldiers with a good physical presence and
whose horses are well equipped so that they
approach the enemy fortifications safely as
much as they can and let the besieged people
observe them well. The less polished troops
must be kept away with the supplies, at such
a distance that the people within the walls
cannot make any judgment about the men or
the animals, but will think that all the men are
of the same quality as those who they had
seen approaching before. It is also a good
idea to keep the besieged in the belief that
we have a large number of armed men; To
achieve this it is necessary to make the men
who do not have chain mail wear the mail
hoods of those who have them and in this
way from a distance it will nevertheless be
seen that all of them are wearing mail. We
should set up our camp far enough away to
keep them in the belief that all the objects
they see there are really soldiers.
At the beginning, there is no need to offer
terms of peace that are severe and harsh for
the besieged. If the terms are too harsh,
advocates may think that the risk of fighting
is the lesser of two evils and may begin to
become more desperate and motivated.
Therefore, we must try to offer softer and
more acceptable terms, such as for them to
hand over horses, weapons or other
possessions. Thus a moderate offer with this
hope of being saved may lead them to
change their minds, and they may begin to
hesitate to resist and face danger. In case of
a prolonged siege, you must ensure that all
your supplies are obtained in time. Estimate
the number of men required for each task
and type of work and be sure to assign each
man to his task.
The entire army should not be sent every
day to assault the walls so as not to quickly
exhaust it. Rather, the army should be
divided into several sections and a certain
number of troops assigned to work several
hours each day. Some will have to be in
charge of working at night, others during the
day. But not only must the besieged be
harassed by constant attacks during the day,
but they must also be kept awake all night by
troops assigned for this purpose. In order
that the soldiers of our army may not be
disturbed and disturbed by the shouts of men
or the sound of weapons, the camp should be
located a mile or two from the enemy's
fortifications, beyond the reach of the noise
and confusion of the siege The assaults
should not be carried out recklessly and
without purpose, to avoid some losses taking
away the courage of our troops and giving
courage to the besieged. If the besieged fort
is small and an assault direct seems to be
risky and expensive and the besieged are well
supplied, so they will have to be harassed
constantly, day and night, so that they are
exhausted by the siege. If there are buildings
made of flammable material within the walls,
fire arrows will be launched from various
directions, especially if a strong wind blows.
Catapults must also be used to launch the so-
called incendiary bombs 2 . While the enemy
is kept busy trying to extinguish the fires,
ladders are installed, if the terrain allows, and
climbed. Catapults are used in almost all
sieges, especially if it is difficult to force entry
by digging 3 or piling dirt to place a battering
ram into position.
Book X, chapter 2. How to do an

encounter with hostile raids
within our own territory
If an enemy force, superior in number or
even equal to ours, invades our territory,
especially at the beginning of the invasion we
must be sure not to engage in a pitched
battle with it. Instead, we must carefully set
up ambushes day and night, block the route
the enemy is taking, occupy strong points in
advance, and destroy supplies along their line
of march. If an attack is going to occur, it is
most effective to do so when the enemy is
returning and abandoning our territory, when
he is hampered in plundering, fatigued, and
in the vicinity of his own territory. If you want
to engage him in combat, that is the time to
attack. Anyone who operates in their own
territory is less inclined to attack, has many
ways to save themselves, and is not
interested in taking unnecessary risks. On the
other hand, anyone who marches through
enemy territory prefers to risk fighting,
considering any retreat dangerous.
The most important thing is to keep the
army undamaged and intact. Keeping this in
mind, the enemy will not find it easy to
besiege the fortifications or disperse his
forces to raze the territory, since he will be
under observation and will fear that our army
is prepared.
Even if the strategos does not want to
engage in a pitched battle, he must make
preparations and pretend to prepare for it
and give the impression to all his troops that
it is true that he will attack the enemy. This
will cause problems for the enemy when it
comes to their attention.
If the nature of the terrain and the situation
of the enemy's territory are favorable, make
plans to send a force there by another route,
to distract the enemy. Of course, as has been
said, it is necessary to study the situation and
the distance, in case the enemy has news of
the incursion and moves against our force, so
our people can leave the territory safely by
another route and avoid being there at the
sight of the enemy as he advances.
All essential supplies must be stored in very
secure fortresses and all livestock in the
country must be captured. If the enemy
decides to lay siege to one of our fortified
places, we must destroy the supplies in the
vicinity and ambush the men sent to collect
supplies and embarrass the enemy.
Forts that are not in a naturally protected
area should be safer. Part of the army,
depending on the progress of the fight, must
be assigned to its defense. Preparations must
be made to transfer inhabitants from weakly
defendable locations to better fortified ones.
Book X, chapter 3. How to endure a
siege that is supposed to be long
You have to know how much time the
enemy usually spends in a siege in order to
calculate the supplies you will need. If you
are well supplied with the necessary
provisions, before the enemy approaches,
evacuate from the fortification all those who
are not necessary, such as women, the
elderly, the sick and children, thus leaving
whatever provisions there may be. stored for
would-be warriors. The device must be
prepared to defend against artillery 4 that
throws stones. As protection against it, heavy
rugs, bundles, and coils of rope can be hung
from the walls along the battlements. or loose
logs. The walls can be increased with bricks.
Pillows or bags filled with grain husks and
sand are effective against battering rams. To
prevent the movement of rams that end in a
spike, hooks made of iron, fish, fire or heavy
sharp stones are used, held by ropes or
chains that can be quickly thrown from
machines and then hoisted again by another
counterweight.
If they move siege towers, launch
incendiary projectiles or stones at them. If
this does not stop them, towers must be built
inside the walls to confront them. It is
necessary that the towers of the wall that are
most exposed to attack be without roofs, so
that the soldiers stationed there can fight
without any obstacles, and therefore the
artillery can be easily installed on them and
handled from there. Small, narrow doors
should be opened in those towers, towards
the right side of the enemy's siege engines so
that our infantry can leave through those side
doors and attack safely covered by their
shields and supported by troops from the top
of the tower. Wall. This way they will be able
to force the enemy to delay their team. Those
small doors should have portholes so that
they can remain secure when necessary and
not remain open.
The garrison must be distributed along the
wall, selecting an adequate force from the
troops and keeping it in reserve to support a
threatened sector when necessary. Then, in
an emergency, the troops defending the wall
will not have to rush from one side to the
other, leaving certain wide spaces open, a
very dangerous thing to do. If the civilian
population remains in the city they must also
join the men distributed along the wall to help
the soldiers. Not only does this keep them too
busy to plan an insurrection, but they believe
that they have been entrusted with the
defense of the city and are again ashamed of
an uprising.
The gates of the city must be entrusted to
trusted men. No soldier or civilian should be
allowed, especially at the beginning of the
siege, to leave the walls to fight even when
the garrison is very numerous and brave.
Direct contact with the enemy may be
allowed to destroy a siege engine that is
causing significant damage. But in general,
the defense must be carried out from the top
of the wall and not by putting men at risk of
their lives outside in a hand-to-hand fight. If
that kind of thing happens and the best
soldiers are killed or wounded, the rest of the
troops will begin to lose courage, being easily
defeated by the enemy. It is obvious that as
long as there are enough men the wall will be
safe, but if one point surrenders the rest will
be in danger. If the fortification has an
external wall, it is a good idea to post
sentinels there, especially at night, when
some might consider deserting to the enemy
or might carry out secret sabotage plans
against the defense of the walls. Projectiles
should be launched from the wall only when
they are effective.
If the supply of drinking water depends on
cisterns or wells, their use should be
restricted to some extent. No one has the
authority to consume as much as they want.
Sentinels must be carefully instructed,
especially at night. The distribution of
provisions must be strictly regulated and they
must be kept safe under guard, so that they
cannot be easily stolen by anyone passing by.

fortress cautiously and without
engaging in open combat
A thorough reconnaissance must be carried
out to locate a strong site, capable of being
fortified with dry wood in ten or twelve days
and defended by a small garrison in the event
of an enemy attack. The reconnaissance
could also find out if there is easily accessible
stone, wood or bricks in the vicinity and if
there is water there or if you have to look for
paths to find it. A sufficient force of craftsmen
must be organized to prepare gates and
machines for the walls, and a well-armed
force of infantry must be chosen under the
command of intelligent and courageous
officers and provided with provisions for three
or four months. If it is summer, the crops in
the vicinity should be burned, but if this is
difficult to do, they should be destroyed in
some other way and spread the rumor that
the enemy is going to be attacked elsewhere.
A force must be sent there, without taking
risks, so that the enemy can be diverted in
that direction. Then, a day before, you must
try to instill courage in the troops that form
the garrison there and encourage them to
fulfill their mission by giving them some
rewards and promising them others. While
the enemy is occupied in that other place,
move, in one rapid movement, the entire
army to its original position, establish secure
outer posts, arrange a camp for the infantry
around the fortification, and dig a deep ditch
if the terrain permits it. It allows. If there is
stone or brick in the area, build a dry wall
firmly fortified with logs along its path. If
wood is the only existing building material,
use it, but build the fortified area smaller.
After enclosing the area in this way, if the
enemy moves to attack the location and the
tactician knows that he cannot confront him
in a pitched battle, the tactician must retreat
before his approach and prepare a camp
nearby. This way you will not be so close to
the enemy that they are forced to engage in
battle, nor too far from the men in the
fortification to prevent the enemy from
putting too much pressure on them. Signals
must be prepared, some by day and some at
night, by which the garrison can communicate
its situation to outside forces, so that they
can come to its assistance when necessary. If
the circumstances are favorable and the
infantry can repel the enemy by fighting, they
should not delay him, so as not to endanger
the garrison. As soon as the situation is safer,
the fortifications should be built solidly and
regularly, reinforced with mortar and all other
necessary details. Against an enemy with a
heavy dependence on cavalry, such an
expedition can best be undertaken in July,
August and September, when the grass is dry
and burns easily and the enemy cavalry finds
it difficult to remain in one place for long.
If the place has no water supply, no
streams or wells, then it is necessary to get
large clay jars or barrels of good quality. They
must be filled with water and some clean
gravel from the riverbed, so that it lasts until
winter and until the usual cisterns to contain
rainwater are built. To prevent the water
stored in the barrels from starting to stagnate
and rot, the barrels should be pierced with
small holes and receptacles placed
underneath so that the water can flow into
them drop by drop, and then emptied back
into the jars. or barrels. Through this constant
movement, the water is aerated and does not
become unclean. This helps by pouring a little
vinegar into the water that has started to turn
bad and thanks to this its deterioration
quickly decreases and the bad smell begins to
clear up. Thick planks of good quality can be
prepared, placed in a trench and fastened
together as if it were a box. The joints must
be sealed with pitch and tow or wicker, and in
this way a regular cistern of moderate size
has been prepared. One or more should be
built measuring ten by twenty feet on the
base and eight or ten feet high. This will
allow solid cisterns to be built. In fact, it is
well known that water is best kept in large
containers. Wooden props must be placed in
the middle of the cisterns and the boards
must be thick so that they do not give way
due to the pressure of the water and it does
not spread.
END OF BOOK TEN
1 This probably refers to the Byzantine siege in 583 of

the fortress of Akbas (present-day Başka Kale, near
Ambar [the most northeastern one], in the province of
Diyarbakir, Turkey). Persians and Byzantines were
then operating in Arzanene (the region southwest of
Lake Van, between it, located between the provinces
of Van and Biltis, and Silvan, province of Diyarbakir,
Turkey), a region of Armenia bordering Persia. When
the Persians were trying to recover the town of
Aphumon (today Zerzel Kale, on the banks of the
Garzan River, northeast of Silvan, Diyarbakir province,
Turkey), the Byzantines, probably in a maneuver of
distraction, they laid siege to Akbas, on the right bank
of the Nymphius River (the Batman River, a left
tributary of the Tigris, in the province of Diyarbakir,
Turkey), north-northeast of Martyropolis (the present
ruins of Mejafarkin, in the vicinity of Mermer [the one
in the northeastern province of Diyarbakir, Turkey], but
that maneuver went badly for them, as they were
defeated, and several of their generals were captured.
About this event, cf. Theophylacto Simocatta, Historiae
I 12, 1-7. The fortress was definitively taken for the
Eastern Roman Empire by the troops of the magister
utriusque militiae Comentiolus in 590.
2 It is possible that reference is made here to a
variant of the famous "Greek fire" (which the
Byzantines never called that, since they considered
themselves Romans), since it cannot be that weapon
itself, since its first use is dated 673 AD during the first
siege of Constantinople by the Arabs and F. Quesada
Sanz (Ultima Ratio Regis. Control and prohibition of
weapons from Antiquity to the Modern Age, Edic.
Polifemo, Madrid, 2009, p. 320) even gives us the
name of its possible inventor, the Syrian Callinicus of
Heliopolis.
3 This excavation can refer both to the construction of
a tunnel to sneak into the besieged place, and to the
construction of a mine in which, once completed, its
wooden shoring would be set on fire, which, when it
gave way, would cause the collapse of the mine. the
external structures that could be on it, for example, a
section of the wall.
4 On artillery and siege engines in the times of the
Roman-Byzantine Empire, cf. McGEER (1991a).
Book XI
Introduction
Chapter 1. How to deal with Persians
Episode 2. How to deal with the Scythians ,
that is, Avars , Turks and others whose
way of life resembles that of the Hunnic
peoples
Chapter 3. How to deal with light-haired
people, such as the Franks , Lombards
and others like them
Chapter 4. How to deal with the Slavs , the
Ante and other similar peoples
ON THE CUSTOMS AND TACTICS OF THE

VARIOUS PEOPLES
Book XI, introduction
Having dealt with the organizational and
command principles of the cavalry, without
which, as we believe, it is impossible to
confront the enemy with any degree of
safety, we must now deal with the tactics and
customs of each race that can cause
problems for our State. . The purpose of this
chapter is to make it easier for those who
intend to wage war against these peoples to
prepare themselves properly. Not all nations
fight in a single formation or in the same way
and one cannot deal with them in the same
way. Some, whose audacity knows no limit,
are led by an impulsive spirit, while others
have good judgment and order in attacking
their enemies.
Persians
The Persian nation is evil, evil and servile,
but at the same time patriotic and obedient.
The Persians obey their rulers out of fear
and the result is that they are determined to
resist hard work and the art of war in the
name of their homeland.
Most of them prefer to achieve their results
through planning and leadership and stand
out for an orderly approach rather than a
brave and impulsive one. They have always
been raised in a warm climate, so they easily
endure the difficulties of heat, thirst and lack
of food. They are formidable when engaged
in a siege, but even more so when they are
besieged. They are extremely skilled at
concealing their flaws and bravely cope with
adverse circumstances, even turning them to
their own advantage. They are intractable in
negotiations, so they will not initiate any
proposal, even when they consider it vitally
important to them, but will wait until the
proposal is made by their opponents.
They wear armor and chain mail, and are
armed with bows and swords 1 . They are
more adept at speed, though not powerful
archers, than all other nations. Going to war,
they camp inside fortifications. When the time
of battle approaches, they surround
themselves with a moat and a sharp palisade.
They do not leave the impediment inside but
make a pit for refuge in case of defeat in
battle. They do not allow their horses to
graze, but rather collect forage by hand.
They go to battle in three identical bodies,
center, right and left, with the center
increased by four or five hundred additional
chosen soldiers. The depth of the formation is
not uniform, but they try to place cavalry in
each company of the first and second line or
phalanxes and keep the center of the
formation even and dense 2 . The spare
horses and the impedimenta are parked a
short distance behind the main line. During
the fight against spearmen, they rush to form
their battle line in the most difficult terrain
and use their archers, so the spearmen's
charges against them will be scattered and
broken because of the rough terrain. Before
the day of battle, their favorite tactic is to
camp on rough terrain and postpone fighting,
especially when they know their opponents
are well prepared and ready for combat.
When they go into battle, especially in
summer, they make their attack during the
hottest time of the day, wait for the heat of
the The sun and the delay in the beginning of
the action discourage the courage and spirit
of their adversaries and they then engage in
battle calmly and determinedly, marching
step by step in pairs and dense formation.
They really suffer from cold water, rain and
south wind, elements that weaken the power
of their bows. They are also uncomfortable
with a very careful infantry formation, a
smooth field without obstacles for the
spearmen to charge, and hand-to-hand
combat, because volleys of arrows are not
effective at close range and because they
themselves do not use spears and shields. .
Charging at them is effective because they
are prone to fleeing quickly and do not know
how to suddenly turn around on their
attackers, as the Scythian nations do. They
are vulnerable to attacks and enveloping
movements from a lateral position, against
the flanks and rear of their formation,
because they do not place enough flank
guards in their line of battle to resist a large
lateral attack. Unexpected attacks at night
against their camp are also often effective
because they pitch their tents indiscriminately
and without order within their fortifications.
To fight them, our forces must be
positioned as described in the book of
formations 3 . You must select an open,
uniform and level terrain and, if possible, do
so without swamps, ditches or stubble that
could break the formation. When the army is
prepared and aligned for battle, there is no
need to delay the attack if it has really been
decided to fight in a pitched battle on that
day. When you are within arrow range, you
must launch the attack or charge in a
compact, dense and regular order, and you
must do it quickly because any delay with the
enemy means that his Maintained rate of fire
will enable them to discharge more missile
weapons against our soldiers and horses.
If it is necessary to fight the battle in very
rough terrain, it is best not to have the entire
battle line on horseback in similar locations,
but instead place part of the formation as
infantry while the others remain mounted.
When spearmen attack archers, as we have
said, unless they maintain a seamless joint
front, they will endure serious damage from
arrows and will fail to stand in close
formations. For all this, a more uniform
terrain is needed for this type of combat. If
the army is not really prepared for combat, it
should not engage in pitched battle, but
should be safely employed in skirmishes and
raids against the enemy, which may be made
on favorable ground, so as not to show either
the enemy or our own troops the reason for
not having accepted a pitched battle, since,
on the one hand, they could become
emboldened and on the other, become
cowards. When turning or turning during
retreats, the attack should not be directed
against the enemy front, but should be
encircled by his flanks and taken from his
rear. For the Persians , perseverance in the
chases means an effort not to break their
formation; Because of this they could easily
expose their rear to forces around them.
Likewise, if a retreating force ahead of them
wants to engage in enveloping maneuvers
and attack the pursuers' front line, they will
suffer damage in the attack to their well-
organized ranks. The Persians do not attack
in a disorderly manner as the Scythians do
in pursuit, but rather they do so carefully and
in good order. For this reason, as has been
said, the retreating forces will not attack their
front, but must be sure to go against their
rear, on their flanks.
the Scythians, that is, Avars, Turks and
others whose way of life resembles that
of the Hunnic peoples
The Scythian nations are, in general, one in
their way of life and in their organization, but
they have many leaders and are of a carefree
nature 4 . Of these peoples, only the Turks
and the Avars care about military
organization, and this makes them stronger
than the other Scythian nations when they
engage in a pitched battle. The nation of the
Turks is very numerous and independent 5 .
They are not experts in most human
endeavors and do not train for anything other
than to conduct themselves bravely against
their enemies. The Avars , for their part, are
some scoundrels, devious and very
experienced in military matters.
These nations have a monarchical form of
government and their rulers subject them to
cruel punishments for their mistakes. They
are governed not by love, but by fear, so they
firmly endure fatigue and difficulties. They
resist heat and cold and many hardships since
they are nomadic people. They are very
superstitious, treacherous, unclean, distrustful
and possessed by an insatiable desire for
wealth. They disregard their oaths, do not
observe agreements and are not satisfied
with gifts. Even before accepting the gift,
they make plans to betray and break the
agreements. They are ready to estimate the
appropriate opportunities to do this, betrayal,
and realize the advantages of it. They prefer
to prevail over their enemies not so much by
force as by deception, surprise attacks, and
cutting off supplies.
They are armed with chain mail, swords,
bows and spears. In combat, most of them
attack doubly armed, brandishing spears on
their shoulders, holding bows in their hands
and using both as needed. Not only do they
carry weapons on themselves, but also the
horses of their illustrious riders have their
fronts covered with iron or felt. They give
special importance to the training of riders
with the bow.
An immense herd of horses and mares
follow them, both to provide food and to give
the impression of a large army. They do not
camp protected by trenches, as the Persians
and Romans do, but until the day of battle
they disperse according to tribes and clans,
continually grazing their horses both in
summer and winter. They then take the
horses they think necessary, lock them by the
legs near their tents, and keep them until it is
time to form the battle lines, which they
begin to do under the cover of night. They
station their sentries at a distance, keeping
them in contact with each other, so it is not
easy to catch them in a surprise attack.
In combat they, as the Romans and
Persians do, do not form their battle lines in
three parts, but in multiple units of irregular
size, all joined very close to each other to
give the appearance of a long battle line.
Separate from the main formation, they
maintain an additional force with which they
can ambush a careless adversary or keep it in
reserve to aid a hard-pressed section. They
keep their spare horses close behind the main
line, and their impediment to the right or left
of the line, a mile or two away, with a guard
of moderate size. They frequently tie spare
horses together at the rear of the battle line
as a form of protection. They make the depth
of their battle line imprecise depending on the
circumstances, being inclined to make it
deeper than ours, and thus make their front
united and dense.
They prefer long-distance battles,
ambushes, surrounding their adversaries,
simulating retreats and suddenly attacking,
and wedge formations, that is, in dispersed
groups. When they make their enemies
accept combat, they put everything second,
and are not content, like the Persians , the
Romans, and other peoples, with pursuing
them at a reasonable distance and plundering
their goods, but they do not give up until they
have achieved the complete destruction of his
enemies using any means to this end. If some
enemies of those they pursue take refuge in a
fortress, they make continuous and
conscientious efforts to cut off their supplies
of men and horses. They then exhaust their
enemies at that point and lead them to
accept terms of surrender favorable to them.
Their first demands are quite moderate, and
when the enemy has accepted them, they
impose stricter terms.
Their weak point is the lack of pasture due
to the large number of horses they carry with
them. Also throughout the battle, when
opposed by an infantry force in close
formation, they remain on their horses and do
not dismount, because they are not capable
of fighting on foot for long. They have been
raised on horseback and, due to their lack of
exercise, simply cannot walk on foot. Level
ground, without obstructions, should be
chosen, and a force of cavalry should advance
against them in a dense, seamless block, to
engage them in hand-to-hand battle. Night
attacks are also effective, with part of our
army holding their formation while the other
parts lie in wait. Defections and desertions
especially hurt them. They are very fickle,
greedy and, composed of as many tribes as
they are, they have no sense of kingdom or
unity with each other. If a few begin to defect
and are welcomed by their enemies, many
others will follow.
When advancing into battle, the first thing
to do is keep your scouts on alert, stationed
at regular intervals. Then you have to make
plans and update preparations in case the
battle might not go well, find a good
defensive position to use in case of
emergency, collect as many provisions are
available, enough for a few days for both
horses and men and especially stock up on
plenty of water. Then preparations for the
impediment must be made as explained in
the book concerning it 6 . If an infantry force
is present, it must be stationed on the front
line of the battle in the customary manner of
the nation to which it belongs. The force must
be arranged according to the method shown
in the convex battle line diagram, that is, with
the cavalry placed behind the infantry. If only
the cavalry is prepared for combat, position it
according to the manner shown in the
formation book 7 . A large and capable force
must be placed on the flanks. In the rear, the
defense troops are sufficient. In a chase,
the Assault troops should not advance more
than three or four arrow shots from the
formation of defending troops , who should
not be carried far in the charge. When
possible, find a clean, unobstructed area to
form the battle line, where neither forests,
swamps or holes can serve as a screen for
enemy ambushes. Scouts should be placed at
some distance on all four sides of the
formation. If possible, it is helpful to have a
non-fordable river, swamp, or lake behind the
battle line so that the rear is safely defended.
If the battle turns in our favor, we should not
be in a hurry to pursue the enemy nor should
we behave carelessly. This nation does not
give up the fight, as others do, when it is
defeated in the first combat, but until its
strength surrenders, it tries every possibility
to attack its enemies. If the formation is
mixed, with the majority made up of infantry,
it is necessary to provide fodder for the
cavalry. When the enemy approaches, the
cavalry should under no circumstances be
allowed to search foraging areas.

light-haired people, such as the Franks,
Lombards and others like them
Light-haired breeds place a high value on
freedom. His men are bold and undaunted in
battle. Reckless and impetuous as they are,
they regard any hesitation and even a short
retreat as a misfortune and calmly despise
death. When fighting violently in hand-to-
hand combat, whether on horseback or on
foot, if they are hard pressed by cavalry
actions, they dismount at an agreed signal
and line up on foot. Even if they are only a
few against many horsemen, they do not
shrink during battle. They are armed with
shields, spears and short swords that hang
from their shoulders. They prefer fighting on
foot and quick charges.
Whether on horseback or on foot, they
range themselves for battle, not in a fixed
size or formation, or in regiments or divisions,
but according to the tribes, their kinship to
each other, and common interests. Often as a
result, when things go wrong and their
friends have been killed, they will risk their
lives in the fight to avenge them. In combat
they make the front of their battle line united
and dense. Even during charges, on
horseback or on foot, they are impetuous and
undisciplined, as if they were the only people
who are not cowards. They are disobedient to
their leaders. They are not interested in
anything that is very complicated and pay
little attention to external security or their
own security. They despise good order,
especially on horseback. They are easily
corruptible by money, greedy as they are.
Suffering and fatigue weaken them.
Although they possess daring and daring
spirits, their bodies are poorly trained and
soft and are not able to endure pain easily. In
addition, they are affected by heat, cold, rain,
lack of provisions, especially wine, and the
postponement of the battle. When it is time
for a cavalry battle, they are hampered by
rough and wooded terrain. They are easily
ambushed on the flanks and rear of their
battle line, because they do not worry at all
about sending scouts or other security
measures. Their ranks are easily broken by a
mock attack and a sudden turn against them.
Night attacks with archers often inflict
damage on them, as they are very
disorganized in the camp location.
Therefore, when waging war against them
one must above all avoid engaging in pitched
battle, especially in the early stages of the
war. Instead, you have to make use of well-
planned ambushes, deceptive attacks and
stratagems, delay things and spoil their
opportunities and try to make deals with
them to help reduce their boldness and zeal
with shortage of supplies or lack of comforts
from heat or cold. This can be done when our
army has an open field in rough and difficult
terrain. In this type of terrain, this enemy
cannot attack successfully because he uses
spears, but if a favorable opportunity for a
regular battle presents itself, the army must
be aligned as previously set out in the book of
formations 8 .
the Slavs, the Ante and other similar
peoples
The nations of the Slavs and the ancients
live in the same way and have the same
customs 9 . Both are independent, they
absolutely reject being enslaved or governed,
even less so in their own land. They are
populous and strong, easily enduring heat,
cold, rain, nakedness, and lack of provisions.
These people are kind and hospitable to
travelers in their territory and take them
safely from one place to another to wherever
they wish. If the foreigner suffers any harm
due to the negligence of the host, the first
one who welcomes him may wage war
against that first host, considering it a
religious duty to avenge the foreigner. They
do not keep those in captivity among them in
perpetual slavery as other nations do, but
rather they establish a definite period of time
for the slaves and then they are given the
choice, if they wish, to return home with a
small reward. or remain there as free men
and friends.
They possess in abundance all types of
livestock and products, which they store in
piles, especially common millet and Italian
millet 10 . Their women are more affectionate
than others in the world. When, for example,
their husbands die, many see it as their own
death and freely suffocate themselves, not
wanting to continue their lives as widows.
They live near impenetrable forests, rivers,
lakes and swamps and the exits from their
settlements branch out in multiple directions
due to the dangers they may encounter. They
bury their most important possessions in
secret places, keeping nothing unnecessary in
view. They live like bandits and love to launch
attacks against their enemies in dense
forests, swamps and rugged areas. They
make effective use of ambushes, sudden
attacks and raids, combining many different
methods both at night and during the day.
Their experience in crossing rivers surpasses
that of all other peoples and they are
extremely good at swimming. Often when
they are in their own territory and are caught
by surprise in a hurry, they will dive to the
bottom in a body of water. There they take
long hollow reeds that they have prepared for
this eventuality and put them in their mouths,
protruding from the surface of the water.
Resting on their backs at the bottom, they
breathe through them and remain there for
many hours without anyone suspecting where
they are. An inexperienced person looking at
the reeds mentioned above may think that
they grow there in the water. But a person
who has had some experience with this trick,
recognizing the reeds by the point at which
they are cut or by their position, pushes them
down into their mouths and forces them out,
so that the men return to the surface, given
that they cannot remain underwater for long
without them.
They are armed with short javelins, two for
each man. Some also have nice but unwieldy
shields. In addition, they use wooden bows,
with short arrows smeared with poisonous
drugs that are very effective. If the wounded
man has not taken an antidote beforehand to
nullify the poison or makes use of other
remedies that experienced doctors may know,
he will immediately cut around the wound to
draw out the poison and prevent it from
spreading to the rest of the body.
Because of their lack of government and
their low opinion of each other, they are not
familiar with an order of battle, nor are they
prepared to fight a battle maintaining a close
order, nor to present themselves on open and
level ground. If they maintain enough
courage when the time comes to attack, they
all shout together and move forward a short
distance. If their opponents begin to falter
from the noise, they attack violently; if not,
they turn away, not showing themselves
eager to experience the enemy's strength in
close ranks. They then run into the forests,
where they have a great advantage because
of their experience in fighting in close
quarters. Often, too, when they are
transporting the loot, they abandon it in
feigned panic and run into the woods. When
their raiders disperse to loot, they calmly
return and cause damage. They are prepared
to make this type of trap on their adversaries
and in a wide variety of ways.
They are completely disloyal and have no
respect for the treaties they sign more out of
fear than bribes. When a difference of opinion
exists between them, whether they do not
reach full agreement or when some reach an
agreement, the others quickly go against
what was decided. They are always
susceptible to each other, and no one likes to
give in to another.
In combat they find themselves in
difficulties due to arrow shots, rapid attacks
launched from different directions, hand-to-
hand fighting against infantry, especially light
infantry, and having to fight in open,
unobstructed terrain. Therefore, it is
necessary to include both cavalry and
infantry, especially light troops or javelin
throwers and above all a large number of
throwing weapons, not only arrows, but also
other types. You must bring materials for the
construction of bridges, of the so-called
floating type 11 , if possible, to effortlessly
cross the numerous and non-fordable rivers in
your territory. They must be built in the
manner of the Scythians , with some men
building the frame and others placing the
plates. You must also have ox hide or goat
skin to make rafts, to use them to help
soldiers who swim across the river for
surprise attacks against the enemy in the
summer.
It is also preferable to launch attacks
against them in the winter, when they cannot
easily hide in bare trees, when the footprints
of fugitives can be located in the snow, when
their family group is in need, and when it is
easy to cross over rivers. ice creams.
Much of the superfluous animals and
equipment must be left behind in a very
secure location with adequate guard and an
officer in charge. The dromons must be
anchored in strategic places. A moira of
cavalry under the command of prominent
officers should be stationed in the area as
protection so that the marching army is not
disturbed by hostile ambushes and also to
spread rumors that an attack on the enemy is
planned somewhere else. Because of this kind
of rumor and the anxiety of their bosses,
each of them will be worried about their own
problems and will not have the opportunity to
gather together and cause trouble for our
army. These troops should not be stationed
near the Danube, since the enemy could learn
of their small number and consider them
unimportant. The troops should not be too far
away, so that they are not delayed, in case It
was necessary to join the invasion army. They
must remain approximately one day's walk
from the Danube. The army must cross into
enemy territory quickly and carry out the
invasion on clean, level ground. Immediately,
a competent officer should ride out with some
chosen men to take prisoners from whom it
will be possible to obtain information about
the enemy. As much as possible, avoid
marching over rough or wooded terrain
during the summer until a thorough
reconnaissance has been made and, if the
enemy is present, until he has been driven
away by our infantry or cavalry. If we are to
march through a narrow pass and if we hope
to return by the same route, measures must
be taken, as explained in the book dealing
with this subject 12 , to clear and widen the
road or leave a relatively strong behind to
prevent the enemy from hiding and launching
surprise attacks that could overwhelm our
army on its return when it is very likely that it
will return hampered by the result of the
looting.
As much as possible, avoid camping in
heavily wooded areas or pitching your tents
near such places. Because forests can easily
serve as a base to launch attacks or scare
horses. The infantry must camp in order
within the fortifications. The cavalry must
camp outside, with sentinels placed in a wide
circle around the grazing horses, unless it is
possible to bring fodder for them, so they
could remain inside both day and night.
If the opportunity for combat arrives, one
must not make the battle line against them
too deep. We must not only concentrate on
frontal attacks, but also on other sectors. If
the enemy occupies a strong position and has
his rear well covered, and there is no
opportunity to surround him or attack his
flanks or rear, in this case, it is necessary to
place some hidden troops, having others
simulating a retreat in front of his front, to let
them be lured with the deceitful hope of
persecution. So they may abandon their good
defensive position and then our men can turn
against them or those who are hidden can
come out and attack them.
Since there are many kings among them,
they always disagree with each other, it is not
difficult to win over some of them by
persuasion or gifts, especially those from
areas close to the border, and then attack the
others, since their common Hostility will not
cause them to unite or gather under a single
ruler. The so-called refugees, those who are
ordered to point out the paths and obtain
certain information, must be observed very
closely 13 . Even some Romans have given in
over time, forgetting their own people and
preferring to win the friendship of the enemy.
Those who remain loyal must be rewarded
and wrongdoers punished. The provisions
found in the surrounding countryside must
not simply be wasted, but animals and ships
must be used to transport them to our own
territory. The rivers there flow into the
Danube, allowing easy transportation by boat.
Infantry is necessary not only in narrow
passes and fortified places, but also in rough
terrain and along rivers. Even in the face of
the enemy it is then possible to bridge the
rivers. When a small force of infantry, both
heavy and light, has been secretly brought to
the other side by night or day and
immediately placed in formation, keeping its
back to the river, it provides enough security
to build a bridge over the river. . At narrow
river crossings or in gorges it is necessary for
the rear guard to be continually prepared for
action, arranging itself according to the
terrain. Because attacks can be expected to
happen when the force is divided and the
troops that are advancing cannot help those
in the rear. Surprise attacks against the
enemy must be carried out according to
normal procedure. A detachment approaches
their front and provokes them, while another
detachment, of infantry or cavalry, is secretly
placed in the rear of the route by which they
are expected to escape. The enemy then,
who avoids action or escapes from the first
attacking force, will run unexpectedly and
directly towards the other detachment. In
summer attacks against them should not
decrease. During that time of year you can
find the most open and discovered areas and
thus establish yourself in its territory. This will
help the Romans who are held captive among
them to gain their freedom after escaping.
The dense summer foliage gives prisoners the
opportunity to escape without fear 14 .
The procedure of the march, the invasion
and looting of the territory and other matters
more or less related, are treated in the book
on the invasion of hostile territory 15 . Here
the matter will be summarized as best as
possible. The settlements of the Slavs and
the Ancestors are made in a row, along the
rivers, very close to each other. In fact, there
is practically no space between them and the
settlements are surrounded by forests,
swamps and reed beds. As a result, it What
generally happens to invasions launched
against them is that the entire army stops at
its first settlement and is kept occupied there,
while the rest of the inhabitants of the
neighboring settlements, knowing of the
invasion, easily escape with their belongings
to the nearby forests. Their young warriors
then return ready for action, gauging their
opportunities and attacking our soldiers from
cover. This prevents the invading army from
inflicting any damage on the enemy. For
these reasons, surprise attacks must be
carried out against them, particularly in
unexpected places. The flags or tagmas
must be prepared in advance so that they
know which will go first, which will go second,
which will third and they must march in that
order through very narrow areas, therefore,
they should not be mixed 16 so that they do
not waste your time reorganizing. When a
passage has been made undetected, if there
are two suitable places where the enemy can
be attacked, the army must divide in two,
with the hypostrategos in command of one
part, prepared for battle and unimpeded, and
advance one distance of fifteen or twenty
miles through terrain with no settlements on
its flanks with the intention of launching an
attack from more mountainous areas. Then,
approaching the furthest settlements, he can
begin the pillage, continuing until he finds the
units commanded by the strategos . The
strategos , at the head of the other part of
the army, must invade or loot from the other
side of the settlements. Both sides of the
army must advance, destroying and looting
each other's settlements until they meet at a
certain point. Arriving there, they must break
camp together towards sunset. In this way,
the attack is carried out victoriously. The
enemy will flee from one and fall
unexpectedly and directly into the hands of
the other and will not be able to regroup.
If there is only one suitable route by which
it is possible to invade the settlements, the
army must be divided. The hypostrategos
must take half or even more of the army, a
strong contingent prepared for battle, without
hindrance. His own flag , with himself in its
correct place, must advance at the head of
the entire force and all the tagma
commanders must accompany him. When
your force approaches the first settlement,
you must detach one or two flags and thus,
while some are engaged in plundering, others
can keep guard over them. It is not desirable
to highlight too many flags to attack the first
settlement, even if it is one of the large,
because when the army arrives there is no
time for the inhabitants to organize resistance
17
. The hypostrategos himself must
continue his advance quickly, executing the
same procedure with the rest of the
populations along the way as long as he has
enough tagmas under his command. The
hypostrategos must completely depart from
these actions. He must keep with him three
or four flags , more than a thousand capable
men, until the invasion has been completed
so that he can take care of safely
reconnoitring the rest of the troops.
While the hypostrategos is performing
these tasks, the strategos must move
forward, taking the plundering troops with
him and maintaining the forward movement
towards the hypostrategos . For his part,
the hypostrategos must retreat and gather
the plundering troops along his line of march.
In the place where both of you are, you must
set up camp together that same day. In these
surprise raids carried out by the two units,
they should not advance more than fifteen or
twenty miles so that both can get there, loot
and set up camp on the same day. In those
expeditions in which the enemy can offer
resistance, it is not necessary to capture him
alive, but rather you must kill everyone you
encounter and advance. When you are
leaving, you should not delay, but rather take
advantage of the opportunity.
Now that we have reflected on these topics
to improve our ability, taking into account our
own experience and the authorities of the
past, we have written these reflections for the
benefit of whoever wants to read them. All
other cases that one can easily encounter and
about which we have not written in the
present book must be examined in the light of
what we have written, the teaching of
experience and the true nature of things and,
whenever If possible, apply them to problems
when they arise. But how can it be possible
for us or anyone else to write warnings about
everything that might happen in the future?
How can we write about what the enemy will
try to do next or at any time? Who can say
what he will bring? the future? Enemies do
not all campaign according to the same
school of thought. Generalship is a very
diversified art, many different methods of
combat are used. This means that one must
spend some time imploring God so that
through Him he can understand the enemy.
Human nature is very skillful and beyond all
understanding; can conceive multiple plans
and act evilly.
END OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK
1 In Taq-e Bostan, next to Kermānshāh/Bajtaran, in

