Case Title: SACHIN KUMAR vs. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND., Diary No.

- 51567 – 2023
Coram: Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan
Recently, the Supreme Court expressed its dilemma regarding how, for the last few months, the panel of
Advocates in the States/Union Territories has witnessed change after the shift in political power. The
Court observed that this change in the panel often results in adjournments.
Against this backdrop, the Top Court has proposed that the States/Union Territories maintain the previous
panel of Advocates for at least six weeks while changing the panel of Advocates. This was suggested to
avoid adjournments.

Impermissible For High Court To Interfere With Acquittal Unless Trial Court's View Is Perverse Or
Impossible : Supreme Court
Case Title: BALLU @ BALRAM @ BALMUKUND AND ANOTHER VERSUS THE STATE OF
MADHYA PRADESH
Coram: Justices BR Gavai and Sandeep Mehta
The Supreme Court reiterated that in the event of the possibility of two views, if the trial court acquits the
accused, then it would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere with the trial court's order of
acquittal unless the view taken by the trial court was perverse.

Limitation Act | Time Spent Contesting Bonafide Litigation At Wrong Forum Would Be Excluded While
Computing Limitation : Supreme Court
Case Title: PURNI DEVI & ANR. VERSUS BABU RAM & ANR., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 273
Custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally
true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to
release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion
on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is
required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the
custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. Ashok Kumar v. State of
Union Territory Chandigarh, 2024
Section 82(1) - An accused would not be entitled to pre-arrest bail if the non-bailable warrant and the
proclamation under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. is pending against him. Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar
Mere filing of an anticipatory bail application by the accused could not be treated as his appearance
before the court which had initiated proceedings under Section 82/83 Cr.P.C. against the accused.
Section 173 – Police report – It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned
court that on the material collected during the course of investigation, an offence appears to have been
committed by the particular person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been committed., Dablu
Kujur v. State of Jharkhand. Mandatory requirements of police report – It is found that the investigating
officers while submitting the chargesheet/Police Report do not comply with the requirements of the
Section 173(2). Though the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) has to be prescribed
by the State Government and each State Government has its own Police Manual, the mandatory
requirements required to be complied with by such officers in the Police Report/Chargesheet are laid
down in Section 173.
Also -- Power of Magistrate to act on Police report – When such a Police Report concludes that an
offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three
options: (i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, (ii) he may
direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further
report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such
Police Report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three
options: (i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or (ii) he may disagree with the report and
taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and
issue process, or (iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of
Section 156. Bhagwant Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & Anr; (1985)
Also -- Right to default bail on grounds of incomplete police report – Once from the material produced
along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance
of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in
terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused
or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither
vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that
the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section
173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 15) CBI vs. Kapil Wadhwan & Anr, Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 2024
High Court should have exercised power under Section 482 to stop the abuse of the process and to secure
the ends of justice. Although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such
criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature but are given a cloak of criminal offence.
Criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 90; referred. Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024.
The scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the
transfer is persuaded by malafide. In absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the
person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of
the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is
not warranted. Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024
Jurisdiction to interfere in administrative decisions – The judiciary must exercise restraint and avoid
unnecessary intervention qua administrative decision(s) of the executive involving specialised expertise in
the absence of any mala-fide and / or prejudice. The process of evaluation of an IAS officer, ought to
have been left to the executive on account of it possessing the requisite expertise and mandate for the said
task. State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024
Testimony of the prosecution witness identifying the accused persons at the police station cannot be
considered a proper Test Identification Parade to convict the accused. (Para 5 - 7) Jafar v. State of
Kerala, 2024
The Court can rely on the victim as a “sterling witness” without further corroboration, but the quality and
credibility must be exceptionally high. While a victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual offence
cases, an unreliable or insufficient account from the prosecutrix, marked by identified flaws and gaps,
casts serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution version and could make it difficult for a
conviction to be recorded. Considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court
does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident and allows the victim to provide
her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the
Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration
of that version. Material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution witnesses, including the
victim, significantly undermine the credibility of the prosecution version. Enough missing links present to
extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024
Also, Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of a victim of crime; however, it must
undergo a strict scrutiny through the well settled legal principles.
Director of the company not responsible for its day-to-day affairs cannot be held liable for dishonor of
cheque. Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. 2024 NI.
Mere filing of the cheque dishonor complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act would not grant a
right to a complainant to seek interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act, as the power
of the court to grant interim compensation, isn't mandatory but discretionary and needs to be decided after
prima facie evaluating the merits of the case. Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand,2024.
Where there is no reason to decline a decree for specific performance, the Courts ought to grant the same
rather than give an alternative relief. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024
Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and will override any personal law or statute. The
wishes/desire of the child who is capable of forming an opinion has to be considered by the court while
deciding any matter of child custody. Shazia Aman Khan v. State of Orissa, 2024
Section 156 (3) - An affidavit is necessary with the application under Sectionb 156 (3) Cr.P.C. -
Directions in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 are mandatory. Ramesh Kumar
Bung v. State of Telangana, 2024
Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Grant of pre-arrest bail to a police officer facing allegations
of manipulating the investigation so as to favour an accused would send out a wrong signal in society and
would be against public interest. Presumptions and other considerations applicable to a layperson facing
criminal charges may not carry the same weight while dealing with a police officer who is alleged to have
abused his office. Considering the position held by the respondent, even if he was suspended from
service, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and the evidence was sufficiently high. Bail
order is liable to be set aside. Court must record reasons for grant of Bail – An order of bail, bereft of any
cogent reason, could not be sustained. Though grant of bail is discretionary, it calls for exercise of such
discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar
2024.
Article 19(1) (a) & 21– Right to dissent – The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an
integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and every individual must respect the right of
others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an
essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right
to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21, but the protest or dissent must be subject
to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2). Further, the police machinery must
be enlightened on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the
Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on this freedom. The police machinery must be
sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of
Maharashtra, 2024
Article 20(1) – Article 20(1) does not prohibit this Court, to award a lesser punishment in a befitting case,
when this Court is of the opinion that a lesser punishment may be awarded since the new law on the penal
provision provides a lesser punishment i.e. lesser than what was actually applicable at the relevant time.
The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher
punishment than which was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is
no prohibition for this Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same
crime. A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212
Article 136 – Interference under Article 136 is not warranted – The Supreme Court may exercise its
power under Article 136 sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist which justify the
exercise of its discretion. The court is not inclined under Article 136 of the Constitution to re-appreciate
the findings of facts which have been arrived at by the High Court. The order of the High Court does not
suffer from any error that would warrant the invocation of jurisdiction under Article 136. Vedanta Ltd. v.
State of Tamil Nadu, 2024
Rajya Sabha's role is part of basic structure - Rajya Sabha elections protected by legislative privileges
under Article 194. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 Parliamentary processes not
taking place on the floor of the house are also covered by parliamentary privilege.
As per English jurisprudence, pre-contractual correspondence loses its significance once the contract
comes into existence. When the parties have signed the agreement, the terms agreed therein would bind
the parties and the email exchanged between the parties prior to the agreement, cannot override the policy
decisions. In order to contend that the appellant has been misled, the appellant ought to have raised such
contention when the agreement was to be signed. Rajesh Monga v. Housing Development Finance
Corporation Ltd; 2024
Dying declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. The
Court is required to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the
statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where the Court is satisfied
about the dying declaration being true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further
corroboration. There cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of
prudence. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the
deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment
to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. Naeem v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, 2024
Incidental witnesses – The incident, which transpired partly within the confines of the house and extended
slightly beyond the deceased's premises, the family members and close relatives naturally become the
witnesses. These individuals cannot be considered incidental witnesses; instead, they emerge as the most
