Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism Notes
Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism Notes
Syllabus
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1. 4th wave of terrorism
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2. New terrorism
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3. Suicide terrorism
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4. State terrorism
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5. Grassroots terrorism
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6. 9/11 incident
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7. Bali bombing
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8. London bombing
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9. Holey Artisan attack
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10. Mumbai attack
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11. Crime- terror continuum
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12. Terrorist financing
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13. Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime
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14. Crime-Terror Nexus in Bangladesh
15. Crime-Enabled Terrorism Financing in Europe
16. Anti-terrorism act in Bangladesh, GOB
Country case studies:
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17. Afghanistan: Unfinished Business in Afghanistan, Islamic State–Khurasan Province,
SHURA TALIBAN IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN, The Taliban in Afghanistan
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18. Pakistan: Terrorism Trends in Pakistan, Women, and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan,
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Anti-Terrorism laws in Pakistan, Historical patterns of terrorism in Pakistan.
19. Sri Lanka: Case study of the 2019 easter terror attack, Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation Program
20. Counter-terrorism strategies of: USA, UK, EU, Canada, UN
21. Role of intelligence in national security and counterterrorism.
22. Intelligence sharing.
23. Intelligence, and Counterterrorism in South Asia
24. Bangladesh: Intelligence Culture
25. Role of the military in counter-terrorism
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26. BD VEO Rehabilitation.
27. Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation.
28. Bangladesh Rehab manual.
Topic-1: 4th wave of terrorism (Anan)
First Wave: The first wave of terrorism emerged in the late 19th century. Rapoportt states that
this wave was characterized by systematic assassination campaigns against prominent officials,
often using dynamite as a weapon. He highlights the tactics employed by groups like Narodnaya
Volya, who strategically selected victims for symbolic reasons to evoke emotional and political
responses. The document states, "The practices of the revolutionary tribunals exemplified the
purpose and method."
Second Wave: The second wave of terrorism began in the 1920s and was motivated by the
pursuit of national self-determination. Rapoport mentions that this wave focused on colonial
powers and their police forces as targets. He highlights the tactics of attacking colonial rule and
challenging the legitimacy of the occupying powers. The document suggests that the
ambivalence of colonial powers about their own legitimacy made them ideal targets during this
wave.
Third Wave: The third wave of terrorism emerged in the 1960s and was characterized by
international terrorism driven by ideological motives. Rapoport notes that this wave saw the rise
of groups with Marxist or anti-imperialist ideologies. The tactics employed during this wave
included hijackings, bombings, and attacks on symbolic locations or high-profile individuals.
Rapoport states that this wave involved a shift from localized struggles to international terrorism.
Fourth Wave: The fourth wave of terrorism began in 1979 and was still ongoing at the time of
writing the document. Rapoport highlights that this wave was marked by transnational Islamist
terrorism and the emergence of non-state actors as major players in global conflicts. It mentions
that this wave witnessed the development of cellular structures and guerrilla-like hit-and-run
actions against troops.
Overthrowing the Autocratic Regime: Narodnaya Volya aimed to overthrow the autocratic
regime of Tsar Alexander II. The movement sought to challenge the existing political structure
and replace it with a system that would better represent the interests of the people.
Raising the Consciousness of the Masses: The movement believed in the power of terrorism as
a temporary means to raise the consciousness of the masses. They saw acts of violence and
terrorism as a way to expose the oppressive regime and provoke government repression, with the
ultimate goal of inspiring a popular uprising.
Advocating for Social Justice: Narodnaya Volya focused on addressing social injustices and
improving the conditions of the common people. They sought to create a society in which the
interests of the narod took precedence over the privileges of the ruling class.
Promoting Revolutionary Change: The movement aimed to bring about revolutionary change
by destabilizing the existing order through acts of terrorism. They believed that targeted violence
against state officials and representatives of the ruling elite would serve as a catalyst for political
and societal transformation.
The Narodnaya Volya movement strategically selected victims for symbolic reasons, targeting
individuals whose deaths would evoke emotional and political responses. They sought to expose
the regime's oppressive nature and inspire broader discontent among the population.
It is important to note that the objectives and tactics of the Narodnaya Volya movement were
based on the historical context of late 19th-century Russia and the specific challenges faced by
the movement at that time.
(Rafi)
David C. Rapoport, outlines four major waves of terrorism that have occurred since the late 19th
century, with each wave having its distinct characteristics, purposes, and tactics. Here is a
detailed analysis of each wave and how the fourth wave differs from the previous ones:
1. Religious motivations and objectives: While previous waves were driven by political
ideologies, the fourth wave is primarily motivated by religious extremism, particularly Sunni and
Shia Islamic fundamentalism, with the goal of establishing religious states governed by Sharia
law.
2. Suicide bombings: The tactic of suicide bombings, pioneered by Shia groups in Lebanon and
later adopted by Sunni organizations like Al-Qaeda, became a hallmark of the fourth wave,
reflecting the emphasis on martyrdom and self-sacrifice.
3. Transnational nature: The fourth wave is more transnational, with groups like Al-Qaeda
operating across multiple countries and regions, facilitated by global networks and the use of
remote training camps (e.g., in Afghanistan).
4. State sponsorship: Unlike previous waves, the fourth wave has seen active state sponsorship
of terrorist groups by countries like Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan (under the Taliban regime),
providing safe havens, training facilities, and resources.
5. Global reach: The fourth wave has a more global reach, targeting Western interests and
attempting to undermine secular governments in Muslim-majority countries, making it a truly
international phenomenon.
While terrorism has persisted throughout modern history, each wave has exhibited distinct
characteristics, reflecting the evolving socio-political landscape and the emergence of new
motivations, tactics, and technological capabilities. The religious underpinnings, transnational
nature, and global ambitions of the fourth wave pose unprecedented challenges for countering
this form of extremism.
Topic-2: New Terrorism (Anan)
Article: America and New Terrorism by Steven Simon & Daniel Benjamin
Key characteristics that distinguish the new form of terrorism from the traditional paradigm of
terrorism.
Motivation: The new form of terrorism discussed in the document is primarily motivated by
religious beliefs, whereas traditional terrorism may have political, ideological, or nationalistic
motivations. The religious motivation of the new terrorism, particularly its Islamic manifestation,
sets it apart from the traditional paradigm.
State sponsorship: Traditional terrorism often involves state sponsorship or support, where
terrorist groups receive backing, training, and resources from governments. In contrast, the new
terrorism discussed in the document is characterized by a lack of state sponsorship. It operates
independently, with non-state actors and networks driving its activities.
Targets and tactics: The new terrorism aims to produce casualties on a massive scale, targeting
civilians and public spaces. It seeks to create widespread fear and disruption through coordinated
attacks and the use of unconventional weapons. Traditional terrorism may have targeted specific
political or military entities rather than focusing on mass casualties and civilian populations.
Transnational nature: The new terrorism operates across borders and has a transnational
presence. It involves networks and operatives in multiple countries, which can make it more
challenging to attribute responsibility or combat effectively. Traditional terrorism may have been
more localized or regionally focused.
Shift in dynamics: The emergence of the new terrorism represents a shift in the dynamics of
terrorism. It introduces a new paradigm that combines religious motivation, non-state actors, and
a different set of tactics compared to traditional terrorism. This shift necessitates a reevaluation
of counter-terrorism strategies and approaches.
Religious extremism: The document highlights that the new terrorism is primarily motivated by
religious beliefs. Extremist interpretations of Islam, as propagated by figures like Osama bin
Laden, have played a significant role in driving the rise of this form of terrorism. The appeal of
religious ideology and the ability to mobilize individuals based on religious convictions
contribute to its growth.
Failure of traditional counter-terrorism measures: The document suggests that the rise of
new terrorism reflects a shift in the effectiveness of traditional counter-terrorism measures. The
strategies employed by governments to combat state-sponsored terrorism may not be as effective
against the decentralized and non-state actors associated with the new terrorism. This failure to
effectively address the evolving threat has contributed to its rise.
Leadership and recruitment: The influence and charismatic leadership of figures like Osama
bin Laden, as mentioned in the document, have played a crucial role in the recruitment and
mobilization of individuals for the new terrorism. The ability to inspire and attract followers has
contributed to the growth and expansion of extremist networks.
Does Duyvesteyn agree with this label 'new terrorism'? Are there more changes than
continuities in modern terrorism?
Isabelle Duyvesteyn challenges the prevailing view that terrorism in the late 20th century and
beyond is fundamentally new. It questions the supposed new aspects of terrorism, such as its
transnational nature, religious inspiration, use of weapons of mass destruction, and
indiscriminate targeting. Duyvesteyn is skeptical about the label of "new terrorism" and
questions its validity. The article argues that there are essential continuities between modern
terrorism and previous expressions of terrorist violence. Duyvesteyn highlights the territorial
focus, political motivations, use of conventional weaponry, and symbolic targeting as
continuities that challenge the notion of fundamental novelty in modern terrorism.
Duyvesteyn challenges the dominant view that modern terrorism represents a fundamentally new
phenomenon. The article suggests that while there are certain new aspects of terrorism, such as
transnational networks, religious inspiration, and the use of mass destruction weapons, these
elements should not overshadow the continuities with past forms of terrorism.
Duyvesteyn argues that the territorial focus, political motivations, use of conventional weaponry,
and symbolic targeting are enduring features that can be found in both historical and modern
instances of terrorism. These continuities suggest that there is a historical context and foundation
for understanding modern terrorism, rather than viewing it as a completely novel development.
The article emphasizes the importance of conducting more thorough historical investigations to
gain a comprehensive understanding of terrorism. By examining patterns, trends, and
transformations over time, researchers can identify the true new aspects of terrorism, if any, and
avoid overemphasizing the perceived novelty of contemporary manifestations.
Overall, Duyvesteyn's perspective challenges the notion of "new terrorism" and calls for a
nuanced approach that acknowledges both the changes and continuities in modern terrorism. It
encourages a deeper understanding of the historical roots and contexts of terrorism to provide a
more accurate assessment of its nature and evolution.
How do Duyvesteyn's views on the continuities in terrorism challenge the dominant "new
terrorism" narrative?
Duyvesteyn's views on the continuities in terrorism challenge the dominant narrative of "new
terrorism" by highlighting the enduring features and historical context of terrorist violence. Here
are a few ways in which Duyvesteyn's perspective challenges the notion of "new terrorism":
Territorial Focus: Duyvesteyn argues that the territorial focus of modern terrorists, their desire to
achieve political goals within a specific geographical area, is a continuity with past forms of
terrorism. This challenges the idea that modern terrorism is primarily transnational and lacks
territorial objectives.
Political Motivations: Duyvesteyn points out that the political motivations behind terrorism, such
as challenging existing power structures or advocating for specific ideologies, have persisted
over time. This challenges the notion that modern terrorism is solely driven by religious
fanaticism or lacks political objectives.
Conventional Weaponry: The use of conventional weapons by modern terrorists, such as firearms
and explosives, is seen as a continuity with historical forms of terrorism. This challenges the
perception that modern terrorists primarily rely on unconventional or technologically advanced
weapons.
Symbolic Targeting: Duyvesteyn emphasizes that modern terrorists still employ symbolic
targeting to achieve a surprise effect and generate attention. This challenges the idea that modern
terrorism is solely characterized by indiscriminate violence or random targetin
g.
By highlighting these continuities, Duyvesteyn argues for a more nuanced understanding of
terrorism that takes into account historical precedents and contextual factors. This challenges the
dominant narrative of "new terrorism" by suggesting that while there may be specific new
aspects in certain instances, terrorism as a whole is rooted in historical patterns and motivations.
It calls for a comprehensive analysis that goes beyond simplistic categorizations and recognizes
the complexities and historical dimensions of terrorist violence.
(Rafi)
Some scholars use the term 'New Terrorism' to describe what they perceive as a fundamentally
different form of terrorism that emerged in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This 'New
Terrorism' is characterized by several features that are claimed to be novel or unprecedented,
such as:
3. Use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and indiscriminate targeting of civilians to cause
mass casualties, rather than selective and symbolic targeting.
4. Lack of clear political goals or demands, with aims focused on inflicting maximum damage
and destruction.
However, Isabelle Duyvesteyn strongly disagrees with the label 'New Terrorism' and argues that
there are more continuities than changes in modern terrorism compared to its historical
manifestations. Her key arguments are:
1. Territorial claims and national/political motives are still present in many modern terrorist
groups, even those labeled as 'new' like Al-Qaeda.
2. Transnational links, network structures, and religious elements have existed in terrorist groups
throughout history, such as anarchist movements in the 19th century.
4. Indiscriminate targeting and high civilian casualties are not new phenomena, with several
historical examples of large-scale attacks by traditional terrorist groups.
5. Surprise, provocation, and publicity remain the primary effects sought by both traditional and
modern terrorist groups, rather than purely maximizing destruction.
Duyvesteyn argues that while the scale and lethality of terrorism may have increased due to
technological advancements and globalization, the fundamental nature and underlying
motivations of terrorism have not changed significantly. She calls for more thorough historical
investigations to appreciate truly new aspects of terrorism, if any, rather than relying on
perceived differences based on limited cases or events.
What, according to, Robert Pape is the strategic logic of suicide terrorism?
Robert A. Pape's analysis of the strategic logic of suicide terrorism offers several key insights.
He argues that suicide terrorism is not primarily motivated by religious fanaticism or individual
psychological factors, as commonly assumed. Instead, it is a calculated tactic employed by
terrorist organizations to achieve specific political goals.