the current Iranian province of Kermānshāhā, a relief
of King Khusrau II is preserved where the monarch is
seen riding a horse with armor only on its front,
Khusrau II holding a spear typical cavalry length and
we see on the horse's rump a quiver with a bow
inside. In another scene from the same set we see the
monarch in hunting scenes with composite bows of the
Sassanian type.
2 The Persian army had the custom of placing itself
in the battle line, dividing itself into five parts, the main
line, the rear guard or reinforcement line, the
Immortals (the Persian Imperial Guard, named after
the style of the ancient guard of the emperors of the
dynasty Achaemenid [550-331 BC]), cavalry as reserve
troops and two wings of cavalry. Another tactic
constantly used is to form the cavalry in front while
advancing and then withdraw to the wings while the
infantry advances. On the particular, cf. CORNUELLE
(1996) p. 2 and, in general, WILCOX (1986), NICOLLE
(1996) and
FARROKH (2005).
3 Book XII, part B.
4 The term Scythians is generally used by Byzantine
writers to jointly designate the nomadic tribes
inhabiting the northern lands of the Black Sea and the
steppe plains of Central Asia. On the Scythians , cf.,
among others, CERNENKO and GORELIK (1983) and
LEBEDYNSKY (2001). On the Avars , cf., among
others, ZÁSTÉROVÁ (1971) and VV. AA. (1988).
5 These must be the Turks of the west, in the
eastern area of the Black Sea and northern Persia
(WIITA [1977], p. 122).
6 Book V.
7 Book XII, part B.
8 Book XII, part B.
9 The Slavs then lived in the territories north of the
lower Danube border of the Eastern Roman Empire, in
what is now Romania. The former lived northeast of
the previous ones. This information provided to us by
Strategikon is confirmed by other sources. On this
topic, cf. WIITA (1977) p. 259 and ZÁSTÉROVÁ
(1971). 10 In the original Greek, the first word that
refers to the matter, κένχρος , seems clear to mean
millet (panicum miliaceum). However, some
researchers translate the second word ἔλυμος as barley
or black wheat. J. Wiita (1977, pp. 279-81) believes
that its real meaning refers to a less robust grain called
Italic millet (staria italica).
11 Floating bridges are those that are not attached to
the river bed with pillars, but are built in the form of a
more or less wide walkway on floating elements, such
as pontoons or boats, which are anchored to the
bottom of the river current.
12 Book XI, chap. 4.
13 TO. Madgearu (1997, p. 119-121) makes an
interesting study about these Romans from the other
side of the Danube classified as "refugees." According
to this author, there does not seem to be a clear
answer to the discussion about whether or not there
are Roman populations on the other side of the
Danube at this time, as there is no conclusive evidence
because although archaeologically the presence of
Romanized populations is documented in the area of
Wallachia (the south of current Romania) in the 6th
century, it is not possible to determine whether they
are Romanized natives or, on the contrary, authentic
Romans (Byzantines) who settled in the territory,
perhaps refugees or former prisoners of war as the
Strategikon seems to attest a little later.
14 Cf. the previous note.
15 Book IX, chap. 3.
16 Infantry and cavalry.
17 F. Curta (1998, pp. 19-28) understands that the
Byzantine attack on these populations with such small
forces (400-800 men) would however greatly exceed
the number of inhabitants of the town capable of
wielding a weapon, therefore and according to this
author, the habitats of these towns They would not be
too big, although they would be dispersed. Such an
interpretation seems to be corroborated by
archaeology, which indicates for these centuries north
of the Danube in present-day Romania, Moldova and
southeastern Ukraine populated with a small number
of rooms per occupation phase housing between ten to
fifteen people at most each.
Book XII
MIXED
Chapter 1. How to make a mixed order of

battle formation. List of symbols for units in
a mixed force
Episode 2. The so-called mixed order of battle
Chapter 3. The first battle formation for
cavalry
Chapter 4. Another formation
Chapter 5. The order of battle called lateral
Chapter 6. column formation
Chapter 7. The so-called convex formation
PART B. ABOUT THE FORMATIONS OF

INFANTRY
Preamble
Chapter 1. What clothing should infantry
wear?
Episode 2. What should be the training of
infantrymen with heavy weapons?
Chapter 3. How should the training of
infantrymen with light weapons and archers
be?
Chapter 4. About weapons. What weapons
should heavy infantry carry?
Chapter 5. What weapons should light
infantry carry?
Chapter 6. What essential equipment should
you always have present and at hand?
Chapter 7. Soldiers of each rhythm that
must be assigned to tasks
specialized
Chapter 8. How infantry troops and their
officers should be organized
Chapter 9. How should the personnel
assignment and organization of infantry
tagmas be?
Chapter 10. Orders that must be given
regarding punishments
Chapter 11. How should the formation of
heavy infantry tagmas be?
Chapter 12. How should the formation of light
infantry be along with heavy infantry and
cavalry?
cavalry alongside heavy infantry?
Chapter 14. In what movements should
infantry be exercised?
Chapter 15. A second exercise
Chapter 16. How to start
aforementioned movements
the battle line and training in resisting the
enemy
Chapter 18. How to accommodate cars and
impediments
Chapter 19. What should be the method of
marching with the enemy nearby?
Chapter 20. How to cross wooded areas,
rugged areas and narrow passes by infantry
Chapter 21. What river transport and river
crossing should be like in the face of the
enemy
Chapter 22. How to build fortified camps
Chapter 23. Issues to be considered by the
infantry strategists on a day of battle
Chapter 24. Synopsis of the previously
mentioned instruction that must be known by
the tribunes or commanders of the infantry
tagmas
PART C. DIAGRAM OF A
FORTIFIED CAMP
PART D. ABOUT HUNTING. HOW I

KNOW
THEY MUST HUNT WILD ANIMALS
NO SERIOUS OR SERIOUS INJURIES
ACCIDENTS
PART A. ON THE MIXED ORDER OF

BATTLE
Book XII, part A, chapter 1. How to
make a mixed order of battle formation.
List of symbols for units in a mixed force
& The strategists of the entire army
9 The hypostrategos h Merarch of chivalry
N Merarch of the Infantry
J Moirarch of the Cavalry f Assault Troops Flag d Defense Troops Flag
T heavy infant
• Light infantryman, archer or javelin thrower
K Rider
Book XII, part A, chapter 2. The so-

called mixed order of battle.
This formation is appropriate for fighting
against cavalry when both cavalry contingents
are of the same strength or even smaller than
the infantry forces.
Book XII, part A, chapter 3. The first

battle formation for cavalry
This formation is appropriate to fight

against cavalry when ours surpasses the
infantry but has the same strength as that of
the enemy. In this case it forms two lines of
cavalry and one of infantry. Make sure the
lines are within an arrow's throw of each
other. Cavalry must form their lines in the
same way as assault troops and defense
troops .
SECOND LINE OF BATTLE
INFANTRY
Book XII, part A, chapter 4. Another

formation
This formation is appropriate for fighting
against infantry when ours is superior to our
cavalry.
Book XII, part A, chapter 5. The order of

battle called lateral
It is suitable in open and unobstructed
places.
Book XII, part A, chapter 6. column

formation
This training is necessary to go through gorges, rugged terrain and densely forested areas. It
can be formed in lines of two, three or four all in a column that adapts to the configuration of the
terrain.
Book XII, part A, chapter 7. The so-

called convex formation
How should mixed or convex formations be
aligned? What are they useful for?
The depth in the phalanxes and the order
of battle must be in accordance with the size
and nature of the troop. If we have more
cavalry than infantry, the cavalry columns can
be eight or even ten horsemen deep,
however the infantry column must be
shallower, four or five men. If we have more
infantry than cavalry, they must be formed in
exactly the reverse order. A similar proportion
for such a type of formation is one-third
cavalry and two-thirds infantry. Even if the
cavalry is only a quarter, the army will not be
unbalanced. If there is a war against a
powerful foreign nation and our army is in
good shape, it is desirable, I think, that in the
first combat, at that moment when the enemy
is tested, the infantry should be formed in
columns of eight heavy infantry and two light,
and the cavalry in columns eight or ten deep
and this formation will be able to resist any
attempt to charge or break our lines by the
enemy.
But when our troops activate to take the
offensive against the enemy, then the depth
of four heavy infantry and one light infantry is
sufficient, because with the cavalry behind
them, the formation will not be easily broken.
The flankers should be about one thousand
or two hundred on both sides and the rear
guard in square formation should be
composed of about five hundred, both heavy
and light. In such formations also the so-
called infantry wedge formation can be useful
to the rear. They must be given instructions
to the cavalry so that if the infantry pushes
their adversaries back and makes them flee,
at a signal, the infantry columns that were in
front of the cavalry will arrange themselves in
a closed formation with their group of officers
or primi 1 leaving a space in your line. The
cavalry then advances through the space left
by the infantry simultaneously and in good
order so as not to overwhelm the infantry. As
soon as they pass through the phalanx
columns, the front half of each cavalry
column should advance at a faster but even
trot, as best they can, and ride toward the
retreating enemy for three or, at most, five
arrow shots, but not further due to enemy
ambushes. The second half of each cavalry
column must follow behind the other half in
order, forming a close order, so that in case
the horsemen who have ridden ahead must
go back and welcome them to this second
group, still in formation. The infantry
phalanxes must also advance in formation.
It's not a bad idea to add a cavalry tagma
to the infantry flankers on both sides, so
they can help out if needed. Well, if all the
cavalry advances in pursuit of the enemy, this
tagma can also gallop and approach the
flanks of the cavalry, but to its rear,
configuring itself as flankers . The infantry,
as said, already covers the rear.
In the event that none of the horsemen
who have advanced ahead, or those of the
second group, can hold back an enemy
counterattack and the horsemen must retreat
to the rear of the infantry, then those
flankers advance and take up positions next
to the line. of infantry, but not along the front
to avoid disorder and confusion. So, the The
infantry deploys out of the formation it was in
and the troops once again close the gaps in
the line and prepare to resist the enemy. If
the enemy advances within an arrow shot and
attempts to charge and break our phalanxes
, which is a very dangerous move for them,
the infantry must close ranks in the usual
way. The first, second and third men of each
column form a fulcon 2 , bringing their
shields together, fixing their spears firmly in
the ground and holding them at an angle
away from the shields, so that anyone who
tries to get too close may quickly encounter
them. . They must also rest their shoulders
against each other and shift their weight
toward the shields to resist enemy pressure.
The third of them, the one who is next to the
others in a more upright position, and the
fourth hold their spears as if they were
javelins, to that when the enemy approaches
they can use them as a pushing force or to
throw them and then draw their swords. Light
infantry and cavalry must use the bow. If the
enemy attempts to advance toward the
cavalry from the rear, which is usually
attempted, the infantry divides into a double
phalanx . In each phalanx , the second
column advances towards the rear, passing
between the cavalry units that remain there,
in the middle. The light infantry is also
divided into two, one half advancing towards
the front phalanxes , while the other half
marches with the rear phalanxes . The 3
squares also provide support to the rear.
To prevent the formation from being
observed too closely by the enemy before the
battle, a very shallow cavalry screen can be
placed in front of the phalanxes until the
enemy is close. When they are four or five
arrow shots from our battle line, this cavalry
screen leaves the infantry lines to join the
rest of the cavalry in their place in the line
and this group is formed as the front line of
the cavalry as shown in the attached diagram.
The result is that the line is safely protected,
and that the enemy will approach in a very
daring way, thinking that it is a fight against
the cavalry, and thus can be easily defeated
by the infantry in a rapid charge in the
manner already we have explained. This type
of formation requires constant training so that
both the men and the mounts become
accustomed and know how far the cavalry
can advance quickly in pursuit although
without confusion, but not leaving the
infantry formation in excessive disorder or
reduced in number. This formation is basic
when infantry accompanies a cavalry troop,
with or without wagons, or only cavalry. If
the cavalry is in a critical situation due to
difficult terrain or a setback in battle and
becomes very nervous, some horsemen can
take the shields of the heavy infantry, if they
have lost theirs, and line up in formation like
infantry, while other horsemen remain
mounted in the manner explained above, and
in this way the danger can be avoided.
LIST OF SYMBOLS USED BY THE

TROOPS ALIGNED IN A FORMATION
MIXED OR CONVEX
T Infant of the front line, leader of the line,
decarca
OHeavy infantry with shield, armed, on foot
I Light infantry, javelin thrower, archer
K Rider
DIAGRAM OF A MIXED FORMATION.

CONVEX FORMATION CONTAINING
BOTH CAVALRY AND INFANTRY, WHICH
WHICH IS ESSENTIAL IN SITUATIONS
CRITICS
PART B. ON INFANTRY FORMATIONS
Book XII, part B, preamble

Next we have to discuss infantry tactics, a
subject that has been largely neglected and
even forgotten throughout time, a topic to
which we attribute the greatest attention. We
are interested in their training and even their
weapons and uniform, and all this considering
the traditional training and organization of
such troops. We have collected information
on these matters and now we transmit it in
writing to the officers who are concerned, so
that they can know and practice them. To
make them more intelligible to officers, we
have now organized the subjects in the form
of an index, worrying at all times not about
style but about practice and brevity. We have
compiled a list of chapter titles and
established the following layout of our
treatise.
Book XII, p art B, chapter 1. What

clothing should infantry wear ?
They should wear either Gothic type tunics 5

or short ones with openings on the sides that
reach the knees. They must wear Gothic-type
shoes with thick soles, that are wide for the
toes, with flat seams and fastened with no
more than two buckles; The soles should be
reinforced with some small nails to increase
their durability. Boots or greaves are not
necessary, as they are not suitable for
marching since, if used, they slow down the
pace. Their cloaks should be simple, not like
the Bulgarian cloaks. They should have
short hair and it is better if long hair is
prohibited.
be the training of infantrymen with
heavy weapons?
They must be trained in individual combat
against each other, armed with a shield and
staff, and they must also be trained in long-
distance throwing of both the short javelin
and the matiobarbulos .

the training of infantrymen with light
weapons and archers be?
They must be trained in rapid bow shooting
using a long-range spear as their target. They
must shoot in both the Roman and Persian
ways 6 . They must be trained in rapid fire
while carrying the shield, also in throwing
small javelins at long distances, in the use of
the sling, in the jump and in the race.
Book XII, part B, chapter 4. About

weapons. What weapons should heavy
infantry carry?
The men of each aritmos or tagma must
have shields of the same color, herula swords
7
, spears, helmets with small feathers and
tassels on the upper part and on the
paragnathids 8 – at least the first in each row
– slings and matiobarbules . The men
chosen from each column must have chain
mail, all of them if possible, but if there are
only two, for the first of each column. At least
the first and last of each column must also
have iron or wooden greaves.
Book XII, part B, chapter 5. What

weapons should light infantry carry?
Infantrymen must carry bows on their

shoulders with long quivers with thirty or
forty arrows. They must carry small shields,
as well as wooden crossbows 9 with small
arrows in small quivers 10 . Arrows can be
shot at great distances from bows and cause
damage to the enemy. Those who may not
have bows or are not experienced archers
must be provided with small javelins or Slavic
spears 11 . They could also carry
matiobarbules in leather sheaths and slings.

essential equipment should you always
have present and at hand?
We must have light wagons, one for each
decarchy or squadron, no more, so that
there are no men too busy with them and
neglect other matters. Each wagon must
carry a hand mill, an axe, hatchets, an adze,
a saw, two hoes, a hammer, two shovels, a
basket, some thick cloth, a sickle,
matiobarbules , tied caltrops
together with light ropes attached to iron
tongs so that they can be easily picked up
from the ground. There must be other
wagons carrying revolving ballistas at both
ends 12 , as well as artillery servants,
carpenters, blacksmiths, all under the
command of a single officer. Packhorses
should be provided, if possible, for each
squad or at least every two. If the need arises
for the light infantry to have to abandon the
carts to seize some place or position, these
animals should be used to transport rations
for eight or ten days, and they can
accompany the troops until the carts slower
they arrive. Other cars are also necessary to
transport both offensive and defensive
weapons of each aritmos . Another ten or
twelve carts must carry flour or biscuits,
arrows and spare bows.
Book XII, part B, chapter 7. Soldiers of
each rhythm must be assigned to
specialized tasks
Heralds must be alert, intelligent, vigorous
and with pleasant voices, able to speak Latin,
Persian and, if possible, also Greek. There
must be instructor officers 13 , standard
bearers or draconaries , trumpets , armor
smiths, weapon builders, makers of bows,
arrows and other things according to the
regulations. Some men must be assigned to
pick up lost items and return them to their
owners. Just as in the case of the impediment
of cavalry, certain Men must be assigned to
the protection of the impedimenta, those in
charge of it must obey and in each group
there must be a person in charge of its own
impedimenta. Just as in the case of horses, a
special mark must identify the oxen that
belong to each arhythm so that men can
easily recognize them. It is very important, if
possible, that each grouper have two eagle
holders 14 .
Book XII, part B, chapter 8. How

infantry troops and their officers should
be organized
In the past, when the legions were
composed of a large number of men, the
commanders formed the heavy infantry
company into sixteen columns, two hundred
and fifty-six men. Each column, then, was
composed of sixteen men, and the entire
battle line comprised sixty-four companies or
one thousand twenty-four columns composed
of sixteen thousand three hundred and
eighty-four men 15 . In addition, eight
thousand light infantry must be added, such
as archers, javelin throwers and slingers, and
ten thousand cavalry. The commands of both
the heavy infantry and light infantry
companies were divided into four equal
contingents – right, left, centre-left and
centre-right – and the cavalry into two wings.
But since our current units do not have the
same number of troops, it is not easy to
define a specific number for each company.
All personnel in excess of two hundred and
fifty-six men do not have a clear function to
perform and can lead to disorienting training.
It seems better to make the numerical
strength of the unit flexible. Depending on
the number of soldiers available, you have to
make one large unit or two smaller ones.
Each tagma must have its own banner and
its own commander. Normally he will be a
tribune , respected, intelligent and good at
hand-to-hand fighting, who may even be a
lieutenant or a training officer 16 . In each
evaluation, it must be ensured that the
columns of each tagma are always sixteen
men deep, organized according to their
obligations. The battle line must maintain the
same strength ratio as the rest of the army.
This line, all the tagmas and columns
present, must be divided into four contingents
of equal strength, the right under the
command of the merarch or stratelates of
the right, the left under the command of the
merarch or stratelates of the left, the
center left under the command of the
merarch or stratetelates of the center left
and the center right under the command of
the merarch or stratelates of the center
right. A few soldiers with their officers, both
heavy and light infantry, away from the line
of battle, should be kept in reserve to give
quick assistance in case of emergency or
even on the flanks of the line behind the
cavalry, in the cars or other places. Hence, if
the army consists of less than twenty-four
thousand infantry, it must be divided into
three contingents, not four. In the central
group he places the strategos banner , so
that the other contingents can use it as a
guide.
the personnel assignment and
organization of infantry tagmas be?
First of all, those who know how to shoot
with a bow or are able to learn and those
who are young and strong should be chosen
for the light infantry. If there are more than
twenty-four thousand men in the army, half
must be chosen 17 ; if they are less, a third of
each company. They must be organized into
decarquies with competent decarquies in
command, and an officer known as the chief
archer 18 . The other half of each company
must be divided into columns of eighteen
men, both veterans and recruits. The two
weakest soldiers should be assigned to the
wagons or any other place where they might
be needed. The remaining sixteen must be
placed in the line of battle under the
command of respected and intelligent
officers. Of the sixteen, the eight most
competent are stationed at the front and rear
of the column, that is, in positions one, two,
three, four and sixteen, fifteen, fourteen and
thirteen. In this sense, even if the depth is
reduced to four, the front and rear will still be
strong. The remaining men, the weakest,
must be placed in the center of the line.
Of those sixteen, each one of them must be
classified as primi or secundi. Two of them
must carry a double list, that is, the first must
be called leader of the line and primus, the
others decarca and secundus. Therefore the
rest will be designated as primi or secundi. To
make them easier to command and operate
more harmoniously as a unit, it is necessary
to divide them into two squads. The primus
goes with the leader of the line, the secundus
with the decarca . In this way, even if they
have to be temporarily divided, those sixteen
are united and subject to the decisions and
will of the leader of the line. As a result, good
order and discipline can be easily maintained.
All troops, both Heavy as well as light, they
must be divided and aligned into four equal
contingents. It is practical, if possible, to line
up the sixteen men of each heavy infantry
column not only according to their
qualifications, but also according to their
height, so that, with the tallest at the front,
this makes the entire line look much neater
and more impressive. But if they cannot be
organized according to their height and
strength, as we have said, then the best
soldiers in each rank must be placed in the
front and in the rear, with the weaker soldiers
in the center, in the manner already stated.
described. For good reasons, our
predecessors fixed the depth of the column
for combat at sixteen s 19 , as it facilitates an
adequate number of troops, which should not
be excessive and when necessary can be
divided quickly and in an orderly manner and
reduced to a single
man.
Book XII, part B, chapter 10. Orders
that must be given regarding
punishments
After the army has been organized as
described above, it must be assembled in its
entirety on a specific day. If soldiers and
officers already know the regulations
established by law, they simply have to
remember them. It would be different if the
regulations should be read to the troops,
tagma by tagma by their own commanders,
as explained in the chapters dealing with
cavalry 20 .

should the formation of heavy infantry
tagmas be?
After the regulations have been made
public, the organization of each tagma must
be completed by its officials. First, the
columns of each tagma are assigned to their
positions, some aligned to the left, others to
the right of the banner or commander. The
commander then advances along with the
standard bearer , herald , training
officer and trumpeter . The leaders of each
line advance in their assigned positions, first
those on the left side, then those on the
right. Upon reaching the site of the battle
line, the commander stops with the standard
bearer right behind him and the orderly and
the trumpeter behind them. The columns
are lined up on both sides of them in their
assigned positions, at first at a distance, so
that they do not collide with each other,
maintaining the depth of sixteen, with the
light infantry in the rear. They keep the tips
of their You throw your spears high to avoid
getting in the way of them. The training
officer and the herald march at the front of
the line, one for reconnaissance and
guidance, the other to convey the
commander's orders. If a tagma is being
trained, his commanding officer must take his
position at the front with the herald and the
training officer . If a grouper is being
trained, no one should be at the front except
the commander of the grouper , mounted,
with two heralds , two training officers , a
strator , a spatari o 21 and two eagle
bearers 22 . They remain in their position
until the battle line reaches the place of
fighting. Then everyone returns to the places
where their banners are displayed. The
commander must not enter combat
personally, nor should the eagle carriers ,
who are unarmed. No trumpeter or bugler ,
no matter how many there may be, should
touch on every grouper except that of the
merarch , as the resulting confusion may
prevent orders from being heard.

should the training of light infantry be
along with heavy infantry and cavalry?
Light infantry can take multiple forms.
Sometimes archers are placed in the rear of
each column in proportion to the number of
men, that is, four for every sixteen heavy
infantry, so that if the number of heavy
infantry is reduced to four per column, there
will be an archer behind them. .
Sometimes, archers are placed inside the
columns, alternating a heavy infantryman
with an archer. Sometimes they are placed in
the middle of the column and on the flanks of
the line, that is, inside the cavalry.
Frequently, if there are a large number of
them, they are placed a short distance away
from the cavalry, along with some of the
heavy infantry as lateral protection for the
cavalry stationed there. Troops with short
javelins or matiobarbules should be both
within the heavy infantry ranks and on the
flanks of the line, not in the middle. But the
slingers must be above all on the flanks of the
line. At this time, we train the archers and the
rest of the light infantry with throwing
weapons behind the columns during training.
should be the formation of cavalry
alongside heavy infantry?
The cavalry should form on the flanks of the
infantry line, placing the best tagmas with
their own officers outside. If the cavalry force
is large, that is, more than twelve thousand
men, it must have a depth of ten; if the force
is less, about five. An extra detachment
should be placed for support in the rear,
away from the wagons, so that if the enemy
approaches from that direction, they can
repel him or, if the rear does not need such
help, they can support the flanks of the line.
The formation of this detachment must be
very open, so as not to overwhelm the
infantry when it is necessary to make a turn.
The cavalry should be ordered not to ride
after the enemy or advance too far from the
infantry line, even if the enemy flees. She
could run into an ambush and, being alone,
few in number and far from any support,
could be hit hard. If he must retreat because
of the enemy, he will have refuge in the rear
of the battle line, but not beyond the wagons.
If, however, it cannot hold, the horsemen
must dismount and defend themselves on
foot.
If the army wants to line up for battle, but
not to fight that day, and the enemy charges
against our cavalry and cannot resist, the
horsemen should not wait for the charge in
their position on the flanks of the line, but
should move after the infantry, that is,
between the battle line and the wagons. To
facilitate such a movement, the distance
between the line and the wagons must be
greater than usual, so that the cavalry is not
stopped by any maneuver it may make and
cannot be hit by enemy arrows.

movements should you exercise the
infantry
The herald orders: silentium, mandata
tumbate, non uos turbatis, ordinem seruate,
bando sequite, nemo demittat bandum, et
inimicos seque 23 . The troops advance at a
uniform pace and in silence, without anyone
whispering. They must become accustomed
to these movements, whether they are
spoken commands, a nod of the head, or
some other signal. They march or stop,
reduce or divide the depth of the column,
march uniformly in close order for a good
distance over various types of terrain, closing
or narrowing their formation in both depth
and width, marching in fulcon formation,
engaging in battle simulated, sometimes
using wooden weapons and sometimes drawn
swords.
Book XII, part B, chapter 15. A

second exercise
They may divide into a double phalanx and
then assemble in normal formation, facing
right and left, marching to the flanks and
returning to their original position, changing
their front to right and left, widening and
shortening their formation, deepening or
doubling the depth of the columns, changing
their front to their rear and then turning
again.

