Business of Safety Managing Occupational and Industrial Risks Textbook - PART - 1

The business of safety The business of safety
Managing occupational and
Egidijus R. Vaidogas
industrial risks
Managing occupational and industrial risks

The business of safety
Copyright © 2010. Vilnius Gediminas Technical University Press. All rights reserved.
1108-S Egidijus Rytas Vaidogas
Vaidogas, Egidijus Rytas. Business of Safety : Managing Occupational and Industrial Risks : Textbook, Vilnius Gediminas Technical
University Press, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unitemlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3572003.
Created from unitemlibrary-ebooks on 2019-01-08 18:19:40.
V I L N I U S G E D I M I N A S T EC H N I C A L U N I V E R S I T Y
Egidijus Rytas Vaidogas
The business of safety

Managing occupational and
industrial risks
Textbook
Vilnius “Technika” 2010
UDK 65.011(075.8)
Va78
Egidijus Rytas Vaidogas. The business of safety. Managing occupational and

industrial risks: textbook. Vilnius: Technika, 2010. 344 p.
This textbook was written to fulfil the need for an up-to-date teaching resource which
focuses on the needs of students who study business management in English and have
prospects to work as junior and senior managers in various industry branches. Educators
in disciplines of industrial engineering, technology, and manufacturing may find this text-
book valuable and easy to use. The textbook is intended for the use in universities and
companies’ training settings which offer programmes, courses, and workshops on occupa-
tional safety and health.
The textbook had been reccomended for publishing

by the Study Committee of the Civil Engineering Faculty
Alphabetical list of reviewers:
Prof. A. V. Rutkauskas, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University

Chem. Eng. D. Stulgys, “Danis sauga”, Joint Stock Company
Assoc. Prof. A. Vegys, Kaunas University of Technology
The book 1108-S of the stock of training and methodical

publications issued by VGTU Publishing Office “Technika”
http://leidykla.vgtu.lt
ISBN 978-9955-28-527-4
doi:10.3846/1108-S
© Vaidogas, E. R., 2010

© VGTU leidykla TECHNIKA, 2010
3
CONTENTS
PREFACE .................................................................................................................... 7
PART I THE PROBLEM OF SAFETY ................................................................. 11
1 SAFETY VERSUS BUSINESS PROFIT .............................................................. 13
1.1 THE CHALLENGE OF SAFETY ........................................................................ 13
1.2 FINANCIAL IMPACT OF ACCIDENTS UPON COMPANY PROFITS ....................... 16
1.3 BUSINESS BENEFITS OF GOOD SAFETY PERFORMANCE ................................. 19
1.4 REVIEW QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES ............................................................ 23
2 SAFETY LEGISLATION ...................................................................................... 24
2.1 EUROPEAN LEGISLATION ............................................................................. 24
2.2 THE LEGAL INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON HEALTH AND SAFETY 26
2.3 MAJOR ACCIDENT LEGISLATION................................................................... 29
3 RISK ASSESSMENT AT WORK ......................................................................... 32
3.1 WHAT IS RISK ASSESSMENT?........................................................................ 32
3.2 THE STEPWISE APPROACH TO RISK ASSESSMENT .......................................... 33
3.3 THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTICIPANTS................................... 40
3.4 EXAMPLE RISK ASSESSMENT ........................................................................ 43
3.5 WORKPLACE RISK AND THE RISK OF A MAJOR ACCIDENT ............................. 50
4 INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS ENCOUNTERED IN THE PAST......................... 53
4.1 FLIXBOROUGH ............................................................................................. 53

4.2 SEVESO ........................................................................................................ 57
4.3 BHOPAL ....................................................................................................... 59
4.4 PIPER ALPHA ............................................................................................... 62
4.5 TOULOUSE ................................................................................................... 66
4.6 TEXAS CITY ................................................................................................. 69
PART II DEALING WITH INDIVIDUAL WORKPLACE HAZARDS ............. 75
5 OCCUPATIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS .......................................... 77
5.1 DEFINITION OF HAZARD AND RELATED TERMS ............................................. 77
5.2 CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDS...................................................................... 79
5.3 COMMON WORKPLACE HAZARD GROUPS ..................................................... 82
6 FALLS, IMPACT, FALLING OBJECTS AND LIFTING ................................. 90
6.1 FALLS .......................................................................................................... 90
6.2 SLIP AND FALL PREVENTION MEASURES ....................................................... 92
6.3 IMPACT AND ACCELERATION HAZARDS ........................................................ 95
6.4 LIFTING HAZARDS ........................................................................................ 98
4
7 MECHANICAL HAZARDS AND MACHINE SAFEGUARDING................. 100

7.1 MECHANICAL INJURIES .............................................................................. 100
7.2 MACHINE GUARDS AND SAFETY DEVICES .................................................. 102
7.3 ROBOT SAFEGUARDS.................................................................................. 107
7.4 REVIEW QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES .......................................................... 108
8 HAZARDS OF TEMPERATURE EXTREMES ............................................... 109
8.1 EFFECTS OF HIGH TEMPERATURES.............................................................. 109
8.2 HEAT STRESS AND PERFORMANCE ............................................................. 110
8.3 EFFECTS OF COLD ...................................................................................... 112
8.4 PROTECTION AGAINST TEMPERATURE EXTREMES ...................................... 115
9 NOISE AND VIBRATION HAZARDS .............................................................. 117
9.1 EFFECTS OF NOISE ...................................................................................... 117
9.2 NOISE CONTROL ......................................................................................... 122
9.3 EFFECTS OF VIBRATION .............................................................................. 125
10 ERGONOMIC HAZARDS ................................................................................ 128
10.1 THE SCIENCE OF ERGONOMICS ................................................................... 128
10.2 MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS ................................................................ 129
10.3 ERGONOMIC RISK FACTORS ........................................................................ 132
10.4 PREVENTION OF MSDS .............................................................................. 134
11 ELECTRICAL HAZARDS................................................................................ 137
11.1 ELECTRICAL SHOCK ................................................................................... 137

11.2 IGNITION OF COMBUSTIBLE OR EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS .............................. 140
11.3 OVERHEATING AND DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT AND BURNS TO EMPLOYEES . 142
11.4 ELECTRICAL EXPLOSIONS .......................................................................... 142
11.5 INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF EQUIPMENT ............................................... 142
11.6 ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS ..................................................................... 143
11.7 REDUCING ELECTRICAL HAZARDS.............................................................. 144
12 RADIATION HAZARDS................................................................................... 148
12.1 ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION................................................................. 148
12.2 IONISING RADIATION .................................................................................. 151
12.3 RADIATION MEASUREMENTS AND LIMITS................................................... 155
12.4 RADIATION LIMITS ..................................................................................... 159
12.5 DAMAGING EFFECT OF IONISING RADIATION .............................................. 160
12.6 RADIATION PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS ............................................... 161
12.7 NON-IONISING RADIATION ......................................................................... 164
13 PRESSURE HAZARDS ..................................................................................... 167
13.1 CRACKING AND RUPTURE OF PRESSURE VESSELS ....................................... 168
13.2 HAZARDS OF UNFIRED PRESSURE VESSELS ................................................. 172
5
13.3 DYNAMIC PRESSURE HAZARDS .................................................................. 172

13.4 PRESSURE HAZARDS TO HUMANS ............................................................... 173
14 FIRE HAZARDS................................................................................................. 176
14.1 FUELS ........................................................................................................ 177
14.2 OXIDISERS ................................................................................................. 180
14.3 IGNITION .................................................................................................... 180
14.4 FIRE DANGERS TO HUMANS ........................................................................ 181
14.5 FIRES IN INDUSTRY .................................................................................... 182
15 EXPLOSIVES AND EXPLOSIONS ................................................................. 187
15.1 EXPLOSIONS............................................................................................... 189
15.2 EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS .............................................................................. 190
15.3 DAMAGING EFFECTS .................................................................................. 195
15.4 ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS IN INDUSTRY .................................................... 196
16 HAZARDS OF TOXIC MATERIALS.............................................................. 198
16.1 TOXIC CHEMICALS ..................................................................................... 198
16.2 SOURCES OF TOXIC CHEMICALS ................................................................. 201
16.3 TRANSPORT OF TOXIC CHEMICALS IN THE BODY ........................................ 201
16.4 EFFECTS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS .................................................................. 203
16.5 TOXIC RELEASE ACCIDENTS ....................................................................... 206
17 HAZARDS IN WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENTS ........................................ 211

17.1 DIVERSITY OF ENVIRONMENTS .................................................................. 211
17.2 HAZARDS OF WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENTS ................................................ 213
17.3 HAZARD RECOGNITION AND EVALUATION ................................................. 217
17.4 ENTRY INTO CONFINED SPACE.................................................................... 217
18 HAZARDS POSED BY PERSONNEL ............................................................. 222
18.1 HUMAN FACTOR IN WORKPLACE SAFETY ................................................... 222
18.2 HUMAN ERRORS AND MISBEHAVIOUR ........................................................ 223
18.3 MANAGING THE HAZARD OF HUMAN ERRORS ............................................ 228
19 EMERGING HAZARDS.................................................................................... 239
19.1 NEW AND INCREASING HAZARDS ............................................................... 239
19.2 HAZARDS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND AGED PLANTS ............................... 244
19.3 HAZARDS IN NETWORKS AND OTHER INTERDEPENDENCIES........................ 245
19.4 NATURAL HAZARDS TRIGGERING THREAT TO INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ............ 245
19.5 ATTACKS ON AND AGAINST INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS .......................... 246
19.6 HAZARDS OF NANOTECHNOLOGIES ............................................................ 247
6
PART III DEALING WITH ACCIDENTS............................................................ 249

20 OCCUPATIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS .................................. 251
20.1 OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS ....................................................................... 252
20.2 MAJOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS................................................................. 259
20.3 ACCIDENT CAUSING MECHANISMS ............................................................. 266
21 ACCIDENT PREVENTION BY CONTROL OF HAZARDS ....................... 272
21.1 ELIMINATING HAZARDS ............................................................................. 273
21.2 HAZARD LEVEL LIMITATION ...................................................................... 274
21.3 ISOLATION, BARRIERS, AND INTERLOCKS ................................................... 275
21.4 FAIL-SAFE DESIGNS .................................................................................... 280
21.5 FAILURE MINIMISATION ............................................................................. 281
21.6 WARNING MEANS AND DEVICES................................................................. 292
21.7 SAFE OPERATING PROCEDURES .................................................................. 295
21.8 BACKOUT AND RECOVERY ......................................................................... 295
22 MINIMISATION OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY ACCIDENTS....................... 298
22.1 ISOLATION AND BARRIERS ......................................................................... 298
22.2 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT .......................................................... 299
22.3 WEAK LINKS .............................................................................................. 301
22.4 ESCAPE, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE ................................................................ 301
23 MANAGING THE RISKS OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS................................... 304
23.1 PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................ 304

23.2 ACCIDENT PREVENTION ............................................................................. 307
23.3 CONSEQUENCE MITIGATION ....................................................................... 312
POSTSCRIPT ............................................................................................................ 314
APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS................................................................................. 318
APPENDIX 2 ORGANISATIONS AND WEBSITES ....................................... 319
APPENDIX 3 EXAMPLES OF WARNING SIGNS.......................................... 322
APPENDIX 4 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................... 324
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 327
INDEX ........................................................................................................................ 333
7
PREFACE
Safety improves productivity
According to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EASHW, the list
of acronyms used in this textbook is given in Appendix 1), every few minutes some-
body in the European Union dies from a work-related cause. Every year hundreds of
thousands of employees are injured at work. Others take sickness leave to deal with
stress, work overload, muscular-skeletal disorders or other illnesses related to the
workplace. The costs of accidents for workers and their families are immense. These
costs stretch the resources of healthcare systems and affect business productivity.
Besides the workplace accidents, in average 30 major accidents happen each year in
Europe. These accidents may have catastrophic consequences to people and the en-
vironment as well as serious economic impacts on industry and on the communities
which rely on it for employment. One can say with certainty that Europe is not a
“safe haven” for people working in almost all industry branches.
European governments, their regulators and agencies aim to improve occupa-
tional safety and health in order to reduce the cost injury and illness to society, while
at the same time improving competitiveness and national efficiency. Occupational
safety and health can improve productivity by the following actions (EASHW
2007f):
Reducing the number of employees who are unavailable for work due to injuries
and occupational diseases,
Cutting the healthcare and social costs of injury and disease,

Improving the health of employees and so their ability to work,
Stimulating more efficient and safe working methods and technologies.
In the modern competitive environment, the productivity can no longer be end-

lessly increased by investing in new machines and devices. Companies must try to
accelerate productivity through other ways. The focus should be increasingly on im-
proving matters related to occupational safety and health. It can stimulate productiv-
ity in a number of ways, for instance, by
Less wastage of resources, less down time, higher process yields,

