r

Critical Notice/Etude critique

A Role for Reason in Science*

JONATHAN Y. TSOU University of Chicago

1. Introduction
Michael Friedman's Dynamics of Reason is a welcome contribution to the
ongoing articulation of philosophical perspectives for understanding the
sciences in the context of post-positivist philosophy of science. Two per-
spectives that have gained advocacy since the demise of the "received
view" are Quinean naturalism and Kuhnian relativism. In his 1999 Stan-
ford lectures, Friedman articulates and defends a neo-Kantian perspec-
tive for philosophy of science that opposes both of these perspectives. His
proffered neo-Kantian perspective is presented within the context of the
problem of theory change or "scientific revolutions," and its main feature
is a conception of scientific knowledge that requires "relativized constitu-
tive a priori principles." The lectures make up the first part of the book;
the second part of the book, "Fruits of Discussion," is a further elabora-
tion and defence of the ideas advanced in the lectures. The resulting book
serves as a useful sequel to Friedman's impressive historical studies in Foun-

* Michael Friedman, Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford

University (Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2001), xiv + 141 pp. Page refer-
ences in the text refer to this book unless otherwise noted.

Dialogue XLII (2003), 573-98

© 2003 Canadian Philosophical Association/Association canadienne de philosophie

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 574 Dialogue

dations of Space-Time Theories (1983), Kant and the Exact Sciences

(1992), and Reconsidering Logical Positivism (1999). In the preface, Fried-
man tells us that this book represents the philosophical viewpoint that he
has arrived at as a result of completing these works (pp. xi-xii). As such,
it is not surprising that the prominent themes of the book are ones that
have occupied Friedman's attention in the past, viz., the importance of a
priori principles in the exact sciences (Part 1, §3; Part 2, §§1-2), the con-
ventionalism of the logical positivists (Part 1, §2; Part 2, §4), and, more
generally, an articulation of what remains defensible in neo-Kantian phi-
losophy of science.
The aim of this article is to explicate Friedman's proposed perspective
and to evaluate his arguments against Quinean naturalism and Kuhnian
relativism, respectively. I begin by examining the positivist considerations
that motivate Friedman's neo-Kantian perspective. In particular, I exam-
ine Reichenbach's pre-conventionalist views on physics and Carnap's phi-
losophy of linguistic frameworks focusing on the relativized a priori
articulated in these works. I subsequently examine Friedman's assimila-
tion of the positivists' conception of the relativized a priori with Kuhn's
theory of scientific revolutions, an assimilation that Friedman employs to
articulate his own conception of "dynamical" or "relativized" a priori
principles in scientific knowledge. Finally, I explicate and evaluate Fried-
man's arguments against Quinean naturalism and Kuhnian relativism.

2. A Positivist Background
The philosophical perspective defended by Friedman draws upon positiv-
ist philosophy of science as much as it does from neo-Kantian philosophy
of science. Unlike many contemporary philosophers of science, Friedman
is largely sympathetic with mature ideas of positivist thought (see Fried-
man 1997, 1999). In particular, he draws upon ideas forwarded in Hans
Reichenbach's neo-Kantian philosophy of physics and Rudolf Carnap's
syntactic-conventionalist view of scientific theories or "philosophy of lin-
guistic frameworks." The significance of these ideas, for Friedman, lies in
the positivists' articulation of a relativized a priori, a central feature of his
own neo-Kantian perspective.1

2.1. Reichenbach's Revision of Kant: The Relativized A Priori

Within the positivist tradition, the idea of a relativized a priori finds its
origins in Reichenbach's first major work, The Theory of Relativity and A
Priori Knowledge (originally published in 1920). In this work, Reichen-
bach considers the implications of Einstein's relativity theory for Kant's
philosophy of science with the aim of modifying the latter to be consistent
with the former. Central to Reichenbach's modification is a rejection of
Kant's synthetic a priori in favour of a relativized a priori. Reichenbach
(1965) argues that Kant's a priori judgements carried two related senses:

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 Reason in Science 575

(1) necessary and valid for all times, and (2) "constituting the concept of
the object" (p. 48). Reichenbach's revision of Kant's a priori consists in,
first, unlinking these two senses and, second, rejecting the necessary
aspect while retaining the "constituting" or "constitutive" aspect. For
Reichenbach, the constitutive aspect of the a priori represents the concep-
tual framework that is required before meaningfully objective (i.e., inter-
subjective) empirical judgements are possible in physics. Reichenbach
writes: "Indeed, there cannot be a single physical judgment that goes
beyond a state of immediate perception unless certain principles about the
description of the object in terms of a space-time manifold and its func-
tional connection with other objects are made" (1965, p. 77). What
Reichenbach finds defensible in Kant's critical philosophy is the idea "that
the object of knowledge is not simply given, but constructed, and that it
contains conceptual elements not contained in pure perception" (ibid.,
p. 49). Accordingly, all objects of scientific knowledge are constructed,
and these constructions require a "conceptual schema" to create the
object. Reichenbach writes: "the conceptual schema, the category, creates
the object; the object of science is therefore . . . a reference structure based
on intuition and constituted by the categories" (ibid.; emphasis added).
Reichenbach's resulting picture of scientific knowledge includes two
distinct components. First, there are formal components contributed by
reason that Reichenbach calls "axioms of coordination" or "coordinating
principles." Second, there are empirical components supplied by the sen-
sible world called "axioms of connection." Axioms of coordination are
constitutive a priori principles that must be presupposed in order to frame
objectively meaningful empirical laws (i.e., axioms of connection). For
Reichenbach, the lesson of Einstein's theory of relativity is that theories
of physics, from Newtonian mechanics to special relativity to general rel-
ativity, require axioms of coordination (viz., laws of physical geometry)
as necessary presuppositions to frame axioms of connection; however,
these coordinating principles change in the transition from one theory to
another. Reichenbach emphasizes that in the context of any given scien-
tific theory there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between princi-
ples of coordination and principles of connection:

[T]he principles of coordination are determined by the nature of reason; expe-

rience merely selects from among all possible principles. It is only denied that
the rational component in knowledge remains independent of experience. The
principles of coordination represent the rational components of empirical sci-
ence at a given stage. This is their fundamental significance, and this is the cri-
terion that distinguishes them from a particular law, even the most general one.
A particular law represents the application of those conceptual methods laid
down in a principle of coordination. (1965, p. 87; emphasis added)

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 576 Dialogue

On Reichenbach's view, axioms of coordination serve as the background

framework for axioms of connection; however, axioms of coordination
are revisable and evolve with the development of empirical science. These
coordinating principles are constitutive a priori insofar as they secure
both the objective meaning and intersubjective communicability of
empirical judgements; however, such principles are "relativized" insofar
as they are only a priori relative to a particular theory in some historical
context. In this sense, science is possible because of constitutive a priori
principles.
It is important to note that Reichenbach initially conceives of axioms
of coordination as relativized synthetic a priori judgements. This is a point
of ambiguity in Reichenbach's book that becomes clarified in a subse-
quent correspondence between Schlick and Reichenbach.2 What is at issue
in this correspondence is the precise nature of axioms of coordination.
Whereas Reichenbach conceives of his relativized a priori principles as
synthetic, Schlick finds Reichenbach's axioms of coordination to be indis-
tinguishable from Poincare's conventions (i.e., analytic a priori principles).
As such, Schlick urges Reichenbach to adopt the terminology of Poincare
and the theory of conventions (also see Schlick 1979). Schlick's sugges-
tions to Reichenbach were evidently influential since in all subsequent
works Reichenbach drops his Kantian terminology of aprioricity in
favour of Poincarean conventionalism (e.g., see Reichenbach 1958,1969).