natural witnesses. Thoti Manohar v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) SCC 7 723; referred. State of
Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024
Section 94(2) – Mode for determination of age – In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate
from the school stands at the highest pedestal in determination of age. The ossification test has been kept
at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate
issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat. Opinion of medical board that estimation of age
based on X-ray examination becomes uncertain after 25 years is accepted. JJ Act. Vinod Katara v. State
of U.P., 2024
Section 153-A (1) (a) & Section 153-A (1) (b) and Constitution of India; Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to
criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression,
under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or
every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an
offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will
not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or
community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and
anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of
reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not
be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good
wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that
such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different
religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion.
WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among
various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross
abuse of the process of law. Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024
The grant of decree for specific performance is always discretionary and depends on the conduct of the
person. Considering the plaintiffs' conduct of making false and/or incorrect statements in the plaint, which
were very material, we hold that the plaintiffs are disentitled to relief of specific performance. The relief
of specific performance is an equitable relief, hence a person who seeks equity must do equity. ) Major
Gen. Darshan Singh v. Brij Bhushan Chaudhary, 2024
Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., Diary No. 11805 of 2024 Electoral
Bonds Case
Supreme Court Reviews Its Order, Reiterates Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 Are Relevant Rules For
Considering Question Of Juvenility
Case Title: Review Petition In GAURAV KUMAR @ MONU vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA., 2024
LiveLaw (SC) 242
Party Claiming Adverse Possession Must Know Who The Actual Owner Of Property Is: Supreme Court
Case Title: M. Radheshyamlal versus V Sandhya and Anr. Etc., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 245
Coram: Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot seek ownership over the property based on the claim of an
adverse possession if he fails to prove (i) who was the actual owner of the property and (ii), an
uninterrupted possession for more than 12 years was in the original owner's knowledge.
'Judges Shouldn't Attempt To Change Views Of Couples, Sexual Orientation' : Supreme Court Issues
Guidelines To HCs On Habeas Corpus & Protection Petitions
Case Details: DEVU G. NAIR vs. THE STATE OF KERALA., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 249
Coram: CJI DY Chandrachud and comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court has issued guidelines for the High Courts in dealing with
habeas corpus petitions or petitions seeking police protection. The guidelines come as a consequence of a
petition filed by a woman against a Kerala High Court order which, while considering a habeas corpus
petition, directed her alleged lesbian partner to undergo counselling. The court in issuing the said
guidelines observed that such directions for counselling often torment the members of the LGBTQ+
community and could have deterrent effects.
'Even Today Court Is Forced Restate DK Basu Principles', Supreme Court Directs Police & Probe
Agencies To Strictly Follow Norms On Arrest
Case Title: SOMNATH VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252
Coram: Justices Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court expressed displeasure with the conduct of the investigative
agencies and the police for not adhering to the Constitutional and statutory safeguards while arresting and
taking the accused into custody.
Supreme Court Directs States/UTs To Issue Ration Cards To 8 Crore Unorganised Sector Workers
Registered Under E-Shram Portal
Case: In Re Problems and Miseries of Migrant Labourers
Coram: Justices Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
The Supreme Court has directed the State Governments and Union Territories to grant ration cards to 8
crore workers in the Unorganised sector who, despite being registered under the center's e-Shram portal,
do not have these ration cards. This, in turn, will allow these workers to get the benefit of schemes by the
Union of India and state governments, as well as the benefit of the National Food Security Act, 2013
(Act). The timeline given by the Court for the task is two months.
'No Live Issue Existing' : Supreme Court Dismisses PIL To Declare Right To Vote As Fundamental Right
Case Details : DEVADIPTA DAS vs. UNION OF INDIA Diary No.- 3169 - 2024
The Supreme Court refused to entertain a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking the declaration of
voting rights as part of fundamental rights.
Chief Justice of India (CJI) highlighted the necessity for a live controversy to be present before the court,
emphasizing the need for a "live lis" (legal dispute) to warrant jurisdiction under Article 32.
Case Details: Nipun Malhotra vs Sony Pictures Films India Pvt Ltd SLP(C) No. 005239 - / 2024
Coram: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra
The Supreme Court issued notice in a petition challenging the alleged insensitive portrayal of disabled
individuals in the film 'Aankh Micholi,' produced by Sony Pictures. The Court, in the present matter, will
consider the potential implications of the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities Act 2016 ( Act of 2016)
on the certification process for films involving differently-abled individuals.
Allegation Of Sexual Harassment Committed Within Closed Confines Requires Closer Scrutiny If
Victim's Statement Is Doubtful: Supreme Court
Case Title: NIRMAL PREMKUMAR & ANR. VERSUS STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE.,
2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221
Coram: Justices Dipankar Datta, KV Viswanathan and Sandeep Mehta
The Supreme Court observed that the offence of sexual harassment committed within the confines of a
room or a house (under the POCSO Act) requires closer scrutiny by the courts while deciding the
conviction of the accused solely based on the victim's statements.
Anticipatory Bail Can't Be Denied On Mere Assertion Of State That Custodial Interrogation Of Accused
Is Required: Supreme Court
Case Title: ASHOK KUMAR VERSUS STATE OF UNION TERRITORY CHANDIGARH., 2024
LiveLaw (SC) 223
Coram: Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra
Recently, the Supreme Court held that anticipatory bail can't be denied merely because the custody of the
accused is required by the State for custodial interrogation.
The Supreme Court observed the State cannot oppose the bail plea citing the requirement of custodial
interrogation unless the State proves that why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for
investigation.
Filing Of Suit To Assert Rights Cannot Amount To Contempt Of Court: Supreme Court
Case Title: M/S SHAH ENTERPRISES THR. PADMABEN MANSUKHBHAI MODI VERSUS
VAIJAYANTIBEN RANJITSINGH SAWANT & ORS., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 224
Coram: Justices B.R. Gavai, Rajesh Bindal, and Sandeep Mehta
The Supreme Court recently, while hearing an appeal dismissing a contempt petition, observed that filing
a suit to assert rights cannot amount to contempt of court.
“We find that, by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the filing of the suit for asserting the
rights of the plaintiffs/respondents could be said to be amounting to contempt of the Court.”
Judiciary Must Avoid Unnecessary Interference With Administrative Decisions Involving Specialized
Expertise: Supreme Court
Case Title: The State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka and Anr., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220
Coram: Justices Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma
While allowing the appeal against a Punjab and Haryana High Court order, which set aside Chief Minister
ML Khattar's (Accepting Authority's) remarks and overall grade regarding senior IAS Officer Ashok
Khemka's Performance Appraisal Report (PAR), the Supreme Court yesterday reiterated the principle of
judicial restraint in administrative decisions.
Conveyance Takes Place Only At Time Of Registration Of Sale Deed; Need For Sanction For
Conveyance Doesn't Bar Agreement To Sell : Supreme Court
Case Title: BABASAHEB vs. RADHU VITHOBA BARDE., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225
Coram: Justices BV Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih
The Supreme Court observed that conveyance by way of sale would take place only at the time of
registration of a sale deed in accordance with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Therefore, the
Court held that there is no bar for a tribal in Maharashtra to enter into an agreement to sell and seeking
advance sale consideration.
Retired HC Judges Can't Be Discriminated Regarding Pension Based On Whether They're Elevated From
Service Or Bar : Supreme Court
Case details : UNION OF INDIA MINISTY OF LAW JUSTICE vs. JUSTICE (RETD.) RAJ RAHUL
GARG (RAJ RANI JAIN) | SLP(C) No. 007246 - / 2019
In an important judgment, the Supreme Court held there cannot be any discrimination between the retired
High Court judges, depending on their source of elevation (whether from the bar or the District
Judiciary), while computing their pensionary benefits.
'Counselling' In Habeas Corpus Proceedings Should Not Be To Change One's Sexual Orientation Or
Gender Identity: Supreme Court
Case Details: DEVU G. NAIR vs. THE STATE OF KERALA SLP(Crl) No. 001891 - / 2023
Coram: CJI DY Chandrachud, comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra
The Supreme Court issued a word of caution that there should not be any attempt to influence the sexual
orientation or gender identity of persons by directing them to undergo "counselling" during habeas corpus
proceedings before High Court.
Manipur Violence | Judges Committee Raises Concerns About Armed Protests By Weaponised Outfits,
Supreme Court Seeks Union's View
Case Details : Dinganglung Gangmei vs Mutum Churamani Meetei & Ors | 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 626
Senior Advocate Ms. Makhija, representing the Court-appointed Committee led by Justice Gita
Mittal, brought urgent concerns before the Supreme Court regarding recent spurt of violence in Manipur.
The Committee, formed in August 2023 to address humanitarian issues arising from ethnic violence,
sought specific directions from the court to restrain protesting organizations from inciting violence
against State Administration.
Bhartiben Bipinbhai Tamboli v. State of Gujarat 2018, categories were clarified. -- Sexual violence is
a type of physical force that involves any act in which a woman is compelled to engage in any undesired, dangerous,
or demeaning sexual behavior. It includes calling her names, harming her by using objects and weapons during sex,
and even forcing her to have sex by a spouse or intimate partner with whom she has consensual sex. Physical
violence is the use of physical force against a woman so that she sustains bodily harm or injury. Physical assault,
criminal intimidation (threaten to cause harm), and criminal force (use force against a person to injure him/her) in
the form of beating, stomping, punching, abandoning the aggrieved party in a dangerous place, using weapons to
intimidate her, pressuring her to leave her matrimonial home, injuring her children, using physical force in sexual
situations, and so on.Not all abusive relationships are violent and result in physical harm. Many women are
subjected to emotional abuse, which is as damaging as physical violence. It involves loud names calling, accusing,
isolating, scaring, displaying domineering behaviour, insulting or constantly criticising her.Economic violence is
defined as, a woman not being supplied with enough money by her spouse to support herself and her children by
purchasing clothes, food, medications, and so on. It also involves prohibiting women from working. Apart from that,
forcibly evicting her from her home by not paying her rent, denying her of financial resources to which she is
entitled under any custom or law, and limiting her access to shared domestic resources also come under this
category. It also involves selling or alienating her movable or immovable assets, jewellery, shares, stocks, and other
items in which she has a stake.