Increasing quality and safety of products,
Prompting companies to replace old practices by more productive operations,
Promoting replacement of older and less productive technology and equipment.
Thus there is a good reason for managers, who are active in various industry
branches, to acquire knowledge on and skills in safety and health and to deal with
safety problems and so to accelerate productivity. The field of safety and health is
vast and professional, systematic knowledge in this field can not be gained solely in
a simple empirical, passive way of day-to-day activities. In addition, managers deal-
8
ing with hazardous facilities must also be aware of the possibility of industrial acci-
dents. An accident of average severity can completely destroy business, to say noth-
ing of an industrial disaster which can negatively influence an entire industry branch.
The aim is not simply to avoid these accidents, but to motivate and empower people
and company to work safely. Thus the manager’s knowledge and practical experi-
ence in the field of safety and health can be beneficial personally to the manager and
to his/her company.
Why was this textbook written and for whom?
This textbook was written to fulfil the need for an up-to-date teaching resource
which focuses on the needs of students who study business management in English
and have prospects to work as junior and senior managers in various industry
branches. The textbook is also intended for use in universities and companies’ train-
ing settings which offer programmes, courses, and workshops in occupational safety
and health. Educators in disciplines of industrial engineering, technology, and manu-
facturing may find this textbook valuable and, hopefully, easy to use. The author
also hopes that the material of this book was presented in a real-world setting and in
a down-to-earth manner.
Organisation of the book
The text contains twenty three chapters grouped in three parts. Each chapter is fo-
cussed on a major area of interest for a manager which will have to deal with safety
issues. The first part presents a general view on the field of safety and health and
includes chapters which allow to grasp the main principles of managing phenomena
and problems arising in this field. The second part has the form of a handbook and
includes chapters describing individual occupational hazards and approaches to
managing these hazards. The aim of the second part was to provide technical infor-
mation which can be of use for assessing and managing occupational and industrial
risks. The third part is devoted to the phenomenon of occupation and industrial acci-
dents. The chapters included in this part explain how to deal with this phenomena by
applying engineering control, and organisational approaches and managerial tech-
niques. Each chapter includes review questions and exercises which, as the author
hopes, will encourage review and stimulate additional thought.
How this textbook differs from others
This textbook was written because the role of safety and health in European compa-
nies has changed considerably in the global competitive climate. The risk-oriented
European safety legislation and a more and more positive attitude of European com-
panies towards safety issues require to give more attention and greater depth of cov-
erage to certain topics and problems than is given in other textbooks. Some of them
are the following:
9
Focusing on the primary problem, namely, occupational and industrial hazards

and accidents, rather than on legal and normative issues. The problems of safety
are solved primarily by engineers and managers, not by lawyers;
A greater attention to managing safety and health in line with the risk-based
approach which is strongly promoted in directives of the European Union;
The coverage of the hazards which can manifest themselves as serious industrial
accidents. These adverse events can have a devastating impact on individual
businesses and the manager should know how to deal with them and, first and
foremost, how to prevent them. Authors of most textbooks on occupational
safety and health do not consider this phenomenon in their texts, as if it would
not exist at all and would not be capable of causing a direct harm to employees.
The author’s country and safety teaching
When writing this textbook, the author was in a dilemma over the choice of the
country, the industrial and legal practice of which could serve as a basis for develop-
ing the text. It was not surprising that almost all textbooks on occupational safety
and health stick strongly, one can even say “sharply”, to the legal practice and tradi-
tions of authors’ countries. The acronyms of regulatory organisations enforcing
safety legislation in individual countries (say, HSE in the United Kingdom and
OSHA in the United States) are among most cited words in these textbooks. The
educational problem here is obvious and can be expressed by the phrase “what is
good for HSE may not be good for OSHA and vice versa”.
The author’s country, Lithuania, a member state of the European Union, has its
own experience in legislation and regulation of safety and health. This experience is
not very rich and does not stand out sharply, in positive or negative sense, against
other European countries. In addition, the Lithuanian occupational safety and health
practice is recorded, of course, in Lithuanian. All this led to the author’s decision to
base his text on the European, rather than Lithuanian, practice and examples. Of
course, the vast American knowledge in the field considered and the mighty Ameri-
can regulator OSHA can not be ignored and are not ignored in the textbook.
The only thing, which came as a surprise to the author before he started to write
this book, was the absence of a “Pan-European” textbook on occupational safety and
health. The author was not able to find such a textbook. The present text is far from
pretending to become such book; however, it can serve as teaching resource for stu-
dents who visit European universities in the framework of Socrates/Erasmus pro-
gramme.
10
Acknowledgements
The author deeply acknowledges the European Agency for Safety and Health at
Work and the British safety organisation Health and Safety Executive for collecting,
drawing up, and making available a huge amount of documents which were very
helpful for writing this textbook. All those persons who created and run the Euro-
pean Socrates/Erasmus programme are also deeply acknowledged. This splendid
programme enabled so many students and teachers to visit European universities
outside their countries and to gain invaluable experience. This book was written
keeping in mind those Erasmus visitors who would come to the author’s university
for the course of occupational safety and health.
PART I
THE PROBLEM OF SAFETY
Railway accident, Canada 1899
1 Safety versus business profit 13
1 SAFETY VERSUS BUSINESS PROFIT

1.1 The challenge of safety
Managers and engineers are becoming increasingly aware of their legal liability and
their responsibility for the public welfare, especially with respect to the society tol-
erance for engineering and management failures and the need for safe working con-
ditions (see Box 1.1 for a definition of terms). Although managers and engineers can
minimise the risk of being sued, they can not avoid their professional responsibility
to protect human health and the environment with their expertise and knowledge.
The law can keep them from doing wrong, but ethical constraints influence them to
do whatever is right.
The struggle to eliminate or reduce accidents and the injuries and damages re-
sulting from these unexpected and uncontrolled events has been influenced by two
mutually opposing considerations:
Costs of accident prevention,

Moral regard for human life and well-being.
Box 1.1: some basic definitions and the main abbreviation

Safety: freedom from hazard.
Hazard: something with the potential to cause harm (substance, machine, activ-
ity or process, etc.).
Health: the avoidance of disease and injury from the hazards in the workplace.
Welfare: the provision of facilities to maintain health and well-being of individu-

als at the workplace.
Occupational safety and health (OSH): a cross-disciplinary area concerned with

protecting the safety, health, and welfare of people engaged in work.
Risk: the probability, high or low, that the harm from a particular hazard will be
realised.
Risk assessment: evaluating the significance of a risk, either quantitatively or

qualitatively.
Risk management: lowering the threats from known hazards whilst maximizing
any related benefits.
* DiBerardinis (1999), Stranks (2002), Koren (2005)
14 Part I The problem of safety
The moral consideration has developed because massive numbers of accidental

deaths and injuries. The influential individuals and groups who witnessed or who
knew of the effects of accidents called for corrective actions and new laws to protect
employees and the general public. Gradually compromises came about between the
benefits and the costs of accident prevention. Many of the larger companies found
mutual consideration and compromise beneficial. Employees found themselves safer
than if no safety measures were provided. The result was fewer accidents and more
efficient operations, because employees had less need to slow down to avoid or pro-
tect themselves against hazards. Another benefit to companies was a reduction in
costs of litigation and insurance premiums.
Workplace and major industrial accidents cost society a lot of money (the defi-
nition of the term “accident” is given in Box 1.2). European statistics related to
workplace safety in the 15 old countries of the European Union shows that one
worker becomes a victim of an accident at work every 5 seconds and one worker
dies every two hours (ETPIS 2006). In 2001, this meant
7,6 million workplace accidents in total,

4,9 million accidents that resulted in more than three days absence from work,
4900 fatalities.
Box 1.2: definitions related to the term “accident”*

Accident: an unplanned event which results in, or suggests the possibility of, per-
sonal injury, property damage, production interruption, diminished health, or
environmental damage.
Workplace (occupational) accident: an accidental injury to a person which oc-

curs in the workplace. In the following text of the book, the adjectives “occupa-
tional” and “workplace” will be used interchangeably.
Major industrial accident: an event including, in particular, a major emission,

fire or explosion which result from uncontrolled developments in the course of
the operation of any establishment and lead to serious danger to human health or
the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and
involving one or more dangerous substances.
Near miss: an unplanned chain of events which has a potential to develop into an
accident but is broken down and does not result in damage.
* DiBerardinis (1999), Stranks (2002), Koren (2005)
For the most countries of the old 15 EU countries, the cost of accidents at work and
occupational diseases ranged from 2,6% to 3,8% of the gross domestic product
(GDP). The overall share of occupational injury and illness costs in a typical devel-
oped-country economy is not less than 3% GDP (Harms-Ringdahl 2001: 4). In addi-
tion, 2,5 million workplace accidents and 1400 fatalities were recorded in the new
countries of the European Union in 2002 (ILO data, see Appendix 2).
Safety fact*
The European data on workplace safety reveal the following ugly truths:
Every 3,5 minutes, somebody in the European Union dies from work-related causes;
Every year, 142 400 people in the Union die from occupational diseases and 8 900
from work-related accidents;
Up to a third of these 150 000 fatalities each year can be attributed to hazardous sub-
stances at work in the Union, including 21 000 to asbestos.
* EASHW website (Appendix 2)
Besides the workplace accidents, about 30 major accidents happen each year in
the European Union (ISPRA, see Appendix 2). These accidents may have catastro-
phic consequences to people and the environment as well as serious economic im-
pacts on industry and on the communities which rely on it for employment. The ma-
jor accidents disrupt the process of sustainable industrial development, directly
through the immediate response of the community and indirectly through restrictions
placed on the whole industry as a result of these failures. Moreover, the development
of modern technologies brings about many new industrial safety issues. New pro-
duction technologies are often accompanied by new, unexpected hazards. At the
same time, the same technologies provide new cost-effective and time efficient solu-
tions to the workplace accident and disease prevention task.
Safety fact*
Countries with less developed OSH systems spend a far higher percentage of GDP on
work-related injury and illness and take resources away from more productive activities.
The International Labour Organisation estimates that work-related illness and accidents
cost up to 10% GDP in Latin America, compared to 2,6% to 3,8% in the European Union.
* EASHW (2007f)
The risk assessment and management need to guard against potential hazards
and disasters have become critically important because of the enormity of their im-
pact. Flixborough (1974, the United Kingdom), Seveso (1976, Italy), Bhopal (1984,
India), Piper Alpha (1988, the United Kingdom), Toulouse (2001, France), and
Texas City (2005, the United States) are among the disasters which might have been
avoided through better engineering and operational safety (Chapter 4). Risk analysis
and management must be a fundamental element of the engineering and managerial

components in construction, chemical process, defence, aviation, nuclear power, and
other industries.
Sometimes only a disaster will cause managers and engineers to acquire vital in-
formation about hazardous technology and its effects upon the society and industry.
Technological improvements, refinements in production methods, and market de-
mand can outpace requisite advances in process safety equipment and procedures. A
complacent attitude may develop as a result of the successful operation of a manu-
facturing facility involved with hazardous chemicals and processes, allowing certain
coincidental events to occur that can lead to a disaster of catastrophic proportions.
This was certainly the case at Bhopal and Toulouse which provided dramatic exam-
ples of the need for increasing safety in engineering design and implementation
(Sections 4.3 and 4.5).
Occupational safety and environmental health issues can easily become an un-
pleasant burden unless engineers and managers have taken it seriously and have de-
veloped a systematic approach to solving safety and environmental problems. This
approach must be incorporated into all aspects of engineering and management of
hazardous technology, from conceptual design, feasibility studies, pilot plant opera-
tion and commercial operation, to shipment of products and disposal of wastes. This
enormous task can be accomplished only if managers and engineers have proper
training and knowledge in occupational and industrial safety as well as environ-
mental health issues.
The safety and welfare of employees in the workplace is a matter of increasing
concern to workers and often is a deciding factor in both job selection and worker
satisfaction. Closely related to this is the issue of worker compensation for work-
related injuries and illnesses. The increasing cost of workmen’s compensation is of
great concern to industry, as it is perceived to deplete funds that otherwise could be
used for further profitability. Financial concerns and safety and health issues them-
selves provide strong incentives for management to seriously regard the safety issues.
1.2 Financial impact of accidents upon company profits
Every year, thousands of European workers are killed in the workplace. Tens of
thousands of workers are permanently injured. Millions of others have their physical
and mental health affected. These accidents result in lost time or reduced production
as well as disrupting personal lives.
Accidents cost European and American companies and the economy billions of
euros and dollars every year. Many companies lose their market share and are even
forced out of business due to accidents. Many other companies receive “bad” public-
ity after a serious accident. It may take years to “repair” financial damage, especially
if the accident is one that results in environmental damage. Many companies have a
combination of problems due to an accident. For example, the world largest com-
puter chip producer had its main manufacturing plant shut down due to a fork truck
mishap when an operator accidentally hit the main electrical power line (DiBerardi-
nis 1999: 14). In addition, electrical power was interrupted for 9000 local residents.
The chip producer put the cost of production interruption into millions of dollars.
Safety fact*
Years ago, the American chemical company Dupont did a study of both direct and indi-
rect costs of accidents causing employee’s lost time. In 1999 dollars, the average cost of
such an accident would exceed $20 000. This translates into the company having to gen-
erate $200 000 in sales or services at a 10% profit margin, or $400 000 at a 10% profit
margin. In some cases insurance will cover a portion of the loss, but over the time the
company will pay back the loss through increased premiums. Ultimately the company
will pay for all losses directly or indirectly.
* DiBerardinis (1999: 14)
All accidents represent varying degrees of loss to an organisation. Costs arising

from these events can be classified as direct or indirect costs. Direct costs, some-
times referred to as “insured costs”, include premiums paid annually to an insurance
company to cover the employer’s liability in terms of claims made by injured em-
ployees. Such premiums are affected, to some extent, on the previous claims history
of the organisation. Other direct costs can include fines in the criminal courts for
breaches of health and safety law.
The calculation of accident losses often overlooks indirect costs. The following
are typical causes of indirect costs:
Lost and/or reduced production until the injured employee returns to work full
time;
Reduced production until a replacement employee comes up to speed with the
operations, if the employee’s duties are done by someone else;
Overtime for other employees who must perform injured employee’s duties if a
replacement can not be obtained;
Long-terms physical restrictions of employee’s work activities from causes such
as carpal tunnel or repetitive work motion problems, back injuries strains, etc.;
Increased insurance costs;
Fines imposed by regulatory agencies as a result of violations involved in the
accident;
Local and state government fines for violations of their codes and requirements;
Decreased production after a serious accident when workers become fearful of
their safety;
Decrease or interruption of production due to the damage to machinery or
equipment caused by an accident (sometimes they are not allowed to be oper-
ated until officials investigate an accident);
Losses due to the damage to the company’s reputation caused by negative pub-
licity by media. Good employees do not want to work in companies where em-
ployees are injured. An accident can also produce negative neighbourhood and
community attitudes towards the company;
Loss of contracts due to the lack of an effective safety and health programme
resulting in an above-average accident and injury record. The negative record
may raise the contractor’s doubt as to whether employees of the employer and
the contractor will be properly trained to recognise and avoid hazards they may
produce.
The total costs of workplace accidents vary considerably between employing