start the aforementioned movements
These maneuvers begin as follows. Troops
march or stop at an oral order, gesture or
other signal. When the commanding officer
wants them to move, the training officer
gives the signal with trumpet, horn or voice
and they march. To stop, the signal is given
by trumpet, voice or a blow of the hand, and
the troops stop. It is essential that troops
become accustomed to these voice or signal
commands, so that they are not confused by
clashing weapons, dust, or fog.
The columns, which are generally sixteen
men deep, can be reduced or divided, for
example, when the commander wants to
extend the width of the battle line, either to
make it more impressive or to make it the
same dimensions as that of the enemy. . The
commanding officer gives the order: ad octo
24
, or exi 25 . Then they separate one by one
outside the line, the depth of the columns is
already reduced, the width of the battle line is
extended and the depth is established at
eight men. If the officer command wants to
do it in fours, again he orders: exi 26 . As said
before, they all tilt to one side, both to the
right and to the left. You have to make sure
that everyone moves together to one side.
They must march uniformly in close order.
Therefore, when some men in the line
advance ahead and the entire line loses
uniformity, the order to give is: direct frontem
27
. And the front is aligned.
Soldiers press in or close ranks when the
line is within two or three arrow shots of the
enemy line and prepare to charge. The order
is: iunge 28 . Joining together, they close
towards the center, both sides and the front
and rear, so that the shields of the front-line
men touch each other and those lined up
behind them are almost close to each other.
This maneuver can be executed while the
army is marching or when it is stopped.
Those closing the ranks should order those in
the rear to close forcefully toward those in
front and maintain a straight line, if
necessary, to prevent some from fleeing in
fear.
The army must form a fulcon when the two
lines, ours and the enemy's, approach each
other, the archers are about to shoot and the
front-line men are not wearing chain mail or
greaves. The order is: ad fulcum 29 . The men
in the front rows join together until their
shields touch, completely covering the
intervening spaces, including their corners.
The men behind them place their shields
above their heads, joining the shields with
those of the men in front of them, covering
their chests and faces, and with this
formation they attack.
When the ranks have been properly closed,
the line is within an arrow's shot of the
enemy and the fight is about to begin, the
order to be given is: stop 30 . Just after
another officer shouts: adiuta 31 . In unison
everyone responds loud and clear: Deus 32 .
The light troops begin shooting with their
bows. The heavy infantry, which has been
placed on the front line, advances closer to
the enemy. If the men carry matiobarbules
or throwing weapons, they shoot them,
leaving their spears on the ground. If they do
not carry such weapons, they advance even
closer, throw both their spears and javelins,
draw their swords and fight, remaining in
their position and not pursuing the enemy if
he retreats. The men in the rear keep their
heads covered with their shields and support
those in the front with their spears. line.
Obviously, it is essential for frontline soldiers
to remain protected until they collide with the
enemy, so that they are not hit by enemy
arrows, especially if they are not wearing
chain mail or greaves.
They divide into a double phalanx when
the line advances and hostile forces appear
both in front and in the rear. Assuming that
the columns are sixteen men deep, if the
enemy approaching ahead is very close and is
about to begin battle, give the order: medii
partitis ad diphalangiam 33 . The first eight
men stop. The next eight go around, thus
forming a double phalanx .
If the columns are eight or four men deep,
then the order is: primi state, secundi ad
diphalangiam exite 34 . I seconded them,
under the command of decarca , they retreat
three hundred paces, to a sufficient distance
so that the enemy's arrows do not reach the
rear of each phalanx , but rather fall in the
intermediate space between them. [If
ordered] Reverte 35 , the soldiers turn around,
if the need arises, and return to their original
formation. If, as might happen, a large hostile
force approaches from the rear of our line
and the tanks do not follow us 36 , then the
secundi stop and the primi leave and
advance. The double phalanx formation
occurs when the impediment does not follow
us or is attacked by the enemy.
The turn to the right or left is made when
the commander moves the line along the
flank of either side, as could easily be done,
to extend the line and outflank the enemy, to
avoid being outflanked by him, to reach more
ground. favorable or to pass a gorge.
If the commanding officer wants to march
to the right, he orders: ad contum clina 37 .
Each soldier in his place turns. Moue 38 , and
move to the designated location. Redi 39 and
resume their original position. If you want
them to march to the left, order: ad scutum
clina, move 40 , and the rest is as described
above.
The double front line is formed in the event
that the enemy surprises us, both in front and
in the rear, after having had time to divide
the battle line, forming the double phalanx .
Give the order: undique servate 41 . Half of
the troops quickly stop to contain the enemy
attack from the front. The other half turns
towards the rear. The middle rows remain in
position with their heads covered by their
shields.
Change the front to the left or right when
the commander wants to take our battle line
to the right or left depending on any
emergency that may occur. The order for this
is: depose aut dextram aut sinistram 42 . By
changing each tagma , one by one, the
entire line will quickly be placed on the
designated front.
The line can be made more open or more
closed. When the soldiers are in close order
and the commander wants, as could
sometimes happen, to divide or thin the
columns and extend the width of the battle
line or reduce its strength, he gives the order:
largia ad both parties 43 . And they stretch.
This maneuver can be executed while the line
is advancing or has stopped, with both flanks
advancing on the sides, and can be
performed by an individual grouper or by the
entire line.
The depth of the columns can be increased
or doubled, when the troops are four soldiers
deep and the commander wants to double it
to correspond to the depth of the enemy line
and make his own stronger in preparation for
the charge. The order for this is: intra 44 , and
the ranks go eight soldiers deep. If you want
to make them sixteen deep, you give the
same command: intra. One by one they
resume their own position, and the columns
double, resuming their original formation as a
single unit of sixteen men. In case the
commander wants to make the columns
thirty-two soldiers deep, although it is not
convenient, he orders: acies in acies 45 , they
are doubled in the manner described above
and the battle line becomes deeper while its
width HE reduces.
The line must turn when the line advances
and the enemy, instead of approaching from
the front, does so from the rear. If the
commander wants to modify the front, the
column leaders stand in the rear, maintaining
the depth of sixteen soldiers and orders:
muta locum 46 . The line does not change until
the leaders of the line advance between the
lines to the rear; The rest of the men follow
them and form a new front facing the enemy.
It is best to do this before closing ranks. But
if they have already closed them and there is
no time to open them again, the order to give
is: transform 47 . Remaining in position, each
man turns to the rear and of the sixteen men,
the one bringing up the rear is now ahead of
the leader of the line.
should be the formation of the battle
line and training in resisting the enemy
After training each tagma completely
satisfactorily in the manner described above,
the entire army must be unified and formed
with full equipment as if it were going to
combat. There must be both heavy and light
infantry, cavalry, wagons and the rest of the
impedimenta and, on the opposite side, a
simple line must be aligned opposite our
troop, composed of both infantry and cavalry,
shooting blunt arrows. This simple line must
move in formation against our battle line,
sometimes raising dust, shouting and
disorder, sometimes from behind or attacking
our flanks or rear, so that our soldiers, on
foot or on horseback, become accustomed to
all kinds of conditions and are not altered by
them and the merarchs gain skill in direct
encounters. The cavalry must receive similar
training, sometimes positioned on the flank,
sometimes moving to the rear of the infantry
and turning back from the rear .
The groupers are placed in line of battle
with intervals of one or two hundred feet
between them, so that they do not crowd
each other while marching, but that they can
also act in unison during the battle and
provide mutual support. They must be
instructed to use the central grouper as a
guide, for that is where the standard of the
strategos is found. It is for this reason that
the tacticians of the past called the center of
the battle line the mouth or the navel, since
the rest of the formation follows its lead.
Since it is faster and safer to close or
narrow the ranks than to open or stretch
them, the initial formation of the columns
does not need to be sixteen soldiers deep,
but only four, so that our battle line appears
more impressive to the enemy and relax our
soldiers as they advance, especially if it is
done at some distance. If necessity requires
making the line eight or sixteen deep, this
type of closure can be done quickly while
marching. On the other hand, if the formation
is already narrow and closed and necessity
forces it to extend its width, many hours are
needed to do so. It is also not wise to extend
the line when the enemy is close.
Mounted standard bearers must remain
with their commanders until the battle line
has been formed and then take their place in
the formation on foot. Although the enemy's
columns are deeper, the depth of our own
columns must not exceed sixteen soldiers, nor
be less than four. More than sixteen is
impractical and less than four is weak. The
center ranks should be eight heavy infantry
deep. Absolute silence must be observed in
the army. Those closing the ranks in each
column must be instructed that if they hear
anything more than a whisper from one of
their men, they are to prick them with the
end of their spears. In combat they must also
push men ahead of them, so that no one can
hesitate and flee. Infantrymen should not
make long marches with full weapons. In
case your adversaries delay things and the
battle line must wait, they should not be
forced to wait too many hours, so that just at
the moment when the battle is about to
begin, they are not already exhausted by the
weight of the weaponry, but must, on the
contrary, sit down and rest. Only when the
enemy approaches should the army be
reorganized so that they will be fresh and in
good condition. No one must march ahead of
the battle line except the merarchs ,
assembled, each one
accompanied by two heralds , two training
officers , a strator and a spar , one for
each commander and the eagle bearers .
They must remain at their post until the
enemy approaches and then each must take
up his position on his own groupers .
You have to know that it is very good and
practical for the infantry or its individual units
to quickly get used to the signals or orders
used in their training, as they make the
soldiers more obedient and prepared for
action. It is not necessary that in battle the
entire line maneuvers at a signal. The terrain
or situation does not always allow it,
especially if the line is made up of too many
men and extends too far. The signals that
must be given in certain situations must not
be understood by all troops, in the same way
that the enemy's movements are not uniform.
Suppose, for example, that a unit in the line
is shallow and the enemy is pushing it back.
Other units, whose ranks are deeper, will be
able to help her. If one unit is being
surrounded by the enemy, the others can
form a double front and help it. For these
reasons, each unit must adapt the
movements described above to the
formations of the army that is attacking it and
[soldiers] must not wait for another signal. In
fact, it is necessary for everyone to stop or
advance uniformly obeying a single signal
until the moment of contact with the enemy.
For all these reasons, our predecessors
divided large armies into various units and
tagmas .

accommodate cars and impediments
If it is decided that the impedimenta
advances following the army, it must be
positioned within an arrow's shot behind the
infantry with each section accompanying its
own groupers in good order. The wagons
must occupy the same area of land as the
battle line, so that they do not stand out and
be left unprotected. Each wagon must have
its rear covered by heavy cloth, so that the
drivers can stand on their backs and protect
themselves on a platform and the oxen are
protected from the rain of arrows. Ballistae -
carrying tanks should be distributed along the
entire front, with the majority, including the
most powerful ones, located on the flanks.
Drivers must be able to use javelins, slings,
matiobarbules or arrows. The rest of the
equipment must remain in the wagons.
The area between the line of troops and the
tanks must be kept clean, so that the heavy
infantry can divide into a double phalanx
and, in the event of an attack on the tanks,
both the cavalry and the light troops can
advance without the tanks presenting a
barrier. obstacle or cause confusion. If a
powerful and hostile force is harassing the
wagons from behind and the drivers cannot
keep them away and there are no troops in
the double phalanx , then plant a few
thistles . In this case we must be careful
that the army does not return by the same
route, but by another, so that our people are
not injured by them.
should be the method of marching with
the enemy nearby?
Cavalry patrols should be sent both in front
and rear, and no infantry should be allowed
to go beyond the line of patrols. The camps
should be relatively close to each other, so
that the infantry is not exhausted by long-
distance marches. The wagons must be
prepared according to the needs of each
group in the army, whether marching in
column or line, depending on the nature of
the terrain. First there must be the grouper
wagons on the right, then those on the left,
those on the center-left and finally those on
the center-right. There should be no
confusion or mixtures between the different
sections. If the enemy is in the vicinity, the
soldiers should not leave their weapons in the
wagons, but should carry them with them
while marching, so that they can be prepared
at all times for combat. In moments of
pressure, they must march in battle formation
order, tagma by tagma , without mixing or
dispersing units so that, if it is necessary to
form the battle line, they are in good
readiness to form it. If the enemy cavalry
force is large and approaches our army we
should not move camps or undertake a march
until after the battle is over. Instead, two or
three days beforehand you must occupy the
place where the battle is likely to be fought
and camp there with due precautions.

cross wooded areas, rugged areas and
narrow passes through
part of the infantry
For a successful expedition against an
enemy in wooded areas, difficult terrain, or
narrow passes, especially against the Slavs
and the Ante , troops must be lightly
equipped and not include many horsemen.
You must march without wagons and the
impediment should not be too much nor
should you carry heavy weapons such as
helmets and chain mail. Troops with heavy
weapons should carry moderate-sized shields,
short spears, not the type used by cavalry;
Lightly armed men should carry smaller
shields, lighter bows and arrows, short
spears, short javelins of the Moorish type 48 ,
and some matiobarbulos . They must carry
all available axes and transport them on pack
animals to be used when necessary. The
force Heavy infantry should not be placed in a
continuous line or front as in flat or open
terrain, but depending on the size of the
troop, in two or four units, two or four rows
deep. They must advance on their flank, as
shown in the following diagram, adapted to
the needs of the situation and their units
must march and spread out until they are
within a stone's throw. If cavalry or
impedimenta is present, they should be
placed in the rear, followed by the cavalry
and behind them there should be a few heavy
and light infantry as a rear guard to protect
the cavalry from possible surprise attacks.
Part of the light infantry, accompanied by a
small unit of cavalry, must advance up to a
mile in front of the main body of the army.
Others must march on both flanks to patrol
and discover any enemy ambushes. They
must carefully investigate among trees that
appear to be upright, but may be somewhat
sawn, so they could quickly be felled and
block those narrow passages where a surprise
attack could cause serious problems. The
light infantry, accompanied by some cavalry,
must be alert against such stratagems and, at
the same time, must clear the terrain of any
hidden enemy presence. Thus the main body
of the army can pass through said area.
Where the terrain is open, the cavalry must
ride ahead as a patrol, but where there is
dense and rough terrain, the light infantry will
advance. The light infantry should not form in
a closed order like the heavy infantry, but in
irregular groups, that is, three or four soldiers
armed with javelins and shields so that they
can protect themselves if necessary while
throwing the javelin. An archer must also go
to provide cover. These small groups, as
mentioned above, should not advance in solid
formation, nor should they be dispersed, but
rather they should be one after another to
protect each other's rear. If something
happens to the group in front, if, for example,
they encounter resistance from the enemy or
find themselves stuck in mountainous terrain,
the groups behind them can advance along
the top of the mountain unobserved and fall
onto the enemy without being seen. This
should always be the objective of the light
infantry, to advance over the highest ground
to fall behind the enemy's back. The light
infantry must be instructed not to advance
too far from the main body of the army,
either so as not to hear its trumpets or horns,
or to find itself unsupported and
outnumbered. If the four groupers of the
main body of the army, advancing on the
flank, find a point so narrow that all four
cannot pass at once, then two groupers
must fall back and form a double column. If
the place is too narrow for two groupers ,
then advance with a single grouper , lining it
up in a single flank column and the rest
behind and always, as said, keeping the light
troops in front. After passing the narrow
place, they resume their original formation in
four units or groups marching on the flank.
If a powerful enemy force appears in front
of them or on their flank, they must form the
battlefront in that threatened section. If, for
example, the enemy appears to the left of the
column, the grouper on that flank stops in
formation and the other three advance to
take up their own positions. If, on the other
hand, the enemy appears from the right, the
corresponding maneuver is carried out and
the front forms in that direction. If they
appear from the front, against one or both
central groups , the other two swing to the
right, going from column to line and forming
for battle with their flank as a front. If the
terrain allows our troops to march in close
order against the enemy, then the light
infantry and cavalry must surround the
enemy. But if formation in close order is not
practicable, then the heavy infantry must be
lined up deeper and with wider spaces
between men, so that they can move more
easily into wooded areas and, if necessary,
return to close order. If even this is not
feasible, the main body must halt while the
light infantry, constantly supported by some
of the heavy infantry and cavalry, must be
sent against the enemy.
Orders must be given to the army so that at
the time of march, if the alarm is raised that
the enemy is in the vicinity, the entire army
does not become nervous and advance
towards such a place, but rather the heavy
infantry must maintain their formation, while
the light of each grouper must run towards
the man who raised the alarm. The front
troops must not rush to move to the flanks or
those of the flanks towards the front without
being ordered by their commanding officer,
but each grouper must support his own
troops at the moment of alarm, as each
demand. situation so that, at the moment
when the troops are seriously pressed, they
quickly retreat towards the main body of the
heavy infantry, and cannot be crushed by the
enemy. Consequently, the infantry can march
safely and in good order, as we have noted,
in densely wooded areas and on rough
terrain, either forming in four or in two
groups , depending on the terrain, and more
so in open terrain using a formation with the
front on the flank and keeping its columns
moderately wide and deep.
It should always be kept in mind that in
densely forested terrain, javelin throwers are
more necessary than archers or slingers.
Therefore, most light infantry must be trained
in the use of javelins and short spears.
Archers, preferably, are useful in constant
connection with the main battle line and in
rough, steep, narrow or open terrain. Javelin
throwers, meanwhile, should be stationed
away from the main line and are particularly
necessary in heavily wooded areas.
The security of our entrenched places and
camps is important. If possible, tents should
be pitched on open ground, but if this is not
possible, security should not be neglected,
but camps should be adequately protected
and fortified and places surrounded by higher
areas should be avoided. The main body
should not be ordered to rest until everyone
has pitched their tent, the camp is adequately
fortified, and the patrols have been sent out.
Everyone must remember that the blow of
the horn is the signal to stop and the blow of
the trumpet is the signal to go.
We have added some diagrams for further
clarification of the formations described in this
chapter.
Online training using four phalanxes . This
formation is basic when the infantry force is
very large and the terrain is favorable, also in
case you want to cross an area quickly and it
is also the most suitable for changing the
front towards the flank.

should transport along rivers and
crossing them be in the face of the
enemy?
Everything must be prepared in advance,

the warships, the other ships and rigging,
supply ships, smaller ships and material for
making bridges, including the stays and
pontoons. The fleet must be organized like an
army marching on land. It will be commanded
by moirarchs , merarchs and the
respective officers of the tagmas that make
up the navy. Each warship must carry a
regular banner on its main mast to denote
which officer commands the ship. Next, an
admiral or strategos must take command of
the entire fleet. If there are a large number of
warships, divide them into three divisions,
each with a commanding officer, and each
with a trumpeter and heralds . On the bow
of all of them, or at least on most warships,
he mounts a small ballista , covered with a
heavy cloth, so that his shots can repel any
enemy attack while he is still at a good
distance. Good and competent archers must
be assigned to ships and to fortified positions
built for them. At the time of departure, all
new berths must be predetermined; The
warships sail in order according to their
divisions and maintaining their pre-
established formation and, as mentioned,
when they are placed in their assigned place
and when everyone is in their position and
safe, they will be able to sail in formation to
the next place of docking Because it is not
always true that nets and other heavy gear
can be loaded onto warships, the transport
vessels carrying all this must be organized
under the command of their own officers as
in the case of shore-based impedimenta.
Transport ships should not be docked too far
from the point of origin, so that the heavier
ones can arrive on time, dock and set sail at
the same time as the warships. The heavier
ships should sail behind the warships, and
behind them there should be another set of
ships to protect them. If it is necessary to
dock the ships to camp on land when the
enemy is nearby, solid trenches must be
made to prevent any surprise attack that the
enemy could easily attempt at night. If a
naval battle is imminent and the enemy is
lining up for combat, then the warships must
be placed in a single line and sail uniformly at
a sufficient distance to avoid crossing each
other, colliding or clashing their oars. This line
must be long enough to occupy the navigable
width of the river. As has been said, the ships
must form in a wide front, and the rest must
be placed in the second or third line at an
arrow's throw from the rear. In case you have
to land on the opposite bank where the
enemy is, a bridge must be laid, that is, built.
You must start on our shore by collecting the
necessary materials, including large skiffs,
and then drive the piles to build the bridge,
assuming of course that everything, both
piles and pontoons, is available. At the
beginning of the bridge and with the works
an arrow's throw away from the opposite
bank, the ballistae of the warships or the
ships that carry them must be used to clean
said bank. This way, the bridge can be built
completely safely, section by section, until
you reach the other side. After securing it on
both banks, then, especially on the side
where the enemy is located, to later defend
the bridge, towers of wood, brick or dry stone
must be built. Before this, strong trenches
must be dug to be occupied by infantry with
ballistae , so that the construction of the
towers can be completed without obstacles.
Thanks to all this, the army will then be able
to cross the river, including both cavalry and
impedimenta.

build fortified camps
The carts should be parked around the
camp site, and in case of emergencies they
should be nailed to the ground and, if the
terrain permits, a pit five or six feet wide and
seven or eight feet deep, with the earth
forming an embankment of the inside side.
Externally, the holes with the caltrops must
be scattered and there should be small holes
dug with sharp stakes driven into the bottom.
The location of all these elements must be
known by the troops, so that they can avoid
falling into them and getting hurt. Along the
perimeter of the camp there should be four
large recognizable gates and smaller ones 49 .
The commanding officer of the unit camped
in the vicinity of each gate must be
responsible for protecting it. Right next to the
line of wagons should be the small tents
belonging to the light troops, and next to
them a large and wide space of three or four
hundred feet and from that point the rest of
the tents should be pitched. When the enemy
begins to shoot, in this way, he will not reach
the men in the center, as the arrows will fall
into the empty space 50 . Two wide streets
must run along along the camp in the shape
of a cross, crossing in the middle 51 . These
streets should be about forty or fifty feet
wide and on either side there should be shops
lined up in rows with a little space between
them. Each merarch must camp in the
middle of his troops. The tactician 's tent
should be on one of the sides, not at the
central intersection, so that the flow of traffic
will not be interfered with and so that he
himself will not be disturbed by troops
circulating through the intersection 52 . If the
situation is such that the cavalry has to be
inside the camp, they should be placed in the
middle and not near the edge.
The most competent tribunes with the
tagmas under their command must be
placed at the doors of the camp, so that from
the signal call 53 no one in the camp can enter
or leave without the permission of the
strategos . It must be had Pay special
attention to the night patrols of the cavalry, if
they remain inside the camp.
The commander commanding each meros
must have one of his heralds permanently in
the strategos ' tent, and each tribune must
have a herald in the merarch 's tent. To
make the transmission of orders faster for
everyone.
The strategos must have trumpeters and
bugles at his service. The trumpets must
sound three times at sunset as a signal of the
cessation of activity; the men must then dine
and sing the Trisagion 54 . Part of the
strategos ' own guards must be assigned for
inspection and to order silence throughout
the camp, so that no one shouts his
comrade's name. There are many advantages
to maintaining silence, for example, it often
allows you to detect enemy spies lurking in
the camp. On the other hand, noise can
cause many problems. Dancing and clapping
should be prohibited, especially after the
afternoon retreat, not only because they are
messy and problematic, but because they are
a waste of energy for the soldiers. When the
army is on the march, orders must be given
the evening before. In this way, at dawn the
next day the horn must sound three times
and the march begins 55 . The units move in
order, first the heavy infantry and then the
impedimenta wagons.
The use of caltrops is essential. If the
ground is rocky and digging is impossible or it
is too late to set up camp, caltrops should
be spread appropriately in the same way as
trenches would be dug.
The ancients 56 have described various
shapes for camps or entrenched places, but
this author recommends the four-sided shape
as the basic shape suitable for good order.
Camps located on a wide front or on high
ground make the army appear more
impressive than those located on flat or
sloping terrain. If, therefore, you want to
impress enemy scouts, you should select
locations with a wide front, especially if they
contain the supplies and provisions you need.
Healthy, clean places should be chosen for
camps and we should not stay in one place
too long unless the air and availability of
supplies are very advantageous. Otherwise,
diseases could spread among the troops 57 . It
is very important that physiological needs are
not carried out inside the camp, but outside,
because of unpleasant odors, especially if
there are reasons for the army to remain in
the same place.
At critical moments a place with a small
stream flowing through the middle of the
camp must be chosen for the convenience of
the troops. But if it is long and fast, it is
better to leave it on one flank to help protect
the camp.
When the cavalry camps in the interior,
special attention must be paid to night
patrols.
If a river of good size flows through the
camp, the horses should not drink from it as
they enter the camp, so as not to stir up silt
from the bottom, fouling the water and
making it unsuitable for the consumption of
the people.
soldiers, but the horses must water
downstream. If this is small, the horses
should water in buckets, so that they do not
stir up the bottom.
The camp should also not be placed near
hills that are accessible to the enemy so that
they do not shoot arrows into the camp.
Before getting close to the enemy, you
should try not to camp near water. This is
particularly applicable to cavalry. Horses and
riders may have the habit of drinking a lot
and when it is not available, as on these
occasions, they cannot stand it and falter.
Before approaching the enemy, the infantry
should not camp together with the cavalry
inside the entrenched places, but the cavalry
should remain outside, although close to the
camp, so that they are not crowded and do
not give the impression to enemy spies of be
the army small in number. It should be
determined a few days in advance, however,
how much space will be needed and how it
should be divided and, if the situation
requires it, how many will fit inside. When the
enemy is close, the cavalry will join the
infantry and camp together in prearranged
sections. At the time of combat, care must be
taken to place the camp in a strong position
and provide supplies for several days, not
only provisions for men but, if possible, also
for animals, since the outcome of the battle is
uncertain. However, special attention must be
paid to how to defend the water supply
against the enemy in case the camp needs
support.
If the place of battle is an open and wide
place, you should always try to have a river, a
lake or some other natural obstacle to protect
your rear. You must build a strong camp and
place the wagons following the troops in
order. If the terrain is rough and rugged, the
wagons and the rest of the baggage should
be left in the camp with a few of their drivers
as guard and the battle line should be formed
near the camp in a suitable place. If the
terrain is rough, especially when the enemy is
cavalry, the difficult terrain is, in itself, good
protection for our central army body. If
wagons accompany troops over this type of
terrain, they will not only be unnecessary,
they will be a nuisance.
Great care must be taken with the oxen that
pull the carts, so that while they advance with
the army and the carts have to stop, they are
not frightened by the noise the enemy makes,
by the arrows they shoot or by panic and
believe thus confusion throughout the line.
The oxen must be hobbled or tied so that, as
mentioned, if some of them are hit by arrows,
they cannot cause confusion among the
infantry. For all that has been said, you
should not park too close to it.
When the need arises to help an attacked
position or to occupy a position quickly and
the wagons cannot arrive in time and so as
not to slow down the march, they must be
left in a fortified place and the infantry must
continue with their supplies. Plans should be
made to transport provisions in packages on
camels 58 or on horses used for this use. A
supply of caltrops should also be carried.
When the time comes to set up camp, the
infantry digs the trench in the usual way,
disperses the thistles and internally builds
the wall or wooden palisade. This provides so
much protection as the impedimenta carts
would do and thus, by not carrying the
wagons, we avoid moving slower or creating
any other problem that can often happen.
If there is a large force of cavalry in the
army and only a small force of infantry and it
is decided that the impedimenta remain in the
camp, there is no need to keep all the
infantry within it. Part must remain with her
on guard, while the rest must be placed in
formation outside the camp gates and
trenches. Thus, in case the cavalry must
withdraw without having infantry with them,
that infantry can cover them and give them
the opportunity to turn against the enemy or,
at least, to enter the camp in good order
without being dangerously crowded at the
gates. .
Book XII, part B, chapter 23.

Issues to be considered by the infantry
strategists on a day of battle
If the enemy cavalry is very numerous,
outnumbering us and our troops are not
accompanied by impediments, we must not
form for battle on open and flat terrain, but
on rough and difficult terrain, that is, in
swampy, rocky, rugged or rugged places.
wooded
We must be careful to send patrols to keep
our rear and flanks protected against attack.
Some of the remaining heavy infantry
should be placed on the flanks and in the
center of the impediment wagons so that, if
necessary, they can help destroy enemy plans
to cause problems around the wagons, the
line. of battle or our cavalry.
You should not engage cavalry in many
infantry battles, except for a few on the
flanks of the battle line, up to three thousand
or four thousand cavalry, but it is not
advisable to have more, they must be good
soldiers and wear chain mail. If the
opportunity presents itself, your mission is to
attack retreating enemy units. A number
greater than this is not advisable.
If the enemy army consists of cavalry and is
unwilling to engage in combat with infantry
and if our cavalry force is strong, considering
that our infantry is weak, then line up three
cavalry groups in front and place the infantry
line behind, in good order, a mile or two
behind those. He orders the cavalry not to
separate from the infantry at too much
distance. If they are forced to retreat by the
enemy, they must do so on the flanks and
place themselves in the rear of the battle line
and not in the front, so as not to cause its
breakdown.
On the day of battle, the line of infantry
should not be advanced to a great distance,
no more than two miles from the camp, lest
it be exhausted by the weight of the armor. If
the enemy delays the battle, the men must
be made to sit down and rest until he is close.
If the weather is hot, let them take off their
helmets and cool off. On such occasions they
should not carry wine with them, lest it heat
them up or dull their minds. The water,
however, must be transported in the wagons
and each person must be given what he
needs to remain in the formation.
Book XII, part B, chapter 24. Synopsis
of the previously mentioned instruction
that must be known by the tribunes or
commanders of the tagmas
infantry
The herald shouts the following orders:
«Attention. Pay attention to orders. Let no
one abandon their position. Everyone looking
at the banner . Let no one break ranks.
Pursue the enemy in formation and order" 59 .
The troops march calmly, calmly, at a steady
pace, holding the tips of their spears high.
They must begin to maneuver only at the
signal, whether by voice or gesture, both to
march or stop and to disperse or divide their
ranks. In this case the order is: exi a stemma
60
. They march calmly and in close order for
a certain distance. If the front of the tagma
is not very uniform, the order is: direct
frontem 61 . To reduce or reduce the depth or
width of the formation, the order is: iunge
fulco 62 . To march, the order is: ami fulco 63 .
Individual combat must be simulated,
sometimes with staves, sometimes with
drawn swords. A man shouts: adiuta 64 , and
everyone responds in unison Deus 65 .
SECOND TRAINING
To form the double phalanx the order is
given: primi state, secundi exite 66 . To move
right or left, if the commander wants them to
move to the right he orders: "Turn right!" 67 .
If to the left: «Turn left. Move!" 68 and moves.
[Orders] «Redi» 69 and they resume their
original position. To form the double front
defensive line, the order is: “Face all
directions. Come back!" 70 . Then they resume
their original position. To change the front to
the right or left, if it is for the right: "Switch
to the right!" 71 , if it is for the left: "Change
to the left!" 72 . To extend or lengthen, if the
commander wants to extend the line to the
right, he orders: largia ad dextram 73 . If it is
towards both sides: largia ad both parts 74 .
To increase or double the depth of the
columns, if the depth is eight or four men,
order: intra 75 . To deal with an attack from
the rear the order is: transform 76 .
Written regulations recalling these
maneuvers must be given to the tribunes ,
and the merarchs must also know the
purpose of the movements.
PART C. DIAGRAM OF A FORTIFIED

CAMP
It should be noted that the outer line of the
impedimenta indicates a trench. The
caltrops are indicated by the letter lambda
and the signs in the middle are for shops. The
main streets, formed in a cross, must be fifty
feet wide and the space around the carts two
hundred. There should be a ditch on the
outside for the thistles , so that animals or
men in the camp cannot trip carelessly into
them.
PART D. THE HUNT. HOW WILD

ANIMALS SHOULD BE HUNTED
WITHOUT SERIOUS OR SERIOUS
INJURIES
ACCIDENTS
Spending some time hunting is of great
importance to soldiers as it not only makes
them more alert and helps exercise their
horses, but also gives them good experience
in military tactics. It is very important for
soldiers to become experts in hunting by
constant practice, during the most suitable
and convenient times of the year, when
inexperience can easily be learned and those
who make mistakes, as might be expected,
can be corrected without delay. cause any
damage. Since Divine Providence has created
so many wild animals, agile in mind and light
on foot, that run under their own leaders,
such attacks on animals 77 are really
appropriate if they could be carried out with
some degree of tactics and strategy.
The formations should not be very deep so
that they do not take up so little space that
they are useless when surrounding the game.
They should also not be too extensive, with
soldiers at a great distance so that the game
does not slip through the gaps in the
formation and escape. In open, flat terrain
the line may extend up to seven or eight
miles , but no more; On moderately level but
dense terrain the distance should be less.
It is important to set a limit for the number
of riders who can fit into each mile in a loose
enough formation so that they do not collide
with each other and mingle while riding.
Between eight hundred and one thousand
men are thus allowed for each mile .
The day before the hunt, a few scouts must
go in search of it and must study the terrain
carefully. The Commanders of each unit must
then give orders to their troops. Once the line
has formed, everyone has to move calmly and
in order. No one should leave the formation
or their assigned place, even if difficult terrain
is encountered. No one should spur their
horse or shoot when they are not supposed
to. If, however, the game is scared away, the
nearest archer must shoot at it, without
leaving his place in the line. One of the
heralds must then take the dead piece 78 to
the tagma commander and no one else must
dare touch it. If, due to some carelessness,
the game escapes, the man responsible for
letting it escape must be punished.
No one should ride at the front of the line
except the merarch with his own heralds
and the tagma commanders with theirs. The
merarchs will distribute their heralds along
the front of each mere to transmit the orders
of the strategos and the reports of the
explorers when arriving with the news.
Tagma commanders must maintain the
alignment of their own units. On the day of
the hunt, then, before the second hour 79 ,
the army moves to hunt. Men should be
equipped with light weapons such as bows,
and, for those inexperienced with them,
spears. Some scouts will go ahead to observe
the game while others guide the army. When
the game is close, three or four miles away,
the line must be formed in a suitable and
protected location. You should not get much
closer for fear that the wind and the
movement of the army will cause the animals,
whose senses are alert, to smell the soldiers
and flee. The army must line up in phalanx
formation in three sections, center, right and
left, with flankers located a little behind, but
close to the flanks of the line. The depth of
the columns, as we have said, will depend on
the strength of the army, the nature of the
terrain, and the distance to be covered.
Columns can be four, two, or even one rider
deep. The scouts arrive and lead the flanks of
the line, whose duty is to surround the game
to completely surround it. The line begins to
move in the usual phalanx formation, but as
soon as the game is close and in sight, the
flanks begin to move forward and the line
begins to assume the shape of a crescent
moon, the horns gradually moving closer
together. to another until they join together
and the game is completely within the line
that surrounds it.
If a strong wind blows, the horn on the side
with the wind in its face must ride a good
distance from the game or its scent may
make the animals aware of its approach and,
before they can be surrounded, they will flee.
If the game begins to become alarmed before
the horns have had time to connect and
makes a sudden start to avoid capture and
escape through the gap between the horns,
then the flankers on both sides should move
more quickly in column until contact is
made. . That is, advance to the tip of the
horns and fill the gap between them, so that
the game is caught in the line of horses. After
cutting off the game's escape route, the
horns of the line will make contact and the
horsemen will pass side by side, with the right
flank advancing inwards, while the left flank
moves outwards. With both flanks continuing
their spiral movement, the hunt will gradually
be forced towards the center, and that place,
now surrounded by the line of horsemen, will
contract until four or more complete circles
have made the full circumference and this is
one or two miles . The game can be quickly
located and the space will be large enough so
that the archers do not hurt each other.
When the circle has been closed in the
manner described, some infantrymen, if
present, carrying shields, must enter the
circle and stand with their shields joined
together and nailed to the ground, facing
away from the horsemen. In this way, it can
be prevented that smaller animals, easily
surrounded, can, thanks to their small size,
escape through the horses' legs. If there are
no infantry present, detach some horsemen
from the outside of the formation circle and
have them do the above.
After this, the strategos will instruct
qualified officers and soldiers to shoot game
from horses. No one from outside, except
those designated by the strategos , should
come into contact with the hunt. If the hour
is late, the space inside the circle can be
reduced even further, by having the foot
soldiers join their shields up to a certain
height, so that the game can even be
captured by hand.
When everything has been done as
described, if the capture is significant, it must
be distributed equally among the tagmas ,
so that the morale of the entire army can
grow because they jointly enjoy the fruits of
their labor. If the capture is not important, it
must be distributed in parts. Part of the
reward must go to the explorers or spies, if
their work has been carried out
conscientiously.
This formation can be used by an army
moving from its camp exclusively for this
purpose and later returning, or it can be used
while leaving. It is appropriate not only when
the animals have been sufficiently well
observed previously, but also, as is more
normal, when they have been unexpectedly
surprised by the army in marching order. It
resembles the battle formation usually used
by the Scythians , but a little slower and
more elongated. In fact, troops trying to use
this formation for the first time should not
immediately apply it for hunting. Due to their
likely inexperience, the resulting errors,
efforts and fatigue will tend to discredit this
training as effective. Instead, a few horsemen
should first be designated to represent the
hunt, so that the main body can practice it
and judge its distances and easily learn the
enveloping movements.
There is another method of conducting the
hunt which we believe is quicker and easier,
and which could be done by even a small
contingent of horsemen, especially if the
animals have been located previously. The
day before the hunt the army is divided into
five contingents 81 , one third, one fourth and
one twelfth of the force. The third is the
center contingent, the two fourths the flank
contingents, and the two twelfths the
flankers 82 . When the army approaches the
chosen point, as already described, the
scouts, acting as guides and doing their best
at the right time, will work to bring the game
to the area in front of the center contingent
and not to the sides. The center division is
first placed in a phalanx formation, that is,
along the front. After him comes the left with
its flankers on his left flank, a little behind.
Next is the right contingent also with its
flankers to the right and a little behind. The
scouts go ahead, taking up positions at the
ends of the force divisions located on the
sides, where the flankers are located. The
center division stops its line while the others
pass along its flanks towards the hunt evenly.
As soon as the other divisions have got
underway, the center advances without
breaking. The result is that the entire
formation begins to move as one of the
regular battle formations, the center with its
advanced flanks. They will continue the
march to the point where the horns of the
crescent keep the game, which is inside it.
With the hunt now barely surrounded, the
flankers move from both sides in column,
increasing their trot and making side-to-side
contact, closing the remaining side of the
entire formation to look like a rectangular
brick. With the hunt completely surrounded,
the horsemen from the four sides approach
towards the center. The riders on the sides
advance towards the flankers with those in
the center following them, so that the
flankers keep their own lines and the men
on the flanks maneuver, so that there are no
gaps in their sections through which the
game could escape. .
When the lines have been properly closed, a
suitable place will be chosen where the game
so surrounded can be shot. Maintaining
proper and close order, the two sides then
stop. The other sides close or increase in
depth by advancing towards each other until
they are three or four arrow shots from each
other. The other sides adapt their
movements, as we have stressed several
times, and close with them towards the
flanks. As the place where the game is begins
to constrict, then they will have to proceed as
mentioned above to bring it down. This
training can be quickly organized when
breaking camp. The center contingent
marches in front, as has been said, and the
other two follow behind until they approach
the hunt. When the army finds a safe place
three or four miles from the hunt, the
maneuver described above can begin.
There is another method that can be
performed by even a smaller number of
horsemen, one commonly used by the
Scythians . The riders are divided into
squads of five or ten men each, mainly made
up of archers. When the hunt begins, the
men in their own areas advance, approaching
it, as best they can, beginning to shoot.
However, although this method involves
greater movement and training for the
individual, all riding entails danger for
novices, can tire the horses and lead to
errors.
END OF THE TWELFTH BOOK
1 These primi would be the old primi ordines, officers