Pape's research challenges the notion that suicide terrorism is predominantly associated with
Islamic fundamentalism. While Islamic groups receive significant attention in Western media,
Pape points out that the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, who adhere to a Marxist/Leninist ideology,
were actually the world leaders in suicide terrorism during the period under study. This
highlights the diverse ideological backgrounds of suicide terrorists and demonstrates that it is not
limited to a single religious or ideological group.
Furthermore, Pape finds that the personal characteristics and profiles of suicide attackers are
highly varied. They can come from different educational backgrounds, marital statuses, and age
groups. This challenges the notion that there is a standard profile for a suicide terrorist, making it
difficult to identify potential attackers in advance.
Pape's central argument is that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic aimed at coercing
liberal democracies into making significant territorial concessions. Terrorist organizations
employ this tactic to demonstrate their resolve and willingness to inflict severe harm in pursuit of
their political objectives. By targeting civilian populations and causing mass casualties, suicide
terrorists aim to create fear and political pressure, forcing governments to reconsider their
policies and make concessions.
The effectiveness of suicide terrorism, according to Pape, lies in the fact that it has often
achieved political gains for terrorist organizations. He highlights several cases where territorial
concessions were made by targeted governments following suicide attacks. This perceived
success incentivizes terrorist groups to continue using suicide terrorism as a strategic tool.
Pape suggests that countering suicide terrorism requires a nuanced approach. Western
democracies should pursue policies that challenge the perceived effectiveness of suicide attacks
and demonstrate that concessions are not guaranteed. This may involve improving homeland
security measures and addressing the root causes of terrorism to reduce the appeal of suicide
attacks.
Overall, Pape's analysis emphasizes the strategic nature of suicide terrorism and its purposeful
use as a means to achieve political ends. By understanding the underlying motivations and goals
of suicide terrorists, policymakers can develop more effective strategies to counter this form of
terrorism.
(Rafi)
According to Robert Pape, suicide terrorism is defined as the most aggressive form of terrorism
where the attacker does not expect to survive the mission and often employs a method of attack
that requires the attacker's death in order to succeed, such as planting a car bomb, wearing a
suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building. In essence, a suicide terrorist kills others at
the same time that he kills himself.
Pape argues that the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is to use the threat of punishment to
coerce a target government to change policy, especially to cause democratic states to withdraw
forces from territory that the terrorists view as their homeland. He contends that the main
purpose of suicide terrorism is coercion through punishment rather than mere destruction or
demonstrative acts.
The key points of the strategic logic of suicide terrorism as outlined by Pape are:
1. Timing: Nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as isolated or
randomly timed incidents, indicating a strategic calculation behind their timing.
2. Nationalist Goals: Suicide terrorist campaigns are directed at gaining control of what the
terrorists see as their national homeland territory, specifically at ejecting foreign forces from that
territory. It is a high-cost strategy used only when high nationalist interests are at stake.
3. Democracies as the Targets: Suicide terrorism is more likely to be employed against states
with democratic political systems than authoritarian governments. Pape cites three reasons -
democracies are often viewed as "soft" targets vulnerable to coercive punishment due to public
sensitivity to costs and ability to influence policy, suicide terrorists need some assurance their
opponent will be restrained in retaliation which democracies generally provide and suicide
attacks may be harder to organize in authoritarian police states.
4. Coercive Logic: The central logic is to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to
overwhelm their interest in resisting the terrorists' demands and cause either the government to
concede or the population to revolt against the government.
5. Credibility: Suicide attacks signal the likelihood of more pain to come, as suicide itself is a
costly signal suggesting that attackers cannot be deterred by threats of retaliation.
Pape argues that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic of coercive punishment aimed at
achieving nationalist goals of ejecting foreign forces from the terrorists' perceived homeland by
targeting democracies, which are seen as more vulnerable to such coercion.
Articles: State Terrorism by Ruth Blakeley & State Sponsored Terrorism by Daniel L.
Byman
b. Proxy warfare: States may support terrorist groups as proxies to fight their adversaries
indirectly. By using non-state actors, states can maintain plausible deniability and avoid direct
confrontation while achieving their strategic goals.
c. Ideological alignment: States may sponsor terrorist groups that share a similar ideology or
political agenda. This can be driven by a desire to promote a particular ideology, support
separatist movements, or challenge the influence of rival ideologies.
d. Regime security: States may sponsor terrorist groups as a means of suppressing internal
dissent or maintaining the stability of authoritarian regimes. By supporting groups that target
domestic opposition, states can effectively suppress opposition and maintain control.
e. Resource acquisition: States may sponsor terrorist groups to gain access to resources such as
illicit trade, natural resources, or strategic locations. Terrorist groups can provide a means for
states to control or exploit these resources.
What are the fundamental differences between state terrorism and state-sponsored
terrorism?
State Terrorism:
State terrorism refers to acts of violence directly carried out by representatives of a state. It
involves the state itself engaging in terrorist activities to instill fear and achieve political
objectives. State terrorism is characterized by the use of state apparatus, such as military, police,
or intelligence agencies, to commit acts of violence against civilians.
● State terrorism refers to acts of violence, repression, or intimidation carried out by a state
against its own population or civilians within its jurisdiction.
● State terrorism can manifest in various forms, including extrajudicial killings, torture,
enforced disappearances, mass surveillance, and systematic human rights abuses.
● The document highlights that democratic great powers, particularly during the Cold War
and the "war on terror," have been involved in state terrorism as part of their foreign
policies.
● State terrorism is often justified by the state as necessary for national security,
counterinsurgency, or the preservation of political stability.
● Critics argue that state terrorism undermines democratic values, violates human rights,
and perpetuates cycles of violence and instability.
State-Sponsored Terrorism:
State-sponsored terrorism involves a state providing support, resources, or safe havens to
non-state terrorist groups. The state sponsors these groups to carry out acts of terrorism on its
behalf or in alignment with its interests. State-sponsored terrorism is a form of indirect state
involvement in terrorism through support, rather than direct perpetration by state representatives.
(Rafi)
Different scholars make compelling arguments that states can indeed engage in terrorist activities
and therefore be considered 'terrorists'. Byman (2008) discusses strategic, ideological and
domestic political motivations for why states actively or passively support terrorist groups.
Blakeley (2007) explicitly focuses on 'state terrorism' and brings evidence of Northern
democracies like the US, UK and France being complicit in and perpetrating terrorist violence
against civilians for political purposes in other countries.
There are fundamental differences between state terrorism and state sponsored terrorism.
In state terrorism, states directly engage in violence against civilians and in state sponsored
terrorism, states support terrorist proxies but the violence is carried out by non-state actors.
States are the primary agents using terror in state terrorism, while in state sponsored terrorism
states provide funding, training and arms to third parties who carry out attacks.
State terrorism is more direct violence by a state itself against civilians, while state-sponsored
terrorism involves states instigating and facilitating terror through non-state intermediaries and
maintaining plausible deniability.
Both ultimately aim to achieve political goals through terror but state terrorism is more directly
violent and criminal compared to state-sponsorship which is less directly violent but still
critically enabling terror attacks.
Articles by Blakeley and Byman demonstrate that states can definitely engage in terrorist
activities and thereby be considered terrorists. Strategic goals, ideological motivations and
domestic politics are key drivers for states to support terrorist proxies. However some states like
major Northern democracies have also directly perpetrated terrorist violence against civilians in
other countries. While subtle differences exist, both state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism
represent the criminal politicization of violence against non-combatants by state actors.
Topic-5: Grassroots terrorism (Anan)
Articles: The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman & The Reality of
Grass-Roots Terrorism by Marc Sageman
Do transnational terrorist networks pose more threat than self-radicalized individuals and
homegrown terrorists? What is the evidence to support the answer?
The threat posed by transnational terrorist networks versus self-radicalized individuals and
homegrown terrorists is a complex issue that depends on various factors, including the scale,
sophistication, and impact of potential attacks. Both forms of terrorism present significant
challenges, but the nature and level of threat can differ.
Evidence of Threat
9/11 Attacks: The September 11, 2001, attacks orchestrated by Al-Qaeda are a prime example of
the devastating impact that a well-coordinated transnational terrorist network can have. The
attacks resulted in nearly 3,000 deaths and had profound global repercussions.
Paris Attacks (2015): The coordinated attacks in Paris by ISIS operatives killed 130 people and
injured hundreds, showcasing the lethal potential of transnational networks.
Mumbai Attacks (2008): The multi-day siege in Mumbai, carried out by the Pakistan-based
group Lashkar-e-Taiba, resulted in 166 deaths and highlighted the capability of transnational
groups to execute prolonged and complex attacks.
Self-Radicalized Individuals and Homegrown Terrorists
Characteristics
Decentralization: These actors operate independently or in small, loosely connected cells,
making them harder to detect and disrupt.
Local Knowledge: They often have a better understanding of local environments and can blend
in more easily.
Radicalization Pathways: They typically radicalize through online content, personal
grievances, or local networks without direct support from larger organizations.
Evidence of Threat
Orlando Nightclub Shooting (2016): Omar Mateen, a self-radicalized individual inspired by
ISIS propaganda, killed 49 people in a mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida.
Boston Marathon Bombing (2013): The Tsarnaev brothers, who self-radicalized through online
content, carried out bombings at the Boston Marathon, killing 3 people and injuring over 260.
San Bernardino Attack (2015): A married couple, radicalized through online content and
connections with extremist ideologies, killed 14 people in a mass shooting in San Bernardino,
California.
Comparative Analysis
Threat Magnitude
Transnational Networks: Tend to carry out fewer but more devastating attacks due to their
resources, expertise, and ability to coordinate complex operations.
Self-Radicalized Individuals: Often carry out more frequent, smaller-scale attacks that can be
just as deadly but typically lack the coordination and scale of transnational networks.
Conclusion
Both transnational terrorist networks and self-radicalized individuals pose significant threats, but
in different ways. Transnational networks have the capability to execute large-scale, coordinated
attacks with catastrophic consequences, while self-radicalized individuals and homegrown
terrorists are challenging to detect and can carry out frequent, unpredictable attacks. A balanced
and multifaceted counterterrorism strategy is necessary to address the threats from both forms of
terrorism effectively, leveraging intelligence, international cooperation, community engagement,
and online monitoring.
Supporting Evidence
Reports and Studies: Various governmental and academic reports highlight the evolving nature
of the terrorist threat landscape, emphasizing the need to address both organized and individual
actors. Examples include reports from the FBI, Europol, and academic studies on terrorism and
radicalization.
Historical Incidents: The documented cases of major terrorist attacks provide empirical
evidence of the differing impacts and methodologies of transnational networks versus
self-radicalized individuals.
By understanding the unique characteristics and threats posed by these different forms of
terrorism, policymakers and security agencies can better allocate resources and develop targeted
strategies to mitigate the risks effectively.
(Rafi)
There is scholarly evidence both for and against the notion that transnational terrorist networks
pose a greater threat than self-radicalized individuals and homegrown terrorists. While Marc
Sageman (2008) argues that the grassroots model of localized self-radicalization leads to greater
threat, Bruce Hoffman (2008) believes transnational networks are still the dominant threat
model.
Sageman (2008) presents evidence from extensive research of Western jihadists that the process
of radicalization today is increasingly grassroots and homegrown. Many Western Muslims are
radicalized through local social ties within their own communities, rather than direction from
al-Qaeda central. They form small, informal local clusters to plan and execute terrorist attacks
with means readily at hand in Western societies. Sageman shows multiple examples of such
localized cells being inspired by but not directed by al-Qaeda, like the 2004 Madrid train
bombers.
This grassroots model enables terrorist threats to emerge rapidly from within Western societies
with operators who already possess local knowledge, nationality and ability to move freely.
Sageman argues this diffusion of autonomous cells is a higher strategic threat than transnational
top-down networks as they are hard to map and disrupt through law enforcement. Localized self-
starters also pose a persistent threat that is impossible to eliminate completely.
On balance, both models appear to present significant threats, but of different types.
Transnational networks currently maintain greater ability to launch strategically impactful
spectacular attacks through resources and expertise. However, Sageman makes a persuasive case
that localized grassroots radicalization has produced a more persistent, diffuse and hard to
counter threat to Western societies from within. As transnational groups are degraded,
self-radicalized homegrown terror may emerge as the dominant al-Qaeda linked threat going
forward. A balanced strategy is needed to counter both transnational and grassroots terrorism
simultaneously.
Makarenko places the crime-terror nexus on a continuum because groups can slide between the
two depending on their environment and motivations. Organized crime and terrorism exist on the
same plane with potential to converge at the center. At one end is organized crime focused on
profits, while terrorism motivated by political goals sits on the other. Between them lay varying
degrees of alliances, shared motivations and ultimately convergence.
In terms of alliances, Makarenko notes groups form tactical partnerships for expertise, logistical
support or destabilizing shared enemies. For example, drug cartels hired terrorist groups for
bombings. Such alliances remain situation-specific without ideological blending. A deeper
example is the KLA-Albanian mafia alliance, which established a "drugs for arms" network
through the 1990s Balkan wars.
Moving right, groups develop in-house criminal or terrorist capabilities to avoid alliance
vulnerabilities. Criminals may use terror for disrupting legal challenges while terrorists raise
funds through drug trade, fraud etc. Makarenko cites Italian Mafia bombings challenging
anti-mafia laws as a criminal group adopting terrorism for operational aims. Terrorist
involvement in drug trade is also elaborated through historical case studies of FARC, ETA etc.
The center represents 'convergence' - hybrid entities with criminal and political goals.