In the case of Lalita Toppo v. the State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2018), which was heard by the Supreme
Court of India, the Complainant, who was not the Respondent’s legally wedded wife, approached the
Court to obtain maintenance under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005, supposing that she will not be allowed to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.

In this instance, the Appellant was in a live-in relationship, with whom she had a kid. When the couple
got separated, the Appellant sought support from her spouse, for which the Gumla Family Court allowed,
giving her Rs 2000 per month and Rs 1000 to her child. The Appellant filed an appeal in the High Court,
which found the family court’s ruling to be incorrect and ruled in favour of the partner. The Appellant
then went to the Supreme Court.

In the Supreme Court a three-judge Bench composed of the then- CJI Ranjan Gogoi, Justices U.U. Lalit
and K.M. Joseph observed that a live-in partner will be obligated to even more relief than that envisaged
by Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Making reference to the provisions of the
Domestic Violence Act, the bench noted that the petitioner in the case would have a remedy to seek
maintenance under the Act despite the fact that she is not the legally wedded wife and thus not obligated
to be maintained under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

It was also observed by the Court that domestic violence, according to the provisions of the Domestic
Violence Act, also includes economic abuse.
Inder Raj Malik v. Sunita Malik, (1986) - To extract more and more money and articles, the
Complainant Sunita was treated cruelly, beaten, starved, and abused by her husband and in-laws after
marriage, particularly during festivals. One day, she was tortured physically and mentally to the point of
fainting in her matrimonial home, but no doctor was called for her medical checkup. Sunita Malik was
threatened by her mother and brother-in-law with death and kidnapping unless she compelled her parents
to sell their property in Hauz Qazi. The Court held that an individual can be convicted under both Section
4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1956 and Section 498A of the IPC without facing double jeopardy. The
Court held that Section 498A, IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are distinct, since, under
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, mere demand of dowry is subject to punishment, whereas, in
Section 498A, an act of cruelty committed against a newly wedded woman is punishable. As a result, it is
possible to conclude that a person is subject to prosecution under both Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act and Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Hiralal P. Harsora and Ors v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Ors, (2016)

The Supreme Court struck down adult male from the concept of ‘Respondent,’ holding that it is not
founded on any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the purpose sought to be attained. In
the same instance, the Supreme Court clarified that women and non-adults are among the people who can
seek redress under the DV Act. The word “Respondent” in Section 2(q) or those who can be considered
perpetrators of violence against women/against whom remedies under the DV Act are enforceable cannot
be limited to the phrase “adult male person” in Section 2(q). As a result, remedies under the DV Act are
accessible even against female members and non-adults.