in command of the various units of a legion from
imperial times.
2 Fulcon ( φοῦλκον ), a word related to the German
term volk, is a type of very closed formation similar to
the ancient Roman testudo (cf. fulcon ). Cf.
MIHĂESCU (1969) pp. 261-272.
3 It refers to training in cadres.
4 On the military customs of this time in terms of
clothing, cf. again D'AMATO (2005).
5 They are the zostaria or woolen tunics cinched with
a belt, which appear represented for the first time in
sculptural reliefs in Constantinople, and are
characterized by embroidery with rhomboidal shapes.
that decorate their edges (D'AMATO [2005] p. 10).
6 About these ways of shooting with a bow cf. book I,
chap. 1.
7 Very similar to the late imperial spatha, along with
this they are considered the antecedents of the typical
medieval sword. However, in the case of the Herula
sword ( σπαθίον ) it is difficult to specify the size and
characteristics. During the excavation of the Bluèvina
fortified site in the Brno region (Czech Republic), the
remains of a double-edged sword have been found in a
tomb of a probable Herulian magnate from the late
5th century. The reconstruction of said sword seems to
indicate that the blade would be between 70 and 80
cm long and 5 or 6 cm wide.
8 Paragnathids: metal sheets, of varying shape
depending on the model, that hung laterally from the
helmet and protected the soldier's cheeks, being tied
under his chin with a leather strap. They are also called
cheeks (bucculae).
9 Already Flavius Vegetius (Epitoma Rei Militaris II 15,
7; III 14, 13; IV 21, 1; IV 22, 1 and 6) and the
anonymous De Rebus Bellicis (16, 5) mention
crossbows as part of military weapons, although The
first refers to two types, the manuballista and the
arcuballista (it is only in Vegecio), whose details are
not known to us. unknown in depth, but that D.
Paniagua Aguilar, in its edition by the aforementioned
author (Flavio Vegecio Renato: Compendio de Tactica
Militar, Edic. Chair. Madrid, 2006, p. 217, nos. 214 and
215), describes as follows: (for the manuballista or
manual crossbow): "it was a shooting device in the
shape of an ordinary crossbow, which rested on the
ground supported on two struts, ready to be activated
by a only man"; (for the arcuballista or bow crossbow):
"it seems that (...) it was the common type of
crossbow, mounted horizontally on a bow that is
activated with a trigger or an alternative system that
releases the tensioned string, imparting momentum to
the projectile" . According to various authors (for
example, citing sources, DB CAMPBELL [1986]:
"Auxiliary Artillery Revisited", Bonner Jahrbücher 186,
p. 130), the manuballista was sometimes called
cheiroballistra, these two not being, therefore, different
weapons.
10 The arrows could be shot with the help of a device
called a solenarion, first described in the Ambrosiana
Paraphrasis (written around 950) as a reed or tube
open in the center used as an aid for shooting small
arrows or darts from a normal bow.
Although we do not know exactly what it was like, it
They have carried out two different reconstructions:
•
The solenarion would be a tube with slots at the
top and bottom from its end to its front, a few
centimeters deep.
•
The guide is a drilled channel with the arrow shaft
wider but narrower in the metal tip of the dart.
These darts launched from the solenarion would not
be fatal, but they would be very effective against
approaching enemy formations, since due to the
wounds inflicted they could cause the enemy
formation to break up, facilitating the counterattack.
About all this, cf. HALDON (1970) pp. 155-57 and
DENNIS (1981) pp. 1-5. One of the reconstructions in
DAWSON, T.: Byzantine Infantryman Eastern Roman
Empire c. 900-1204, Osprey Publishing. Oxford, 2007,
pp. 25 and 26.
11 It is a strong and heavy spear capable of
penetrating armor, which has a strap in the middle of
the shaft and a pennant or banner (which could be
removed if necessary) at the top.
12 We do not know if the extremes referred to are
those of the marching column or of the wagon itself.
Of transport.
13 These officers bore the name of campidoctores as
we see in Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris I 13, 1 (quod
armaturam uocam et a campidoctoribus traditur) and
II 23, 3 (qui sub campidoctore sunt). In some Spanish
translations they are called "masters of arms" and in
others, "field instructors."
14 According to GT Dennis (1984, p. 140, no. 4),
Maurice refers to the eagle bearers by the term
ὀρνιθόβορας , equivalent to the old Roman aquilifer, the
soldier who carried the eagle standard of the legion.
Plutarch calls it ἀετοφόρος . The reading ὀρνίβορας of
VNP does not make much sense. The Codex
Ambrosianus calls this soldier ὀρδινατούρους . His
mission was probably that of aide-de-camp or
orderly , and he was unarmed, as indicated in book
XII, part B, chapter. 11.
15 Here the author appears confused in his information
about the type of military organization of previous
times since he is not describing the Roman legion but
the Macedonian phalanx, as presented by the treatise
writer Asclepiodotus the Tactician, in his work Tactica (
an edition of it in the collective English translation of
The Illinois Greek Club, in Aeneas Tacticus,
Asclepiodotus, Onasander. Loeb Classical Library.
Harvard University. Cambridge [Massachusetts], 1928).
16 Mauricio offers the Latinisms uicarius aut
campidoctor.
17 Chosen: refers to the best quality soldiers.
18 Mauricio uses anteagittator Latinism.
19 Arrian, Tactics 5, 4-5.
20 Book II and book XII, part A, chap. 3 and part B,
chaps.
12 and 13.
21 Stratum r (in lat. strator), spatario (in lat.
spatharius): two types of ordinances . Spatharius
literally means "the bearer of spatha."
22 Cf. note 154.
23 «Silence. Observe the orders. Do not worry. Hold
your position. Follow the banner. "Do not abandon the
standard in pursuit of the enemy."
24 "Eight!"
25 “Go ahead!”
26 “Go ahead!”
27 "Line up the front!"
28 "Close ranks!"
29 "Form fulcon !"
30 “Ready!”
31 “Help us!” Judging by the next scream, refers to
getting divine help.
32 “Oh, God!”
33 «Divide in half. Form double phalanx !
34 «Primi, stop, secundi, come out. Form double
phalanx !
35 “Come back!”
36 Or there isn't.
37 "On the side of the spear!"
38 “Go ahead!”
39 "Come back!"
40 «Next to the shield. March!”
41 «In front of all directions!».
42 «Change to the right, or to the left!».
43 "Advance on both sides!"
44 “Enter!”
45 "Column in column!"
46 "Change positions!"
47 "Change!"
48 In previous times they were the typical lances used
by the Mauritanian light cavalry (equites Mauri or
Mauretanici).
49 wickets.
50 This is the intervallum of the old camps from the
Republican and High Imperial times.
51 He is talking about the viae praetoria et principalis.
52 Here we find an obvious difference with the camp
organization of the republican and imperial times, since
in them the general's tent was located at the
crossroads between the vias praetoria and principalis.
53 It refers to the late afternoon call to stop activity
and go to rest.
54 On the Trisagion, cf. note 96.
55 Just as it was already done in at least the High
Imperial era, as Flavius Josephus tells us in his Bellum
Iudaicum III 89-91.
56 Among them Polybius (Historiae), Pseudo-Hyginius
(De Munitionibus Castrorum) or Vegetius (Epitoma Rei
Militaris).
57 On the care that must be taken with water to avoid
diseases, cf. Codex Iustiniani XII 35, 12.
58 Although the translation is correct, it rather refers
to dromedaries, animals well known in the Eastern
Roman armies.
59 The Laurentian manuscript gives these orders in
Greek, while the remaining codices give them in Latin.
60 "Abandon the column!"
61 "Straighten your front!"
62 "Close ranks!" Cf. the following note.
63 "Form fulcon !" According to P. Rance (2004, p.
270, no. 12 and p. 272, no. 17) the original text would
not say ami fulco, but ad fulco. To corroborate his
interpretation, he points out that there would be an
incorrect punctuation, the iunge fulco order would not
exist (cf. the previous note), but on the one hand we
must read iunge, that is, "close ranks!", while we must
understand fulco with the following word with the
meaning of "advance in fulcon ." In such a way, the
full meaning of the phrase would be the following:
«Close or close ranks, he orders: Iunge. To advance in
fulcon , order: ad fulco.
64 “Help us!”
65 “Oh, God!”
66 "Primi, stop, second, get out!"
67 In this fragment, the Laurentian gives the orders in
Greek, the rest of the codices give them in Latin.
68 Idem.
69 "Come back!"
70 Cf. note 207.
71 Idem.
72 Idem.
73 "Spread out to the right!"
74 "Spread out to both sides!"
75 “Come in!”
76 “Change!”
77 Refers to hunting.
78 That's right, naturally.
79 Cf. note 119.
80 It refers, therefore, to the tips of the crescent moon
formation.
81 He then names them and only three come out.
82 In this new enumeration there are now five.
Glossary
Caltrop : iron ball of variable size with four
points, one of which always faces upwards
and is used to hinder the passage of infants
and horses by injuring their legs or paws.
Quiver : cf. quiver
Before : Slavic tribe (one of the three
largest ethnic groups of the Slavs ) with a
certain mixture of Iranian people who
inhabited between the 4th and 7th centuries
the territories located between the Vistula,
Dnieper and Dniester rivers (Jordans, Getica
V 34-35) At times they occupied the
Carpathian Mountains and the lands of the
lower Danube bordering the Eastern Roman
Empire (Procopius of Caesarea, Anecdote
XVIII 20), just north of the delta of said river.
At the end of the 6th century they were at
the zenith of their power, forming a great
alliance of tribes led by both princes and a
tribal oligarchy capable of defeating the
Byzantine army and occupying the Balkans. It
was during this period of fighting against the
Byzantines that they disintegrated as a tribal
alliance, disappearing from Byzantine
chronicles, such as that of Theophylacto
Simocatta, at the beginning of the 7th
century.
Arithms ( ἀριθμός ): irregular unit (in lat.
numerus), of contingent similar to a tagma .
Avars : traditionally identified as the huan-
huan/yuan-yuan or heftolet (cf. Ephthalite
Huns ), they called themselves Yu-Küe-Lu or
Yue-chi and were one of the many peoples
belonging to the federation of the Huns .
Their advance westward from the Asian
steppes brought them into contact with the
peoples whose lands they crossed, with
whom they began to mix.
They began to be named in the Byzantine
chronicles at the end of the empire of
Justinian I (527-565) when they began to
settle on the banks of the Danube River, in
the Pannonia area (more or less the area on
the right bank of the Danube and the interior,
in present-day Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia)
creating a khanate there (word derived from
jan, title of its chiefs). From there they will
carry out multiple attacks not only towards
the east, against Byzantine territory, allowing
their settlement shortly after in the Balkans,
but also towards the west, against Frankish
territory, in the time of the Frankish king
Sigebert I (561-575), as Gregory refers. of
Tours (Historia Francorum IV 29 1 ) and
against the southwest, to the Lombard
territory of northern Italy. Their strength
became such that they surrounded the
imperial capital of Constantinople in the
summer of 626, in coalition with the
Persians , although with fruitless result
(Theophanes the Confessor, Chronographia
625/626). This disaster led them to a series
of internal disputes that ended up putting an
end to their power at the beginning of the 9th
century, being assimilated by another
stronger people, the Bulgarians , who were
the ones who gave them the finishing touch
in the east, while the Charlemagne's Franks
(king, 768-800; emperor, 800 814) did the
same from the west. On the Avars and their
military aspects, cf. NICOLLE (1995a).
Ballista : projectile-launching torsion
weapon similar to a large bow wielded by two
or more soldiers. In times of the Roman
Empire, let's call it "classical", the ballistae
were artillery pieces that threw stones, while
the various models of catapultae threw
arrows of greater or smaller size. However, at
the time of reference, the transposition of
terms had already occurred, a terminology
that has survived to this day.
Flag : military unit that in the Spanish army
is equivalent to a battalion. In the late Roman
army it would have a contingent of just over
three hundred men and would be equivalent
to a tagma .
The term flag (lat.: bandum) comes from
the Germanic languages (bandwa or
bandwo), being a common military term in
Procopius (De Bello Vandalico IV 2, 1) and
equated by Paul the Deacon (Historia
Langobardorum I 20) and Theophylacto
Simocatta (Historiae III 4, 4) to the term
vexillum, in what refers to a military
standard .
Pennant ( φλάμουλον ; lat.: vexillum
parvum): banner that is fixed on the tip of the
spears in spearman units and that usually
displays the unit's colors.
Bucellarians (lat.: bucellarii; Greek:
βουκελλαρίοι ): the bucellarians (from lat.
buccellatum, biscuit, sponge cake 2 ) were
soldiers originally recruited by private
individuals. Recruited from among Romans
and barbarians, they formed part of the
regular army and eventually settled in the
area that would become thema 3 of
Boukelarion (made up of parts of the ancient
late imperial provinces of Bithynia, Galatia I
and Phrygia Salutaris [= Phrygia II], which
They correspond approximately in whole or in
part to the current Turkish provinces of
Afyonkarahisar, Ankara, Bolu, Çankiri, Çorum,
Eskişehir, Kirikkale, Kirşehir and Konya) in
Asia Minor (Constantino Porphyrogenitus, De
Thematibus, Ed. TO. Pertusa, Studi e Testi
160. Vatican City, 1952, 133-136; JONES
[1964] vol. I, pp. 665-668) and with capital in
Ancyra (modern Ankara, in the Turkish
province of the same name). They constituted
a select body on horseback, escorting the
general or the emperor, with functions similar
to those of the praetorians, or, since 312 AD,
to those of The Scholae Palatinae, the new
Imperial Guard that replaced the dissolved
(that year) Praetorian Guard. Although
inferior in rank to the federates and the
optimates , their equipment was better than
the bulk of the Byzantine army (NICOLLE
[1995b] p. 24-25).
Bulgarians : nomadic people who arrived
in the lower basin of the Danube River and
settled in the lands on its right bank during
the empire of Heraclius (610-641),
assimilating other minor and/or declining
peoples settled there. However, the first time
they appear mentioned in the written sources
of the time is at the end of the 5th century,
and historians of the time will continue to
mention them for several decades, to be
eclipsed in said writings for several more
decades until they reappear at the end of the
6th century. in relation to the arrival also to
the area of the Avars . A large part of these
would end up being assimilated by the
Bulgarians themselves (cf. avars in this
glossary).
Quiver ( θηκάριον ): box or case used by
archers where arrows are grouped (about
forty, in Byzantine quivers ) before being
shot and which can be carried strapped to the
archer's back or hip or hung from the saddle.
Chiliarchy ( χιλιαρχία ): cf. Moira .
Chiliarch ( χιλιάρχα ): cf. moirarch . The
word chiliarch was already used by Arrian in
the 2nd century (Tactica 10, 3; The
expedition against the Alans 2, 5, 6, 22).
Count (lat.: comes): military rank
equivalent at this time to a tribune , whose
functions are explained by Maurice himself in
book I, chapter 3.
Contubernium : originally, in the
republican and high-imperial Roman army, a
platoon of eight men, who shared a tent in
marching camps or accommodation in
permanent barracks. In late imperial times
and according to Flavius Vegetius (Epitoma
Rei Militaris II 8, 9), its strength had
amounted to ten men.
Cornet (lat.: bucinator [from bucina, name
of the instrument]). The cornets , who
played the instrument of the same name (lat.:
bucinae), along with the trumpets (lat. :
tubicines) who played the instruments of the
same name (lat.: tubae) and those who blew
the horns (lat.: cornicines; name of the
instrument: cornu), were in charge, with the
sounds they produced, of sending the orders
To the soldiers. The bugles were shaped like
bull horns, the trumpets were straight and
elongated, and the horns had the appearance
of a hunting trunk.
Decarca : ( δεκάρχης ): junior officer whose
functions are explained by Mauricio himself in
book I, cap. 3.
Decarchy : ( δεκαρχία ): section of ten
soldiers commanded by a decarca .
Draconary (lat.: draconarius):
literally, the bearer of the draco (dragon).
The drake was an emblem developed by the
peoples of the steppes such as the
Sarmatians, the Alans and others such as the
Parthians and the Sassanid Persians . All of
them with great use of cavalry in their armies.
This emblem, with a probable religious
meaning, was adopted by the Roman army
throughout the 2nd century AD since the
Dacian Wars (101-102 and 105-106) of
Trajan, a time in which Sarmatian horsemen
were enlisted in the Roman cavalry. In the
following century it was also incorporated by
infantry units.
It consists of an emblem in the shape of an
animal head (dragon [hence the name], wolf,
snake...) elongated, with open jaws, made of
bronze with a sleeve of fabric added from
behind and which swelled with the wind. As
the air entered through the drake's mouth, a
hissing sound was produced. This is how
Ammianus Marcellinus describes them (Res
Gestae XVI 10, 7), referring to the dracons of
the units that entered with the emperor
Constantius II (Flavius Iulius Constantius,
337-361) in Rome in 357: «... dragons woven
of color purple, tied to the top of the spears
with gold and precious stones, dragons that
opened a huge mouth to the wind in such a
way that they made a sound that suggested
that they were furious while their tails waved
in the wind. Arrian (Tactica 35) already
describes the draco as "made of pieces of
dyed material sewn together." To see
graphically what this banner looked like, cf.
the artistic reconstructions of works such as
those of WILCOX (1986) plate C; McDOWALL
(1995) plate A; WINDROW (1995) p. 43;
STEPHENSON and DIXON (2002) plate 15.
During the Late Empire the position of
magister draconum appears as the
commanding officer of the draconaries (lat.:
draconarii), a position just inferior to that of
tribune . This magister draconum would be
the equivalent of the optio signiferorum in the
high imperial army. However, we cannot
specify if the magister led the draconaries
into battle or if he was simply the
commanding officer of said schola
(battalion). Despite the importance that the
draconaries had in the imperial Roman
army, it does not seem to correspond to what
they had in the 5th and 6th centuries, when
the schola draconariorum still existed but as
a non-military office composed of ten men
dependent on the Prefect of the Praetorium
(Praefectus Praetorio), a position that, after
the disappearance of the Praetorian Guard in
312 BC, was preserved with purely civil
powers. From the 7th century onwards the
position of draconary disappeared from the
Byzantine army.
Vegetius (Epitoma Rei Militaris I 20, 6 and
23, 2; II 7, 5 and 13, 1), Ammianus
Marcellinus (Res Gestae XV 5, 16; and the
already mentioned paragraph of XVI 10, 7)
and Zosimus (Historia Nova III 19, 1).
Dromón : type of Byzantine ship whose
predecessor was the Roman bireme (lat.:
biremis). The dromón was a wooden boat
with two rows of oars, of which there could
be three variants: large, medium and small.
The medium-sized one, the most common,
had measurements that ranged between 30
and 50 m in length and 5 and 7 m in width.
They initially had a single mast (later two),
which mounted a lateen (triangular) sail. It
also had about thirty oars per band and each
of them was handled by three men, usually
slaves. A hundred more men made up the
crew. It also had a spur. They had ballistae
on board and the largest models also
mounted towers, catapults and other war
devices on their decks. Furthermore, these
were some of the ships that threw the
famous "Greek fire", a weapon similar (within
the distance) to a current flamethrower that
projected on the enemy a fire composed of
who knows exactly what (the Byzantines kept
the secret that today is not known for sure),
but that would surely include water, naphtha
or petroleum, sulfur, resin and some other
chemical compounds. This fire burned even in
water, and its use provided great military
superiority to the navy of the Eastern Empire.
Drungos ( δρούγγος ; lat.: drungus):
irregular formation of cavalry organized to
carry out ambushes and rapid surprise
attacks. The term drungos seems to be of
Celtic origin. In Vegetius (Epitoma Rei Militaris
III 16) the drungos is identified with a
squadron of enemy cavalry without specifying
size or specific tactical disposition.
Duke (lat.: dux): in the late imperial era he
is the officer in command of the troops of a
border province (soldiers were called
limitationei). In Mauritius times it was
equivalent to a moirarch .
Nurses : according to the term Mauricio
uses ( δηποτάτοι ; lat.: deputatores), these
nurses can be assimilated to surgeons and we
have sometimes used this other meaning in
the translation.
Scythians : nomadic people who lived in
the Asian steppes in the regions of Bactria or
Bactriana (in modern Afghanistan) and
Sogdiana (in modern Turkmenistan) (Strabo,
Geographia XI 8, 1 and 2) well known thanks
to historians such as Herodotus in book IV of
his Histories. At
Throughout the first century AD, it was
diluted and fragmented into a good number
of peoples that spread throughout the
Eurasian steppes to the limits of the Roman
Empire. Its mention in a work from the 6th-
7th centuries is an archaism and seems to
refer to peoples who remember the way of
life of the Scythians as described by
previous writers such as the aforementioned
Strabo and Herodotus, and this is also how
we believe that the next reference to the
Scythian Goths . However, when reference
is made to the Goths in any of their
confrontations with the Romans, they are
clearly referring to the traditional Goths , of
undoubted Germanic and not Scythian
origin. The Goths themselves, since the 3rd
century and after a journey of centuries from
their original lands in the current
Scandinavian peninsula, were divided into two
groups: the so-called Tervingi (the future Visi
Goths ), who initially settled in the lands to
the west of the Dniester River, and the
Greutungs (later evolved into the Ostro
Goths ), to the east of said river. When this
military manual is composed, the only Goths
who exist politically are the Visigoths , then
already sovereign of the kingdom of Toledo,
in the Iberian Peninsula, while the Ostro
Goths , who with their great king Theodoric I
(474-529) They had constituted a powerful
kingdom in Italy, Sicily and several other
territories between the upper course of the
Danube and the Italian borders, they had
been destroyed as a political entity by the
campaigns (535-554) ordered against them
by the emperor Justinian I. However, at the
end of the 6th century, there were many
people of the Ostro Goth ethnic group and,
above all, many warriors of that origin, since
these Ostro Goths were not annihilated as a
people. Furthermore, these other Goths are
geographically closest to the Eastern Empire
and the almost twenty years of war against
them mean that they are militarily much
better known in Constantinople than their
Iberian cousins.
Scythian Goths : cf. Scythians .
Slavs : name by which an Indo-European
people is known, fragmented into various
tribes (one of them the former [cf.]),
believed to have originally been located in the
northeast of the Balkans and Ukraine. Despite
being the generic name by which we currently
know various peoples of Eastern Europe, as
an entity they appear referred to by Jordanes
(Getica XXIII 119) as a large confederation of
consanguineous tribes such as the Veneti, the
Antes and the Sclaveni. At the end of the 6th
century, the lack of protection of the
Danubian border and the Byzantine war effort
against the Persians allowed them to enter
the western Balkans, settling in said territory,
also taking advantage of the vacuum left by
the Germanic tribes that inhabited those
areas and who They had displaced the
ancient Western Roman Empire.
Spatary : Mauritius uses the Latinism
σπαθαρίος (lat.: spatharius). He is literally the
one who carries the sword and here he is
used as an orderly (helper). Over time it
became a noble-official grade within the
Byzantine court, distinguishing between
protospatharios (the highest grade),
spatharios, basilikos spatharios and
spatharokandidatos.
The position of spatharius, with similar
characteristics to the Byzantine ones, is found
in the Visi Gothic kingdom of the Iberian
Peninsula and thus Don Pelayo, later the first
king of Asturias (718 737), according to the
Rotense Chronicle 8, he was a spatar of the
kings Witiza and Rodrigo: (…) Perugius
quidam, spatarius Uitizani et Rudeciri rege,
(…).
Banner (βάνδον): emblem that
identifies a military unit and can range from a
wooden or metal (possibly precious metal)
statuette of a person, animal or thing (for
example, the ancient eagles [lat.: aquilae] of
the Roman legions) to a piece of fabric
hanging from a wooden slat, with an
identifying sign and certain colors. The most
used banner in the army that Mauricio knew
was the dragon (lat.: draco) (cf.
draconarius ).
Strategists ( στρατεγός ): general. Military
rank whose functions Mauricio himself
explains in book I, chapter. 3.
Estratelates ( στρατηλάτες ): another name
for the merarch .
Strator : Mauricio uses the Latinism
στράτορος (lat.: strator), which is a type of
ordinance . Sabino Perea Yébenes (1998, p.
13) explains a little more about his function in
high-imperial times: "soldier or non-
commissioned officer assigned to a military
command or integrated into the officium as a
specialist soldier, among the so-called
principals." During the time of Justinian I
(527-565), according to Perea (1998, pp. 89-
98), its mission was limited to advising the
command on the purchase of horses.
Phalanx ( φάλαγξ ): the phalanx mentioned
by Mauricio has nothing to do with the
Macedonian one or the hoplitic one. Mauricio
calls each of the battle lines that form an
army aligned for combat a phalanx.
Federated (lat.: foederati): Federated
troops began as allied tribes serving under a
treaty (foedus), but in the 6th century they
began to be simply barbarians enrolled in the
regular army, a kind of foreign legion, based
in Thrace ( approximately present-day
Bulgaria) (cf. JONES [1964] vol. I, pp. 663-
666). Commanded by Byzantine (Roman)
officers, they were considered the elite of the
front-line troops (NICOLLE [1995b] p. 24).
Franks : Germanic people who, after the
collapse of the Western Roman Empire,
settled in northern Gaul as a federation of
the Empire (still existing, but dying). Still in
the 6th centuries VII, two families were
distinguished within the Franks , the
Ripuarians and the Salians, and it was the
Salians who, being more Romanized,
developed a powerful kingdom in the time of
Meroveus (448-457) and, above all, his
grandson Clovis I (481- 511). The first of the
mentioned kings gives its name to the
reigning dynasty, the Merovingian. On those
dates the Franks almost successively
defeated both the Alemanni (in 497, in
Tolbiacum 4 ) and the Visigoths (in 507, in
Voglada 5 ) which allowed them to control a
significantly larger territory than current
France (although it did not include all of
present-day France), being therefore a great
power to take into account in the 6th century.
In the 6th and 7th centuries the Byzantines
relied on them to stop the Lombard advance
through the Italian peninsula (cf.
Lombards ).
Flankers ( πλαγιοφύλακες ): those who
protect the flanks of an army. Mauricio
himself explains his functions in book I,
chapter. 3.
Attack flankers ( ὑπερκερασταί ): Mauricio
himself explains their functions in book II,
chap. 4.
Fulcon ( φοῦλκον ): type of military
formation that is documented for the first
time in the Strategikon and, according to
what Maurice himself describes (book XII,
part I, chap. 7), it is a compact infantry
formation whose most immediate antecedent
would be the Roman testudo (turtle).
Etymologically, in the opinion of P. Rance
(2004, p. 266), the term fulcum has Germanic
reminiscences and, therefore, it would not be
"something new" but rather the updating of
something that would exist in previous
military regulations. About this type of
training, cf. McDOWALL (1994) pp. 32 and
45.
Goths : cf. Scythians .
Hecatontarch ( ἑκατοντάρκης ): military
rank whose functions are explained by
Maurice himself in book I, cap. 3. It would be
equivalent to the ancient centurion (lat.:
centurio).
Herald : Mauricio uses the Latinism
καντάτωρ (lat.: cantator). He is in charge of
transmitting the orders of a superior officer
and haranguing the troops before entering
combat. Mauricio also sometimes calls them
haranguers using the same Latinism of
καντάτωρ /cantator. They also had the mission
of exploring the terrain where the battle was
going to be fought.
Herulus : as in many other cases, Jordanes
and Procopius of Caesarea are the main
sources available about this town. Originally
from northern Europe, they appear for the
first time mentioned by the Romans in the
second half of the 3rd century AD at which
time they came to attack, together with the
Goths, such important cities as Athens, in
the then Greek province of Achaea.
Already in the 5th century, after getting rid
of the Hunnic yoke (cf. Huns ), the Heruli
formed a kingdom north of the Danube River
in the present-day region of Moravia (in the
present-day Czech Republic) that supported
the army of the leader Odoacer by serving as
mercenaries in the deposition of Romulus
Augustulus (Romulus Augustus), the last
Roman emperor. of the West (475-476). At
the end of the same century, various defeats
against another barbarian people, the
Lombards (Paul the Deacon Historia
Langobardorum I 20) forced them to
emigrate from their lands, a good number
marching to the Scandinavian peninsula
and/or Jutland while another group marched.
towards Dacia (modern Romania) being
eventually assimilated by Lombards and
Avars , while a third settled within the
Byzantine Empire around Singidunum (today
Belgrade, in the district of the same name, in
Serbia) serving in the imperial army of
Justinian I (527-565), which Belisarius then
commanded, as a professional troop after its
Christianization. They were also an important
part of the troops of General Narsés, with
whom in 554 he completed the conquest of
Ostro- Gothic Italy, rejecting the invasion of
the Franks and Alemanni. This last group
also ended up being assimilated.
Huns : although in the 6th century nothing
remains of the people who terrorized both
parts of the Roman Empire in the middle of
the 5th century when, led by Attila, they
managed to penetrate Italy, nevertheless the
overwhelming force of their armies and their
model of civilization so different from that
known by the Empire until then made them
the point of comparison for other peoples
with the same cultural characteristics (cf.
Ephthaltite Huns and Avars ). On the
Huns and their military aspects, cf. NICOLLE
(1995a).
Ephthalite Huns : although they are
known by this name (Procopius, De Bello
Persico I 3-5) or by that of White Huns ,
there is no clear evidence of their connection
with the people who in the mid-5th century
and under the command of Attila attacked
both. Roman empires (cf. Huns ).
Mentioned for the first time by the Chinese
as a people settled on the western limits of
their Empire, throughout the 5th century they
moved towards the region of Sogdiana (in
present-day Turkmenistan) and northern
Persia, entering into a series of wars against
the Persian Empire that would end up
definitively defeating them in the time of
Khosrow I (531-579). After the disappearance
of their power, one group will join the
Persian army (Sebeos, History I 6), another
will move towards the west mixing with the
Avars in the area of the lower basin of the
Danube River while another group will move
towards the Ganges River, in India, where
shortly afterwards they would also end up
being defeated by a Hindu coalition.
Hypostrategos ( ὑποστρατεγός ): second in
command to a strategos , being the
commander of the cavalry. In other times of
the Empire, it would correspond to the
magister equitum (not to be confused with
the position of the same name, second in
command of a dictator, in republican times).
Mauricio himself explains his functions in book
I, chapter. 3 and 4.
Ilarca ( ἰλάρχης ): military rank whose
functions Mauricio himself explains in book I,
chapter. 3 and 5.
Libra : measure of weight that if it were
like the Roman one it would be 327.45 g.
Lombards : not very populous Germanic
people that Tacitus already refers to
(Germania XL, where he mentions them by
the other variant of their name: Lombards).
The migrations of the 5th century led them to
settle in the territory of present-day Austria,
moving shortly after in the direction of
Pannonia (eastern Austria and a large part of
Hungary, as well as currently Croatian and
Slovenian territories) where they met the
Heruli at which they would win in successive
battles (Paulo Diacono, Historia
Langobardorum I 20). After securing said
territory they received from the Eastern
Emperor Justinian I (527 565) the title of
federates of the Empire (Paul the Deacon,
Historia Langobardorum II 1).
His stay in Pannonia was not very long (Paul
the Deacon, Historia Langobardorum II 7)
because with the arrival to the throne of its
king Alboinus (c. 563-572) crossed the Alps
(in 568) founding a kingdom with the lands
occupied in northern Italy, the Padan plain
and Tuscany where their encounter with the
Byzantine Empire, supported by the Franks ,
stopped them, although they managed to
found, in the center and south of Italy, the
duchies of Spoleto and Benevento, which
ended up being isolated from the rest of the
Lombard territory.
Matiobarbulo (lat.: mattiobarbulum or
plumbata): it was a very short spear,
somewhat longer than a large dart, feathered
at the back, weighted with a lead ball in the
center and thrown by hand. According to
Vegetius (Epitoma Rei Militaris I 17, 3; II 15,
4), each soldier used to carry five of these
weapons on the inside of his shield. An
artistic reconstruction of how they were worn
on the shield can be seen in McDOWALL
(1994) plate A, and how it was used in
WINDROW (1995) p. 43.
Mensores : military position whose
functions Mauricio himself explains in book I,
chapter. 3.
Merarch ( μεράρχης ): officer who
commands a grouper .
Meros ( μέρος ): division, unit composed of
three moiras , approximately six thousand or
seven thousand men.
Mile : measurement of length that if it were
like the Roman one it would be 1478.5 m.
Moira ( μοῖρα ): unit of one thousand
soldiers, although it could be composed of
more men if the needs of the service required
it. It is equivalent to a chiliarchy .
Moirarch ( μοιράρχης ): officer who
commands a moira . It is equivalent to a
duke or a chiliarch .
Nephthalites : cf. phthalite huns .
Training officer : Mauricio uses the
Latinism καμπιδούκτωρ (lat.: campidoctor). He
is in charge of preparing the soldiers.
Optimates (lat.: optimates): unit of chosen
troops, generally formed by Gothic nobles
armed in the Germanic manner and which
constituted the elite troops of the reserve
closest to Constantinople, the imperial capital
(NICOLLE [1995b] p. 24) . The creation of
this type of troops was the initiative of
Emperor Maurice, in principle to militarily
replace some units of the imperial guard that,
like the excubitors, had lost military capacity
and had become a unit for parades and
military parades. Members of the optimates
probably descended from the gothograeci
(Greek Goths ) whose own ancestors were
Goths defeated, captured, and settled in the
late 4th century in western modern-day
Turkey. Its name comes from lat. optimus
(the best). Its cantonment in the lands of the
province of Bithynia in the 6th and 7th
centuries gave rise to more forward to the
name of thema 6 of Optimaton in
northwestern Asia Minor (occupying the
northern territories of the former low-imperial
province of Bithynia, corresponding, in whole
or in part, to the present-day Turkish
provinces of Bolu, Istanbul, Kokaeli, Sakarya
and Zoguldak ) (Constantine
Porphyriogenitus, De Thematibus, Ed. TO.
Pertusa, Studi e Testi 160. Vatican City, 1952,
130-133). The capital of the thema was in
Nicomedia (modern İzmit, Kokaeli province,
Türkiye). On this matter, cf. NICOLLE (1992)
pp. 8 and 10.
Ordinance ( ὁ τὴν κάππαν βαστάζων :
literally, "he who wears the cape"): military
rank whose functions are explained by
Mauricio himself in book I, chapter. 3.
Although it can be translated as bearer of the
cape, the term ordinance seems more
appropriate to us.
Pentarch ( πεντάρχης ): junior officer whose
book I, cap. 3.
Persians : traditional eastern enemies
primarily (the Achaemenid Persians ) of the
Greeks and Macedonians until the time of
Alexander III the Great (336-323 BC) and of
the Romans and Byzantines (the Sassanian
Persians ) from 226 AD At the beginning of
the 6th century, they began what is
considered their Second Golden Age,
expanding their Empire at the expense of
their immediate neighbors, such as the
Byzantines to the west, from whom they
managed to take important cities in Anatolia
and inflict severe defeats on them in Nisibis
(now Nusaybin, Mardin province, Turkey), in
530, and Callinicum (today Ar Raqqah, Ar
Raqqah province, Syria), in 531.
Chosroes I (531-579), the great monarch of
this period who ruled for 38 years, subjected
the Byzantines to continuous raids on their
territory and to the payment of a large sum in
gold to maintain peace. However, in the time
of Emperor Justin II (565-578) the
Byzantines, by refusing to pay the tribute,
broke off hostilities, thus beginning the so-
called Persian War described in detail by
writers such as Theophylacto Simocatta,
Menander the Protector and John of Ephesus.
in which it seems that Maurice stood out as a
brave soldier and that later as emperor he
may end favorably for the Byzantine arms
when a civil war occurred within the Persian
Empire for the succession to the throne after
Hormuz (Hormisdas) IV was deposed (579-
590 ). The military support of Maurice to the
son and successor of Hormuz (Hormisdas) IV,
Chosroes II (590-628) against the usurper
Bahram VI (590-591) will facilitate peace,
which will again be broken when Mauritius is
deposed, assassinated and succeeded by
Seals in 602.
Foot : unit of length of which we do not
know if the author uses the Roman or
Byzantine foot . The first is equivalent to
29.56 cm, while the most common
measurement of the second was 31.23 cm.
On this, cf. SCHILBACH (1970) pp. 13-16.
Eagle bearer ( ὀρνιθοβόρος ; lat.:
urnaphorus): would be the soldier in charge
of carrying a banner with the figure of an
eagle (what the aquilifer formerly carried)
although G. T. Dennis (1984, p. 172) believes
that he is an aide-de-camp or orderly . If it
really were an "eagle bearer" we would be
faced with the survival of this ancient
standard of the Roman legions in the
Byzantine army, although it is probably
nothing more than another survival, in the
times of Maurice, of a previous word.
Standard bearer ( βανδοφόρος ): soldier
who carries the standard and who would be
equivalent to the old signifer of the "classical"
Roman army. Its functions are explained by
Prómajos ( πρόμαχος ): first line of troops
in battle formation.
Schola : military unit approximately
equivalent to a battalion (currently and in the
Spanish army, about four hundred soldiers).
Tagma ( τάγμα ): regular unit of soldiers
composed of a theoretical strength of just
over three hundred men. It would be
equivalent to a flag . The member of a
tagma is called ταγματικός : tagmatikós.
Taxiarch ( ταξιάρχης ): name given to a
moirarch who commands one or two
thousand soldiers of the optimates . Its
functions are explained by Mauricio himself in
book I, chapter. 3. The word taxiarch was
already used by Arrian (Tactica 10, 2 and 9)
in the second century.
Tetrarch ( τετράρχης ): junior officer whose
book I, cap. 3.
Tribune (lat.: tribunus): in the late Roman
army, he is the commander of a flag ,
tagma or aritmos and would be equivalent
to the count . Its functions are explained by
Trumpet : cf. bugle .
Assault troops : Mauritius uses the
Latinism κούρσωρ (lat.: cursor), troops in open
or extended order.
Defense troops : defenders. Mauricio uses
the Latinism δηφένσωρ (lat.: defender), troops
in close order.
Turks : nomadic people originally from
Central Asia. It is in the 6th century when the
first references in the West to this town begin
to be made. Due to its settlement on the
borders of the Persian Empire, its disputes
with it were continuous, seeking Byzantine
support against the Persians on more than
one occasion. On the Turks and their military
aspects in their early times, cf. NICOLLE
(1995a).
Vexiliarius (lat.: vexilliarius): is the bearer
of a vexillum or cavalry standard .
Helmet (lat.: cassis): the helmet or
helmet is a basic element of the defensive
armament of the late imperial and Byzantine
Roman soldier. Made of iron (less and less in
bronze), there were many types, with mostly
hemispherical shapes and a minority of
conical ones. All of them used to have a
longitudinal reinforcement from the forehead
to the nape of the neck (some culminating in
the form of a metal crest) and almost all
included cheek pads and neck covers.
Depending on the type, they could also wear
a nose cover and a throat protection. To the
taste of their owner (or, sometimes,
according to ordinance) they could be, or not,
adorned with feathers.
1 Gregory of Tours (Historia Francorum IV 29) calls