Russian/Albanian mafias seek political influence through economic control. The KLA-mafia
alliance shows intertwined political-criminal activities. Groups like FARC lost ideology to drug
profits. Moving left, Makarenko argues terrorism's political rhetoric sometimes cloaks full-scale
criminal objectives.
The furthest point deals with 'black hole' scenarios where the most extreme convergence enables
ungoverned safe havens. Afghanistan under warlords and North Korea under 'Bureau 39' are
analyzed as states dominated by criminalized violence beyond any ideological goals. Sierra
Leone's RUF similarly had no political program, using permanent conflict for individual
aggrandizement through diamond trade.
Financing is critical for terrorist organizations as it serves as their "lifeblood," enabling them to
conduct operations, sustain their existence, and function effectively as organizations. Without
adequate funding, terrorist groups would be unable to carry out attacks, recruit new members,
provide training, acquire necessary equipment and resources, or offer social services to their
constituent populations. The importance of financing has led terrorist groups to carefully
consider various sources of funding based on six key criteria:
2. Legitimacy: Funding sources that demonstrate the group's legitimacy, or at least do not
undermine it, are preferred. Some activities, like drug trafficking, may alienate the group's
supporters, while others, like charitable donations, can enhance their perceived legitimacy.
3. Security: Terrorist groups seek funding sources that allow them to operate clandestinely and
avoid drawing unwanted attention from security forces. For example, legal businesses are less
likely to attract scrutiny compared to criminal activities like extortion or kidnapping.
4. Reliability: Consistent and predictable sources of financing are advantageous for terrorist
groups. The reliability of a funding source often depends on factors like geography and
demographics. For instance, the FARC's involvement in the cocaine trade is facilitated by its
proximity to drug production areas.
5. Control: Terrorist organizations prefer funding sources that allow them to maintain control
over their operations and members. External sponsors, like state sponsors, may attempt to
influence the group's tactics or objectives, undermining its autonomy.
6. Simplicity: Funding sources that require minimal effort, specialized skills, or complex
processes are more desirable for terrorist groups. Activities like petty theft or extortion are
relatively simple compared to elaborate operations like drug smuggling.
Based on these criteria, terrorist organizations typically utilize four primary types of financing
sources:
1. State sponsorship: During the Cold War, state sponsorship was a common source of funding
for terrorist groups, with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other nations supporting various
organizations. Today, Iran is a notable state sponsor, providing an estimated $100 million
annually to Hezbollah.
2. Illegal activities: Terrorist groups engage in a wide range of illegal activities to generate funds,
including extortion, kidnapping for ransom, theft, smuggling (drugs, weapons, people, etc.), and
counterfeiting. For example, the FARC has been heavily involved in the drug trade, while the
PKK has profited from human smuggling.
3. Legal activities: Some terrorist organizations operate legitimate businesses like farms, trading
companies, or construction firms to generate revenue. Al-Qaeda operated a range of legal
businesses during its time in Sudan, and the Provisional IRA owned pubs and taxi services in
Northern Ireland.
4. Popular support: Many terrorist groups, particularly Islamic ones, rely on charitable donations,
diaspora communities, and membership dues for funding. Hamas and the Taliban have received
substantial funds from charities and wealthy donors, primarily from the Gulf region.
Each of these sources has its advantages and disadvantages for terrorist groups, based on the
criteria mentioned earlier. By understanding the rationale behind various funding sources,
counter-terrorism efforts can be tailored to disrupt the specific financial networks and activities
of different terrorist organizations more effectively.
Topic-13: Financial Nexus (Rafi)
The financial nexus between terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime poses a serious
threat to global security. Various case studies highlight how these illicit activities are intertwined
and help fund terrorist operations. However, there are certain strategic interventions that can play
an important role in preventing such nexus.
Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS, Boko Haram and others have extensively relied on
revenues generated from drug trafficking over the past few decades. For instance, the Taliban
earns about half of its income from Afghan opium and heroin trade which it taxes (UNODC,
2017). Groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Africa derive
substantial profits from trafficking cannabis and cocaine through territories under their control.
In Colombia, the FARC had long funded its insurgency through cocaine sales and taxation. The
North Korean state produces methamphetamines which its diplomats help traffic abroad, earning
hard currency despite sanctions.
Terrorists supplement drug money with proceeds from other transnational crimes like trafficking
of counterfeits, antiquities, humans and illicit cigarettes. Organized criminal networks also
actively partake in global drug markets. For example, Mexican cartels and post-Soviet syndicates
profit immensely by moving Afghan heroin into lucrative European consumer bases through
established routes. Criminal groups such as D-Company from South Asia generate revenues
through diversified criminal markets including drug and arms trafficking as well as money
laundering operations spanning multiple countries and regions.
There is growing evidence that environmental crimes and wildlife trafficking also serve to
finance conflicts and terrorism. In Africa, charcoal trade in places like Somalia provide earnings
to Al-Shabaab while the lucrative fishing economy along Nigerian coastlines has been infiltrated
by Boko Haram. Illicit trade in conflict antiquities from Iraq and Syria thrived under ISIS
control.
Some key strategies that can help disrupt the financial links between these threats include:
strengthening multilateral counter-narcotics cooperation, cutting off terrorist access to criminal
markets, using anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws more effectively, regulating
high-risk commodity sectors prone to illicit infiltration, bolstering criminal justice systems in
conflict-regions and involving local communities more proactively in solutions.
Concerted international efforts are needed to curb drug cultivation and trafficking. The Colombia
model shows how military suppression of cartels and insurgents combined with crop substitution
programs supported by socio-economic development can gradually reduce drug production.
However, eliminating poppy in places like Afghanistan will require stability and governance,
which remains a long term challenge. Choking terrorist access to the Drug-Crime-Terror nexus
calls for globally coordinated intelligence and legal frameworks that allow tracking terrorist
monies flowing through these criminal conduits.
Laws against money laundering and terrorist financing need better implementation. Financial
intelligence units must monitor for suspicious transactions and illicit funds transfers across both
formal and informal value transfer systems. Recent regulation of renewable energy markets
shows how new investment sectors can be protected from abuse even as they emerge. Similarly,
managing high-value commodity economies in fragile regions through chain-of-custody
tracking, certification and trade monitoring may cut opportunities for terrorist-criminal
infiltration.
Rehabilitation of former militants, disrupting recruitment, and addressing local grievances that
fuel radicalization through community-centric programs also dent the allure of armed insurgent
groups. A multidimensional strategy involving security, legal and development prongs seems
indispensable to sever the growing financial nexus that strengthens the intersections between
drugs, organized crime and terror. Concerted global action is required to check this evolving
threat.
Islamic militant groups in Bangladesh have benefited significantly from developing nexus with
organized criminal activities and networks. This crime-terror nexus has facilitated their offensive
and defensive capabilities by providing resources for acquiring weapons, generating funds, and
sustaining logistical operations. According to the case studies and evidences from several
sources, militant groups like Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Neo-JMB, and
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B) have strategically exploited criminal
appropriation, cooperation, and marketplace interactions to further their agenda of violence.
In terms of strategy, the largest cohort of militants belonging to JMB, Neo-JMB pursued the
strategic appropriation of major criminal activities like transnational arms and explosives
smuggling from India, armed robbery of commercial entities, stockpiling of smuggled weapons,
and large-scale production of hand grenades and bombs within Bangladesh. By developing
specialized militant cells tasked with each criminal activity, these groups ensured independent
supplies of weapons and resources which are critical requirements for any terrorist organization.
Some other militants cooperated with existing criminal networks involved in activities such as
counterfeit currency operations, smuggling, and underground arms trade. Such cooperation
provided additional revenue streams and connections beyond their organizational capacities. A
few Old-JMB militants also transformed into professional criminals focused on monetary gains
over ideological goals.
In terms of interaction, a majority of lower-level militants from these groups engaged directly in
supportive roles for the criminal operations like transportation, retail sale, and safekeeping of
smuggled goods. On the other hand, senior leaders and deputies handled the procurement of
smuggled weapons, foreign funds through illegal money laundering networks, and management
of counterfeit currency syndicates. For example, JMB and Neo-JMB leaders liaised with Indian
smugglers along the porous border to procure firearms on a cash basis. Some high-ranking
ISIS-inspired Bangladeshi nationals like Saifullah Ozaki were involved in raising funds
deceptively for Syrian refugees and then laundering them through informal Hundi networks to
finance terror activities in Syria and Bangladesh.
In terms of process, most militants interacted with criminals and formed nexus in border areas by
exploiting the porous Indo-Bangladesh border and conducting unchecked movements. Some
engaged criminals in prison cells where they got radicalized. A few used virtual platforms and
online friendship networks to plan, recruit for, and financially support global jihadist causes like
ISIS through anonymous digital money laundering. For instance, Ex-Cadets Islamic Learning
Forum online discussion group comprised of members with differentiated roles as recruiters,
fighters and financiers for transferring funds to ISIS in Syria.
Islamic militant groups in Bangladesh have greatly benefited from the crime-terror nexus by
enhancing their logistical abilities. The strategic appropriation and cooperative engagement with
criminal markets and syndicates have provided them offensive resources like firearms and
explosives for executing terrorist attacks. Illicit funding avenues through counterfeiting,
smuggling, and digital money laundering have boosted their financial muscle. Interactive
interfaces in borderlands, prisons and online spaces have expanded their recruitment base and
global connectivity. Therefore, by leveraging the crime-terror nexus prudently, these terrorist
outfits have been able to escalate their kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within the country.
Topic-15: Missing Connections: Crime-Enabled
Terrorism Financing in Europe (Rafi)
#### Introduction
The introduction sets the stage by emphasizing the need to understand how terrorists exploit
Europe's criminal markets to finance their activities. Despite the acknowledged importance of
this issue, there is a noticeable gap in empirical research focused specifically on CETF in the
European context.
#### Methodology
The research was conducted from January 2022 to April 2023 and involved a comprehensive
literature review, a survey targeting Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) across 30 European
countries, and expert consultations. The survey aimed to gather insights from FIUs on the extent
and nature of CETF. Challenges included the limited availability of open-source material on TF
and the complexity of distinguishing between criminal and ideological motivations in certain
activities. The methodology was designed to build a robust understanding of CETF, despite these
limitations.
2. **Terrorist Financing (TF)**: Involves the provision or collection of funds with the
intention that they be used to support terrorist activities. This definition encompasses a wide
range of financial activities, from legitimate fundraising to illegal activities.
3. **Counterterrorist Financing (CTF)**: Encompasses the strategies and measures
implemented to prevent and combat the financing of terrorism. CTF efforts include legislative
frameworks, financial monitoring, and international cooperation.
4. **Crime-Enabled Terrorist Financing (CETF)**: Describes situations where terrorists
engage in or benefit from criminal activities to finance their operations. This concept highlights
the overlap between criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations, illustrating how terrorists
exploit criminal markets to sustain their activities.
3. **Summary**: While CETF is not the primary financing method for most terrorist groups in
Europe, it remains a significant concern. The large illicit market within the EU provides ample
opportunities for terrorists to generate funds through criminal means. This persistent threat
underscores the need for vigilant monitoring and targeted interventions by authorities.
2. **Key Finding 2**: Opportunistic relationships between terrorists and criminals facilitate the
procurement of resources like weapons and forged documents. These relationships are often
temporary and based on mutual benefit, allowing terrorists to access critical resources without
long-term commitments.
- **Recommendation 2**: The European Commission should include provisions in the next
Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) to classify obtaining or providing resources for TF
through criminal means as ‘aggravating circumstances’. This legal enhancement would
strengthen the penalties for CETF-related activities, acting as a deterrent and improving the legal
framework for prosecution.
3. **Key Finding 3**: Fraud is an increasingly common method of CETF in Europe, used by
various terrorist actors. Fraud schemes, such as credit card fraud or VAT fraud, provide a
lucrative and relatively low-risk source of funding for terrorists.
- **Recommendation 3**: Authorities should enhance their focus on fraud as a method of
terrorist financing and improve cross-sector cooperation to combat it. This effort would involve
financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory bodies working together to
identify and disrupt fraud schemes linked to terrorism financing.
#### Conclusion
The study concludes that while CETF is not the predominant method of terrorist financing in
Europe, it poses a significant risk due to the exploitation of the region’s illicit markets by certain
foreign-based terrorist groups. Effective prevention of CETF requires coordinated efforts to curb
both crime and terrorism within and around Europe. The recommendations provided aim to
enhance the understanding and mitigation of CETF risks, ultimately strengthening Europe's
overall counterterrorism framework. The study underscores the need for continued vigilance,
adaptive policies, and international cooperation to effectively combat the multifaceted threat
posed by CETF.
Warlordism in Afghanistan
The issue of warlordism has been a persistent challenge to the state-building process in
Afghanistan, particularly in the post-Taliban era. The phenomenon of warlordism, characterized
by the exercise of military, political, and economic power by individuals outside the
constitutional or legal framework, has deep historical roots in the country and has been
exacerbated by various internal and external factors.
Afghanistan's struggle with warlordism can be traced back to its history of a weak central
government and regionalist politics. Historically, the Afghan central government has had a
tenuous hold on power, with regionalist tendencies being the norm. This power vacuum has been
exploited by regional strongmen, or warlords, who have used regionalism to consolidate their
influence and control over specific geographical areas.
The manner in which the United States and its allies conducted the war against the Soviet Union
in the 1980s inadvertently facilitated warlordism. Instead of supporting a centralized political
authority, the United States provided weapons and money to various Afghan commanders,
empowering them and contributing to the fragmentation of power structures. This approach,
which was adopted again during the post-9/11 military campaign against the Taliban, reinforced
the position of regional commanders and warlords, further undermining the authority of the
central government.