Sandhya Wankhede v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhede, (2011) - the Supreme Court resolved the question by
ruling that the provision to Section 2(q) that doesn’t exclude female relatives of the husband or male
partner from the scope of a complaint that can be submitted under the Domestic Violence Act. As a result,
complaints can be filed not only against the adult male person, but also against the adult male’s female
relative.

V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot, (2012) – Delhi HC, SC.

The Act’s goal was to safeguard women from domestic violence, hence it should be read in favour of
women who are victims of domestic abuse. The Legislature’s intention was to cover women who’ve been
victims of domestic abuse prior to the Act’s enactment. This was obvious from the Act’s definitions of
the phrases “aggrieved individuals” and “domestic relationship.” The Domestic Violence Act,2005 is a
civil remedy, and the criminal penalties given in the Act cannot be committed prior to the Act’s entry into
effect, hence enforcing the Act retroactively does not violate Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution.

Rajesh Kumar & others v. State of UP 2017 -- In this case, it was determined that in order to protect
the innocent person, i.e., the husband as well as their relatives, the Court directed the formation of a
“Family Welfare Committee” to deal with Section 498A of the IPC, and that no one would be arrested
until the committee provided justice to the Complainant. “The committee’s primary goal is to separate
genuine cases from fraudulent ones.” To provide assistance to victims of false complaints. The accused
who wasn’t in the jurisdiction cannot be excused from making personal appearances in court and must
attend through video conference.”
The Supreme Court has recognised that Section 498A of the IPC is being severely misapplied. In the
current instance, the Supreme Court directed the prosecution of the dowry-related offences and ordered
that the harassment or persecution of the husband and married man be halted. Furthermore, the goal of
this committee is to provide for the restoration of innocent people’s human rights.

“The spouse and his family members may have different points of view in the conflict, and arrest and
court remand are not the solution.” The ultimate goal of every judicial system is to punish the wicked
while protecting the innocent.”

Arnesh Kumar v. the State of Bihar & Anr, 2014 - “Section 498A is a cognizable and non-bailable
offence and has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather
than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives
arrested under this provision.

Bibi Parwana Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (2017) - common intention

Kamlesh Devi v. Jaipal and Ors., (2019) –

Ajay Kumar v. Lata @ Sharuti, (2019) - Supreme Court ruled that under the Domestic Violence Act,
2005, maintenance to a widow can also be provided by a brother-in-law. The Supreme Court rejected the
Appellant’s allegation that Section 2(q) of the Protection Women from DV Act defines “Respondent” as
any adult male individual who is or has been in a domestic relationship with a partner against whom the
remedy is sought. The Supreme Court drafted a domestic connection between the woman and her brother-
in-law, stating that the brother-in-law and the woman are a joint family.

Arvind Singh v. the State of Bihar.(2001) The court held that Section 498A of I.P.C. does not
specifically talk about the diverse forms of violence like sexual, verbal, or psychological. Hence, it
defines ‘cruelty’ in a broad term, giving discretionary powers to the Courts who have then interpreted
cruelty to the disadvantage of women, such as in one case, court held – “cruelty denotes a state of conduct
which is painful and distressing to another,” which is neither inclusive nor lucid in its interpretation.

Satish Chander Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja(2020) In the instant case, the Court haddealt with several
questions of laws relating to the DV Act which were already decided by the Supreme Court hitherto. The
petitioner had filed the suit for the removal of his daughter-in-law from the suit premises after her divorce
from his son. He had relied on the case of S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 where
the Supreme Court had ruled that under DV act the property of husband’s property which was not a joint
family property did not come within the meaning of shared household. The landmark judgement
overruled the judgement of S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra case and held that the definition
provided for the shared household in Section 2(s) of the DV Act was exhaustive in nature. It was held that
the following needs to be established for the determination of whether a suit property was shared
household or not: a. The aggrieved person under the said Act resided or was residing in the premise
during the period when the domestic relationship existed. b. The property was required to belong to the
joint family of which the aggrieved person is a part.

Meenavati vs. Senthamarai Selvi(2008) The proviso to Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act
explicitly specifies that no order under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Act can be issued against a woman. It was
held in this matter that women members of the family cannot be commanded to be removed from the
shared household under the pretence of granting an order under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Domestic
Violence Act.

Chanmuniya vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and Anrs (2010) In 2008, the Maharashtra
government proposed to expand the definition of "wife" under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to cover women in long-term non-marital relationships. The Malimath committee also advised that
the law recognise women in such "live-in" relationships so that males do not exploit and take advantage
of them, which could lead to circumstances where the guy absolves himself of his responsibilities to his
partner without incurring legal consequences. The courts should take into account the changing society
structure, in which people are increasingly engaging in 'live-in' partnerships. It was contended, based on
the decisions of J. GS Singhvi and J. AK Ganguly, that a couple who had been living together for a long
period should be recognised as married. This legal sanction would be effective in safeguarding and
defending the rights of women who are subjected to abuse and violence in these types of relationships. As
a result, under section 2(f) of the Act, live-in relationships must be included under the term "relationship
in the nature of marriage."

Indra Sarma v. V.K. V. Sarma (2013) and D. Veluswamy vs D.Patchaiammal Section 2(f) of the Act
defines ‘domestic relationships.’ The Supreme Court laid down tests to determine what constituted
‘relationship in the nature of marriage.’ In the matter of Veluswamy, the Court concluded that live-in
partnerships in which a man financially supports a woman for primarily sexual purposes as a keep or a
servant are not deemed domestic relationships under the Act. As a result of the Supreme Court's
judgement, courts must now consider a variety of factors related to the parties' relationship. The Court
would have to deconstruct and scrutinise the origins of their relationship, giving judges broad discretion
in deciding the nature of the relationship and, as a result, allowing subjectivity and personal prejudice to
play a large role in the final decision. While seeking to strike a balance between the rights of women and
public policy considerations, the two judgments unjustly restricted the scope of beneficiaries of the Act.