2.2. Carnap's Philosophy of Linguistic Frameworks and the Relativized A

Priori
Friedman maintains that the most-developed articulation of the positiv-
ists' formal notion of the relativized a priori appears in Carnap's philoso-
phy of linguistic frameworks in works such as The Logical Syntax of
Language (originally published in 1934) and "Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology" (originally published in 1950). In these works, Carnap provides
a poignant statement of his conventionalism and epistemological relativ-
ism, arguing that all standards of "correctness," "validity," and "truth" are
relative to the choice of a formal language or linguistic framework (i.e.,
such standards are relative to the logical rules of a particular linguistic
framework). As expressed in his "Principle of Tolerance," Carnap (1937,
§17) maintains that the choice of a formal language is a conventional
choice that can only be decided on practical (as opposed to theoretical)
grounds. Friedman maintains that within this conventionalist picture,
Carnap provides the most mature articulation of the relativized a priori
that occupied Reichenbach's pre-conventionalist ideas (pp. 31-32, 72).
In "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," Carnap argues that an
assertion is meaningful (i.e., meaningfully answerable as true or false) if it
is asserted within the given rules of some conventionally stipulated lin-
guistic framework. Carnap calls these sorts of questions or assertions

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 Reason in Science 577

"internal questions." Internal questions are meaningfully answerable

insofar as they are capable of being true or false given the rales of some
linguistic framework. The truth or falsity of internal questions, however,
is not "absolute" but relative to some linguistic framework. Questions or
assertions made outside a linguistic framework (e.g., questions about the
existence of entities assumed in a linguistic framework) are not meaning-
ful, i.e., not meaningfully capable of being true or false. Carnap calls these
sorts of questions "external questions."3 Carnap diagnoses the status of
external questions or assertions as pseudo-statements because such asser-
tions really pertain to the choice of adopting some linguistic framework.
As such, external assertions are practical suggestions to adopt some lin-
guistic framework or another. Carnap states that confusion among phi-
losophers results from tendencies to understand external questions or
assertions metaphysically:

[T]he introduction of a new [linguistic framework] does not need any theoretical
justification because it does not imply any assertion of reality . . . it must not be
interpreted as referring to an assumption, belief, or assertion of the "reality of
entities." . . . An alleged statement of the reality of the system of entities is a
pseudo-statement without any cognitive content. . . . [W]e have to face at this
point, an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it
is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The accept-
ance cannot be judged as being true or false because it is not an assertion. It
can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the
aim for which the language is intended. (1983, p. 250)

Here, Carnap emphasizes that the choice of adopting a linguistic frame-

work is a conventional one. The decision involved in adopting a linguistic
framework (or the answer to external questions) must appeal to practical
rather than theoretical grounds.4
Friedman argues that this picture defended by Carnap provides a fur-
ther articulation of the relativized a priori (conceived as a relativized ana-
lytic a priori) initially forwarded by Reichenbach. Linguistic frameworks
are constitutive frameworks because in these formal languages, analytic
theorems provide the rules that allow for the subsequent formulation of
objectively meaningful empirical laws. This idea is implicit in Carnap's
distinction, in The Logical Syntax of Language, between logical rules ("L-
rules") and physical rules ("P-rules"). L-rules are the formal or analytic
statements of a linguistic framework, including rules of logic, mathemat-
ics, and geometry. P-rules, on the other hand, are empirical or synthetic
statements of a linguistic framework whose objective meaningfulness is
provided by the L-rules of that linguistic framework. In this sense, Car-
nap's L-rules are constitutive a priori relative to a particular linguistic
framework analogous to the way Reichenbach's axioms of coordination

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 578 Dialogue

are constitutive a priori relative to a particular scientific theory. The dis-

tinction between L-rules and P-rules is also related to Carnap's aforemen-
tioned distinction between internal and external questions. Internal
questions, which are asked within the rules of an already adopted linguis-
tic framework, are answered on the basis of the L-rules of that linguistic
framework. In contrast, external questions, which are asked outside all
linguistic frameworks and concern the question of which linguistic frame-
work or set of L-rules to choose in the first place, can only be answered
conventionally, i.e., on the basis of practical considerations.
In forwarding his own neo-Kantian perspective, Friedman draws
strongly from Carnap's philosophy of linguistic frameworks and espe-
cially the positivists' formal conception of a relativized constitutive a pri-
ori. Inasmuch as Friedman endorses these ideas of mature positivist
thought, Friedman affirms his own status as the closest approximation to
a neo-positivist in contemporary philosophy of science.

3. Relativized A Priori Principles and Scientific Revolutions

The central feature of Friedman's neo-Kantian perspective is its emphasis
on the importance of relativized constitutive a priori principles in scientific
knowledge. Friedman articulates his own version of such principles in an
interesting assimilation of Carnap's philosophy of linguistic frameworks
with Kuhn's "paradigms." In the preface of his book, Friedman describes
his project as an

attempt to combine basic aspects of Carnap's philosophy of formal languages

or linguistic frameworks with fundamental features of Thomas Kuhn's much
less formal theory of scientific revolutions . . . [in order to] articulate a concep-
tion of dynamical or relativized a priori principles within a historical account
of the conceptual evolution of the sciences rather than a purely syntactic or
semantic account of formal language(s) of the sciences, (p. xii)

Friedman aims to motivate his neo-Kantian perspective with a historical

argument for a view of scientific knowledge that includes relativized a pri-
ori principles. The principle support for this perspective, he argues, stems
from the historical fact that the philosophical problem of coordination,
i.e., the problem of coordinating abstract mathematical structures to con-
crete physical phenomena, has been absolutely fundamental in formulat-
ing theories of physics (pp. 33-42, 71-82).