Factors Contributing to the Persistence of Warlords
Several key factors have contributed to the persistence of warlordism in Afghanistan, despite
efforts to establish a stable and centralized state:
1. Weakness of the Central Government: The Afghan central government has historically
struggled to assert its authority beyond the capital, Kabul. This weakness has been exacerbated
by a lack of adequate funds, security structures, and infrastructure, leaving a power vacuum that
warlords have exploited.
2. Control over Resources: Warlords have maintained their power by controlling vital resources,
such as customs posts, transit routes, and illegal trades like drug trafficking. This control over
resources has enabled them to generate alternative sources of income, undermining the central
government's capacity to provide basic public goods and services.
3. Absence of Security Forces: The lack of effective international security forces or a credible
national army beyond Kabul has left the provinces outside central and international control.
Warlords have filled this security vacuum, consolidating their power without facing significant
opposition.
4. Regional Actors and Interests: Regional actors, such as Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), have played a significant role in supporting and empowering warlords, often to further
their own interests in the region.
1. Legitimacy and Authority of the Central Government: The presence of warlords undermines
the legitimacy and authority of the central government, as they control resources, territories, and
population centers outside the government's jurisdiction.
2. Security and Rule of Law: Warlords operate outside the legal framework, threatening the
establishment of a credible security apparatus and the rule of law in the country.
3. Economic Development: The control of resources and illicit activities by warlords hinders
economic development and the implementation of reconstruction efforts.
4. Ethnic Tensions: Warlords often exploit ethnic divisions and loyalties, potentially fueling
ethnic tensions and hindering national integration.
1. Political Engagement and Reconciliation: While some advocate for a hard-line approach
against warlords, others suggest the need for political engagement and reconciliation, offering
warlords incentives and potential roles in the political process to encourage their transition from
military to civilian leadership.
2. Strengthening the Central Government: Significant efforts must be made to strengthen the
capacity of the central government, particularly in terms of financial resources, security forces,
and administrative structures. This would enable the government to assert its authority and
provide public goods and services, reducing the need for alternative power structures.
4. Economic Development and Alternative Livelihoods: Addressing the economic factors that
fuel warlordism is essential. Promoting economic development, creating alternative livelihoods,
and tackling illicit activities like drug trafficking can undermine the financial resources of
warlords.
5. International Support and Regional Cooperation: Sustained international support, both in
terms of financial assistance and security forces, is vital for addressing warlordism. Additionally,
regional cooperation is necessary to prevent external actors from empowering or supporting
warlords for their own interests.
6. Strengthening Governance and Rule of Law: Efforts must be made to establish a functioning
legal system, effective law enforcement, and robust institutions that can uphold the rule of law
and hold warlords accountable for their actions.
Warlordism in Afghanistan represents a complex challenge that has persisted despite efforts to
establish a stable and democratic state. Its roots are deeply entrenched in the country's history of
weak central governance, regionalist politics, and external interventions. Addressing this issue
requires a comprehensive strategy that combines political engagement, economic development,
security measures, and sustained international support. Failure to effectively tackle warlordism
risks undermining the legitimacy of the central government, perpetuating insecurity, and
hindering the country's path toward lasting peace and stability. While progress has been made,
the persistence of warlordism remains a formidable obstacle that demands continued attention
and concerted efforts from both Afghan authorities and the international community.
The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) is a potent and well-organized militant group operating in
southern Afghanistan, posing a significant threat to the Afghan government and coalition forces.
The QST's primary objectives are to exert control over Helmand and Kandahar provinces, which
hold strategic importance. Helmand offers access to a supportive Pashtun population and revenue
from the narcotics trade, while Kandahar City is the spiritual home of the Taliban and the center
of operations for Mullah Omar's shura before the 2001 U.S. invasion.
The QST is headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar, who claims the title of "Amir-ul-Momineen"
or "Leader of the Faithful." The group's leadership is divided into two main bodies: the Rahbari
Shura and the Majlis al-Shura. Although Mullah Omar remains the figurehead, the day-to-day
operations are handled by his top deputy, Mullah Baradar, due to Omar's advanced age and "most
wanted" status.
The QST is organized functionally in southern Afghanistan, consisting of indigenous fighting
units and foreign fighters. Commanders plan and lead offensive and defensive operations, while
facilitators manage logistics. The group operates within a hierarchical chain of command
stretching back to Quetta, where the senior leadership provides guidance and adjusts the
campaign as necessary.
The QST employs a multi-pronged approach, combining offensive operations against coalition
and Afghan forces with a sophisticated intimidation campaign aimed at dissuading the
population from cooperating with the government.
On the offensive front, the QST conducts coordinated, multi-directional ambushes, raids on
Afghan National Police (ANP) fortifications, and sophisticated attacks involving suicide
bombers, often carried out by foreign fighters. Smaller units, comprised of 8-12 local fighters,
are responsible for planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), conducting small-scale
ambushes, and gathering intelligence.
The intimidation campaign targets influential figures, including security officials, tribal leaders,
militia commanders, pro-government clerics, and civilian administrators. Assassinations, public
executions, and night raids are used to instill fear and discourage collaboration with the
government and coalition forces.
The QST recruits from a pool of fighters sympathetic to the Taliban for various reasons,
including tribal identity, resentment towards the government or ISAF forces, or religious
obligations propagated by Taliban mullahs. Financial incentives, such as monthly salaries
ranging from $100-$350, are also used as a means of recruitment.
Foreign fighters, recruited from Pakistan's madrassas, refugee camps, and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), constitute a smaller but significant portion of the QST's
forces. These fighters are often better trained and more likely to conduct sophisticated attacks or
serve as suicide bombers.
Shadow Governance
Beyond military operations, the QST has demonstrated a concerted effort to replace existing
governance structures with their own mechanisms, effectively establishing a shadow government
in areas under their control.
In Kandahar and Helmand, the Taliban have established courts, issued edicts, and conducted
night patrols, projecting an aura of authority and control. They have also targeted cell phone
companies, demanding service disruptions to hinder communication and tip-offs from the local
population.
By assassinating government officials, tribal leaders, and clerics, the QST aims to fracture
existing power structures and eliminate dissenting voices, paving the way for their own
governance system.
The Quetta Shura Taliban represents a formidable and multifaceted threat to the Afghan
government and coalition forces in southern Afghanistan. Their well-organized leadership,
effective military operations, intimidation tactics, and efforts to establish shadow governance
highlight the group's determination to regain control over the region. Countering the QST's
influence requires a comprehensive strategy that addresses not only their military capabilities but
also their ability to infiltrate and influence the local population. Disrupting their recruitment
networks, dismantling their governance structures, and empowering legitimate Afghan
authorities are crucial steps in mitigating the QST's impact and ensuring lasting stability in
southern Afghanistan.
The Taliban's stunning takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 marked a significant turning
point in the country's tumultuous history. After a two-decade-long insurgency against the
U.S.-backed government in Kabul, the Islamic fundamentalist group swiftly regained control,
raising concerns about the future of human rights, security, and stability in the war-torn nation.
The Taliban's primary objective is to establish an Islamic Emirate governed by their strict
interpretation of Sharia law, as they did during their previous reign from 1996 to 2001. Their
ideology is rooted in Pashtun tribal traditions and the austere Deobandi school of Islam, which
emphasizes strict adherence to religious principles and the rejection of modern influences.
The group's worldview is shaped by their experiences during the Soviet-Afghan War and the
subsequent civil war, which left them disillusioned with the perceived corruption and
ineffectiveness of the Afghan government. The Taliban's vision for the country is one of order,
stability, and adherence to their interpretation of Islamic values, which often clashes with
internationally recognized human rights norms.
Organizational Structure and Leadership
The Taliban's organizational structure is hierarchical, with the Rahbari Shura (Leadership
Council) serving as the highest decision-making body. This council, also known as the Quetta
Shura due to its historical base in Quetta, Pakistan, is led by Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada,
who holds the title of Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful).
Beneath the Rahbari Shura is a caretaker cabinet, consisting of 33 members, many of whom are
former Taliban officials or individuals loyal to the group. Key figures include the acting Prime
Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund, Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar,
Acting Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani (leader of the notorious Haqqani Network), and
Acting Defense Minister Mullah Muhammad Yaqoub (son of the late Mullah Omar).
Since regaining power, the Taliban have imposed a harsh interpretation of Islamic law,
reminiscent of their brutal rule in the late 1990s. They have cracked down on civil liberties,
suppressed dissent, and severely curtailed the rights of women and minorities.
Women have been effectively erased from public life, with most girls barred from attending
secondary school and women prohibited from working in most sectors. The Taliban have also
reestablished the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforces
strict dress codes and behavioral norms.
The Taliban's governance efforts have been hampered by their lack of experience in running a
modern state and the economic challenges posed by international sanctions and aid suspensions.
The country's economy has plunged into a deep crisis, with an estimated 97% of the population
facing some form of poverty by mid-2022.
The Taliban's return to power has raised significant security concerns, both domestically and
internationally. Within Afghanistan, the group faces a potential threat from the Islamic State in
Khorasan (IS-K), a terrorist organization that has carried out numerous attacks, particularly
targeting minority communities like the Hazaras.
On the international front, the Taliban's close ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups pose a
potential risk of Afghanistan once again becoming a safe haven for terrorist organizations
capable of launching attacks against the United States and its allies. The recent killing of
al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul by a U.S. drone strike underscores the ongoing
presence of terrorist elements within the Taliban's ranks.
The Taliban's takeover has significant regional and global implications, particularly for
neighboring countries like Pakistan, Iran, and China, as well as for the broader international
community.
Pakistan, which has long been accused of supporting the Taliban, now faces the challenge of
managing its complex relationship with the group while also addressing the potential spillover of
instability and extremism into its own territory.
Iran, which has historically had a contentious relationship with the Taliban, is now seeking to
engage with the new regime in an effort to maintain its influence in Afghanistan and protect its
economic interests.
China, which has invested heavily in Afghanistan's natural resources and infrastructure projects,
is cautiously engaging with the Taliban in the hopes of maintaining stability and protecting its
economic interests in the region.
The broader international community, including the United States and its allies, faces the difficult
task of determining how to engage with the Taliban regime while upholding their commitment to
human rights and counterterrorism efforts.
The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan represents a significant setback for the international
community's efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and stability in the country. The
group's harsh interpretation of Islamic law, suppression of civil liberties, and potential harboring
of terrorist organizations pose significant challenges for the region and the world.
Addressing these challenges will require a multifaceted approach that combines diplomatic
pressure, targeted sanctions, and humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan
people. At the same time, the international community must remain vigilant in countering the
potential resurgence of terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan.
Ultimately, the path forward will depend on the Taliban's willingness to engage constructively
with the international community and moderate their policies to protect the rights and well-being
of all Afghans. Failing that, the country risks descending further into instability, poverty, and
isolation, with far-reaching consequences for the region and beyond.
Introduction:
The Islamic State-Khurasan Province (ISKP) is an affiliate group of the Islamic State (IS). The
article explores the emergence, ideology, activities, challenges, and the strategies employed by
regional and international actors to counter ISKP. It also emphasizes the importance of
incorporating the lessons learned from ISKP into broader international counterterrorism
strategies.
Conclusion:
While providing valuable insights into ISKP, the article also examines the group's emergence,
ideology, activities, challenges, and the strategies employed by regional and international actors
to counter its operations. By incorporating the lessons learned from ISKP, policymakers and
counterterrorism efforts can strengthen their ability to address the evolving threats posed by
extremist groups worldwide.
Topic 18- Pakistan-shefat
Geopolitical Shifts
The 1970s saw significant geopolitical changes in the region:
Afghan Coup (1973): The overthrow of King Zahir Shah by Muhammad Daud led to
tensions with Pakistan, as Daud made territorial claims on Pashtun areas.
Domestic Politics:
General Zia ul Haq's Coup (1977): The military takeover by General Zia ul Haq led
to a period of political instability and a focus on Islamization, which inadvertently fueled
religious extremism.
Islamization Policies: Zia's policies, aimed at consolidating power, promoted
religious education and institutions, often with a Sunni slant, which alienated Shia
communities and created fertile ground for sectarian conflict.
Pakistan's Support for Mujahideen: Pakistan became a key staging ground for the
Afghan mujahideen, providing them with training, weapons, and logistical support.
Rise of Extremist Groups: The Afghan Jihad saw the emergence of extremist groups,
including those that would later become involved in terrorism within Pakistan.
Terrorist Tactics: Terrorist attacks during this period were often focused on
disrupting Pakistani support for the mujahideen and were carried out by Afghan and
Soviet intelligence agencies.
Shifting Focus: The 1990s saw a shift from foreign-backed terrorism to more
domestically driven sectarian and ethnic violence.
Sectarian Violence: The Sunni-Shia divide intensified, leading to deadly clashes and
attacks on Shia communities.
Geographical Shift: Terrorist activity shifted from the north to the south, with
Sindh and Karachi becoming major targets.
US-led Invasion of Afghanistan (2001): Pakistan's alliance with the US against the
Taliban after 9/11 further complicated the situation.
New Dimensions: The War on Terror also saw the emergence of secessionist
terrorism in Baluchistan, fueled by grievances over resource exploitation and
political marginalization.
Foreign Influence: The involvement of foreign powers, such as the Soviet Union and
the United States, has often exacerbated tensions and provided opportunities for
extremist groups.
Ethnic and Regional Tensions: Long-standing ethnic and regional tensions have
contributed to violence and provided extremist groups with a base of support.