Sabita Mark Burges vs. Mark Lionel Burges (2013) Section 19 (1) (b) of the Domestic Violence Act
allows for an order to be granted directing the Respondent to leave the joint residence. As a result, the
Magistrate has the power to issue an order compelling the respondent to vacate the shared residence. The
Bombay High Court ruled in this case that even though a man is the sole owner of a house, he has no right
to be aggressive against his wife or the lady he lives with, and if the Court notices any violence, he must
be barred from visiting the residence, primarily to protect his wife and children from additional violence
and similar disagreements. The goal of enacting Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act — The
Bombay High Court put it succinctly: "It is general observation that applications for grant of injunction in
respect of the respondent's residence and possession is essentially considered by Courts as a violation of
the parties' proprietary rights." Because most wives do not own marriage residences, they are statutorily
granted rights that would not have been granted by courts under common law principles, such as the right
to peaceful enjoyment of their matrimonial home. In the first place, Section 19 of the Domestic Abuse
Act was adopted, guaranteeing essentially the woman’s peace against domestic violence in their homes,
regardless of their title. The lofty idea of human rights prevailing over proprietary rights underpins this
statutory gift. It is worth repeating that unless one of them is violent, they are both equally entitled to the
said flat.
.Kusum Sharma vs. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (2015) The Delhi High court had stated that: the
affidavit of assets, income and expenditure of both the parties are necessary to determine the rights of the
parties and hence, both parties must file sworn affidavits with the court in order for the court to make
monetary relief orders.

Mohd. Zakir vs. Shabana & Ors. (2018) – sirf women ko milega protection.

Indira Sarma vs VKV Sarma(2018) The Supreme Court ruled in this decision that not all live-in
partnerships are marriage-like relationships. Guidelines for testing the concept of live-in-relationship-
Duration of relationship, Shared household Pooling of resources and financial arrangements, Domestic
arrangements, Sexual relationship Children, Socialization in public, Intention and conduct of the parties.

Kamlesh Devi vs Jaipal & Or (2019) The Supreme Court held that mere vague allegation that
respondents are family members will not be sufficient to maintain the complaint. In this instance, a panel
of Justice Banerjee and Justice Shah ruled that a vague claim is insufficient to pursue the case under the
Domestic Violence Act. The Supreme Court is in favour of the High court order and hence dismissed the

petition for special leave.

Binita Dass v. Uttam Kumar(2019) The Supreme Court held that Domestic Violence and Section 125
CrPC both are proceeded independently. The magistrate indirectly ordered maintenance at a rate of Rs.
2,000 per month to the respondent until the proceedings under section 125 Crpc are not concluded,
according to the Supreme Court of India. Because the order lacks authority, it is completely unreasonable
and unsustainable. The Delhi High Court has ruled that a Magistrate cannot refuse to pay interim support
to a wife only because she has earning capacity or is a qualified person, and that qualification and earning
capacity cannot be used as a reason to deny interim maintenance to a wife.

Smt. Haimanti Mal vs The State of West Bengal (2019) The Calcutta High Court took the view that
determination of compensation has to be rational and it should not be an outcome of guesses

Manju Sharma vs Vipin (2019) With an annual turnover of Rs. 1 crore, the husband was pleading his
income as Rs.10,000/-, Delhi HC did not agree and enhanced the maintenance awarded to the wife. When
it was discovered that the husband was not revealing his actual income, with an annual turnover of Rs.1
crore, Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva issued an order in this case, increasing the amount of maintenance to be
paid to the wife. The interim support was increased from Rs.10,000 to Rs.30,000 per month to
accommodate the petitioner's and her daughter's needs.

Kuldeep Singh Vs. Rekha (2019) Case against parents-in-law cannot be filed if the wife is living
separately. Justice Awasthi has passed the order in the case and the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that
if the wife and husband leave the shared households to establish their own household, the domestic
relationship comes to an end in respect of parents and therefore complaints under Domestic Violence Act
cannot be maintained against them. The first requirement of the Domestic Violence Act is that the
applicant be an aggrieved person, as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act. To invoke the Domestic Violence
Act, the aggrieved individual and respondent must have a domestic relationship.

Ajay Kumar v. Lata (2019) The Supreme Court held that an aggrieved wife may also file a complaint
against a relative of the husband or the male partner, as the case may be. The case was decided by Justice
Dr Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justice Hemant Gupta. An aggrieved wife or female living in a
relationship in the form of marriage may file a complaint against the husband's or male partner's relative,
as the case may be, under the proviso to section 2(q) of the Act, 2005.

Vikas Bhutani v. State (2019) The wife was entitled to maintenance under both sections, subject to
modification, according to the Delhi High Court. In this case, Justice Sachdev issued an order. The
woman is entitled to maintenance for domestic abuse even if maintenance under Section 125 CrPC was
granted, according to the Delhi High Court, however there may be an adjustment qua former
maintenance.

Megha Khandelwal v. Rajat Khandelwal (2019) The Supreme Court held that the husband has to pay
maintenance even if the wife is well educated. Justice Khanwilkar and Justice Rastogi have passed the
order in this case. Despite the fact that the woman was well educated, the Supreme Court significantly
increased interim maintenance for her in a domestic abuse case.

Sadhana vs Hemant (2019) A divorcee is not entitled to the benefits of the Domestic Violence Act,
according to this judgement of Bombay High Court. Justice Giratkar passed the order in case and held
that if at the time of filing of petition, the wife has already been divorced, there cannot be any domestic
relationship. As a result, a divorced wife cannot be protected under the Domestic Violence Act.

The Madras High Court in Vandhana v. T. Srikanth, 2007 SCC Online Mad 553 in one of the early cases
since the enactment of the DV Act, observed that the Act was formulated to implement Recommendation
No. 12 of United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), 1989 and which was ratified by India in June, 1993. Interpretation of the DV
Act should conform to international conventions and international instruments and norms. The Bombay
High Court in the case of Ishpal Singh Kahai v. Ramanjeet Kahai, 2011 SCC Online Bom 412 reiterated
that the object of the DV Act is to grant statutory protection to victims of violence in the domestic sector
who had no proprietary rights. The Act provides for security and protection of a wife irrespective of her
proprietary rights in her residence. It aims at protecting the wife against violence and at the prevention of
recurrence of acts of violence and at the prevention of recurrence of acts of violence.