3.1. Kuhn's Paradigms and the Relativized A Priori

In a brief yet provocative discussion, Friedman argues that Thomas
Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions provides an informal complement
to the positivists' formal conception of the relativized a priori (pp. 41-46;
cf. Reisch 1991). In particular, Friedman suggests an affinity between Car-

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 Reason in Science 579

nap's notion of constitutive linguistic frameworks and Kuhn's notion of

paradigms (in the sense of "disciplinary matrices" or "lexicons"). Con-
sider the similarities between Kuhn's distinction between "normal sci-
ence" and "revolutionary science" and Carnap's distinction between rule-
governed operations within an already adopted linguistic framework and
the change of a linguistic framework (pp. 41-42). Kuhn's view of normal
science, in which a paradigm prescribes generally agreed upon, often tacit,
rules that are constitutive of what counts as a genuinely "correct" or
"valid" solution to a scientific puzzle is similar to Carnap's view that the
logical rules of an adopted linguistic framework are constitutive of
notions of "correctness" or "validity" relative to that framework. Simi-
larly, Kuhn's view that paradigm changes, in revolutionary science, do not
proceed on the basis of agreed-upon rules or algorithms is amenable to
Carnap's suggestion that the choice of adopting a linguistic framework is
not governed by logical rules, but must be decided on practical or other-
wise conventional grounds. In support of this "positivist reading" of
Kuhn, Friedman appeals to Kuhn's (1993) own acknowledgment of the
affinities between his own views on lexicons (Kuhn's later term for "para-
digms" or "disciplinary matrices") and the more formal conception of the
relativized a priori articulated by Reichenbach and Carnap:

Though it is a more articulated source of constitutive categories, my structured

lexicon . .. resembles Kant's a priori when the latter is taken in its second, rel-
ativized sense. Both are constitutive of possible experience of the world, but nei-
ther dictates what that experience must be. Rather, they are constitutive of the
infinite range of possible experiences that might conceivably occur in the actual
world to which they give access. Which of these conceivable experiences occurs
in the actual world is something that must be learned, both from everyday expe-
rience and from the more systematic and refined experience that characterizes
scientific practice.... The fact that experience within another form of life [i.e.,
another lexicon]—another time, place, or culture—might have constituted
knowledge differently is irrelevant to its status as knowledge. (Kuhn 1993,
pp. 331-32, cited by Friedman on p. 43; emphasis in the original)

Besides Kuhn's explicit endorsement of the constitutive function of para-

digms,5 the last sentence in this passage suggests that Kuhn is also com-
fortable with a form of epistemological relativism implied by Carnap's
philosophy of linguistic frameworks, i.e., the view that all knowledge is
relative to a choice of a constitutive framework.
Friedman takes these similarities between Kuhn's view of paradigms
and Carnap's view of linguistic frameworks to provide strong support for
the idea that the problem of coordinating mathematical principles with
empirical principles is a problem basic to science and formulating scientific
knowledge. Friedman claims that Kuhn's recognition of the significance of

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 580 Dialogue

constitutive frameworks suggests that "our best current historiography of

science [viz., Kuhn] requires us to draw a fundamental distinction between
constitutive principles, on the one side, and properly empirical laws formu-
lated against the background of such principles, on the other" (p. 43;
emphasis added). While this statement of Friedman does not seem war-
ranted, or at least it places a great deal of authority on Kuhn, Friedman
does give credence to this distinction in his analysis of the history of phys-
ical theories.

3.2. Friedman's Argument for Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Science

Friedman argues that contemporary philosophy of science has failed to
recognize the existence of constitutive relativized principles in scientific
theories. In the context of the historical development of physical theories,
Friedman illustrates the role that constitutive a priori principles play with
reference to the development of Newtonian mechanics to general relativ-
ity, which involve the coordination of non-empirical (constitutive a priori)
and empirical principles (pp. 35-39, 71-82). In Newtonian mechanics,
Euclidean spatial geometry functions as the mathematical part of the the-
ory that makes possible empirical principles such as the law of gravita-
tion. The mathematical part, according to Friedman, is constitutively a
priori because this part of the theory raises the very possibility of the
empirical part by coordinating mathematical structures to experience. In
the transition from Newtonian mechanics to special relativity, the back-
ground space-time structure (i.e., the constitutive a priori part) is revised
in light of empirical findings. Accordingly, there is a shift in both the non-
empirical and empirical parts of physical theory. In special relativity,
Euclidean spatial geometry, Lorentzian kinematics, and the structure of
Minowski space-time function as constitutive a priori principles relative
to the theory insofar as they are presupposed in empirical theories of
fields and forces such as Maxwell's equations. In the transition from spe-
cial to general relativity, there is another revision in the background
space-time framework. In the theory of general relativity, only the infini-
tesimally Lorentzian manifold structure (i.e., the space-time topology
that is sufficient to admit some Riemannian metric) is constitutive a priori
relative to the theory. The empirical theory realized by such constitutive
principles is the particular Riemannian metrical structure determined
empirically from the distribution of mass energy.6
Friedman attributes the neglect of the phenomenon of constitutive a
priori principles in scientific theories, in contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence, to Quine's apparent victory in the Carnap-Quine debate (pp. 40-41).
In particular, Friedman argues that contemporary philosophers' accept-
ance of Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction has led them
to blindly neglect the problematic that Carnap was attempting to address.
Although Friedman states that he has no desire to defend Carnap's par-

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 Reason in Science 581

ticular way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction (p. 33), he does

aim to defend the problematic that occupied Carnap's mature writings.7
Friedman writes:

[C]areful attention to the actual historical development of science, and, in par-

ticular, to the profound conceptual revolutions that have in fact led to our cur-
rent philosophical predicament, shows that relativized a priori principles of just
the kind Carnap was aiming at are central to our scientific theories. Although
Carnap may have failed in giving a precise logical characterization or explication
of such principles, it does not follow that the phenomenon he was attempting to
characterize does not exist. On the contrary, everything that we know about the
history of science . . . indicates that precisely this phenomenon is an absolutely
fundamental feature of science as we know it. (p. 41; emphasis in original)

This passage encapsulates the main thesis of Friedman's book, viz., that
the problem of coordination is fundamental to formulating scientific
knowledge.
Two critical points are worth raising here. First, although Friedman's
claim regarding the need for constitutive a priori principles in science is
made with reference to science in general, his own analysis is limited to
scientific knowledge in the domain of mathematical physics. This limita-
tion becomes painfully apparent in the final chapter of the book (Part 2,
§5) when Friedman outlines possible directions of his proposed perspec-
tive to domains such as chemistry and biology, and the discussion has
very little to do with either chemistry or biology (pp. 124-29). Second,
although Friedman is not obliged to defend Carnap's manner of drawing
the analytic-synthetic distinction, he does seem to be obliged to provide an
independent argument for drawing it since his perspective presupposes the
distinction (cf. n. 7).8 Otherwise, it could be objected that Friedman's argu-
ments fail to motivate his perspective.
Despite such objections (which demonstrate limitations rather than a
fundamental untenability), Friedman's historical analysis does provide a
strong basis for his neo-Kantian perspective. Friedman's analysis suggests
a crucial functional role for constitutive a priori principles in formulating
physical theories and knowledge. This neo-Kantian understanding of
physical theory forms the basis of Friedman's rejection of philosophical
naturalism and sociological relativism associated with Kuhn. In what fol-
lows, I explicate and evaluate the merits of Friedman's arguments against
Quine and Kuhn respectively.