organisations. The costs depend on which type of insurance and compensation sys-
tem is operated and how sensitive the operation is to disturbances caused by an acci-
dent. The accident cost can be relatively high; however, in some cases these costs
were not necessarily high (Söderqvist et al. 1990). The reasons for the low accident
costs were comprehensive insurance policies which covered compensation to injured
persons, the independence of insurance premiums on the number of accidents, and a
surplus of personnel.
Generally, the larger property damage and production interruption accidents
cost many times more than personal injuries. History books are filled with major
accidents which have caused business to shut down temporarily and sometimes per-
manently go out of business due to employees’ fatalities, fires, explosions, serious
chemical reactions, spills, environmental damage, etc.
Losses due to property damage and business interruption caused by major acci-
dents may amount to very impressive figures (e.g., Table 1.1). However, such acci-
dents also pose indirect consequences. These may be of legal and social nature and
may affect the whole industry “touched” by major accidents. For instance, in 1980s
chemical industry of the United States has almost completely stopped all invest-
ments in new manufacturing plants due to legal overregulation which was in part a
consequence of major chemical accidents (Kumamoto and Henley 1996: 579).
Safety fact*
Multi-million dollar fines of regulatory agencies and court verdicts can force companies
into bankruptcy. Here are several examples of the headlines stemming from liability law-
suits and actions of the agencies:
“EPA sues “Celanese” for $165 000 000 for air pollution.”
““Bard Medical” fined $63 million by FDA.”
“EPA fines “Rockwell International” $18,5 million.”
“Jury assesses “Upjohn” $127 million – 70 year old man losses use of eye.”
““Chevron” hit with $127 million fine for self-reported violation.”
“OSHA fines “Phillips” $5,2 million for explosion.”
““Colotex” to pay $76 million to Illinois 68 year old in asbestos suit.”
* Kumamoto and Henley (1996: 573), see Appendix 2 for abbreviations
Table 1.1 The cost of fourteen accidents experienced world-wide in the period from 1977 to
1992 (Fewtrell and Hirst 1998)
Includes business in-
Location Date Cost (US$ 1996)
terruption losses?
Pasadena, Texas, US 23/10/89 $1,456 million Yes
La Mede, France 11/09/92 $458 million Yes
Pampa, Texas, US 14/11/87 $396 million Yes
Antwerp, Belgium 07/03/89 $356 million Yes
Thessaloniki, Greece 24/02/86 $300 million No*
Norko, Louisiana, US 05/05/88 $293 million No*
Sweeny, Texas, US 04/13/91 $264 million Yes
Romeoville, Illinois, US 23/07/84 $241 million No*
Port Neal, Iowa, US 13/12/84 $182 million Yes
Sodegaura, Japan 16/10/92 $172 million No*
Seadrift, Texas, US 02/12/91 $172 million Yes
Umm Said, Qatar 03/04/77 $156 million Note*
Shuaiba, Kuwait 20/08/81 $148 million No*
Sterlington, Louisiana, US 05/01/91 $148 million Yes
* Fewtrell and Hirst (1998) quote the information that business interruption losses reported
in UK in 1997 were on average 2,7 times property damage losses; however, there were
wide variations between individual cases.
A plant shutdown due to a major accident is a depressing event. A plant shut

down due to a lawsuit or a legal action taken by a government agency is an even
more depressing event. The number of Americans, for instance, who lose jobs due to
their company’s legal and regulatory problems is orders of magnitude higher than
the number who lose their jobs due to industrial accidents (Kumamoto and Henley
1996: 573). The risk of a company being crippled or closed down by lawsuits of an
environmental or factory inspection agency is far from negligible. Therefore it is
naïve on the part of managers and engineers to focus only on technical matters of
occupational and industrial safety. The risk of a legal disaster is real and managers
and engineers must learn how to deal with government regulations and inspections
in order to reduce this risk.
Whatever is the cause of a financial loss to a company, that loss comes out of
profits. In the present national and international competitive business culture, com-
panies of excellent safety and health programmes can better control their overhead
costs and be more competitive.
1.3 Business benefits of good safety performance
In view of many companies, occupational safety and health is good for business. A
positive approach to health and safety issues prevents workers from being harmed or
made ill at work. In addition, OSH can be an essential part of a successful business
(Figure 1.1). This beneficial role of OSH results from various factors positively in-
fluencing business. A good safety performance of a company
Helps demonstrate that a business is socially responsible,

Protects and enhances brand image and brand value,
Helps to maximise the productivity of workers,
Enhances employees’ commitment to the business,
Builds a more competent, healthier workforce,
Reduces business costs and disruption,
Enables enterprises to meet customers’ OSH expectations,
Encourages the workforce to stay longer in active life.
Figure 1.1 Benefits of good OSH (EASHW 2007h)

Box 1.3: OSH management system*

OSH management system is a part of the overall management system that facili-
tates the management of workplace risks associated with the business of the or-
ganisation. This includes the organisational structure, planning activities, respon-
sibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources for developing and
achieving, reviewing and maintaining the organisation’s OHS policy.
* BS (2008)
Every enterprise can enjoy significant benefits by investing in OSH. Simple im-
provements can increase competitiveness, profitability and the motivation of em-
ployees. The implementation of an OSH management system provides an effective
framework to prevent or minimise accidents and ill health (Box 1.3). The key prin-
ciples of good OSH are:
Commitment and leadership to improve OSH,

Effective OSH policies and procedures,
Proactive risk assessment programmes,
Trained and competent workers,
Effective risk control measures,

Ongoing monitoring and review processes.
Although the principles of good OSH apply to every organisation, the commer-
cial drivers can be very different for large and small organisations.
1.3.1 Benefits of OSH for large companies
Good companies have long recognised the importance of their image and reputation.
Large companies are expected to demonstrate ever-higher standards of corporate
governance and greater transparency in reporting practices. The combination of op-
erating in a market-driven economy alongside a society that is more aware of risks
means that many enterprises now realise the significant gains that can be made from
integrating safety performance into their wider business model. These include:
Improvements in the image, brand value, and reputation of the enterprise,

Delivering on corporate social responsibility commitments,
Maintaining and promoting investor confidence,
Developing positive stakeholder engagement.
Corporate social responsibility considers how business can take account of its
economic, social, and environmental impacts in the way it operates. OSH can play a
major role in how these principles are put into effect. Of particular relevance is:
Including OSH in wider corporate governance initiatives,

Ensuring OSH risks are adequately addressed by contractors and suppliers,

Motivating other enterprises to make OSH improvements through peer pressure.
Safety fact*
Whether your enterprise is a small or a large company, implementing an efficient OSH

management can enhance your productivity. OSH is about managing risk. If you prevent
and control OSH risks effectively many of the business benefits of good OSH will fol-
low.
* EASHW website (Appendix 2)
One of the central commitments of the European Union is to give equal impor-
tance to increased employment and productivity through greater competitiveness.
The cost of accidents at work and occupational diseases in the old 15 member states
ranges from 2,6% to 3,8% of GDP (Section 1.1). On the other hand, returns on in-
vestment as high as 12 to 1 (€12 profit for every €1 invested) can be achieved
through spending money for good OSH (EASHW 2007h). Reducing accidents and
ill health, production and efficiency benefits can follow from:
Enhancing the levels of motivation, cooperation and morale in the workforce,

More productive workers and more efficient working methods,
Minimising unplanned costs through effective business continuity planning,
Improving the quality of employee recruitment and retention,
Cutting insurance premiums,
Reducing the potential exposure to criminal or civil litigation.
There is a clear and direct relationship between the social behaviours of a com-
pany and its reputation, sales, brand and indeed overall value. This correlation gets
stronger as both the size of the business and the value of the brand increase.
1.3.2 Benefits of OSH for small enterprises
Many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are also beginning to recognise
the costs of poor OSH and the benefits of good safety performance. These are most
noticeable in terms of:
Meeting the OSH requirements of business clients in order to win and retain
contracts,
Avoiding business disruption and loss of key staff,
Motivating staff and retaining their commitment,
The availability and affordability of insurance.
Safety fact*
The average rate of fatal accidents at work in the European Union in 2001 accounted for
2,7 per 100 000 workers, while the fatality rate was twice as much in the small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The category of SMEs is made up of enterprises which
employ less than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding €50 mil-
lion and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million.
There are 19 million SMEs in the European Union employing nearly 75 million people.
However, SMEs also record an over proportional 82% of all occupational injuries, even
rising to about 90% for fatal accidents.
* ETPIS (2006), EASHW website (Appendix 2)
New and growing enterprises seeking to achieve sustained business growth and
stability are realising how their safety performance can contribute. This is most no-
ticeable in terms of satisfying the OSH requirements of clients. A good safety per-
formance results not merely in higher staff morale and lower sickness. It also con-
tributes to the retention of existing customers, and it is a real differentiator when
winning new business and helping the company to expand.
The need for corporate businesses to act responsibly also leads to demands be-
ing placed on their suppliers. Investing in good OSH standards boosts the competi-
tiveness of the enterprise, which also increases the potential to retain clients and win
new business.
Poor safety performance has a disproportionate impact on small enterprises. The
human and business costs of a workplace fatality, a major fire, or high-profile prose-
cution are obvious. Some 60% of companies that are disrupted for longer than nine
days go out of business (EASHW 2007h). But well-performing enterprises can real-
ise productivity benefits such as:
Safer working methods that also allow work to be done quicker and with fewer
people,
Reduced rates of accidents, incidents and ill health – with examples of sickness
absence being halved,
Maximising levels of recruitment, motivation, and retention of skilled staff.
It is illegal for enterprises to operate without adequate insurance cover, but

premiums are rising and becoming more difficult to obtain. The cost of workers’
insurance varies according to the type of business. Clerical-based work enjoys rates
of less than 0,5% of payroll; manufacturing rates are higher at around 5%. Construc-
tion activities such as roofing have rates as high as 15% (EASHW 2007h). Signifi-
cant increases or discounts from these “book” rates are offered in most countries,
depending on the insurance system, thus meaning significant financial savings for
good performers and penalties for poor performers.
The message is clear: good OSH is good business. Enterprises should integrate
OSH into business management and raise the awareness of key decision-makers
within the organisation. OSH is likely to be a key business success factor for an en-
terprise if its managers give a positive answer to any of the following questions:
Do your customers, investors or banks expect a responsible and properly risk-

managed approach to OSH?
Would your business be disrupted if an incident occurred?
Would the loss of one or more key staff harm your business?
Could you benefit from cheaper insurance or improved productivity?
1.4 Review questions and exercises

1 Differentiate the terms “hazard” and “risk”.
2 What is approximate number of workplace accidents in Europe per year?
3 What is the average annual number of major accidents in the European Union?
4 Explain direct and indirect losses posed by accidents.
5 How can good occupational safety and health positively influence business performance?
6 What are benefits of good occupational safety and health?
7 Why is good occupational safety and health is beneficial for an SME?
2 SAFETY LEGISLATION
Different states take different approaches to legislation, regulation, and law en-
forcement in the field of occupational safety and health (OSH). The member states
of the European Union have enforcing authorities to ensure that the basic legal re-
quirements relating to occupational safety and health are met. In many member
states, there is strong cooperation between employer and worker organisations (e.g.,
unions) to ensure good OSH performance as it is recognised this has benefits for
both the worker (through maintenance of health) and the enterprise (through im-
proved productivity and quality). In 1996 the European Agency for Safety and
Health at Work was founded (Figure 2.1, Appendix 2). In the present textbook, the
name of this agency is abbreviated by EASHW.
Figure 2.1 The logo of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work
The member states have all transposed a series of directives establishing mini-
mum standards on OSH into their national legislation. These directives (of which
there are about 20 on a variety of topics, follow a similar structure requiring the em-
ployer to assess the workplace risks and put in place preventive measures based on a
hierarchy of control. This hierarchy starts with the elimination of hazards and ends
with personal protective equipment.
2.1 European legislation
European law-making is divided into primary and secondary legislation. The pri-
mary legislation consists of Treaties which are effectively the constitutional law of
the European Union. They are created by governments from all member states acting
by consensus. They lay down the basic policies of the Union, establish its institu-
tional structure, legislative procedures, and the powers of the Union.
The Treaties empower the European Parliament, the European Commission and
the Council of Ministers to legislate on all matters within the Union’s competence
(Box 2.1). These institutions draft, propose, and enact secondary legislation. Acts of
this legislation are classified according to whom they are directed and how they are
to be implemented:
2 Safety legislation 25
Box 2.1: the main European institutions in brief

European Commission: an institution which acts as an executive or civil service
of sorts. It is currently composed of one member from each state and is responsi-
ble for drafting all proposed law, a duty on which it maintains a monopoly in
order to co-ordinate European law. It also controls some agencies and the day-to-
day running of the Union.
Council of Ministers: a body forming one half of the Union’s legislative branch
(the other being the European Parliament). The Council is composed of the na-
tional ministers responsible for the area of European law being addressed.
European Parliament: the only European Union body composed of officials di-
rectly elected by the citizens of the member states. The European Parliament
forms the second half of the Union’s legislative branch.
European Court of Justice: the supreme law court within the European Union
empowered to define and interpret primary and secondary legislation. Cases can
only be brought before this court by organisations or individuals representing
organisations.
Regulation (a legislative act of the Union which becomes immediately enforce-

able as law in all member states simultaneously; regulations apply mainly to the
iron and coal industries and are rarely used for health and safety matters);
Directive (a legislative act which requires member states to achieve a particular
result without dictating the means of achieving that result; it can be distin-
guished from regulations which are self-executing and do not require any im-
plementing measures);
Decision (a legislative act about a specific subject; it affects the parties to whom
it is addressed, that is, individuals, corporations, or member states).
Directives are the main body of European law. They provide for harmonisation
of the laws of the member states including those dealing with OSH. A directive is a
legislative act which requires member states to achieve a particular result without
dictating the means of achieving that result. It can be distinguished from regulations
which are self-executing and do not require any implementing measures. Directives
normally leave member states with a certain amount of leeway as to the exact rules
to be adopted. Directives can be adopted by means of a variety of legislative proce-
dures depending on its subject matter. Most directives are addressed to all member
states.
When adopted, directives give member states a timetable for the implementa-
tion of the intended outcome. Occasionally the laws of a member state may already
comply with this outcome and the state involved would only be required to keep
their laws in place. But more commonly member states are required to make
changes to their laws in order for the directive to be implemented correctly. If a
member state fails to pass the required national legislation, or if the national legisla-
tion does not adequately comply with the requirements of the directive, the Euro-
pean Commission may initiate legal action against the member state in the European
Court of Justice (Box 2.1).
2.2 The legal influence of the European Union on health and safety
European legislation in the field of OSH includes regulations, directives, proposals,
recommendations, decisions, and other texts. A systemised representation of these
documents can be found in the website of the European Agency for Safety and
Health at Work. The full texts of the documents can be retrieved from the EUR-Lex
database (Appendix 2). The main set of legislative documents consists of directives
on OSH established to protect the health and safety of European workers.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 contain an overview of the directives related to different di-
rections of OSH. The main document in this part of European legislation is the so-
called framework directive 89/391/EEC (EC 1989). This directive sets out overall
objectives. More detailed matters are subsequently dealt with daughter directives.
The framework directive seeks to ensure a higher degree of protection at work
through the implementation of preventive measures to guard against accidents at
work and occupational diseases, and through the information, consultation, balanced
participation and training of workers and their representatives.
Table 2.1 European directives concerning the protection of workers*

1 Health and safety at work
1.1 Framework directive 89/391/EEC
1.2 Individual directives
1.2.01 Workplaces 89/654/EEC
1.2.02 Use of work equipment 89/655/EEC
1.2.03 Use of personal protective equipment 89/656/EEC
1.2.04 Work with display screen equipment 90/270/EEC
1.2.05 Manual handling 90/269/EEC
1.2.06 Carcinogens 2004/37/EC
1.2.07 Biological agents 2000/54/EC
1.2.08 Safety signs 92/58/EEC
1.2.09 Pregnant workers 92/85/EEC
1.2.10 Mineral extracting industries (drilling) 92/91/EEC
1.2.11 Mineral extracting industries 92/104/EEC
1.2.12 Fishing vessels 93/103/EC
1.2.13 Medical treatment on board of vessels 92/29/EEC
1.2.14 Chemical agents 98/24/EC
2000/39/EC
2006/15/EC
1 Health and safety at work