them Huns , in memory of their origin, although at
that time they no longer had anything to do with that
people.
(cf. Huns ). Their leader, the chronicler continues,
uocabatur enim Gaganus. Omnes enim regis gentes
illius hoc appellantur nomine ("they called him Gagán
[chagán, khan, jan]. This is, in fact, the name that
designates all the kings of this nation.
2 Food widely consumed by Roman soldiers (Codex
Theodosianus VII 4, 6).
3 Since the mid- 7th century, the name (Greek, θέμα )
of a Byzantine province.
4 Today Zülpich, district of Euskirchen, administrative
region of Cologne, state of North Rhine-Westphalia,
Germany.
5 Today Vouillé, Vienne department, France.
6 Since the middle of the 7th century, the name
(Greek: θέμα ) of a Byzantine province.
Thematic index
name index
Acilius Attianus (Publius) (Roman military): p.
211 (no. 113).
Adarmaanes (Persian general): p. twenty.
Hadrian (Roman emperor): pp. 35, 36 (no.
53), 44, 210 (n. 113), 211 (no. 113).
Aelius Aurelius Commodus (Marcus) (cf.
Comfortable).
Aelius Aurelius Verus (Marcus) (cf. Marcus
Aurelius).
Aelius Hadrianus (Publius) (cf. Hadrian).
Alboinus (Lombard king): p. 308.
Anastasia (daughter of Emperor Maurice): p.
29.
Anastasius (Persian soldier martyr): pp. 45,
89
(no. 6), 162 (no. 90).
Anastasius I (Eastern Roman Emperor): p. 31.
Hannibal (Carthaginian politician and military
man): pp. 32, 43, 44, 49, 202, 203, 203 (nos.
111 and 112).
Achaemenid (Persian dynasty): pp. 240 (no.
125), 309.
Ardagastos (Slavic chief): p. twenty-one.
Attila (leader of the Huns): p. 307.
Aurelius Antoninus (Marcus) (cf. Caracalla).
Aurelius Probus (Marcus) (cf. Probo).
Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus (Caius) (cf.
Diocletian).
Avidius Nigrinus (Caius) (Roman politician and
military man): p. 211 (no. 113).
Augustus (Roman emperor): pp. 20, 35, 36
(no. 53), 53.
Bahram Chobin (Persian usurper): pp. 27,
309.
Bahram V (king of Persia): p. 144 (no. 85).
Bahram VI (cf. Bahram Chobin).
Baian (Avar chief): p. 22.
Belisarius (Roman-Byzantine general): pp. 24,
54, 54 (no. 68), 55, 307.
Belisarius (Flavius) (cf. Belisarius).
Bokolobras (Avar chief): p. 22.
Cabrias (Athenian general): pp. 43, 45, 201
(n. 106), 203 (n. 112).
Callinicus of Heliopolis (medieval inventor): p.
229 (no. 121).
Caracalla (Roman emperor): p. 36.
Charlemagne (Emperor of the Franks): p.
300.
Castus (Roman-Byzantine general): p. 22
Caesar (Roman politician and military man):
pp. 42, 145 (no. 88), 202 (no. 109).
Chabrias (cf. Cabrias).
Claudius Nero (Tiberius) (cf. Tiberius).
Cleopatra (daughter of Emperor Maurice): p.
29.
Comentiolus (Roman-Byzantine general): pp.
22, 22 (no. 14), 25, 25 (no. 21), 26, 27, 29,
227 (n. 120).
Commodus (Roman emperor): p. 36 (no. 53).
Constantine (Eastern Roman Empress,
daughter of Emperor Tiberius II and wife of
Emperor Maurice): pp. 20, 29.
Constantius II (Roman emperor): p. 302.
Constantine I (Roman emperor): pp. 9, 21
(no. 11), 51, 52, 53, 98 (n. 34).
Constantine VII (Eastern Roman Emperor):
pp. 21 (no. 11), 32, 32 (n. 44), 33, 98 (n.
34), 301.
Constantine Porphyrogenitus (cf. Constantine
VII).
Cornelius Palma (Aulus) (Roman politician and
military man): p. 211 (no. 113).
Cornelius Scipio (Publius) (cf. Scipio
Africanus).
Chosroes I (Persian emperor): pp. 307, 309.
Chosroes II (Persian emperor): pp. 27, 27
(no. 22), 29, 30, 45, 216 (n. 116), 240 (no.
124), 309.
Decius (Roman emperor): pp. 44, 49, 145,
145 (nos. 86 and 87).
Deus: pp. 41, 116, 116 (n. 51), 274, 290.
Diocletian (Roman emperor): pp. 9, 20 (no.
6), 25 (no. 19), 51, 52.
God: pp. 30, 41, 42 (no. 55), 46, 47, 50, 81,
82 (n. 2), 105, 116 (n. 51), 169, 180, 181,
183 (n. 96), 194, 195, 198, 252, 274 (n. 172),
290 (no. 205).
Domitian (Roman emperor): p. 210 (no. 113).
Domitianus (Roman-Byzantine bishop and
imperial advisor): pp. 27, 27 (no. 23).
Drocton (Roman-Byzantine general): p. 23.
Scipio Africanus (Roman politician and military
man): pp. 42, 49, 203, 203 (n. 111).
Fernández de Córdoba (Gonzalo) (Spanish
military): p. 193 (no. 101).
Flavius Domitianus (Titus) (cf. Domitian).
Flavius Claudius Iulianus (cf. Julian).
Flavius Iulius Constantius (cf. Constantius II).
Flavius Mauricius (cf. Mauricio).
Flavius Mauricius Tiberius (cf. Mauricio).
Flavius Petrus Sabbatius Iustinianus (cf.
Justinian I).
Flavius Phocas (cf. Seals).
Flavius Theodosius (cf. Theodosius I).
Flavius Theodosius (cf. Theodosius II).
Flavius Valens ( cf. Valente).
Flavius Valerius Constantinus (Caius) (cf.
Constantine I).
Flavius Valerius Leo ( cf. Leo I).
Phocas (Eastern Roman Emperor): pp. 28, 29,
30, 31, 309.
Gallienus (Roman emperor): p. 52 (no. 61).
Germanus (in-law of Emperor Maurice): p. 29.
Germanus (Roman-Byzantine general): p. 26.
Gordia (sister of Emperor Maurice): pp. 19,
23 (no. 14), 26, 31.
Gratian (Roman emperor in the West): p. 52
(no. 63).
Great Captain (cf. Fernández de Córdoba
[Gonzalo]).
Great King (official title of the Persian
emperor): p. 27.
Gratianus ( Flavius ) ( cf. Gratian).
Gregory I (saint) (pope): pp. 19 (no. 1), 27.
Heraclius (Eastern Roman Emperor): pp. 31,
32, 301.
Heraclius (cf. Heraclius).
Hormisdas IV (cf. Hormuz IV).
Immaculate (Virgin Mary): p. 81.
Isaiah (prophet): p. 183 (no. 96).
Isauric (dynasty of the Roman Empire of
East): p. 54 (no. 67).
Isocrates (politician and orator): pp. 43, 197
(no.
103).
Imperator Caesar Augustus (cf. August).
Iulius Caesar (Caius) (cf. Cease).
Iulius Caesar Octavianus (Caius) (cf.
August).
Iustinus (son of Emperor Maurice): p. 29.
Jesus Christ: pp. 27 (no. 24), 30, 81 (n. 2).
John IV (patriarch of Constantinople): p. 28.
John Chrysostom (saint): p. 183 (no. 96).
Julian (Roman emperor): p. 52.
Julius Caesar (cf. Cease).
Justinian I (Eastern Roman Emperor): pp. 9,
19, 21 (no. 10), 24, 29, 29 (n. 26), 36 (no.
53), 44, 51, 53, 54, 56, 148 (n. 89), 175 (no.
93), 216 (no. 116), 218 (no. 117), 299, 304,
305, 307, 308.
Justin II (Eastern Roman Emperor): pp. 19,
309.
Kniva (Gothic leader): p. 145 (no. 86).
Leo I (Eastern Roman Emperor): pp. 20 (no.
5), 54 (no. 67).
Leo III (Eastern Roman Emperor): p. 54 (no.
67).
Leo VI (Eastern Roman emperor and military
treatise writer): pp. 32, 32 (no. 43), 33, 34,
45, 107 (n. 38), 179 (n. 94), 201 (no. 106),
203 (n. 112).
Leontia (Roman Empress of the East): p. 29.
Leovigild (Visigoth king): p. 25.
Licinius Egnatius Gallienus (Publius) (cf.
Gallienus).
Lusius Quietus (Mauritanian prince and soldier
in the service of Rome): pp. 44, 49, 210 (n.
113), 211 (no. 113).
Mary (mother of Jesus Christ): pp. 28, 32 (no.
38), 47, 81.
Mary (wife of Chosroes II and daughter of
Emperor Maurice?): p. 27.
Marcus Aurelius (Roman emperor): p. 36, no.
53.
Martinus (Roman-Byzantine general): p. 22.
Maurice (Eastern Roman Emperor): pp. 9, 19,
19 (nos. 1 and 3), 20, 20 (n. 8), 21, 21 (no.
7), 23, 23 (n. 14), 24, 24 (no. 15), 25, 26, 26
(n. 21), 27, 27 (n. 23), 28, 28 (no. 25), 29,
29 (n. 26), 30, 31, 32, 32 (n. 44), 33, 34, 34
(n. 52), 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 42 (ns.
55 and 56), 43, 44, 45, 45 (n. 57), 46, 49, 50,
51, 53, 56, 57, 81 (n. 2), 82 (nos. 3 and 4),
91 (n. 12), 108 (no. 39), 116 (no. 49), 117
(no. 53), 144 (no. 84), 145 (no. 87), 184 (no.
99), 203 (no. 112), 216 (no. 116), 268 (no.
154), 269 (nos. 156 and 158), 301, 302, 303,
304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310.
Messius Quintus Decius (Caius) (cf. Decius).
Narses (general Roman-Byzantine, of
Justinian I): p. 175 (no. 95).
Narses (Roman-Byzantine general, of
Justinian I): pp. 175 (no. 95), 216 (no. 116),
307.
Narses (Roman-Byzantine general, from
Mauritius): p. 216 (no. 116).
Our Lady: p. 81.
Our Lord (referring to Jesus Christ): pp. 30,
81, 81 (n. 2).
Odoacer (king of the Heruli): p. 306.
Hormuz IV (Persian emperor): pp. 20, 27, 216
(n. 116), 309.
Paulus (son of Emperor Maurice): p. 29.
Paulus (father of Emperor Maurice): p. 19.
Pelagius II (pope): p. 27.
Pelayo (Don) (king of Asturias): p. 304.
Peroz (cf. Peroz I).
Peroz I (king of Persia): pp. 44, 144, 144 (n.
85).
Petrus (brother of Emperor Maurice): pp. 19,
23, 24, 28, 29.
Petrus (son of Emperor Maurice): p. 29.
Philippicus (Roman-Byzantine general and
brother-in-law of Emperor Maurice): pp. 23,
23 (no. 14), 26, 31.
Pompeius Magnus (Cneus) (cf. Pompey).
Pompey (Roman general): p. 53.
Porcius Cato Licinianus (Marcus) (Roman
politician, son of Cato the Censor): p. 35 (no.
53).
Porphyrogenitus (cf. Constantine VII).
Priscus (Roman-Byzantine general): pp. 23,
26.
Probus (Roman emperor): pp. 54 (no. 67),
105 (no. 57).
Providence: pp. 82, 292.
Publilius Celsus (Lucius) (Roman politician
and military man): p. 211 (no. 113).
Redeemer (referring to Jesus Christ): p. 30.
Rodrigo (king of the Visigoths): p. 305.
Romulus Augustulus (Western Roman
Emperor): p. 306.
Romulus Augustus (cf. Romulus Augustulus).
Salvador: pp. 81, 81 (no. 2).
Holy Trinity, Holy Trinity: pp.
30, 47, 81, 81 (n. 2).
Lord (referring to Jesus Christ): pp. 30, 81,
81 (n. 2), 82, 116 (n. 50).
Septimius Bassianus (cf. Caracalla).
Suintila (king of the Visigoths): p. 26.
Tamchosroes (Persian general): p. twenty.
Tarasicodissa (cf. Zeno).
Theodora (Roman Empress of the East): p.
29.
Theodoric I (Ostrogoth king): p. 304.
Theodosius I (Roman emperor): p. 52.
Theodosius II (Eastern Roman Emperor): p.
183 (no. 96).
Theoctista (sister of Emperor Maurice): p. 19.
Theoctista (daughter of Emperor Maurice): p.
29.
Theodosius (son of Emperor Maurice): pp. 28,
29.
Tiberius (Roman emperor): p. 35 (no. 53).
Tiberius II (Eastern Roman Emperor): pp. 19,
20, 20 (no. 8).
Tiberius (son of Emperor Maurice): pp. 28,
29.
Tiberius Constantinus (cf. Tiberius II).
Almighty (God): p. 82.
All Saints: p. 81.
Trajan (Roman emperor): pp. 35, 36 (no. 53),
44, 49, 210, 210 (n. 113), 211 (no. 113), 302.
Valens (Roman emperor): pp. 52, 52 (no. 63).
Vercingetorix (Galic leader): p. 42.
Virgin Mother of God: pp. 28, 32 (no. 38), 47,
81.
Vlpius Traianus (Marcus) (cf. Trajan).
Witiza (king of the Visigoths): p. 305.
Yazdegerd II (king of Persia): p. 144 (no. 85).
Zeno (Eastern Roman Emperor): p. 54 (no.
67).
Index of toponyms
Abrit (current location): p. 22.
Abrittus (ancient place): pp. 49, 145 (no. 86).
Achaea (ancient province): pp. 23, 306.
Ad Aquas (old place): p. 22 (no. 12).
Adamclisi (current location): p. 22 (no. 12).
Afghanistan (current country): p. 303.
Africa (ancient and current continent): pp. 24,
54.
Africa (old demarcation): pp. 24, 24 (no.
17), 56.
Afyonkarahisar (current administrative
demarcation): p. 301.
Akbas (ancient place): pp. 27, 30, 227 (n.
120).
Al Hasakah (current administrative
Al Jamah (present location): p. 111.
Germany (current country): p. 305 (no. 4).
Algarve (current region): p. 24.
Alesia (ancient place): pp. 42, 145 (no. 88).
Alicante (current city and administrative
district): p. 25.
Alise-Sainte-Reine (current location): pp. 42,
145 (no. 88).
Alps (old and current mountain range): p.
308.
Ambar (current location): pp. 27, 227 (no.
120).
Ana (current river): p. 22.
Anatolia (current region): p. 309.
Anchialus (ancient place): pp. 21, 23.
Ancyra (ancient place): p. 301.
Andalusia (current administrative
Anglon (ancient place): pp. 49, 175 (no. 93).
Ankara (city and current administrative
district): p. 301.
Antalya (current administrative demarcation):
p. 20 (no. 5).
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(current country): pp. 30, 211 (no. 115).
Aphumon (ancient place): p. 227 (no. 120).
Aquis (ancient place): pp. 22, 22 (no. 12).
Arabissus (ancient place): p. 19.
Ar Raqqah (current place and administrative
demarcation): pp. 20, 309.
Arčar (current location): p. 22 (no. 12).
Armenia (ancient region and current country):
pp.
27, 44, 49, 56, 175 (n. 93), 229 (no. 120).
Armenia II (ancient province): p. 19 (no. 2).
Armenia III (ancient province): p. 19.
Arzanene (old region): pp. 26, 44, 227, 227
(n. 120).
Asia (ancient province): p. 35 (no. 53).
Central Asia (current region): pp. 242 (no.
127), 310.
Asia Minor (ancient and current region): pp.
301, 309.
Athens (ancient and current place): p. 306.
Austria (current country): pp. 90 (no. 8), 307.
Auxois (mountain) (current location): pp. 42,
145 (no. 88).
Bactria (ancient region): p. 303.
Balkans (old and current region): pp. 21, 23,
299, 300, 304.
Balearic Islands (islands and current
administrative demarcation): pp. 25, 26, 28.
Banya (current location): p. 22.
Başka Kale (current location): pp. 27, 227
(no.
120).
Batman (current river): p. 227 (no. 120).
Badajoz (current place and administrative
demarcation): p. 25 (no. 19).
Belgrade (present location): p. 307.
Benevento (old duchy): p. 308.
Beroea (ancient place): p. 22.
Biltis (current administrative demarcation): p.
227 (no. 120).
Bithynia (ancient province): pp. 29, 201, 309.
Bitola (current place and administrative
demarcation): pp. 30, 211 (no. 115).
Bluèvina (current location): p. 266 (no. 147).
Bolu (current administrative demarcation):
pp. 301, 309.
Bononia (ancient place): pp. 22, 22 (no. 12).
Boukelarion (old administrative demarcation):
p. 301.
Britannia (ancient province): pp. 35 (no. 53),
36.
Brno (current location): p. 266 (no. 147).
Bulgaria (current country): pp. 21, 22, 22 (no.
12), 46, 145 (n. 86), 305.
Burgas (current administrative demarcation):
p. twenty-one.
Callinicum (ancient place): pp. 20, 309.
Çankiri (current administrative demarcation):
p. 301.
Cappadocia (ancient province): p. 19 (no. 2).
Cartagena (current location): pp. 25, 25 (no.
21). Carthage (ancient place): pp. 35 (no.
53), 53. Carthago (ancient place): pp. 24, 35
(no. 53) Carthago Nova (ancient place): p.
25.
Carthago Spartaria (ancient place): pp. 25,
26.
Sardinia (current island): p. 28.
Ceuta (current location): p. 25.
Chrysopolis (ancient place): p. 32 (no. 38).
Cilicia (ancient province): p. 54 (no. 67).
Colonia (current place and administrative
Valencian Community (current administrative
Constanza (current administrative
demarcation location): pp. 22, 22 (no. 12).
Constantine (ancient place): p. twenty.
Constantinople (ancient place): pp. 20, 21,
23, 27 (n. 23), 28, 28 (no. 25), 29, 29 (n.
26), 33, 53, 56, 89 (n. 5), 183 (no. 96), 216
(no. 116), 229 (no. 121), 265 (no. 145), 300,
304, 308.
Corsica (current island): p. 28.
Córdoba (city and current administrative
district): pp. 25, 193 (no. 101). Corduba
(ancient place): pp. 25, 25 (no. 20). Çorum
(current administrative district): p. 301.
Côte-d'Or (current administrative
Croatia (current country): p. 299.
Dacia (old province): p. 306.
Dacia Ripensis (old province): p. 22.
Danube (current river): pp. 21, 22, 53, 55,
145, 246 (n. 132), 248, 249 (n. 136), 250,
251 (n. 140), 299, 301, 304, 306, 307.
Danuvius (ancient river): p. twenty-one.
Denia (current location): p. 25.
Dianium (ancient place): p. 25.
Diocletianopolis (ancient place): p. 22.
Diyarbakir (current administrative
demarcation): pp. 26, 27, 227 (n. 120).
Dniester (current river): pp. 299, 304.
Dobrudja (current region): p. 145 (no. 86).
Dorostolon (ancient place): pp. 22, 22 (no.
12).
Durostorum (ancient place): p. 22 (no. 12).
Dvin (present place): pp. 49, 175 (no. 93).
Edessa (ancient place): p. 211 (no. 113).
Edirne (current place and administrative
Emerita Augusta (ancient place): p. 25 (no.
19).
Yerevan (present place): pp. 49, 175 (no.
95).
Ergina (ancient river): p. 22.
Scandinavian (peninsula) (current territory):
pp. 304, 306.
Escútari (current place): p. 32 (no. 38).
Eski Malatya (present place): pp. 19 (no. 2),
27 (no. 23).
Eskişehir (current administrative district): p.
301.
Slovenia (current country): p. 299.
Spain (current country): pp. 24, 25 (no. 19).
Istanbul (current city and administrative
district): pp. 21, 32 (no. 38), 309.
Europe (old and present continent): pp. 9,
21, 306.
Euskirchen (current administrative
Extremadura (current administrative
Flaminia (ancient province): p. 24.
France (current country): pp. 42, 145 (no.
88),
305 (no. 5), 306.
Galatia I (ancient province): p. 301.
Ganges (ancient and present river): p. 307.
Garzan (current river): p. 227 (no. 120).
Hadrianopolis (ancient place): pp. 23, 52 (no.
63).
Haemimontus (ancient province): pp. 21, 23,
52 (n. 63).
Haskovo (current administrative district): p.
22.
Heracleia (ancient place): pp. 211, 211 (no.
115).
Heraclea Lyncestis (ancient site): pp. 30, 211
(no. 115).
Heraklea (ancient place): pp. 30, 45.
Hisarya (present place): p. 22.
Hispania (old province): p. 24, 25, 25 (no.
21), 26, 26 (n. 21).
Hispaniarum (dioecese) (ancient
administrative demarcation): p. 25 (no. 19).
Hispanias (diocese of the) (old administrative
Hister (old river): pp. 21, 22, 24, 28.
Hissar (present place): p. 22.
Hisarlak (present place): pp. 50, 145 (no. 86).
Hungary (current country): pp. 299, 307.
Iberian Peninsula (old and current territory):
pp. 25, 25 (no. 20), 36, 304.
Byzantine Empire (ancient territory): pp.
26, 54 (no. 67), 230 (no. 123), 307, 308.
Persian Empire (ancient territory): pp. 26,
307, 309, 310.
Roman Empire (ancient territory): pp. 9, 26,
36, 50, 51, 52, 53, 93 (n. 19), 96 (no. 32),
230 (no. 123), 300, 303, 307.
Western Roman Empire (ancient territory):
pp. 24, 34, 36, 304, 305.
Eastern Roman Empire (ancient territory): pp.
9, 21, 24, 26, 34, 36, 49, 50, 51, 54 (n. 67),
56, 91 (n. 12), 218 (no. 117), 227 (no. 120),
246 (no. 132), 299.
India (current country): pp. 27 (no. 24), 307.
Isauria (ancient province): pp. 20 (no. 5), 54
(no. 67).
Italy (old territory and current country): pp.
24, 28, 30, 53 54 (n. 64), 300, 304, 307, 308.
Iudaea (ancient province): p. 210 (no. 113).
İzmit (present place): pp. 29, 309.
Jama (current location): p. 111.
Jutland (present-day peninsula): p. 306.
Kahramanmaraş (demarcation
current administrative): p. 19.
Karaman (administrative demarcation
current): p. 20 (no. 5).
Kermānshāh/Bajtaran (present location): p.
240 (no. 124).
Kermānshāhā (current administrative
Kiklareli (demarcation administrative
current): p. 22.
Kirikkale (demarcation administrative
current): p. 301.
Kirşehir (current administrative district): p.
301.
Kiziltepe (current location): p. 26.
Kokaeli (current administrative demarcation):
pp. 29, 309.
Konya (current administrative demarcation):
p. 301.
Lebanon (current country): p. 27.
Libida (old place): p. 22.
Macedonia I (ancient province): p. 23.
Macedonia II (ancient province): p. 211 (no.
115).
Málaga (current administrative district): p. 25.
Malatya (current administrative demarcation):
pp. 19 (no. 2), 27 (no. 23).
Marcianopolis (ancient place): pp. 22, 22 (no.
12).
Mardin (current administrative demarcation):
pp. 26, 211 (no. 113), 309.
Marmara (current sea): p. 29.
Martyropolis (ancient place): pp. 26, 227 (no.
120).
Mauretania Tingitana (old province): p.
25 (no. 19).
Mejafarkin (current location): pp. 26, 227 (no.
120).
Melitene (ancient place): pp. 19 (no. 2), 27
(no. 23).
Mérida (current location): p. 25 (no. 19).
Mermer (current location): pp. 26, 227 (no.
120).
Mersin (current administrative demarcation):
p. 20 (no. 5).
Moesia (ancient province): p. 145.
Mesia Inferior (ancient province): p. 145 (no.
86).
Mesopotamia (ancient province): p. twenty.
Mesopotamia (ancient region): p. 27.
Miloševo (current location): p. 22 (no. 12).
Miseno of Bacoli (current location): p. 53.
Misenum (ancient place): p. 53.
Moesia Inferior (ancient province): pp. 44.
145 (no. 86).
Moesia II (ancient province): p. 22. Moldova
(current country): p. 251 (no. 140).
Monokarton (old place): p. 26.
Montana (current administrative
Moravia (current region): p. 306.
Murcia (current administrative demarcation):
p. 25.
Naples (current administrative demarcation):
pp. 53, 193 (no. 101).
Negotin (current location): p. 22 (no. 12).
Negro (current sea): pp. 21, 53, 242 (nos.
127 and 128).
Nicomedia (ancient place): pp. 29, 309.
Nisibis (ancient place): p. 211 (no. 113), p.
309.
Nusaybin (current location): p. 211 (no. 113),
309.
Nymphius (ancient river): p. 227 (no. 120).
West (old territorial scope): pp. 9, 24, 28, 32
(n. 44), 53, 93 (n. 19), 310.
Optimaton (old administrative district): p.
309.
East (ancient territorial scope): pp. 20, 21
(no. 10), 25, 27, 32 (n. 44), 49.
Padana (plain) (present-day region): p. 308.
Pannonia (ancient province): pp. 21, 21 (no.
10), 299, 307, 308.
Pannonia II (ancient province): p. 21 (no.
10).
Peloponnese (ancient and present region): p.
23.
Balkan Peninsula (cf. Balkans).
Persia (ancient country): pp. 27, 227 (no.
120), 242 (no. 128), 307.
Philippopolis (ancient place): p. 22.
Phenicia Libanensis (old province): p.
26.
Phrygia (ancient place): p. 52 (no. 62).
Phrygia Salutaris (ancient province): p. 301.
Phrygia II (ancient province): p. 301.
Plovdiv (current place and administrative
Pomorie (present place): p. twenty-one.
Pontus Euxinus (ancient sea): pp. 21, 22.
Prahovo (current location): p. 22 (no. 12).
Propontis (ancient sea): p. 29.
Rateria (old place): pp. 22, 22 (no. 12).
Ratiaria (ancient place): p. 22 (no. 21).
Ravenna (current place and administrative
demarcation): pp. 24, 53.
Ravenna (ancient place): p. 24, 24 (no. 17).
Razgrad (present place): pp. 49, 145 (no.
86).
North Rhine-Westphalia (current
administrative demarcation): p. 305 (no. 4).
Czech Republic (current country): pp. 266
(no.
147), 306.
Rome (ancient and current place): pp. 28, 35
(no. 53), 36, 49, 55, 202 (n. 109), 302.
Romania (current country): pp. 22 (no. 12),
145 (no. 86), 246 (no. 132), 250 (no. 136),
251 (n. 140), 306.
Ruse (current administrative demarcation): p.
22 (no. 12), 49, 145 (n. 86).
Sakarya (current administrative district): p.
309.
Salāh (present place): p. 26.
Salahuddīn (Saladin) (current demarcation):
p. 52 (no. 62).
Sāmarrā' (present place): p. 52 (no. 62).
Thessaloniki (current location and
administrative demarcation): p. 23.
Sanliurfa (current location): p. 211 (no. 113).
Hagia Sophia (church): p. 29.
Scythia (ancient province): pp. 22, 23.
Septem (ancient place): pp. 25, 26.
Serbia (current country): pp. 21, 22 (no. 12),
307.
Siirt (current place and administrative
Silistra (present place): p. 22 (no. 12).
Singidunum (ancient place): p. 307.
Sirmium (ancient place): pp. 21, 21 (no. 10),
22 (no. 13).
Sicily (ancient and current island): pp. 28, 54,
304.
Silvan (present location): p. 227 (no. 120).
Şirvan (present place): p. 27.
Syria (current country): pp. 20, 26, 309.
Sisarbanon (ancient place): p. 27.
Slava Rusă (current location): p. 22.
Sogdiana (old region): pp. 303, 307.
Solachon (old place): p. 26.
Spain (cf. Hispania).
Spoleto (old duchy): p. 308.
Sremska-Mitrovica (current location): p.
twenty-one.
Stara Zagora (current location): p. 22.
Tangier (current place and administrative
Tanir (present place): p. 19.
Taq-e Bostan (present place): p. 240 (no.
124).
Tekirdağ (current administrative
Theotokos (ancient monastery): p. 32 (no.
38).
Thessalonica (ancient place): p. 23.
Thracia (ancient province and diocese): pp.
22, 22 (no. 13), 28.
Tigris (ancient and current river): p. 227 (no.
120).
Tingis (ancient place): p. 25.
Tolbiacum (ancient place): p. 305.
Toledo (medieval kingdom): p. 304.
Tomis (ancient place): pp. 22, 23.
Tuscany (current region): p. 308.
Thrace (ancient province): pp. 31, 145, 305.
Tropaeum Traiani (ancient place): p. 22 (no.
12).
Tropaion (ancient place): pp. 22, 22 (no. 12).
Tulcea (place and current administrative
Tunisia (current place and administrative
Tunisia (current country): pp. 24, 203 (no.
111). Turkmenistan (current country): pp.
303, 307.
Türkiye (current country): pp. 19, 19 (no. 2),
20, 20 (no. 5), 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32 (n.
38), 54 (no. 67), 211 (no. 113), 227 (no.
120), 309. Ukraine (current country): pp. 251
(no. 140), 304. Urfa (current administrative
Üskudar (current location): p. 32 (no. 38).
Wallachia (current region): p. 249 (no. 136).
Van (current lake): p. 227 (no. 120).
Van (current administrative demarcation): p.
227 (no. 120).
Varna (current place and administrative
Vidin (current location): p. 22 (no. 12).
Vienna (current city): p. 90 (no. 8).
Vienne (current administrative district): p.
305.
Viransehir (present place): p. twenty.
Voglada (ancient place): p. 305.
Vouillé (current location): p. 305 (no. 5).
Yerevan (present place): pp. 49, 175 (no.
95).
Zaldapa (old place): p. 22.
Zama (ancient place): p. 203 (no. 111).
Zergan (current river): p. 26.
Zerzel Kale (current location): p. 227 (no.
119).
Zeugitana (old province): p. 24.
Zoguldak (current administrative district): p.
309.
Zülpich (current location): p. 305 (no. 4).
Subject index and common names