4. Against Quinean Naturalism

Much of Friedman's book is devoted to explaining what is wrong with
Quinean naturalism as a philosophical perspective for the sciences
(pp. 28-46, 78-82). He argues that the anti-apriorist conception of scien-

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 582 Dialogue

tific knowledge suggested by Quine's epistemological holism and "web of

belief" picture provides an entirely unsatisfactory account of scientific
knowledge when one actually considers the history of science (viz., math-
ematical physics). As previously alluded to, Friedman also argues that
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction is entirely irrelevant to
the "phenomena of coordination" motivating the positivists' original con-
ception of the relativized a priori. Against Quine's suggestion of locating
philosophy or epistemology within science, Friedman's ultimate aim is to
reaffirm a meta-scientific role for philosophy of science. In this section, I
review and evaluate Friedman's arguments against Quine. I conclude that
Friedman's analysis presents a strong challenge to Quinean naturalism
while providing, conversely, a strong bid for his own perspective.

4.1. Quine's Naturalistic Holism

At the heart of Quine's (1969) naturalism or "naturalized epistemology" is
a holistic view in which all knowledge is conceived of as being empirical
within an interrelated "web-of-belief." This picture of knowledge is moti-
vated by Quine's well-known rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction
in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Once it is "recognized" that there is no
special status for certain types of knowledge traditionally thought to be
analytic or a priori, then the idea of epistemology naturalized, viz., that phi-
losophy itself should be set within empirical science, gains merit. That is, the
recognition that all knowledge is synthetic or empirical and that no state-
ment is immune from revision implies that traditional foundationalist
projects that aim for certain knowledge are hopeless.9 Accordingly, the ideal
of philosophy occupying a privileged position to analyze science (and, more
generally, knowledge) must be given up. Quine's own prescription is to relo-
cate philosophy (or "epistemology") as a branch of empirical science. In an
interview, Quine describes his position as follows: "Epistemology... is sci-
ence self-applied. It is the scientific study of scientific process. It explores the
logical connections between the stimulation of the scientist's sensory recep-
tors and the scientist's output of scientific theory" (Quine, cited in Pyle
1999, p. 20). Quine's argument is that if epistemology is to become a plau-
sible project, then it must no longer be conceived as a normative project but
as a descriptive one (viz., as a scientific project). In this somewhat debased
but pragmatic role, philosophy will be capable of drawing upon the best
available scientific resources in describing what knowledge is.
Quine's holist picture of knowledge is motivated by instances of revolu-
tionary science (a point that Friedman rightfully emphasizes motivates the
positivists' own articulation of the relativized a priori) and a Duhemian pic-
ture of theory testing. On Quine's view, the total system of science, a vast
web of beliefs, faces the "tribunal of experience" as a corporate body. While
Quine grants that some beliefs will be more entrenched (e.g., beliefs about
mathematics and logic) while other beliefs lie at the periphery of the web

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 Reason in Science 583

(e.g., beliefs about biology), he maintains, on the basis of Duhemian under-

determination considerations, that when a particular scientific theory is
inconsistent with empirical data (a "recalcitrant experience") this evidence
cannot suggest which of the beliefs ought to be revised (see Quine 1970,
pp. 5, 7).10 In describing "empiricism without the dogmas," Quine writes:

The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs . . . is a man-made fabric

which impinges on experience only along the edges. . . . A conflict with experi-
ence at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. . . .
But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experi-
ence, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate
in the light of any single contrary experience. . . . If this view is right, it is mis-
leading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement. . . . Fur-
thermore, it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements,
which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold
come what may. . . . Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to
revision. (1980, pp. 42-43, cited by Friedman on pp. 28-29)

Quine maintains that because empirical evidence "spreads" over all beliefs
in the vast web that is the totality of science, all beliefs encompassed in this
web, holistically conceived, equally face the "tribunal of experience." And
it is precisely in this sense, for Quine, that all knowledge or beliefs have the
status of being empirical or synthetic.
4.2. Friedman on the Poverty of Naturalism
Friedman argues that Quine's picture of scientific knowledge is entirely
inadequate in the face of the historical development of physics (pp. 35ff.).
He claims, moreover, that Quine's holism only gains its force by com-
pletely ignoring the history of mathematical physics. Friedman writes:

The increasingly abstract character of the mathematics applied in our most fun-
damental physical theories, the characteristically modern problem of coordina-
tion between abstract mathematical structures and concrete physical phe-
nomena, and the Kantian idea of constitutively a priori principles functioning
to mediate between the two are thus three distinguishable aspects of what is at
bottom the same conceptual situation. And it is only by ignoring this situation
entirely that we can, on the contrary, arrive at Quinean holism. Indeed, Quine
himself arrives at epistemological holism by focussing exclusively on problems
in the foundations of mathematics, with no real concern for the foundations of
modern mathematical physics, (p. 81)

Here, Friedman highlights a weak point in Quinean holism insofar as it

seems peculiar to conceive of knowledge in the domain of mathematical
physics as being a large web of beliefs that equally face the "tribunal of

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 584 Dialogue

experience." In particular, Quine's picture of empirical testing, in which

even the mathematical background of a physical theory equally faces the
"tribunal of experience" seems to be at odds with the actual testing of the-
ories in physics. In an earlier article against Quinean naturalism, Fried-
man voices his complaint as follows:

The fundamental problem is that general relativity is not happily viewed as

something like a large conjunction, such that one conjunct is given by Einstein's
field equations, another... by the Kleinian theory of transformation fields, and
a t h i r d . . . by the Riemmanian theory of manifolds—where we then view Eddin-
ington's experimental results . . . as spreading empirical confirmation over the
entire conjunction. Rather, the mathematical background of Einstein's theory
functions as a necessary presupposition of that theory, as a means of represen-
tation or a language, as it were, without which the theory could not even be for-
mulated or envisioned as a possibility in the first place. (1997, p. 12)

Here, Friedman emphasizes the problem of coordination that motivates

his neo-Kantian view. This aspect of scientific knowledge, he argues, is
completely obscured by Quine's "beguiling form of epistemological
holism" (p. 35).
Defenders of holism might object to Friedman's historical argument by
appealing to Quine's notion of entrenchment. It could be maintained that
the presuppositions of physical theories (i.e., the geometrical principles)
are simply more-entrenched parts of knowledge. In the transitions from
Newtonian mechanics to general relativity, these entrenched beliefs are
revised in the face of recalcitrant experiences.11 This rejoinder to Fried-
man, I think, completely misses his point. Friedman's challenge for the
naturalist, quite simply, is that Quinean holism cannot do justice to the
nature of scientific knowledge in the domain of mathematical physics; it
is not a challenge for the naturalist to provide an ad hoc reconstruction of
mathematical physics in Quinean terms. Friedman's point is that the
notion of entrenchment is not an appropriate distinguishing feature of sci-
entific knowledge at all. His own suggestion is that