1. Political Instability:
Example: The 1977 coup by General Zia ul Haq led to a period of political uncertainty
and allowed extremist groups to gain a foothold, particularly through the promotion of
religious education and institutions.
Lack of Accountability: Weak governance often means a lack of accountability for
those who commit acts of violence, further emboldening extremist groups.
Example: The failure to prosecute perpetrators of sectarian violence in the 1990s
contributed to the escalation of such attacks.
2. Religious Extremism:
Sectarianism: The deep-rooted sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims,
fueled by historical grievances and theological differences, has been a major source of
conflict.
Example: The rise of groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP) in the 1990s, which targeted Shia Muslims, is a direct consequence of
this sectarianism.
Religious Ideology: Extremist interpretations of Islam, often used to justify violence
against those deemed "unbelievers" or "heretics," have provided a powerful ideological
framework for terrorist groups.
Example: The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) uses a strict interpretation of Islamic law to
justify its attacks on the Pakistani government and civilians.
Poverty and Lack of Education: Poverty and lack of education create fertile ground
for extremist ideologies to take root, offering a sense of purpose and belonging to
marginalized communities.
Example: The TTP has found support among Pashtun communities in the tribal areas,
where poverty and lack of education are widespread.
3. Foreign Influence:
Proxy Wars: Pakistan has often been caught in the middle of proxy wars, with foreign
powers using the country as a battleground for their own interests.
Example: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghan Jihad turned
Pakistan into a key player in the Cold War, with both the Soviet Union and the United
States supporting different factions.
Support for Extremist Groups: Foreign powers have sometimes provided support
to extremist groups, either directly or indirectly, furthering instability in Pakistan.
Example: The US's support for the mujahideen during the Afghan Jihad, while aimed
at combating the Soviet Union, inadvertently led to the rise of groups like al-Qaeda.
Military and Economic Aid: The influx of military and economic aid from foreign
powers, often with strings attached, can create dependence and undermine the Pakistani
government's ability to control its own affairs.
Example: The US's military and economic aid to Pakistan after 9/11, while intended to
combat terrorism, also created tensions and fueled resentment towards the Pakistani
government.
Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift: The September 11th attacks fundamentally altered the
global security landscape. Terrorism became a central concern, demanding a
comprehensive legal and strategic response.
The Zia Regime and Islamisation: The Zia regime (1978-1988) witnessed a
significant shift towards Islamisation in Pakistan, which, while intended to strengthen
national identity, inadvertently fostered a climate of sectarianism and extremism.
Sectarian Violence and the Rise of Militant Groups: This period saw the
emergence of sectarian groups like Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ) and
Sipah-e-Sahaba, contributing to a cycle of violence and instability, laying the
groundwork for the rise of terrorism.
Pakistan's Legal Framework for Counterterrorism:
The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997: This landmark legislation marked Pakistan's
first comprehensive attempt to address terrorism. It aimed to criminalize terrorist acts,
establish special courts, and provide a framework for counterterrorism operations.
Addressing Root Causes:** Tackling the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty,
social exclusion, and extremist ideologies, is crucial for long-term stability and security.
Conclusion:
The article begins by reviewing existing literature on factors influencing support for
Islamist violence, including economic arguments, piety and Islamism, support for
democratic politics, sectarian orientation, ethnicity, and knowledge of Islam. However,
it highlights the lack of research on gender's role in this context.
The authors then introduce their hypotheses: women are more likely to
support SSP due to its outreach efforts, while there is no significant gender
effect on support for the Afghan Taliban. Their analysis confirms these
hypotheses, finding that women are indeed significantly more likely to support SSP, but
not the Afghan Taliban.
The article concludes by emphasizing the need for future research to further explore the
complex relationship between gender, support for Islamist groups, and the strategies
employed by these groups to engage women. It also underscores the importance of
incorporating gender considerations in efforts to combat terrorism and extremism.
"Findings" and "Discussion"
Findings:
Discussion:
**In essence, the study reveals that gender is not a neutral factor in the context of
Islamist militancy. Understanding the role of women, their motivations, and the ways in
which they are targeted by different groups is essential for developing effective
strategies to combat terrorism and promote peace.**
Extremism and Terrorism Trends in Pakistan:
The article "Extremism and Terrorism Trends in Pakistan: Changing
Dynamics and New Challenges" by Hassan Abbas explores the evolving
landscape of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan. It highlights the resurgence of
the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State Khorasan
Province (ISK)'s expansion into Baluchistan, particularly targeting the
Brahui ethnic group. The article also examines the rise of targeted killings in Karachi
and the threat posed by Kashmir-focused militant groups.
Key Points:
Resurgence of TTP:
* ISK is expanding its recruitment drive in Baluchistan, targeting the Brahui ethnic
group.
* The ISK's local partner in Pakistan is Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami (LeJA), a sectarian
extremist group known for targeting Shi`a communities.
* The Brahui community, while generally conservative, is susceptible to recruitment by
extremist groups due to their religious inclinations and lagging socio-economic
development.
* The article highlights a potential link between Pakistani intelligence agencies and LeJ,
suggesting that the group was used to counter Baluch nationalists in the past.
**Targeted Killings in Karachi:**
**Other Threats:**
* The article also discusses the continuing threat posed by Kashmir-focused militant
groups, which have evaded counterterrorism scrutiny.
* The rise of violent sectarianism within Pakistan, particularly targeting the Shi`a
community, is another significant challenge.
**Overall, the article provides a comprehensive overview of the evolving terrorism and
extremism landscape in Pakistan, highlighting the complex dynamics and challenges
facing the country.**
Topic 19- Case Study: 2019 Easter Terror Attacks in
Sri Lanka (Rafi)
Introduction
The 2019 Easter terror attacks in Sri Lanka marked a tragic and unprecedented event in the
nation's history. On April 21, 2019, a series of coordinated suicide bombings targeted three
churches and three luxury hotels, resulting in the deaths of over 250 people and injuries to
approximately 500 others. These attacks were carried out by the National Thowheeth
Jama'ath (NTJ), a local Islamist militant group that had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The attacks were shocking not only due to their scale and brutality but
also because they exposed significant lapses in Sri Lanka's intelligence and security systems.
This case study examines the details of the attacks, the subsequent investigation, the identified
intelligence failures, the inquiries into these failures, and the proposed reforms to prevent such
tragedies in the future.
The NTJ operatives used suicide vests packed with high explosives, demonstrating a
level of coordination and training that was unprecedented for the group. The
attackers were primarily young men, some of whom were well-educated and from
affluent families, challenging typical profiles of suicide bombers.
The Sri Lankan government responded with a nationwide curfew and a massive
security crackdown, leading to the arrest of hundreds of suspects. Investigations
revealed that NTJ had received support from international terror networks,
including financial and logistical assistance. The forensic analysis of the attack
sites, interrogation of suspects, and examination of digital evidence unveiled an
extensive network of radicalized individuals within Sri Lanka who were prepared to
carry out further attacks.
The investigation faced several challenges, including the complexity of the terror
network, the need for international cooperation, and the management of public fear and
unrest. Despite these obstacles, the Sri Lankan authorities, with support from
international intelligence agencies, managed to dismantle much of the NTJ's
operational capabilities.
Intelligence Failures
One of the most critical aspects of the 2019 Easter attacks was the apparent failure of Sri
Lankan intelligence services to prevent the attacks despite having prior warnings.
Intelligence agencies from India had provided detailed warnings about the
potential attacks, including specific dates, targets, and the identities of key
suspects involved. These warnings were shared with Sri Lankan officials weeks
before the attacks.
However, this intelligence was not acted upon effectively. Several factors contributed to
this failure:
These failures were not just technical but also indicative of deeper systemic issues
within the Sri Lankan intelligence and security framework.
Inquiries into Intelligence Failures and Intelligence Reform
Following the attacks, there was a national outcry for accountability and reform. Several
inquiries were launched to investigate the intelligence failures and recommend
improvements:
#### Conclusion
The 2019 Easter terror attacks in Sri Lanka were a grim reminder of the vulnerabilities
that nations face in the fight against terrorism. The attacks not only resulted in immense
human loss and suffering but also exposed critical weaknesses in Sri Lanka's intelligence
and security systems. The subsequent investigations and inquiries revealed significant
lapses in coordination, communication, and preparedness, highlighting the need for
comprehensive reforms.
The lessons learned from these tragic events underscore the importance of effective
intelligence sharing, inter-agency cooperation, and proactive security measures. While
the recommendations for reform provide a roadmap for improving Sri Lanka's
counter-terrorism capabilities, the implementation of these reforms remains a complex
and ongoing challenge. Ensuring national security requires continuous vigilance,
adaptability, and a commitment to addressing systemic issues within the intelligence
and security framework.
The 2019 Easter attacks serve as a sobering case study for other nations, emphasizing
that the fight against terrorism is an ever-evolving battle that demands robust, dynamic,
and coordinated efforts at both national and international levels.
Introduction
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, engaged
in a violent struggle for an independent Tamil state in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.
This led to a protracted and bloody civil war lasting several decades. After the decisive
defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, Sri Lanka embarked on an ambitious rehabilitation
program aimed at the over 11,000 captured or surrendered LTTE members. This
program is not only crucial for the stability and reconciliation in post-conflict Sri Lanka
but also serves as a potentially replicable model for global counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency efforts.
Categorization of Detainees
A pivotal first step in the rehabilitation process was the categorization of detainees
based on their level of involvement and specific activities within the LTTE. This
categorization was achieved through detailed interviews and thorough background
checks, resulting in the classification of individuals into high, medium, or
low-risk categories:
-High Risk (A and B groups):** This group consisted of frontline leaders and those
actively involved in significant roles within the LTTE. These individuals were typically
subjected to judicial processes and detention, rather than rehabilitation, due to the
severity of their involvement.
-Medium Risk (C and D groups):** This group included individuals with moderate
levels of involvement. Depending on the specific circumstances, these individuals were
either detained or sent to rehabilitation centers for further processing.
- **Low Risk (E and F groups):** This group consisted of minor participants in the
LTTE's activities. These individuals were generally placed in rehabilitation centers,
known as Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centres (PARCs), where they
underwent comprehensive rehabilitation.
Modes of Rehabilitation
Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program employed six distinct modes of
rehabilitation to facilitate the transformation of detainees into productive
and peaceful citizens:
1. Educational Rehabilitation:
- This component focused on providing academic education, particularly targeting
those who had not completed basic education. Efforts were made to impart literacy and
numeracy skills in Tamil, Sinhala, and English.
- For beneficiaries under 18 years of age, a formal education was provided in a
structured, residential school environment. Additionally, adult supplementary
education was offered to improve literacy and numeracy among older beneficiaries.
2. **Vocational Rehabilitation:**
- Vocational rehabilitation emphasized skill-building that would be useful for future
employment. As detainees progressed through the rehabilitation program, vocational
training became increasingly important and desired.
- Training covered various trades, equipping beneficiaries with marketable skills that
could facilitate their reintegration into society and enhance their employment prospects.
3. **Spiritual Rehabilitation:**
- This aspect aims to promote values of peace and coexistence through religious
teachings and spiritual activities.
- Activities included recitations and readings of historical texts, along with engagement
in cultural and religious practices, fostering a sense of reflection and personal
transformation among the beneficiaries.
4. **Psychosocial Rehabilitation:**
- Addressing mental health issues was a crucial component of the rehabilitation
program. Counseling services were provided to help beneficiaries cope with past
traumas and psychological scars.
- The program included activities designed to build emotional resilience and social
skills, aiding in the overall well-being of the detainees.
5. **Recreational Rehabilitation:**
- Physical activities, sports, and other recreational pursuits were incorporated to
promote teamwork and physical well-being.
- This mode of rehabilitation aims to offer a balanced approach, ensuring that
beneficiaries engage in leisure activities as part of their overall rehabilitation process.
---
Introduction
Overview
The **National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2018)** provides a detailed blueprint for
how the United States plans to tackle and mitigate the complex threats posed by
terrorism. The document serves as a guiding framework under the Trump
Administration, emphasizing a proactive, whole-of-government approach to ensure the
safety of the American people and interests abroad.
Key Points
- **Counter Radicalization:** Addressing the root causes and pathways that lead to
radicalization and recruitment into terrorist activities. This involves promoting
counter-narratives and supporting community-based prevention efforts.
- **Radical Islamist Terrorism:** Groups like ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates
pose significant threats due to their global reach and ideological commitment to
attacking the U.S. and its interests. These groups are adept at exploiting ungoverned
spaces and using sophisticated propaganda to recruit followers.
- **Continuous Adaptation:** The strategy highlights the need for a flexible and
adaptive approach to counterterrorism. As threats evolve, so too must the strategies and
resource allocations to effectively counter them.
- **Global Pursuit:** Actively targeting terrorists wherever they operate around the
world. This includes using military, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities to
disrupt and dismantle terrorist networks.
- **Asset Freezing:** Identifying and freezing assets linked to terrorism. This includes
tracking and blocking financial transactions and holdings that are connected to terrorist
activities.
## Conclusion
---
These expanded notes provide a detailed overview of each major point in the chapter
outline, covering the comprehensive approach taken by the 2018 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism. This elaboration should serve as a robust study guide, offering a deep
understanding of the strategic objectives, methods, and principles guiding the U.S.
counterterrorism efforts.
EU: Understanding EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: A
Comprehensive Examination
This in-depth examination delves into the European Union's (EU) multifaceted
approach to counter-terrorism, exploring its legal framework, policy developments, and
the ever-present challenges it faces. It dissects the persistent terrorist threat facing the
EU, its external dimension in counter-terrorism, and the financial instruments deployed
to combat terrorism. Finally, it discusses the European Parliament's role and the future
direction of EU counter-terrorism policy.