Caltrop(s): pp. 145, 146, 267, 279, 285, 286,
288, 291, 299.
acies in acies (order): p. 276.
quartering: pp. 38, 177, 301.
ad contum clina (order): p. 275.
ad decarchas (order): p. 126.
ad fulco, ad fulcum (order): pp. 274, 290 (n.
203).
ad latus stringe (order): pp. 124, 126.
ad octo (order): p. 274.
ad pentarchas (order): p. 126.
ad scutum clina, move (order): p. 276.
adiuta (order): pp. 274, 290.
African(s), African-style: pp. 48, 75, 159, 161,
162.
August: pp. 20, 28, 52 (n. 63), 232.
eagle(s): pp. 268, 268 (no. 154), 272, 278,
305, 310.
water(s): pp. 53, 99, 112, 115, 154, 172,
173, 184, 184 (n. 99), 200, 203, 215, 227,
231, 232, 233, 241, 244, 247, 286 (n. 197),
287, 289, 303.
alano(s), a la alana: pp. 12, 48, 75, 159, 161,
162, 301, 302.
Alemanni: pp. 305, 307.
alarm: p. 282.
saddlebag(s): pp. 12, 48, 76, 91, 167, 172,
184.
quiver(s): pp. 90, 266, 299.
ally, ally, allies: pp. 55, 176, 178, 196, 199,
201, 305.
Early Roman Empire: p. 96 (no. 32).
high command: p. 55.
dawn: pp. 209, 211, 286.
ami fulco (order): pp. 290, 290 (no. 203).
mutineer(s): pp. 26, 29, 196.
host: pp. 194, 246.
before (town): pp. 14, 30, 49, 77, 213, 237,
246, 246 (n. 132), 250, 280, 299, 304.
anteagittator: p. 270 (no. 158).
antidote: p. 247.
apocrisiary: p. 28 (no. 25).
aquilae: p. 305.
aquilifer: p. 310.
Arabs: pp. 30, 55, 229 (n. 121).
groves: p. 247.
arc(s): pp. 89 (no. 5), 90, 91, 92, 93, 96,
111, 112, 123, 170, 177, 183, 199, 211, 240,
240 (n. 124), 241, 242, 243, 247, 262, 265,
265 (n. 146), 266, 266 (nos. 149 and 150),
267, 268, 269, 274, 280, 292, 300.
arcuballista: pp. 38, 266 (no. 149).
harangue(s), harangue: pp. 12, 48, 75, 167,
171, 179, 306.
harangue(s): pp. 94 (no. 29), 184, 306.
battering ram(s): pp. 229, 230.
arhythms: pp. 15, 57, 78, 93, 93 (n. 19), 255,
265, 267, 268, 299, 310.
imperial navy: pp. 53, 55.
armor(s): pp. 92, 181, 240, 240 (n. 124), 267
(no. 151), 268, 289.
armament, weapon(s): pp. 10, 13, 15, 32, 37,
38, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 74, 76, 78,
89 (n. 5), 90, 91, 92, 92 (n. 16), 93, 94, 97,
99, 103, 111, 112, 113 (n. 47), 123, 168,
177, 181, 191, 194, 197, 199, 202, 203, 211,
228, 229 (n. 121), 241, 243, 248, 251 (n.
140), 255, 264, 265, 266, 266 (n. 149), 267,
268, 268 (n. 153), 272, 273, 275, 278, 280,
292, 300, 303, 308, 309, 311.
archer(s): pp. 13, 15, 37, 54, 76, 78, 89 (n.
5), 91 (no. 12), 108, 110, 111, 113, 125, 126,
167, 170, 175, 175 (n. 93), 179, 199, 209,
211, 240, 241, 245, 255, 263, 265, 267, 268,
269, 271, 272, 274, 281, 282, 284, 292, 293,
295, 301.
horse archers: pp. 37, 54, 91 (n. 12).
Arianism: p. 183 (no. 96).
craftsman(s): p. 232.
artillery: pp. 230, 230 (no. 123), 231, 267.
assailant(s): p. 247.
assault(s): pp. 10, 38, 73, 94, 103, 105, 108,
109, 111, 135, 137, 146, 147, 161, 162, 163,
170, 181, 182, 201, 209, 212, 228, 244, 258,
310.
siege(s): pp. 14, 22, 23, 41, 42, 44, 48, 77,
113, 145 (n. 88), 225, 227, 227 (n. 120), 228,
229, 229 (n. 121), 230, 230 (n. 123), 231,
239.
attack(s): pp. 10, 11, 12, 13, 24 (no. 15), 25,
28, 30, 45, 48, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 94, 103,
105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 114, 116 (n. 52),
121, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137,
138, 141, 143, 146, 147, 148, 159, 163, 167,
168, 169, 170, 173, 176, 177 , 178, 180, 194,
199, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215,
216, 217, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 239, 240,
241, 242, 243, 244 , 245, 247, 248, 249, 250,
251, 251 (n. 140), 276, 279, 280, 281, 284,
288, 291, 292, 303, 306.
night attacks: pp. 14, 48, 77, 207, 210, 211,
215, 244, 245.
surprise attack(s): pp. 11, 13, 48, 76, 127,
141, 167, 168, 173, 176, 177, 194, 199, 207,
209, 213, 214, 217, 242, 243, 248, 249, 250,
251, 280, 281, 284, 303.
athletes: p. 148.
charioteers: p. 148.
advance(s): pp. 94, 99, 100, 113, 138,
215.
avar(s): pp. 14, 21, 22, 22 (no. 13), 23, 23
(n. 14), 30, 45, 49, 56, 77, 89 (n. 5), 90, 91,
91 (n. 12), 92, 105, 211, 237, 242, 242 (n.
127), 299, 300, 301, 306, 307.
field assistant: p. 268 (no. 154).
hoes: p. 267.
adze: p. 267.
Blues (Constantinople Hippodrome faction):
pp. 29, 29 (no. 26).
Under Roman Empire: pp. 52, 302.
crossbow(s): pp. 38, 268 (no. 149).
ballista, ballistae, ballistas: pp. 38, 43, 267,
279, 283, 283, 300, 303.
rafts: p. 248.
flag(s): pp. 12, 48, 75, 92, 114, 114 (n.
47), 123, 130, 167, 170.
flag(s) (military unit[s]): pp. 57, 93, 93 (n.
19), 94, 95, 106, 108, 108 (n. 40),
109, 112, 117, 125, 127, 128, 129, 138, 146,
148, 154, 176, 177, 182, 183, 184, 214, 251,
252, 257, 300, 310.
pennant, pennants: pp. 10, 47, 74, 92, 105,
112, 113, 181, 182, 183, 267 (n. 151), 300.
bandits: p. 247.
ship(s), boats: pp. 53, 170, 248 (n. 134),
250, 283, 303.
barbarian(s), barbarians: pp. 22, 24, 26 (no.
21), 28, 34, 43, 52, 53, 55, 126 (n. 68), 144
(no. 84), 199, 202, 300, 305, 306.
barrels: p. 233.
basilikos spatharios: p. 304.
cane, canes: pp. 265, 290.
battle(s): pp. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20,
26, 31, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,
73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 94, 94 (n. 29), 95, 98,
99, 103, 105, 106, 107, 107 (n. 38), 109,
110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 124,
127, 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138,
143, 144, 145, 145 (ns. 86 and 87), 147, 147,
151, 153, 154, 155, 161, 162, 167, 168, 169,
171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 175 (n. 93), 176,
177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 195, 196,
198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 103, 209, 210, 211,
212, 213, 219, 229, 232 , 240, 240 (n. 125),
241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 251,
255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 268,
269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277,
278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 287, 288, 289,
294, 295, 302, 306, 308, 310.
battalion: pp. 99, 300, 302, 310.
drink: p. 203.
blessing: pp. 12, 48, 75, 81, 167, 170.
National Library of Madrid: p. 92 (no. 15).
byzantine(s), byzantine(s): pp. 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 25 (nos. 19 and 30), 26, 27, 28,
30,
32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 45 (n. 57), 47 (no. 58),
48, 50, 54 (n. 67), 55, 89 (n. 5), 91 (no. 12),
98 (no. 34), 110 (no. 41), 113 (no. 44), 175
(no. 93), 202 (no. 109), 211 (no. 115), 227
(no. 120), 229 (no. 121), 230 (p. 123), 242
(no. 127), 250 (no. 136), 251 (n. 140), 299,
300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309,
309 (n. 6), 310, 311.
whites (Constantinople Hippodrome faction):
p. 29 (no. 26).
incendiary bombs: pp. 228-229.
forest(s): pp. 99, 143, 181, 202, 244, 247,
249, 250, 251.
bravura: pp. 195. 200, 220.
Britons: pp. 36, 202, 202 (n. 109).
bucellaries: pp. 54, 55, 56, 90, 100, 300.
whelk(e): p. 301.
bucinator(s): p. 115 (no. 48), 301. ox(es): pp.
248, 268, 279, 288.
Bulgarians, Bulgarians: pp. 265, 300, 301.
cavalry: pp. 10, 14, 15, 34, 37, 39, 43, 45,
46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 52 (n. 61), 54, 55, 57, 73,
77, 78, 90, 91 (n. 12), 95, 103, 105, 107,
109, 110 (n. 41), 124, 148, 162, 170, 174,
179, 196, 202, 210, 211, 212, 216, 217, 218,
220, 221, 232, 239, 240, 240 (ns. 124 and
125), 244, 245, 248, 249, 251 (n. 139), 255,
256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264,
268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 277, 279, 280, 280
(n. 188), 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288,
289, 302, 303, 307, 310.
light cavalry: pp. 54, 280 (no. 188). heavy
cavalry: pp. 15, 54, 78, 255, 271. horse(s):
pp. 12, 30, 37, 45, 48, 50, 54, 55, 75, 76, 89
(nos. 5 and 6), 90, 91, 91 (nos. 12 and 13),
93, 93 (n. 30), 100, 110, 112, 115, 116, 124,
126, 127, 130, 131, 145, 146, 151, 153, 154,
155, 162 (n. 90), 167, 170, 172, 174, 176,
177, 178, 179, 180, 184 (n. 99), 194, 211,
214, 215, 216, 216 (n. 116), 217, 218, 218
(n. 117), 219, 220, 227, 228, 240, 240 (n.
124), 241, 243, 244, 245, 249, 267, 268, 277,
287, 288, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 299, 301,
305.
reserve (or spare) horse(s): pp. 12, 75, 93,
93 (n. 30), 151, 153, 154, 243. goat: pp. 91,
248.
fallen: pp. 112, 176.
heat: pp. 239, 240, 242, 245, 246.
comrade(s): pp. 98, 99, 286.
camels: p. 288.
camp(s): pp. 12, 13, 15, 16, 36 (n. 54), 38, 40, 41,
42, 43, 46, 48, 75, 76, 78, 90, 94, 97, 98, 99, 113,
116, 135, 137, 151, 153, 154, 155,
167 ,168,172,173,174,177,178,179,183,193,194,1
95,198,201,209,210,211,212,214,215,219,220,221
,227,228, 232 , 241, 245, 251, 252, 256, 279, 280,
282, 285, 285 (ns. 190 and 192), 286, 287, 288,
289, 291, 294, 295, 301.
campaign(s): pp. 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31,
40, 43, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 90, 99, 180,
193 (n. 101), 194, 197, 211, 221 (n. 119),
252, 304.
campidoctor(s): pp. 38, 268 (no. 153), 269
(n. 156), 308.
battlefield: pp. 11, 12, 31, 38, 50, 75, 76,
112, 151, 153, 167, 169, 172, 175 (n. 93),
178.
cane fields: p. 250.
layer(s): pp. 91, 92, 265.
hood: p. 90, 91, 228.
mesh hood(s): pp. 90, 228.
quiver(s): pp. 90, 91, 140 (n. 124), 266, 299,
301.
load(s): pp. 22, 40, 92, 94 (n. 30), 98 (no.
34), 112, 113, 115, 116, 125, 126, 127, 127
(n. 72), 128, 135, 136, 137, 144, 181, 182,
202, 203, 240, 241, 244, 245, 261, 263, 267,
272, 276, 280.
meat: pp. 172, 172 (no. 91).
carts, carts, wagon(s): pp. 15, 78, 94, 177,
184, 213, 214, 215, 217, 256, 263, 267, 267
(n. 152), 269, 272, 275, 277, 279, 280, 285,
286, 287, 288, 289, 291.
cheek pads: pp. 266 (no. 148), 311.
jacket: p. 93.
helmet(s): pp. 181, 266 (no. 148), 280, 289,
311.
punishment(s): pp. 10, 12, 15, 40, 47, 50, 73,
76, 78, 83, 87, 97, 98, 99, 167, 171, 180,
191, 197, 215, 221, 242, 255, 270.
capital punishment: p. 97.
castramentation: p. 49.
cataphractarii: p. 52 (no. 61).
catapults, catapultae: pp. 228, 229, 300, 303.
Catholic(s): pp. 27, 29 (no. 26).
hunting: pp. 16, 49, 78, 100, 135, 170, 180,
220, 240 (n. 124), 256, 291, 292, 292 (n.
217), 293, 294, 295, 302.
barley: pp. 172, 216, 246 (n. 133).
yield (order): p. 127.
centurio, centurion: p. 306.
Caesar (title of heir to the Roman Empire):
pp. 19, 20.
basket: p. 267.
chagán (chief title): p. 300 (no. 1).
cheiroballistra: p. 266 (no. 149).
chiliarch(s): pp. 57, 95, 301, 308.
chiliarchy(s): pp. 57, 95, 301, 308.
circus: p. 29 (no. 26).
cistern(s): pp. 231, 233.
city(ies): pp. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29 (nos.
19 and 20), 26, 30, 35 (n. 53), 38, 40, 42, 45,
46, 52 (n. 63), 55, 97, 98, 100 (n. 36), 183
(no. 96), 193, 194, 195, 201, 231, 306,
309.
citizen(s): pp. 35 (no. 53), 36, 44, 46, 97,
97 (no. 33), 100.
civil(s): pp. 19 (no. 3), 20 (no. 6), 24 (no.
16),
25 (no. 19), 51, 97, 191, 231, 303, 309.
bugle, bugles: pp. 126, 212.
classis, classes: p. 53.
classis Alexandrina: p. 53.
classis Britannica: p. 53.
classis Germanica: p. 53.
Historical classis: p. 53.
classis Moesica: p. 53.
classis Pontica: p. 53.
classis Syriaca: p. 53.
clibanarii: p. 52 (no. 61).
coward(s), cowardice: pp. 83, 192, 193, 194,
197, 241, 245.
codex description: p. 33.
military code: p. 174.
hills: pp. 143, 175, 200, 202, 287.
column(s): pp. 14, 21, 43, 77, 94, 96, 100,
110, 111, 112, 128, 183, 184, 209, 212, 217,
219, 255, 260, 261, 262, 266, 267 (n. 152),
268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276,
276 (n. 185), 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 289
(n. 200), 290, 293, 295.
commander(s): pp. 10, 13, 16, 20, 20 (no. 5),
26, 36 (n. 53), 39, 40, 41, 48, 50, 73, 76, 78,
87, 90, 93, 95, 96, 97, 100, 115, 125, 127,
131, 137, 138, 143, 144, 168 , 169, 179, 183,
184, 189, 191, 191 (n. 100), 195, 196, 198,
199, 209, 210, 215, 216, 219, 221, 251, 256,
269, 270, 271, 273, 275, 276, 278, 282, 285,
289, 290, 292, 307, 310.
combat(s): pp. 10, 13, 14, 20, 24, 38, 40, 41,
43, 44, 47, 50, 56, 73, 74, 76, 77, 87, 89 (n.
6), 92, 95, 98, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112,
113, 115, 116, 116 (n. 51), 126, 128,
135.145, 146, 147, 154, 167, 170, 172, 173,
175, 176, 177, 178, 183, 184, 192, 193, 195,
202, 210, 211, 219, 225, 229, 232, 240, 241,
242, 243, 244, 245, 249, 249, 252, 261, 265,
270, 271, 272, 278, 280, 284, 287, 289, 290,
305, 306.
hand-to-hand combat: pp. 110, 170, 241,
245.
you eat, you commit: pp. 20, 20 (no. 5), 22,
26, 31, 52, 56, 93 (n. 20), 175 (no. 93), 301.
comes excubitorum: pp. 20, 20 (no. 5), 26,
31.
you eat foederatum: p. 56.
come rei militaris: pp. 22, 175 (no. 93).
food: pp. 39, 82, 172, 178, 184, 191, 196,
203, 214, 227, 239.
comitatensis, comitatenses: pp. 22 (no. 13),
51, 52, 54, 110 (n. 41).
comitatus: pp. 36 (no. 53), 51, 51 (n. 60).
company(s): pp. 110, 125 (no. 60), 240, 268,
269.
Council of Chalcedon (religious assembly): p.
183 (no. 96).
count: pp. 57, 93, 95, 96, 116, 301, 310.
decorations: p. 114 (no. 47).
drivers: pp. 279, 287.
conscription: pp. 52, 56.
advisory board: p. 41.
conspiracy: pp. 29, 36 (no. 53), 97, 191, 211
(n. 113).
accountant(s): pp. 19 (no. 3), 55.
containers: e.g. 233.
Constitutio Antoniniana: p. 36. constitutions:
p. 36 (no. 53). weapon builders: e.g. 268.
consul(s), consulate, consular: pp. 20, 20 (no.
8), 35 (no. 53), 44, 203 (n. 111), 210 (no.
113).
consul sine collega: p. twenty.
password(s): pp. 40, 41, 116 (n. 51), 196.
counteroffensives: e.g. 23.
collusion(s): pp. 10, 12, 73, 74, 75, 87, 92,
95, 96, 103, 111, 167, 170, 183, 221, 301.
ties: pp. 114, 114 (no. 47).
cornet(s) (musician[s]): pp. 115 (no. 48),
271, 286, 301, 302, 310.
cornicines: p. 302.
cornu: p. 302.
crops: p. 232.
chain mail(s): pp. 90, 90 (no. 8), 181, 228,
240, 242, 266, 274, 275, 280, 289.
crime: p. 23 (no. 14).
Christianity: p. 184 (no. 96).
nose cover: p. 311.
neck cover: p. 311.
string(s): pp. 89 (no. 5), 90, 230, 266 (n.
149), 267.
horn(s) (sound instrument[s]): pp. 10, 74,
103, 115, 115 (n. 48), 126, 182, 273, 281,
282, 286, 293, 295, 302.
leather: pp. 90, 23, 248, 266 (n. 148), 267.
medical body: pp. 10, 47, 74, 103, 112, 130,
154.
main body of the army: pp. 147, 280, 281.
cum ordine seque (order): p. 126.
cursu mina (order): p. 126.
dart(s): pp. 266 (nos. 149 and 150), 308.
leaded dart: p. 38.
decarca(s): pp. 57, 90, 91 (n. 11), 93, 96, 97,
112, 123, 126, 126 (n. 65), 136, 138, 179,
214, 269, 270, 275, 302.
decarchy(s): pp. 96, 110, 111, 147, 148, 267,
269, 302.
defections: e.g. 244.
defect(s): pp. 29, 239.
criminals: pp. 12, 76, 83, 167, 171.
crimes: pp. 10, 40, 73, 87, 96, 97, 98, 171,
191, 192, 197.
demagogues: p. 29 (no. 26).
deposes aut dextram aut sinistram (order): p.
276.
deposes dextra (order): p. 127.
deposes sinistra (order): p. 127.
defeat(s): pp. 23, 39, 42, 44, 49, 135, 137,
143, 144 (n. 85), 154, 172, 178, 179, 184,
192, 196, 197, 202, 240, 306, 309.
disaster(s): pp. 144, 180, 192, 300.
desert, deserter(s), desertion, desertions: pp.
39, 92 (no. 16), 97, 106, 109, 144, 161, 171,
174, 180, 192, 193, 194, 195, 210, 213, 215,
219, 220, 231, 244.
gorge(s): pp. 14, 48, 77, 207, 214-215, 216,
217, 218, 219, 250, 275.
parades: pp. 20 (no. 5), 171, 308.
nudity: p. 246.
detachment(s): pp. 110 (no. 41), 138, 147,
163, 173, 175, 215, 250, 272.
Deus (military cry): pp. 274, 290.
December: pp. 19, 20.
decimate, decimated: p. 98, 98 (no. 35), 175
(no. 93).
money: pp. 24, 28, 197, 245.
diocese: pp. 20, 20 (no. 6), 25 (no. 19), 55,
56.
dioecesis: pp. 25 (no. 19), 52.
directs frontem (order): pp. 274, 290.
speech(es): pp. 117, 204.
Divine Assistance: p. 81.
Divine Liturgy: p. 183 (no. 96).
Divine Providence: p. 292.
draco, dracons: pp. 302, 303, 305.
draconarius, draconarii: pp. 302, 305.
draconary(s): pp. 268, 302, 303.
dragon, dragons (banner[s]): pp. 302, 305.
drugs: e.g. 247.
dromedaries: p. 288 (no. 198).
dromón, dromones: pp. 248, 303.
drungarius: p. 105 (no. 37).
drungos: pp. 105, 105 (no. 37), 107, 128,
129, 133, 134, 136, 215, 303.
duke(s): pp. 56, 57, 93, 95, 303, 308.
dux, duces: pp. 22, 26, 52, 56, 93 (n. 18),
303.
ephthalites: pp. 43, 144 (nos. 84 and 85),
307, 308. army(s): pp. 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20,
21, 22, 22 (no. 13), 23, 26, 26 (n. 21), 28,
34, 35, 36, 36 (n. 53), 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 51 (n. 60), 52,
52 (n. 63), 53, 53 (n. 54), 54, 55, 56, 57, 73,
74, 75, 77, 82, 87, 91 (n. 12), 92 (no. 15),
93, 93 (n. 19), 94, 94 (n. 30), 95, 97, 99,
100, 100 (n. 36), 103, 105, 106, 107, 108,
109, 110 (n.
41),111,113,115,116,117,121,128,131,132,13
3,143,144,145,146,147,148,154,155,161,169,
170,171,172 (n . 92), 173, 174, 176, 177,
178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 191, 194, 195,
196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201 (n. 106), 202,
203, 204, 207, 210, 210 (n. 113), 211, 213,
214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 218 (nos. 117 and
118), 219, 220, 221, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232,
240 (n.
125),241,243,244,246,248,249,250,251,261,2
69,270,272,274,277,278,279,280,281,282,28
3,284,286,287, 8 , 288 (no. 198), 289, 292,
293, 294, 295, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 305,
306, 307, 310.
embassy(s), ambassador(s): pp. 28, 192,
194, 209.
ambush(s), ambush: pp. 10, 11, 22, 23, 47,
49, 74, 75, 95, 103, 106, 109, 111, 113, 121,
128, 138, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,
163, 169, 175, 175 (n. 93), 176, 181, 193,
209, 214, 229, 230, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248,
261, 272, 280, 303.
emeriti: p. 96 (no. 32).
emissaries: p. 209.
palisade(s): pp. 194, 240, 288.
emperor(s): pp. 9, 19, 19 (no. 1), 20, 20
(nos. 5 and 6), 21, 21 (n. 11), 23, 24, 25
(nos. 19 and 21), 26, 26 (n. 21), 27, 27 (n.
23), 28, 28, (n. 25), 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35,
35 (n. 53), 36, 36 (n. 53), 44, 45, 49, 51, 51
(n. 60), 52, 52 (nos. 61, 62 and 63), 53, 54,
54 (n. 67), 55, 56, 71, 81 (n. 2), 98 (no. 34),
110 (no. 41), 145, 145 (nos. 86 and 87), 171,
210 (n. 113), 216 (no. 116), 240 (no. 125),
300, 301, 302, 304, 306, 308, 309.
enemy(s), enemy(s): pp. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 23, 24, 26, 26 (n. 21), 28, 30, 34, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48, 49, 50, 74, 75, 76, 77,
78, 82, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97 , 98, 99, 100, 103,
105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 116 (n. 52), 117, 124, 125, 125 (n. 60),
126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137,
138, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 153, 154,
155, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168 , 169, 170, 171,
172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182,
183, 184, 192, 193, 193 (n. 101), 194, 195,
196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 202 (n.
109), 203, 204, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213,
214, 215, 216, 216 (n.
116),217,218,219,220,221,225,227,228,229,2
30,231,232,239,241,242,243,244,245,246,24
7,248,249,250, 1 , 252, 256, 258, 261, 262,
263, 267, 267 (n. 150), 272, 273, 273 (n.
163), 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281,
281-282, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288,
289, 303, 309.
January: pp. 20, 21 (no. 10), 53.
nurses: pp. 194, 112 (no. 45), 305.
deception(s), deceptively: pp. 50, 178, 194,
195, 198, 242, 249.
training(s): pp. 11, 15, 37, 45, 47, 49, 74, 78,
81, 82 (n. 4), 89 (no. 6), 90, 91 (n. 12), 93,
121, 125, 127, 128, 135, 148, 182, 184, 185,
196, 200, 243, 255, 256, 263, 264, 265, 271,
272, 273, 277, 278, 290, 295, 308. epigram:
p. 31.
equaliter ambula (order): p. 126.
equipment (military): pp. 10, 15, 28, 34, 47,
49, 55, 73, 78, 87, 90, 91, 154, 180, 199,
216, 231, 248, 255, 267, 277.
equites Dalmatae (type of military unit): p. 52
(no. 61).
equites Dalmatae Illyriciani (military unit): p.
110 (no. 42).
equites Illyrici or Illyriciani (military units): p.
110 (no. 42).
equites Mauri or Mauretanici (type of military
unit): pp. 52 (no. 61), p. 210 (no. 113), 280
(no. 188).
equites Osrhoenae (type of military unit): e.g.
52 (no. 61).
equites promoti Illyriciani (military unit): p.
110 (no. 42).
equites sagitarii (military unit): p. 54.
equites scutarii Illyriciani (military unit): p.
110 (no. 42).
skirmish(es): pp. 23, 52 (no. 62), 93, 154,
241.
Scythian(s), Scythian(s), to the Scythian: pp.
11, 12, 14, 24 (no. 15), 48, 49, 75, 77, 106,
141, 143, 144, 145, 154, 159, 161, 170, 173,
178, 189, 219, 237, 241, 242, 248, 294, 295,
303, 304, 306.
slave(s): pp. 56, 92, 92 (nos. 16 and 17),
246,
303.
squad(s): pp. 53, 55, 267, 270, 295.
shield(s): pp. 90, 94, 111, 112, 123, 126,
136, 181, 212, 217, 231, 241, 245, 247, 262,
263, 265, 266, 274, 275, 276, 276 (n. 180),
280, 281, 293, 294, 308.
Slavic(s): pp. 14, 21, 23, 24, 28, 30, 49, 77,
213, 237, 246, 246 (n. 132), 250, 280, 299,
304.
sword(s): pp. 91, 240, 242, 245, 262, 265,
265 (n. 147), 266 (n. 147), 273, 275, 290,
305.
herula sword(s): pp. 265, 265 (no. 147).
espatario(s): pp. 100, 271, 271 (n. 161), 278,
304, 305.
spy(s), spy: pp. 10, 14, 38, 48, 74, 77, 94,
100, 103, 111, 113, 116, 161, 171, 183, 197,
207, 218, 219, 220, 221, 286, 287, 294.
Status: pp. 27, 34, 44, 56, 81, 171, 203,
239.
staff: p. 36 (no. 53).
banner(s): pp. 10, 47, 74, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98,
99, 100, 103, 114, 115, 117, 123 (n. 54), 125
(no. 60), 127, 127, 136, 138, 146, 182, 184,
268 (n. 154), 269, 271, 273 (n. 163), 277,
283, 289, 300, 302, 305, 310.
ploy(s): pp. 11, 35 (no. 53), 75, 141, 143,
144, 146, 170, 178, 181, 195, 199, 246, 281.
strategy: pp. 105, 128, 145, 169, 192, 193,
292.
strategists: pp. 13, 16, 39, 41, 46, 56, 57, 76,
78, 81, 82, 82 (n. 4), 94, 95, 100, 105, 107,
114, 115, 116, 130, 137, 146, 161, 167, 169,
170, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181,
191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201,
202, 203, 204, 209, 210, 213, 214, 215, 218,
220, 227, 229, 232, 252, 252, 256, 257, 269,
277, 283, 285, 286, 288, 292, 293, 294, 305,
307.
stratelates: pp. 57, 95, 269, 305.
strator: pp. 271, 271 (no. 171), 278, 305.
stars: p. 211.
stirrup(s): pp. 91, 91 (nos. 12 and 13), 112.
Gospels: p. 56.
exarch: pp. 24, 24 (16).
exarchate: pp. 24, 24 (17).
exarchus: p. 24.
excubitors: pp. 20 (no. 5), 55, 308.
exi (order): pp. 138, 274.
exi to stemma (order): p. 289.
expedition, expeditions: pp. 26, 54, 54 (n.
65), 194, 211, 214, 232, 252, 280.
explorer(s): pp. 10, 14, 74, 77, 94, 100, 103,
113, 144, 147, 171, 183, 197, 207, 215, 218,
219, 220, 227, 244, 245, 286, 292, 293, 294,
295.
foreigner(s), foreigner(s): pp. 55, 90, 91, 111,
154, 221, 246, 261, 305.
bow and arrow manufacturers: e.g. 268.
phalanx(s): pp. 111 (no. 49), 179, 240, 258,
261, 262, 263, 264, 268 (n. 155), 273, 275
(nos. 173 and 174), 276, 279, 283, 290, 293,
294, 305.
family(s), relative(s): pp. 19, 28, 28, (no. 25),
29, 33, 34, 47 (n. 58), 92, 114, 153, 199,
305.
February: p. 170.
federated(s): p. 53, 54, 56, 90, 110, 111,
113, 129, 301, 305, 308.
felt: pp. 91, 91 (no. 9), 92 (no. 15), 243.
flankers: pp. 10, 11, 12, 73, 74, 75, 94, 103,
108, 109, 114, 121, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133,
134, 136, 159, 163, 175, 176, 261, 262, 293,
294, 295, 306.
attack flankers: pp. 10, 11, 12, 73, 74, 75,
94, 103, 108, 109, 114, 121, 127, 128, 129,
130, 133, 136, 137, 159, 163, 306. arrow(s):
pp. 89, 89 (no. 5), 90, 93, 108, 108 (n. 39),
110, 113, 114, 115, 125, 127, 135, 136, 137,
138, 146, 180, 193, 228, 241, 244, 247, 248,
258, 261, 262, 263, 266, 266 (no. 150), 267,
268, 272, 274, 275, 277, 279, 280, 284, 285,
287, 288, 295, 300, 301. fleet(s): pp. 53,
283.
foederati: pp. 53, 54, 305.
foedus: pp. 52, 305.
training, training: pp. 10, 11, 14, 15, 34, 40,
47, 49, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 95, 98, 99, 103,
105, 106, 107, 110, 114, 115, 116, 121, 123,
124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 135,
136, 137, 141, 144, 146, 147, 148, 161, 162,
163, 172, 175, 176, 177, 9, 180, 184, 196,
198, 201, 210, 212, 214, 215, 216, 216, 218,
219, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 250,
255, 256, 257, 8, 259, 260, 261, 262, 262
(nos. 142 and 143), 263, 264, 267 (n. 150),
269, 271, 272, 273, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280,
281, 282, 283, 284, 288, 289, 290, 292, 293,
294, 295, 303, 306, 310.
closed formation or formation(s): pp. 126,
127, 129, 135, 137, 162, 198, 215, 242, 243,
261, 262 (n. 142).
convex formation(s): pp. 14, 77, 255, 261,
263, 264.
crescent (or crescent moon) formation: pp.
136, 137, 293 (n. 220).
column training: pp. 14, 77, 255, 260, 283.
formation of or in phalanx: pp. 293, 294.
wedge formations: pp. 243, 261.
irregular formation(s): pp. 11, 75, 127, 128,
136, 141, 157, 148, 303.
mixed training or training(s): pp. 244-
245, 261, 263, 264.
formation or formations of or in cadre(s): p.
261, 262 (no. 143).
fodder: pp. 13, 76, 99, 154, 155, 168, 170,
174, 177, 178, 200, 214, 215, 240, 245, 249.
forage, foragers: pp. 177, 215, 245.
strength(s): pp. 14, 27, 44, 48, 77, 97, 98,
194, 195, 214, 225, 227, 227 (p. 120), 230,
232, 243, 270.
fortification, fortifications: pp. 22, 154, 173,
174, 177, 180, 194, 211, 213, 214, 215, 220,
227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 240, 241, 249.
pit(s): pp. 42, 177, 180, 182, 220, 232, 240,
241.
frank(s): pp. 14, 36, 49, 77, 237, 245, 300,
305, 307, 308.
cold(s): pp. 28, 242, 245, 246.
front (part of military equipment): p. 243.
border(s): pp. 24, 31, 49, 51, 55, 110 (n.
41), 154, 246 (n. 132), 249, 304, 310.
escape, fugitives: pp. 24 (no. 15), 99, 135,
147, 198, 248, 272.
Fulcon: pp. 262, 262 (no. 142), 273, 274, 274
(n. 169), 290 (n. 203), 306.
gagan (chief title): p. 300 (no. 1).
cookie(s): pp. 154, 172 (n. 91), 184, 267,
300.
Gaul(s): pp. 36, 42, 202, 202 (n. 109).
general(s), generalship: pp. 9, 12, 20, 23, 24,
25 (n. 21), 26 (no. 21), 27, 30, 31, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 47 (n. 58), 48,
49, 52, 54, 71, 75, 82, 82 (nos. 3 and 4),
167, 169, 175 (n. 93), 191 (no. 100), 200,
201 (n. 106), 203 (n. 112), 210, 210 (n. 113),
211 (no. 113), 227 (no. 120), 252, 285 (n.
192), 301, 305, 307.
Germans: pp. 36, 49, 126 (n. 68), 202, 202
(n. 109).
goth(s): pp. 25, 36, 44, 49, 52, 52 (n. 63), 53, 54
(no. 64), 56, 89 (n. 5), 145, 145 (n. 86), 304, 305,
306, 308.
gothic: p. 265.
gothograeci: p. 308.
grain (cereal): pp. 39, 194, 203, 215, 230,
246 (n. 133).
gratification, gratifications: pp. 148, 199.
greaves: pp. 265, 266, 274, 275.
greutungos: p. 304.
battle cry(s) (or war): pp. 10, 41, 47, 74, 103,
116, 116 (n. 51), 137, 198.
gauntlets: p. 90.
flank guard: pp. 133, 134, 264.
Imperial Guard (military unit): pp. 301, 308.
Persian Imperial Guard (military unit): p.
240 (no. 125).
Praetorian Guard (military unit): pp. 36 (no.
53), 301, 302.
war(s): pp. 12, 20, 23, 23 (no. 14), 25, 26,
27, 28, 32, 33, 36 (n. 53), 39, 40, 41, 42, 45,
49, 53, 54 (n. 64), 76, 98, 108, 116 (n. 51),
143, 145, 145 (n. 88), 162 (no. 90), 163, 167,
169, 170, 173, 180, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199,
199 (n. 105), 200, 201, 203, 203 (n. 111),
210 (no. 113), 216, 216 (n. 116), 239, 240,
245, 246, 250 (n. 136), 283, 284, 302, 304,
307, 309.
Parthian War (by Trajan): p. 210 (no. 113).
Persian War (of Justin II): p. 309.
Punic War (Second): p. 203 (no. 111).
Dacian Wars (of Trajan): pp. 210 (no. 113),
302.
ax(es): pp. 92, 267, 280.
hatchets: p. 267.
hunger: pp. 39, 178, 195, 197.
flour: pp. 154, 172, 267.
hecatontarch(s): pp. 57, 90, 93, 95-96, 96,
117, 123, 184, 306.
hay: pp. 155, 173, 174.
herald(s): pp. 10, 74, 96, 103, 117, 125, 182, 183,
267, 271, 273, 278, 283, 285, 286, 289, 292, 306.
heretics, heresies: pp. 27, 183 (no. 96).
injured(s): pp. 13, 76, 94, 98, 99, 112, 148,
155, 168, 176, 183, 198, 231, 247, 279.
blacksmiths: pp. 267, 268.
herule(s), herula(s): pp. 265, 265 (no. 147),
266 (no. 147), 306, 307.
grass: pp. 155, 173, 174, 232.
iron: pp. 90, 91, 145, 230, 243, 266, 267,
299, 311.
hippodrome: pp. 29, 29 (no. 26).
Hispanics: pp. 36, 202, 202 (n. 109).
sling(s), slinger: pp. 37, 177, 265, 266, 267,
268, 272, 279, 282.
hour(s): pp. 30, 40, 41, 82, 209, 211, 221,
221 (n. 119), 228, 240, 247, 278, 285 (n.
193), 292, 294.
sickle, sickles: pp. 92, 267.
war orphans: p. 28.
hun(s): pp. 14, 43, 44, 49, 77, 89 (n. 9), 144
(no. 84), 170, 237, 242, 299, 300 (n. 1), 306,
307, 308.
White Huns: pp. 43, 144 (no. 84), 307.
hypostrategos: pp. 57, 93, 95, 108, 114, 115,
130, 135, 251, 252, 257, 307.
Church (institution): pp. 27 (no. 24), 183 (no.
96).
Armenian Apostolic Church: p. 27 (no. 24).
Catholic Church: p. 27 (no. 24).
Coptic Church: p. 27 (no. 24).
Church of Egypt: p. 27 (no. 24).
Church of India: p. 27 (no. 24).
Eritrean Church: p. 27 (no. 24).
Ethiopian Church: p. 27 (no. 24).
Greek Orthodox Church: p. 27 (no. 24).
Syrian Orthodox Church: p. 27 (no. 24).
Syrian Church of the East: p. 27 (no. 24).
ilarch(s): pp. 93, 96, 117, 123, 184, 214, 309.
Illyriciani (type of military unit): p. 110 (no.
42).
impediment: pp. 11, 12, 15, 47, 49, 74, 75,
78, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 121, 130,
131, 146, 147, 151, 153, 154, 155, 174, 177,
184, 197, 212, 215, 219, 240, 243, 244, 251,
256, 268, 275, 277, 279, 280, 284, 286, 287,
288, 289, 291.
raid, raids: pp. 14, 21, 22, 23, 26, 48, 77,
138, 148, 169, 194, 197, 207, 210, 121, 220,
225, 229, 230, 241, 247, 252, 309.
undisciplined: pp. 142, 213.
infant(s), infantry: pp. 14, 15, 16, 37, 39, 40,
46, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 78, 89, 107, 110,
110 (n. 41), 153, 154, 170, 177, 179, 196,
202, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 218 (n.
117), 221, 231, 232, 240 (n. 125), 241, 243,
244, 245, 248, 249, 250, 251 (n. 139), 255,
256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264,
265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274,
277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 286,
287, 288, 289, 293, 299, 302, 306.
heavy infantry, heavy infantry: pp. 15, 49, 50,
78, 177, 196, 250, 255, 256, 261, 263, 265,
268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 277, 278, 279,
280, 281, 282, 286, 289.
light infantry, light infantry: pp. 15, 49, 54,
78, 248, 250, 255, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266,
267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 277, 280, 281, 282.
information, information: pp. 12, 35, 35 (no.
53), 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 75, 100,
167, 171, 179, 194, 209, 213, 215, 219, 220,
246 (n. 132), 249, 264, 268 (n. 155).
Immortals (military unit): p. 240 (no. 125).
instruction: pp. 9, 12, 16, 37, 45, 47, 48, 73,
75, 78, 87, 89, 138, 159, 161, 161, 162, 163,
256, 289.
instruction to Scythian: pp. 12, 75, 159, 161.
instruction to the alana: pp. 12, 75, 159, 162.
African-style instruction: pp. 12, 75, 159, 162.
instruction in italics: pp. 12, 75, 159, 163.
instructions (orders): pp. 13, 41, 48, 76, 135,
148, 189, 191, 216, 261.
instructor(s): pp. 37, 38, 268, 268 (n. 153).
field instructors: p. 38, 268 (no. 153).
interrogate, interrogation: pp. 213, 221.
intervallum: p. 285 (no. 190).
military interveners: p. 55.
intra (order): pp. 276, 291.
winter: pp. 24 (no. 15), 43, 90, 93, 97, 98,
162, 170, 233, 243, 248.
Iranians (people): p. 299.
italic, italics, italics: pp. 12, 24, 48, 75, 159,
161, 163, 246, 246 (n. 133).
iunge (order): pp. 125, 126, 274, 290 (n.
203).
iunge fulco (order): pp. 290, 290 (no. 203).
July (month): p. 232.
javelin(s): pp. 37, 170, 177, 211, 247, 248,
262, 263, 265, 267, 272, 275, 279, 280, 281,
282.
jan (chief title): pp. 211, 211 (no. 114), 299,
300 (n. 1).
boss(es): pp. 10, 22, 26, 28, 29, 44, 53, 54
(n. 65), 56, 94, 95, 110, 111, 112, 169, 170,
175 (n. 93), 179, 192, 199, 242, 248, 269,
299. chief archer: p. 269.
rider(s): pp. 10, 35, 52, 54, 55, 73, 87, 89,
90, 90 (n. 8), 91, 91 (nos. 12 and 13), 106,
108, 123, 124, 128, 128, 131, 145, 163, 210
(n. 113), 218 (no. 117), 219, 243, 245, 257,
261, 262, 263, 268, 272, 280, 287, 289, 282,
293, 295, 302.
June: p. 52 (no. 62).
oath(s): pp. 179, 184, 200, 242.
Justice, justice: pp. 46, 47, 82, 82 (n. 3), 83,
191.
khan (chief title): pp. 211 (no. 114), 300
(no. 1).
kineson (order): p. 126.
Kunsthistorische Museum, Vienna: p. 90 (no.
8).
Kyrie Eleison (prayer): p. 116.
thief, thieves: p. 97.
lake(s): p. 227 (no. 120), 244, 247, 287.
spearmen: pp. 39, 106, 110, 180, 196, 240,
241, 300.
spear(s): pp. 10, 47, 74, 89, 90, 90 (n. 8),
91, 92, 103, 111, 112, 113, 123, 126, 127,
136, 145, 170, 181, 182, 183, 240 (n. 124),
241, 242, 246, 262, 265, 267, 267 (n. 151),
271, 275, 278, 280, 280 (n. 188), 282, 289,
292, 300, 302.
Slavic spears: p. 267.
javelin thrower(s): pp. 211, 248, 264, 268,
282.
largia ad both parties (order): pp. 276, 290.
largia ad dextram (order): p. 290.
Latinism(s): pp. 32, 32 (no. 44), 184 (no. 98),
269 (nos. 156 and 158), 304, 305, 306, 308,
310.
legation: p. 210.
legionnaire: pp. 38, 94 (no. 25), 110 (no. 41).
legion, legions: pp. 50, 52, 54 (n. 67), 261
(no. 141), 268, 268 (nos. 154 and 155), 305,
310. legion I Isauria Sagittaria: p. 54 (no.
67).
legion II Isauria: p. 54 (no. 67).
legion III Isauria: p. 54 (no. 67).
mottos: pp. 13, 41, 48, 76, 189, 195.
law (quality of currency): pp. 21 (no. 11), 98
(no. 34).
law(s): pp. 56, 92, 96, 97, 270.
freedom: pp. 92 (no. 16), 193, 215, 245, 250.
pound(s): pp. 98 (no. 34), 154, 172, 307.
librarius (military position): p. 19 (no. 2).
Ligurians: pp. 36, 202, 202 (n. 109).
lilia: pp. 42, 145 (no. 88).
limitei: pp. 51, 51 (no. 60), 55, 303.
line of battle: pp. 12, 15, 47, 73, 78, 95, 98,
103, 106, 107, 107 (n. 38), 109, 111, 112,
113, 115, 116, 127, 128, 133, 134, 135, 136,
137, 138, 143, 145, 146, 147, 154, 162, 176,
177, 182, 198 , 201, 202, 219, 240, 240 (n.
125), 241, 243, 244, 245, 249, 256, 259, 263,
268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277,
278, 279, 280, 282, 287, 289.
line of battle: pp. 135, 147, 272.
lilies (weapon): pp. 42, 145 (no. 88).
hagiographic literature: p. 32.
plain(s): pp. 39, 196, 308.
rain: pp. 91, 192, 233, 241, 245, 246, 279.
Lombard(s): pp. 14, 23, 28, 30, 36, 49, 77,
237, 245, 300, 306, 307, 308.
Longobards: pp. 30, 307.
loriga(s): pp. 991, 92, 93.
wood: pp. 193, 200, 210, 229 (n. 122), 232,
233, 247, 266, 273, 284, 288, 303, 305.
weapons masters: pp. 38, 268 (no. 153).
magister draconum: p. 302,
magister equitum, magistri equitum: pp. 52,
307.
magister militum, magistri militum: pp. 22,
24, 25, 52, 56.
magister militum per Africam (or Africae): pp.
24, 56.
magister militum per Armeniam (or
Armeniae): p. 56.
magister militum per Italiam (or Italiae): p.
24.
magister militum per Spaniam (or Spaniae):
pp. 25, 56.
magister militum praesentalis: p. 23.
magister peditum, magistri peditum: p. 52.
magister utriusque militiae, magistri utriusque
militiae: pp. 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 31, 52, 54,
55, 55-56, 175 (n. 95), 216 (no. 116), 227
(no. 120).
magister utriusque militiae per Illyricum: p.
55.
magister utriusque militiae per Orientem: pp.
20, 26, 31, 54, 55, 56.
magister utriusque militiae praesentalis: pp.
23, 55-56, 56.
magister utriusque militiae per Thracias: pp.
22, 23, 28, 31, 55.
manuballista(e): pp. 38, 43, 266 (n. 149).
cloak(s): pp. 90, 91, 92, 154, 181, 265.
maintenance: pp. 12, 92, 167, 172.
maintenance of soldiers: pp. 12, 167, 172.
maintenance of horses: pp. 12, 167, 172.
camp maintenance: pp. 12, 167, 172.
siege machines: pp. 227, 230, 230 (n. 123),
231, 232.
march(s), march: pp. 12, 15, 41, 46, 49, 75,
76, 78, 90. 94, 97, 99, 100, 110, 113, 114,
116, 124, 127, 135, 138, 151, 155, 162, 167,
170, 173, 174, 177, 178, 184, 194, 198, 201,
203, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
217, 218, 218 (n. 118), 219, 229, 240, 248,
249, 250, 251, 252, 256, 262, 265, 267 (n.
152), 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280,
281, 282, 283, 286, 288, 289, 290, 294, 295,
301.
March: pp. 45, 89 (no. 6), 162, 162 (n. 90),
170.
matiobarbulo(s): pp. 38, 265, 266, 267, 272,
275, 279, 280, 308.
mattiobarbulum: p. 308.
medii partitis... (order): p. 275.
mentors: pp. 10, 74, 94, 94 (n. 28), 99, 103,
113, 183, 308.
merarch(s): pp. 12, 13, 57, 76, 92, 93, 94,
95, 108, 114, 115, 129, 167, 168, 170, 172,
181, 182, 183, 257, 269, 271, 277, 278, 283,
285, 286, 291, 292, 305, 308.
mercenaries: pp. 52, 54, 306.
groupers: pp. 10, 11, 47, 57, 74, 90, 92, 93,
95, 98, 99, 100, 103, 107, 108, 109, 113,
114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 126, 128, 129, 130,
131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 155, 161, 163,
171, 181, 182, 215, 221, 258, 268, 269, 271,
276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 285, 289, 292,
308. fear, fearful: pp. 40, 46, 82 (n. 3), 83,
178, 197, 198, 199, 239, 242, 248, 250, 274,
293.
millet: pp. 246, 246 (no. 133).
Italic millet: pp. 246, 246 (no. 133).
border militias: p. 56.
urban militias: p. 55.
mile(s): pp. 113, 113 (no. 46), 114, 124, 126,
128, 146, 154, 176, 177, 180, 181, 182, 211,
216, 218, 228, 243, 251, 252, 280, 289, 292,
293, 295, 308.
moira(s): pp. 57, 90, 92, 93, 95, 99, 100,
105, 107, 108, 128, 129, 161, 162, 171, 182,
248, 301, 308.
moirarch(s): pp. 13, 57, 76, 93, 94, 95, 108,
114, 129, 168, 182, 183, 257, 284, 301, 303,
308, 310.
mill: p. 267.
monastery: pp. 29, 32.
monophysitism, monophysites: pp. 27, 27
(no. 24), 29 (no. 26).
mountain(s): pp. 143, 175, 202, 213, 281.
mounts: e.g. 263.
mutiny, mutinies: pp. 29, 29, 97.
move (order): p. 276.
death, dead, dead(s): pp. 20, 29, 29 (no. 26),
39, 42, 52 (n. 62), 98, 112, 115, 145 (nos. 86
and 87), 149, 174, 192, 195, 210 (n. 113),
216 (no. 116), 231, 245, 246, 292.
women: pp. 230, 246.
fine: pp. 98, 98 (no. 34).
wall(s): 23, 210, 227, 228, 229 (n. 122), 230,
231, 323, 288.
muta locum (order): p. 277.
ship(s): pp. 55, 82, 283, 284, 303.
nephthalites: pp. 43, 44, 144, 144 (n. 85).
negligence(s), negligent(s): pp. 83, 198, 200,
220, 246.
negotiation, negotiations: pp. 50, 179, 240.
neologisms: p. 32
Nike (revolt): pp. 29, 29 (no. 26).
nobiscum (battle cry): pp. 116, 182.
nobiscum Deus (battle cry): pp. 43, 116, 116
(n. 51).
night(s): pp. 43, 170, 172, 173, 191, 192,
194, 195, 197, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 219,
220, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 241, 243, 247,
249, 250, 284.
nomisma, nomismas: pp. 98, 98 (no. 34),
112. notarius (civil and military position): pp.
19, 19 (no. 3).
November: pp. 28, 29.
October: p. 203 (no. 111).
official(s), officiality: pp. 10, 15, 20 (no. 7),
27 (no. 24), 28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 43, 47,
48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 73, 73 (n. 1), 74, 78,
89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 103, 115,
116, 127, 135, 138, 146, 169, 170, 171, 172,
172 (n . 92), 177, 179, 182, 183 (n. 96), 184,
191, 193, 200, 214, 216, 219, 220, 221, 232,
248, 249, 255, 261, 261 (n. 141), 264, 267,
268, 268 (n. 153), 269, 270, 271, 272, 273,
274, 275, 278, 282, 283, 284, 285, 294, 302,
303, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310.
Training officer(s) (or instructor officers): pp.
37, 268, 269, 271, 273, 278, 308.
recruitment offices: p. 56.
operation, operations: pp. 23, 26, 28, 44, 50,
109, 146, 148, 173, 191, 192, 194, 199, 209,
210, 211.
optimates: pp. 56, 94, 95, 111, 113, 130,
301, 308, 310.
optio signiferorum: p. 302.
order, orders: pp. 11, 15, 22, 24, 28, 29, 38,
46, 47, 52, 54 (n. 68), 57, 74, 78, 82 (n. 3),
97, 100, 114, 115, 116, 116 (n. 49), 121,
124, 125,126, 126 (no. 70), 127, 135,136,
Historical introduction- literary 25
FLAVIO MAURITIUS, MILITARY AND
EMPEROR R 1 25
Mauritius' policy in Europe 29
Administrative reforms in the West 39
The eastern policy of Mauritius 44
The religious politics of Mauritius 48
The end of the Mauritius empire 49
THE WORK AND ITS AUTHOR 55
THE TRANSMISSION OF THE TEXT 64
SOURCES 67
THE WORK. CONTENT 109
The army of Diocletian and Constantine I 125
The army of Justinian I and Maurice 131
Bibliography 163
Historical sources mentioned in this book 163
Monographs, articles and contributions to
collective works 173
Note on the present translation 186
Abbreviations 187
Strategikon (About the general) of Mauritius,
emperor Eastern 189
Preamble 209
Book I 218
INTRODUCTION 219
Book I, chapter 1. How is it convenient for
soldiers to train in their instruction? 219
Book I, chapter 2. How is it advisable to arm the
riders and what basic equipment should they be
provided with? 221
Book I, chapter 3. About the various titles of
officers and soldiers 229
Book I, chapter 4. How is it advisable to divide
the army and its officers? 232
Book I, chapter 5. How tagma commanders
should choose their subordinate officers and
leaders for combat and organize tagmas into
collusion 236
Book I, chapter 6. The regulations on military
crimes that must be given to the troops 238
Book I, chapter 7. Regulations on military
crimes that must be given to tagma commanders
241
Book I, chapter 8. About military punishments
243
Book I, chapter 9. What organization should the
army have in its own territory when there is no
hostile activity? 246
Book II 259
261
Book II, chapter 1. On the usefulness and
necessity of forming the army in two lines 261
Book II, chapter 2. Of the organization of the
tagmas in the line of battle 269
Book II, chapter 3. Assault and defense troops
270
Book II, chapter 4. About flankers and attack
flankers 270
Book II, chapter 5. Ambushes in the rear or on
the flanks of the enemy line 273
Book II, chapter 6. The depth of training 275
Book II, chapter 7. About collusion 280
Book II, chapter 8. About weapons 280
Book II, chapter 9. About the medical staff 281
Book II, chapter 10. About the pennants of the
spears 283
Book II, chapter 11. About spies or explorers
284
Book II, chapter 13. Distances between groupers
and battle lines 286
difference between the banners 288
Book II, chapter 15. About the custody of the
banners 289
Book II, chapter 16. About the place of officers
289
Book II, chapter 17. About those who blow the
horns 12 291
Book II, chapter 18. About the battle cries that
arise in the midst of conflict 292
Book II, chapter 19. About the heralds 294
Book II, chapter 20. On the convenience of
using two banners 295
Book III 300
ON THE FORMATION OF TAGMAS 1 2 303
Book III, chapter 1. The symbols used to
illustrate tagma formations 303
Book III, chapter 2. The formation of the tagmas
claiming a force of three hundred and ten men
304
Book III, chapter 3. Scheme of the same tagma
with its flanks in closed order 305
Book III, chapter 4. Scheme of the same tagma
with both flanks and the rear in closed order 306
Book III, chapter 5. Tagma training methods 307
Book III, chapter 6. The formation of groupers.
Explanation of the symbols that illustrate the
training of groupers and their personnel 319
Book III, chapter 7. Explanation of the symbols
that illustrate the formation of the first and
second lines 320
Book III, chapter 9. An individualized grouper
323
Book III, chapter 12. About orders to front-line
troops 330
Book III, chapter 13. About orders to flankers
332
Book III, chapter 14. About orders to attack
flankers 333
Book III, chapter 15. Orders to the troops of the
second line 336
Book III, chapter 16. Orders to troops assigned
to ambushes 339
Book IV 343
ABOUT AMBUSHES 343
ambushes and stratagems against superior
enemy troops 344
Book IV, chapter 2. About the ambushes of the
Scythians 345
Book IV, chapter 3. About the ambushes carried
out by both sides 346
Book IV, chapter 4. About the most opportune
moment for ambushes 354
Book IV, chapter 5. On the convenience of
using irregular formations for ambushes or
attacks 357
Book V 363
ABOUT THE IMPEDIMENT 364
Book V, chapter 1. About the precautions to
take into account when carrying the
impedimenta to the field of 364
Book V, chapter 2. About reserve horses 365
Book V, chapter 3. About the non-necessary
impediment 367
Book V, chapter 4. About the intermediate
camps 368
Book V, chapter 5. About the protection of
impediments while walking 370
Book VI 371
ON THE DIVISION OF THE ARMY AND 371
ON MILITARY INSTRUCTION 371
Book VI, preamble 371
Book VI, chapter 1. About Scythian instruction,
simulation 373
Book VI, chapter 2. About wing instruction,
simulation 374
instruction, simulation 375
instruction, the most common 376
Book VI, chapter 5. How to exercise flankers
and attack flankers 378
Book VII 380
BATTLE 384
Book VII, part A, preamble 384
Book VII, part A, chapter 1. About the blessing
of the flags 388
Book VII, part A, chapter 2. On the organization
of collusion 389
Book VII, part A, chapter 3. About gathering
information about the enemy 389
Book VII, part A, chapter 4. On the use of
harangue to encourage troops 390
Book VII, part A, chapter 5. About enemy
prisoners taken by patrols 390
Book VII, part A, chapter 6. On the punishment
of criminals 391
Book VII, part A, chapter 7. On the maintenance
of soldiers, their horses and their camps 392
consultations with the merarchs regarding the
battlefield 393
Book VII, part A, chapter 9. On how to water
horses 393
Book VII, part A, chapter 10. About the rations
carried in the saddlebags 394
Book VII, part A, chapter 11. On how to wage
war against unknown people 395
Book VII, part A, chapter 12. About the enemy's
surprise attacks during the march 396
Book VII, part A, chapter 13. About the camps
and the care of the horses inside them 397
Book VII, part A, chapter 14. On how not to
loot enemy bodies during battle 398
Book VII, part A, chapter 15. About people
similar to the enemy 399
399
how not to overwhelm the strategos during the
day of battle 399
Book VII, part B, chapter 2. About the enemy
archers 401
engage the enemy or show our own strength
before knowing his intentions 401
Book VII, part B, chapter 4. How to hide the
second line when you are unable to follow the
first, so that the two appear as one 402
Book VII, part B, chapter 5. On the tactics and
method of dealing with a surprise attack by the
enemy 403
Book VII, part B, chapter 6. About the wounded
404
Book VII, part B, chapter 7. On the apparent
strength of the enemy 404
Book VII, part B, chapter 8. On the prevention
of hostile reconnaissance of our line 405
Book VII, part B, chapter 9. How to protect the
camp 406
Book VII, part B, chapter 10. How to gather
fodder 407
Book VII, part B, chapter 11. About an adverse
outcome 409
Book VII, part B, chapter 12. About a favorable
outcome in the battle 414
Book VII, part B, chapter 13. About recognition
417
how not to expose our second line too soon 419
Book VII, part B, chapter 15. About keeping the
surface of weapons shiny to be seen from afar
before battle 419
recapitulation of the obligations of each merarch
421
recapitulation of the type of obligations assigned
to the commanders of each tagma, the moirarchs
and the merarchs, so that each one knows his
obligation 425
Book VIII 434
Book VIII, chapter 1. About general instructions
for the commander 434
Book VIII, chapter 2. Mottos 446
Book IX 475
Book IX, chapter 1. About surprise attacks 476
Book IX, chapter 2. About night attacks 480
Book IX, chapter 4. About passing through
gorges and rugged territory 499
Capture scouts or enemies trying to infiltrate our
army 505
Book 520
Book X, chapter 1. How to organize a siege of
enemy fortresses if opportunity allows 520
Book X, chapter 3. How to endure a siege that is
supposed to be long 529
fortress cautiously and without engaging in open
combat 534
Book XI 542
Book XI, chapter 1. How to deal with Persians
544
Scythians, that is, Avars, Turks and others
whose way of life resembles that of the Hunnic
peoples 551
Book XI, chapter 3. How to deal with light-
haired people, such as the Franks, Lombards and
others like them 561
Book XI, chapter 4. How to deal with the Slavs,
the Ante and other similar peoples 565
Book XII 590
Chapter 3. The first battle formation for cavalry
590
Chapter 4. Another formation 590
Chapter 6. column formation 590
PART A. ON THE MIXED ORDER OF
BATTLE 594
mixed order of battle. 595
convex formation 599
Book XII, p art B, chapter 1. What clothing
should infantry wear ? 609
Book XII, part B, chapter 2. What should be the
training of infantrymen with heavy weapons?
610
Book XII, part B, chapter 3. How should the
training of infantrymen with light weapons and
archers be? 611
Book XII, part B, chapter 4. About weapons.
What weapons should heavy infantry carry? 611
Book XII, part B, chapter 5. What weapons
should light infantry carry? 612
Book XII, part B, chapter 6. What essential
equipment should you always have present and
at hand? 613
Book XII, part B, chapter 7. Soldiers of each
rhythm must be assigned to specialized tasks615
Book XII, part B, chapter 8. How infantry
troops and their officers should be organized 616
personnel assignment and organization of
infantry tagmas be? 619
Book XII, part B, chapter 10. Orders that must
be given regarding punishments 623
formation of heavy infantry tagmas be? 623
training of light infantry be along with heavy
infantry and cavalry? 626
Book XII, part B, chapter 13. What should be
the formation of cavalry alongside heavy
infantry? 628
movements should you exercise the 630
Book XII, part B, chapter 16. How to start the
aforementioned movements 632
the formation of the battle line and training in
resisting the enemy 642
accommodate cars and impediments 648
the method of marching with the enemy nearby?
650
Book XII, part B, chapter 20. How to cross
wooded areas, rugged areas and narrow passes
through 652
transport along rivers and crossing them be in
the face of the enemy? 662
Book XII, part B, chapter 22. How to build
fortified camps 667
Issues to be considered by the infantry
strategists on a day of battle 678
Book XII, part B, chapter 24. Synopsis of the
previously mentioned instruction that must be
known by the tribunes or commanders of the
tagmas 681
PART C. DIAGRAM OF A FORTIFIED
CAMP 684
PART D. THE HUNT. HOW WILD
ANIMALS SHOULD BE HUNTED
WITHOUT SERIOUS OR SERIOUS
INJURIES 685
Glossary 709
Thematic index 754
name index 754
Index of toponyms 771
Subject index and common names 800
Index of works, authors and versions of the
strategikon text 902
275, 276, 277, 278, 282, 286, 289, 289 (n.