What characterizes the distinguished elements of our theories i s . . . their special

constitutive function: the function of making the precise mathematical formula-
tion and empirical application of the theories in question first possible. In this
sense, the relativized and dynamical conception of the a priori developed by the
logical empiricists appears to describe . . . conceptual revolutions far better than
does Quinean holism, (p. 40; emphasis in original)

To be clear, Friedman's argument against naturalism gains its force

through an appeal to the history of physics. Although Friedman presents
the development of physics through a neo-Kantian lens, the naturalist

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 Reason in Science 585

cannot simply re-describe the situation in Quinean terms, which would

beg the very question at issue. The issue at hand is whether the problem of
coordination, i.e., the problem of coordinating mathematical principles to
physical phenomena, is a phenomenon that actually exists in the formula-
tion of scientific knowledge. In the case of mathematical physics, Fried-
man presents a strong case for adopting his own perspective against
Quine's naturalistic holism.12
Against Quine's suggestion of locating philosophy within science,
Friedman's neo-Kantian perspective proposes a distinct role for philoso-
phy (as "meta-frameworks" or "meta-paradigms") in generating and sug-
gesting Carnapian external questions (pp. 43-46). This neo-Carnapian
picture of science can be illustrated with reference to a three-tiered frame-
work for analyzing scientific knowledge advanced by Friedman (pp. 45,
105). On this picture, scientific knowledge operates on three levels that are
constantly evolving and in "dynamic interaction" (p. 45):

(1) The "base level" of empirical laws and tests.

(2) The "conceptual level" of a priori principles that are constitutive of

empirical laws and tests, i.e., mathematical principles and assump-
tions that frame and make possible objectively meaningful empir-
ical laws and tests.

(3) The "philosophical level" where philosophical concepts and prin-

ciples function as suggestions for choosing one particular scientific
framework over another.

Reconstructing this picture of scientific knowledge in Carnapian terms, we

can ask relatively straightforward internal questions about (1) whose
answers will be prescribed by the rules of (2). Questions about principles
in (2), however, are external questions and they are asked on level (3).
Against Quine's (1969) suggestion to locate philosophy within empirical
science, as a branch of psychology, Friedman's claim is that philosophy can
still occupy a distinct meta-scientific role, offering suggestions drawing on
philosophical resources for choosing among competing scientific or con-
stitutive frameworks (p. 46). Moreover, he argues that this philosophical
level plays an especially fruitful role during periods of scientific crisis.13

5. Against Kuhnian Relativism

In the most ambitious section of his book, Friedman addresses the prob-
lem of the "arationality of science" implied by Thomas Kuhn's picture of
theory change where sociological factors play a key role in theory choice
(pp. 47-68, 93-103).14 Friedman opposes the relativism of Kuhn and, in
particular, Kuhn's suggestion that sociological factors, such as persuasion or

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 586 Dialogue

conversion, explain theory choice better than rational reasons. Like other
commentators on Kuhn, Friedman's strategy against this picture is to artic-
ulate the sense and extent to which theory choice is objective and rational.
In the following section, I explicate Kuhn's (1977) argument that theory
choice is inevitably arational with reference to the two main theses that moti-
vate it, viz.: (1) the "incommensurability of values" thesis and (2) the "incom-
mensurability of meaning" thesis. Subsequently, I examine and evaluate
Friedman's counter-argument for "scientific rationality." I conclude that
Friedman's arguments fail to give good reasons to reject Kuhnian relativism.

5.7. Kuhn on Values and Paradigm Choice: An Arational Picture of Theory

Change
An overlooked and important aspect of Kuhn's picture of science is his
philosophical thesis on the incommensurability of values (Kuhn 1977;
1983; 1996, pp. 94-110,198-207). Through an examination of the problem
of values in science, Kuhn (1977) concludes that there is no "rational"
basis for theory choice. Kuhn's argument begins with a consideration of
the epistemic values that may be employed to judge between competing
paradigms. Kuhn provides a "non-exhaustive" list of "defensible" values
or standards as follows: (1) empirical accuracy; (2) consistency, i.e., inter-
nal and external consistency; (3) explanatory scope; (4) simplicity; and
(5) fruitfulness, i.e., puzzle-solving efficacy. Kuhn notes that two sorts of
problems arise when applying such values to judge between competing
paradigms. First, there is an ambiguity regarding these values insofar as
the terms can be interpreted and applied differently by scientists. Thus,
the application of such values in paradigm choice will inevitably involve
the application of both objective (shared) and subjective (personal) val-
ues. Second, when considered together, these values may conflict, e.g.,
accuracy conflicts with scope or accuracy conflicts with consistency.
Again this suggests that paradigm choice will necessarily involve the
application of subjective values insofar as certain values will be weighted
more heavily than others. Kuhn appeals to these two observations to
establish the claim that there exists no objective (i.e., intersubjective) basis
for theory choice, i.e., there is no objective "meta-perspective" of values
that can be appealed to in order to choose among competing paradigms.
Presented more formally, Kuhn's argument that there is no rational
basis for theory choice can be reconstructed as follows:

1. Comparisons between competing paradigms must appeal either to an

objective set of values or to the shared values of a particular paradigm.

2. It is impossible to appeal to an objective set of values because such

a meta-perspective does not exist (see previous paragraph).

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 Reason in Science 587

3. Thus, theory choice must appeal to the shared values of one partic-
ular paradigm.

4. Thus, to argue for the merits of a paradigm is to appeal to values

that a paradigm is premised upon. But this amounts to circular rea-
soning or "persuasion."

5. Thus, there is no rational way to judge between competing paradigms.

Kuhn's claim that there is no (objective or paradigm-independent) per-

spective of epistemic values that can be appealed to in order to judge com-
peting paradigms establishes his subsequent claim that there is no rational
or objective basis for paradigm choice.15 This argument motivates Kuhn's
further claim that paradigm choice inevitably involves sociological factors
such as persuasion or conversion. Given the problem of incommensurable
values in science, Kuhn maintains that the social consensus of the current
scientific community (and especially their favoured epistemic values)
plays a decisive role in determining a paradigm shift within a scientific tra-
dition. Kuhn's argument, I think, establishes that "paradigm choice can
never be unequivocally settled by logic and experiment alone" (1996,
p. 94). Paradigm choice is rational, according to Kuhn, to the extent that
the relevant community of scientists are capable of arguing on the basis
of shared values; however, these shared values themselves are ultimately
a matter of subjective preference (which reflect and are relative to a par-
ticular social-historical context).
Corresponding to this picture of paradigm choice is a discontinuous
picture of science implied by Kuhn's philosophical-historical thesis of the
incommensurability of meaning.16 Kuhn claims that a revolution in sci-
ence necessarily involves the abolishment of the previous paradigm.17 As
such, scientific revolutions represent discontinuities in science and Fried-
man maintains that science is not a cumulative process. Many commen-
tators have argued against this characterization of science. In the context
of physics, e.g., some commentators have pointed out that Newtonian
physics is derivable from relativistic dynamics as a special case. Kuhn's
counter to this claim is that the older Newtonian paradigm cannot be
derived at all because the concepts in relativistic dynamics do not mean
the same thing as those in the Newtonian paradigm. Here, Kuhn appeals
to his controversial incommensurability of meaning thesis in claiming
that there is no common framework for both paradigms. Kuhn writes:

Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Only at

low relative velocities may the two be measured in the same way, and even then
they must not be conceived to be the same.... Unless we change the definitions

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 588 Dialogue
of the variables . . . the statements we have derived are not Newtonian . . . at
least not in any sense of "derive" now generally recognized. (1996, p. 102)

Kuhn's resulting picture of science is a discontinuous one in which

changes in paradigms are accompanied by the abolishment of previous
paradigms. It is characteristic of such scientific revolutions that there is a
corresponding shift in the epistemic values presupposed by the paradigm
(which play a large role in the triumph of a paradigm).

5.2 Friedman's Argument for Scientific Rationality

Friedman takes exception to Kuhn's picture of theory change, which rules
out any notion of "truly universal human rationality" for the sciences.
Friedman remarks that "the only notion of scientific rationality we have
left is a relativized, or sociological one according to which all there ulti-
mately is to scientific rationality . . . is the otherwise arbitrary commit-
ment of some particular social community... to one particular paradigm
. . . rather than another" (p. 48). Moreover, Friedman argues persuasively
that Kuhn's subsequent attempts to defend scientific rationality cannot be
judged as successful (pp. 50-53).18 In light of this consequence, Friedman
endeavours to provide his own argument for scientific rationality in the
face of Kuhnian relativism. In what follows, I explicate and evaluate
Friedman's argument against Kuhn. I argue that Friedman's argument for
scientific rationality cannot be judged as successful because it fails to
address Kuhn's first argument against scientific rationality premised on
the incommensurability of values thesis.
In a somewhat unexpected manoeuver, Friedman appeals to the Frank-
furt school in arguing for scientific rationality, viz., the Habermasian dis-
tinction between instrumental and communicative rationality (pp. 54ff.).
Instrumental rationality, which is subjective or personal, refers to a
capacity to engage in effective means-ends reasoning (where an agreed-
upon goal is already given). By contrast, communicative rationality,
which is intersubjective, refers to a capacity to engage in deliberative argu-
mentative reasoning (where no agreed-upon goal is given) aimed at bring-
ing about consensus. Against Kuhn's picture of science that suggests that
communicative rationality is limited to normal science, i.e., rationality
within a paradigm, Friedman argues that "there is also an important
sense in which [the scientific enterprise] aims for, and successfully
achieves, agreement or consensus across different paradigms" (p. 58;
emphasis in original). To support this idea of interparadigm rationality,
Friedman again appeals to the history of physics. The history of mathe-
matical physics, argues Friedman, shows us that (1) earlier constitutive
frameworks are exhibited as limiting cases, holding approximately under
certain precisely defined conditions, and (2) the concepts and principles
of succeeding constitutive frameworks evolve continuously, by a series of

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 Reason in Science 589

natural transformations, from previous constitutive frameworks (pp. 58-

66, 95-101). Taken together, Friedman maintains that "we can thus view
the evolution of succeeding paradigms . . . as a convergent series . . . in
which we successively refine our constitutive principles in the direction of
even greater generality and adequacy" (p. 63).19 For instance, in the tran-
sition from Newtonian mechanics to special relativity, the constitutive
principles of mechanics (viz., Euclidean geometry and the law of inertia)
are retained, but in moving to the more general four-dimensional spatial-
temporal structure, special relativity yields the Newtonian Euclidean spa-
tial geometry as a limiting case. Granting Friedman this much, it does not
follow that these paradigms, i.e., Newtonian and special relativity, both
equally share a constitutive framework in the sense needed to secure the
rationality of theory change denied by Kuhn. Friedman admits this much
when he writes,

[Tjhis kind of relationship of successive approximation between paradigms, and

the resulting notion of mfer-paradigm agreement, is highly anachronistic or
"Whiggish," in that it is constructed wholly from the point of view of the suc-
cessor paradigm and, in truly revolutionary cases, uses concepts and principles
that simply do not exist from the point of view of the preceding paradigm,
(p. 59; emphasis in the original)

As Friedman observes, what is really needed to combat Kuhn's scepticism

on theory change is an explanation of how a new paradigm can be chosen
on a rational basis, i.e., a rational basis fox prospective (interparadigm)
continuity must be illustrated (pp. 99-101).
Friedman argues for a rational basis for prospective continuities
between present and future paradigms with the notion of a philosophical
"meta-framework" proffered in his book (pp. 66-68, 93-103). According
to Friedman, prospective interparadigm continuity is successfully
achieved in the sciences insofar as new philosophical meta-frameworks
(which arise in dynamical interaction with older meta-frameworks, older
constitutive frameworks, and developments in empirical science) function
to motivate and sustain continuous transformations and modifications of
previous constitutive frameworks (pp. 65-66,99-103). Although Friedman
is not entirely clear on what he means to argue in this brief discussion, the
basic point {contra Kuhn) is that paradigm changes within a particular sci-
entific tradition are continuous and hence attain interparadigm (commu-
nicative) rationality. To support this point, Friedman argues that
succeeding paradigms in a scientific revolution are more similar to differ-
ent stages of development within a linguistic tradition than disparate lan-
guages in separate cultures (p. 100). Relating this analogy to Friedman's
earlier claims about interparadigm retrospective communicative rational-
ity, which I have granted for the sake of argument, Friedman's further