1.2.15 Temporary and mobile construction sites 92/57/EEC
1.2.16 Physical agents – vibration 2002/44/EC
1.2.17 Physical agents – noise 2003/10/EC
2 Protection of workers from occupational risks
2.1 Protection of workers from risks related to the exposure 80/1107/EEC
to chemical, physical, and biological agents
2.2 Chemical agents 98/24/EC
2.3 Individual directives
2.3.1 Metallic lead 82/605/EEC
2.3.2 Asbestos 83/477/EEC
2003/18/EC
2.3.3 Noise 2003/10/EC
2.3.4 Banning 88/364/EEC
2.3.5 Indicative limit values 91/322/EEC
96/94/EC
2000/39/EC
2.4 Vinyl chloride monomer 78/610/EEC
3 Organisation of working time 93/104/EC
4 Equal treatment of men and women (employment, training, and 76/207/EEC
working conditions)
* The texts of the directives can be found in the EUR-Lex database or the EASHW
webpage (Appendix 2)
Table 2.2 European directives concerning internal market (numbering is continued from
Table 2.1)*
5 Machines products and apparatus

5.1 CE marking (indication of equipment compliance with all 93/68/EEC
requirements and regulations)
5.2 Machines 98/37/EC
5.3 Lifts 95/16/EC
5.4 Personal protective equipment 89/686/EEC
5.5 Equipment and protective systems intended for the use in 94/9/EC
potentially explosive atmospheres
5.6 Pressure vessels 76/767/EEC
5.7 Gas cylinders 84/525/EEC
84/526/EEC
84/527/EEC
5.8 Aerosol dispensers 75/324/EEC
5.9 Simple pressure vessels 87/404/EEC
5.10 Pressure equipment 97/23/EC
5.11 Construction plant and equipment 84/532/EEC
5.12 Limitation of noise emitted by hydraulic elevators rope oper- 86/662/EEC
ated excavators, dozers, loaders, and excavator loaders
5.13 Construction products 89/106/EEC
5.14 Product safety 92/59/EEC
5 Machines products and apparatus

5.15 Electromagnetic compatibility 89/336/EEC
5.16 Electrical equipment designed for the use within certain volt- 2006/95/EC
age limits
5.17 Appliances burning gaseous fuels 90/396/EEC
* The texts of the directives can be found in the EUR-Lex database or EASHW webpage
(Appendix 2)
The framework directive serves as a basis for daughter directives covering,

among other things, the areas listed in the annex to the directive:
1 Work equipment;
2 Personal protective equipment;
3 Work with visual display units;
4 Handling of heavy loads involving risk of back injury;
5 Temporary and mobile work sites;
6 Fishing;
7 Agriculture.
The framework directive can be characterised as follows:
1 The directive applies to all sectors of activity, both public and private, with the
exception of certain specific activities in the public and civil protection services;
2 The directive defines the terms “worker”, “employer”, “workers’ representa-

tive” and “prevention”.
The directive lists the obligations of the employers:
To ensure the health and safety of workers in every aspect related to work, pri-
marily on the basis of the specified general principles of prevention, without in-
volving the workers in any financial cost;
To evaluate the occupational risks, among other things, in the choice of work
equipment and the fitting-out of workplaces, and to make provision for adequate
protective and preventive services;
To keep a list of, and draw up reports on, occupational accidents;
To take the necessary measures for the first aid, fire-fighting, evacuation of
workers and action required in the event of serious and imminent danger;
To inform and consult workers and allow them to take part in discussions on all
questions relating to safety and health at work;
To ensure that each worker receives adequate health and safety training
throughout the period of employment.
The directive also states the obligations of the employers (workers):
To make correct use of machinery, other means of production, personal protec-

tive equipment and safety devices;
To give warning of any work situation presenting a serious and immediate dan-
ger and of any shortcomings in the protection arrangements;
To cooperate in fulfilling any requirements imposed for the protection of health
and safety and in enabling the employer to ensure that the working environment
and working conditions are safe and pose no risks.
The directive states that the health of workers is monitored through the applica-
tion of measures introduced in accordance with national laws and practices. The di-
rective also states that particularly sensitive risk groups must be protected against
the dangers which specifically affect them.
The Council of Ministers adopt daughter directives in the seven areas listed
above, to which the provisions of this directive will apply. The framework directive
and the daughter directives may be amended by the Council. Technical adjustments
of the directive are made by the European Commission, assisted by a committee
composed of representatives of the member states.
Safety fact*
The framework directive 89/391/EEC lays down the obligation to assess risks related to
all occupational activities and highlights the key role played by risk assessment. Risk
assessment is the cornerstone of the European approach to prevent occupational

accidents and ill health.
The directive 89/391/EEC is indeed a framework, with “general principles concerning

the prevention of occupational risks … as well as general guidelines for the
implementation of the said principles” (Article 1). The framework directive makes em-
ployers responsible for ensuring the safety and health of workers in every aspect related
to work, and risk assessment is an integral aspect of mandatory occupational safety and
health management. According to the directive, risk assessment must be the starting
point of this management.
* * EASHW website (Appendix 2)
2.3 Major accident legislation

Since the 1960s, developments in the process industries have resulted in large quan-
tities of toxic and flammable substances being stored and transmitted in locations
that could, in the event of failure, affect the public. Society has become increasingly
aware of these hazards as a result of major accidents which involve both process
plant and public such as Flixborough (1974), Seveso (1976), Bhopal (1984), Tou-
louse (2001) (Chapter 4). The disasters in Flixborough and Seveso drew attention to
the lack of formal controls throughout Europe (Smith 2005: 258). This prompted the
adoption of legislation aimed at the prevention and control of such accidents.
In 1982, the first directive 82/501/EEC – so-called Seveso directive – was
adopted. In 1997, the Seveso directive was replaced by the directive 96/82/EC, so-
called Seveso II directive (EC 1997). The Seveso II directive applies to some thou-
sands of industrial establishments where dangerous substances are present in quanti-
ties exceeding the thresholds in the directive.
The Seveso II directive is aimed at the control of major accident hazards involv-
ing hazardous substances. It is a direct attempt to both promote the learning of the
general lessons from past accidents and to promote the capture and dissemination of
the many other more specific lessons which can be learned from past accidents and
near misses (Box 1.2). The first can be achieved mainly by the formal requirements
of the directive, whereas the second can be achieved using the major accident report-
ing system (MARS, see Appendix 2). The operation of the MARS database is a re-
quirement of the directive.
Safety fact*
The biggest industrial disaster in France occurred in 2001 in Toulouse. It was a devastat-
ing explosion of ammonium nitrate in a chemical plant manufacturing mainly ammo-
nium nitrate-based fertilisers. It must be noted that the plant was fully covered by the
Seveso II Directive! The company running the plant was also certified with both ISO
9000 and ISO 14000 family standards (ISO 2004, 2005).
* ERRIS, Appendix 2
The European Commission conducted a study to assess the level and quality of
practical implementation of the Seveso II directive (Salvi et al. 2008). The main
purpose of this study was to provide the European Commission with key findings
and lessons learnt from the implementation of the main requirements imposed on
operators, focussing in particular on those relating to major accident prevention pol-
icy, safety reports and internal emergency plans. The study focussed on:
The adequacy of the requirements imposed by the directive on the operators of

Seveso II establishments and the objectives to prevent major accident and miti-
gate their consequences;
The real impact of the requirements and the most effective way to measure it;
The effectiveness of the implementation, in terms of compliance in various
member states and industrial sectors, and the assessment of possible market dis-
tortion.
In the light of recent industrial accidents (e.g., Toulouse in 2001) and studies on
carcinogens and substances dangerous for the environment, the Seveso II directive
96/82/EC was extended by the directive 2003/105/EC (EC 2003). The most impor-
tant extensions of the scope of that directive are to cover risks arising from storage
and processing activities in mining, from pyrotechnic and explosive substances and
from the storage of ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate based fertilisers. The
directive 2003/105/EC is addressed to all member states. They had to bring into
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with
this directive before 1 July, 2005.

1 Which European organisations are the legislative braches of the European Union?
2 Which organisation in the European Union maintains a monopoly in drafting all pro-
posed Union’s law?
3 What is the role of European directives in Union’s legislation and legislation of member
states?
4 Explain the function of the framework directive and daughter directives on occupational
safety.
5 What is the role of the framework directive in the assessment of occupational risks?
6 What were the circumstances of the adoption of the Seveso II directive?
7 Briefly explain the aim of the Seveso II directive.
3 RISK ASSESSMENT AT WORK

Safety and health of European workers is protected by an approach based on assess-
ing and managing risk. Risk assessment is the cornerstone of OSH in Europe. There
are good reasons for this. If risk assessment is not done properly or not done at all,
the appropriate protective measures are unlikely to be identified or put in place.
Every few minutes somebody in the European Union dies from work-related causes
(EASHW 2008b). Millions of people have their health seriously harmed in the
workplace. Numerous workplace accidents and numerous cases of workplace ill-
nesses stretch the resources of healthcare systems and affect business productivity.
That is why risk assessment is so important for creating healthy and safe work-
places.
Risk assessment is a dynamic process which allows companies to put in place a
proactive policy in managing workplace hazards. The most important piece of Euro-
pean legislation relevant to risk assessment is the framework directive 89/391/EEC
(EC 1989) (Section 2.2). This directive has been transposed into the legislation of
member states. However, member states have the right to introduce more stringent
provisions to protect their workers (EASHW 2008b). The European Commission has
guidelines to help member states as well as individual companies to fulfil their risk
assessment duties laid down in the framework directive (EC 1996). This chapter is
based on these guidelines as well as materials of the European Agency for Safety
and Health at Work (or EASHW, see Appendix 2).
3.1 What is risk assessment?
Risk assessment is the process of evaluating risks to workers’ safety and health form
workplace hazards. It is simply a careful and systematic examination of all aspects
of work which provides answers to the following questions (EASHW 2008b):
What could cause injury or harm?

Can the hazards be eliminated and, if not,
What preventive and protective measures are, or should be, in place to control
the hazards?
The employer at each workplace has a general duty to ensure safety and health
of workers in every aspect related to their work. Workers and others have the right
to be protected from harm caused by a failure to take reasonable control measures.
These measures include:
Prevention of occupational risks,

Providing information and training to workers,
Providing the organisation and means to implement necessary measures.
3 Risk assessment at work 33
The purpose of risk assessment includes the elimination of occupational risks.

Although the elimination of risks should always be the goal, it will not always be
achievable in practice. Where the elimination is not possible, the risks should be re-
duced and the residual risks should be controlled. In other words, the employer is
requires to protect workers as far as “reasonably practicable”. At a later stage, the
residual risks can be reassessed and the possibility of elimination considered, for
instance, in the light of new knowledge on existing hazards.
Safety fact
The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EASHW) has developed a data-
base containing information on risk assessment tool from all over Europe. These tools
are free and available online. The database is updated regularly with new tools (see Ap-
pendix 2).
3.2 The stepwise approach to risk assessment

Fixed rules of risk assessments do not exist on the European level. However, there
are two principles which should always be kept in mind when carrying out risk as-
sessment:
Structuring of risk assessment in order to ensure that all relevant hazards are
identified and addressed (e.g., not to overlook operations which might take
place out of normal working hours, say, cleaning, or to take into account ancil-
lary departments such as waste removal);

Asking whether risk can be eliminated after it was identified.
The European guidelines propose a risk assessment approach based on breaking

down the risk assessment process into a series of five steps (Figure 3.1).
3.2.1 Identifying hazards and persons at risk
The first step consists in working out how people could be harmed. The identifica-
tion of hazards in all aspects of work should be approached by the following actions:
Walking around the workplace and looking at what could reasonably be ex-
pected to cause harm;
Asking employees and/or their representatives about any problems they have
encountered. Employees may have noticed things which are not immediately
obvious to the risk assessor. They will know what process steps they follow,
whether there are any short cuts, or ways of getting over a difficult task, and
what precautionary actions they take;
Step 1
Identify hazards
Look for those things at work which have the potential to cause harm
and identify workers who may be exposed to hazards
Step 2
Evaluate and prioritise risks
Estimate the existing risks (severity and probability of accidents/
diseases) and prioritise them in order of importance
Step 3
Decide on precautions
Identify the appropriate measures to eliminate or control the risks
Step 4
Implement precausions
Put in place the preventive and protective measures through a
prioritisation plan and specify who does what and when
Step 5
Monitor assessments and update if necessary
Review the assessment at regular intervals to ensure it remains up to
date.
Figure 3.1 Five steps of the risk assessment procedure (EASHW 2008a)
Examining systematically all aspects of work, that is: (i) looking at what actu-
ally happens in the workplace or during work activity because actual practice
may differ from the works manual; (ii) thinking about non-routine and intermit-
tent operations (e.g., maintenance operations, changes in production cycles); (iii)
taking account of unplanned but foreseeable events such as interruptions to
work activity;
Considering long-term hazards to health, such as high levels of noise or expo-
sure to harmful substances, as well as more complex or less obvious risks such
as psychosocial or work organisational risk factors;
Looking at company accident and ill health records;
Seeking information from other sources such as: (i) manufacturers’ and suppli-
ers’ instruction manuals or data sheets; (ii) occupational safety and health web-
sites; (iii) national bodies, trade associations or trade unions; (iv) legal regula-
tions and technical standards.
Safety fact*
Every business is different. You need to think through the hazards and controls required
in your business for yourself.
* HSE (2008a)
For each hazard it is important to be clear about who could be harmed. This will
help to identify the best way of managing the risk. An account should be taken of
workers interacting with hazards whether directly or indirectly, e.g., a worker paint-
ing a surface is directly exposed to solvents, while other workers in the vicinity, en-
gaged in other activities, are inadvertently and indirectly exposed. This does not
mean listing everyone by name, but identifying groups of people such as “people
working in the storeroom” or “passers-by”. Cleaners, contractors, and members of
the public may also be at risk. A particular attention should be paid to:
Workers with disabilities,