199), 290, 290 (nos. 203 and 207), 291, 292,
302, 306.
order: pp. 11, 14, 39, 46, 47, 49, 74, 77, 83,
94, 96, 98, 100, 107, 116, 121, 124, 124 (n.
56), 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 136, 137, 178,
179, 180, 215, 239, 241, 242, 245, 247, 249,
251, 255, 257, 260, 261, 270, 273, 274, 276,
279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 286, 287, 288, 289,
292, 294, 295, 310.
open order: pp. 124, 124 (no. 56), 126,
127, 128, 310.
closed order: pp. 11, 47, 74, 98, 121, 124,
125, 126, 127, 128, 136, 247, 261, 273, 274,
276, 281, 282, 289-290, 310.
order of battle: pp. 14, 46, 47, 129, 247, 260,
261, 280.
mixed order of battle: pp. 14, 49, 77, 255,
257.
lateral order of battle: pp. 14, 77, 255, 260.
ordinance(s): pp. 94, 110, 111, 268 (n. 154),
271, 271 (n. 161), 304, 305, 309, 310, 311.
Orthodox (religious group): p. 29 (no. 26).
ostrogoths, ostrogoth: pp. 36, 54 (no. 64), 89
(no. 5), 304.
autumn: pp. 20, 22, 23.
pay: pp. 46, 51 (no. 60), 90, 92, 112, 191.
shovel(s): p. 267.
palatinae, palatini, palatines: pp. 51 (no. 60),
110 (no. 41), 301.
palatium: p. 51 (no. 60).
bread: pp. 172, 172 (no. 91).
panic: pp. 247, 288.
panicum miliaceum: p. 246 (no. 133).
swamp(s): pp. 145, 202, 241, 244, 247.
pope(s) (ecclesiastical title): pp. 19 (no. 1),
27, 28.
military parades: pp. 20 (no. 5), 113.
paragnathids: pp. 266, 266 (no. 148).
for you (order): p. 274.
betting games: pp. 10, 74, 103, 113.
exploring parties: pp. 154, 183.
Parthians (town): pp. 36, 49, 202, 202 (n.
109), 302.
homeland: pp. 35 (no. 53), 195, 239.
patriarch: p. 28.
ecumenical patriarch: p. 28.
Patrick: pp. 20, 20 (no. 4), 25 (no. 21).
Patricius: p. twenty.
patrol(s): pp. 12, 76, 92, 138, 167, 169, 171,
177, 180, 180, 194, 215, 216, 219, 220, 279,
281, 282, 285, 288.
peace: pp. 27, 40, 98, 100, 179, 194, 197,
199, 199 (n. 105), 200, 210, 213, 228, 309.
capital punishment: pp. 996, 98.
pentarch(s): pp. 57, 90, 91 (n. 11), 93, 97,
123, 126, 126 (n. 65), 136, 169, 309.
percute (order): p. 126.
permission(s): pp. 97, 98, 216, 285.
Persian(s), Sassanian(s): pp. 14, 20, 21, 26,
27, 27 (n. 22), 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 44, 45,
49, 52, 52 (n. 61), 55, 56, 77, 89, 89 (n. 5),
106, 144, 144 (n. 85), 175 (no. 93), 179, 202
(109), 216, 217 (p. 116), 227 (no. 120), 237,
239, 240 (n. 125), 241, 242, 243, 265, 267,
300, 302, 304, 307, 309, 310.
foot(s) (unit of measurement): pp. 112, 112
(no. 44), 144, 145, 162, 218, 233, 277, 285,
291, 310.
skin(s): pp. 91, 248.
pillage: pp. 213, 215, 251, 252.
pilot: p. 169.
tweezers: p. 267.
plan(s): pp. 40, 82, 99, 114, 161, 172, 191,
192, 195, 196, 200, 201, 203, 210 (n. 113),
212, 213, 214, 230, 231, 242, 244, 252, 288,
289.
battle plan: p. 161, 172, 195.
plumbata: p. 308.
pontoon, pontoons: pp. 210, 248 (no. 134),
283, 284.
eagle holders: pp. 268, 271, 278, 310.
cape holder: p. 123.
standard bearer(s): pp. 94, 94 (no. 22), 96,
125 (n. 60), 126, 127, 131, 146, 170, 182,
268, 271, 278, 310.
gates: pp. 231, 232, 285 (n. 189).
post consulatum: p. 20 (no. 8).
well(s): pp. 216, 231, 233.
praefectus, praefecti: pp. 53, 73 (no. 1).
Praefectus Praetorio: pp. 36 (no. 53), 302.
praesentalis: pp. 23, 54, 56.
praetoria (way): p. 285 (nos. 191 and 192).
prefect(s): pp. 53, 73 (no. 1), 123, 211 (n.
113), 302.
Prefect of the Praetorium: pp. 211 (no. 113),
302.
principalis (way): p. 285 (nos. 191 and 192).
spring: pp. 21, 22, 23.
first line: pp. 11, 13, 74, 76, 91, 94, 106, 107,
107 (n. 38), 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113,
114, 115, 121, 128, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136,
137, 138, 146, 163, 167, 175, 176, 178, 240.
primus, primi: pp. 261, 261 (no. 141), 270,
275, 275 (n. 174), 290 (n. 206).
first orders: p. 261 (no. 141).
primi state, secundi ad difalangiam exite
(order): p. 275.
primi state, secundi exite (order): p. 290.
prisoner(s): pp. 12, 23, 23 (no. 14), 48, 56,
76, 90 (n. 8), 167, 171, 193, 194, 123, 215,
217, 218, 219, 220, 249, 250, 250 (n. 136).
proposal(s): pp. 199, 209, 210, 240.
domestic protectors: p. 55. protospatharios:
p. 304.
province(s): pp. 19, 19 (no. 2), 20, 20 (nos. 5
and 6), 21, 21 (n. 10), 22, 22 (n. 12), 23, 24,
25, 25 (n. 19), 26, 27, 27 (n. 23), 29, 32 (n.
38), 44, 49, 52, 52 (nos. 62 and 63), 53, 54
(n. 67), 55, 56, 98, 145 (n. 86), 175 (no. 93),
203 (n. 111), 211 (nos. 113 and 115), 227 (n.
120), 240 (no. 124), 301, 301 (n. 3), 303,
306, 309,
309 (no. 6).
pseudocomitatenses: pp. 51 (no. 60), 55.
provision, provisions: pp. 154, 155, 172, 177,
178, 194, 213, 214, 215, 230, 231, 232, 244,
245, 246, 250, 286, 287, 288.
people with light (or blond) hair (or hair): pp.
14, 49, 77, 143, 237, 245.
bridge(s): pp. 193 (no. 101), 210, 248, 248
(no. 134), 250, 283, 284.
door(s): pp. 38, 116, 177, 193, 231, 285,
288.
surveillance posts: pp. 215, 219, 232.
prop(s): pp. 233, 266 (n. 149).
rations: pp. 12, 28, 48, 79, 91, 92, 167, 172,
173, 267.
range: pp. 23, 47, 90, 92, 99, 301.
recruit(s), recruitment: pp. 37, 52, 52 (n.
61), 56, 96, 184, 269.
recognition(s): pp. 13, 48, 76, 146, 147, 168,
175, 177, 180, 183, 213, 232, 249, 271.
network(s): pp. 170, 284.
redi (order): pp. 275, 290.
refugee(s): pp. 29, 249, 249 (n. 136), 250
(no. 136).
regulation(s): pp. 10, 47, 73, 87, 94, 96, 97,
98, 138, 268, 270, 271, 291, 306.
oars: pp. 284, 303.
rearguard: pp. 10, 11, 42, 51, 74, 94, 95,
103, 106, 108, 109, 110, 110 (n. 41), 112,
114, 116, 121, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131,
134, 136, 137, 138, 143, 144, 146, 147, 175,
176, 177, 180, 181, 182 , 216, 217, 240 (n.
125), 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 249, 250, 259,
261, 262, 264, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275,
276, 277, 279, 280, 281, 284, 287, 288, 289,
291.
withdrawal(s): pp. 52 (no. 62), 94, 106, 108,
109, 113, 127, 135, 137, 146, 155, 193, 195,
211, 212, 229, 241, 241-242, 242, 243, 245,
249, 261, 289.
retreat: pp. 183, 285, 286.
king(s): pp. 25, 26, 44, 45, 144, 144 (n. 85),
240 (no. 124), 249, 300, 300 (n. 1), 304, 305,
308.
king of kings: p. Four. Five.
risk(s): pp. 83, 126, 135, 148, 155, 194, 195,
203, 218, 228, 229, 231, 232.
river(s): pp. 15, 22, 24 (no. 15), 25, 26, 41,
53, 55, 78, 100, 184, 193, 210, 227 (n. 120),
244, 247, 248, 248 (n. 134), 250, 256, 283,
284, 287, 299, 301, 304, 306, 307.
riparienses: p. 55.
ripenses: p. 55.
braces: e.g. 283.
Reds (Constantinople Hippodrome Faction):
p. 29 (no. 26).
Roman(s), Roman(s): pp. 19, 19 (no. 2), 20
(nos. 5 and 8), 21, 21 (n. 10), 23, 24 (n. 16),
25, 29 (n. 26), 30, 34, 35 (n. 53), 36, 36 (n.
53), 42, 44, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 73 (n. 1),
89, 89 (n. 5), 91, 96 (n. 32), 98 (no. 34),
106, 112 (n. 44), 113 (no. 46), 135, 145, 145
(n. 86), 178, 181, 199 (n. 105), 202 (no.
109), 203, 210 (n. 113), 211, 221, 229 (n.
121), 243, 249, 249 (n. 136), 250, 250 (n.
136), 262 (no. 142), 265, 268 (nos. 154 and
155), 288 (n. 198), 300, 300 (n. 2), 301, 302,
303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311.
rumor(s): pp. 177, 179, 192, 232, 248.
route(s): pp. 29, 100, 183, 213, 214, 216,
217, 220, 229, 230, 249, 250, 251, 279, 293.
priest(s): pp. 55, 116, 183 (n. 96).
safe conduct(s): p. 180.
plunder, plunder: pp. 13, 14, 23, 26, 76, 77,
98, 112, 167, 174, 184, 193, 198, 207, 212,
213, 214, 215, 217, 229, 243, 247, 249, 250,
251, 252.
Sarmatians: p. 302.
Saracens: p. 55.
Sassanid(s) (cf. Persian[s] Sassanid[s]).
scholae: p. 301.
schola draconarioum: p. 302.
Scholae Palatinae: p. 301.
scriptorium: p. 33.
secretary ab epistulis latinis: p. 36 (no. 53).
secundus, secundi: pp. 270, 275, 275 (n.
174), 290, 290 (n. 206).
sedition: pp. 97, 192.
Second Golden Age (of the Persians): p. 309.
second line: pp. 11, 13, 74, 76, 95, 106, 107,
108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 121, 127, 128,
130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138,
146, 147, 163, 167, 168, 175, 176, 177, 181,
240, 259.
semissis: p. 98 (no. 34).
signal(s): pp. 40, 115, 116 (n. 52), 125, 126,
136, 147, 177, 196, 212, 214, 221, 232, 245,
249, 261, 273, 278, 282, 286, 289, 291, 305.
September: pp. 24, 183 (no. 96), 232.
saw: p. 267.
servant(s): pp. 56, 92 (no. 16), 96, 174.
signifer: p. 310.
silentium, mandata capitate... (order): p. 273.
silentium. Nemo demittat... (order): p. 125.
symbols: pp. 11, 14, 47, 74, 77, 121, 123,
129, 130, 184, 255, 257, 263.
servant(s): pp. 92, 94, 153, 154, 177, 221.
soldier(s): pp. 9, 10, 12, 15, 20 (no. 5), 22
(no. 13), 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53 (n. 64), 54, 54
(n. 64), 55, 56, 57, 73, 76, 78, 81, 87, 89, 89
(ns. 5 and 6), 90, 91, 92, 92 (nos. 16 and
17), 93, 94, 94 (nos. 22, 29 and 30), 95, 96,
96 (n. 32), 97, 98, 98 (n. 35), 99, 100, 105,
106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 112 (n. 45), 115,
116, 116 (n. 52), 123, 124, 125 (n. 60), 126,
127, 128, 144, 145, 146, 153, 154, 155, 161,
162 (n. 90), 167, 171, 172, 172 (n. 91), 173,
174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 183 (n.
96), 184, 191, 191 (n. 100), 192, 193, 194,
195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 211, 212,
213, 214, 215, 216, 216 (n. 116), 217, 218,
219, 220, 221, 227, 228, 231, 240, 241, 248,
251, 255, 266 (n. 148), 267, 268 (n. 154),
269, 269 (n. 157), 270, 274, 275, 276, 277,
278, 279, 281, 286, 287, 289, 291, 292, 293,
294, 300, 300 (n. 2), 302, 303, 305, 308,
310, 311.
peasant-soldiers: p. 55.
border soldiers: p. 55.
solenarion: p. 266 (no. 150).
solidus, solidi: pp. 21, 21 (no. 11), 24, 98 (n.
34).
spatha: pp. 265 (no. 147), 271 (n. 161).
spatharius, spatharios: pp. 271 (no. 161),
304.
spatharo-kandidates: p. 304.
sta (order): p. 126.
staria italica: p. 246 (no. 133).
strator: pp. 271 (no. 161), 305.
supply(s): pp. 28, 39, 48, 94, 155, 170, 174,
177, 179, 180, 196, 210, 211, 212, 214, 217,
227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 242, 243, 283,
286, 287.
suscipe (order): p. 131.
symmachoi: p. 55.
tables: p. 233.
tactic(s), tactic(s): pp. 13, 14, 34, 35 (n. 53),
40, 48, 76, 77, 82, 89 (n. 5), 93, 94 (n.
25), 114, 128, 145 (n. 87), 168, 169, 175,
200, 203 (n. 112), 239, 240, 240 (n. 125),
264, 277, 291, 292, 303.
tagma(s): pp. 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 47, 57, 73,
74, 78, 87, 90, 92, 93, 93 (n. 19), 95, 96, 97,
98, 100, 103, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113,
114, 115, 117, 117 (n. 53), 121, 123, 124,
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136,
137, 138, 161, 168, 170, 171, 178, 179, 182,
183, 184, 214, 220, 221, 251, 252, 255, 256,
262, 265, 269, 270, 271, 272, 276, 277, 279,
280, 283, 285, 289, 290, 292, 294, 299, 300,
310.
taxiarch: pp. 94, 130, 310.
lieutenant: p. 269.
theory: pp. 24, 82.
third line: pp. 108, 109, 136, 137, 138, 284.
embankment: p. 285.
territory(s): pp. 10, 14, 21 (no. 10), 25, 26,
48, 73, 77, 87, 90, 99, 100, 153, 154, 180,
193, 195, 196, 199, 200, 202, 207, 210, 212,
213, 215, 216 , 225, 229, 230, 246, 246 (n.
132), 247, 248, 250, 250 (n. 136), 299, 300,
304, 306, 307, 308, 309.
rugged territory: pp. 14, 77, 207, 216.
hostile territory: pp. 14, 48, 207, 212, 213,
215, 216, 250.
tervingios: p. 304.
Nagyszentmiklós Treasury: p. 90 (no. 8).
testudo: pp. 262 (no. 142), 306.
tetrarch(s): pp. 90, 91 (no. 11), 94, 96, 126,
310.
theme(s): pp. 26, 301, 309.
store(s): pp. 92, 92 (no. 15), 154, 211, 221,
241, 243, 249, 282, 285, 285 (n. 192), 286,
291, 301.
helmsman: p. 82.
jars: p. 233.
arrow shot(s): pp. 108, 108 (no. 39), 114,
115, 125, 127, 135, 136, 137, 138, 146, 180,
241, 244, 248, 258, 261, 262, 263, 274, 279,
284, 295.
torna mina (order): p. 127.
tower(s): pp. 210, 230, 231, 284, 303.
siege towers: p. 230.
turtle (cf. testudo).
betrayal: pp. 172 (no. 92), 192, 193, 194,
242.
traitor(s): pp. 202, 213.
trap(s): pp. 145, 146, 175 (n. 93), 180, 182,
192, 247.
transmutes (order): pp. 127, 138.
transform (order): pp. 127, 277, 291.
transportation: pp. 15, 53, 78, 172, 250, 256,
267, 267 (n. 152), 283, 284.
treaty(s) (international agreement[s]): pp. 21,
23, 27, 52, 180, 198, 248, 305.
treatise (literary work): pp. 30, 31, 32, 34, 35
(n. 53), 45, 46, 59, 82 (n. 3), 108 (no. 39),
264.
tremissis: p. 98 (no. 34).
tribune(s): pp. 16, 57, 78, 93, 95, 96, 117,
256, 269, 285, 289, 291, 301, 302, 310.
black wheat: p. 246 (no. 133).
trench(s): pp. 144, 145, 180, 193, 215, 233,
243, 284, 286, 288, 291.
Trisagion (religious hymn): pp. 183, 183 (no.
96), 286, 286 (n. 194).
trumpet(s) (musician[s]): pp. 123, 268, 301,
310.
trumpet(s) (musical instrument): p. 172, 177,
212, 221, 273, 281, 282, 286, 302.
troop(s): pp. 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, 22, 25, 26,
28, 30, 31, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48,
50, 51, 51 (n. 60), 52, 53, 54, 56, 63, 74, 75,
78, 81, 82, 87, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99,
100, 103, 105 (n. 37), 106, 107, 108, 109,
110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 125,
126, 127, 128, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141,
143, 144 , 145, 146, 153, 154, 155, 161, 162,
163, 167, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178, 179, 181, 182, 183, 185, 191, 192, 193 ,
194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202,
203, 204, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
216 (n. 116), 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 227
(n. 120), 228, 229, 231, 232, 240 (n. 125),
241, 244, 248, 249, 250, 252, 255, 258, 261,
262, 263, 264, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 273,
274, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 285,
286, 287, 288, 289, 292, 294, 305, 306, 307,
308, 310.
support troops: e.g. 109.
assault troops: pp. 10, 38, 73, 94, 103, 108,
109, 111, 135, 161, 162, 163, 181, 182, 244,
258, 310.
defense troops: pp. 10, 73, 94, 103, 108,
109, 135, 161, 162, 163, 181, 182, 244, 310.
ambush troops: pp. 11, 74, 109, 111, 176.
border troops: pp. 51, 51 (no. 60).
maneuver troops: pp. 51, 51 (p. 60).
rear troops: pp. 109, 175, 176.
regular troops: pp. 54, 96, 215.
tubae: p. 302.
tubes: p. 301.
tunics: pp. 91, 265, 265 (n. 145).
Turkish(s), Turks: pp. 14, 26, 27 (no. 23), 49, 52
(n. 63), 77, 105, 237, 242, 242 (n. 128), 301, 309,
310.
undique servate (order): p. 276.
unit(s) (military[s]): pp. 14, 19 (no. 3), 20
(no. 5), 21, 28, 39, 41, 47, 50, 51 (n. 60), 52,
52 (n. 61), 54, 54 (n. 67), 55, 57, 77, 93, 93
(n. 19), 94 (no. 22), 95, 96, 99, 100, 105,
106, 110, 110 (ns. 41 and 42) , 183, 197,
212, 214, 218, 243, 244, 251, 252, 255, 257,
261 (n. 141), 262, 269, 270, 276, 278, 279,
280, 281, 285, 286, 289, 292, 299, 300, 302,
305, 308, 310.
value: pp. 20 (no. 5), 39, 40, 97, 143, 171,
178, 195, 196, 197, 199, 228, 232, 245, 247.
vandals: pp. 25, 54, 56.
avant-garde: pp. 110, 214, 217.
spear: p. 308.
poison, poison, poisonous (and variants): pp.
30, 45, 203, 216, 216 (n. 116), 247.
summer: pp. 21, 23, 26, 49, 145 (n. 86), 216,
218, 221 (n. 119), 232, 240, 243, 248, 249,
250, 300.
Greens (Constantinople Hippodrome faction):
pp. 29, 29 (no. 26).
clothing(s): pp. 15, 32 (no. 44), 49, 78, 91,
91 (no. 14), 255, 265, 265 (n. 144).
wardrobe (clothes): p. 28.
veterans: pp. 28, 96, 96 (n. 32), 183, 269.
vexilation, vexilations: pp. 110, 110 (no.
41),
vexiliary: p. 310.
vexillatio: p. 110 (no. 41).
vexilliarius: p. 310.
vexillum: p. 300, 310.
vexillum parvum: p. 300.
viae praetoria et principalis: p. 285 (nos. 141
and 142).
vicar: pp. 20 (no. 6), 25 (no. 19).
vicarius: pp. 20 (no. 6), 25 (no. 19).
victory(s): pp. 20, 30, 39, 45, 48, 107, 117,
135, 144 (n. 85), 154, 170, 171, 175 (n. 93),
179, 180, 192, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202,
203 (n. 111).
surveillance: pp. 53, 55, 179, 211, 216 (n.
116), 219.
vinegar: pp. 172 (no. 91), 233.
wine: pp. 172 (no. 91), 173, 215, 245, 289.
Visigoth(s): pp. 25, 36, 52, 52 (n. 63), 53,
304, 305.
widow(s): pp. 29, 246.
bivouac: p. 215.
volunteer(s), volunteering: pp. 52, 56.
mares: p. 243.
helmet(s): pp. 90, 265, 311.
ditch(es) (cf. trench[s]).
shoes: p. 265.
Index of works, authors and versions of