The amount or period of time lived together by the petitioner and respondent is not necessary in terms of
that the petitioner and respondent should live or have lived together for a particular period of time. Hence,
application by lady, for maintenance, from a man with whom she shared a close relationship is
maintainable, M. Palani v. Meenakshi, 2008 SCC Online Mad 150. The Supreme Court had observed in
one of the cases that judicial separation does not change the status of the wife as an “aggrieved person”
under Section 2(a) read with Section 12 and does not end the “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f).
It stated that judicial separation is mere suspension of husband-wife relationship and not a complete
severance of relationship as happens in divorce, Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2
SCC 705
The definition of “domestic relationship” under the DV Act is exhaustive: when a definition clause is
defined to “mean” such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive, Indra Sarmav.
V.K.V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755. The Supreme Court further stated that the word domestic relationship
means a relationship that has some inherent or essential characteristics of marriage though not a marriage
that is legally recognized. Expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” cannot be construed in the
abstract. It is to be taken in the context in which it appears and to be applied bearing in mind the purpose
and object of DV Act as well as meaning of the expression “in the nature of marriage”

Narrow interpretation of “domestic relationship” and “shared household” would leave many a woman in
distress without remedy. Hence the correct interpretation of aforesaid definition including the right to live
in “shared household” would be that words “live” or “have at any point of time lived” would include
within its purview “the right to live”, Vandhana v. T. Srikanth, 2007 SCC Online Mad 553. This law does
not alter the legality of ownership or transfer the ownership and a woman cannot claim that she owns a
house; it only provides emergency relief to the victim in the sense that she cannot be thrown out of her
house. For claiming ownership, a woman has to follow a separate legal procedure and has to file a
separate application as per the provisions of laws whichever are applicable to her situation.

The Supreme Court emphasised that the Police has to look into the complaint made under the DV Act
seriously and it cannot submit a report that no case is made out without proper verification, investigation,
enquiry not only from members of family but also from neighbours, friends and others, Santosh Bakshi
v. State of Punjab, (2014)

Supreme Court held that petition under DV Act can be filed in a court where “person aggrieved”
permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, Shyamlal Devda v. Parimala,
(2020)

Shared household would come into picture only when relief is sought in terms of Sections 19(1)(a) to (e)
of the Act. Aggrieved woman can seek orders to enable her to continue to reside in shared household or
protection order to enable her to reside in shared household, then property, which is subject-matter,
should be shared household. Aggrieved woman can seek relief of alternate accommodation in terms of
Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and in such case concept of shared household would not be attracted.
Expression “shared household” occurring in Section 19(1)(f) of the Act is just for purpose of enabling
aggrieved woman to seek alternative accommodation, which would be on par with shared household that
she enjoyed at some point of time, M. Muruganandam v. M. Megala, 2010

A divorced Muslim woman can avail of her rights under the statute, in addition to her rights under the Muslim
Women (Protection of Rights Upon Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWA).
It secures the rights of women whose marriages are not valid under the law or those who have never gone
through a formal ceremony of marriage but have been living in marriage-like relationships. Proof of a marriage
is not required for filing proceedings under the Act.
The Act provides for summary proceedings and expeditious reliefs. The Magistrate shall fix the first date of
hearing which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court
and shall dispose off such application within a period of sixty days from the date of the first hearing. This has
been mentioned in clauses 4 and 5 of Section 12 of DV Act. Though this seldom happens, magistrates courts
are under pressure to give short dates and pass orders expeditiously.

Divorced Women are Entitled to Reliefs under the Act

Bharati Naik v Ravi Ramnath Halarnak, MANU/MH/2048/2010
Aradhana Walkade v Chandrashekar Vaidya, MANU/MH/0662/2014
Krishna Bhattacharjee v Sarathi Choudhury, MANU/SC/1330/2015
Sudipta Saha Roy v Dola Roy, MANU/WB/0475/2016
Atmaram v Sangita, MANU/MH/3099/2019
Krishnendu Das Thakur v State of West of Bengal, MANU/WB/1496/2019

Unsuccessful divorce cannot adversely affect the maintainability of DV application

Prakash Nagardas Dubal-Shah v Meena Prakash Dubal-Shah, MANU/SC/0447/2016

Women in past Matrimonial Relationships are Entitled

Karimkhan v State of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/0990/2011

Aradhana Walkade v Chandrashekar Vaidya, MANU/MH/0662/2014
Dhananjay Ramkrishna Gaikwad v Sunanda D. Gaikwad, MANU/MH /0580 /2016
Widows are Entitled to Relief under the Act

Chhangur Ram Nishad v State of UP, MANU/UP/1086/2015

Sapna v Pravin Ishwarbhai Patel, MANU/MH/0851/2019
Surekha Nanaso Jagtap v Dhanaji Jalindar Jagtap, MANU/MH/2708/2019
Mothers are Entitled to Reliefs under the Act

P.N. Samyuktha v Aravind Ratnakaran, MANU/KE/2516/2018

Goutam Chandan v Gouri Rani Chandan, 2020 (1) CLJ (CAL) 174
Women can be “Respondents” under the DV Act

Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade, 2011 (3) SCC 650
Smita Aggarwal- MANU/WB/0987/2012
Tami v Gaytri Bisi, MANU/OR/0321/2012
Lakshmimani v Neethu N, MANU/KA/0807/2012
Hiral P. Harsora v Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, MANU/SC/1269/2016
Men Cannot file under the DV Act

Attaullah Mushtaq Kazi v State of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/3845/2018

Duration of Marriage
No time period stipulated to Initiate Proceedings

Giridhari Nath v Mamitarani Sutar, MANU/OR/0677/2016

Duration of Cohabitation not Relevant

Vinita Sethia v Vinay Kumar Sethia, MANU/WB/0011/2016

Dinesh v Sonika, MANU/MH/1267/2019
Non-consummated Marriage is within the Purview of the Act

Vijaya Ramesh Varnekar v Urvashi, MANU/KA/7924/2019

Amjad Abdul Aziz Pagarkar v Taiseer, MANU/MH/1210/2019
Jurisdiction of Courts
Temporary Residence Creates Jurisdiction

Neeraj Goswami v State of UP, 2013 (2) ACR 1335

Unnamed Victim who filed a cast against her husband
Vikas Rastogee v State of UP, 2014 (3) JCC 1720
Rabindra Nath Sahu v Susila Sahu, 2016 Cri.LJ 4931
Rahul Bhargava v State (NCT) of Delhi, 2018 (1) JCC 482
K.L. Jayalakshmi v M. Vijaya Bhanu Prasad, 2019 (2) AKR 204
Zeba Khan v State of UP, 2019 (1) ACR 503
Vijay Ramesh Varnekar v Urvashi, MANU/KA/7924/2019
Shrikrushna v Sangeeta, 2019 ALLMR (Cri) 4967
K.C. Vijayakumara v S. Geetha, 2020 (1) Kar.LJ 570
Shyamlal Devda v Parimala, I (2020) DMC 395 SC
Jurisdiction awarded to Place of Employment