Migrant workers,
Young and old workers,
Pregnant women and nursing mothers,
Temporary and part-time workers,
Untrained or inexperienced staff,
Maintenance workers,
Workers with existing ill health conditions such as bronchitis,
Workers on medications which can increase their vulnerability to harm.
It is important to identify how these people might be harmed, i.e. what type of
injury or ill health may occur.
3.2.2 Evaluating and prioritising risks
The second step of risk assessment is to evaluate the risk arising from each hazard
(Box 3.1). This can be done by providing answers to the following three questions:
How likely is it that a hazard will cause harm (e.g., whether it is improbable,
possible but not very likely, probable, or inevitable over time)?
How serious is that harm likely to be (e.g., result in minor damage, a non-injury
incident, a minor injury (bruise, laceration), a serious injury (fracture, amputa-
tion, chronic ill health), a fatality, or a multiple-fatality)?
How many workers are exposed?
How often are workers exposed?
A straightforward process based on the judgement and requiring no specialist

skills or complicated techniques could be sufficient for many workplace hazards or
activities. These include activities with hazards of low concern, or workplaces where
risks are well-known or readily identified and where a means of control is readily
available. This is probably the case for most businesses, mainly, SMEs.
Box 3.1: Forms of risk evaluation*

Quantitative risk analysis (QRA): attempts to measure the risk by relating the
probability of the risk occurring to the possible severity of the outcome and then
giving the risk a numerical value. This method of risk assessment is used in
situations where a malfunction could be very serious (e.g., aircraft design and
maintenance or petrochemical industry). Data sources for quantification of risk
include:
Records of past accidents,

Relevant experience,
Industry practice,
Relevant published data including reliability databases,
Test marketing and research,
Experiments and prototypes,
Economic, engineering and other models,
Specialist and expert judgments.
Qualitative risk analysis is based purely on personal judgment and is normally

defined as high, medium, or low. Qualitative risk analyses are usually satisfac-
tory since the definition (high, medium or low) is normally used to determine the
time frame in which further action is to be taken. The quantitative risk analysis is
the most common form of risk evaluation. Risk matrices are commonly used
method of qualitative risk analysis (Section 5.2.3).
Generic risk assessment is a risk assessment which covers similar activities or

work equipment in different departments, sites, or companies. Such assessments
are often produced by specialist bodies, such as trade associations. If used, they
must be appropriate to the particular job and they will need to be extended to
cover additional hazards or risks.
* Lingard and Rowlingston (2005: 171), Hughes and Ferrett (2007:70)
In some other cases it may not be possible to identify hazards and evaluate risks
without professional knowledge, support, and advice. This may arise in respect of
the more complex processes and technologies in the workplace, or hazards, such as
those related to health, which may not be readily or easily identifiable, and may re-
quire analysis and measurements.
After evaluating the risks, they must be prioritised. The prioritisation will de-
pend on the risk rating (high, medium, and low). This will allow to prioritise meas-
ures implemented to protect against hazards. However, as Hughes and Ferrett (2007)
put it, the time scale in which the measures are introduced will not always follow the
ratings. It may be convenient to deal with a low level risk at the same time as a high
level risk or before a medium level risk. It may also be that work on a high risk con-
trol system is delayed due to a late delivery of an essential component – this should
not halt the overall risk reduction work. It is important to maintain a continuous pro-
gramme of risk improvement rather than slavishly following a predetermined prior-
ity list. Many risk assessors seem unable to distinguish between priorities and time-
scales. The highest priority may require a complex solution and may not be able to
be undertaken for several months whereas lower priorities, such as sweeping the
floor, may be undertaken relatively quickly.
3.2.3 Deciding on preventive action
Having evaluated the risks, the next step is to put in place preventive and protective
measures. Among the things to be considered at this stage are:
Whether risks are preventable or avoidable. Is it possible to get rid of the risk?
This can be done, for instance, by (i) considering whether the task or job is nec-
essary; (ii) removing the hazard; (iii) using different substances or work proc-
esses;
Is it possible to get rid of the risk? This can be done, for instance, by (i) consid-
ering whether the task or job is necessary; (ii) removing the hazard; (iii) using
different substances or work processes.
Safety fact*
Improving health and safety need not cost a lot. For instance, placing a mirror on a dan-
gerous blind corner to help prevent vehicle accidents is a low-cost precaution consider-
ing the risks. Failure to take simple precautions can cost a lot more if an accident does
happen.
* HSE (2006)
When determining a strategy to reduce and control risks, employers should be

made aware of the following additional general principles of prevention:
Combating the risk at source;

Adapting the work to the individual, especially as regards the design of work
places, the choice of work equipment and the choice of working and production
methods, with a view, in particular, to alleviating monotonous work and work at
a predetermined work-rate and to reducing their effect on health;
Adapting to technical progress and changes in information;
Substituting the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous (replac-

ing the machine or material or other feature that introduces the hazard by an al-
ternative);
Developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, or-
ganisation of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of
factors related to a working environment;
Giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective meas-
ures (e.g., controlling exposure to fumes through local exhaust ventilation rather
than personal respirators);
Giving appropriate instruction to workers.
A detailed guidance on the reduction and control of risks through technical and
organisational measures is given in Chapters 21 and 22. Employers should also refer
to specifications in national legislation, national standards, published guidance and
other such criteria, published by national authorities.
A further important general principle of which employers need to be aware is
that they should not transfer risks. That is to say that in providing a solution to one
problem, another problem should not be created. For instance, it would be of doubt-
ful benefit to provide double-glazing to office windows in order to reduce noise
from outside, unless provisions were made for adequate ventilation.
3.2.4 Taking action
After the most appropriate preventive and protective measures have been identified,
the next step is to put them in place effectively. It is important to involve the em-
ployees in the process. Effective implementation involves the development of a plan
specifying:
The measures to be implemented,

The means allocated (time, expenses, etc.)
Who does what and when,
When actions are to be completed, and
A date for reviewing the control measures.
The involvement of employees in the process can be implemented by:
Informing them about the measures implemented, about how they will be im-
plemented, and who will be the person in charge of implementing them;
Training or instructing them about the measures or procedures that will be im-
plemented.
It is essential that any work to eliminate or prevent risks is prioritised.
Safety fact
Few workplaces stay the same. Sooner or later, new equipment, substances, and proce-
dures will be brought in or new people will be assigned to carry out operations. This
could lead to new hazards.
3.2.5 Monitoring and reviewing

The fifth step is to carry out regular checks to ensure that preventive and protective
measures are working or being implemented and to identify new problems. The as-
sessment needs to be reviewed and revised for a number of reasons, including:
The degree of the change likely in the work activity;

Changes which might alter the perception of risk in the workplace, such as a
new process, new equipment or materials, change of work organisation, and
new work situations including new workshops or other premises;
Changes in the data or information on which the assessment is based. The data
and information may no longer be valid;
The situation where the preventive and protective measures currently in place
become insufficient or no longer adequate, for instance, in case where new in-
formation becomes available regarding particular control measures;
Findings resulting from an accident or near miss (Box 1.2).
Figure 3.2 The “iceberg” of costs resulting from day-to-day workplace accidents (after HSE
2008b)
The straightforward five-step approach should work well for most businesses
especially SMEs. The risk assessment should not be an overcomplicated process. In
many organisations, the hazards are well-known and the necessary control measures
are easy to apply. It is very probable that employers already know whether, for in-
stance, they have employees who move heavy loads and so could harm their backs,
or where people are most likely to slip or trip. If so, employees have to take reason-
able precautions to avoid injury.
Safety fact*
With very few exceptions, employers have to have liability insurance cover for injuries
and ill health to their employees. They will also have insurance cover for accidents in-
volving vehicles and possibly third-party and building insurance. However, insurance
policies only cover a small proportion of the costs of accidents. Costs not covered by
insurance include:
Sick-pay,
Damage or loss of product and raw materials,
Repairs to plant and equipment,
Overtime working and temporary labour,
Production delays,
Investigation time,
Fines.
HSE studies have found that uninsured costs outweight those covered by insurance poli-
cies. In a wide range of business activities, the total uninsured losses from day-to-day
accidents ranged from twice up to 36 times the total paid in insurance premiums in the
same year. The average was around ten times the amount paid in premiums. So in some
cases, you could think of accident costs like an iceberg with the majority of the losses
uninsured and hidden below the water line (Figure 3.2).
*HSE (2008b)
3.3 The roles and responsibilities of participants

Employers should carefully prepare what they are going to do in order to meet their
responsibilities to make a risk assessment, and put in place the measures necessary
for the safety and health of workers. The employer has the final decision on the peo-
ple who will carry out risk assessments (Figure 3.3). They can be:
The employer,
Employees designated by the employer,
External assessors and services if there is a lack of competent personnel in the
company.
People designated by the employer to undertake risk assessments should be

competent. In most circumstances they do not need to be safety and health experts,
but they can demonstrate their competence by showing they have:
1 An understanding of the general approach to risk assessment;
2 The capacity to apply this to the workplace and task required; this may require:
Identifying safety and health problems,

Assessing and prioritising the need for action,
Suggesting options available to eliminate or reduce risks and their relative merit,
Evaluating their effectiveness,
promoting and communicating safety and health improvements and good prac-
tices.
3 The ability to identify situations where they would be unable to adequately as-
sess the risk without help and be able to advise on the need for further assis-
tance.
Employer External risk assessor
Undertakes risk assessment Undertakes risk assessment

Manages risks Helps to manage risks
Designates an employee
to asses risks
Undertakes risk
assessment
Workplace risk
Participates in risk assessment

Helps to implement workable preventive measures
Employee Employee’s representative Contractor
Figure 3.3 The participants of risk assessment and management process
Persons carrying out risk assessments at work should have knowledge of and/or
information on:
Hazards and risks which are already known to exist, and the way that they arise;
The materials, equipment and technology used at work;
Working procedures and organisation and interaction of workers with the mate-
rials used;
The type, likelihood, frequency, and duration of the exposure to the hazards. In
some cases this may mean the application of modern, validated techniques of
measurement;
The relation between the exposure to the hazard and its effect;
The legal standards and requirements relevant to the risks present in the work-
place;
What is regarded as good practice in areas where there are no specific legal
standards.
Employers should make sure that whoever is making the risk assessment,
whether an employee or an external consultant, speaks to the employees, or other
people such as contractors who actually carry out the work. Where employees of
different employers work in the same workplace, assessors may need to share infor-
mation about risks and health and safety measures in place to address those risks.
Facilitating this is a matter for the employer to arrange.
It is important that workers participate in risk assessment. They know the prob-
lems and the details of what really happens when they perform their tasks or activi-
ties, so they should be involved in the assessment. Their practical knowledge or
competence is also often needed to develop workable preventive measures.
The participation of workers is not only the right, it is fundamental to make the
occupational health and safety management effective and efficient. Workers and/or
their representatives have the right/duty to:
Be consulted on arrangements for the organisation of the risk assessment and

for the appointment of those undertaking the task;
Participate in risk assessment;
Alert their supervisors or employers regarding perceived risks;
Report any changes in the workplace;
Be informed of the risks to their safety and health and of the measures necessary
to eliminate or reduce these risks;
Be involved in the process of deciding on the preventive and protective meas-
ures to be put in place;
Ask the employer to put in place appropriate measures and to submit proposals
to minimise hazards or to remove the danger at source;
Cooperate to help the employer to ensure that the working environment is safe;
Be trained/receive instructions on the measures to be put in place;
Take care as far as possible of their safety and health and that of other persons
affected by their acts in accordance with the training and instructions given by
the employer.
In addition, it is important that workers representatives are trained so that they

understand risk assessment and their role in it. Risk assessment should not be carried
out by the employer or the employer’s representative working in isolation. They
should involve employees or their representatives. Workers should be consulted as a
part of the assessment process itself and given information on any conclusions
reached, as well as on the preventive measures to be taken.
Where employees from different enterprises work in the same workplace, asses-
sors from each employer may need to share information about risks and the meas-
ures needed to tackle those risks. When carrying out risk assessment, always con-
sider the potential presence at the workplace of employees from other businesses
(e.g., cleaners, private security guards, maintenance workers) or other outsiders (e.g.,
clients, visitors, “passers-by”). They should be considered as persons at risk but at-
tention should also be paid to whether their presence may introduce new risks into
the workplace.
3.4 Example risk assessment
This example of risk assessment shows the kind of approach a small business might
take. It should be used as a guide to think through some of the hazards in an individ-
ual business and the steps needed to take to control the hazard. It is not a generic risk
assessment that one can just put his/her company name on and adopt wholesale
without any thought. This would not be effective in protecting people. The following
example follows, with some modifications, materials of the Health and Safety Ex-
ecutive (HSE, see Appendix 2). This organisation is responsible for the regulation of
risks to health and safety in the United Kingdom (HSE 2006, 2008a,b). Further ex-
amples are presented by Lingard and Rowlingston (2005), Stranks (2006), Hughes
and Ferrett (2007) and the website of HSE (Appendix 2).
3.4.1 Setting the scene
The manager of a bricklaying contractor, with the help from worker representatives,
carried out a general risk assessment that covered their typical work (Figure 3.4).
This assessment was used when tendering for contracts to demonstrate the contrac-
tor’s approach to health and safety. In the tender documents the manager was clear
about what was needed from the principal contractor to do the job safely and prop-
erly. The company won a bricklaying contract for the development of a three-storey
block of flats. Work was due to start on 1 May, 2009.
3.4.2 How was the risk assessment carried out?
The manager followed the guidance to risk assessment in five steps (see “Risk
assessment in general” in the EASHW website, Appendix 2). Table 3.1 explains the
actions of the manager by implementing each of the assessment steps. The site-
specific results of risk assessment are presented in Table 3.2. A blank template for
recording the findings of risk assessment can be found in the HSE’s leaflet HSE
(2006). Table 3.3 presents a modified version of this template.
Figure 3.4 A masonry construction using scaffold for the erection of an external wall
Table 3.1 Manager’s actions at implementing the five-step risk assessment procedure (HSE
2006)
Step Action
1 To identify the hazards the manager:
Read EASHW construction webpages (Appendix 2), the European directive

92/57/EEC on safety and health on construction sites, as well as the national le-
gal and technical documents implementing this directive (Table 2.1);

Checked the manufacturers’ instructions for tools/machinery and the data sheet
for mortar;
Thought about the work on the sites;
Talked to employees to help identify the significant hazards and particular work
practices.
2 The manager wrote down who could be harmed by hazards and how.
3 For each hazard identified, the manager recorded what controls, if any, were in place
to manage these hazards. He compared these controls to the good practice guidance
laid out in the manufacturers’ instructions or the data sheets, EASHW construction
webpages, and national documents of heath and safety in construction.
4 Putting the findings of the risk assessment into practice, the manager decided and
recorded who was responsible for implementing the further actions and when they
should be done. When each action was completed it was ticked off and the date was
recorded.
5 The manager decided that for each new site he would need to make sure the assess-
ment was suitable and amend it depending on the particular work and conditions. A
review and the update of the general risk assessment would be made each year and
staff would learn from the work on different sites.
Table 3.2 Results of the site specific risk assessment (HSE 2006)
No Action
1 To turn the general risk assessment into a site-specific assessment, the manager
checked if the following had been identified:
The right hazards,

Who might be harmed and how,
Controls that would need to be taken on this particular site, and
Who would be responsible for putting the controls into practice and when.
2 The manager did this by:
Checking the construction phase plan for the site;

Looking at the general layout of the site as well as what materials were to be
used (in particular what weight of blocks and lintels), what equipment and
plant would be needed, and what general rules would need to be followed;
Visiting the site, and
Discussing the work and the site conditions and general rules with the principal
contractor’s site manager.
3 The manager made the supervisor responsible for briefing the bricklayers about the
site rules on their first day.
Table 3.3 The record of risk assessment findings (modified from HSE 2006)
Date of risk assessment: 6 March, 2009
1 What are the hazards?