the strategikon text
A (cf. Codex Ambrosianus).
Ab Vrbe Condita (literary work of Titus Livy):
pp. 43, 202 (no. 108).
Record of the Martyrdom of Anastasius the
Persian (cf.
Acta Martyris Anastasii Persae).

Acta Martyris Anastasii Persae (anonymous
literary work): pp. 45, 89 (no. 6), 162 (no.
90).
Ad Demonicum (literary work of Isocrates):
pp. 43, 197 (no. 103).
Aeneas Tacticus (cf. Aeneas [military treatise
writer]).
Agathias (historian): pp. 19 (no. 1), 42, 43,
44, 53 (n. 44), 144 (nos. 84 and 85), 218 (n.
117).
Ambrosiana Paraphrasis (historical source):
pp. 266 (no. 150).
Ambrosianus (cf. Codex Ambrosianus).
Ammiano Marcellinus (historian): pp. 302,
303.
Anecdote (literary work of Procopius of
Caesarea): p. 299.
Anthologia Graeca (literary work): p. 31.
Apocalypse (literary work of Saint John the
Evangelist): p. 183 (no. 96).
Apotegmatha Chabriae (literary work of
Plutarch): pp. 43, 201 (no. 106).
Arrian (military treatise writer): pp. 33, 43,
162 (n. 90), 270 (no. 159), 301, 302, 310.
Arts (work of Cornelius Celsus): p. 35 (no.
53). Asclepiodotus (cf. Asclepiodotus the
Tactician [military treatise writer]).
Asclepiodotus the Tactician (military treatise
writer): pp. 33, 268 (no. 155).
Bellum Iudaicum (literary work of Flavius
Josephus): pp. 43, 286 (no. 195).
Cato the Censor (politician and writer): pp.
35, 35 (no. 53).
Cato the Elder (cf. Cato the Censor).
Cervantes Saavedra (Miguel de) (Spanish
writer of the 16th and 17th centuries): p. 193
(no. 101).
Chronica (literary work by Juan de Biclaro): p.
25.
Chronica (literary work of Juan de Nikiu): pp.
19 (no. 1), 45, 216 (n. 116).
Chronica (literary work of Miguel el Sirio): p.
19 (no. 1).
Chronicon Anonymi ad annum Domini 1234
pertinens (historical source): p. 19 (no. 1).
Chronicon Paschale (historical source): p. 19
(no. 1).
Chronographia (literary work of Gregorio bar
Hebreo): p. 19 (no. 1).
Chronographia (literary work of Theophanes
the
Confessor): p. 300.
Codex Ambrosianus (codex): pp. 33, 268 (no.
154).
Codex Iustiniani (legal work of Justinian I):
pp. 44, 82 (no. 4), 92 (no. 16), 96 (no. 32),
97 (no. 33), 172 (no. 91), 286 (no. 197).
Codex Mediceus-Laurentianus (codex): p. 33.
Codex Neapolitanus (codex): p. 33.
Codex Parisinus (codex): p. 33.
Codex Theodosianus (legal work of
Theodosius II): p. 300 (no. 2).
Codex Vaticanus (codex): p. 33.
Compendium Historiarum (literary work of
Jorge Cedreno): p. 19 (no. 1).
Constantine VII (Eastern Roman emperor and
literary author): pp. 21 (no. 11), 32, 32 (n.
44), 33, 98 (n. 34), 301.
Cornelius Celsus (Roman writer): pp. 35, 35
(no. 53).
Cornelius Celsus (Aulus) (cf. Cornelius
Celsus). Corpus Iuris Civilis (legal work of
Justinian I): pp. 36 (no. 53), 44, 97 (n. 33).
Chronicle (literary work of Juan Skylitzes): p.
92 (no. 15).
Cronicón Rotense (historical source): p. 304.
De Bello Civile (Caesar's literary work): p. 42.
De Bello Gallico (literary work of Caesar): p.
42.
De Bello Gothico (literary work of Procopius of
Caesarea): pp. 53 (no. 64), 54 (nos. 67 and
68), 89 (n. 5).
From Bello Persico (literary work of Procopius
of Caesarea): pp. 43, 44, 89 (n. 5), 144 (nos.
84 and 84), 175 (n. 93), 307.
De Bello Vandalico (literary work of Procopius
of Caesarea): pp. 54 (no. 66), 94 (no. 22),
300.
Of Medicine (work of Cornelius Celsus): p. 35
(no. 53).
De Munitionibus Castrorum (work of Pseudo-
Higinius): pp. 36 (no. 54), 286 (no. 196).
From Rebus Bellicis (anonymous literary
work): pp. 43, 266 (no. 149).
From Thematibus (literary work of
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus): pp. 301,
309. Digesta (legal work of Justinian I): pp.
36 (no. 53), 92 (no. 17).
Dio Cassius (historian): pp. 44, 211 (no. 113).
Speeches (literary work of Isocrates): p. 197
(no. 103).
The General (cf. Strategikos, by Onasander).
The ingenious gentleman Don Quixote of La
Mancha (literary work by Miguel de Cervantes
Saavedra): p. 193 (no. 101).
Aelianus (military treatise writer): p. 33.
Aeneas (military treatise writer): p. 33, 268
(no. 155).
Epistolarum Registrum (historical source of
Pope Gregory I): p. 19 (no. 1).
Epitoma Rei Militaris (literary work of
Vegetius): pp. 35, 36 (no. 54), 37, 89 (n. 6),
94 (no. 25), 116 (no. 51), 199 (no. 105), 266
(no. 149), 268 (n. 153), 286 (n. 196), 301,
303, 308.
Epitome Historiarum (literary work of
Zonaras): p. 19 (no. 1).
Eustratio (historian): p. 19 (no. 1).
Evagrius (historian): pp. 19 (no. 1), 21 (no.
9).
Flavius Josephus (historian): pp. 43, 286 (no.
195).
Spanish forest of apothegms and sentences
(literary work by Melchor de Santa Cruz de
Dueñas): p. 193 (no. 101).
Fragments (what is preserved from the work
of
Menander the Protector): p. 19 (no. 1).
Frontinus (Roman politician, military man and
writer): pp. 35, 35 (no. 53), 42.
Germania (literary work of Tacitus): p. 307.
Getica (literary work of Jordanes): pp. 299,
304.
Gregory I (saint) (pope and author of a
historical source): pp. 19 (no. 1), 27, 28.
Gregorio bar Hebreo (historian): p. 19 (no.
1).
Gregory of Tours (historian): pp. 300, 300
(no. 1).
Herodotus (historian): pp. 303, 304.
History (literary work of Miguel Attaliates):
pp. 46, 179 (no. 94).
History (literary work of Sebeos): p. 307.
History (literary work of Teofilacto
Simocatta): pp. 19 (no. 1), 44, 211 (n. 115),
227 (no. 120), 300.
Historia Augusta (literary work by several
authors): pp. 44, 105 (no. 37), 211 (no. 113).
Ecclesiastical History (literary work of
Evagrio): pp. 19 (no. 1), 21 (no. 9).
Ecclesiastical History (literary work of John of
Ephesus): p. 19 (no. 1).
Ecclesiastical History (literary work of
Nicephorus Callisto): p. 19 (no. 1).
Historia Francorum (work literary
Gregory of Tours): pp. 300, 300 (no. 1).
Historia Langobardorum (literary work of
Paulo Diácono): pp. 19 (no. 1), 300, 306,
308. Historia Nova (literary work of Zosimo):
p. 303.
Historiae (literary work of Agathias): pp. 19
(no. 1), 43, 44, 144 (nos. 84 and 85).
Historiae (literary work of Polybius): pp. 36
(no. 54), 43, 202 (n. 108), 286 (no. 196).
Histories (literary work of Herodotus): p. 303.
Homer (poet): pp. 43, 107 (no. 38), 201 (no.
107).
Iliad (literary work of Homer): p. 43, 107 (no.
38), 201 (no. 107).
Isocrates (Greek author): pp. 43, 197 (no.
103).
Iulius Frontinus (Sextus) (cf. Frontinus).
Jordanes (historian): pp. 299, 304, 306. Jorge
Cedreno (historian): p. 19 (no. 1).
Juan de Biclaro (historian): p. 25.
John of Ephesus (historian): pp. 19 (no. 1),
309.
Juan de Nikiu (historian): pp. 19 (no. 1), 45,
216 (n. 116).
Juan Skylitzes (historian): p. 92 (no. 15).
Kekaumenos (military treatise writer): pp. 45,
46, 82 (n. 3), 100 (no. 36), 191 (no. 100).
The Star of Seville (work by, or attributed to,
Félix Lope de Vega y Carpio): p. 193 (no.
101).
The expedition against the Alans (literary
work of Arrian): p. 301.
The Stratagems (cf. Stratagemata).
Leo VI (Eastern Roman emperor and military
treatise writer): pp. 32, 32 (no. 43), 33, 34,
45, 107 (n. 38), 179 (n. 94), 201 (no. 106),
203 (n. 112).
Libri ad Filium (literary work of Cato the
Censor): p. 35 (no. 53).
Lope de Vega y Carpio (Félix) (Spanish writer
of the 16th and 17th centuries): p. 193 (no.
101).
Lp (cf. Problemata).
Lt (cf. Tacticae Constitutiones).
M (cf. Codex Mediceus-Laurentianus]).
Mauricio (Eastern Roman emperor and
military treatise): pp. 9, 19, 19 (nos. 1 and
3), 20, 20 (n. 8), 21, 21 (no. 7), 23, 23 (n.
14), 24, 24 (no. 15), 25, 26, 26 (n. 21), 27,
27 (n. 23), 28, 28 (no. 25), 29, 29 (n. 26),
30, 31, 32, 32 (n. 44), 33, 34, 34 (n. 52), 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 42 (ns. 55 and
56), 43, 44, 45, 45 (n. 57), 46, 49, 50, 51,
53, 56, 57, 81 (n. 2), 82 (nos. 3 and 4), 91
(n. 12), 108 (no. 39), 116 (no. 49), 117 (no.
53), 144 (no. 84), 145 (no. 87), 184 (no. 99),
203 (no. 112), 216 (no. 116), 268 (no. 154),
269 (nos. 156 and 158), 301, 302, 303, 304,
305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310.
Μαυρικίου (cf. Mauricio).
Maxims of kings and generals (literary work
of Plutarch): p. 201 (no. 106).
Mazoneus (Strategikon archetype): pp. 33-34.
Menander the Protector (historian): pp. 19
(no. 1), 309.
Michael the Syrian (historian): p. 19 (no. 1).
Miguel Attaliates (historian): pp. 46, 179 (no.
94).
Moralia (literary work of Plutarch): p. 201 (no.
106).
Nicephorus Callisto (historian): p. 19 (no. 1).
Nicephorus Uranos (military writer): p. 203
(no.
112).
ND Or. (Notitia Dignitaum, pars Orientis)
(historical source): pp. 69, 110 (no. 42).
Onasander (cf. Onasandro [military treatise
writer]).
Onasandro (military treatise writer): pp. 33,
41, 42 (n. 55).
Οὐρβικίου (cf. Urbicio, Urbicius, Urbikíos).
P (cf. Codex Parisinus).
Paterno (praetorian prefect and Roman
jurist): pp. 35, 35 (no. 53).
Paulo Deácono (historian): p. 308.
Philippicus (cf. Philippikos).
Philippikos (possible military treatise writer):
p. 31.
Plutarch (historian): pp. 35 (no. 53), 43, 201
(n. 106), 203 (n. 112), 268 (no. 154).
Polybius (historian): pp. 36 (no. 54), 43, 202
(n. 108), 286 (no. 196).
Porcius Cato (Marcus) (cf. Cato the Censor).
Problemata (literary work of Leo VI): pp. 33,
45.
Procopius of Caesarea (historian): pp. 42, 43,
44, 53 (n. 64), 54 (nos. 66, 67 and 68), 89
(n. 5), 94 (no. 22), 144 (nos. 84 and 85), 175
(n. 93), 299, 300, 306, 307.
Pseudo-Higinius (military treatise writer): pp.
36 (no. 54), 286 (no. 196).
Summary of Military Affairs (cf. Epitoma Rei
Militaris [literary work of Vegetius]).
Santa Cruz de Dueñas (Melchor de) (Spanish
writer of the 16th century): p. 193 (no. 101).
Sebeos (historian): p. 307.
Synopsis Historion (literary work by Juan
Skylitzes): p. 92 (no. 15).
Stratagemata (literary work of Frontinus): pp.
35 (no. 53), 42.
Strategikon (military manual of Emperor
Maurice): pp. 5, 9, 16, 24, 24 (no. 15), 30,
31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,
49, 50, 55, 57, 67, 71, 82 (n. 3), 246 (no.
132), 250 (no. 136), 306.
Strategicon (literary work of Kekaumenos):
pp. 100 (no. 36), 191 (no. 100).
Strategicos (literary work of Onasandro): pp.
33, 41.
Στρατηγικός (literary work of Onasander): p.
41.
Tacitus (historian): p. 307.
Tακτικά (cf. Taktika).
Tactica (literary work of Arrian): pp. 31 (no.
29), 43, 152 (n. 90), 270 (no. 159), 301, 302,
310.
Tactica (literary work of Asclepiodotus the
Tactician): p. 268 (no. 155).
Tacticae Constitutions (literary work of Leo
VI): pp. 32 (no. 43), 35, 45, 107 (n. 38), 179
(n. 94), 201 (no. 106), 203 (n. 112).
Taktiká (literary work of Aeliano): p. 33.
Taktiká (another name of the Strategikon of
Mauritius): p. 31.
Tarrutenius Paternus (Publius?) (cf.
Paternal).
Theodosius II (emperor and author of
legislative works): p. 183 (no. 96).
Theophanes the Confessor (historian): p. 300.
Theophylacto Simocatta (historian): pp. 19
(no.
1), 44, 45, 211 (n. 115), 227 (no. 120), 299,
300, 309.
Titus Livy (historian): pp. 43, 202 (no. 108).
Urbicio (possible author): p. 31.
Urbicius (possible author): p. 31.
Urbikíos (possible author): p. 31.
Vegetius (military treatise): pp. 34, 35, 35
(no. 53), 36 (no. 54), 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43, 89 (n. 6), 94 (no. 25), 105 (no. 37), 116
(no. 51), 199 (no. 105), 266 (no. 149), 268
(no. 153), 286 (n. 196), 301, 303, 308.
Life of Hadrian (part of the Historia Augusta):
pp. 44, 211 (no. 113).
Life of Marcus Cato (literary work of
Plutarch): p. 35 (no. 53).
Life of Probus (part of the Augustan History):
p. 105 (no. 37).
Vita Eutychii (literary work of Eustratio): p. 19
(no. 1).
VNP (family of codexes [cf. Codex Vaticanus,
Codex Neapolitanus and Codex Parisinus]):
pp. 31, 33, 94 (n. 29), 268 (no. 154).
Zonaras (historian): p. 19 (no. 1).
Zosimus (historian): pp. 44, 145 (no. 86),
303.

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Strategikon

Book VI, chapter 2. About wing

Book IX, chapter 2. About night attacks

Mauritius' policy in Europe

Administrative reforms in the West

The eastern policy of Mauritius

The end of the Mauritius empire

THE WORK. CONTENT

THE WORK IN ITS HISTORICAL

The army of Diocletian and Constantine

The army of Justinian I and Maurice

1 To biograph the Emperor Maurice there are

Monographs, articles and contributions

Note on the present

PART B. ABOUT THE POINTS TO BE

Chapter 5. How to spy on the enemy and how

ABOUT CUSTOMS AND TACTICS

PART B. ABOUT THE FORMATIONS OF

1 Emperor Maurice had issued a decree that all

Book I, chapter 1. How is it convenient

Book I, chapter 2. How is it advisable to

Book I, chapter 3. About the various

1. If a soldier disobeys his own tetrarch or

Book I, chapter 8. About military

Book I, chapter 9. What organization

END OF BOOK ONE

1 Apparently, the way that the Romans had of holding

Book II, chapter 1. On the usefulness

Book II, chapter 2. Of the organization

Book II, chapter 5. Ambushes in the

Book II, chapter 7. About collusion

Book II, chapter 8. About weapons

Book II, chapter 9. About the medical

Book II, chapter 10. About the pennants

Book II, chapter 11. About spies or

Book II, chapter 12. Over the

mensores and betting games

Book II, chapter 14. About the size and

Book II, chapter 15. About the custody

Book II, chapter 16. About the place of

Book II, chapter 17. About those who

We do not consider it desirable for many

Book II, chapter 18. About the battle

Book II, chapter 19. About the heralds

Book II, chapter 20. On the convenience

Chapter 1. The symbols used to illustrate

Explanation of the symbols that illustrate

ON THE FORMATION OF TAGMAS 1 2

Book III, chapter 1. The symbols used

k He must definitely march in open order so

Book III, chapter 4. Scheme of the same

Book III, chapter 5. Tagma training

When the flag has been aligned in the

Book III, chapter 6. The formation of

MEROS OF THE FEDERATIONS. TRAINING

Flag in open order

Groupers Tagma Groupers Tagma Groupers Tagma Groupers

If it happens that the army is of a force of

THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST LINE OF BATTLE WITH THE FLANKERS

FLANK GUARDS MEROS MEROS MEROS FLANKERS

HOW THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE

Book III, chapter 11. About general