Terrorism in the EU is not a recent phenomenon. Member States like France, Italy,
Spain, and the UK have a long history of combating domestic terrorist groups. However,
the 9/11 attacks in 2001 transformed the threat into a global phenomenon, demanding a
coordinated response.
The evolution of the terrorist threat has been dynamic and unpredictable:
* **A Growing Trend:** Between 2000 and 2018, 753 people died in EU terrorist
attacks, and 1115 EU citizens fell victim to terror outside the EU. From 2010 to 2021,
1871 terrorist attacks occurred within the EU, highlighting the ongoing nature of the
threat.
* **From Large-Scale Attacks to Lone Actors:** The rise of Da'esh (Islamic State)
and the influx of foreign fighters returning from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq led to
large-scale attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016). However, as Da'esh lost ground,
terrorist activity shifted to more spontaneous and unpredictable attacks by lone actors,
often using readily available tools.
* **Democratization of Terrorism:** Technological advancements, particularly
online access to extremist material, have made it easier for individuals to radicalize and
carry out attacks, leading to the "democratization of terrorism." This has made it more
difficult to predict and prevent attacks.
* **Right-Wing Extremism:** While the EU has experienced fewer acts of
right-wing terrorism, there is a growing problem of right-wing violence, including hate
crimes. This trend is particularly concerning, as it often targets marginalized groups and
fuels social division.
* **Left-Wing and Anarchist Extremism:** While historically focused on property
damage, there is growing concern about an increased propensity for violence within
left-wing and anarchist extremist circles. This shift in tactics necessitates a reassessment
of strategies to counter this form of extremism.
* **Pandemic and Hybrid Ideologies:** The COVID-19 pandemic provided an
opportunity for extremist groups to exploit mass protests and spread conspiracy
theories, leading to the emergence of new "hybrid" ideologies. These ideologies often
combine elements of traditional extremism with anti-establishment sentiments, making
them more difficult to categorize and counter.
* **Extremist Online Presence:** Lockdowns during the pandemic led to a
significant increase in extremist online presence, moving from well-known platforms to
less-known and less regulated ones. This shift has made it harder to monitor and control
the spread of extremist content online.
The EU's counter-terrorism efforts are grounded in a robust legal framework and a
series of policy developments:
* **Legal Basis:**
* **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):** Article 83 lists
terrorism as a serious cross-border crime, allowing for common minimum rules.
However, Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) emphasizes national
security as the sole responsibility of each Member State, requiring a delicate balance
between EU-level action and national sovereignty.
* **Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU):** The EU can mobilize resources to
prevent or respond to terrorist attacks in any Member State, demonstrating its
commitment to collective security.
* **Fundamental Rights:** EU counter-terrorism measures must respect
fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including
privacy and data protection. This ensures that counter-terrorism measures are
implemented in a way that upholds human rights and safeguards civil liberties.
* **Policy Developments:**
* **TREVI Group (1976):** An intergovernmental network of representatives from
justice and home affairs ministries, established to address terrorism, radicalism,
extremism, and violence. This early initiative laid the groundwork for future EU-level
cooperation on security matters.
* **Post-9/11:** The EU adopted its first action plan and the Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism (2002), providing a common definition of terrorist offences. This
marked a significant shift towards a more coordinated approach to counter-terrorism.
* **2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy:** Based on four pillars: prevention,
protection, pursuit, and response. Emphasized global reach and cooperation with
non-EU countries. This strategy broadened the scope of counter-terrorism efforts
beyond the EU's borders, recognizing the global nature of the threat.
* **2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda:** Builds on past achievements and
focuses on:
* **Anticipate:** Developing strategic intelligence and enhancing preparedness
and early detection capacity. This proactive approach aims to identify potential threats
before they materialize.
* **Prevent:** Countering radicalization and extremist ideologies, particularly
online. This focuses on addressing the root causes of extremism and preventing
individuals from being radicalized.
* **Protect:** Increasing resilience of critical infrastructures and protecting
people in public spaces. This emphasizes safeguarding vulnerable targets and mitigating
the impact of attacks.
* **Respond:** Securing external borders and reinforcing law enforcement and
judicial cooperation. This focuses on strengthening the EU's capacity to respond to
terrorist attacks and apprehend perpetrators.
The EU recognizes the global nature of the terrorist threat and emphasizes cooperation
with non-EU countries and international institutions:
* **EU Global Strategy (2016):** Aims to join up internal and external policies,
including counter-terrorism. This strategy underscores the interconnectedness of
internal and external security, recognizing that terrorism cannot be effectively
countered without a global approach.
* **Security Union Strategy:** Recognizes the importance of external security and
its link to internal security. This strategy emphasizes the need to address the root causes
of terrorism, including poverty, inequality, and conflict, in order to prevent its spread.
* **External Action:** The EU employs a range of measures to address the external
dimension of counter-terrorism, including:
* **Development Aid:** Supporting countries to address the root causes of
terrorism, such as poverty and inequality. This aims to create a more stable and secure
environment, reducing the likelihood of individuals being drawn to extremist ideologies.
* **Military Action:** Participating in international military operations against
terrorist groups. This involves working with other countries to degrade and dismantle
terrorist organizations.
* **Diplomatic Efforts:** Working with other countries to strengthen international
cooperation against terrorism. This involves sharing information, coordinating
strategies, and promoting common standards for counter-terrorism.
* **Border Control:** Strengthening external border controls to prevent terrorists
from entering the EU. This aims to prevent individuals who pose a security threat from
entering the EU and carrying out attacks.
* **Financial Instruments:**
* **Internal Security Fund (ISF):** Provides financial support for projects
related to counter-terrorism, including border control, law enforcement, and judicial
cooperation. This fund helps Member States implement EU-level counter-terrorism
measures and strengthen their national security capabilities.
* **European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI):** Supports investments
in critical infrastructure, which can help to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.
This fund helps to make critical infrastructure, such as transportation networks and
public buildings, more resilient to terrorist attacks.
* **Horizon Europe:** Supports research and innovation projects related to
counter-terrorism, including the development of new technologies to prevent and
combat terrorism. This fund promotes research and development in areas such as
artificial intelligence, data analytics, and cybersecurity, which can be used to improve
counter-terrorism efforts.
**V. European Parliament's Role: A Vital Check and Balance**
The EU has adopted a series of legislative measures to address the evolving nature of the
terrorist threat:
* **Future Directions:**
The EU faces a complex and evolving terrorist threat. Its counter-terrorism policy has
evolved significantly since 9/11, with a focus on harmonizing criminal laws,
strengthening law enforcement cooperation, and addressing the online dimension of
extremism. However, challenges remain, including balancing security and fundamental
rights, addressing the root causes of terrorism, and ensuring effective implementation
and evaluation of counter-terrorism measures. The EU must continue to adapt its
approach to meet the evolving nature of the terrorist threat and ensure a coordinated
and effective response.
Canada CT Strategy (Anan)
Violent Sunni Islamist Extremism: This is the primary threat, with groups like
al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Shabaab posing significant risks.
The document highlights the dangers of homegrown extremism, where individuals
radicalize and potentially carry out attacks within Canada.
Other International Terrorist Groups: The document mentions groups like the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hizballah, and Hamas, emphasizing the need
to monitor and counter their activities.
Domestic Issue-Based Extremism: While less prominent than other threats, the
document acknowledges the potential for domestic groups to engage in terrorism,
especially those motivated by specific issues.
The Strategy:
Fundamental Principles: The strategy is guided by respect for human rights, the
rule of law, proportionality, and adaptability.
Beyond al-Qaeda: The document acknowledges that the threat goes beyond
traditional terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. It recognizes the rise of decentralized,
independent extremist groups, often inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology but operating
autonomously.
The Internet's Role: The document highlights the significant impact of the internet
on radicalization. Extremist groups use online platforms to spread propaganda, recruit
members, and inspire lone-wolf attacks. This poses a challenge for authorities as it's
difficult to control the flow of information online.
Foreign Fighters: The document addresses the issue of Canadians traveling to
conflict zones to join extremist groups. These individuals pose a threat both abroad and
upon their return, potentially bringing back combat experience and radicalized
ideologies.
Preventing Radicalization:
Addressing Root Causes: The strategy emphasizes the importance of addressing the
underlying factors that contribute to radicalization. This includes social, economic, and
political grievances that can make individuals susceptible to extremist ideologies.
Building Resilience: The strategy aims to build resilience within communities by
promoting social cohesion, fostering dialogue, and addressing issues like discrimination
and marginalization.
Countering Extremist Narratives: The strategy recognizes the need to challenge
extremist narratives and provide alternative perspectives. This includes promoting
tolerance, understanding, and respect for diversity.
Continuous Evaluation: The strategy emphasizes the need for continuous evaluation
and adaptation to address the evolving nature of the terrorist threat. This includes
monitoring emerging trends, adapting tactics, and updating policies.
Transparency and Accountability: The strategy emphasizes the importance of
transparency and accountability, ensuring that the public is informed about the threat
and the government's efforts to counter it.
In summary, Canada's counter-terrorism strategy is a comprehensive and multi-faceted
approach that seeks to prevent radicalization, detect and disrupt terrorist activities, and
respond effectively to attacks. It emphasizes the importance of partnerships, resilience,
and ongoing adaptation to address the evolving threat landscape.
1. Prevention:
Balancing Security and Freedom: The strategy faces the challenge of balancing
security measures with the protection of individual freedoms and privacy. This involves
finding a delicate balance between surveillance and monitoring online activity while
respecting individual rights.
The Evolving Nature of Online Extremism: The strategy must constantly adapt to
the evolving nature of online extremism. This includes staying ahead of new platforms,
tactics, and ideologies used by extremists.
In summary, Canada's counter-terrorism strategy acknowledges the threat of lone-wolf
attacks inspired by online extremism and addresses it through a multi-pronged
approach that includes prevention, detection, disruption, and response. The strategy
recognizes the challenges of this evolving threat and emphasizes the need for ongoing
adaptation and collaboration with partners.attacks inspired by online extremism?
What are the key challenges Canada faces in implementing its
counter-terrorism strategy against online extremism?
Canada faces several key challenges in implementing its counter-terrorism strategy
against online extremism. These challenges stem from the very nature of the internet
and the evolving tactics of extremist groups:
Surveillance and Privacy: The need to monitor online activity for potential threats
raises concerns about privacy and civil liberties. Balancing security measures with
individual rights is a delicate and complex issue.
Censorship and Free Speech: Restricting extremist content online raises concerns
about censorship and free speech. Striking a balance between protecting individuals
from harmful content and upholding freedom of expression is challenging.
4. The Role of Social Media Companies:
Social and Economic Factors: Online extremism often appeals to individuals who
are marginalized, disenfranchised, or seeking a sense of belonging. Addressing
underlying social and economic factors that contribute to vulnerability is crucial for
preventing radicalization.
Promoting Critical Thinking: Empowering individuals to critically evaluate online
information and resist manipulation is essential. This involves promoting media
literacy, critical thinking skills, and healthy online habits.
Introduction:
The article "Intelligence and Counter Terrorism" by Julian Richards delves into the
intricate relationship between intelligence and countering terrorism. It emphasizes the
historical significance of intelligence in conflict, drawing upon the wisdom of ancient
military strategists such as Sun Tzu and Baron Karl Von Clausewitz. The author explores
the evolution of national security discourse from traditional state actors to the focus on
combating international terrorism. Additionally, the article discusses the implications of
this shift on intelligence gathering capabilities.
The article explores the transformation of national security discourse following the Cold
War, with a significant focus on countering international terrorism. It criticizes the
controversial labeling of this struggle as the "War on Terror" and highlights the
complexity of terrorism as a power element exercised by both state and non-state actors.
The author argues that the framing of terrorism as a major threat justifies the
expansion of intelligence gathering capabilities and the emergency powers
assumed by states.
3. Game Theory and the Interaction between Terrorist and State Actors:
The article delves into the analysis of the interaction between terrorist and state actors
using Game Theory approaches. It emphasizes the interdependence between these
actors and the vital role of intelligence gathering as a proactive and pre-emptive
counterterrorism policy. States seek to acquire intelligence on terrorist groups to gain
"foreknowledge," as advocated by Sun Tzu. On the other hand, terrorists require
information about counterterrorism capabilities to outwit the state.
5. Definitions of Intelligence:
The article addresses the definitional challenges in the field of Intelligence Studies,
paralleling the debates in Terrorism Studies about defining terrorism. It explores
different perspectives on intelligence, focusing on both the agencies responsible for
intelligence gathering and the information they acquire. The distinction between
information and intelligence is discussed, with intelligence considered a refined or
developed form of information. The role of secrecy and the utility of information in
defining intelligence are also examined.
The article delves into the various tradecraft techniques employed in intelligence
gathering. It distinguishes between human intelligence (Humint) and technical
intelligence gathering (Techint). Humint involves persuading individuals to provide
sensitive information or infiltrating target groups, while Techint utilizes technical means
such as intercepting electronic communications (Sigint) or gathering imagery data
(Imint). The article also touches upon other forms of intelligence, including open-source
intelligence (Osint) and financial intelligence (Finint).
7. Intelligence, Covert Action, and Ethical Debates:
The connection between intelligence and action on the ground is a significant area of
debate in countering terrorism. The article examines the ethical considerations
surrounding covert action, where intelligence agencies act upon the information they
gather. It compares the traditional British model, where intelligence agencies provide
information to other agencies responsible for action, with models in other countries
where intelligence agencies have executive arms and engage in direct action. The article
raises ethical questions about the use of extreme violence and the risks associated with
erroneous intelligence.