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 590 Dialogue

claim is that new paradigms come about as deliberate modifications of

earlier paradigms against the backdrop of a common framework of prob-
lems, concepts, and goals. In this way, a constitutive framework, which
gives rise to standards of communicative rationality, can be expanded or
transformed into a new constitutive framework that was not previously
possible.20 In this sense, we can see how a new paradigm can become a
defensible ("rational or reasonable") option from the perspective of a cur-
rent paradigm. Granting this point to Friedman regarding interparadigm
prospective communicative rationality, we have the picture that (1) a con-
stitutive framework contains the previous constitutive framework as a
limiting case; (2) the new constitutive principles evolve continuously from
the older constitutive principles by a series of natural transformations;
and (3) this process of continual transformations will be motivated and
sustained by an appropriate new philosophical meta-framework (pp. 66,
99-101). This sense of communicative rationality, viz., a continuity or
convergence between paradigm shifts, Friedman thinks, captures a sense
of scientific rationality that can be defended in the face of Kuhnian rela-
tivism. But does this sense of "rationality" defeat the relativism associated
with Kuhn's picture of theory change or theory choice? I think not.
The fundamental difficulty with Friedman's picture of scientific ration-
ality is that it fails to address the "historical relativism" implied by Kuhn's
argument on the incommensurability of values.21 Even if we grant the
sense of rationality that Friedman presents, this sense of communicative
rationality only has persuasive force against Kuhn's argument that differ-
ent paradigms are incommensurable with respect to meaning, not the
argument that different paradigms are incommensurable with respect to
values. Friedman's failure to squarely address this latter issue, I think,
highlights the correctness (and perhaps triviality) of Kuhn's argument
against scientific rationality. What Friedman does with Kuhn's analysis on
incommensurable values is grant that there is no paradigm-independent
perspective of values or standards that can be appealed to in judging com-
peting paradigms, arguing that these values can be continually negotiated
on the level of meta-frameworks. Friedman wants to call this negotiation
process "rational" insofar as the transition between paradigms is both
modified from older paradigms and motivated by an "appropriate" new
philosophical meta-framework; however, what is missing from this analy-
sis is an argument that establishes the connection between scientific con-
tinuity and rationality. What is not shown by Friedman's analysis, in
particular, is why the consensus regarding values endorsed by later meta-
frameworks should be viewed as progressions towards rationality rather
than historical contingencies. Friedman's failure to clearly address this
point on values, renders his argument for a "universal scientific rationality
for the sciences" optimistic at best (see n. 19). While the notion of com-
municative rationality, I think, provides the right sort of initial response

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 Reason in Science 591

to Kuhn's problematic, Friedman's analysis, as it stands, requires further

articulation in order to persuasively overcome Kuhn's "relativistic or
sociological" conception of scientific rationality.
6. Conclusion
Despite some weaker points in the more ambitious portions of the book,
Dynamics of Reason is an admirable and provocative defence of neo-
Kantianism in the context of contemporary philosophy of science. In my
view, the most cogent and interesting argument presented in Friedman's
book is its diagnosis of why philosophical naturalism, despite its intuitive
appeal, cannot provide an adequate perspective on the sciences. If natural-
ism cannot provide a satisfactory picture of the nature of scientific knowl-
edge in physics, traditionally conceived as the paradigmatic domain of
scientific knowledge in philosophy of science, then naturalism cannot serve
as a satisfactory perspective for the sciences. As indicated in this article,
however, Friedman would do well (with regards to his argument against
naturalism and for his own neo-Kantian view) by expanding his perspec-
tive to other domains of science (e.g., biology), where Quine's perspective,
arguably, provides a better account of theory change. Despite Friedman's
best intentions, his argument for scientific rationality, in the face of Kuhn-
ian relativism, cannot be judged as successful. Friedman's failure to
address Kuhn's analysis on the incommensurability of scientific values, I
think, renders his subsequent response to be entirely unsatisfactory. Fried-
man's failure in this regard indicates the immense challenge facing philos-
ophers of science on the problem of epistemological relativism.
Although many readers will remain unmoved by Friedman's suggestion
for a neo-Kantian philosophy of science, in my opinion his perspective
merits attention, especially among philosophers of mathematical physics.
In presenting and articulating his position, Friedman displays his gifts
and impressive breadth of knowledge as a historian, especially in the
domains of history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy and the
exact sciences. In the face of "anti-positivist" movements in contempo-
rary philosophy of science, Friedman's perspective is especially refreshing
in its attempt to retain some lost insights of the positivists, while avoiding
simplistic characterizations. In his creative assimilation the positivists'
worldview with Kuhn's—two views typically thought to be at odds—
Friedman makes a strong case for re-examining the problem of coordina-
tion in the context of physical theory. Ultimately, the nature of Friedman's
proposal for a neo-Kantian perspective can only be taken as a Carnapian
external assertion, i.e., as a practical suggestion for philosophers of sci-
ence. As I have indicated, I think that Friedman presents a persuasive
argument for the potential fruits of such a perspective and his proposal
deserves further consideration.22

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 592 Dialogue

Notes
1 In his revisionist writings on logical positivism, Friedman (1997, 1999) argues
that the true innovation advanced by positivists such as Carnap, Reichenbach,
and Schlick was not a radical form of empiricism (the "received view"), but a
relativized conception of the a priori.
2 For English translations and commentary of the Schlick-Reichenbach corre-
spondence, see Coffa (1991, pp. 201-204) and Howard (1994, pp. 56-63).
Schlick initiates the correspondence on November 26, 1920, in response to
Reichenbach's note in his book: "It is characteristic of Schlick's psychologiz-
ing method that he believes to have refuted by many proofs the correct part of
Kant's theory, namely, the constitutive significance of the coordinating prin-
ciples" (1965, p. 116, n.27). Here, Reichenbach refers to Schlick (1985).
3 In the context of contemporary philosophy of science, Carnap's distinction
between internal and external questions arises most often in the realism-anti-
realism debates. Arthur Fine (1984), for example, in forwarding his "Natural
Ontological Attitude" expresses his essential agreement with Carnap when he
states that realists are fooling themselves in thinking that they can justifiably
adopt a stance outside science (i.e., outside the language of scientific theories)
and affirm a metaphysical reality that science captures. Howard Stein views his
attempted reconciliation of realism and instrumentalism as a rehearsal of Car-
nap's distinction of internal and external questions, and in a passing remark
he attributes similar considerations to be motivating Hilary Putnam's internal
realism (1989, p. 51). Putnam's (1981) rejection of "Metaphysical Realism"
(and its associated "God's eye view") and endorsement of "internal realism"
follows Carnap's suggestion that the notion of Truth can only be understood
relative to a particular linguistic framework or "conceptual scheme."
4 Carnap's conventionalism is nicely captured in the closing lines of his article:
"Let us grant to those who work in any special field of investigations the free-
dom to use any form of expression which seems to be useful to them. . . . Let
us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, but tolerant
in permitting linguistic forms" (1983, p. 257; emphasis in original).
5 In a 1991 interview, Kuhn describes himself as a "post-Darwinian Kantian"
arguing that the mind can only order experiences by presupposing some sort
of a priori paradigm (see Kuhn, cited in Horgan 1996, p. 44). Whereas Kant
views such a priori paradigms (or categories) asfixed,Kuhn, like Reichenbach,
views such paradigms as constantly evolving.
6 Friedman articulates this conception of physical knowledge more precisely
with a picture of physical theories that involves three asymmetrically function-
ing parts (pp. 79-80). First, there is a mathematical part that describes some
spatio-temporal framework, e.g., Euclidean space, four-dimensional Minowski
space-time, or semi-Riemmannian space-time manifolds. Second, there is an
empirical part that applies such mathematical structures to formulate empiri-
cal laws to describe some concrete empirical phenomena, e.g., the law of uni-
versal gravitation, Maxwell's equations, or Einstein's equations for the