1 Fall from height
2 Who might be harmed and how?
Serious injury or even fatal injury could occur if a worker falls.
3 What are you already doing?
Agree scaffolding requirements at contract stage, including appropriate load rating
and provision of loading bays;
Bricklayers’ supervisor to check with the site manager that the correct scaffold is pro-
vided and inspected;
Workers instructed not to interfere with or misuse scaffold – supervisor to keep an eye
out for problems;
Ladders in good condition, adequately secured (lashed) and placed on firm surface;
Band stands with handrails to be used for work on internal walls;
Workers trained to put up bandstands.
4 What further action is necessary?
Action 1: Scaffold requirements agreed, including loading bays and appropriate load rat-
ing.
Action 2: A supervisor has to speak regularly to a site manager to arrange scaffold altera-
tions and ensure that weekly inspections are carried out.
5 Action by whom? 6 Action done when? 7 Action done
Action 1: TB, Action 2: LG 20 March, 2009 20 March, 2009

2 Collapse of scaffold
All operatives on scaffold may incur crush injuries, or worse, if the scaffold collapses on
top of them.
Agree scaffolding requirements at contract stage, including appropriate load rating and
provision of loading bays;
Bricklayers’ supervisor to check with the site manager that the correct scaffold is pro-
vided and inspected.
A supervisor to keep a check to make sure that the scaffold is not overloaded with materi-
als.
LG From 1 May, 2009

3 Falling objects hitting the head and body, including feet
Serious head and other injuries to workers, others on site and members of the public.
Brick guards kept in position on scaffold lifts;
Waste materials removed from scaffolding and placed in skip;
Safety helmets and protective footwear (with steel toecaps and mid-soles) supplied
and worn at all times.

Supervisor to monitor use of safety hats and protective footwear.
LG From 1 May, 2009

4 Manual handling
All workers could suffer from back injury and long-term pain if regularly lifting/carrying
heavy or awkward objects.
Bricks, mortar, etc. to be transported and lifted to scaffold using telehandler provided
by principal contractor;
Provision of lifting bay agreed with principal contractor;
Bricks/blocks to be covered with tarpaulin when stored on site to prevent taking up
water;
Spot boards to be raised with blocks to easy working height;
Trolley to be used for moving loads of bricks around the scaffold lift;
Check at tender stage for any blocks or lintels over 20 kg and make arrangements.
Action 1: Heaviest blocks are 15 kg, no special arrangements necessary.
Action 2: Concrete lintels are well over 20 kg, to be positioned using telehandler (all are
accessible).
Action 3: All workers to be instructed not to carry materials up by hand.
Actions 1 to 3: VP All actions from 1 May, 2009
Action 3: LG

5 Workers struck or crushed by moving vehicles on site
Workers could suffer serious or even fatal injuries from vehicles and machines on site –
particularly when reversing.
A manager to agree safe route to work area with principal contractor based upon the
construction phase health and safety plan;
Induction to each site to be carried out for all workers on the first day.
Action 1: Safe route agreed with principal contractor.
Action 2: A supervisor to liaise with a site manager to ensure safe route stays clear.
Action 3: Instruct staff that they must never drive vehicles and plant on this site.
Action 4: High-visibility vests to be provided.
Action 5: A supervisor to check vests are worn on all sites where the principal contractor
requires them.
Action 1: TB Action 1: 20 March, 2009 Action 1: 20 March, 2009
Actions 2 to 5: LG Actions 2 to 5: from 1 May,
2009

6 Slips and trips
All workers may suffer sprains or fractures if they trip over waste including brick bands
and pallet debris. Slips at height could result in a serious fall.
Good housekeeping maintained at all times;
Waste including brick bands and pallet debris disposed of in a skip;
Safety footwear provided to all workers;
Safe route to workplace agreed with a principal contractor based on construction
phase health and safety plan.
Action 1: Temporary storage locations to be agreed with a site manager.
Action 2: A supervisor to ensure that workers wear safety footwear whenever on site.
Action 1: TB Action 1: 20 March, 2009 Action 1: 20 March, 2009
Action 2: LG Action 2: from 1 May, 2009

7 Stepping on nails and sharp objects
All workers could suffer foot injuries.
Safety boots with steel toecaps and mid-soles provided to all workers;
Waste disposed of in skips.
Action 1: Explain the need to wear safety boots and dispose of waste in skips – repeat an-
nually.
Action 2: A supervisor to check that safety boots are always worn and waste disposed of
properly.
LG 20 March, 2009 20 March, 2009

8 Hazard to eyes, cutting bricks
Bricklayers could suffer eye injury through flying brick fragments.
Safety goggles worn when breaking bricks.
Use of goggles to be monitored by a supervisor.
LG From 1 May, 2009

9 Hazardous substances, mortar
Direct skin contact with the mortar could also cause a bricklayer’s contact dermatitis and
burns.
Risk of dermatitis or cement burns and precautions explained to all workers;
Use cement or cement containing products within the use-by date;
Direct skin contact to be avoided, CE marked PVC gloves used when handling mor-
tar;
Good washing facilities on site, with hot and cold water, soap and basins large enough
to wash forearms;
Principal contractor’s first aid includes emergency eyewash.
Action 1: Training on how to treat exposure to be given to all operatives.
Action 2: A supervisor to be aware of anyone with early signs of dermatitis.
Action 1: TB, Action 2: LG From 1 May, 2009

10 Dust from cutting bricks
Dust exposure could cause silicosis.
Angle grinders replaced with block splitter, removing the risk of significant dust ex-
posure;
The use of a grinder for chasing, etc. is not needed on this work.
None
— — —

11 Operating cement mixer
Workers could be crushed or cut if the mixer topples or they get caught in moving parts.
Damage to electrics could result in a shock.
Cement mixer located on a firm, level ground;
A mixer is fully guarded and guards in place during operation;
A mixer is 110 volt and PAT tested every three months.
A supervisor to check the mixer daily for obvious damage.
LG From 1 May, 2009

12 Noise from the use of equipment, e.g., angle grinder
Workers using grinders or working near people who may suffer hearing loss.
Angle grinders replaced with a block splitter, removing high noise levels from our
work;
Construction phase plan shows other workers using grinders, etc. should not be work-
ing close enough to cause problems.
A supervisor to monitor and talk to site a manager if noisy work does start close by.
LG From 1 May, 2009

13 Vibration from the use of equipment such as an angle grinder
Exposure to vibration can lead to the development of “vibration white finger”.

Angle grinders replaced with a block splitter. No significant vibration left.
None
– – –

14 Fire or explosion
All operatives in the vicinity could suffer from smoke inhalation or burns.
A suitable fire extinguisher kept in site office and welfare block.
Good housekeeping monitored by a supervisor.
A supervisor to brief all workers on the first day on emergency arrangements agreed with
the principal contractor.
LG 1 May, 2009 1 May, 2009

15 Welfare or first aid
Good facilities help prevent dermatitis, etc.
A principal contractor will have facilities on site by the time bricklaying starts, including:
Flushing toilet;
Hot and cold running water, soap, towels and full-size washbasins;
Heated canteen with a kettle, etc.;
First-aid equipment;
A principal contractor will arrange clearing and ensure the necessary electrical and
heating safety checks are made; and
A site agent is appointed as person for the first aid.
A supervisor to brief workers on facilities and keeping them clean.
LG 1 May, 2009 1 May, 2009
Assessment review date: 25 August, 2009
3.5 Workplace risk and the risk of a major accident

The assessment of risks in the workplace must not be an overcomplicated process. In
many companies, workplace hazards are well-known and the necessary protective
measures are easy to apply. For most workplace hazards, the straightforward five-
step approach to risk assessment outlined in the previous sections should work well.
However, there are other methods which should be used for more complex risks and
circumstances. These circumstances embrace the potential accidents which can
cause harm to more than one employee and induce consequences which come out-
side an individual workplace. Such accidents are called industrial accidents
(Box 1.2).
A distinction between a workplace accident and an industrial accident is not
easy to draw. One can say that there is a grey area between consequences of the two
types of accidents (Figure 3.5). Workplace accidents are usually relatively frequent
events involving harm to one employee. Industrial accidents, on the other hand, are
infrequent (low-probability events) which may involve damage to a large number of
individuals, employees and population. However, industrial accidents may occur
without a direct harm to people. A disastrous spill of oil from the grounded Exxon
Valdez tanker in 1989 is a well-known example of the latter type of accident (e.g.,
Skinner and Reilly 1989). The “anatomy” of industrial accidents is discussed in the
next chapter and Chapters 20 and 23. At his point, one can only say that the risk
posed by the possibility of an industrial accident may be much more complex and
difficult to assess than the risk of a workplace accident. The simple five-step ap-
proach described in Section 3.2 will be insufficient in case of most types of indus-
trial accidents.
Workplace accident Major industrial accident
Qualitative risk analysis can be Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is

sufficient necessary
Harm to an individual Harm to more than one individual

Damage to the workplace Damage to the plant, population and
environment
Figure 3.5 Two opposite cases of an Accidents: workplace accident and major industrial
accident
An assessment of risk posed by industrial accidents is the subject of a widely-

developed methodology known as the quantitative risk analysis (QRA) or probabil-
istic risk assessment (PRA) (Kumamoto and Henley 1996, Ayyub 2003). Methodo-
logical tools of QRA are highly sophisticated and, one can argue, still under devel-
opment (e.g., Aven 2003). Formally, QRA can be applied to the assessment of
simple workplace risks (e.g., Chapter 5 in Lingard and Rowlingston 2005). However,
the qualitative risk assessment within the five-step approach will be the simplest and
least costly method to assess workplace risks (Box 3.1). It can be used in cases
where the level and complexity of risks do not warrant the cost involved in applying
a detailed QRA. The qualitative risk analysis can also be used as an initial screening
method, to identify risks which require more thorough analysis, or where numerical
data are so inaccurate as to render QRA meaningless.

1 What is the purpose and main principles of an assessment of occupational risks?
2 Briefly explain the five steps of the risk assessment procedure used in European coun-
tries.
3 What is the average ratio of the total uninsured costs of day-to-day occupational acci-
dents to the costs of accidents covered by insurance policies?
4 Who can carry out the risk assessment in your company?
5 What is the role of employees and their representatives in the risk assessment process?
6 Differentiate between quantitative and qualitative risk analysis.
7 Why does the quantitative risk analysis prevail in the assessment of risks posed by in-
dustrial accidents?
4 Industrial disasters encountered in the past 53
4 INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS ENCOUNTERED IN THE PAST

Natural and industrial (technological) disasters are complex phenomena which occur
when community and/or business suffer exceptional, non-routine levels of disruption
and loss. A disaster is an event, concentrated in time and space, in which community
and business experience severe danger and disruption of its essential functions, ac-
companied by human, material, or environmental losses. These losses often exceed
the ability of community or business to cope without external assistance.
Industrial disasters are man-made accidents because the trigger event arises
from human actions or inactions when dealing with hazardous technologies. The
term “technology” is applied in different ways ranging from a single toxic chemical
to an entire industry, like nuclear power. In this textbook, an industrial disaster is
defined as an accidental failure rooted in design or management of industrial proc-
esses, transport systems and large-scale structures.
A synonym term used to denote an industrial disaster is “major accident”
(Box 1.2). A universal and detailed definition (definition in quantitative terms, say)
of a major accident does not exist. In the European Union, the Seveso II Directive
introduced to control major industrial hazards provides quantitative scale for mini-
mum criteria of accident consequences which allow a distinction between a major
and non-major accident (EC 1997, Kirchsteiger 1999).
This chapter describes a selection of “headline” or “milestone” accidents in an
attempt to provide lessons which can be learned from these events. Despite the vari-
ety of locations, intended activities and causes of the accidents, there is a similarity
between basic salient features of these events and an overlap of lessons which can be
learned.
4.1 Flixborough
In Flixborough, North East England, on 1 June, 1974, there was a massive explosion
(Box 4.1). A cloud containing an estimated 30 tonnes of fuel, mostly cyclohexane,
which was mixed with the air above Nypro chemical plant has been ignited (Venart
2004, Høiset et al. 2000). The immediate and secondary effects of this explosion led
to 28 deaths, many major injuries, and the virtual demolition of the site. Many inju-
ries and much of structural damage to dwellings and other property were experi-
enced off-site. The fires burned for ten days. Bodies were still recovered from the
debris after fourteen days. The fire-fighting was on the same scale as that of the
largest wartime fires in London (Kirchsteiger et al. 1998: 72).
The Flixborough plant included large liquid filled reactors in which cyclohex-
ane was oxidised in the presence of a catalyst (Figure 4.1). The reaction was incom-
plete and so six reactors R1 to R6 were used in series, each overflowing into the next
(lower) reactor through a short connecting pipe. There was a large recycle stream by
which outflow from the train of reactors returned as inflow. A typical molecule
passed through the reactor series more than once before conversation to the oxida-
tion products. The amount of reacting material was much larger than would have
been necessary in a more effective reaction system.
Box 4.1: the explosion in Flixborough