The post-9/11 era has witnessed a greater emphasis on "community intelligence" due to
the domestic nature of terrorism threats. The article underscores the importance of
engaging with religious and ethnic communities that have traditionally been less
involved with state authorities. It discusses the community engagement activities
carried out by police services and their role in counterterrorism efforts. The shift
towards preemptive and preventive action in counterterrorism strategies is explored,
particularly in the context of the UK's Prevent strategy.
Conclusion:
Introduction:
South Asia has a long-standing history of intelligence practices and statecraft. The
chapter begins by highlighting the historical significance of South Asia in the realm of
intelligence, tracing its roots back to ancient texts such as Chanakya Kautilya's
Arthashastra. This classical treatise, written in the third century BC, provides valuable
insights into intelligence gathering, espionage, and military strategies employed by
ancient South Asian rulers. Additionally, Abul Fazl's Ain-i-Akbari offers a historical
account of a network of spies during the reign of the Sultans and Mughals, underscoring
the long-standing tradition of intelligence gathering in the region. Moreover, the chapter
references Richard Popplewell's work on intelligence and imperial defense under the
British Raj, highlighting the evolution of surveillance and security practices in South
Asia over time.
The chapter delves into the major threats faced by South Asian countries in the realm of
counterterrorism. It identifies three primary threats: Islamist extremism, ultra-left
movement, and ethno-separatist movements. Islamist extremism poses a significant
challenge, with transnational terrorist networks such as al Qaeda and ISIS exerting
influence and establishing operational bases in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The ideological impact of these extremist groups on homegrown militants in countries
like Bangladesh, India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka is a cause for concern for security forces
in the region. Additionally, the chapter explores the expansion of Kashmir-focused
militancy in India, with militant groups increasingly targeting urban centers such as
Delhi and Mumbai. The rise of the ultra-left movement, exemplified by the Maoist
insurgency in Nepal and pockets of India, presents another security challenge in the
region. Furthermore, the chapter acknowledges the threat posed by ethno-separatist
movements, which aim to challenge the territorial integrity of countries like India and
Pakistan. It highlights the conflicts in regions such as Kashmir, Northeast India, and
Balochistan as examples of ethno-separatist movements that have necessitated robust
counterterrorism measures.
Militarization Theory:
The chapter introduces the concept of militarization and its significance in shaping
policing and intelligence practices. It distinguishes between militarism, which refers to
the glorification of military power and values, and militarization, which denotes the
process of arming, organizing, planning, and training for violent conflict. The focus of
the chapter is on militarization, particularly as it pertains to policing. It explores Peter
Kraska's theory of militarized policing, which encompasses four dimensions: material,
cultural, organizational, and operational.
Militarization in Policing:
Building upon Kraska's theory, the chapter extensively analyzes the manifestations of
militarization in policing practices within the South Asian context. It provides detailed
examples and case studies to illustrate the various dimensions of militarization
discussed earlier.
To provide empirical evidence and deeper insights, the chapter conducts a comparative
analysis of counterterrorism responses in different South Asian countries. The analysis
encompasses countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The methodology employed is structured and focused
comparison, which allows for qualitative research and theory-building.
Findings:
The analysis of counterterrorism responses in South Asia yields several findings that
contribute to understanding the extent of militarization in policing and intelligence
efforts. The chapter highlights the dual roles of military-controlled intelligence agencies
in internal and external security matters. These agencies actively seek leadership roles
in counterterrorism coordination committees, indicating their involvement in both
intelligence gathering and operational counterterrorism activities.
Furthermore, the analysis reveals the prevalence of material, cultural, organizational,
and operational militarization in policing and intelligence practices across South Asian
countries. It underscores the acquisition of advanced weaponry and technologies, the
adoption of military symbols and language, the establishment of hierarchical command
structures, and the expanded involvement of police in intelligence and high-risk
operations.
Conclusion:
The chapter concludes by emphasizing the importance of studying the evolving nature of
terrorist threats and state responses in postcolonial South Asia. It highlights the need to
consider the impact of militarization on policing, intelligence, and counterterrorism
dynamics in the region. The implications of militarization theory in the South Asian
context are discussed, highlighting its relevance for understanding the changing security
landscape.
The findings drawn from the case study analysis and the extended theory of intelligence
community militarization contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the subject
matter. The chapter concludes by suggesting future research directions, such as
exploring the local and global implications of militarization in South Asia's fight against
terrorism. It emphasizes the need for ongoing analysis and evaluation of the
effectiveness and consequences of militarized approaches in addressing security
challenges in the region.
Chapter Overview:
The chapter titled "Bangladesh's Intelligence Culture and Reform Priorities" provides a
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the intelligence community (IC) in Bangladesh,
focusing on its organizational structure, intelligence culture, and key reform priorities.
The chapter explores various aspects such as specific intelligence services, drivers of
reform, oversight mechanisms, international cooperation, and the influence of politics
on intelligence culture and reform priorities.
1. Bangladesh's Intelligence Community and Culture:
Bangladesh's intelligence community inherits a bureaucratic system with a culture of
secrecy from its British colonial past. Since gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971,
intelligence agencies have played a crucial role in collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating information for internal control and external security. The intelligence
agencies have historically enjoyed an expansive mandate in internal affairs due to
concerns over regime survival, ethnic insurgency, and maintaining law and order.
However, recent developments such as the fight against terrorism, multidimensional
peacekeeping, and the influx of refugees have necessitated a shift towards a more
comprehensive intelligence approach. As a result, reform priorities have focused on
capacity building, interagency coordination, and international cooperation to enhance
the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence operations.
3. Drivers of Reform:
Several key events have shaped intelligence reform in Bangladesh. The fight against
terrorism, border issues, and challenges posed by a significant influx of refugees have
been central drivers of reform in recent years. The country has experienced high-profile
intelligence failures over the past two decades, including terrorist attacks and major
security breaches. These incidents have prompted a renewed focus on capacity building,
interagency coordination, and international cooperation to enhance the intelligence
community's ability to prevent and respond to security threats effectively.
4. Oversight Mechanisms:
Effective oversight is crucial in ensuring accountability and the proper functioning of
intelligence agencies. The chapter explores the institutions and coordination of
intelligence oversight in Bangladesh. It emphasizes the significance of robust oversight
mechanisms to prevent abuse of power, protect civil liberties, and maintain public trust
in the intelligence community. Oversight bodies, such as parliamentary committees and
independent review boards, play a vital role in monitoring intelligence activities,
ensuring compliance with the law, and safeguarding human rights.
Hierarchy and Discipline: The intelligence agencies are highly hierarchical, with a
strong emphasis on discipline, loyalty, and chain of command. Officers undergo
rigorous training and are expected to adhere to strict codes of conduct.
Secrecy and Discretion: Given the sensitive nature of their work, intelligence officers
are trained to maintain a high level of discretion and confidentiality. This secrecy is
necessary to protect sources, methods, and ongoing operations.
Public Perception: The public's view of the intelligence community is mixed. While
there is respect for their role in ensuring national security, there are also concerns about
transparency, accountability, and potential overreach. Instances of alleged human rights
abuses and political interference by intelligence agencies have contributed to these
concerns.
Resource Constraints: Limited financial and technological resources can hamper the
effectiveness of intelligence operations. Upgrading infrastructure and acquiring
advanced technology are ongoing needs.
Political Influence: Intelligence agencies sometimes face pressure to serve political
interests, which can undermine their objectivity and professionalism.
Terrorism and Extremism: The threat of terrorism and religious extremism remains
significant. Intelligence agencies must continuously adapt to evolving tactics and
networks of extremist groups.
Cross-Border Issues: Bangladesh's geographical location poses challenges related to
cross-border smuggling, human trafficking, and regional security dynamics. Effective
border management and regional cooperation are critical.
Conclusion
The intelligence community in Bangladesh is a vital component of the country's national
security apparatus. Despite facing various challenges, these agencies work diligently to
protect the nation from diverse threats. Understanding the cultural context in which
they operate helps to appreciate their roles and the complexities they navigate. Efforts to
enhance transparency, accountability, and cooperation with international partners are
essential for strengthening the overall effectiveness and public trust in the intelligence
community.
US Counterterrorism Strategy in South Asia by ASM
Ali Ashraf (Rafi)
1. Introduction:
The article titled "US Counterterrorism Strategy in South Asia" delves into the United
States' approach to combating terrorism in the region. It aims to analyze the changing
threat perception, the involvement of different terrorist organizations, and the strategies
employed by the US to address these challenges effectively.
2. Threat Perception:
Before the rise of ISIL, the primary threats to the US and its interests in South Asia were
al Qaeda's core and its affiliates. The core of al Qaeda was based in Pakistan, while the
affiliates comprised various groups, cells, and individuals connected to the core. It is
important to highlight the distinctions between the core and the affiliates and their
respective impacts on US security.
3. Al Qaeda's Transformation:
The article traces the evolution of al Qaeda from the period between 2001 and 2007.
Initially, al Qaeda was significantly weakened due to US military actions. However, it
later regrouped and reorganized, taking advantage of the distraction caused by the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Al Qaeda shifted its attack strategy from large-scale
expeditionary strikes, like the 1998 US embassy bombings and the 9/11 attacks, to
guerrilla-style strikes in Madrid and London. This shift involved radicalized immigrant
communities and local recruits instead of trained operatives.
5. Taliban Threats:
The article discusses two versions of the Taliban that continue to pose serious threats to
the US and its allies. The first version includes major Afghan Taliban groups, such as
Mollah Omar's Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Gulbuddin
Hekmatiyar's Hezbe Islami. These groups aim to expel US and NATO forces from
Afghanistan and seek power-sharing in Afghanistan's domestic politics. The second
version, known as the "Pakistani Taliban," consists of violent extremist groups opposing
Pakistan's support for the US-led war on terrorism and Islamabad's counterinsurgency
operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
US Counterterrorism Approach:
The article discusses the comprehensive counterterrorism approach adopted by the
United States, which includes various elements of national power. These elements
encompass diplomacy, law enforcement cooperation, intelligence sharing, financial
control, and military force. It highlights that the use of military force has received more
visibility and priority in the national security strategies of the Bush Jr. and Barack
Obama administrations.
10. Conclusion:
In conclusion, the article provides a comprehensive overview of the US counterterrorism
strategy in South Asia. It analyzes the evolving threat landscape, the role of different
terrorist organizations, and the strategies employed by the US to address these
challenges. The article underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach that
encompasses various elements of national power to effectively counter terrorism in the
region.
Introduction:
Counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia involves three distinct models: global,
bilateral, and regional. These models can be understood within the framework of
three levels of analysis: global, bilateral, and regional. The United States has adopted a
militaristic approach as part of the global model, primarily visible in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. On the other hand, India has pursued a hybrid approach focusing on bilateral
partnerships with neighboring countries. Additionally, there is a legal and normative
basis for regional counterterrorism cooperation among the SAARC nations, but
traditional power politics has limited SAARC's emergence as a regional
counterterrorism actor.
The expansion of the Afghanistan War into Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal
Area (FATA) was a consequence of al Qaeda operatives and Taliban militias finding safe
haven in the bordering regions of eastern Afghanistan. Due to the inaccessibility of these
tribal territories, the U.S. and NATO forces relied on drone strikes and cross-border
special operations as their preferred strategy. Pakistan supported the U.S.-led war effort
by providing a transit route for NATO's logistic supplies and deploying approximately
100,000 troops to suppress insurgency in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and the
rest of FATA. In return, Pakistan received substantial economic and military aid, as well
as the status of a non-NATO ally. However, Pakistan's alleged support for various
Afghan Taliban factions, including the Haqqani Network, Quetta Shura Taliban, and
Heze Islami group, has been a subject of criticism and labeled as a dangerous double
game.
India's security cooperation with Bangladesh has also witnessed notable progress in
recent years. Several agreements have been signed, addressing mutual legal assistance
on criminal matters, transfer of sentenced persons, and combating international
terrorism, organized crime, and illicit drug trafficking. High-profile cases of
India-Bangladesh cooperation include the extradition of top-level northeast
Indian insurgent leaders belonging to the United Liberation Front of Assam
(ULFA). Similarly, India worked closely with the Sri Lankan government between
2004 and 2009 to assist in its military campaign against the Tamil insurgency. The two
countries signed an anti-terrorism agreement in 2013. However, counterterrorism
cooperation between India and other SAARC nations, namely Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal,
and Pakistan, has been limited due to various factors, including the Kashmir dispute
and mutual mistrust.
The Regional Model:
At the regional level, counterterrorism cooperation among SAARC nations is based on a
legal and normative framework. SAARC has adopted an anti-terrorism convention and
additional protocols to address the issue comprehensively. SAARC desks have been
established to monitor drugs offenses, terrorism offenses, and cybercrime, while a
conference on cooperation in police matters aims to facilitate intelligence sharing.
However, the operationalization of SAARC-level counterterrorism cooperation has faced
challenges. The concept of SAARCPOL, a proposed regional information-sharing
mechanism, has encountered hurdles due to unclear roles and an institutional
moratorium on new SAARC-level agencies.
As a response to these challenges, India has shifted its focus towards alternative regional
cooperation platforms like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). BIMSTEC comprises seven countries in South Asia
and Southeast Asia and seeks to enhance cooperation in various areas, including
counterterrorism. This shift reflects India's pragmatic approach to regional cooperation
and its recognition of the limitations within the SAARC framework.