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 Reason in Science 593

gravitational field. Third, there is a mechanical part that functions to coordi-

nate or set up a correspondence between the mathematical and empirical part,
e.g., the Newtonian laws of motion, the light principle, or the principle of
equivalence. While the second part is empirical, Friedman claims that the first
and third parts are constitutive a priori, i.e., the mathematical and mechanical
parts function to make possible empirical laws.
7 Friedman does defend Carnap's way of drawing the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction insofar as he argues, successfully I think, that Quine's attack on the
analytic-synthetic distinction premised on Duhemian underdetermination
considerations does not undermine, in the least, the relativized notion of a pri-
ori defended by Carnap (pp. 37-41). Also see n. 10 below.
8 It is fair to grant to Friedman that he has provided a historical argument in
his analysis of the development of theories of physics for drawing a distinction
between constitutive a priori and empirical principles (pp. 35-41, 75-82). This
argument, however, cannot be taken as an independent argument for the exist-
ence of constitutive principles since it is already framed within a neo-Kantian
perspective (and it is circular in this sense). As such, Friedman's claim for the
existence of constitutive a priori principles hinges on whether the reader
accepts his neo-Kantian interpretation of physics. As a broad criticism on this
issue, it could be objected that Friedman has provided an interesting interpre-
tation of the history of physics; however, it is only one of many possible inter-
pretations.
9 It is worth mentioning in this connection that Quine's (1969, 1980) attack on
Carnap, which is presented against Carnap's (1967) epistemological project in
the Aufbau (originally published in 1928), only gains its force by completely
distorting the nature of Carnap's project as nfoundationalist project address-
ing the empiricist problem of gaining certain knowledge the external world
(see Friedman 1999, pp. 89-94, 116-24, and Richardson 1998, chap. 1).
10 Friedman rightly notes that Quine is extremely misleading when he equates
analyticity with unrevisability (see p. 33, n.38), since Carnap's own philoso-
phy of linguistic frameworks is premised on Duhemian holism and the idea
that both analytic and synthetic principles can be revised in the development
of empirical science (see Carnap 1937, §82). Carnap squarely addresses this
issue in his reply to Quine (see Schilpp 1963, pp. 921-22). For an extended dis-
cussion on the Carnap-Quine debates on analyticity, see Creath (1990).
11 Friedman provides a brief response to this possible objection on pp. 39-41.
12 As previously mentioned, however, a severe limitation of Friedman's analysis
lies in its exclusive attention to the domain of mathematical physics at the
exclusion of all other sciences. A defender of naturalism could object to Fried-
man's general conclusion (viz., that his neo-Kantian perspective accounts for
science better than naturalism) on the ground that holism explains other sci-
ences (e.g., biology) better than Friedman's neo-Kantian account.
13 As two concrete examples of philosophical discourse informing science, Fried-
man appeals to (1) Newton's philosophical encounters with Descartes and

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 594 Dialogue
Leibniz (on topics such as the nature of space, time, matter, force, interaction,
and divinity) informing the formulation of his universal theory of gravitation,
and (2) Einstein's philosophical encounters with Helmholtz and Poincare (on
the foundations of geometry) informing his "geometrical" notion of gravita-
tion in general relativity (pp. 44-45, 107-17).
14 In response to accusations that he had portrayed science as irrational, Kuhn
subsequently clarified his position as the claim that science isarational (Kuhn,
cited in Horgan 1996, p. 42).
15 It is important to note that Kuhn's conclusion that there is no rational basis
for paradigm choice implicitly equates "rationality" with "objectivity" (i.e.,
intersubjectivity).
16 This second thesis, which is (rightfully) attacked by philosophers of science, is
the thesis Friedman also targets. As I will argue subsequently, however, Kuhn's
first philosophical argument is sufficient to establish his claim that there is no
purely rational standpoint in paradigm choice. I will also argue that although
Friedman is successful in refuting Kuhn's second argument, he fails to suffi-
ciently address Kuhn's first argument on the problem of values in science.
17 Kuhn defines scientific revolutions (somewhat circularly given his purposes) as
"those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is
replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" (1996, p. 92; emphasis
added). Friedman argues that Kuhn's historical analysis of scientific revolu-
tions (viz., from Newtonian to Einsteinian theory) is incorrect insofar as it
neglects an important sense in which the old and new paradigms are compat-
ible.
18 Kuhn (1983, 1993) argues that science is progressive and rational insofar as
subsequent paradigms can solve more puzzles than earlier paradigms (cf.
Laudan 1977). This view, however, presupposes that there is a stable set of
epistemic values that are definitive of science, an assumption that seems to be
undermined by Kuhn's (1977) claim that both the application of, and relative
weights attached to, such values do not remain stable over time. Along these
lines, Friedman objects that Kuhn only secures a subjective sense of rational-
ity, rather than a truly objective sense (pp. 50-53, 93).
19 Friedman suggests that this picture of convergence can be fruitfully assimi-
lated with Kant's regulative use of Reason (pp. 64-65). Although science can
only be conceived as an ongoing process of revision, Friedman suggests that
we necessarily need to conceive of our present constitutive principles, which
represent one stage in a convergent series, as an approximation to a "final,
ideal community of inquiry . . . that has achieved a universal, trans-historical
communicative rationality on the basis of thefully general and adequate consti-
tutive principles reached in the ideal limit of scientific progress" (p. 64; emphasis
added). For a commentary on this passage, see Richardson 2002, pp. 261-69.
20 Friedman emphasizes the importance of the history of scientific philosophy as
a factor to help explain scientific rationality and understand the ongoing dialec-
tic of scientific knowledge (p. 44; also see Disalle 2002). For instance, in the case

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 Reason in Science 595

of the transition from special to general relativity, Friedman argues that the
rational shift in constitutive frameworks can be illustrated with reference to how
Einstein engaged in the ideas of both Helmholtz and Poincare (pp. 101-103).
21 Popper, I think, accurately dubbed Kuhn's view as a species of "historical rel-
ativism" (1970, p. 55). Kuhn likens scientific development to biological devel-
opment as a "unidirectional and irreversible process" (1996, p. 206). This
"evolutionary" view of science implies that all scientific knowledge is relative
to the puzzle-solving efficacy of a historically situated paradigm. Scientific
knowledge and scientific values, on this view {contra Friedman), are not
approaching some ideal, but are simply solving puzzles in particular social-
historical environments. Kuhn concedes that even if this picture of scientific
knowledge is relativistic, he "cannot see that the relativist loses anything
needed to account for the nature and development of the sciences" (1996,
p. 207).
22 I am grateful to Philip Hanson and Steven Davis for earlier discussions on
such issues at Simon Fraser University. This article benefited from discussion
with my colleagues in the Committee on Conceptual and Historical Studies of
Science and the Fishbein Center for the History of Science and Medicine (who
participated in a discussion seminar of Friedman's book), as well as with
Michael Friedman (who clarified and defended the ideas of his book in a guest
lecture at the University of Chicago in March 2002). I would also like to thank
two anonymous referees from this journal for useful suggestions. Finally, I
would like to acknowledge the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for research support.

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