Date: 1 June, 1974
Process: liquid phase oxidation of hydrocarbon
Location: North East England, the United King-
dom
Accident: massive explosion
Fatalities: 28
Injuries: 36
Critical event: loss of containment of about 30 tonnes
of hydrocarbon
The reaction conditions were not extreme. The normal operating temperature
was around 220ºC and the normal operating pressure was less than 9 bar (900 kPa).
However, the material processed in reactors was flammable and was being contained
as a liquid above its normal boiling point. In these conditions, a leak could produce a
large release because of the rapid liquid outflow at the leak site. A spontaneous va-
porisation of the spilled material could generate a large flammable cloud.
Figure 4.1 The six reactors and their connections of the Nypro (UK) Ltd chemical plant dur-
ing the construction of the Section 25A of the plant before reactors were insulated (Venart
2004)
After one of the reactors cracked, it was decided to temporarily replace the
faulty reactor with a “bypass” pipe. The bypass was quickly built and installed (Fig-
ure 4.2). The bypass had been operated successfully for two months prior to the dis-
aster. To allow for thermal expansion and because each reactor was fixed in the
place, the short interconnecting pipes, which joint the outlet nozzle of the reactor R4
to the inlet nozzle of the reactor R6, were fitted with bellows B4 and B6 (Figure 4.2).
A bellows is a special section of a pipe with a flexible corrugated wall which is able
to accommodate changes in axial length. The interconnections were horizontal but
the bypass was constructed with a sloped middle section in order to bridge the verti-
cal shift between the nozzles. The unbalanced horizontal forces that result from such
an arrangement led to stresses on the bellows and bypass arrangement for which it
was not designed.
Figure 4.2 The reactors R4 and R6 with the temporary bypass and liquid levels at full
reactions (B4 and B6 denote scaffolding bellows) (Teng-Yang et al. 2000)
Figure 4.3 Bird’s eye view of the part of the Nypro (UK) Ltd chemical plant after the
explosion
The catastrophe was initiated by a rupture of the bypass at the upstream bellows
(Venart 2004). The initiation of this failure may have been fatigue of the B4 bellows.
The rupture caused an accidental release of cyclohexane and subsequent formation
of vapour cloud containing about 30 tonnes of this chemical. The time elapsed be-
tween the rupture and the explosion was 45 seconds (Casal 2008: 128). It has been
estimated that at the time of explosion the cloud had a volume of 400 000 m3 and an
average concentration of 2%. The cloud exploded causing 28 fatalities, the near total
destruction of the 24 hectare plant, severe injury to the population outside the plant,
and severe damage to many structures in the surrounding countryside (Figures 4.3
and 4.4). The debris of the explosion was scattered 32 km away.
The scale of the disaster can be appreciated from photographs taken soon after
the explosion and shown in Figure 4.4. Reactors R4 and R6 after the explosion are
shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.4 Damage to the main office building (upper photograph) and the car park to the
east of the main office building (lower photograph) (Venart 2004)
Figure 4.5 Reactors R4 and R6 after the explosion (Venart 2004)
4.2 Seveso
Near Seveso, located 24 km from Milan in Northern Italy, a “runaway” reaction oc-
curred in a small pharmaceuticals plant owned by ICMESA company (Box 4.2). The
reaction produced heat and the heat promoted the reaction leading to increased pres-
sure in the reactor. A pressure release device operated and the contents of the reactor
were vented to atmosphere. Earlier that day, the intended process of the plant had
been interrupted at the end of the working week. A batch of material thought by per-
sonnel to be stable had been left inside the reactor with the intention to resume the
operations later. After several hours of intentional operations, the reactor vented and
caused an escape of toxic material. It is believed that 6 tonnes of material were dis-
tributed over the area greater than 18 km2 (Figure 4.6) (Lees 2001: Volume 3, Ap-
pendix 3).
Box 4.2: the toxic release in Seveso

Date: 10 July, 1976
Process: batch chemistry
Location: Northern Italy
Accident: toxic release
Fatalities: no direct human fatalities, a number of
abortions
Injuries: more than 500 evacuations exceeding
six months
Critical event: loss of containment of a reaction mass
including about 2 kg of
tetrachloro-dibenzo-para-dioxin
Figure 4.6 A simplified plan of the area affected by the Seveso accident
About two kilograms of materials, among several tonnes stored inside the reac-
tor, could have been converted to TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetra-chloro-dibenzo-para-dioxin).

TCDD is one of a series of ultra-toxic materials commonly called dioxins. This ma-
terial is solid at ambient conditions. The released TCDD deposited on vegetation
across a large area of land. Other reactor contents were discharged too.
The affected area was split into zones A, B and R in decreasing order of surface
soil concentrations of TCDD (Figure 4.6):
Zone A had a TCDD soil concentration exceeding 50 micrograms per square

metre (µg/m²), it had 736 residents.
Zone B had a TCDD soil concentration of between 5 and 50 µg/m², it had about
4700 residents.
Zone R had negligible or a TCDD soil concentration less than 5 µg/m², it had
31 800 residents.
No human deaths were attributed to TCCD but many people suffered various
symptoms of poisoning. 15 children were quickly hospitalised with skin inflamma-
tion. By the end of August Zone A had been completely evacuated and fenced, 1600
people of all ages had been examined and 447 were found to suffer from skin lesions
or chloracne. An advice centre was set up for pregnant women of which several
opted for an abortion, which was legal in special cases, after consultation.
Within days a total of 3300 animals were found dead, mostly poultry and rabbits.
Emergency slaughtering commenced to prevent TCDD from entering the food chain,
by 1978 over 80 000 animals had been slaughtered.
Over the next few days following the release there was much confusion due to
the lack of communication between the company and the authorities in dealing with
this type of situation. At least a week passed before it was publicly stated that dioxin
had been emitted and another week passed before evacuation began. Few scientific
studies had confirmed the level of danger TCDD posed and there were scant indus-
trial regulations to be followed. As a result the local population was caught unaware
when the accident happened and in such an insecure situation became very fright-
ened. Confrontation with an invisible poison possibly extremely hazardous to human
health was a very traumatic experience for small rural communities.
A particular feature of the Seveso accident is that the material of most concern
was normally present in the process equipment in trace quantities only. One of the
lessons learned from this disaster is the need to consider hazards from substances
which can be formed during a foreseeable malfunction of equipment. Another im-
portant lesson is, obviously, the need of planning for emergencies.
The Seveso disaster was so named because Seveso, a small town with the popu-
lation of 17 000 in 1976, was the community most affected among several
neighbourhood communities. The recognition that industrial activities could present
hazards on the scale of Seveso accident and the recognition of poor level of preven-
tion, preparedness and response that existed led directly to industrial safety regula-
tions passed in the European Community in 1982 and called the Seveso Directive. It
imposed harsh industrial regulations. The Seveso Directive was updated in 1997,
amended again in 2003 and is currently referred to as the Seveso II Directive (EC
1997, 2003).
4.3 Bhopal
The Bhopal disaster was an industrial accident that took place at the Union Carbide
pesticide plant in the city of Bhopal, India (Box 4.3). On 3 December, 1984 the plant
released 42 tonnes of toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas, exposing more than
500 000 people to toxic gases. The first official immediate death toll was 2259. A
more probable figure is that 8000 died within two weeks, and it is estimated that an
additional 8000 have died from gas-related diseases. 200 000 people voluntarily mi-
grated. The Bhopal disaster is frequently cited as the world’s worst industrial disas-
ter.
The plant produced the pesticide carbonyl (trademark Sevin). Methyl isocyanate
(MIC), an intermediate in carbaryl manufacture, was also used. In 1979 a plant was
added to the site for producing MIC. MIC was used instead of less toxic (but more
expensive) materials. The corporation was aware of the substance properties and
how it had to be handled.
MIC is a common industrial chemical in the production of pesticides, but it has

qualities that make it hazardous. Firstly, it is extremely volatile and vaporises easily.
Since MIC can boil at the temperature as low as 38ºC, it is important to it to be kept
cool. Secondly, MIC is active chemically and reacts violently with water. Thirdly,
MIC is highly toxic, perhaps it is one hundred times more lethal than cyanide and
more dangerous than phosgene, a poison used in World War I. Fourthly, MIC is
heavier than air and, when released, stays near ground level.
Box 4.3: the disaster in Bhopal

Date: 3 December, 1984
Process: pesticide production
Location: India
Accident: toxic release
Fatalities: 1754 immediate, more than 2000 de-
layed
Injuries: more than 20 000 hospitalised, more
than 50 000 minor injuries
Critical event: loss of containment of 42 tonnes of
methyl iso-cyanate
During the night of December 2–3, 1984, large amounts of water entered tank
610, containing 42 tonnes of methyl isocyanate. The resulting reaction increased the
temperature inside the tank to over 200°C. This temperature raised the pressure to a
level the tank was not designed to withstand. This forced the emergency venting of
pressure from the MIC holding tank and a release of a large volume of toxic gases.
The reaction sped up because of the presence of iron in corroding non-stainless steel
pipelines. A mixture of poisonous gases flooded the city of Bhopal, causing great
panic as people woke up with a burning sensation in their lungs (Figure 4.7). Thou-
sands died immediately from the effects of the gas and many were trampled in the
panic.
An investigative report indicated that the safety devices failed through a combi-
nation of faulty engineering and inadequate maintenance although the corporation
claimed that the cause was sabotage by a “disgruntled worker” who introduced wa-
ter directly into the tank. A contributory factor was that air conditioning system,
normally used to keep MIC cool, was shut down at the time of the accident. It is
likely that the real trigger of this disaster will never be known but safety was inade-
quate. For instance, the Bhopal plant lacked the computerised warning and fail-safe
system used in corporation’s factories in the United States.
The factors which contributed to the Bhopal disaster were the deficiencies in the
Bhopal plant design and management. The deficiencies of the plant design can be
summarised as:
Figure 4.7 The spread of MIC gas during the Bhopal disaster (retrieved from Safety Blog®,
see Appendix 2)
Choosing a hazardous method of manufacturing pesticides, first and foremost,

the use of MIC instead of less dangerous chemicals;
Large-scale storage of MIC before selling;
Location close to a densely populated area;
Underdimensioning of the safety features;

Dependence on manual operations.
The deficiencies in the management of the plant can be summarised as:
Lack of skilled operators due to the staffing policy;

Reduction of safety management due to reducing the staff;
Insufficient maintenance of the plant;
Lack of emergency response plans.
Plant design and economic pressures to reduce expenses contributed most to the
actual leak. The problem was made worse by the location of the plant near a densely
populated area, non-existent catastrophe plans, shortcomings in healthcare and
socio-economic rehabilitation, etc. Analysis shows that the parties responsible for
the magnitude of the disaster are the two owners, Union Carbide Corporation and
the Government of India, and to some extent, the local government of Indian state
Madhya Pradesh.
More clearly than earlier accidents, the Bhopal disaster pointed to the benefits
of inherently safer approaches in chemical production. The material released during
this accident was a hazardous intermediate, the storage of which was convenient but
not essential. Intermediates in a chemical process are typically more reactive than
associated raw materials and products. It is often this reactivity which makes the
intermediate so useful in accomplishing chemical reactions. At the same time, in-
termediates are often more dangerous due to flammability and toxicity which often
accomplish the reactivity.
In the aftermath of Bhopal disaster, the bulk storage of MIC around the world
has been drastically reduced. The storage was replaced by facilities which process
small quantities of MIC in transit by a pipe from a producing unit to a consuming
unit. Alternative routes to chemical production using less hazardous intermediates
were promoted.
4.4 Piper Alpha
Piper Alpha was a gas platform in the North Sea section of the United Kingdom
(Figure 4.8). The platform began production in 1976, first as an oil platform and
then later converted to gas production. An explosion and resulting fire destroyed it
late on 6 July, 1988, killing 167 men, with only 59 survivors (Box 4.4). The death
toll includes 2 crewmen of a rescue vessel. Total insured loss was about £1,7 billion
(US$3,4 billion). To date it is the world’s worst offshore disaster in terms both of
lives lost and impact on industry. At the time of the disaster the platform accounted
for around 10% of the oil and gas production from the North Sea.
Figure 4.8 Piper Alpha platform before the accident
The platform belonged to oil and gas production area (the Piper Field) consist-
ing of the fields Piper, Claymore and Tartan, each with its own platform (Figure 4.9).
To receive and process oil from these fields, the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkney
Islands. One 30 inch (0,762 m) diameter main oil pipeline ran 128 miles (206 kilo-
metres) from Piper Alpha to Flotta, with a short oil pipeline from the Claymore plat-
form joining it some twenty miles (32 km) to the west. The Tartan field also fed oil
to Claymore and then onto the main line to Flotta. Separate 46 cm diameter gas
pipelines run from Piper to the Tartan platform, and from Piper to the gas compress-
ing platform MCP-01 some 30 miles (48 km) to the Northwest.
Box 4.4: the disaster of Piper Alpha platform

Date: 6 July, 1988
Process: oil and gas production and separation
Location: North Sea, the sector of the United
Kingdom
Accident: a series of explosions, fire, and fireballs
Fatalities: 167
Injuries: not reported
Critical event: loss of containment of less than 100 kg
of hydrocarbons (“condensate”)
From Frigg field
MCP-01
18'' gas, 33,5 miles

Gas to St
Fergus
To Flotta terminal 30'' oil, 127 miles
30'' oil P ip e r
16'' gas, 21,5 miles A lp h a
Claymore
18'' gas, 11,5 miles
24'' oil
Tartan
Figure 4.9 The Piper Field of oil and gas extraction and processing located about 120 miles
north-east of Aberdeen (British North Sea section)
On 6 July, 1988 work began on one of two condensate-injection pumps, desig-

nated A and B, which were used to compress gas in the gas compression module of
the platform prior to transport of the gas to Flotta (module C, Figure 4.10). A pres-
sure safety valve was removed from compressor A for maintenance and two blind
flanges were fitted onto the open pipework. Then the dayshift crew finished for the
day.
North
Radio
room
Helideck _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (174')
Derrick
East
Add. acc. replace-
east ment
HP flare
quarters Turbine exhausts
LP flare Utility
module Submodule
Drilling deck (107')
A: B: C: gas D:
wellheads separation compression generation Production deck (84')
Flare boom
DSF _ _ _ _ _ (68')
Heat shield Gas conservation
module
Produced water & hydrocarbon
packages
Figure 4.10 The east elevation of the Piper Alpha platform (after Drysdale and Sylvester-
Evans 1998)
During the evening of 6 July, pump B tripped and the nightshift crew decided
that pump A should be brought back into service. Once the pump was operational,
gas condensate leaked from the two blind flanges and, at around 22:00, the gas ig-
nited and exploded, causing fires and damage to other areas with the further release
of gas and oil (Drysdale and Sylvester-Evans 1998). Some twenty minutes later, the
Tartan gas riser failed and a second major explosion occurred followed by wide-
spread fire. Fifty minutes later, at around 22:50, the MCP-01 gas riser failed result-
ing in a third major explosion. Then further explosions ensued, followed by the
eventual structural collapse of a significant proportion of the installation (Fig-
ure 4.11).
Figure 4.11 The remains of the Piper Alpha platform after the accident
A number of factors contributed to the severity of of the incident (Paté-Cornell