Aloy Kumar Chandra v State of West Bengal, MANU/WB/0066/2016

Jurisdiction Regarding Protection Orders

Amballur Joseph James v State of Delhi, (2013) DLT 601

Transfer of Application from Magistrate’s Court to Other Courts

Minoti Subhash Anand v Subhash Manohar Anand, MANU/MH/3383/2015

Rajeev Thomas v Sheeja Antony, MANU/KE/2119/2018
Necessity and Validity of DIR by PO
Ex-parte ad-interim orders - DIR from PO is not mandatory, Judge’s discretion

Shambhu Prasad Singh v Manjari, MANU/DE/2152/2012

Gandhimathi v Devi, MANU/TN/3421/2018
Protection Officer’s report an Important Piece of Evidence

Jaya Sagade v State of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/3017/2015

Power of Magistrates
Ex-parte ad-interim orders - DIR from PO is not mandatory, Judge’s discretion

S. v J., MANU/DE/1435/2018
Aniket Subhash Tupe v Piyusha Aniket Tupe, MANU/MH/0537/2018
It is not Mandatory to Prove Ingredients of 125 CrPC

Naorem Shamungou Singh v Moirangthem Guni Devi, MANU/MN/0019/2014

Aniket Subhash Tupe v Piyusha Aniket Tupe, MANU/MH/0537/2018
Interim Orders
At interim stage, not required to go into the merits, prima facie evidence is sufficient

Ajay Kumar v Lata, Crl. Apl. No. 617 of 2019, SC

It is not Mandatory to Prove Ingredients of 125 CrPC

Separate application for Interim reliefs is not required

Effect of Previous Proceedings / Simultaneous Proceedings
Outcome of Previous Proceedings not to impact subsequent proceedings under DV Act

Nityananda Das v State of West Bengal, MANU/WB/0454/2011

Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v Atif Iqbal Mansoori, MANU/SC/0861/2014
Simultaneous proceedings in other courts

Bipin Pratapari Bhatt v Union of India, MANU/GJ/0593/2010 : I (2011) DMC 734 Guj - The wife filed an
application under section 12 of the DV Act against the husband. The husband filed an application for
quashing in the High Court. The Gujarat High Court rejected the petition. Thereafter the husband
filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the constitutional validity of section 26(1) of the DV
Act and contended that it is ultra vires to Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Dismissing the
petition, the Gujarat High Court held that sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act relate to relief, which can
be sought for even from civil court and they are civil in nature, the husband cannot derive the
advantage of Article 20(1) of the Constitution to challenge the validity of section 26 of the DV Act.
Surya Kumari v Lakshmi Ravinder, MANU/KE/1059/2011 Ker - The wife filed an application under section
12 of the DV Act against her husband and father-in-law seeking protection orders, alternative
accommodation and maintenance. Simultaneously she has filed an application under section 125
CrPC and a petition for divorce. Aggrieved, the husband filed an appeal in the High Court stating that
multiple cases have been filed against him in order to harass and insult him and his family.
Dismissing the petition, the Kerala High Court held that it cannot be denied that the wife has every
right to file the cases under the respective Acts simultaneously. The wife cannot be asked to
consolidate her claims into one application/forum. The exercise of a statutory right cannot be
described as an abuse of the process of law unless it is prima facie false and vexatious, until the
court concerned says so, ultimately.
Niharika Yadav v Manish Kumar Yadav, MANU/DE/4334/2019 - The wife has filed an application in the
family court u/s 125 of Cr PC for grant of interim maintenance, which was denied on the ground that
the wife was capable of maintaining herself and that the husband was voluntarily paying her
Rs.10,000/- as maintenance in her application under section 24 the Hindu Marriage Act
(HMA). Aggrieved, the wife filed an appeal in the High Court. Setting aside the order of the lower
courts, the Delhi High Court held that grant of maintenance under section 24 of the HMA does not
bar grant of maintenance from other proceedings.
Dual Reliefs under S. 125 CrPC / Matrimonial Proceedings and the DV Act

Vikas v State of UP, 2013 (3 )ACR 2413 2013

Shailesh Milind Gupte v Asmita Milind Gupte, 24.10.2018
Allegations Against the Wife not to be Considered

Shri Vishal Kaushik v Shipra Kaushik, 2013 (2) WLN 611 -

Vidyawati v Shri Kishen, 2013 CriLJ 4469Dismissing the petition, the Chandigarh High Court held that since
the wife was living separately from her husband and was not in a position to bear the economic expenses,
it was the responsibility of the husband to maintain her according to law and the Hindu Shastras. It further
held that the proceedings in the criminal case were still pending before the competent court. So, only on
the basis of the final report given by the police, no adverse inference can be drawn against the wife. Both
the courts have passed orders on interim maintenance and the parties are free to lead evidence before the
magistrate. Further, mere production of the letter in support of the arguments that the wife is having
relation with another person is not sufficient for any court to render a decision. With regards to the
enhancement, the court further held that in fixing the quantum of maintenance, standard of living
consistent with the status of the family must be taken into consideration. The husband cannot say that he
is unable to maintain his wife and children or that the wife is educated and competent to earn.
Amendment to Petitions / Applications under DV Act
Roasaheb Pandharinath Kamble v Shaila Rohasaheb Kamble, MANU/MH/1275/2010
Kunapareddy v Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari, MANU/SC/0628/2016
Non-compliance of Orders passed under the DV Act
Nidhi Kaushik v Union Of India, MANU/DE/1306/2014 - The wife was rejected from a job appointment as she
disclosed her ongoing domestic violence application in court. The Supreme Court held that domestic
violence is not an offence under the DV Act. Domestic violence defined in section 3 of the DV Act per se
is not an offence and the Act does not provide for any punishment for the same. However, breach of a
protection order passed by the Court, amounts to an offence under section 31 of the DV Act.

The reason appears to be that the proceedings under section 12 of the DV Act are civil in nature triable by
a civil court, criminal court as well as the family court. However, in the event of breach of a protection
order, a fresh criminal case has to be initiated against the accused and in that criminal case, at the stage of
framing the charge, the court is empowered to frame a charge under IPC or any other law if the facts
disclose the commission of such offence.

Meera Somil Lodaya v Somil Hirji Lodaya, 2018 ALL.MR(Cri) 4609

Striking off Defence
Swati Kaushik v Ashwani Sharma, MANU/DE/0611/2019
Appellate Court not to interfere in the discretionary powers of the Magistrate Court
Jallarapu Laxman Rao v Jallarapu Pedda Venkateswarlu, MANU/AP/0778/2017
Rakesh Kumar v Nishu, MANU/HP/0373/2019
Conditional Stay by the Higher Court

Kishore Chugh v State of Rajasthan, 2013 (2) Crimes 252

Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code to be used sparingly

Giduthuri Kesari Kumar v State of Telangana, (2013) 4 SCC 176

Suo Motu v Ushaben Kishorbhai Mistry, MANU/GJ/1108/2015
Narendra Kumar v State of Gujarat, 2016 ALLMR (Cri) 398
Proceedings not to be quashed at the initial stage

Rakesh Sachdeva v Neelam Sachdeva, 2011 Cr.LJ 158, Jhar

Costs to be awarded

Francisco Dias v Francisca D’Souza, MANU/MH/0888/2011 Bom

Long delay in appeal not to be entertained.