Conclusion:
Counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia is characterized by three distinct models:
global, bilateral, and regional. The U.S.-led military coalition in Afghanistan represents
the global model, with a focus on dismantling al Qaeda and combating the Taliban
insurgency. India has pursued a bilateral model, emphasizing partnerships with
neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. At the regional
level, SAARC has established a legal and normative framework for counterterrorism
cooperation, but challenges persist due to bilateral disputes and lack of trust among
member states.
The effectiveness of counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia is influenced by
political dynamics, regional tensions, and bilateral relationships. Traditional power
politics, unresolved conflicts, and mutual mistrust between India and Pakistan have
limited the operational spaces for SAARC to emerge as a regional counterterrorism
actor. In response, India has gravitated towards alternative regional platforms like
BIMSTEC to foster cooperation. Overall, achieving comprehensive and effective
counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia requires addressing these challenges and
promoting trust, dialogue, and collaboration among all stakeholders.
Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and
Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders
Introduction:
Prisons as a Focus:
Recognizing the dual nature of prisons as both potential incubators for violent extremist
ideology and institutions for reform, governments from various regions have established
prison-based rehabilitation programs. These programs aim to rehabilitate violent
extremists and reintegrate them into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. This
increase in the number of programs is a promising development in addressing the
global and increasingly diffuse nature of the threat of violent extremism. The
memorandum emphasizes the importance of knowledge sharing and encourages states
engaged in such efforts to share information about their programs with other interested
states. By learning from each other's experiences, governments can gain valuable
insights into what has succeeded and what has failed, facilitating the improvement and
effectiveness of their own rehabilitation programs.
A key aspect of the Rome Memorandum is the recognition of the importance of clearly
defining the goals and objectives of rehabilitation programs. It emphasizes the need for
governments to identify indicators of success and failure and formulate measurable
objectives. Comprehensive risk and threat assessments are crucial in informing these
goals and objectives. Additionally, the memorandum raises essential questions about
the aims of the programs, such as whether they focus on changing the views or
behaviors of inmates (deradicalization vs. disengagement) and whether they target
lower and mid-level extremists or those in leadership positions.
The Rome Memorandum highlights the need for establishing a broad set of metrics to
gauge the success of rehabilitation programs. While recidivism has traditionally been
used as a measure, the memorandum acknowledges its limitations. Not all re-offenders
will be caught and prosecuted, and there are other factors to consider in assessing the
long-term effectiveness of the program. Therefore, states are encouraged to develop
comprehensive metrics that encompass various aspects of success, including the
reduction of violent extremist ideologies, the potential for further violence and terrorism,
and the successful reintegration of individuals into society.
Considerations and Compliance:
The Rome Memorandum emphasizes the need for tailoring rehabilitation programs to
local conditions, cultures, and legal traditions. It underscores the importance of ensuring
that the implementation of these practices is consistent with applicable international and
national laws and regulations. Governments must strike a balance between countering
violent extremism and respecting fundamental rights, including freedom of thought,
conscience, religion, and fair treatment in accordance with the rule of law. The
memorandum recognizes that rehabilitation programs need to be carefully considered to
avoid infringing upon these rights.
Collaborative Approach:
Given the global and diffuse nature of the threat of violent extremism, the Rome
Memorandum highlights the importance of collaboration among states. It encourages
governments to share their experiences, successes, and failures in implementing
rehabilitation programs. By promoting a collective learning process, states can benefit
from the knowledge and expertise of others, thereby improving their own policies and
programs. The memorandum is part of the broader international initiative led by
organizations such as the United Nations' Interregional Crime and Justice Research
Institute (UNICRI) and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague
(ICCT) to address the issue of violent extremist rehabilitation and reintegration.
Conclusion:
National security is a paramount objective for all states in contemporary world affairs. In
order to effectively pursue and maintain security, nations rely on the collection, analysis,
and utilization of intelligence. Intelligence, in this context, refers to the gathering of
information about potentially hostile states, groups, individuals, or activities, with the aim
of supporting national security efforts. Throughout history, intelligence has played a
crucial role in military campaigns, political decision-making, and strategic planning. Over
time, the development of technology and the emergence of the Information Age have
significantly influenced the field of intelligence, shaping the way information is collected,
analyzed, and used in decision-making processes.
Intelligence services exist in every nation, although their size, scope, and nature can
vary significantly based on a country's systems and bureaucratic styles. Major nations
have established intelligence agencies responsible for domestic and foreign
intelligence, signals intelligence, military intelligence, and specialized functions. These
agencies form a crucial part of a nation's security apparatus, providing critical
information to decision-makers at various levels of government. The organizational
structure, capabilities, and methods employed by intelligence agencies differ from
country to country, reflecting the unique historical, political, and cultural contexts within
which they operate.
For example, the United States has multiple intelligence agencies, such as the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), each with its specific focus and responsibilities. The CIA
primarily focuses on gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence, conducting covert
operations, and providing assessments to policymakers. The NSA specializes in signals
intelligence, intercepting and analyzing electronic communications, while the DIA
focuses on military intelligence to support the Department of Defense.
Intelligence collection involves various disciplines that serve as the foundation for
gathering information. These disciplines include human intelligence (HUMINT), signals
intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and open-source intelligence
(OSINT). intelligence (HUMINT) involves the use of human sources, such as agents
and informants, to obtain valuable insights and firsthand knowledge. HUMINT
operations can range from gathering information through diplomatic channels to running
covert operations with human assets on the ground. The collection of HUMINT requires
skilled operatives who can establish and maintain relationships, elicit information, and
assess source credibility.
Imagery intelligence (IMINT) utilizes satellite imagery, aerial photography, and other
visual data to gather information. IMINT provides valuable insights into the geography,
infrastructure, military installations, and activities of potential adversaries. Advanced
imaging technologies allow analysts to identify and analyze objects of interest, track
movements, and detect potential threats.
The intelligence process integrates these various collection disciplines. It begins with
defining intelligence needs, identifying the specific information required to support
decision-making and address national security concerns. Once needs are defined,
collection activities are initiated to gather relevant data from various sources. The
collected information then undergoes analysis to extract meaningful insights, identify
patterns, and assess potential risks and opportunities. The final stage of the intelligence
process involves disseminating the analyzed information to decision-makers who utilize
it to make informed choices and formulate policies to safeguard national security. The
intelligence process is iterative and dynamic, requiring continuous evaluation and
adaptation in response to evolving threats and changing circumstances.
The period following the Second World War witnessed a significant evolution in the role
of intelligence in national security. The Cold War rivalry between superpowers, the
United States and the Soviet Union, necessitated the expansion and refinement of
intelligence capabilities. Intelligence agencies focused on monitoring and countering
threats from rival states, as well as non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. The
technological advancements during this era, particularly in communications and
surveillance technologies, revolutionized intelligence collection and analysis methods.
The Cold War era saw the development of sophisticated spying techniques, including
espionage operations, covert activities, and the use of cutting-edge technologies for
intelligence gathering. The race for nuclear superiority and the potential for global
conflict heightened the importance of accurate intelligence to inform strategic decisions
and prevent catastrophic miscalculations. Intelligence agencies played a crucial role in
gathering information on the military capabilities, intentions, and activities of rival
nations, providing policymakers with insights into potential threats and opportunities.
With the end of the Cold War, intelligence priorities shifted to address emerging security
challenges, such as transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and regional conflicts. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States
marked a turning point in intelligence efforts, prompting a significant reevaluation of
intelligence practices, information sharing protocols, and coordination among agencies.
The need to prevent acts of terrorism and protect national security interests became the
primary focus of intelligence agencies worldwide.
The use of intelligence raises complex legal and ethical considerations. Balancing the
imperative of gathering intelligence to safeguard national security with individual privacy
rights is a delicate task. Covert activities, surveillance programs, and information
sharing among intelligence agencies often raise questions about accountability,
transparency, and civil liberties. Striking the right balance between intelligence
operations and protecting fundamental rights is a continuous challenge for governments
and intelligence communities worldwide.
The rise of terrorism as a global security threat has necessitated intensified intelligence
efforts to identify, track, and disrupt extremist organizations. Intelligence agencies work
closely with law enforcement agencies, sharing information and conducting joint
operations to prevent terrorist acts and apprehend individuals involved in terrorist
activities. The ability to infiltrate terrorist networks, gather actionable intelligence, and
conduct preemptive operations is crucial in preventing attacks and preserving national
security.
The Iraq war, initiated in 2003, brought intelligence failures to the forefront. The
erroneous assessments regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities and the alleged links between Iraq and terrorist organizations underscored
the challenges and risks associated with intelligence analysis and the consequences of
flawed information. The Iraq war experience led to critical reassessments of intelligence
practices, information sharing protocols, and the need for accurate and reliable sources
of intelligence.
Conclusion:
As nations continue to face complex security challenges in the 21st century, intelligence
remains indispensable in countering threats, informing policy decisions, and ensuring
the safety and well-being of societies. The ongoing development and refinement of
intelligence practices, guided by ethical principles and robust oversight mechanisms,
are essential for maintaining a delicate equilibrium between security imperatives and
individual rights. By continuously adapting to emerging threats and technological
advancements, intelligence agencies contribute to the overall effectiveness of national
security efforts in an ever-changing global landscape.
Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the
War on Terror (Rafi)
Introduction:
The article titled "Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror" by
Derek S. Reveron delves into the critical role of intelligence-sharing among allies in the
context of combating terrorism. In today's interconnected world, where terrorist networks
operate transnationally, the author emphasizes the significance of pooling resources,
expertise, and information through intelligence-sharing to enhance counterterrorism
efforts. By fostering a coordinated and comprehensive approach, intelligence-sharing
plays a vital role in identifying, tracking, and disrupting terrorist activities effectively.
1. Importance of Intelligence-Sharing:
The article highlights the fundamental importance of intelligence-sharing in the fight
against terrorism. In this global battle, no single nation can rely solely on its own
intelligence capabilities. Intelligence-sharing enables countries to leverage collective
knowledge, skills, and capabilities to identify and understand terrorist threats more
comprehensively. By sharing intelligence, allies can gain valuable insights into terrorist
activities, strategies, and networks. This collaborative approach leads to improved
preparedness, prevention, and response measures, thereby enhancing the overall
effectiveness of counterterrorism operations.
2. Evolution of Intelligence-Sharing:
The article explores the evolution of intelligence-sharing in the context of the war on
terror. Traditional alliances and partnerships that were primarily based on geopolitical
factors have been reevaluated and reshaped to adapt to the changing dynamics of
terrorism. In this new landscape, nations have recognized the need to forge new
relationships and partnerships, transcending traditional boundaries, to effectively
address contemporary security challenges. The author highlights the emergence of
diverse coalitions and intelligence-sharing networks, reflecting the need for flexibility
and adaptability in intelligence-sharing practices.
3. Challenges in Intelligence-Sharing:
The author identifies and examines several challenges that impede effective
intelligence-sharing among allies. One significant challenge is the presence of mistrust
among nations, which may stem from historical or geopolitical factors. This mistrust can
hinder the willingness to share sensitive information, particularly when national security
interests are at stake. Additionally, the classification and compartmentalization of
intelligence pose barriers to sharing critical data. Different nations may have varying
classification systems and levels of sensitivity, making it challenging to align and
exchange information seamlessly.
4. Enhancing Intelligence-Sharing:
The article puts forth strategies and measures to overcome challenges and enhance
intelligence-sharing among allies. Building trust and cooperation through diplomatic
channels and fostering personal relationships between intelligence agencies are crucial
elements. Regular dialogue, joint training programs, and information-sharing workshops
can contribute to the development of trust and strengthen relationships among allies.
5. Case Studies:
The article provides case studies that exemplify successful intelligence-sharing
initiatives in the war on terror. These case studies highlight instances where countries
have effectively collaborated and shared intelligence to disrupt terrorist networks and
prevent attacks. For example, the intelligence-sharing between the United States and its
allies in the "Five Eyes" alliance (comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand) has been instrumental in countering global terrorist threats. The author
analyzes the factors that contributed to the success of these initiatives, including strong
leadership, well-established information sharing agreements, and close cooperation
among intelligence communities.
These case studies demonstrate the tangible benefits and positive outcomes that can
be achieved through effective intelligence-sharing. They underline the importance of
trust, collaboration, and a shared commitment to combating terrorism. By learning from
these successful experiences, nations can replicate and adapt best practices to
enhance their intelligence-sharing capabilities.
The future outlook for intelligence-sharing is both promising and challenging. On one
hand, advancements in technology offer new opportunities for seamless and timely
information exchange. However, terrorists are quick to adapt, utilizing sophisticated
communication methods and encryption techniques to evade detection.
Intelligence-sharing must adapt and evolve to keep pace with these evolving tactics.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, Derek S. Reveron's article "Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing
in the War on Terror" provides a comprehensive analysis of the significance of
intelligence-sharing among allies in combating terrorism. The article explores the
challenges, opportunities, and strategies associated with intelligence-sharing, supported
by insightful case studies. It underscores the importance of trust, cooperation, and the
development of common frameworks to facilitate timely and accurate information
exchange. By continuously adapting and innovating intelligence-sharing practices,
countries can effectively address the evolving nature of terrorist threats and enhance
global security. Intelligence-sharing is an essential pillar in the fight against terrorism,
enabling nations to leverage collective knowledge, skills, and resources to safeguard
societies from the scourge of terrorism.
Rehab
Here are a few study questions:
1) Do terrorists deserve a second chance?
2) Can they be rehabilitated in the society?
3) What programs can be taken at the community-level and prison-level for the deradicalization,
rehabilitation, and reintegration of violent extremist offenders?