1993, Kirchsteiger et al. 1998: 89):
The presence of fire walls and the lack of blast walls – the fire walls predated
the installation of the gas conversion equipment and were not upgraded to blast
walls after the conversion.
The practice of disarming the automatic fire-fighting pumps during diving op-
erations. The pumps were designed to suck in large amounts of sea water in or-
der to extinguish any fires. These pumps had an automatic control which would
start them in case of fire. However, the fire-fighting system was under manual
control on the evening of 6 July.
The continued pumping of gas and oil by the Tartan and Claymore platforms,
which was not shut down due to a perceived lack of authority, even though per-
sonnel could see Piper Alpha burning.
The breakdown of the chain of command and lack of any communication to the
platform crew.
The fire-walls between the modules of the Piper Alpha platform intended to de-
lay the spread of fire, were destroyed by the initial explosion and became missiles.
This magnified the damage of the initial explosion, destroyed much of the accident
mitigation equipment and severed fuel pipes which contributed to subsequent fires.
The defence against fire thus became a contributory factor in the escalation of an
explosion.
The practice of disarming the automatic fire-fighting pumps during diving op-
erations had developed in the operation of the platform. The hazard to divers, who
could be trapped at the suction to the pumps in the event of false alarms, has been a
factor in developing this practice. Another contributory factor was the vulnerability
of the fire-fighting system. The four pipes intended to carry fire-fighting water when
required were severed in the initial explosion. The fire-fighting system regarded as a
substantial protection, in prospect, probed to be useless in the accident. This illus-
trates the need for diversity in protective systems. This diversity renders the protec-
tion less vulnerable to defeat by a single event (explosion, say).
The immediate loss of communication following the initial explosion was criti-
cal. Piper Alpha was linked to other platforms in the oil field by pipelines of oil gas
(Figure 4.9). From and through these platforms, the fuel flowed to Piper Alpha dur-
ing the disaster. Continued communications could have prompted actions on other
platforms to limit the fuel entering Piper Alpha and could have allowed the reap-
praisal of the situation by those aboard.
The disabling of the control and response systems on board of Piper Alpha,
combined with the heat and black smoke from fires following the initial explosion,
led to almost complete paralysis of organised actions on board of the platform.
Many of those who survived did so because they acted outside the recommended
procedures. These procedures were inappropriate to the scale of the accident. The
main problem was that most of the personnel who had the authority to order evacua-
tion were killed when the first explosion destroyed the control room. This was a
consequence of the platform design, including the absence of blast walls.
4.5 Toulouse
In Toulouse, France, a massive explosion of ammonium nitrate (AN) occured on 21
September, 2001 in AZF (Azote de France), a plant belonging to TotalFinaElf
Group (Dechy et al. 2004, Cahen 2006). The manufactured chemicals in the plant
were mainly ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate-based fertilisers, and other
chemicals including chlorinated compounds. This explosion was the biggest indus-
trial disaster in France and one of the biggest in the modern history of industry
world-wide (Box 4.5).
Box 4.5: the explosion in Toulouse

Date: 21 September, 2001
Process: manufacturing of fertilisers
Location: France
Accident: massive explosion
Fatalities: 30
Injuries: 2242
Critical event: explosion of ammonium nitrate
Figure 4.12 Bird’s eye view on the AZF plant and nearby Toulouse city after the explosion
(Dechy et al. 2004)
The explosion in Toulouse was similar by its cause and extent to another “mile-
stone” major accident, the 1921 explosion at the Oppau nitrogen works in Germany,
with over 500 dead. (e.g., Baker et al. 1983: 181). The AZF plant was located in the
suburbs of Toulouse and the extend of damage was very large both on and off site
with a cost estimated by insurers of €1500 million (Figure 4.12) (Dechy et al. 2004).
The explosion produced a crater of about 65 m × 54 m in plan and 7 m in depth
(Figure 4.13). The TNT equivalent mass of the explosion was estimated to be in the
range of 20…40 tonnes. The explosion produced a seismic wave which was esti-
mated at 3,4 on the Richter’s scale. The shock wave broke windows within a dis-
tance of approximately 3 km. The explosion killed 30 persons (22 employees and 8
persons outside the plant) and up to 30 persons were injured. One of the dead was a
15-year-old boy from a neighbouring school. 5079 persons were treated due to stress.
Two chimneys collapsed and all what remained from the halls at the centre of
the explosion was the crater. The blast from the explosion was sufficient to send cars
flying into the air, causing a nearby shopping centre to collapse and severily damag-
ing all building in the surrounding area. The explosion affected the electricity distri-
bution system. Windowpanes of more than 11 000 homes and public buildings were
broken. The explosion also affected two other chemical plants in the vicinity of the
AZF plant.
The explosion resulted in a panic in the city centre some 3 km from the explo-
sion centre. The telephone network collapsed as a huge orange coloured cloud of gas,
smelling ammonia, moved towards the city centre. Gas masks were distributed in the
city centre and the metro system of Toulouse was evacuated. The city council issued
a warning that people should stay indoors and close their windows. This was a prob-
lem for those whose windows had already been shattered.
Figure 4.13 The crater made by the explosion of the AZF plant in Toulouse (Cahen 2006)
The explosion took place in the warehouse (hangar 221) between process plants,
storage and packaging areas for AN. The warehouse was used as a temporary stor-
age of downgraded (off-sepcs) AN-based fertilisers (materials which do not fulfil the
requirements, for instance, are impure, undersized, returned from customers, pro-
duced in start-ups and shuts-downs, production tests). These products had unaccept-
able properties and were aimed to recycling an AN fertiliser process. Is is estimated
that about 390…450 tonnes of downgraded AN were stored on the day of explosion.
The warehouse had no gas supply, no stream pipes and only natural light and was
supervised by dispatch department. Three different subcontracting companies
worked for the handling of the downgraded AN to the storage, but no one was in the
storage warehouse at the time of the explosion.
There is a controversy on the direct cause of the Toulouse explosion. One of the
investigations of the accident showed that the warehouse of AN had exploded due to
improper handling of this material including mixing with chemical impurities. Spe-
cifically it is believed that a mislabelled bin of 500 kg of sodium dichloroisocyenate
mistakenly thought to be AN was dumped in the warehouse. Here, under sufficiently
hot and humid conditions, it could have reacted with AN to form nitrogen trichloride
which is an exceedingly unstable compound. The decomposition of the nitrogen tri-
chloride could have provided the heat and pressure necessary to detonate AN which
requires detonators when used as an industrial explosive. The TotalFinaElf company
considers a huge electric arc as the trigger of the explosion. The arc could have
spanned between a transformer on the site of a nearby explosives factory and an
electric line.
When the AZF plant was first established in 1924, its site was far removed from
the city. During the expansion of the Toulouse urban area, houses as well as social
and business activities came closer and closer to the AZF plant. At the time of the
accident, 1130 inhabitants were inside the lethal zone (900 m) and 16 000 inside the
zone of irreversible damage to humans (1600 m). One of the lessons following from
the Toulouse disaster is that reducing risks in the plant (on-site risks) is not suffi-
cient to control major hazards. The safety goals must be achieved by promoting and
planning urban areas which engulf industrial sites (individual plants and clusters of
factories). Land use planning with respect to major accident hazards is one of the
important requirements of the Seveso II Directive (Cahen 2006, Cozzani et al. 2006).
In the aftermath of the accident in Toulouse, the French authorities revised the legis-
lation on land use planning. The main lesson learned from the disaster is that the
consequences of the worst-case scenario of a potential accident can be prevented by
maintaining appropriate distances around hazardous industrial sites and prepared-
ness for an accident (Cahen 2006).
It must be noted that the AZF plant was fully covered by the Seveso II Directive.
The company running the plant was certified with both ISO 9000 and ISO 14000
standards but this did not help to prevent the accident.
4.6 Texas City

In Texas City, Texas, USA, a fire and explosion on the isomerisation plant (ISOM)
at the refinery owned and operated BP Products North America killed 15 people and
injured 170 people (Boxes 4.6 and 4.7).
Box 4.6: the explosion in BP refinery in Texas City

Date: 23 March, 2005
Process: manufacturing of fertilisers
Location: Texas City, Texas, the United States
Accident: major fire and explosion
Fatalities: 15
Injuries: 170
Critical event: explosion caused by heavier–than-air
hydrocarbon vapours mixed with air
It is believed that the accident was initiated by overfilling a raffinate splitter

with liquid, overheating of the liquid and the subsequent overpressurisation and
pressure relief (Figure 4.14 and Box 4.7). Hydrocarbon flow to the blowdown drum
and stack overwhelmed it, resulting in liquids carrying over out of the top of the
stack, flowing down the stack, accumulating on the ground (Figure 4.15 and
Box 4.7). A flammable vapour cloud was formed and was ignited by an abandoned
white pickup truck with the ignition on. The report of the accident investigation
identified numerous failings in equipment, risk management, staff management,
working culture at the site, maintenance and inspection and general health and safety
assessments (Mogford 2005).
Box 4.7: terms related to the equipment involved in the BP accident*

Isometrisation (ISOM): a reaction which catalytically converts straight chain
hydrocarbon molecules into branched-chain molecules of substantially higher
octane number; the reaction rearranges the carbon skeleton of a molecule with-
out adding or removing anything from the original material.
Raffinate spliter: vertical distillation column used to separate the light from
heavy raffinate (a non-aromatic, primary straight-chain hydrocarbon mixture).
Blowdown drum: separators or accumulators used to separate liquids and va-

pours in pressure-relieving and emergency systems.
Blowdown stack: venting equipment which can release build-ups of dangerous

liquid or vapour in an emergency.
* Baker et al. (2007)
Figure 4.14 Raffinate splitter in the BP refinery (Mogford 2005)

Figure 4.15 Blowdown drum and ISOM unit after the accident (Mogford 2005)
At least two witnesses, who saw vapours and liquid emerging approximately 20
ft above the top of the stack “like a geyser” and running down and pooling around
the base of the blowdown drum & stack, issued radio messages. Vapours were seen
evaporating from the liquid pool. The high level alarm in the blowdown drum &
stack alarmed for the first time at 13:20.
Alerted by the radio messages and the shouting of at least one eyewitness, sev-
eral personnel in the area of the ISOM left the immediate vicinity before the vapours
ignited. The evacuation alarm was not sounded. At least one witness saw a pickup
truck parked just to the north of the Blowdown Drum & Stack with its engine racing
and exhaust glowing, but it is not known if this was the source of ignition. Several
witnesses described two or more explosions; the first minor explosion(s) followed
rapidly by a louder, more powerful blast at approximately 13:20, although subse-
quent modelling suggests that there was only one explosion. The explosion severely
damaged several trailers on the west side of the ISOM, and resulted in 15 fatalities
and over 170 individuals harmed. The exact number of injuries is difficult to ascer-
tain as some contractors and members of the public sought medical attention directly
without involving site first-aiders. The blast resulted in damage to the ISOM, caus-
ing a number of secondary hydrocarbon releases and fires. Aerial views of the dam-
age are shown in Figures 4.16 to 4.19.
Figure 4.16 Northeast view on the isometrisation plant after the accident (Mogford 2005)
Figure 4.17 Northeast view on the isometrisation plant after the accident (Mogford 2005)
Figure 4.18 The view on the destroyed trailers to the west of the isometrisation plant
(US CSHIB 2007)
Figure 4.19 Destroyed trailers to the west of the blowdown drum indicated by the red arrow
(US CSHIB 2007)

1 Which industrial accident remains the world’s deadliest industrial disaster?
2 What initiated the accident known as Flixborough explosion?

3 How is the accident near Italian town Seveso related to the European Seveso II direc-
tive?
4 How many people died in the Piper Alpha accident and what is the insured loss of this
accident?
5 Explain briefly the circumstances of the initiation of the Piper Alpha accident.
6 Briefly describe the biggest industrial disaster in the history of French industry.
7 What was the critical event of the disaster which occurred in Texas City in 2007?

Business of Safety Managing Occupational and Industrial Risks Textbook - PART - 1

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The business of safety The business of safety

Managing occupational and

Managing occupational and industrial risks

Egidijus Rytas Vaidogas

The business of safety

Vilnius “Technika” 2010

Egidijus Rytas Vaidogas. The business of safety. Managing occupational and

The textbook had been reccomended for publishing

Alphabetical list of reviewers:

Prof. A. V. Rutkauskas, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University

The book 1108-S of the stock of training and methodical

© Vaidogas, E. R., 2010

4.1 FLIXBOROUGH ............................................................................................. 53

7 MECHANICAL HAZARDS AND MACHINE SAFEGUARDING................. 100

11.1 ELECTRICAL SHOCK ................................................................................... 137

13.3 DYNAMIC PRESSURE HAZARDS .................................................................. 172

17 HAZARDS IN WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENTS ........................................ 211

PART III DEALING WITH ACCIDENTS............................................................ 249

23.1 PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................ 304

In the modern competitive environment, the productivity can no longer be end-

Less wastage of resources, less down time, higher process yields,

Focusing on the primary problem, namely, occupational and industrial hazards

Railway accident, Canada 1899

1 SAFETY VERSUS BUSINESS PROFIT

Costs of accident prevention,

Box 1.1: some basic definitions and the main abbreviation

Welfare: the provision of facilities to maintain health and well-being of individu-

Occupational safety and health (OSH): a cross-disciplinary area concerned with

Risk assessment: evaluating the significance of a risk, either quantitatively or

* DiBerardinis (1999), Stranks (2002), Koren (2005)

The moral consideration has developed because massive numbers of accidental

7,6 million workplace accidents in total,

Box 1.2: definitions related to the term “accident”*

Workplace (occupational) accident: an accidental injury to a person which oc-

Major industrial accident: an event including, in particular, a major emission,

* DiBerardinis (1999), Stranks (2002), Koren (2005)

and management must be a fundamental element of the engineering and managerial

All accidents represent varying degrees of loss to an organisation. Costs arising

The total costs of workplace accidents vary considerably between employing

* Kumamoto and Henley (1996: 573), see Appendix 2 for abbreviations

A plant shutdown due to a major accident is a depressing event. A plant shut

Helps demonstrate that a business is socially responsible,

Figure 1.1 Benefits of good OSH (EASHW 2007h)

Box 1.3: OSH management system*

Commitment and leadership to improve OSH,

Effective risk control measures,

Improvements in the image, brand value, and reputation of the enterprise,

Including OSH in wider corporate governance initiatives,

Ensuring OSH risks are adequately addressed by contractors and suppliers,

Whether your enterprise is a small or a large company, implementing an efficient OSH

Enhancing the levels of motivation, cooperation and morale in the workforce,

It is illegal for enterprises to operate without adequate insurance cover, but

Do your customers, investors or banks expect a responsible and properly risk-

1.4 Review questions and exercises

Box 2.1: the main European institutions in brief

Regulation (a legislative act of the Union which becomes immediately enforce-

Table 2.1 European directives concerning the protection of workers*

1 Health and safety at work

5 Machines products and apparatus

5 Machines products and apparatus

The framework directive serves as a basis for daughter directives covering,

The framework directive can be characterised as follows:

2 The directive defines the terms “worker”, “employer”, “workers’ representa-