Ramanand Amit v Ruhi Ramanand, MANU/DE/0256/2011

Harvinder Pal v. Raj Rani, PH, 2012.PDF
Siddharth Sabharwal v The State of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/2899/2019
Sri H S Varadaraju v T Kavitha, CRL.RP 6662/2018
Condonation of Delay

Amol Madhukarrao Ingale v. Sau Amruta Amol Ingale Othr,MH, 2018 .PDF
Sri H S Varadaraju v T Kavitha, CRL.RP 6662/2018
Tushar Pramod Autkar v Shachi Tushar Autkar, 2019
Retrospective Effect
Gajendra Singh v Minakshi Yadav, MANU/RH/0338/2011
Shri Maroti v. Sau Gangubai MH, 2011 .PDF
Saraswathy v Babu, MANU/SC/1193/2013
Sabana v Mohd. Talib Ali, MANU/RH/1336/2013
Deb Shankar Banerjee v. State Of Jharkhand_Anr, JH, 2016 .PDF
Mr R Seran v. Mrs R Vijayabharathi, TN , 2018 .PDF
]
Execution Process As Per The Provisions Of Crpc

Mini Shanmughan v Shanmughan, 2012 (4) KLJ1

Attachment of In-Law’s Property in Execution Process - Restrain from making Disparaging Comments
about Women

Randhir Jain, MANU/DE/5678/2012 - Delhi High Court held that the magistrate should execute the order
passed for interim maintenance. It further held that at the remand stage, the magistrate ought not to have
made disparaging comments on the wife who was fully justified in seeking attachments of properties
which were in India. Use of expressions ‘target’ etc. have to be avoided in judicial decisions when
referring to interpersonal relationships, unless there is no other word to express oneself for the reason a
person who is pursuing her legitimate right would feel hurt if told that she is targeting somebody.

Arrest Warrant Under THE DV ACT for Non Payment Of Maintenance

Sagar Sudhakar Shendge v Naina Sagar Shendge, 2013 (3) ABR 597

While interpreting the right of an aggrieved person to reside in a shared household under section 17 of the
DV Act, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in SK Batra v. Smt. Taruna Batra [(2007) 3 SCC 169]
 held that a wife has no right to reside in the residence that her in-laws own and in which the husband has
no interest. This narrow interpretation of this concept restricted the right of the wronged daughters-in-law
to claim the right to reside at her in-laws’ property.

A full bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja [(2021) 1 SCC 414],
overruled S.K Batra after fourteen years in 2020. The court held that the daughter-in-law can exercise her
right to live in the shared household, which is completely owned by the in-laws until her husband finds
alternate accommodation. In this case, the court interpreted “shared household” in Section 17 irrespective
of whether she has any legal interest or not.

However, it went on to hold that the “living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has
some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household”
and that the intention of the parties and the nature of living including the nature of household have to be
looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as shared household or not.
(Para 62-64)

Analysis of Supreme Court’s Recent Verdict

Recently in the case of Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022 (Division
Bench), the aggrieved person was widowed immediately after her marriage and was subjected to domestic
violence and was forced to leave the matrimonial home, even though she was entitled to properties owned
by her husband after his death. The issues before the court were as follows:

1. Whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the
allegations have been levelled;
2. Whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person
against whom the relief is claimed.

The court held that a victim of domestic violence can enforce her right to reside in a shared household,
regardless of whether she lived in the shared household. The court introduced the concepts of
“constructive residency” and “non-existence of marital connection” to conclude that the wife is entitled to
relief under the DV Act. The Bench observed that if a person is related to another person through
consanguinity, marriage, or another type of relationship, it is not necessary for that person to physically
live with the other person at the time of the alleged act of domestic violence.

The court held that “the expression ‘right to reside in the shared household’ would include not only
actual residence but also constructive residence in the shared household i.e., right to reside therein which
cannot be excluded vis-à-vis an aggrieved person except in accordance with the procedure established by
law. If a woman is sought to be evicted or excluded from the shared household, she would be an
aggrieved person in which event Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 would apply.” (Para 32, 44-45)

For the first time, the court talks about instances like widows, women after judicial separation, divorced
women, and those without any subsisting marital connection that they are entitled to rights and reliefs
under the DV Act, and offers protection to all women irrespective of their status or marital relationship.

Mother-In-Law Cannot Prosecute Father & Brother Of Daughter-In-Law Under Domestic Violence Act:
Bombay High Court - X & Ors vs State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2024
Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, (2022) 8 SCC 90– The Supreme Court held that “the Act does not make it
mandatory for aggrieved to make an application before Magistrate only through the Protection Officer or
Service Provider. When an aggrieved person files an application by herself or with an advocate’s
assistance and not the Protection Officer or Service Provider, there would be no Domestic Incident Report
received by the Magistrate for consideration.” Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414 –
The Supreme Court , pointing towards the consideration of application to Magistrate under Section 12,
held that “Consideration of DIR report does not mean that the Magistrate can pass orders solely relying
upon the domestic violence incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the Service
Provider.” Santosh Bakshi v. State of Punjab, (2014) 13 SCC 25 – While disposing of a criminal appeal,
the Supreme Court held that “If a complaint is made by a woman alleging offence under the DV Act,
2005, committed by any member of a family, matter is to be looked upon seriously. The police cannot
submit a report that no case is made out without proper verification and investigation.” Bhupender Singh
Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4778 – The Delhi High Court held that “On an
application under Section 12 of D.V. Act, notice can be issued to the respondent only after taking the
domestic incident report, because the same would reflect as to which of the respondents, notice has to be
issued, as to who was causing domestic violence, what was the nature of violence and when it was
committed.” Sabah Sami Khan v. Adnan Sami Khan, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1629 – The Bombay High
Court held that “A domestic incident report cannot be made in case of any application alleging domestic
violence other than physical violence, e.g. verbal or emotional abuse. An application made under Sections
18 and 19 of the Act may have to be considered based upon the facts of each case and not necessarily
with the aid and assistance of any protection officer or service provider. It may be required to be
considered only upon the application made to the court by the aggrieved person herself. In such a case no
domestic incident report may be filed or may be necessitated.”...